Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 50303

 1                           Wednesday, 3 March 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The Accused Praljak not present]

 5                           [The Accused Petkovic takes the stand]

 6                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, kindly call the

 8     case.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning,

10     everyone in and around the courtroom.

11             This is case number IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus Prlic et

12     al.  Thank you, Your Honours.

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

14             Today is Wednesday, the 3rd of March, 2010.  Let me first greet

15     General Petkovic, Mr. Prlic, Mr. Stojic, Mr. Coric, and Mr. Pusic.  Good

16     morning to the Defence counsel, to you, Mr. Scott, and all your team

17     members, and a very good morning to all the people assisting us.

18             Before we start, one first thing.  Mr. Kovacic has to be on the

19     transcript.  Mr. Praljak is absent, therefore, you are assisting and

20     representing him; is that so?

21             MR. KOVACIC:  Yes, Your Honour.  Yes, thank you for asking.  Yes.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  It's now been

23     recorded.

24             General Petkovic, in a few moments you are going to answer

25     questions by Mr. Scott.  He's going to start with his cross-examination.

Page 50304

 1     You have attended many such occasions, many cross-examinations, and you

 2     know that Mr. Scott is going to ask you leading questions that may not

 3     please you, in which case you have to remain calm and cool-headed.  You

 4     have to ponder the question he's putting to you, and you answer calmly.

 5             As was said on several occasions, cross-examination is a practice

 6     in which you answer, Yes, or, No, I don't know, I don't understand the

 7     question.  And then should the Prosecutor wish to dig a little deeper, he

 8     will do so.  But let's not go into long speeches, because the

 9     Prosecutor's time is precious and he has to put his case to you through

10     the questions he's asking.

11             Furthermore, I do invite the Defence counsel not to interrupt at

12     any moment, because the Prosecutor does his job, even if you don't like

13     it at times, that's what he does.  And if you have objections, they must

14     be on account of technical substantial errors, or technical issues, but

15     not on the merits, because the Prosecutor is entitled to put his case

16     through the questions he's going to ask Mr. Petkovic.

17             Mr. Scott hardly ever intervened during your

18     examination-in-chiefs and the cross-examination, so I hope you will do

19     the same.  What is important is the question and the answer.

20             When I hear a question and I see that somebody's on his feet on

21     the other side, I think that the answer that is about to be given is not

22     going to have the same weight as if the answer had been provided without

23     intervention of Defence counsel, or of counsel.  So I think you get my

24     drift.

25             Mr. Petkovic, you've got the binders in front of you, so you can

Page 50305

 1     follow the documents as they are submitted to you.

 2             So very well.  Everything's ready.  General Petkovic has got his

 3     documents, and you may proceed.

 4                           WITNESS:  MILIVOJ PETKOVIC [Resumed]

 5                           [The witness answered through interpreter]

 6             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 7             Good morning to each of Your Honours.  Good morning to counsel,

 8     all those in and around the courtroom who are helping us.

 9                           Cross-examination by Mr. Scott:

10        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Petkovic.

11        A.   Good morning.

12             MR. SCOTT:  Let me, just as a housekeeping matter, indicate that,

13     while, ultimately there are a number of binders of documents that might

14     be used in the course of this examination.  To make it easier, I hope,

15     for everyone today, I believe all the exhibits -- the documents today

16     will be in the first binder, with the exception that there might be a

17     couple -- I think there are a couple of loose exhibits that, because of

18     my fault, didn't make it into the binder.  But we should in binder

19     number 1, and I think in the course of the day there will be maybe a

20     couple of loose exhibits as well.  And in the days ahead, we'll probably

21     move into some of the other binders.

22        Q.   Now, Mr. Petkovic, we know by now that you previously testified

23     in both the Blaskic and Kordic cases under oath; correct?

24        A.   Yes, Your Honours, that's correct.

25        Q.   In the Kordic case, where you testified the second time, that is,

Page 50306

 1     after the Blaskic testimony, at transcript page 26800, 26800, you

 2     affirmed and adopted your Blaskic testimony.  You said:

 3             "There is nothing I have to change or would want to change."

 4             And is that still correct today?  Do you stand by your Blaskic

 5     testimony?

 6        A.   Yes, Your Honours, I stand by what I said in the Blaskic case.

 7        Q.   And, likewise, Mr. Petkovic, I am sure -- or at least I presume

 8     that in the course of preparing to give your testimony in this case,

 9     before you got up and Ms. Alaburic started putting questions to you, you

10     had occasion to review your testimony in the Kordic case, didn't you?

11        A.   Yes, Your Honours, I went through my testimony in the Kordic

12     case.

