Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 47392

 1                           Monday, 30 November 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.21 p.m.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, kindly call the

 6     case.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Good afternoon,

 8     everyone in and around the courtroom.

 9             This is case number IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus Prlic et

10     al.  Thank you, Your Honours.

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Registrar.

12             Today is Monday, 30th of November, 2009.  First of all, my

13     apologies for this delay, which is not to blame on us, but it is once

14     again due to the Gotovina Chamber.

15             And good afternoon to the accused, to the Defence counsel, to

16     Mr. Scott and his case manager, and good afternoon to all the people

17     assisting us.

18             Mr. Registrar, you have four IC numbers for us.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour.  Thank you.

20             Some parties have submitted lists of documents to be tendered

21     through Witness 4D-AB.  The list submitted by 4D shall be given

22     Exhibit IC01130.  The list submitted by 2D shall be given

23     Exhibit IC01131.  The list submitted by 3D shall be given

24     Exhibit IC01132.  And, finally, the list submitted by the Prosecution

25     shall be given Exhibit IC01133.  Thank you, Your Honours.

Page 47393

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Registrar.

 2             I am going to read out a short oral ruling on a motion for leave

 3     to file a reply.

 4             On the 23rd of November, 2009, the Praljak Defence filed a motion

 5     to seek for leave to reply to the Stojic Defence's and the Prosecution's

 6     responses to its motion to admit documentary evidence of the 26th of

 7     October, 2009.  The Praljak Defence also sought to have an extension of

 8     time to file its reply until the 18th of December, 2009.

 9             The Praljak Defence wishes to respond to specific arguments which

10     it deems erroneously raised by the Prosecution in its response.  The

11     Praljak Defence argues also that filing a reply will make it possible to

12     correct errors that are found in its motion of the 26th of October, 2009.

13             In light of the submissions by the Praljak Defence, the Trial

14     Chamber decides to grant leave to file a reply.  However, the Trial

15     Chamber is of the view that extension until the 14th of December, 2009,

16     is sufficient for the Praljak Defence to prepare and file the reply.

17             So you have until the 14th of December, Mr. Kovacic.

18             MR. KOVACIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

19             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let us have the witness brought

20     in, Mr. Usher.

21                           [The witness entered court]

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, sir.

23             Witness, please state your surname and first name.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Filip Filipovic.

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What is your date of birth?

Page 47394

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The 1st of March, 1946.

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And what is your current

 3     occupation?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm retired at the moment.  I work

 5     in de-mining.

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you are retired from the

 7     army, I suppose.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  I was a professional officer,

 9     and I'm now retired from the military.

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What was your last rank?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Major general.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, have you had an

13     opportunity to testify in a court of justice as to the events that took

14     place in the former Yugoslavia?  And if so, where?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I testified in the Kordic trial and

16     the Cerkez trial before this Tribunal in The Hague.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And you testified for whom?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Kordic's.

19             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please read out the solemn

20     declaration.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

22     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

23                           WITNESS:  FILIP FILIPOVIC

24                           [The witness answered through interpreter]

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, General.  Please be

Page 47395

 1     seated.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, some information.

 4             You have already testified in the Kordic case, and I know you

 5     have because I have the entire transcript of your testimony in that case.

 6     It was public testimony.  So you know how things are going to take place.

 7             First, you will answer questions by Ms. Alaburic.  You must have

 8     met with her.  She's going to put questions to you, and she will also

 9     submit documents that you can find in two binders.  There's binder

10     number 1 and binder number 2 that you have in front of you.  When she

11     wants to call a document, she'll give you the number, and you can find

12     the document in question.  When she's done with her questions - she is

13     going to take four hours to do so, to ask the questions of you - then the

14     other accused's counsel are going to ask questions as part of their

15     cross-examination, following which the Prosecutor, who's on your right,

16     Mr. Scott, will cross-examine you.  I believe you have had an opportunity

17     to be cross-examined in the Kordic case, where Mr. Nice, the famous

18     Mr. Nice, was the Prosecutor in chief.

19             You have four Judges in front of you.  They can ask questions of

20     you at any time to go into a document with further detail or because an

21     answer you may give calls for some follow-up questions.  They may also

22     have questions that would be necessary for truth to come to light.

23             You were a general, so normally you should be very rational and

24     speak to the point, so do try to answer accurately any questions put to

25     you.

Page 47396

 1             If you don't understand a question, do not hesitate for the

 2     question to be rephrased, even if it is a Judge asking you the question.

 3     And even if you notice that there is a mistake in the question put to

 4     you, do say so to the person asking it.

 5             Furthermore, we have breaks every hour and a half for 20 minutes.

 6             You are under oath.  Therefore, you are now a witness of the

 7     Court.  You're not supposed to have any contact whatsoever with anybody

 8     during the days of your testimony.  Needless to say, you may contact your

 9     family, but you're not allowed to contact the press, the media, or

10     lawyers.

11             You are to testify on Monday and Tuesday of next week, according

12     to the schedule, so I suppose you made all the necessary arrangements to

13     stay here until the beginning of next week.

14             Also, if at any time you're not feeling well - it can happen, it

15     even happens to Judges - so do say so, raise your hand and ask for a

16     break for you to have a rest.  You never know, especially with the stress

17     caused by the fact of testifying, you may feel unwell.  It's never

18     happened so far.

19             So this is what I wanted to convey to you.  Of course, we are

20     available to you if you have any questions related to your testimony.

21             This being said, you may proceed, Ms. Alaburic.  I can see that

22     you have the lectern, so you're ready to go, you may proceed.

23             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

24             I'd like to say good afternoon to you and everybody from the

25     Prosecution, especially Mr. Scott.  Good afternoon to the rest of the

Page 47397

 1     Defence counsel, to you, Witness, and to everybody else in and around the

 2     courtroom.

 3                           Examination by Ms. Alaburic:

 4        Q.   [Interpretation] Now, Witness, we're going to start off with a

 5     short CV, but before I do that, let me ask you whether, about a year ago,

 6     a request came in from the Prosecution to conduct an interview with you

 7     before your arrival in The Hague.

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Tell us, please, what was your answer to their request?

10        A.   My answer was, yes, with the proviso that I did not wish to talk

11     to -- well, if I can say some clerks, but to the Prosecutor, personally,

12     if they wanted to contact me in that way.

13        Q.   Do you remember which name you mentioned from the Prosecution,

14     which person you said you would accept talking to?

15        A.   Well, I might have known a name from the media, but I can't give

16     you a name now.  Ramak [phoen] or something similar.

17        Q.   No, it was Mr. Scott, my colleague Mr. Scott.  And since

18     Mr. Scott is in the courtroom here today, I believe that he remembers

19     that request of yours and that that is why he has decided to be in this

20     courtroom here this afternoon.

21             Now, General, let's describe your CV to the Trial Chamber and

22     everybody else, your education, training, career, and so on.  You told us

23     that you were born in 1946?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Where were you born?  In Travnik, Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that

Page 47398

 1     right?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   It was Yugoslavia at the time; is that right?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   I'm now going to set out your CV, your education and career, so

 6     please listen to me and correct me if I'm wrong at any point.  And if the

 7     information is correct, then confirm it, please.

 8             Now, as far as your education goes, this is what you have had:

 9     You graduated from the Military Academy in Belgrade, and you studied from

10     1966 to 1970.  After that, you completed the Command Staff Academy in

11     1979 in Belgrade.  Tell us, General, is that correct so far?

12        A.   Yes, it is.

13        Q.   Thank you.  You started serving in the Yugoslav People's Army in

14     Slovenia, and you spent four years there as a commander of a battery.

15     Then you went to Doboj, which is a town in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and you

16     spent six years there as battery commander again.  And then four years

17     after that, you were the Chief of Staff of a regiment.  Then you went to

18     Derventa, another town in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and you spent four years

19     there as the Chief of Staff of the regiment there.  So you held the same

20     post there, too.  And then you went back to Doboj and spent two years

21     there as the regiment commander.  And from 1990 until April 1992, you

22     were in Sarajevo, the Chief of Staff of the artillery of the 4th Corps of

23     the Yugoslav People's Army.

24             Tell us, please, General, is that information correct?

25        A.   Yes, the chief of artillery of the 4th Corps, that's right.

Page 47399

 1        Q.   Thank you.  And now your life's road was as follows:  On the 8th

 2     of April, 1992, you left the Yugoslav People's Army.  On the 10th of

 3     April, you arrived in the area of Travnik and Vitez.  You spent a

 4     relatively short time there, performing the duties of commander of the

 5     Regional Staff of Bosnia.  And after that you became the deputy commander

 6     of the HVO for the Central Bosnia Operations Zone.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, I thought Ms. Alaburic

 8     was going to ask that question, but she didn't, so I'll ask it.  What was

 9     your rank in the JNA when you left it?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was lieutenant-colonel.  And that

11     year, I was supposed to be promoted to colonel because I had all the

12     necessary requirements, but I left as a lieutenant-colonel.

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   General, anyway, in June 1992, you became commander of the

16     tactical group or operative group for the Travnik-Novi Travnik-Vitez area

17     in the Central Bosnia Operations Zone.  In October 1992, you were

18     appointed commander of the HVO Brigade in Travnik.  And roughly until

19     April 1993, you performed these three duties: Deputy commander of the

20     operative zone, commander of the Tactical and Operations Group, and

21     commander of the brigade.  In April 1993, you were appointed to the joint

22     command [realtime transcript read in error "commander"] of the BH Army

23     and HVO, and you participated in the various commissions charged with

24     looking into possibilities for quelling the conflict.  In June 1993, you

25     returned to the Vitez area and remained there, remained in that enclave,

Page 47400

 1     and fought there until roughly April 1994.  In April 1994, you became

 2     commander of the Military District --

 3             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Scott.

 4             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me, Your Honour.  I was not going to interrupt

 5     counsel until she finished her question, but in the event that it might

 6     have been a transcription error or translation error, I just wanted to --

 7     what we got on the transcript a few moments ago, it says:

 8             "In 1993, you were appointed to the joint commander of the

 9     BH Army and HVO and you participated in the various commissions ..."

10             I believe perhaps what was intended was that he became -- he was

11     appointed to a joint commission in Central Bosnia around that time.  I'm

12     not aware of -- unless counsel can provide us some additional

13     information, I'm not aware of any joint command during that time-period.

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Scott is absolutely

15     right, because in the Kordic case it was a question put to this witness.

16     He was a member of a joint commission.  But please ask your question

17     again for this to be in the transcript.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I be allowed to answer ?

19             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honour will be able to

20     tell you, but we prepared one of the documents in the set on joint

21     command, and it is document 4D455, in which, to the joint command of the

22     BH and the HVO, the following were appointed:  Mario Andric,

23     Filip Filipovic, and Zivko Totic.  And so in this portion related to the

24     joint command, our case will be that, yes, a joint command was

25     established, in the sense that persons were appointed at the level of

Page 47401

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina and then at the levels of the corps or military

 2     districts, so that I was not wrong.  I very consciously and intentionally

 3     said "joint command," but we can ask the witness to explain.

 4        Q.   So tell us, please, General, what were you in the spring of 1993?

 5     What posts did you hold?

 6             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me, Your Honour.  Before the witness gives the

 7     answer, I do want the record to be clear, then.  And I do appreciate

 8     counsel's candour.  What counsel has just indicated was this is

 9     essentially an argumentative point.  This is her interpretation, this is

10     her characterisation of the relationship.  Having worked in the Kordic

11     case and having seen this testimony before, what was clearly described at

12     the time was this was a joint commission which existed for a few weeks,

13     met a few times.  It had nothing to do with anything being like a joint

14     command function.

15             Now, I understand that counsel wants to argue her case, but this

16     is an argumentative point that's being made now, and I believe all the

17     prior testimony and evidence will indicate that what we're talking about

18     here was a joint commission that existed for a very short time.  Thank

19     you.

20             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I suppose that counsel is now going to ask an

21     open question so that she will take account of your objection.

22             I would, however, point out, too, a small but not insignificant

23     difference.  I think that counsel -- that in the record we read that he

24     was appointed to the joint commander of the BH Army and HVO.

25             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter said "joint command."

Page 47402

 1             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Yes.  I'm reading what I have in front of my

 2     eyes.  Please, interpreters, do not take this as criticism, and I

 3     absolutely take your point.  It's just that the record should be

 4     "command" on line 22 of page 8.  Thank you.

 5             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Yes.  Thank you, Your Honour, for

 6     that correction.  I took on board Mr. Scott's objection, so where it read

 7     "joint commander," so it is "joint command."  There were endeavours to

 8     set up a joint command, but there was a joint commission as well which

 9     toured the area of Jablanica and Konjic, and undertook a series of

10     measures to bring the situation back to normal, which was very tense at

11     the time.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, let the witness

13     answer, because you are now intervening as if it was him who was talking.

14     Mr. Scott raised an objection, and he knows the Kordic case very well.

15     You know that too.  So please ask the witness whether he was part of a

16     commission or whether he was a member of a joint command, or both at the

17     same time.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First, I was in the commission.  We

19     toured positions, resolved problems.  And then I was appointed to the

20     joint command and personally went to Zenica to see the headquarters of

21     the joint command.  I met with Siber, Hadzihasanovic, Sefer, at Zenica,

22     where it was support to be sited, and with them I went to Konjic.  So the

23     joint command was appointed.  There was work done to set it up.  To what

24     extent it functioned, well, that's for us to elaborate upon later.

25             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I assure you, Your Honours, that

Page 47403

 1     the general is following very closely what I'm explaining about his

 2     career, and he will correct me if I'm wrong.  And my learned friend

 3     Scott, if they think that something is wrong, they can deal with that in

 4     their cross-examination.

 5        Q.   So, General, we stopped when you were appointed in April 1994 as

 6     commander of the Military District of Vitez and Mr. Kordic went to the

 7     Main Staff of the HVO.  You stayed at that post for a year, and in

 8     April 1995 you are at the Military District of Tomislavgrad.  But as soon

 9     as in May 1995, you go to the Joint Staff of the Army of the Federation

10     of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  On the 31st of January, 2007, you retire from

11     active military service, holding the rank of major general of the Army of

12     the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

13             In 1998, you were the director of the De-mining Centre for

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And from 2002 onwards, you volunteer in a

15     humanitarian NGO which focuses on de-mining, and the name is Provita.

16             General, please tell us whether the information is correct.

17        A.   It's correct, thank you.

18        Q.   For starters, while you were deputy commander of the Operations

19     Zone of Central Bosnia, who was the first commander that you deputised at

20     the time?

21        A.   My first commander was Zarko Tole.

22        Q.   How long did he occupy that post?

23        A.   For some 10 days before he was captured by the Army of Republika

24     Srpska.  I was deputy to Tole, then Mr. Zulu, for a very brief time, and

25     then Blaskic became commander.  He was number 1 and I was number 2.

Page 47404

 1        Q.   Could you please tell us a couple of words about the activities

 2     of Zarko Tole as commander of the Central Bosnia Operations Zone.  What

 3     were his first moves when he took over that position?

 4        A.   Zarko Tole arrived around mid-May, and before he met me he held a

 5     number of meetings at municipalities, and at such meetings he advocated

 6     the idea of joint struggle of Croats and Muslims.  I encountered him in

 7     the municipality of Travnik, and since we knew each other from Derventa,

 8     it didn't take us long to agree.  He said, You are going to be my deputy.

 9     We have meetings tomorrow at Gornji Vakuf and Bugojno.  We will continue

10     with our activities.  And we went together to Bugojno, spent a couple of

11     days there, and then he was captured by the Army of Republika Srpska.