13        Q.   And can I ask you, sir, a similar question as I asked you about

14     your Blaskic testimony?  Do you affirm your Kordic testimony as true and

15     accurate, or is there anything in your Kordic testimony that you wish to

16     change?

17        A.   I stand by the testimony that I gave in the Kordic case.

18        Q.   Now, we understand, I think, fairly well by now, sir, that you

19     arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina to take up certain of these new duties and

20     responsibilities on about the 14th of April, 1992; correct?

21        A.   Yes, Your Honours.  That's the date that I always refer to when

22     speaking about the time at which I arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the

23     14th of April, 1992.

24        Q.   And, sir, you've seen -- you've been sitting in this courtroom

25     with all of us these past several years, and, of course, you've seen a

Page 50307

 1     number of the -- well, virtually all of the witnesses, I suppose, and

 2     seen a lot of documents.  And there's just names of a few persons I'd

 3     like to cover with you, if you will, for a few moments.

 4             You saw Mr. Filipovic, who was here and testified in your case,

 5     and we also have some documents that we've seen a number of times from --

 6     regarding Mr. Siljeg.  You knew and know both those individuals; correct?

 7        A.   Yes, Your Honours, I know Colonel Filipovic, and I also know

 8     Colonel Siljeg.

 9        Q.   And do I correctly assume, sir, that you brought Mr. Filipovic as

10     a witness here because you believe that he was a good officer, a

11     professional soldier, reliable and credible?

12        A.   If I hadn't believed that he was such a person, I certainly

13     wouldn't have called him here.

14        Q.   That's what I thought.  And you would trust his judgement?  You

15     respected his work in the past as a professional officer; is that

16     correct?

17        A.   When I was at the head of the Main Staff, as far as I knew, there

18     was nothing I could object to the duties performed by Colonel Filipovic.

19        Q.   And Mr. Siljeg, he was one of your senior officers from the very

20     beginning, the documentation seems to show, from about the same time that

21     you arrived.  He took over very quickly as head of the -- or the

22     commander of the North-West Operative Zone for most of the time, at

23     least, relevant to this case; correct?

24        A.   Your Honours, Colonel Siljeg was there for a long time.  When I

25     arrived, he was already in the area.  Later, he was the commander of the

Page 50308

 1     North-Western Herzegovina Operative Zone.

 2        Q.   So, sir, the answer to my question would be, Yes.  As you know

 3     already, time is precious.  So you've repeated back to me the question I

 4     put to you, essentially the same information, but I do appreciate that

 5     you have confirmed Mr. Siljeg's role at the time.

 6             Mr. Siljeg was another JNA -- former JNA professional officer,

 7     wasn't he?

 8        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 9        Q.   And like Mr. Filipovic, you found him to be a good, professional,

10     and reliable officer, didn't you?

11        A.   Yes, that's correct.  Each in his own specialty.

12        Q.   Well, I must tell you that in the probably thousands, if not tens

13     of thousands of documents that I've seen over the past few years

14     including those in communications between you and Mr. Siljeg, I have

15     never seen any complaints or criticisms that you directed towards

16     Mr. Siljeg or his conduct during 1992/1993.  Would you agree with that?

17        A.   It's difficult to remember these things now, but there probably

18     wasn't any criticism.  There were probably just certain requests that

19     were made.

20        Q.   In your Kordic testimony, you described the time when you arrived

21     in Bosnia in mid-April, as we discussed a moment ago.  You described it

22     and used the words "it was an embryonic time in the establishment of the

23     HVO armed forces"; correct?

24        A.   Yes, that's correct.

25        Q.   And you likewise testified in Kordic that prior to your arrival,

Page 50309

 1     there had been no one there to prepare and organise the HVO military;

 2     correct?

 3        A.   Not at the level that I later occupied, but at other levels in

 4     municipalities, yes, there were people who were responsible for

 5     organising the army.

 6        Q.   Sir, you said in Kordic, at 26691:

 7             "There was no one at the time to prepare and organise the

 8     Croatian Defence Council"; correct?

 9        A.   Yes, that's correct, that what I had in mind was higher levels,

10     not levels below the Main Staff in the HZ-HB.

11        Q.   Well, you heard Mr. Filipovic testify here, and Mr. Filipovic

12     testified that when he came into the situation, he found the situation

13     chaotic and almost nothing functioned properly.  You would agree with

14     that assessment, wouldn't you?

15        A.   Yes, fully.  It was the beginning.  I don't really want to say

16     that it had to be that way, but that's how it was.