12        Q.   General, please tell us, when, as a JNA officer, you came to the

13     area of Central Bosnia, what was the reception that you encountered there

14     by the local population?

15        A.   In the area of Central Bosnia, the Lasva Valley - this is where I

16     hail from - I encountered armed individuals.  They were gladdened by my

17     arrival because they thought that some professionalism will be injected

18     into defence efforts, it will be improved.  I knew some people in Vitez.

19     I knew nobody at Busovaca.  But I attended a meeting of the then crisis

20     headquarters that I was supposed to command, the area of Bosnia minus

21     Posavina, which is a huge area.  And the circumstances were that I did

22     not know many people in my home area, but I managed.  Somehow I started

23     creating the preconditions to set up an army because I was aware of the

24     dangers that were lurking behind the horizon.

25        Q.   Were there any cases of lack of trust because of your JNA

Page 47405

 1     background?

 2        A.   Yes, many occasions I encountered that.  I came to that area as a

 3     traitor and a Communist, and I left the JNA rather late, after it had

 4     performed many negative deeds, but after a month I started being accepted

 5     as a commander, due to my efforts that I invested in that time.

 6        Q.   General, you retired as a Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina Army

 7     [as interpreted]; is that correct?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Did you enter the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina Army as an HVO

10     officer or taking another route?

11        A.   As an HVO officer.

12        Q.   Could you please tell us whether the time you spent in the HVO

13     was calculated towards your years of service and retirement entitlement

14     as an FBiH Army officer?

15        A.   Yes, like in everybody else's case, and the time I spent in

16     combat was counted as twice as long.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, I'm going to put a

18     question to you which I've never put before.  I could have done it

19     before, but I didn't really have the opportunity.

20             You were in the HVO, and then you joined the Federation of

21     Bosnia-Herzegovina, where you had an official role.  We have seen a

22     number of HVO personalities who became representatives of the Federation

23     of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Mr. Prlic, for example, who was minister of

24     foreign affairs.  When you joined the Federation, how was the climate,

25     the environment?  Did they welcome you or was it difficult?  Could you

Page 47406

 1     tell us how you became integrated within the Federation?  Was it done

 2     naturally or were there a lot of reluctant people?  Could you tell us

 3     exactly what you felt at the time?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The question is a bit vague, but

 5     I'll try to explain.

 6             When I came to the Travnik and Vitez area, I was accepted by

 7     everybody, both the Muslims and the Croats, and later on both the

 8     Territorial Defence and the HVO as commander, when it comes to combat

 9     operations and professional aspects of combat, meaning de-mining of the

10     line of defence, deployment and disposition of forces, et cetera.  And

11     even the Mujahedin, in May 1992, accepted me as commander, in terms as I

12     encountered them on the defence positions.

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] My question wasn't clear,

14     obviously you're not answering my question, because this is not what I

15     asked.  I am asking what happened when you arrived in your position

16     within the Federation, but after the conflict.  This is what I want to

17     know.  How were you welcomed after the conflict, after the Dayton

18     Agreement, the Washington Agreement, and so on, when the Army of the

19     Federation was set up?  Within this army, there were former members of

20     the BH Army and former members of the HVO, and I would like to know what

21     the feeling was.  Was it like other brothers-in-arms who found each other

22     when at one point in time they had been enemies or not?  What happened in

23     Travnik?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, you specified 1994, after the

25     Washington Accords.  I was at that time deputy commander of the military

Page 47407

 1     district, and after a while commander of the military district or the

 2     corps.  From 1992 and 1994, I both co-operate and combat -- fight

 3     those [as interpreted].  You will have to specify your question in terms

 4     of time.  With General Alagic, in the first year of the war, I worked

 5     perfectly well and co-operated.  Then the next year, we fought.  And

 6     after the Washington Agreement, we then co-operated again.  You will have

 7     to specify the time-period.

 8             When I came to the Joint Command of the Federation of

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, that was in 1995.  Since I was the commander and

10     my opposite number from the Muslim side, we worked perfectly, and 1995

11     was very successful in terms of liberating territory and bringing the war

12     to an end.

13             So your question should be more specific.  How did I feel?  Well,

14     as well as I could in the circumstances, given the relations obtaining

15     [as interpreted].

16             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Prlic.

17             THE ACCUSED PRLIC: [Interpretation] Correction.  In the

18     transcript, you said that I was minister of foreign affairs of the

19     Federation.  I just want to say that I was not Federation of

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina minister of foreign affairs, but Bosnia-Herzegovina,

21     and I was minister from 1994 to 1996.  So this may have been a

22     mistranslation.  I'd like to rectify that.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well, thank you.

24             Ms. Alaburic, you may pursue.

25             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

Page 47408

 1        Q.   General, I'm going to show you several documents.  Let us go

 2     through them briefly to see how, from mid-1992, the HVO was deemed as an

 3     integral part of the defence forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then we

 4     will see how it was legislated upon by the Washington Agreement and the

 5     Dayton Accords.  You may listen to me, and I'm going to refer to those

 6     documents briefly.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

 8             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me, Your Honour.  I apologies to Ms. Alaburic

 9     and the witness but I do want to make a record early on, and I will

10     continue to object in the course of the direct examination, to any

11     characterisations, introductions, of the nature of the witness's

12     testimony and what the testimony -- what the witness is going to say

13     next.

14             Just now, Ms. Alaburic said:

15             "I'm going to show you several documents," this all in front of

16     the witness, of course.  "Let us go through them briefly to see how, from

17     mid-1992, the HVO was deemed as an integral part of the defence forces of

18     Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then we will show how it was legislated upon by

19     the Washington Agreement and the Dayton Accords."

20             I don't think we need prefaces and introductions as to the points

21     counsel wishes to make.  Normal practice in the courtroom is that

22     questions are asked and answers are given.

23             Thank you.

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, yes, you should

25     have said, I will show you a number of documents, show the documents, and

Page 47409

 1     then you can conclude by saying, Well, according to the comments made

 2     from these documents, do you really mean that the HVO was a part of the

 3     armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina?  But you're putting the horse before

 4     the cart, and Mr. Scott is absolutely right when it comes to procedure.

 5             But continue.

 6             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I thought I would

 7     facilitate to everybody in the courtroom to make a preface to the topic,

 8     but I'm going to skip from theme to theme and leave it for people to find

 9     their bearings.

10        Q.   General, the first document I'd like to ask you about is document

11     P339.  This is the Friendship and Co-operation Agreement between

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia.  General, listen to me --

13     please listen to me.  When I want you to take a look at a document, I'm

14     going to indicate that.

15             This agreement was signed on the 21st of July, 1992, by

16     President Franjo Tudjman and President Alija Izetbegovic, and in the

17     sixth paragraph it says:

18             "The armed component of the Croatian Defence Council is an

19     integral part of the United Armed Forces of the Republic of

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The Croatian Defence Council will have its

21     representatives in the joint command of the Armed Forces of

22     Bosnia-Herzegovina."

23             My question, General:  Did you see yourself as a member of the

24     Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and what did you

25     think -- what was the country that you were defending at the time?

Page 47410

 1        A.   First of all, I took part in the defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 2     I was defending myself, my family, the local community, and the wider

 3     community in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I don't know why you're asking me this.

 4        Q.   I would like to explain, but I'm afraid that Mr. Scott would

 5     object to that.

 6             Let me go to the next document, 4D410, 4D410.  That's --

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, we just looked at a

 8     document that we have seen on numerous occasions, and the Judges know

 9     this document inside-out.  As Ms. Alaburic just asked you, on item 6 in

10     this document it says that the armed component -- that the HVO is an

11     integral part of the united Armed Forces of the Republic of

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  This is what's written on paragraph 6.  This was

13     signed by the president of the Presidency on July 21st, 1992.

14             Now, I have a question which is of a legal nature and might be

15     outside your scope of competence, but we know that the

16     Constitutional Court of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina made a

17     decision declaring the HVO armed forces illegal.  Now, there's one thing

18     I don't understand.  On this we have, on the one hand, a document which

19     is an international agreement, which could be ratified by the Parliament

20     of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but if this text goes against the

21     Constitution, the Constitution needed to be changed because there's a

22     hierarchy in legal standards.  But the Constitutional Court still decided

23     that the HVO and its armed component was illegal.

24             Now, you were on the field at the time.  Were you aware of the

25     decision made by the Constitutional Court, and were you aware of this

Page 47411

 1     agreement signed between Tudjman and Izetbegovic?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In terms of agreements and high

 3     politics, this is something I learned about later.  But all those

 4     documents, agreements, did not mean a thing for me when I spent hours

 5     every day being fired at.  You have to understand this.  I do not know

 6     how to formulate this in legal terms.  As I said, I defended

 7     Bosnia-Herzegovina because it was internationally recognised as a state

 8     at the time.  See, the Territorial Defence and later on the armija of

 9     BiH, HVO, or the Army of Republika Srpska, were either legitimate or

10     illegitimate because they were working to defend their own people.  I do

11     not get the gist of your question.  Three sides are in conflict with each

12     other.  The Territorial Defence and the HVO fought together, hand in

13     hand, and the decisions of the Presidency, agreements, et cetera, they

14     may be relevant today, but they were not at the time.  I never considered

15     myself as a paramilitary, as an illegitimate -- member of an illegitimate

16     operation.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Continue.

18             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Witness, the next document is 4D410.  That is the Decree with the

20     Force of Law on Changes and Amendments of the Decree with the Force of

21     Law on Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  It was

22     adopted by the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  It was

23     signed by Alija Izetbegovic.  And in Article 1 of that decree, it reads:

24             "The Republic's armed forces shall comprise the Army of the

25     Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and all the other units that are

Page 47412

 1     subsumed under the Supreme Command."

 2             General, did anyone take the floor away from you or bar you from

 3     working at any meeting because you were a member of the Croatian Defence

 4     Council?

 5        A.   No, nobody ever even thought that because I was a commander in

 6     the Croatian Defence Council, that they would challenge the function that

 7     I occupied until then.  There was talk.  They would say, You were a

 8     paramilitary to the others.  Now, if I'm a paramilitary -- well, when you

 9     came across members of the Territorial Defence, but it had nothing to do

10     with meetings or any relevant facts related to that period of time.

11        Q.   The next document is P1329, and it's a joint statement dated the

12     27th of January, 1993, which was signed in Geneva by Alija Izetbegovic

13     and Mate Boban.  In point 1, it says that all conflicts between the

14     BH Army and the HVO should stop.  And in point 2, it says that without

15     delay, a joint command should be established.

16             Now, tell us, General, at that time or perhaps later on, did you

17     ever come across any statements made by Alija Izetbegovic to the effect

18     that the HVO was not a legitimate army of the Croatian people in

19     Bosnia-Herzegovina and to everybody else who joined up with that army?

20        A.   I never heard any statements of that kind.

21        Q.   The next document is P1988.  This is an agreement which, on the

22     20th of April, 1993, in Zenica, was signed by Sefer Halilovic and

23     Milivoj Petkovic.  In point 1 of this agreement, it says that:

24             "The BH Army and the HVO are both legal military forces of the

25     Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and are treated equally."

Page 47413

 1             This agreement was signed in the presence of General Morillon and

 2     Mr. Thebault.  Tell us, please, General, at that time did you have a

 3     meeting with Sefer Halilovic and Milivoj Petkovic?

 4        A.   I think that already on the 20th, and certainly on the 21st and

 5     22nd, there was a meeting in UNPROFOR, the UNPROFOR base in Vitez, but

 6     Morillon wasn't there.

 7        Q.   Tell us, please, at that meeting in Vitez was Sefer Halilovic

 8     there?

 9        A.   Sefer Halilovic, Dzemal Merdan, and others on the side of the TO,

10     and Petkovic, myself, Blaskic, and others on the side of the HVO.  And

11     the meeting was conducted by Colonel Stewart, or was it Colonel Williams?

12        Q.   Tell us, please, the representatives of the BH Army, did they try

13     and reach an agreement with you, who were the representatives of the HVO,

14     or did they come to Vitez, as an illegitimate and unlawful army, to

15     disarm you and arrest you?

16        A.   Problems were resolved on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

17     current problems, and in the Lasva River Valley, Zenica and so on.

18        Q.   The next document is P2078.

19             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] This document, P1988, is a

20     document that the Judges have seen on several occasions.  The date is

21     quite important.  It's April 20th, 1993, four days after Ahmici, when

22     this document was signed between the BH Army and the HVO in the presence

23     of the international community, General Morillon, extremely well known,

24     and Ambassador Thebault, representing the European community.  Now, I

25     would like to know whether at the time you knew of this document.

Page 47414

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Certainly, on the 21st or 22nd, I

 2     already knew -- or, rather, there was this meeting in Vitez where they

 3     elaborated this actual document, in operational terms.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You're saying that on the 21st

 5     or the 22nd, you were aware of the document.  When looking at paragraph 1

 6     in this document, it seems that the international community is

 7     recognising the fact that the military HVO exists.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That was reality as of April 1992.

 9     If this was the beginning of recognition, in the sense of an official

10     document, then maybe that might be the case.

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You were not present on

12     April 20th, when the negotiations occurred.  But normally generals have a

13     staff with them and legal advisers, and when they -- of course,

14     General Morillon might not have studied law, but here we have the word

15     "legal" in this text in item 1.  You were a member of the HVO at the

16     time, so did you feel that you belonged to a legal army?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, certainly.

18             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   General, since we went back to this Zenica agreement of the 20th

20     of April, if you still have it in front of you, and it was P1988, let's

21     take a look at point 3 of the document together.  It says that:

22             "A joint operations centre of Vitez was established at the level

23     of the 3rd Corps of the BH Army and the HVO of the Operative Zone of

24     Central Bosnia as the beginning of the establishment of a joint command

25     which will be finally established in the coming days."

Page 47415

 1             Now, was that the reason for the meeting in Vitez, General?

 2        A.   The reason for the meeting in Vitez was a follow-up from the

 3     meetings in Vitez and Zenica.  That's how I understood it, it was a

 4     continuation of those previous meetings.  So apart from this meeting and

 5     this joint command, we had problems linked to the conflicts in the field,

 6     in the territory.  But I don't think the meeting was convened to solve

 7     the joint command question, but it was to resolve the problems we were

 8     facing in the field.

 9        Q.   All right.  We'll come to that later on when we come to Central

10     Bosnia, Ahmici, and April 1993, those documents.

11             But now let's look at the next document, which is P2078, 2078,

12     2078, that's right, which is a joint statement by Mate Boban and

13     Alija Izetbegovic, signed in Zagreb in the early hours of the 25th of

14     April, 1993.  And in point 3, it says that the BH Army and the HVO are

15     legal units on a footing of equality and that a joint command of those

16     forces should be established, composed of the representatives of both

17     staffs."

18             And the document refers to attachment 1, so let's take a look at

19     that attachment 1 together, which is the next document.  It is P2091,

20     supplement 1, and this is a military supplement co-signed by

21     Sefer Halilovic and Milivoj Petkovic, and it says here as follows:

22             "The BH Army and the HVO shall keep their separate identities and

23     organisation of the command."

24             Then point 2 says that they shall form a joint command which is

25     going to be responsible for control of operations in the military

Page 47416

 1     districts.

 2             And then point 3 says the joint command shall consist of two

 3     supreme commanders, General Halilovic and General Petkovic, who shall

 4     meet on a regular basis, et cetera, et cetera.  We don't need to read the

 5     rest.

 6             Tell us, please, General, to the best of your recollections, was

 7     that how it was?  Did the BH Army and HVO need to continue as separate

 8     identities and then have a joint command which would co-ordinate their

 9     activities?

10        A.   Yes, that's correct.

11             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me, Your Honour.  My apologies for my voice.