17        Q.   And I don't think we need to pause and stop and look at it, in

18     the interests of time, given your testimony, but I'll just mention, in

19     fact, you gave an interview on the 31st of December, 1994, which, if the

20     courtroom does wish to look at it, is P11167.  And in that interview, you

21     said then, many years ago, 15 years ago almost, what you said just now:

22             "The Croatian Defence Council was neither organised nor

23     structured.  They lacked officers at the command level"; correct?

24        A.   Yes, that's correct.

25        Q.   And you saw your responsibility, on arriving on the scene as a

Page 50310

 1     former professional JNA officer -- you remained a professional officer, I

 2     suppose, but not in the JNA any longer.  You said, about as your primary

 3     responsibility or activity, is organising the HVO as a military force;

 4     correct?

 5        A.   Yes.  In addition to carrying out ongoing combat, the task was

 6     also to organise the HVO in a more efficient manner.

 7        Q.   In the operative zones or what became the operative zones, for

 8     example, Mr. Blaskic had been appointed commander or head of the Central

 9     Bosnia Operative Zone by late June 1992; correct?

10        A.   Yes, that's correct.  In June 1992, he was appointed as the

11     commander of -- what was it officially called?  Well, yes, we can say it

12     was Central Bosnia.

13        Q.   And by the fall of 1992, sir, these forms of organisations that

14     had existed previously, and I think you may have mentioned it a moment or

15     two ago, the municipal staffs, so the crisis staffs, by the fall of 1992

16     you had been successful in largely abolishing those, with a new structure

17     based on brigades being put in place; correct?

18        A.   Yes, but that came to an end towards the end of the year.  We

19     started doing this in the autumn, and it came to an end towards the end

20     of the year.

21        Q.   Well, there may have been different stages in different places, I

22     agree, sir.  But as early as September, you were giving orders to

23     Mr. Blaskic, for example, as part of this new structure, weren't you?

24        A.   Yes, that's correct.  There was the Central Bosnian Operative

25     Zone, but not all the units of the Municipal Staff had been transformed

Page 50311

 1     into brigades.  This was the case in 1993.  At the end of 1992, as far as

 2     I can remember, we had moved on to a brigade structure.

 3        Q.   All right.  Then can we agree to this much and then move forward:

 4     And you I might not agree on an exact date, but you would agree, and we

 5     do seem to agree, that by late 1992, the brigade -- the HVO brigade

 6     structure was in place and going forward; correct?

 7        A.   Yes, that's what I said, at the end of 1992, and that's the

 8     system that was in place in 1993.  So in 1992, as far as I can remember,

 9     these municipal staffs were completely dismantled.

10        Q.   And during this same period of time, sir, the new BiH government

11     forces, initially called the Territorial Defence, not the old Territorial

12     Defence under the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but under the new

13     Territorial Defence established by the BiH Presidency on the 8th of

14     April, 1992, and then later became known as the ABiH or the Army of

15     Bosnia-Herzegovina, during this period that armed force was also being

16     established and organised, April, May, June 1992; correct?

17        A.   Yes, that's correct.  And in June, I think that was when they

18     went through the last stage.  It went through several stages.  I think it

19     was in June that the official term for all the forces was the ABiH.

20        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And during this time, the BiH -- these BiH

21     forces - let's just call them that for the moment - TO, ABiH, but they

22     were essentially doing many of the same things, they were trying to get

23     organised, they were looking for -- they were recruiting a number of

24     former JNA officers, they were really doing a lot of the same things that

25     the HVO -- that you were doing on the HVO side; correct?

Page 50312

 1        A.   Yes, that's correct.  The procedure had to be identical because

 2     everything had to be done from the very beginning on both sides.  No one

 3     was in a position to just come across units.

 4        Q.   Mr. Filipovic testified in the Kordic case, and I believe again

 5     here, that on the ABiH side, during this period April to July 1992 or so,

 6     there were actually more former JNA officers on the ABiH side, if you

 7     will, than in the HVO.  Would you agree with him?

 8        A.   Yes, that's correct, I fully agree, because most of the Muslims

 9     in the JNA were from the territory of the then Republic of Bosnia and

10     Herzegovina.

11        Q.   And Mr. Filipovic also testified that by June 1992, the

12     Territorial Defence or the ABiH had developed actually into a much larger

13     force, at least in terms of personnel and manpower, than the HVO; is that

14     correct?

15        A.   Yes, that's correct.  The territory where it was being

16     established was also larger and its population was larger.  When I refer

17     to "territory," I'm referring to the territory of Eastern Bosnia that was

18     covered by units of the ABiH.  There were no HVO members there, apart

19     from in the Tuzla area.  So the ABiH covered the entire territory of

20     Eastern Bosnia.  Bihac was also included.

21             THE INTERPRETER:  The witness mentioned another town.  The

22     interpreter didn't hear the name.  Could the witness please be asked to

23     speak up, as he's speaking very softly.  Thank you.

24             MR. SCOTT:

25        Q.   Mr. Petkovic, I think you will have heard that the interpreters

Page 50313

 1     would appreciate if you could speak a bit more loudly, please.

 2             Mr. Filipovic also said, sir, that as of the June 1992, the ABiH

 3     carried its part of the burden and responsibility and was on an equal

 4     footing in its ability to fight at the defence lines obviously against

 5     the Serbs.  You also agree with that?

 6        A.   Yes, I fully agree with that.  Once it was formed, they took up

 7     certain positions, they were responsible for certain lines, and they were

 8     more or less capable of defending themselves.

 9        Q.   All right.  Can you turn, please, in the binder to P11219,

10     P11219.  It's loose, it's one of the loose ones, Your Honours, and the

11     courtroom.  I think it's right next to you there, sir.  I can see it.

12     P11219.

13             Just very briefly, sir, this is a copy of a decision of the BiH

14     Presidency, I believe, on the 18th of August, 1992, where they also were

15     going through various organisation and reorganisation, and it was around

16     this time that they went to -- just as you went to your structures, they

17     went to a structure involving corps, correct, essentially regional corps?

18        A.   Yes, that's correct.

19             JUDGE PRANDLER:  Mr. Scott, sorry, but at least myself, I haven't

20     found it.  Binder 1, you said?

21             MR. SCOTT:  It's loose, Your Honour.  It's one of the loose

22     exhibits.  My apologies.

23             JUDGE PRANDLER:  Thank you.

24             MR. SCOTT:

25        Q.   And in particular, sir, the fourth -- I'm going to direct your

Page 50314

 1     attention and the courtroom's attention to, under Article 1, Roman

 2     numeral I:  "The 4th Corps, Mostar," and you see that.  And if you turn

 3     over, I don't know about in the Croatian language version, but in the

 4     English version, below the second -- below the middle of the second page,

 5     and I'm sure you'll be able to find it, the area covered by the 4th Corps

 6     is described, and it says:

 7             "The 4th Corps, the headquarters of which is in Mostar."

 8             And then it covers these following areas:  Bjelica, Capljina,

 9     Citluk, Gacko, Grude, Jablanica, Konjic, Ljubuski, Mostar, et cetera.

10     You see that?

11        A.   Yes, I do, item 4.

12        Q.   And would you agree with me, sir, that the 4th Corps covered not

13     all, not all, but much of the territory or municipalities claimed to

14     comprise the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna?

15        A.   First, I should say something about the date.  The 4th Corps was

16     formed at the beginning of November 1992.  On paper, it covered this

17     area, but in no other way.  So on paper, yes, it had these

18     municipalities, but none of its forces were present in those

19     municipalities.

20        Q.   Well, there was a Muslim formation in the Mostar region, wasn't

21     there, in 1992?

22        A.   Yes.  We can mention which municipalities these are.  I think

23     that would be fair, if you agree.

24        Q.   Well -- no, let me just focus on Mostar, for example.  There

25     was -- wasn't there something called the Independent Battalion, or the

Page 50315

 1     Mostar Brigade, or Mostar Battalion, that was primarily a Muslim unit, if

 2     you will, or ABiH unit?

 3        A.   Yes, exactly.  That was the 1st Mostar Brigade at the time, which

 4     had been established some 20 days ago.  It started -- establishment

 5     started in July 1992.  All these other places, except for Jablanica and

 6     Konjic, were places where there was no one soldier of the ABiH to be

 7     found.

 8        Q.   Well, if we have time, we'll come back to some of that

 9     eventually, perhaps.  But we have the 4th Corps established, and we see

10     the area which it was at least intended to cover.

11             Now, we can stop briefly, perhaps, and this will be in the

12     binder, on 4D00830.  I think it's the last document in the first binder

13     that we're using today, 4D00830.

14             While you're looking for that, sir, just for the record, I'll say

15     that this is your report on the work of the HVO, essentially from the

16     time you arrived, it says on page 1 -- the report itself -- let me back

17     up and say the report, itself, is dated February 4th, 1993, covering the

18     period April 14, 1992, through December 31, 1992.  And I think, sir, if

19     you look through that, and we're not going to stop and look at the

20     document in detail at all, but simply for you to know and for the

21     courtroom to see that many of the things we've talked about in the last

22     few minutes are, in fact, covered in your report.  You talk about the

23     organisation of the brigades.  Under the second heading overall, not

24     number 2, but at the end of, I guess, end of unit 1, you say:

25             "General conclusion.  Nowadays, HVO forces successfully hold

Page 50316

 1     under their control 90 per cent of the area mapped out as HZ-HB, and they

 2     are capable and ready to defend it, provide they get better material

 3     support."