12     I seem to have a bit of a frog in my voice today.

13             Your Honour, I know the witness has already answered, but I did

14     want to object, in terms of time again, in terms of the question just

15     now, "was it that way?"  Does that mean is that what the document says,

16     which we can all see what the documents say, or is that the way things

17     were in reality?  So at present, we don't know what exactly that means

18     when the question is "was it that way?"  I agree the document says that,

19     but that doesn't really assist us.  Thank you.

20             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I never ask the

21     witnesses whether it says something in a document, because we can all

22     read what a document says.  My intention was to ask the witness whether

23     that was how things happened in reality; that is to say, that the BH Army

24     and the HVO kept their separate identities while attempting to establish

25     a joint command which would co-ordinate their activities or, in other

Page 47417

 1     words, whether attempts were made to implement what was recorded in this

 2     document.  I apologise if I wasn't sufficiently clear, but I think that

 3     the witness has already answered, I believe.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, as you know, the

 5     Prosecutor may have a frog in his throat, and to avoid that because he

 6     could just lose air and be unable to breathe, so do ask your questions in

 7     a classical fashion.

 8             As to the last document, you can see there's paragraph 3 that

 9     says that this joint command must be located or established in Travnik.

10     The witness knows Travnik.  Why don't you just ask him whether something

11     happened in Travnik?  He will say, Yes, or he will say, No, and so on,

12     and then you could ask him whether he saw this document and whether the

13     document was implemented, and he can answer, Yes, No.  This way, you

14     avoid objections.

15             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I thought that as

16     Defence counsel for General Milivoj Petkovic, I have the right to

17     structure my examination-in-chief.  So at present I'm not asking the

18     witness about the joint command and its make-up, because if you look at

19     the binder, this is going to be one of the next sections that we're going

20     to address with respect to the system applied.  But my intentions at

21     present are to look at the HVO as a legal army.

22             Now, since I was prevented from saying what my case was, given

23     the documents, you're going to have to find your own way among these

24     documents, but for the moment I am putting these documents to the witness

25     exclusively from the standpoints of the HVO as a legal army and the HVO

Page 47418

 1     as a component part of the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Now, if

 2     there are other exceptionally interesting things in these documents, I'm

 3     not dealing with that now.

 4             So I'll be showing these documents again -- I'll come back to

 5     them when I deal with other issues of my examination-in-chief, but I

 6     would like to assure you that I'm going to cover all the topics, and not

 7     only the ones that the Petkovic Defence deems to be significant, but

 8     those that the Trial Chamber is interested in as well.

 9        Q.   And now, Witness, General, would you focus on the next document,

10     which is 4D1611.

11             There's something wrong with the channels.

12             As I was saying, this was an order from Alija Izetbegovic, dated

13     June 1993, ordering immediate cessation to all hostilities between the

14     BH Army units and the HVO units.  And in item 2, it says for the

15     implementation of this order, the following persons shall be responsible:

16     The commander of the BH Army, Rasim Delic, and commander of the

17     Main Staff of the HVO, Milivoj Petkovic.

18             Tell us, please, General, as a professional soldier yourself,

19     here the president of the Presidency of the Republic of

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina, is he issuing an order here to the chief of the

21     Main Staff of the HVO, Milivoj Petkovic?

22        A.   Yes, the order relates to both the components of the army and to

23     both individuals, both Delic and Petkovic.

24        Q.   All right, fine.  Now, the next document is

25     1D26644 [as interpreted].

Page 47419

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, allow me to return to

 2     this document, because if my memory serves me right, this is the first

 3     document we can see drafted in this way.  It is entitled "Republic of

 4     Bosnia and Herzegovina."  So far, nothing to say about it.  But then we

 5     can see or read "Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, HV," so one could be

 6     tempted to think that this is a document --

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Or "HVO," interpreter's correction.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One could believe that this is

 9     a 100 per cent HVO document, but apparently it is signed by Izetbegovic,

10     although we can't see or find any signature in the B/C/S document.

11             This being said, if this is an authentic document, the president

12     of the Presidency signed a document which was stamped as

13     "Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna/HVO."  Unless Mr. Izetbegovic was not

14     able to read or had no education at all, if he signed this document, that

15     meant that, in his view, the HVO existed as such.  What do you think?

16     When you see this document signed by Mr. Izetbegovic, whilst it is a

17     100 per cent HVO document, what is your conclusion?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The heading here was the right one

19     that was used from the first day, the HVO Croatian people, Republic of

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina, Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the

21     Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, the Croatian Defence Council, then

22     the operative zone or whatever.  So most of the documents had this same

23     heading like a template.

24             Now, I don't believe that Alija Izetbegovic signed this document

25     in this form, but I do believe that it was conveyed to the HVO units or

Page 47420

 1     to the people whom it concerned in this particular form.  Now, whether

 2     the signature is original or not or whether an original document was

 3     signed or not wasn't relevant at that time.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] At any rate - the Defence will

 5     tell me if I'm wrong - but this is the first time I see an HVO

 6     document -- whilst we have 8.600 documents already, this is the first

 7     document in which mention is made of Izetbegovic as the signatory of

 8     Herceg-Bosna documents.  There may be others, but this is the first one I

 9     see.  However, you, yourself, said that this document is not signed by

10     Izetbegovic, everybody can see that, but when you were in service did you

11     receive this documents, because I see it is addressed to all the

12     operative zones?  Were you made aware of this document?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It must have been certainly in the

14     Central Bosnia Operations Zone.  Each document reached the operational

15     zone.  Whether it was distributed lower down the chain of command, that's

16     something I could not comment upon, but it could not have been

17     distributed lower down except in this form as we see it.

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] There are four essential items

19     in this document.  The first one is cessation of hostilities.  Item 2,

20     appointment of Delic and Petkovic.  Third item, the role played by the

21     UNPROFOR.  As to the fourth item, I can see it is that the Presidency of

22     the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was to be a three-member

23     presidency, is unanimous; in other words, the Presidency of the Republic

24     of Bosnia and Herzegovina agreed with the entire above text.  What do you

25     think?

Page 47421

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In terms of timing, this came about

 2     after the Kiseljak meeting which I attended, in which I did take part,

 3     and it was then that we learned that Delic became commander instead of

 4     Sefer, I mean commander of the BiH Army.  After that meeting, well, I

 5     simply -- the question is not specific enough for me to give you a

 6     specific answer.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I highlighted the fact that

 8     there were four items in my question, and I return to the fourth item

 9     because it's always been said that Izetbegovic was the only one to rule

10     or ruled alone; however, here we can see that he acted as president of

11     the Presidency because it is written that the Presidency agreed with the

12     text.  You were on the ground.  You may not have noticed all this, but

13     I'm rather surprised to hear you say that this document was sent to the

14     operative zone, and I wanted to know whether you read it.  And you seem

15     to say that you were not aware of it, so I'm rather puzzled, because this

16     is such an important document that it's rather extraordinary that

17     you -- you were on the ground.  You were not made aware of it?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The operations zone, the document

19     arrived to it because there were technical prerequisites for it to be

20     received at the operations zone.  Very often, those technical

21     requirements were not present at the lower units.

22             The question is whether I saw that document at the time and

23     studied it.  Well, when you asked me whether it referred specifically to

24     Petkovic, I answered, Yes.  As for whether I saw that document,

25     personally, is that the gist of your question, whether I did see it at

Page 47422

 1     the time?  Nothing -- it would not strike me as strange for me to have

 2     seen it.  I can confirm that I saw it at the Military District of Vitez.

 3             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] But wouldn't you have thought

 4     it strange that an HVO document was signed by Izetbegovic?  I mean, this

 5     is really something out of the ordinary, isn't it?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It could not have reached us in any

 7     other way as a document.

 8             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   General, please take a look --

10             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  General, Witness, I did not quite understand

11     your last answer.  I could imagine that the Presidency of Bosnia and

12     Herzegovina takes a decision, which is put on paper, signed by the

13     president of the Presidency, and then sent to the addressees, including

14     the command of the HVO.  You said the document could not have reached you

15     in any other way than under the letterhead of the HVO.  Is my -- why is

16     my hypothesis, in your view, completely wrong?  Why is it completely

17     excluded that such an order be forwarded to the operations zone on the

18     letterhead of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was no technical capacities

20     for the document to be received at the operations zone.  It could have

21     been brought by Sefer or Delic, or somebody of his personnel, in the form

22     as it was created in Sarajevo, or, alternatively, it had to come from the

23     Main Staff.  There were no technical possibilities for the document to

24     get there.  That was what I meant.

25             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me, Your Honour.  I'm sorry.

Page 47423

 1             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I'm still trying to understand, if you allow.

 2             Are you saying that while the president of the Presidency of

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina had authority over the HVO, it had only the

 4     possibility of addressing whom?  You seem to say the Supreme Command, but

 5     not the operations zone?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no.  Let me reiterate.

 7             The technical means -- for instance, on the 10th of that month,

 8     the APC of the British peacekeepers drove me around that area because

 9     there was no other way to go around on the 10th of June, so there were no

10     technical means for that document, dated later, but in the way that I

11     described.

12             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  In what technical -- on what technical way did

13     the substance of the document reach you or reach the operations zone; by

14     telephone, by telex, by fax, by satellite communication?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know.  Maybe a combination

16     of what you listed.  There were no mobile phones at the time.

17             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  And a last technical question.  The document

18     says the decision was taken in full composition, yes, so it appears that

19     the Croat member of the Presidency also agreed to this.  Do you know

20     whether this is true?  Do you have any other source that confirms that

21     the Croat member of the Presidency also took part in this decision?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I could not have such information,

23     but I knew that there were two Croatian representatives or, rather,

24     representatives of the Croatian people there in the Presidency.

25             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.

Page 47424

 1             Excuse me, Mr. Scott.  Mr. Scott had been on his feet.

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment, please, Mr. Scott.

 3             Witness, through the questions put by my fellow Judge, I think I

 4     understand what happened.

 5             On the 13th of June, in Geneva, Mr. Izetbegovic agreed to the

 6     four points we have here.  Somebody from Geneva, from the Presidency,

 7     passed that on to the headquarters in Mostar, and at the Mostar

 8     headquarters this order was sent to the operational zones, itemising the

 9     four points that were communicated by telephone or by fax.  Instead of

10     signing "General Petkovic, Headquarters Commander," it was signed by the

11     president of the Presidency, which would explain why the document is in

12     this form.

13             What do you think of this?

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that was the only

15     reasonable solution.  It had to arrive to the operations zone from Mostar

16     because there was no other way, except hand delivery, for it to have been

17     received from Sarajevo.

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott might shed some light

19     on this.

20             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me again, Your Honour.

21             Your Honour, thank you.  Mr. President, you just did, and that's

22     the point that I was hoping to clarify.  I think the mystery is largely

23     assisted -- or answering the mystery is largely assisted, in addition to

24     your comments, Judge Antonetti, by the subject reference.  "Delivery of

25     the text of," it's not an order from Izetbegovic.  Someone, as you said

Page 47425

 1     in the HVO, is apparently transmitting what they've been told as

 2     something that Izetbegovic said, and it's not an order to the HVO.  It is

 3     apparently Izetbegovic saying, "I ordered the cessation of hostilities

 4     between the ABiH and the HVO."  So I think, Your Honour, you've noticed

 5     the issue.  Thank you.

 6             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I was ready to

 7     clarify this matter, but this is no longer necessary.

 8        Q.   General, let's expound on this.  When you say the paper could not

 9     have reached you, and you mentioned you were in UNPROFOR vehicles - we

10     are talking about the 14th of June, 1993 - did Travnik fall into the

11     hands of the BiH Army by that time?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   Tell us, General, in June 1993 was there conflict in other parts

14     of Central Bosnia between BiH Army and the HVO?

15        A.   This was the most intense fighting.

16        Q.   Fine.  Let's take a look at the next document, 1D2664, which is

17     minutes of a session of the Presidency of the Republic of

18     Bosnia-Herzegovina held on the 29th of June, 1993.  I'm interested in the

19     discussion on whether the commander of the Staff of the Supreme Command

20     of the Army of BiH, Rasim Delic, can be a member of the Presidency of

21     Bosnia-Herzegovina or not.  And let me focus on two parts of this

22     transcript.  General, please listen to me.

23             On page 1, it reads:

24             "We recognise the HVO as a constituent part of the armed forces."

25             And then discussion is held on whether Rasim Delic, as commander

Page 47426

 1     of one of the components of the armed forces, could be a member of the

 2     Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 3             And later on, on page 8 in both versions, B/C/S and English, it

 4     reads as follows -- Alija Izetbegovic said:

 5             "For us, Mr. Delic is a member of the Presidency until it's

 6     proven differently or otherwise."

 7             And Mile Akmadzic responds, and Mile Akmadzic who was a Croat in

 8     the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, says:

 9             "Please state for me.  In my opinion, Mr. Delic is not part of

10     the Presidency unless Mr. Petkovic joins him there."

11             In your opinion, General, pursuant to your -- to the documents

12     that you've seen so far and in your opinion, if the leading people of the

13     armies that defend Bosnia-Herzegovina are supposed to be part of the

14     Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in your opinion, should members be

15     chosen from the BiH Army and HVO or as Mr. Izetbegovic was right, saying

16     that only Mr. Delic would have been there?

17        A.   In my opinion, neither of them should have been members.  Attend

18     meetings, yes, but it is blasphemous for me -- for them to be members of

19     the Presidency.

20             Secondly, around that time, although we tried to reach

21     agreements, at the time the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army exerted the most

22     intense pressure against the HVO units, and most of the Croatians

23     suffering during the war occurred around that time.  And for Delic to be

24     a member of the Presidency while they were carrying out such policies on

25     the field, well --

Page 47427

 1        Q.   Please finish your sentence.

 2        A.   There was no way for Delic to be a member of the Presidency, but

 3     if he was there, my opinion is that he should not have been there without

 4     General Petkovic also in attendance.

 5        Q.   Let's take a look at the next document, 4D1300.  This is an

 6     agreement on the structure of the Joint Staff of the Army of the

 7     Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 26th of March, 1994.  It was

 8     signed by Rasim Delic and Ante Roso.  And it stated, among other things,

 9     that the Joint Staff is going to comprise of ten members, five from each

10     side.  And in item 3, it's stated that the erstwhile manners of

11     commanding BiH Army and HVO is continued and maintained during the

12     transitional period until federal army mechanisms are set up.

13             General, in spring-time 1994 were you familiar with the

14     establishment of such joint Army of the Federation of Bosnia and

15     Herzegovina?

16        A.   This was after the Washington Agreement, when the fighting

17     stopped, and the Washington Agreement is being operationalised.  And I

18     knew about this Joint Staff and Command.  Fikret Muslimovic, for

19     instance, one month after fighting, spent a night at the Vitez

20     headquarters, in the command building at Vitez.

21        Q.   Fikret Muslimovic was a high-ranking officer in the Security

22     Administration of BiH Army?

23        A.   Yes, that's -- I shouldn't have mentioned his name, but, in

24     essence, he was the most competent person, after Delic, in the army.  But

25     that's only my assessment.  I knew him from our JNA days in Doboj.

Page 47428

 1     Fikret Muslimovic was assistant to Aca Vasiljevic.  The area of

 2     responsibility was Drava to the Adriatic and from Drina to the Una

 3     Rivers.  They were very effective.  Fikret Muslimovic was a very capable

 4     person.

 5        Q.   And now the last document in this section is 4D826 that I'd like

 6     to look at.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  Witness, let me return to the

 8     previous document.  It's several pages long, so by the time I've reached

 9     the end, I'll let Ms. Alaburic put her questions about the document.