 4             Item number 3:

 5             "Organisation of HVO forces.  HVO forces were organised in the

 6     course of combat activities throughout the entire territory of HZ-HB.

 7     Organisation of HVO forces through temporary formations is almost

 8     finished, and nowadays we have the following scheme:"

 9             And then you lay out that scheme, basically, the HVO General or

10     Main Staff for operational zones and the brigade structure in each of the

11     zones.  And we're going to come to that in just a few minutes.

12             At the last item before number item 4, if you can find that,

13     there's a section titled "4" that says "Personnel Issues and Drafting."

14     We can use that, please, as a landmark, and if we look immediately above

15     that, you say in your report:

16             "Formation of brigades cancelled municipal staffs, and this added

17     to commanding quality while units gained mobility"; correct?

18        A.   Yes, that's what I stated here, that by this means and at that

19     moment, a small step toward a better organisation had been made.

20        Q.   Well, it wasn't such a small step, was it, sir?  It was a rather

21     large step, and largely you're responsible for it, to your credit.  You

22     had achieved, in a relatively short time, improving the HVO military

23     organisation rather substantially.  I don't think you have to be unduly

24     modest in this situation.  You did that, didn't you?

25        A.   Yes, I did that, but this couldn't have been a step of five

Page 50317

 1     miles.  These were only the first steps.  Like this, we let the

 2     municipalities know that they were not supposed to interfere, but to keep

 3     out of that.  But certainly the fact that at least on paper we took away

 4     the extensive powers that the municipalities had had before was certainly

 5     a step forward.

 6        Q.   And you would agree, sir, again, with the view expressed by

 7     Mr. Filipovic, that:

 8             "By the end of 1992, the HVO was fairly organised and represented

 9     a significant fighting force"?

10        A.   The HVO had its organisational structure on paper.  Our

11     assessment was that we had up to 45.000 men, and that was the utmost that

12     the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina could rally, not more than

13     that, because simply there weren't enough Croats.

14        Q.   With that background and that foundation laid, let's look,

15     please, at Exhibit P11123.

16             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, one small question.

17             As regards the last document, the 4D0830, do you intend to refer

18     to Prozor again in future, because this document provides an explanation

19     for the events in Prozor.  If you get back to it, I will not put a

20     question, but if you don't, I would like to put a question.

21             MR. SCOTT:  Your Honour, I'd have to say the honest answer to

22     your question is, given the time constraints and the evolving nature of

23     the cross and how time goes, I don't know for sure that we'll come back

24     to it.  So if you would like to ask your question, of course, I invite

25     you to.

Page 50318

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, this is an

 2     extremely short question I'd like to put to you.

 3             I discover in this document, in paragraph 5, you explain the

 4     events in Prozor, and I read what you have written, that the Muslims

 5     attacked in Prozor, they attacked, in fact, because they wanted to take

 6     control of the hydroelectric power-plant.  This is what you have written.

 7     Can you confirm this or not?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can confirm that,

 9     Your Honour.  I confirm everything I wrote here under item 5, and that

10     refers to the Prozor region.

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you are saying that in

12     Prozor, it was the Muslims who attacked, because they killed one of your

13     soldiers.  This is what you write.  And the purpose was to control the

14     hydroelectric power-plant.  You explain that the HVO intervened and that

15     extremist -- Muslim extremist groups were still provocative and fueling

16     the conflict.  It's always interesting to look at the document.  And you

17     add all of this for the benefit of KOS.

18             What did you mean by this; that the Serbs were behind all of

19     this?

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour Judge Antonetti, when I

21     say "KOS," I must add that KOS wasn't manned by Serbs only.  There were

22     Croats, Slovenians, Muslims, Macedonians in their ranks too, everybody

23     who had been citizens of Yugoslavia.  So KOS wasn't manned only by ethnic

24     Serbs.  They may have been the majority because they were the most

25     numerous group, but KOS comprised persons from all peoples, and whoever

Page 50319

 1     want to do join KOS would do so, irrespective of their ethnic

 2     affiliation.  Or, rather, only those would be allowed to join who had

 3     been assessed by the KOS as being able to provide good quality work.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, the floor is yours

 5     again.

 6             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 7             If we could then turn, please, if you haven't done so already, to

 8     P11123, P11123, in, again, the first binder or the binder we're using

 9     today.