10             This is the 207th meeting of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

11     Page 21, Izetbegovic is answering Boras, a Croat, and Izetbegovic

12     mentions the fact that nothing has been signed in Lisbon, that the

13     negotiations have been interrupted.  He says that Sarajevo is not

14     destroyed by the Presidency or by the negotiations, but by those firing

15     from the hills.  So now he has the Serbs in mind.  But then he says, They

16     destroyed the city, and then he mentions Mostar.  He says now Mostar has

17     been destroyed from two sides, from both sides.

18             How do you interpret the last sentence, when he said, And now --

19     so now that is at the date of the meeting, 29th of June, 1993.  So when

20     he said, Now Mostar has been destroyed from two sides, what did he mean?

21     Did he mean the Muslim and the Croat sides, or the Croat side and the

22     Serb side?  How do you interpret this sentence by Mr. Izetbegovic, who

23     said that, I quote:

24             "Now Mostar has been destroyed from two sides"?

25             What did he mean?

Page 47429

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He probably meant the Serb and

 2     Croatian side, because Mostar was destroyed until June 1992 by the Serbs.

 3     They were destroying it until then.  And then in the war between the TO

 4     and HVO, they were destroyed by both sides, so that in fact three sides

 5     were destroying it.  But probably Mr. Izetbegovic meant the Serbs and the

 6     Croats in this particular instance.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You're saying that

 8     Mr. Izetbegovic meant the Serb and the Croat sides.

 9             Well, then in June, in other words, back in June 1993, the Serbs

10     were still firing on Mostar; is that correct or not?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] From time to time, yes, they

12     targeted it, but not in support of the fighting, just a sporadic gun-shot

13     here and there.  But the heavy shelling in Mostar -- well, heavy shells

14     were falling on Mostar at that time, and the only people that could have

15     had shells of that calibre were the Serbs.

16             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Listen to my question carefully

17     and think it through before you answer it.

18             You've just said that every now and then the Serbs would fire on

19     Mostar.  Let us imagine a victim that was hit by shrapnel.  It's just a

20     hypothesis.  How can you ascertain that the shrapnel originates from the

21     HVO or from the Serbs?  Do you have a military answer to my question?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I had been there, I would know

23     by the trajectory or the type of explosion, if I was there.  If I were to

24     see the crater, I would know, once again, the direction the shell came

25     from.  But the general public couldn't have known.

Page 47430

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Just briefly on this document, and then we can take the break.

 4     And it's 4D826, the next document that I'd like us to look at, which is a

 5     Law on Defence of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  And we're

 6     only interested in one article there, and it is Article 37, para 2, where

 7     it says:

 8             "The Army of the Federation is composed of units of the BH Army

 9     and the Croatian Defence Council, inclusive of the corps level and

10     military district, made up of peacetime and wartime components."

11             Now, as defined here, was the HVO entirely a component part of

12     the Army of the BH Federation?

13        A.   This is the "Official Gazette" dating back to 1996, so there's no

14     dilemmas on that score.  The Army of the Federation was made up of two

15     components, and at that point in time they had a joint staff, and most of

16     the activities they waged were the activities of a single army.

17             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, General.

18             I think we can take the break now, Your Honour.

19             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We're going to break for 20

20     minutes.

21                           --- Recess taken at 3.53 p.m.

22                           --- On resuming at 4.18 p.m.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please proceed, Ms. Alaburic.

24             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   General, let's move on to the next area.  And in order to do

Page 47431

 1     that, look at P280, which is an order jointly signed by Mate Boban and

 2     General Roso, dated the 27th of June, 1992.  And for commander of the HVO

 3     Staff of Central Bosnia, as it was already, Tihomir Blaskic is being

 4     appointed to the post, and he's being given various authorisations, as it

 5     says here, for the full articulation of all combat operations in Central

 6     Bosnia.  On the basis of this order, General -- well, he wasn't general

 7     at the time, but, anyway, Colonel Blaskic, Tihomir Blaskic, also

 8     appointed and relieved of duty commanders of military units.

 9             Tell us now, please, General, at that time did you know whether

10     the commanders of the other operative zones in the HVO had the same remit

11     and authorisations?

12        A.   Well, I don't know when this document -- whether they did when

13     this document was actually written, but it was logical that

14     Tihomir Blaskic did have those authorisations linked to the territory he

15     was in command of and the people he knew, as this was a little separate.

16        Q.   You said because of the isolation of the territory, because the

17     territory was isolated.  The isolation of the territory of Herceg-Bosna;

18     is that what you meant to say?

19        A.   Yes.

20             MR. SCOTT:  I'm sorry, Your Honour.

21             MS. ALABURIC:  He did, he said so, but the transcript was wrong.

22             MR. SCOTT:  All I can do, of course, is respond to what's either

23     translated orally or in writing, Your Honour, and I did not hear the

24     witness say that at all.

25             I also did not -- there's nothing on the face of the document

Page 47432

 1     that says anything about it being involving the appointment or removal of

 2     commanders, and there again I'm sorry to say it, because I have great

 3     respect of Ms. Alaburic as a fine colleague, but it's again suggesting

 4     answers to the witness, and the document -- the interpretation of the

 5     document and where the document, on its face, says nothing of the sort.

 6     All the document says is "is fully responsible for full articulation."

 7     It says nothing about how that relates to the appointment or dismissal of

 8     other commanders.  That was completely injected by Ms. Alaburic, and it's

 9     not appropriate, Your Honour, and I'm going to object.  I do object.

10             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if after four years

11     we have to discuss such a banal matter as the appointment and dismissal

12     of duties that Tihomir Blaskic conducted in Central Bosnia, then I don't

13     know what it is that we've been doing for all this time here.

14        Q.   But tell me, to the best of your knowledge, General, did

15     Tihomir Blaskic, as the commander of the Operative Zone of Central

16     Bosnia, appoint and relieve of duty military commanders in that operative

17     zone?

18        A.   In point 2 of this document, it says "appoints commanders of the

19     HVO in Central Bosnia," so as far as I'm concerned that's clear.  And in

20     practice, yes, he did appoint commanders in Central Bosnia.  That's true.

21             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Now, if Mr. Scott wishes to

22     apologise, I accept his apology in advance.

23             Let's now look at --

24             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me, Your Honour.  I still submit that the

25     document does not say what counsel has indicated it does.  It's

Page 47433

 1     unfortunate, but I understand that she may wish that's what it says, but

 2     the document doesn't say that.

 3             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, so we have a document

 4     in front of us appointing Mr. Blaskic as the main commander of the staff

 5     of the HVO in Central Bosnia.  This is a document signed by Mr. Boban.

 6     But the thing that puzzles me is this:  We can also see Mr. Roso, who was

 7     then the Chief of Staff, who also signed the document.

 8             You were there.  You may know.  Does this mean that

 9     Mr. Mate Boban appointed the main officials within the HVO Command and

10     within the operative zone, and it happened that he appointed them based

11     on a document drafted by the headquarters that prepared this order for

12     appointment, as you can see, because you can see the number, 396, and

13     thereafter Boban signed?  But since the document was prepared by the

14     Main Staff, it was also signed by the head of the Main Staff; is that so?

15     Is that the reason why we can see that Mr. Roso intervened in the

16     appointment?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What is correct is that the

18     proposals or, rather, appointments went from Boban -- from the Main Staff

19     to Boban.  Now, why Roso's signature is here, I really don't know.  Only

20     Boban's signature was enough, but you couldn't have just Roso's

21     signature.  So why the two are there, I don't know.  But Mate Boban's

22     signature gave legitimacy to the whole affair because it was the major

23     unit in the HVO of the operative zone or, rather, the corps.

24             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  In the same line, Witness, on the top left hand

25     of the document we read "Main Staff," so the origin of the document is

Page 47434

 1     not at the Presidency, it appears, but at the Main Staff.  Is it possible

 2     that the chief of the Main Staff, General Roso, drafts this as a

 3     proposal, perhaps after telephone conversation, then sends it with his

 4     signature to Mate Boban, and Mate Boban signs to sanctify the document?

 5     Could it have happened like that?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that Boban signed first,

 7     and then since it goes up the chain of command -- through the chain of

 8     command and communications from the Main Staff towards the operative

 9     zone, and I see nothing contentious there.

10             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.  I wasn't implying anything

11     contentious.  I'm just trying to find out the truth.  Later on, we will

12     see what is of importance.  Thank you.

13             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, these are just my

14     introductory remarks about Central Bosnia.

15        Q.   Now moving on to Ahmici on the 16th of April and a few events

16     before that, but let's look at the next document, which is P661, and it

17     is the appointment of the commanders of operations zones which, on the

18     28th of October, 1992, was effected by the president of the HZ-HB,

19     Mate Boban.  And here, under item 3, we see that he appointed for

20     commander of the operative zone Tihomir Blaskic.

21             Now, my question to you, General, is this:  If you remember,

22     roughly when was it that the HVO was organised in such a way as to

23     establish operations zones?

24        A.   I think that it was roughly this time, because the same unit and

25     the same commands were called differently before that.

Page 47435

 1        Q.   Let's look at the next document now, which is P554.  This is an

 2     order from Tihomir Blaskic on the organisation of units in the Central

 3     Bosnia Operations Zone.

 4             Tell us, please, General, were you aware of this order at that

 5     time?  Did you know about it?

 6        A.   It was -- I initiated this because it was an enormous zone, and

 7     in order to facilitate command I proposed that four operative zones or

 8     tactical groups within operative zones be established.  And

 9     geographically, they ran along Vrabac-Lasva, and emerging on to Zenica,

10     then the valley of Bosna, Zepce, and that area over there, and then

11     Lepenica, that general area, so tactically or operationally it was

12     justified to establish zones and the tactical groups.  And there were

13     about six municipalities to one tactical group.  I was the commander of

14     one of those, one of those tactical groups from Jajce to Zenica

15     inclusive, along with my regular duties, that is, as deputy commander of

16     the operative zone or military district of the corps.

17        Q.   General, when you say you were at the head of a tactical group,

18     and you told us which one, is it the one that is stipulated in item 1(b)?

19        A.   Yes, although the Dobratici municipality, or Pogradje, in

20     comprising Kotor Varos municipality and Skender Vakuf municipality, isn't

21     mentioned here, so that was that sixth area or entity.

22        Q.   Right.  Let's look at the next document, which is P658.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, I would like to know

24     whether, as far as this last document is concerned, in the chain of

25     command we have:  Mate Boban as president, being number 1, then we have

Page 47436

 1     the commander of the HVO, i.e., General Petkovic here, then number 3

 2     would be the commander of the operative zone, Tihomir Blaskic, and then

 3     in your own operative zone the commander of the tactical group, i.e.,

 4     you, and then below you the commanders of brigades within this tactical

 5     group?  Does this represent the chain of command?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's correct.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would just like to

 9     draw your attention to the title of the post of Milivoj Petkovic on

10     page 44, line 13 -- or I correct myself, line 12.  It is defined as

11     commander of the HVO, and the function was entitled "Chief of the

12     Main Staff."  It is important, for the Defence case of General Petkovic,

13     to refer to him as chief of the Main Staff.

14        Q.   General, let's take a look at the next document, P658.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, you might be able to

16     shed some light on this.  Can you tell us what difference you make,

17     yourself, between the commander of the HVO and head of the Main Staff?

18     Are these two different positions?  If so, who is in command of the HVO?

19     And if not, what can you say about this?  Because Ms. Alaburic seems to

20     make a difference between these two, and I would like to know exactly how

21     things stand.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Over different time-periods, there

23     was the commander of the HVO and the Chief of Staff or chief of the

24     Main Staff.  However, for the most part, for most of the duration and the

25     existence of that, we had the chief of the Main Staff who was the link

Page 47437

 1     between the president and units, in general.  So if there was no

 2     appointed commander of the HVO, then the chief of the Main Staff, for the

 3     most part, held command role, except if it was otherwise in certain

 4     areas.  But I'm telling you this from my position, how I understood the

 5     chain of command.  So that would be Blaskic, Petkovic, or Roso, whoever

 6     was chief of the Main Staff, and at the top Mate Boban in all his

 7     functions.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] On the 7th of October,

 9     1992 - that's the date of the document - who was the HVO commander?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the operations zone or the

11     corps, it was Blaskic.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So he was the HVO military

13     commander.  I want to know who commanded the military HVO, the one who

14     was in command of all the operative zones.  Who was it?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The term "HVO" entails political,

16     military, and other dimensions.  But in respect of the unit of the HVO,

17     the military wing of the HVO, Blaskic was the commander, but he was not

18     the commander to other elements of life and authorities in the area of

19     his responsibility, in military terms.

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment, because I'm totally

21     lost now.

22             I've been now involved 150 per cent of my time in this case for

23     four years, and now I'm discovering something totally new.  Maybe it was

24     poorly translated; I don't know.  But you just said, because I did ask

25     you this:  Back in October, who was the HVO commander?  And I specified

Page 47438

 1     my question.  I said I want to know who was in command of all the various

 2     operative zones.  And your answer is that, in your view, it was Blaskic,

 3     so now I fail to understand.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If we're discussing a document

 5     which discusses tactical groups within the corps or operational zone,

 6     then Blaskic was the commander of that.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I understand that.  He was the

 8     commander of the HVO in the operative zone.  There, I agree with you.

 9     But I wanted to know who was the HVO commander of all the operative

10     zones, of all of them.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mate Boban, Mate Boban.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  So now this is a

13     very exact answer.  You are telling me that the HVO commander was

14     Mate Boban.  Then there's a chief of Main Staff, and that was

15     General Petkovic.  And then there are operative zone commanders, so in

16     Central Bosnia it was Blaskic.  And then you have commanders of tactical

17     groups, and you were one of them for the 2nd Tactical Group?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Ivo Lozancic was in Zepce, and that

19     tactical group comprised Zepce, Zavidovici, Teslic, Maglaj.  In Lepenica,

20     there was Rajic, and it comprised Kiseljak, Kresevo, Fojnica, Vares, and

21     Kakanj.  And the 4th Operations Group, Bugojno, Kupres, Gornji Vakuf,

22     Prozor, Jablanica, and Konjic.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Okay.

24             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Mr. Filipovic, I may be slow of understanding,

25     perhaps, dimwitted, perhaps, but I still am not quite clear on this,

Page 47439

 1     because at one point the Presiding Judge put to you a line of command

 2     which went:  Boban, Chief of Staff, chiefs of operations zones; Blaskic

 3     was the chief of an operations zone.  You said above him there was Boban.

 4     But according to the line of command previously established, above him

 5     was Petkovic was the chief of the General Staff.  Which of the two is

 6     correct?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Boban was the supreme commander,

 8     and the Main Staff supports and works for him.  The chief of the

 9     Main Staff carries out the orders, the desires, of Boban, and chief of

10     the Main Staff relays to us, at the operations zone, in the form of

11     orders what we're supposed to do.  So you asked of me to precise

12     [as interpreted] the line of command as per definition, but I am telling

13     you how I understood it to be.  I knew that my immediate superior was

14     Blaskic.  I was his deputy, and I knew that he -- his commander or person

15     who he reports to and receives orders from was the chief of the

16     Main Staff, and sometimes there was direct link to Boban.  That was the

17     practice in use throughout that time, except for a time when the chief of

18     the Main Staff was number 3 in the military hierarchy of the HVO, because

19     there was the commander, then the deputy commander, and then the chief of

20     the Main Staff, but that was for a relatively brief period of time.

21             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.  You have clarified my question.

22     Thank you very much.

23             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Thank you, General.  I have no supplementary questions to your

25     description.  I just wanted to intervene as to the title of the function.

Page 47440

 1             Let's take a look at the next document, P658.  This is a

 2     consolidated report for the 26th October 1992.