10        Q.   Sir, this is a chart that I think it's come up before, and I mean

11     to spend a lot of time on it, but I did want to touch on it in leading to

12     something else.  This was a chart that you prepared and was prepared and

13     used by you in connection with your Blaskic testimony; correct?

14        A.   Yes, I think so.

15        Q.   And I take it, sir, that you again stand by this diagram or

16     chart, if you will, as continuing to be true and accurate, according to

17     you.

18             Page 3 of the e-court.  Yes, thank you.

19             You stand by it, don't you?

20        A.   Yes, Your Honours, I stand by this schematic I drew back then or,

21     rather, which I drafted.

22        Q.   I might just say for the record, sir, because we'll, again, not

23     have time to cover everything that we might otherwise, but I think we're

24     probably pretty much in agreement on most of the chart, you and I.  And I

25     will just note that the Prosecution does not accept or agree with the

Page 50320

 1     placement of the Convicts Battalion, but I'm not sure we'll come back to

 2     that or not.  But overall this shows the structure from the supreme

 3     commander, and I take it that's Mr. Boban; correct?  Mr. Boban; correct?

 4        A.   Yes, it's Mr. Mate Boban, this box which reads "Supreme

 5     Commander."  And at that moment, he was alone there, without anybody

 6     around him.

 7        Q.   And beneath him we have the "Defence Department," and that was

 8     headed by Mr. Stojic; correct?

 9        A.   Yes, Mr. Stojic was there until the 15th of November, 1993, I

10     believe, from the 3rd of July, 1992, if I'm not mistaken.  If I am,

11     please correct me.

12        Q.   I think that's right.  And the Main Staff, of course, through

13     1992 and at least up until about November of 1993, the head of the

14     Main Staff or the command -- the number-one commander, so to speak, was

15     either you or Mr. Praljak; correct?

16        A.   We can be more accurate.  That would be better.  On the 24th of

17     July, 1993, I handed over my duty to General Praljak.  And on the 9th of

18     November, 1993, he handed it over to General Roso.  That was his last day

19     on duty.  He left on that day.

20        Q.   And we can agree and confirm that the special units, at least, or

21     special units called the Bruno Busic, the Vitezovi, and the

22     Ludvig Pavlovic, were linked to and, some would say, the assets of the

23     Main Staff; correct?

24        A.   They are units subordinate to the staff, that's what they were

25     called, in the Yugoslav People's Army.  So they were at the disposal of

Page 50321

 1     the Main Staff, rather than the operative zone, until they are attached

 2     to the operative zones.

 3        Q.   Now, I'm going to ask you now to look and the courtroom to look

 4     in Sanction at an excerpt of your Blaskic testimony on this matter.  And

 5     the Chamber's seen this before, but I must say I did find it to be a

 6     rather good and concise outline of these matters that you presented.  I

 7     just want to go through it with you briefly.

 8             We've already talked about your measures to accede to and speed

 9     up the establishment of brigades of the Croatian Defence Council, and

10     then it goes on to say:

11             "Furthermore, there was a reorganisation of the military

12     territorial division or, rather, the creation of operative zones.

13             "Therefore, I now wish to present to you a diagram of the

14     structure of the HVO in the period from 1992 until the end of 1993,"

15     which has been marked in this case as the document we just looked at,

16     11123:

17             "The Decree on Armed Forces stipulated that the

18     commander-in-chief was at the head of the army.

19             "His administrative office comprised the Defence Department, and

20     within the Defence Department, as an operative department, was the

21     Main Staff of the Croatian Defence Council.

22             "So I shall repeat this.  The supreme commander was at the head

23     of the army.  The administrative section was called the Defence

24     Department."

25             Now, let's pause there.  Everything -- you agree with and stand

Page 50322

 1     by your Blaskic testimony as to all those matters?

 2        A.   No, I didn't put it like that.  I didn't say that the

 3     commander-in-chief was in the Defence Department.  The Main Staff was in

 4     the Defence Department, but the supreme commander was outside, and that's

 5     how it is represented here.

 6        Q.   Excuse me.

 7        A.   The Main Staff is an integral part of the Defence Department.

 8        Q.   Yes, I'm sorry.  Well, it may have been translation, sir, because

 9     what's on the page, I'll be corrected, I'm sure, if I'm wrong, is a

10     verbatim taken -- lifted directly out of the transcript of your

11     testimony, so with apologies to interpretation, it may have been

12     misheard:

13             "The supreme commander was at the head of the army, the

14     administrative section was called the Defence Department.