 3             General, in respect of the Jajce theory, it is stated that the

 4     Chetniks are attacking with everything they have and firing between 25

 5     and 30 hundred [as interpreted] projectiles a day, so that everything is

 6     burning.  Tell us, General, since we have seen fierce discussions in this

 7     courtroom whether Serbs and Croats did fight each other at that time in

 8     Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, please tell us, did you conduct any combat

 9     against the Serbs, the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbs, in 1992 and

10     after that date?

11        A.   Well, this item is a wound still fresh in me.  I've invested

12     quite a lot of my efforts into the defence of Jajce.  This refers to a

13     period prior to Jajce's fall.  And as far as the Serbian forces

14     throughout 1992 and 1993, until June 1993, the only enemy out there was

15     the VRS, the Army of the Republika Srpska.  And when we lost in Central

16     Bosnia, direct contact with the VRS, the only enemy was the ABiH or the

17     Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  In our -- Jajce front-line was 100

18     kilometres' long because it was separate from the Lasva Valley

19     front-line, and they had constant fighting there.

20        Q.   General, when you say that in Central Bosnia you lost contact

21     with the territory under the control of the Army of Republika Srpska, was

22     that the time when the Croatian enclave was created in Central Bosnia, or

23     did you mean something else?

24        A.   In 1993?  I said throughout 1992 and 1993, inclusive with June.

25     At that time, during that period, the only enemy was the VRS.

Page 47441

 1        Q.   In item 6 of this report, which refers to Travnik, it is stated

 2     on the basis -- well, that part of the report refers to Central Bosnia.

 3     It is a report by Tihomir Blaskic, and it states:

 4             "On the basis of the order of the supreme commander, number 396,

 5     dated 27th of June, 1992:

 6             2.  I reorganised the entire staff and relieved members of the

 7     staff, and appointed Colonel Filip Filipovic as commander."

 8             Just one note before I ask you a question.

 9             General, the document that is being referred to is the document

10     that we discussed, the P280 document, so that was the document on the

11     basis of which Tihomir Blaskic appointed and relieved of duties

12     commanders.  Could you please tell us, General, was that the time when

13     you were appointed the commander of the brigade in Travnik?

14        A.   Yes.  That's the period when the commander of the Travnik Brigade

15     was killed by Muslim forces, and this brigade was partly in disarray.

16     And on top of my other duties, I took, pursuant to this command, over the

17     command of that brigade, the Travnik Brigade.

18        Q.   Please tell us, General, who was at the head of the Muslim forces

19     in Travnik at that time?

20        A.   The Alpha and Omega, there was Colonel Alagic, Mehmed Alagic.

21        Q.   General, could you please tell us whether and how did you

22     co-operate with Colonel Alagic?

23        A.   We co-operated in the first year of the conflict.  The second

24     year of the war, we fought intense battles.  And after the -- in the

25     third year, after the Washington Agreement, we co-operated again.  I must

Page 47442

 1     say that Mehmed Alagic was a fair both ally and opponent in all respects.

 2     He was a very difficult negotiator, but when you've reached an agreement

 3     with him, you could be sure that the agreement will be implemented.

 4   (redacted)

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 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

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10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

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16   (redacted)

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18   (redacted)

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25   (redacted)

Page 47443

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6             [Interpretation] General, may we have your comments to this

 7     statement about the good co-operation between Filipovic and Alagic?  And

 8     it was an international observer in BH who presented this view.

 9        A.   This observation is highly technical.

10             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I apologise.  I'd just like to

11     correct the transcript on page 8 [as interpreted].  The question that I

12     quoted relates to Colonel Filipovic, not Colonel Alagic.  So "Colonel

13     Filipovic" it should read, page 51, line 8.  The question was:

14             "Do you know what became of Colonel Filipovic?"

15             Now, your comments about this statement that you cooperated well?

16        A.   A professional view, realistic from those times.  Perhaps it's a

17     little exaggerated to say that I let it be known that I was being

18     supported by my superiors.  I always had very proper co-operation with

19     Blaskic, and I don't really know what that referred to.

20        Q.   And can you explain to us, General, about this departure of yours

21     to another location, that final part of the portion I read out?  What

22     would that refer to, if you remember?

23        A.   Well, my departure from Travnik, probably.  I went to the

24     commission that we already mentioned, as a member of the commission, as a

25     member of the joint command, so there should be no insinuations as to why

Page 47444

 1     I left.  It was quite logical that I should do so.

 2        Q.   Now let's look at document 4D1700, which is an order for defence

 3     of the Operative Zone of Central Bosnia compiled by Tihomir Blaskic.

 4     Tell us, please, General, are you familiar with this document?  Did you

 5     know about it before?

 6        A.   Yes, I think I took part in its writing, because it was a

 7     consolidated document for a given period and for a given time.

 8        Q.   On the document, there is no date, General.  So judging by the

 9     contents, could you give us a date for the document, when it was written?

10        A.   Looking at the names of the units, when they were established and

11     when they appeared, like the 2nd Zenica, and the Jure Francetic Brigade,

12     and the Travnik Brigade, this was the time -- well, I would say it was

13     mid-March 1993.

14        Q.   In several places in this document, for example, in item 2 and

15     item 5(1), Tihomir Blaskic plans the organisation of Central Bosnia's

16     defence in co-operation with the BH Army units.  My question to you is

17     this, General:  Did you plan the defence of the territory which came

18     under your responsibility with respect to defence preparations and

19     combat?  Did you plan to co-operate with the BH Army?

20        A.   We co-operated with the BH Army throughout this time and jointly

21     held the defence lines, so that there's no question that co-operation was

22     envisaged with the BH Army units.

23        Q.   The next document is 4D389, which is an order from the chief of

24     the Main Staff of the HVO, Milivoj Petkovic, dated December 1992.  And in

25     the introduction of this order, General, it says that interception of

Page 47445

 1     Chetnik conversations -- by tapping into Chetnik conversations, the HVO

 2     learnt that the Army of Republika Srpska considers that there was very

 3     little to go, allegedly, to the end of the war, and that over the next

 4     five or six days it would attempt to undertake some particular action.

 5             Now, at that point in time, General, that is to say, at the end

 6     of December 1992, for the territory on which you were active in the

 7     defence, were you threatened by the Army of Republika Srpska in any way?

 8     Was it a threat and danger to you?

 9        A.   It was a threat throughout in the war, and this is probably

10     linked to the Christmas holiday preparations.  I am speculating here, but

11     looking at the date, I assume that we were to hold strong there, but the

12     Chetnik -- the defence lines facing the Chetniks was -- they were active

13     all the time.

14        Q.   Now let's look at item 5 of this order, where combat readiness is

15     to be raised, and it says:

16             "In executing this order, achieve full co-ordination with the

17     BH Army units."

18             May we have your comments, General, to that item of this order by

19     the general?

20        A.   Well, I don't know what you want me to comment.  It was

21     understood, implied.  And I'd like to emphasise once again that full

22     co-ordination is stressed once again with the BH Army, not to forget the

23     allies or the neighbour.

24        Q.   Let's look at another document.  It is 4D830.  I am just

25     interested in the last portion of that document, to be found on the last

Page 47446

 1     page.  It's very short, General, but this is what it says.  This is a

 2     report from the chief of the Main Staff for 1992, and then it says:

 3             "The HVO forces, in addition to the many problems and

 4     difficulties, have successfully under their control 70 per cent of free

 5     territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina."

 6             Now, my question to you, General, is this:  To the best of your

 7     recollections, roughly speaking, what portion of the front-line facing

 8     Republika Srpska were held by the HVO units?

 9        A.   Certainly, more than half.  I would have to measure the distance

10     on a map, but I think that this piece of information here is correct.

11        Q.   Now, the next sentence reads:

12             "By organising its own armed forces in the territory of HZ-HB,

13     the Croatian people defended themselves and the majority of the Muslims."

14             My question to you, General, is this:  When you were defending

15     Bosnia-Herzegovina in Central Bosnia, were you just defending the

16     Croatian people or not?

17        A.   I've already said I defended myself, my family, the local

18     community, the broader community, and the whole of Bosnia and

19     Herzegovina.  So in defending this particular territory and area, I was,

20     in fact, defending everybody in the area, including the Serbs and the

21     Muslims.  And in the first two or three months of the war, it is true

22     that we managed to defend everyone, but as of June the Territorial

23     Defence or the BH Army carried its part of the burden and responsibility,

24     and it was only as of June 1992, on a footing of equality, was it able to

25     fight at the defence lines.

Page 47447

 1        Q.   Tell us, General, in the area that you were in, Busovaca,

 2     Travnik, Novi Travnik and Vitez, that general area, roughly speaking,

 3     ratios and proportions between the Croatian and Muslim population, was

 4     there a majority ethnic group in the territory, more than --

 5        A.   In the Lasva Valley, there were slightly more Muslims, but

 6     generally speaking, it was a 50:50 ratio.

 7        Q.   Tell us, General, in the Lasva River Valley, did refugees begin

 8     coming into the area?

 9        A.   The refugees started coming in from the very first days, but the

10     majority came in May and June and later on in the autumn, because the

11     Serbs would send in the Muslims and some Croats, 4 to 5 per cent, but in

12     their masses, in large quantities, thousands of people coming in, coming

13     down from the Serb lines and crossing over on to our side, that happened,

14     too, and those refugees needed help and assistance in those first days

15     because they were a pitiful group.

16        Q.   What year are you referring to, General?

17        A.   1992.

18        Q.   You said that very few Croats were coming in, 4 to 5 per cent.

19     Now, tell us, please, if you can, whether the Croats from these areas of

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina which were under the control of the Army of Republika

21     Srpska, did they go to some other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina or to some

22     other countries?

23        A.   Well, quite logically, from that western area of Republika Srpska

24     or, rather, the area under the control of the Army of Republika Srpska,

25     it was easier for them to ship the Croats across the river.  That's how I

Page 47448

 1     understood it, across the Sava River.

 2        Q.   Could you tell us, roughly speaking, how many refugees there were

 3     until the end of 1992, who arrived in the Lasva River Valley?  What

 4     figure would that be?

 5        A.   Tens of thousands of people.  The lowest figure that I can quote

 6     is 20.000 people.

 7        Q.   And percentage-wise, as you told us, were these wholly Muslims?

 8        A.   Yes, Muslim refugees.

 9        Q.   Can you tell us something, General, about the first half of 1992

10     and the arrival of soldiers into the Lasva River Valley?  Did they come

11     into the area?  Where did they come from?  What ethnicity did they belong

12     to, and so forth?

13        A.   As I've already said that they accepted me as commander in the

14     Lasva River Valley.  I was accepted as commander by one and all with

15     respect to my activities and so forth.  But the first people to arrive

16     were foreigners, El Mujahid later on, but a negligible number of them.

17     Anyway, sometime at the beginning of May, 50 buses arrived of a unit that

18     had been established.  The 1st Krajina Brigade, that's what it was called

19     at the time, and it was put up at the barracks in Travnik.  Up until

20     then, I had struck -- I had a fair balance between the BH Army and the

21     number of Muslims, but with the arrival of refugees and with the arrival

22     of others coming into the area, this balance was upset in Travnik, in

23     that general area.

24             And at first, I was happy to reinforce my own forces facing the

25     enemy.  However, coupled with the arrival of the refugees, who had

Page 47449

 1     nothing and needed everything, and were put up in the area, such as the

 2     Croatian religious sites, the Croatian shrines, churches, the school

 3     building and so on, all these buildings and facilities that could take in

 4     large numbers of people --

 5        Q.   General --

 6             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me, Counsel.  Before the next question, could

 7     I just ask for assistance to get a date, because the only thing that's

 8     been referenced so far was --

 9             MS. ALABURIC:  I wanted to ask that.

10             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you very much.

11             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   General, yes, that's why I interrupted you.  You've been talking

13     for quite some time, but we've lost our bearings in terms of time.

14             Now, everything you've just described to us, what year was that?

15        A.   The beginning of the war, that is to say, the first couple of

16     months of 1992 or, rather, April, May, and June of that year.  And the

17     refugees continued to pour in in the autumn, and they culminated with the

18     arrival of all -- the whole of Jajce and Pogra [phoen] until the

19     beginning of November 1992.

20        Q.   You mentioned the Krajina Brigade, and you said that its members

21     arrived in busloads, 50 buses.  And if my calculations are correct, that

22     would make it about 2.000 soldiers.  Would that be correct?

23        A.   That would be the maximum number.  Including equipment and

24     everything else, the figure would be less, around 1500.  And I'd like to

25     mention that they arrived from the Republika Hrvatska -- Croatia area,

Page 47450

 1     from the Republic of Croatia.  And I found nothing bad in terms of

 2     defence during that first time.

 3        Q.   Can you give us a time-frame for the arrival of the Krajina

 4     Brigade, once again?

 5        A.   It was about the 15th of May, 1992.

 6        Q.   Tell us, please, General, what ethnicity were the soldiers of the

 7     Krajina Brigade?

 8        A.   They were exclusively Muslims.

 9        Q.   Tell us, please, General, if, from the standpoint of the

10     territorial army or the manoeuvre army, you were to compare your own HVO

11     and this Krajina Brigade, what could you tell us about the HVO and about

12     the Krajina Brigade in those terms?

13        A.   I have the Home Guards, who were put up in their own homes, who

14     lived at home.  And when the time came for them to go up to the

15     front-line, then I would have about 20 per cent of my men up at the

16     front-lines, but I did not have any manoeuvre units able to intervene in

17     any way.  The intervention platoons were only to arrive later.  And the

18     Krajina Brigade, since it was a pure -- they were pure soldiers, they

19     were put up in the barracks, and it was a manoeuvre unit and the only

20     unit of that kind able to carry out manoeuvres in that area.

21        Q.   General, now you've just said that the intervention platoons

22     arrived later on.  Did those intervention platoons come from outside

23     Central Bosnia or did you establish those intervention platoons from your

24     own forces, your own men?

25        A.   No, exclusively made up of my own men.  When the need arose,

Page 47451

 1     that's when that unit was established, because you needed a soldier that

 2     you could command and send out in manoeuvres, and not only soldiers up at

 3     the front-lines in the trenches.  You needed someone to carry out the

 4     manoeuvring actions.

 5        Q.   Tell us, please, General, this Krajina Brigade, once it reached

 6     the Lasva River Valley, did it join up with the HVO or the BH Army, or

 7     was it perhaps a sort of independent, autonomous force in the area?

 8        A.   At first -- or, rather, up until the arrival of Alagic and

 9     Cuskic -- well, they did not arrive with them.  It was, well, still

10     unidentified, or, rather, it conducted training and was being

11     established.  But once we had the firm chain of command for the BH Army,

12     it became exclusively a component part of the Territorial Defence or,

13     rather, the BH Army.  I use both terms because I don't know the date

14     exactly when the Territorial Defence became the BH Army or was divided

15     into the Territorial Defence and the BH Army.

16        Q.   You mentioned, General, the hard-line corps in the Army of BiH.

17     Could you please explain what was that about?

18        A.   When I came to that area in the Lasva River Valley, I had four

19     municipal crisis headquarters and some crisis headquarters which derived

20     from the times of Yugoslavia, and in terms of division of authorities in

21     those four municipalities, the president of the municipality would be a

22     Muslim, the executive council president would be Croatian, the secretary

23     for defence would be a Croat, a commander of the Territorial Defence

24     would be a Muslim, so I encountered four commanders of the Territorial

25     Defence staffs who were Muslims, which was a bit strange, in my opinion,

Page 47452

 1     but that was so.  I co-operated with them, and as I said, I was accepted

 2     as a commander by all of them, and my orders were accepted by those on

 3     the front-line.  And there was a point where I realised that all four of

 4     them have been removed from their duties, and --

 5        Q.   Before you continue, General, could you tell us when that was?

 6        A.   June 1992.  In June 1992, there was a large number of Muslim

 7     officers who arrived to the Lasva River Valley area, and presidents of

 8     municipalities were changed.  In Travnik, there used to be Tamburic, but

 9     he was replaced by Hodzic; in Novi Travnik, the commander was -- the name

10     escapes me, but Lendo replaced him.  And there was a change in the

11     personnel, not only in terms of names but in terms of actions in the area

12     of responsibility of the defence lines.

13        Q.   What was that change when the hard-lines came?

14        A.   Well, the change was that they no longer accepted me as

15     commander, neither did they accept my suggestions, and if I had to change

16     or do something, I would have to go down to commands for activities to be

17     carried out as intended.  They demonstrated their powers by moving forces

18     and units from one settlement to another.  There was a large number of

19     such units established.  The insignia in units and signs in the area

20     changed.  A large number of green flags cropped up suddenly.  Simply, you

21     could feel it.  I could list you other occasions.

22             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Excuse me, Ms. Alaburic.

23             I would like to ask a question of you, Mr. Filipovic, regarding

24     page 60, line 9.  You said that for commanders of the Territorial Defence

25     staffs were Muslims and added "which was a bit strange, in my opinion."

Page 47453

 1     Would you be so kind as to explain why you thought this was strange, and

 2     to what degree?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At the 1990 elections, in this area

 4     SDA and HDZ were the victors, and they combined their personnel to set up

 5     authorities.  And if this was so, then, in my opinion, they should have

 6     mixed and combined the personnel and their cadres differently, more

 7     smartly.  It could not function at any time in Bosnia and Herzegovina to

 8     have a monolithic structure.  You had to be mindful of both Serbs,

 9     Muslims, and Croats.  And to see four of them being Muslims, it was

10     strange -- seemed strange to me because of the way I was brought up.

11             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Okay.  But you have spoken about several key

12     roles, and there was some, I seem to recall, where they were all Croats.

13     Is that not so?

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.  Presidents of municipalities

15     would be Muslims.  Presidents of executive councils of those

16     municipalities would be Croats.  Secretaries for defence of

17     municipalities would be Croats, and commanders of staffs of the

18     Territorial Defence, meaning the army, would be Muslims.  At first

19     glance, it would seem to be a good mix, but when it came to defence it

20     seemed strange to me that I had to co-operate with four commanders of

21     Territorial Defence staffs who were all Muslims, and them being all

22     Muslims was a bit strange to me.

23             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you for the explanation.

24             Excuse me, Ms. Alaburic, for having interrupted.

25             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

Page 47454

 1        Q.   General, please tell us, did you have any problems in

 2     co-operating with somebody just because they were Muslim?  Was it

 3     important to you?

 4        A.   No, it was not important.  I did co-operate, and they did accept

 5     me.  But for somebody being brought up in Bosnia, that person should be

 6     mindful of the three peoples in Bosnia at all times.  For instance, when

 7     I would have a hay load on a cart, and there were some bronze rings

 8     around the horses that were drawing the cart, I would then silence the

 9     bells whenever I would drive through a Muslim village, being mindful of

10     the sensitivities of the Muslims.

11        Q.   Those bronzes, you mean the bells?

12        A.   Yes, the bells, but made of the same materials as church bells.

13        Q.   Fine.  We fully understand the example that you illustrated.

14     Please do explain to the people who do not hail from the territory of the

15     former Yugoslavia.  I'm not sure whether they understand what you meant

16     by silencing the bells whenever you passed through a Muslim village.  Why

17     was that?

18        A.   Because you may upset the inhabitants of that Muslim village.

19     Out of respect towards people, out of understanding that this is a

20     different community and that you had to adapt your own behaviour; as

21     simple as that.

22        Q.   Fine, General.  Let's go back to the people who started arriving

23     at the Lasva River Valley.  Did something happen after the fall of Jajce?

24     Did some other people come to the Lasva River Valley after that point?

25        A.   The fiercest fighting up to that point in the Central Bosnia

Page 47455

 1     theatre was in Jajce.  There were 100 kilometres of front-line there.  I

 2     helped them through -- sending people through the Lasva River Valley

 3     through woods to get to Jajce, and when Jajce fell some 2.000 combatants,

 4     Croats, and 2.000 good fighters, Muslims, suddenly appeared in the area

 5     of Travnik, the only difference being that the Croats continued through

 6     to the Republic of Croatia and elsewhere in the world, whereas the

 7     Muslims remained in my area of operation.  And that tipped the scales and

 8     the balance was lost, because automatically I knew that I was weaker by

 9     4.000 men.  While the balance was there, it was all fine, but now I was

10     weaker by 4.000 good combatants.

11        Q.   One question for you, General.  We're still discussing 1992.  Did

12     you plan, in 1992, any attack on the BiH Army?

13        A.   I was in no position to plan or to attack BiH Army at any point

14     in time, not because I was not irritated, but, first of all, I did not

15     have the forces, and the result of such an attack would be a defeat, and

16     both by the enemy against whom I maintained my defence lines, but also in

17     the rear.  So it was out of the question to conduct military activities,

18     but what could be done was to prevent what was being done throughout that

19     time, in terms of threats or jeopardy to the defence of those who are

20     represented at the time throughout my life, and that would be the people

21     of the Lasva River Valley and in the area of my responsibility.

22        Q.   General, please tell us whether, in 1993, the situation changed.

23        A.   Yes, but I would like to note that what I discussed was the

24     situation in the Lasva River Valley in the tactical group area.  Problems

25     were not similar in Zepce, Kiseljak, or Bugojno, in the other three

Page 47456

 1     tactical groups.

 2             Could you please repeat your question?

 3        Q.   Yes, we have to repeat your question [as interpreted] because you

 4     continued answering my previous question.

 5             My question was:  As pertained to the River Lasva Valley, in

 6     terms of planning attacks against the BH Army, did anything change in

 7     1993?  Did you plan to attack the army then?

 8        A.   No, it did not change -- nothing changed until June 1993, when

 9     the only enemy left out there was the BiH Army.

10        Q.   And in June 1993, General, did you start attacking the BiH Army?

11        A.   I'm discussing a time where there could be no co-operation, no

12     agreements made or negotiated -- negotiations conducted, except for the

13     exchange of the dead and the wounded.  This is the period I'm discussing.

14     Up to that point, there was co-operation, negotiations, avoidance of

15     conflicts, and everything else.

16        Q.   General, if we had to define, of course, it's difficult to say

17     because of the many dissidents [as interpreted] who were first to do

18     something, but if we had to define who attacked whom and who captured

19     certain areas, what would you say?  Who went on the offensive?  Who

20     captures territory, the BiH Army or the HVO?

21        A.   In terms of the area or in terms of successes, the HVO did not

22     achieve any successes, which means they did not attack.  If anybody

23     achieved successes, it was the BiH Army, and they attacked.  You see,

24     nowhere were those attacks of high intensity so that you could say a

25     whole brigade is attacking to reach a certain position.  Up to June 1993,

Page 47457

 1     those combat activities were of low intensity.  There were skirmishes

 2     here and there, incidents here and there.  You had to try to solve them

 3     or not.  There was movement of and transport of population, people moved

 4     out of the area where they were threatened, and the accumulation of those

 5     low-intensity incidents provided you with an answer to the question who

 6     got the initiative and who was attacking.

 7        Q.   In the transcript, you said "transport of population."  We are

 8     going to deal with that in great detail.  General, please tell us, did

 9     you say "transport of the population," or did you say that people left

10     the areas where there were combat activities going on?  Please tell us.

11     This formulation could be --

12        A.   I don't know where you got the transport.  When the Serbs deliver

13     10, or 5.000 people, or 2.000, then we would transport them somewhere

14     somehow.  Maybe the question is unclear.  In this document that I'm

15     reading, do you mean that?

16        Q.   No, we're not dealing with documents.  I'm trying to analyse what

17     you said in the manner it was reflected in the transcript, and the

18     transcript reflects something that you did not say, and this is what I'm

19     trying to rectify.  Let me be precise.

20             Page 65, line 10, reference is being made of transport of

21     population, and the witness mentioned that he never used the word

22     "transport" of the population?  We are going to deal with June -- it is

23     line 10 in my screen.

24             General, we are going to deal extensively with June 1993, so I'm

25     going to stop here.  If I understood you correctly, you never planned any

Page 47458

 1     offensive activities against the BiH Army.  Did I get you loud and clear?

 2        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 3        Q.   Did you ever receive from Tihomir --

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, earlier we had a

 5     document on the screen, 4D830.  This is a document dated February 1993,

 6     but it's a report for the period from April 14, 1992, through December

 7     31st, 1992.  The document is signed by General Petkovic.

 8             I was looking at this document, and I focused on the brigades.  I

 9     counted them all.  There are 26 altogether.  And according to this

10     document, I noted that there were 45.000 troops in HVO units.  It's

11     written there are 955 professional soldiers, 85 officers, 91 NCOs, and

12     670 professional soldiers; this is the situation as described by

13     General Petkovic.  And I tried to break this down into 26 brigades, and

14     as a ballpark figure we have about 2.000 soldiers for the brigade, we

15     have 85 officers.  Divided by 26, that gives me 2 to 3 professional

16     officers per brigade, and about the same amount of NCOs.  It seems that

17     the HVO is made up of a hard core of about a thousand professional

18     soldiers.

19             The Prosecutor's case is that the HVO had a plan and the plan of

20     the HVO was ethnic cleansing, so I'm wondering the following:  I'm

21     wondering whether in the framework of this plan, it was possible to carry

22     out this plan with only a thousand professional soldiers, in terms of

23     logistics.

24             So you were on the field, on the ground, and all the witnesses we

25     have are witnesses who were on the field, so I will put this question to

Page 47459

 1     you:  When you were there -- and you had a high rank, so you may be able

 2     to answer my question.  So I'd like to know the following:  Given the

 3     number of units in the HVO, given the very low number of professional

 4     soldiers, officers, and NCOs, do you think that the HVO would have been

 5     able to carry out an all-out action against the Muslims and against the

 6     BH Army, given the number of troops that you had?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was a flagrant lack of

 8     professionals in the HVO units.  In the Lasva Valley, I didn't have more

 9     than three or four professionals [as interpreted], where I had -- whereas

10     I had 5.000 or 6.000 fighters.  We had reserve officers from the

11     Territorial Defence, but that, too, was few in number compared to the

12     number of inhabitants and the proportionate number that should have been

13     there.  So there was a flagrant lack of people able to command and

14     conduct operations.

15             When you say "brigade," yes, it's true that we did call it a

16     brigade, but that brigade was just able to hold its positions, to hold

17     the defence lines.  However, the Serbs weren't able to attack too much,

18     either, and that was comforting because there was an extensive

19     front-line.  Otherwise, these units, which we referred to as brigades,

20     they would have been vanquished very quickly, in military terms.  So

21     given these conditions, to plan attacks -- and if you planned an attack,

22     you could just have an intervention platoon going into action, and that

23     was only possible later on, at a later stage, once they were established,

24     so it would be completely senseless and mad to do that.

25             We had an HVO army only towards the end of 1994, an army in the

Page 47460

 1     sense of -- well, we called it the Guards Brigade, but in operational

 2     terms it was the strength of a battalion.

 3             I don't know whether that answers your question.

 4             MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, perhaps we could

 5     correct the transcript straight away.  Otherwise, the sentence doesn't

 6     read properly.

 7             On page 67, line 17, the witness said -- line 16, the sentence

 8     begins:

 9             "In the Lasva River Valley, I didn't have more than three or four

10     soldiers," professionals.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Professional soldiers, yes, that's

12     the point.

13             MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Professional soldiers, and the

14     witness has just made that point.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

16             When answering my question, you say that it's only in 1994 that

17     the HVO had a real army, not before.  Now, let me be more specific in my

18     question.

19             We've seen a number of documents and plans where the HVO and the

20     BH Army were facing the lines against the Serbs, so they were in position

21     against the Serbs.  So there were these front-lines, but the HVO and the

22     BiH were deployed on the terrain also, not just on the front-line.  Now,

23     looking at these maps, since I don't have the breakdown of HVO on the

24     front-line facing the Serbs, and HVO in the rear in Herceg-Bosna, able to

25     launch actions against the BH Army, but as far as these HVO deployed in

Page 47461

 1     Herceg-Bosna but who were not on the front-line, I would like to know

 2     whether they would have been able to launch attacks against the BH Army

 3     in order to achieve the plan.

 4             Let me tell you that we had a witness sitting exactly where you

 5     are a few weeks ago, and he said that when you launch an attack, if you

 6     want to win, the ratio has to be 3:1, if you want to win.  If you don't

 7     have this ratio, you just don't launch the attack.  And this is my

 8     question:  Given the troops that the HVO had - I'm talking about here HVO

 9     not on the front-line facing the Serbs - do you believe that you would

10     have been able to win an attack against the BH Army?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let me repeat.  We did not have a

12     unit for us to attack the enemy, the Serbs.  We didn't attack anywhere;

13     not because we didn't want to, because we'd lost too much, but we weren't

14     able to.  In Travnik, on my family heritage, there was this Serb, and I'd

15     like -- I wanted to have them expelled, but I wasn't able to.  So when

16     somebody is under attack, then a mountain is made out of a mole hill, and

17     then you defend yourself not as an army but as an individual, if you make

18     a mountain out of a mole hill.  And I'm speaking about the in-depth

19     territory.

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So taking up again this

21     formula, you said that when you are under attack, a mouse can become a

22     lion.  If you look at the conclusion in this document signed by

23     General Petkovic, it looks as though the HVO forces were able to defend

24     themselves.  That's what he says.  So as I understand it, you were able

25     to defend yourself, but not able to attack.  Is that so?

Page 47462

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've already said compared to the

 2     Serb forces, because the territory was very large and the Serbs didn't

 3     have the kind of army they wanted either, but with this deployment, and

 4     the level of equipment, and the establishment of units, we were

 5     successful in defending ourselves.  That's the truth of it.  But to

 6     attack, except for skirmishes or some smaller diversionary or sabotage

 7     action, we weren't able to attack, so we couldn't attack the enemy, the

 8     Serbs, and we especially couldn't attack on our territory in depth where,

 9     in terms of numbers and equipment and the number of professional soldiers

10     we had, and other types of professionals, we were three or four times

11     weaker.

12             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation].

13        Q.   General, we need a subject, verb, object here.  So who do you

14     mean by "in depth"?  Who was in depth, as far as you were concerned, who

15     you could perhaps attack, but that force was three or four times

16     stronger?  Who is that?

17        A.   I'm talking about the defence line, and the defence line was one

18     or two kilometres.  And I'm talking about the in-depth area where the

19     population lived and where the soldiers were staying at home, in their

20     own homes.  Well, perhaps it's clear to me, but not to you.  But when I

21     say "in-depth," everything -- when I say "in-depth," I mean everything

22     that isn't up at the front-line, the defence line.

23        Q.   So we have the defence line, the front-line.  On one side are the

24     Serbs, on the other side are the Croats and the Muslims; is that right?

25     Is that how it was?  Was that how I define the defence line and

Page 47463

 1     confrontation line properly?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   Does that mean, General, that the Croats and Muslims, together

 4     with -- were together, were in-depth, that side of the defence line?

 5     Were they together?

 6        A.   Yes, they were together, and so was life in general, it was on

 7     that side of the line.