15             "Within the Defence Department, there was a Main Staff as the

16     operative part."

17             You agree with all that?

18        A.   Yes, that's correct, I agree.

19        Q.   "The Main Staff had direct communications with the commands of

20     the operative zones.  There was the operative zone with its seat in

21     Mostar, the operative zone with its seat in Tomislavgrad, the operative

22     zone with its seat in Vitez, and the operative zone with its seat in

23     Orasje:

24             "A certain number of brigades, battalions, and other units were

25     directly linked to each operative zone."

Page 50323

 1             And we're not going to go through those now:

 2             "As for the Main Staff, the first professional units of the

 3     Croatian Defence Council were directly linked to them, that is to say,

 4     the Bruno Busic Regiment, the Vitezovi, the Ludvig Pavlovic Battalion."

 5             And you stand by all that, don't you, sir?

 6        A.   Yes, I do, and that's why I drew the schematic the way I drew it.

 7     But if you want me to add, the Operative Zone of Orasje, on the 15th of

 8     October, 1992, was integrated into the command structure of the

 9     Main Staff.  Until that time, it was separate and part of the Bosnian

10     Posavina community.

11        Q.   All right.  And before we leave this particular aspect, and if we

12     had -- we don't need to look back at it, necessarily.  But when you had

13     the "Supreme Commander" box that we had up before, that was Mr. Boban

14     from at least the time that you arrived in April of 1992, and continued

15     to be the case until at least the end of 1993; correct?

16        A.   I think it would be more correct to say February 1994.  I believe

17     that he was replaced by Mr. Zubak then.

18        Q.   That's correct, sir.  And I did say "at least until the end of

19     1993," just to try to avoid getting into a debate with you, but you're

20     absolutely right.  February 1994, and I believe he was actually replaced

21     by a presidential council, of which Mr. Zubak was the head; is that

22     correct?

23        A.   Yes, that's correct.

24        Q.   If we could look -- pause briefly on Exhibit P11124, the next

25     exhibit after the one we were just looking at a moment ago, P11124.

Page 50324

 1             In your Blaskic testimony, you likewise presented a chart of the

 2     organisation of the Defence Department, headed by Mr. Stojic.  Do you see

 3     that?  Do you see that, sir, and do you still stand by that as an

 4     accurate portrayal of the structure?

 5        A.   No, this is not an accurate portrayal of the structure.  It

 6     wasn't my intention here to present the structure of the Department of

 7     Defence.  I only wanted to show how an administration was organised;

 8     namely, the Military Police Administration --

 9        Q.   Well, you don't disagree, sir --

10        A.   -- because there are elements missing here, such as assistants,

11     et cetera.  Some administrations were added that are of no special

12     significance, but the Military Police Administration has been

13     highlighted.  But this isn't the original structure of the Department of

14     Defence, nor was it my intention to present it here, because lots of

15     things are missing; assistants, deputy, et cetera.

16        Q.   I'm going to cut you off for now.  Sorry, you know our time is

17     precious.

18             This is the chart that you presented under oath, titled "Chart of

19     the HVO Structure, 1992-1993."  And I understand, sir, almost any chart

20     could show more detail.  But as far as this chart goes, you previously

21     confirmed it under oath as accurate, and you would agree with that today,

22     wouldn't you?

23             Excuse me.  I don't think we need any answers from the Defence.

24     Mr. Stojic just said, no, out loud in the courtroom.

25             THE ACCUSED STOJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I was waiting,

Page 50325

 1     but this isn't the way it was.  You know yourself -- we've been here for

 2     four years on trial.  You know that there wasn't such a structure.  Thank

 3     you very much.

 4             I apologise for butting in like this.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can answer.

 6             As far as I remember, I didn't say that --

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment, General Petkovic.

 8             The Trial Chamber is asking the other accused not to interfere in

 9     the cross-examination.  Mr. Scott is putting a question to the general,

10     and it is for the general to answer.  Now, if this does have a

11     side-effect, that is another matter.

12             General Petkovic, the document Mr. Scott is showing you is

13     seemingly a document which you presented when you testified under oath?