 8        Q.   Now, His Honour Judge Antonetti asked you about the capabilities

 9     of the HVO of launching attacks, both vis-a-vis the Serbs and vis-a-vis

10     the Muslim army, and you said that you were not capable of launching

11     attacks on the Serbs.  You explained why.  Now, tell us, was the HVO

12     capable, in the Lasva River Valley, of carrying out offensive operations

13     towards the BH Army to cleanse the Central Bosnia area of the Muslims and

14     have an ethnically-pure territory?

15        A.   When I said "incapable," I spoke of the enemy that I had to

16     contend with on a daily basis.  I had no thoughts about any attacks on

17     the Muslims.  I don't know what you're actually asking me.  I could not

18     have any idea of this.  People were living there in that area.  People

19     were doing the best they could to survive.  So no attacks.  All the

20     manoeuvres going on -- only forces engaged in manoeuvres could attack.

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Allow me a follow-up question,

22     because you are the first witness who was clear enough, as far as I can

23     see, on something that could be quite essential.

24             I was listening to you carefully.  You told us that there was a

25     front-line.  We keep this in mind.  And behind the front-line, there were

Page 47464

 1     the Serbs.  On the front-line, there was the HVO and there was the ABiH.

 2     And you said that there was a defence line that was about one or two

 3     kilometres' long.  So you can see the front-line -- what a pity we didn't

 4     think of having a map, because I could have asked you to draw it all and

 5     to mark it all on the map.  There was a defence line that was about one

 6     to two kilometres' long, and then there's the in-depth territory.  And

 7     you say that in depth there were the soldiers that would go home, that

 8     would go work in the fields or have a rest, and then return to the

 9     front-line.

10             Ms. Alaburic put to you a question about the in-depth territory

11     or the notion of "in-depth."  In that so-called "in-depth" area, there

12     were the ABiH and the HVO; is that so?  Is that what you're telling us?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The defence line was two

14     kilometres' long -- or two kilometres in depth and hundred kilometres

15     long, so it was only two kilometres in depth from the front.  Everything

16     else was the depth of the population, the units, and so on.  So I'm

17     talking about in-depth as compared to the front-line.  So it is within

18     that depth that all the units, the BH Army and HVO units, were located.

19     Most of them -- 90 per cent of these soldiers were in their houses, in

20     their own homes, except for those who were refugees and had no homes to

21     go to, and where in the Krajina Brigade, the El Mujahid, the 7th Muslim,

22     they were in the barracks, whether they -- the barracks in Zenica or

23     Travnik.  Everybody else was at home in their own homes.

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you've added something else.

25     You're telling us that there was the front-line, there was the defence

Page 47465

 1     line where the depth is, say, two kilometres, and then in -- and this is

 2     the specification you just added, in that defence line there was the HVO

 3     and the BiH Army, and then there's the whole lot, the remainder; the

 4     houses, the soldiers going back home, the rear, civilians -- well, you

 5     didn't say "civilians," but it could be concluded that the civilians were

 6     there, too, in the rear.  And you added that there are also units, such

 7     as the Krajina Brigade, the Mujahid, or the 7th Muslim Brigades, that

 8     have their barracks.  Is that a right summary?

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, correct.

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Because these are important

11     concepts.  Sometimes it's hard to really fathom what it is, and I think

12     you are among the first witnesses who are clear enough on this issue.

13             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this seems to be a

14     good time for the second break.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let's have a 20-minute break.

16                           --- Recess taken at 5.45 p.m.

17                           --- On resuming at 6.07 p.m.

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The court is back in session.

19             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   General, let's move on to Novi Travnik, 1992, October 1992;

21     Travnik, October 1992.  For those acquainted with the indictment, we're

22     dealing with paragraph 28.

23             Tell us, please, General, in Novi Travnik was there an important

24     factory there at all?

25        A.   Yes, there was an important factory for Yugoslavia and for

Page 47466

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina, manufacturing high-calibre artillery and tank

 2     weapons.  It was called Bratstvo.

 3        Q.   Tell us, please, General, at the beginning of the war in

 4     Bosnia-Herzegovina, who had access to the factory?

 5        A.   Both Croats and Muslims had access there, because there were no

 6     Serb villages in the surrounding parts.  And the JNA, in February 1992,

 7     attempted to take out finished goods from the Bratstvo factory.  However,

 8     thanks to the members of the Croatian population, they prevented them

 9     from taking weapons away, which could have been taken to Croatia at the

10     time.  So the weapons remained in the Bratstvo factory.  When I arrived,

11     I realised the importance that the factory had, and I did my best to

12     disperse the weapons away from the factory.  And I learned from the

13     managing directors how much equipment there was there, how many weapons,

14     and then I discussed this with the decision-makers both on the Muslim and

15     Croat side about the dispersion of these weapons, because neither side

16     could pull them out without everybody knowing about it.

17             So I decide -- we made a decision to send a third to the southern

18     front, where the Croats and Muslims acted together, and then for the TO,

19     for the BH Army, a third was to go to them for the entire area of

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then another third to me for my area of

21     responsibility, and that last third would be divided 50:50.  So realising

22     the importance of the Bratstvo factory, I solved the problem and equipped

23     people with weapons.

24        Q.   General, when you say a third stayed for the local requirements

25     and then was divided 50:50, half/half, half/half to whom, between which

Page 47467

 1     sides?

 2        A.   The HVO and the Territorial Defence at the time, as

 3     organisational forms in which the population was involved.

 4        Q.   Now, tell me, was there anything that happened in June 1992 with

 5     respect to this factory?

 6        A.   In June, we referred to this as the first conflict where there

 7     were dead and wounded between the Croats and Muslims, or HVO and BH Army,

 8     for supremacy.  It was a fight for supremacy over the factory.  And, in

 9     fact, the Muslims managed to eliminate the HVO -- or, rather, the Croats,

10     eliminate them from the factory, and the Croats no longer had access to

11     the factory.  There was just one position from which you could see the

12     factory, but you couldn't approach the factory.

13        Q.   And what was this position called from which you could see the

14     factory?

15        A.   We referred to it as the relay, because there was, in fact, a

16     small tower for the local television station, and it was a prominent

17     position visible from the surrounding parts.

18        Q.   Let's now look at a few documents on the situation in

19     Novi Travnik in October 1992.  The first document is 4D895, which is a

20     consolidated report for the 19th of October, and let's look at item 3,

21     the Operative Zone of Central Bosnia, a report from Novi Travnik.  And it

22     says, and I quote:

23             "In the evening hours on the 18th of October, 1992, there was a

24     serious deterioration in relations between the Muslims and Croats, the

25     HVO and BH Army, and this escalated to an all-out conflict in which a

Page 47468

 1     member of the BH Army was killed and a member of the HVO was wounded by

 2     sniper fire."

 3             Now, my question to you, General, is this:  This description of

 4     events in Novi Travnik for that day, is that correct, was that what the

 5     situation was like?

 6        A.   Yes, it was correct.  But I'd just like to say that this incident

 7     or, rather, the conflict took place on this repeater station because some

 8     parts of the BH Army -- some members of the BH Army attempted to gain

 9     control of that position, which was a strong topographical position, in

10     order to make it impossible for the HVO even to see the factory.  There

11     were three or four soldiers at that particular vantage point, and they

12     managed to hold the position for a time, and this relates to the person

13     who was wounded and killed.

14        Q.   Now let's look at the next document, which is 4D896.  It's page 4

15     of the Croatian, General, and point 2 relating to the Operative Zone of

16     Central Bosnia.  It's a report from Vitez, at 1545 hours, for the 20th of

17     October, 1992.  And among other things, General, here it says that:

18             "The opposite side, the Territorial Defence, is proposing that we

19     issue an order urgently for a cease-fire and to undertake negotiations,

20     and it is our position a cease-fire with unconditional surrender of

21     Commander of the Territorial Defence, Refik Lendo."

22             And now Tihomir Blaskic is asking for permission to act in that

23     manner, and then it goes on to say that:

24             "Ivica Stojak [realtime transcript read in error "Stojic"], who

25     was seriously wounded, member of the Municipal Staff of Travnik,

Page 47469

 1     succumbed to his wounds."

 2             Now, let's see about this truce and Refik Lendo.  Now, General,

 3     did you know about this, that it was one of the conditions laid down by

 4     the HVO for a cease-fire?

 5        A.   So far, I've said about the situation at the repeater location,

 6     in the evening hours of the 18th, then on the 19th there are intense

 7     combat activities.  I strengthened the defence lines there, new units I

 8     introduced.  I personally was there throughout that day's fighting, but

 9     now that conflict spreads along the lines or in depth of the territory.

10     At many points, conflicts flare up.  The situation is becoming critical,

11     in my opinion.  Both sides, and I'm referring to higher echelons, so

12     primarily in the BiH Army, they realised that they have not achieved

13     their goal, and that now they insist on negotiations.  We say, Yes,

14     negotiations, but we want for you to surrender Refik Lendo, who is

15     responsible for tens of casualties.  And I made a decision for a funeral

16     to take part in night-time, and for months in the Lasva Valley such

17     funerals would take part during night-time because this whole territory

18     could be seen by the Muslim forces.

19        Q.   I would like to correct the name, fourth line on the 77 page.

20     The name entered is incorrect.  The correct name is "Ivica Stojak," not

21     "Ivica Stojic."

22             So, General, Ivica Stojak, was that the predecessor of the

23     commander of the Travnik Brigade, would that be your predecessor in the

24     Travnik Brigade?

25        A.   Yes.  But as I said, the conflict spreads into the depth of the

Page 47470

 1     territory.  Ivica Stojak was killed at the check-point Karnada [phoen],

 2     which is when you leave Novi Travnik.  He was the first commander in

 3     Travnik and throughout that time had been commander of the Municipal

 4     Crisis Staff and later on commander of the brigade.  And because of his

 5     death, as I explained earlier, I had to take over the command post of the

 6     brigade.

 7        Q.   We did not refer to him by name at that previous time, and now

 8     I'm going to try and be more precise.

 9             Later on in this report, with reference to the situation in

10     Novi Travnik, it's stated:

11             "Muslim forces do not allow our ambulance vehicles to transfer

12     the casualties to the hospital, and most of those who died died en route

13     to the hospital, and in certain cases members of the TO units even put

14     hand-grenades into the mouths of some of them and taunted them at the

15     barricades."

16             Is that part correct?

17        A.   The Travnik hospital served all those in that area, and it was

18     the only hospital from Jajce to Busovaca and Vitez.  And when the

19     conflict around the repeater station spread, one of the ramifications of

20     that was the killing of Stojak, it was a major ramification, but another

21     was that our wounded had no place to be treated at.  And this is the time

22     when we ordered that a hospital be opened up at Nova Bila.

23        Q.   Before I ask you another question, General, the first part of

24     your answer did not enter the transcript.  Is that part that I quoted

25     from, was that correct?

Page 47471

 1        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 2        Q.   So that part of that report was correct?  That was my question.

 3             Please, General, briefly tell us, that part referring to

 4     hand-grenades in mouths, did you hear at the time that a patient was put

 5     a hand-grenade into mouth?

 6        A.   I don't know whether that was correct or not, but I had a barrel

 7     of a gun put into my mouth.  This is what I referred to as incidents.

 8     But this was a new dimension.  Up to that point, ambulance vehicles could

 9     pass through check-points on both sides, but this was the first time when

10     an ambulance could not pass a certain check-point bearing a patient.

11        Q.   Let's take a look at the next document, 4D897.  It is referred to

12     as Central Bosnia Operational Zone, 21st of October, report at 2100

13     hours, and it's stated for the Novi Travnik battle zone, Muslim forces

14     continue heavy artillery shelling on the town, itself, using mostly

15     Howitzers, 122 millimetres.  Would that statement be true, to the best of

16     your recollection?

17        A.   Yes, that's correct.  Bratstvo did produce and manufacture such

18     equipment.  As I stated earlier, they received half of one-third, and we

19     could precisely state what kind of artillery was used.  So this part is

20     correct.

21        Q.   It is also stated in the report that the enemy had disarmed HVO

22     units in villages where the number of currents [as interpreted] was

23     negligible, such as the villages of Kopila, Torine, et cetera, et cetera.

24     Let me not list all of these.  To the best of your knowledge, was this

25     statement about disarming them correct or not?

Page 47472

 1        A.   That's correct.  I, personally, in front of the old hotel in

 2     Novi Travnik, I encountered refugees from the village of Senkovici.  It

 3     is a mixed-population village, and it is located en route between

 4     Novi Travnik and Bugojno.  In that action, three, four villages were

 5     cleansed.  Most people came from Senkovici because that village was most

 6     important for my purposes.

 7        Q.   Later on in this report, under item 5, referring to HVO units, it

 8     is stated:

 9             "In Vitez, there is a barracks in the village of Ahmici."

10             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Witness, you have just stated that Senkovici was

11     important for your purposes.  Could you specify what your purposes were

12     and why this village was important for it?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was important because I had to

14     have communication with the HVO in Bugojno.  I could not have a situation

15     where just one side had communication, in this case TO or the BiH Army,

16     particularly in circumstances when the 7th Muslim Brigade and Mujahedin

17     held the Rostovo point, which means that my communication with Bugojno

18     had been disconnected, effectively.

19             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Do you recall, Mr. Filipovic, whether Senkovici

20     was in majority inhabited by Croats or by Muslims?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was a mixed-population village,

22     a majority Muslim, but quite a large portion were Croats.  And in terms

23     of hamlets around that village, some hamlets were occupied by Muslims,

24     some inhabited by Croats, but it was a majority Muslim village, I think.

25             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Was the ethnic composition a factor that you

Page 47473

 1     took into account when you examined the situation in a tactical

 2     perspective?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At the start of the war, I had

 4     maps, and wherever I would come, I would indicate on the map the ethnic

 5     composition; red for Serbs, green for Muslims, and blue for Croats.  It

 6     was important who lived where in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it was important

 7     for me because this was the only route to Bugojno that was which was not

 8     now disrupted.

 9             MR. KOVACIC:  Your Honour, I'm sorry for interrupting, but for a

10     couple of minutes we don't have the transcript on our monitors; not only

11     me, but everybody around.  We do have LiveNote, but we are marking the

12     transcript and we need that.

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The technicians are about to

14     come, but we can continue, can't we?

15             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Ms. Alaburic, I think the witness was still in

16     the process of answering my question, and I don't see why he should not

17     be allowed to continue.

18             Witness, you had said at the beginning you had a map where you

19     put colours for the composition -- the ethnic composition of places, red

20     for Serbs, et cetera.  It was important to you, you said, because this

21     was the only route to Bugojno that was not now disrupted.  My question

22     had been whether you did take into account, in your tactical planning of

23     operations, this ethnical composition, and you have given a first answer.

24     But would you please go on and answer?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I stated at the beginning of the

Page 47474

 1     war I had to know, because I commanded a large area.  Senkovici were

 2     probably underlined by the blue and the green colours.  But in technical

 3     terms, my communication with Bugojno had been very difficult, and had the

 4     Croats left Senkovici, then I no longer can even think about gaining

 5     access through that area.  I would have liked for the whole area to be

 6     populated by Croats, but it simply wasn't so.  I don't know tactically

 7     what you mean.  When that happened, I knew that further communication was

 8     impossible from that point on.

 9             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Well, by "tactical" I mean when you are faced

10     with a situation where, as a commander, you have to take a decision, you

11     make an analysis.  You analyse the enemy situation, your own tasks, the

12     terrain, the weather, and so forth.  This is a ritual which you are

13     better familiar with than myself.  And when you look at the terrain,

14     would the ethnic composition of a town be an element that you would also

15     take into account?  And if so, would it be important or would it be only

16     in extreme cases that it would prompt you to take one decision rather

17     than another one?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The whole time, it was important to

19     me.  And at times when it's a make-or-break situation, then it becomes

20     decisive.  Had I attacked, then I would have tried to discard all

21     possibilities of having them place a check-point in Senkovici to prevent

22     me from passing.  And that's what the Muslim side did, too.  So since

23     there was a conflict on, the conflict was expanding, they eliminated the

24     danger in Senkovici, Torine, and wherever else, but Senkovici were more

25     important because they were along the communication line along the road.

Page 47475

 1             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.

 2             Please, Ms. Alaburic.

 3             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honour.  I

 4     didn't mean to interrupt the question and answer.

 5        Q.   General, let's go back to our report, which is document 4D897.

 6     And we're now referring to the portion where the village of Ahmici is

 7     mentioned, and it says that in Vitez, the barricades in Ahmici village on

 8     the main motorway from Busovaca to Vitez have been completely smashed,

 9     and the Muslim forces had been driven out of the village and completely

10     routed.  The Muslim forces, at their own initiative, handed over their

11     weapons.

12             Now, my question to you, General, is this:  It says here that the

13     village of Ahmici was on the main road from Busovaca to Vitez.  Is that

14     correct?

15        A.   As I know the terrain in detail, Ahmici is one and a half

16     kilometres away from the road.  The mosque is up there, and the cemetery,

17     but 25 years prior to the war, with the fact that the area became more

18     built up, the village did descend down to the highway.  But as far as I

19     know, it was Santici, a Croatian village, where as Ahmici was a Muslim

20     village.  So the new houses that were built provided the possibility of

21     going out onto the main road, and the main road was 10 to 15 minutes --

22     10 to 15 metres from the houses.  And Santici was the most sensitive

23     point between Busovaca and Vitez, as far as the Croats were concerned.

24        Q.   General, could you repeat the last sentence, please?

25        A.   Ahmici were [as interpreted] a position -- or, rather, Santici

Page 47476

 1     was a position which was the most sensitive of the interruption of

 2     communication between Busovaca and Vitez, and all the daily comings and

 3     goings, so that was the most sensitive point as far as that road and that

 4     communication line was concerned.

 5        Q.   Yes, the village of Ahmici was left out of the transcript.

 6     That's why I asked you to repeat the sentence.

 7             Tell me now, at that position, Ahmici-Santici, what was the

 8     breadth of territory, the width of the territory, which in 1992 and in

 9     1993 was under the control of the Croatian forces?

10        A.   Later on, we found that width to be 800 metres, but

11     topographically speaking, that's it, the Lasva Valley.  But when there

12     was no conflict, then the breadth is even greater.  But let me repeat,

13     where you had exclusively Croats, that is a breadth of 800 metres.

14        Q.   Tell us, General, if you were Mehmed Alagic at the time, if you

15     were in his position and had the task of cutting across the

16     Busovaca-Vitez communication line, what point would it be that you would

17     choose to do that?

18        A.   If I were in Mehmed Alagic's position, the only place where you

19     could do that successfully, without any large units, would be Ahmici and

20     Santici.

21        Q.   Okay.  Now, carrying on from that, General, let's look at item 8,

22     where it says that the HVO suffered the following losses:  10 killed, 32

23     wounded, and 5 confirmed missing.  And then it goes on to say that they

24     no longer needed reinforcement in manpower, which they had asked for --

25     which the Main Staff had asked for previously, the HVO Main Staff, that

Page 47477

 1     is.  And then it says that the forces that you sent and that arrived and

 2     reached Prozor might be held there for a time or sent back.

 3             Now, to the best of your knowledge, General, at that time, and

 4     we're dealing with the 21st of October, was the situation calming down so

 5     that no reinforcement was necessary from outside?  Is that portion of the

 6     report correct?

 7        A.   After two days of intensive fighting, along with the losses

 8     mentioned here, but I'm not sure that all the losses are incorporated

 9     there, anyway, all the defence across Jajce to Travnik and Zenica was

10     being broken, especially Jajce was the key point.  Then both the Muslim

11     side and our side was doing everything in its power to deal with the

12     conflict as best they could.  So the information here is correct, given

13     the time and period.  Well, we asked for reinforcements at the beginning

14     of the conflict, when it wasn't just an incident but when we saw that it

15     was an all-out conflict, so we asked for reinforcements.  But when the

16     Muslim side didn't manage to affect its target, especially when it came

17     to the relay station, but, yes, it did with respect to the

18     Bugojno-Novi Travnik area, then we no longer needed assistance, we no

19     longer needed reinforcements.

20        Q.   Let's look at the next document, General.  It is P644, and it is

21     an order for a cease-fire, dated the 24th of October, 1992, issued by the

22     chief of the Main Staff of the HVO, sent to Travnik, among others.

23             Tell us, General, did this order for a cease-fire reach you?

24        A.   Yes, the order did reach me.  Now, since I was in the military

25     district, it would have been in this form.  If I was in Travnik, it would

Page 47478

 1     have come in from Blaskic for the brigade in Travnik.  But, anyway, it

 2     did reach me, yes.

 3        Q.   Tell us, please, on your territory, was there a cease-fire even

 4     before this order?

 5        A.   After an all-out conflict -- well, an incident and conflict and

 6     so many dead, we needed days after that to deal with the situation, which

 7     was particularly sensitive in Travnik because of Stojak's death.

 8        Q.   Let's look at what you've just said by looking at the next

 9     document, 4D1179, which is a consolidated report for the 25th from the

10     operative zone.  They are reporting that they have received the order on

11     a cease-fire, which we were looking at a moment ago, and this can be seen

12     from the reference numbers and so on, and it says that the Muslim forces,

13     despite the order from the chief of the Main Staff of the

14     Territorial Defence, on the 24th of October opened fire with mortars

15     targeting the town, and at the Streliste facility or firing range, they

16     kept firing for 20 rounds in 30 minutes and snipers were also active.  So

17     is that part of the report correct about the sporadic shooting in

18     Novi Travnik and what happened on that particular day, the 24th of

19     October?

20        A.   Well, I'm not sure that I was in Novi Travnik at that time.

21     Otherwise, I would know all about this in detail.  This does not

22     incorporate what my men fired, because as I said, with the calming down

23     of the situation, this went on for a number of days.  Orders could be

24     issued, but you needed time for the situation to actually calm down, what

25     with people having been killed and people losing their nearest and

Page 47479

 1     dearest, and so on and so forth.

 2        Q.   Very well, General.  Now let's move on to Busovaca.  January 1993

 3     is the date.  And for that, let's look at the first document which deals

 4     with this; 4D392 is the number.  Yes, 4D392.

 5             This is an assessment -- a security assessment of the situation

 6     from the Armed Forces of BH.  It says the security organ of the 3rd Corps

 7     is of the opinion that the forces of the BH Army in this area, if there

 8     were to be a serious clash, could successfully fight back the HVO's

 9     forces, on the condition that the BH Army cuts off the road

10     communications or the communication line from Busovaca, Kiseljak,

11     Fojnica, at Lugovi and Kacuni -- that the BH Army should cut off the

12     communication lines running from Busovaca-Kiseljak to Fojnica at Lugovi

13     and Kacuni, and also the road from Busovaca to Vitez, Busovaca-Vitez, and

14     Vitez-Travnik at Mecave, and that ammunition and grenades should be sent

15     to the area as soon as possible.

16             Now, may we have a map on e-court.  4D2014 is the number.

17             And I'm going to ask you, General, to indicate for us on that map

18     where the communication along the Lasva River Valley lines were supposed

19     to be cut.

20             May we have the usher's assistance in providing the witness with

21     a felt pen so that he can draw on the map.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we have a little technical problem

23     with this map also.  I'm going to have to print out a hard copy of the

24     map so the witness can mark on it.

25             Is that okay, Counsel?

Page 47480

 1             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] If we need to do that, then I can

 2     hand the witness my copy, although those places are already marked, to

 3     avoid interruption.

 4             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  We would also like to have it.  It is not in the

 5     binder.

 6             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, no, it's not in the

 7     binder because this will be an IC map, and I thought that we'd be able to

 8     do it all through e-court because the witness has not prepared any

 9     markings on the map.

10             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Ms. Alaburic, would it be possible to put this

11     issue aside for tomorrow morning and to have maps provided to whoever in

12     the courtroom would like to have them?  I'm sure the Judges would for

13     tomorrow morning.  Thank you.

14             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  A constructive

15     proposal, as always.  Thank you very much.

16        Q.   Now, General, let's leave those maps for the moment.

17        A.   May I say something?  Can I just tell you which those places are?

18        Q.   We'll come to that in due course when we have the map, because we

19     didn't mention the places where the Busovaca-Vitez road was cut.

20             So let's move on to the next document, which is P1200.  This is

21     an assessment of the situation compiled by the commander of the

22     3rd Corps, Enver Hadzihasanovic.

23             Please, General, under item 4, take a look, and it states here --

24     the heading "The Roads of Evacuation and Delivery."  It reads:

25             "According to our personal assessments, all roads can be put

Page 47481

 1     under the control of BiH Army, except for the road Vitez-Travnik, because

 2     along the whole direction it borders the places impossible to control for

 3     the BH Army."

 4             General, could you please explain to us this assessment by

 5     Mr. Hadzihasanovic?  Why is it impossible for the BiH Army to control

 6     this section of the road?

 7        A.   In respect to the previous document, that it was generated from

 8     the Supreme Command of the BiH Army, and this one -- the present document

 9     comes from the 3rd Corps, so they say they can control everything except

10     for this between Vitez and Travnik, but they could -- if you take Travnik

11     in a broader sense, they could do so at the eastern-most boundary of

12     Travnik.  But in terms of communication between Vitez and Travnik, until

13     the very entrance to Travnik, it was impossible for them to do so because

14     of the composition of the inhabitants, even in terms of military

15     activities had they been in a position to effect defence operations.

16        Q.   Could you please explain this ethnic composition which precludes

17     the army to control that communication?

18        A.   Well, from that point to Ahmici, inclusively, and Vitez, there is

19     not a single Muslim village or any groups of newly-built homes along the

20     road where -- inhabited by Muslims where they could organise a cessation

21     of firing of either high or low intensity.  In Bosnia, for instance, if

22     you had a hamlet within a village inhabited by a certain group, that

23     would give the right for the whole group to fight for the whole village.

24     If there are none of your members in a village, then there would be no

25     justification.  For instance, in the war between Serbia and Slovenia,

Page 47482

 1     since there were no Serbs in Slovenia, Serbs allowed Slovenia to secede

 2     from Yugoslavia.  This is how I saw the situation.

 3        Q.   Let's put Slovenia aside for a while.  Let's go back to the

 4     assessment of Enver Hadzihasanovic.  You say that this meant that there

 5     was Croatian villages along that road, and for that reason the BiH Army

 6     could not control that road; is this what you meant to say?

 7        A.   Yes, this is what I meant to say.  I apologise for the

 8     digressions that I make.  I simply lose sense of time sometimes.

 9        Q.   General, please, to the best of your knowledge, did

10     Enver Hadzihasanovic and did other Muslim commanders take into account

11     which village was Muslim, which village was Croatian, and which were

12     mixed?

13        A.   Without a doubt.  The same conclusion could have been done by

14     somebody in Sarajevo or the -- Loncarevic in Zenica.

15        Q.   Referring to Judge Trechsel's question of you being mindful of

16     the ethnic composition of villages, could you tell us, was that

17     composition objectively important in terms of controlling certain area,

18     territory, or communications, and reliance on the local population, did

19     it mean something in the doctrine of defence that was applied?

20        A.   Yes, I said it was an important factor.  The personnel, the men,

21     are barracked at their own homes deep in the territory, and they can be

22     put into action.  For a goal -- an offensive goal to be able to be

23     effective, you had to have a manoeuvring unit, and the composition of the

24     people under arms was, of course, very important in that area.

25        Q.   Let's take a look at the next document, 421207 -- 4D1207.  This

Page 47483

 1     is a report from the defence staff of Zenica municipality.  It comes from

 2     the Muslim side, and it's stated here that there was fighting in the

 3     village of Dusina between members of the army and the HVO in the morning

 4     hours on 26th of January, 1993.  And in this fighting, three HVO members

 5     were killed, another three were wounded, and five or six were captured.

 6             Is this statement about the fighting at the Dusina village on

 7     that date correct or truthful or not?

 8        A.   Yes, it is true that they liquidated the HVO and the Croats from

 9     the village of Dusina.  I'm not sure whether there was any fighting, and

10     those captured were later dead or killed.

11        Q.   When you say later on those captured were dead, could you please

12     explain the cause of their death, despite the words that appears in the

13     English translation?  What was the cause of their death?

14        A.   They were executed later on, they were killed.

15        Q.   General, please tell us, who killed those HVO members?

16        A.   To the best of my knowledge, in Busovaca, I don't know the serial

17     number of the brigade, there were parts of the 7th Muslim Brigade in that

18     area.

19        Q.   Fine.  Let's take a look at the next document, 4D1210.  This

20     document, and this is a public announcement by the 3rd Corps Press

21     Centre, the situation is portrayed differently.  In the military report,

22     we have that HVO forces were busted, and in this public announcement it

23     is stated that HVO forces are encircled.  Now, I correct myself.  The

24     inhabitants of the villages of Dusina, Gornja Visnjica and Brdo are now

25     surrounded by HVO forces.

Page 47484

 1             General, when you compare, and if you could remember, the

 2     previous military report and this public announcement, what would you

 3     say?  Would this public announcement be truthful, in terms of how things

 4     are portrayed to the public, or is this distorted?

 5        A.   This is a propaganda warfare, where the situation is depicted

 6     opposite to the reality.  Three villages -- I repeat, three villages were

 7     cleansed in that area.  Ten members of the HVO were killed; not in

 8     fighting, but they were executed.  And for their public, they are stating

 9     that villages are encircled by HVO, which means that Croats killed

10     themselves.  The bottom line, it's propaganda warfare.

11        Q.   Take a look at the next paragraph.  It mentions conflicts within

12     the HVO forces, and Zvonko Rajic and another six extremists are referred

13     to.  To the best of your knowledge, was their demise the result of

14     conflicts between their ranks or were they executed by the BiH Army?

15        A.   No, they were executed, and they have to justify somehow not just

16     the executions, but the fact that they expelled three Croats from three

17     villages and now they are inventing this conflict among HVO forces.  Who

18     the three brothers -- I had a sister of those three brothers coming to

19     me, trying to get me to intervene and bring the responsible persons to

20     book, but this notion is quite interesting.  Internal conflicts within

21     the HVO, so they can whitewash and hide the fact that there were people

22     killed, but now they are explaining that away by internal conflicts

23     within the HVO.

24        Q.   Now we're going to skip the next document, because it requires us

25     to make markings on a map, so we will deal with it tomorrow.

Page 47485

 1             Let's take a look at document 4D1206.

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, maybe it would be

 3     best to continue tomorrow.  Let me tell you that you have used up two

 4     hours and ten minutes so far.  You have one hour and fifty minutes left.

 5     There are a great number of documents.  Please be selective in your use

 6     of documents.

 7             Witness, let me remind you of the basic instructions I already

 8     told you about.  You are not to talk to anyone about the substance of

 9     this hearing.  We're sitting tomorrow in the afternoon, which means that

10     we are expecting you for 2.15.  I hope we'll be able to start on time at

11     2.15 sharp and that we will not have to wait, which is a very unfortunate

12     habit we've been running into lately.

13             I wish you all a pleasant evening, and see you tomorrow.

14                           [The witness stands down]

15                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.58 p.m.,

16                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 1st day of

17                           December, 2009, at 2.15 p.m.