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, correct.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I can see that the figure 9 is

16     mentioned here.  This means that you must have prepared several

17     documents.  I always look at the documents in your language to see

18     whether they've been translated properly into English.  In your language,

19     I discover that as far as what you said regarding the military police,

20     where it says "HVO" and the operative zones in the document, in your

21     language you have put a dotted line between the operative zone and the

22     battalions of the military police.  In the English version, this is not a

23     dotted line.  This is a hyphen.  Why was there a dotted line in the text

24     in your language?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this is how I wanted

Page 50326

 1     to show the provisions of the Decree on the Structure of the Military

 2     Police, as adopted in December 1992, which means that the 2nd Battalion

 3     was carrying out its duties in Tomislavgrad OZ, the 3rd Battalion in OZ

 4     Mostar, the 4th Battalion in the territory of OZ Vitez, and the last one

 5     wasn't a battalion at the time, only a company, and it was active in OZ

 6     Orasje.  That's the meaning of these dotted lines.  This is in accordance

 7     with the document adopted on the 26th of December, 1992.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you for having clarified

 9     this.  Let me finish.

10             I listened carefully to the question put by the Prosecutor

11     concerning the documents, and the Prosecutor re-read to you what you had

12     stated during your former testimony.  I must say that this made me

13     reflect on this.

14             You said that the supreme commander, Mr. Boban -- everybody

15     understood that.  But then you added that the administrative section was

16     called "Defence Department."  I understand what this is.  But then you

17     added, and Mr. Scott read this out slowly, what you stated, you said that

18     within this there was the Main Staff regarding operational issues.  And I

19     don't understand this, because you are saying that the Defence Department

20     is administrative, but inside it there is an operational component of the

21     Main Staff which is part of the Defence Department.  I must say that I

22     don't understand this.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour Judge Antonetti, if you

24     read the Decree on the Armed Forces of the HZ-HB, you will read that the

25     Department of Defence carries out staff duties for the president or the

Page 50327

 1     Presidency or, to simplify, for the commander-in-chief.  And then there's

 2     another item for the carrying out of staff duties.  In the framework of

 3     the Defence Department, the Main Staff is established or shall be

 4     established.  It is logical that the Main Staff inside the Defence

 5     Department proclaims itself -- and it doesn't need to proclaim itself

 6     because it is a staff body, an operative body, and will carry out such

 7     activities upon the request of the commander-in-chief.  And that's what

 8     the Decree on the Armed Forces says.  And in the first part, it is also

 9     graphically represented like that.

10             You may be confused by the fact that I didn't place the

11     Main Staff inside the same box as the Defence Department, and instead

12     draw a line between them showing a link.  The Main Staff is a staff body

13     and an operational body doing such work for the commander-in-chief.  We

14     can return to that and check, and you will see that it is an accurate

15     depiction of the situation.

16             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] My last question:  In the

17     Croatian Army and in the JNA, was it -- was there the same structure?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  In the Croatian Army, there

19     was a main staff organised in the same way.  It was an operative body of

20     the supreme commander.  In the JNA, there was the so-called -- there was

21     the so-called Main Staff of the JNA.  It was also a staff body of the

22     Supreme Command.  The JNA had a supreme command at the time, so there was

23     some of them who formed part of that Supreme Command, and this General

24     Staff -- Main Staff was the operative body to produce at the lowest

25     level.  So you can understand this, it was like a staff within an

Page 50328

 1     operative zone or staff within a brigade.  It was involved in operative

 2     duties on behalf of the supreme commander in the HVO and in the Republic

 3     of Croatia.  And Serbia or Yugoslavia had this so-called Supreme Command,

 4     and this staff performed duties -- worked for the needs of this Supreme

 5     Command.

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] For the sake of completeness,

 7     was it the same structure in the ABiH?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the ABiH, yes, there was this

 9     General Staff or, rather, they called it the Staff of the Supreme

10     Command.  We called it the Main Staff, and the Serbs called it the

11     General Staff.  The JNA used this term that was, for example, the nature

12     of the General Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska.  General Halilovic

13     was the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command, I was the Chief of Staff

14     of the HVO Main Staff, and I don't know who occupied that position in

15     Serbia at the time; Perisic, for example, if he was the Chief of the

16     General Staff, or perhaps it was someone else.  All these bodies were

17     staff bodies.  They were involved in work that was carried out on behalf

18     of the supreme commander.

19             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

20             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Your Honour.

21             I think there might have been -- either Mr. Petkovic may have

22     misspoke, or there may have been a mistranslation, but I don't believe

23     Mr. Halilovic was ever the Chief of the Main Staff of the HVO.  Or maybe

24     I misheard.

25        Q.   Is that correct, sir?  In any event, that's what I heard at one

Page 50329

 1     point.  You were talking about --

 2        A.   General Halilovic was the Chief of the Main Staff -- of the

 3     General Staff of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Perhaps there was

 4     some confusion.

 5        Q.   If I can ask you to turn to Exhibit P04527, P04527.

 6        A.   Is it at the beginning of my binder?

 7        Q.   We're not going in numerical order, sir, and I'm not sure I can

 8     tell you exactly.  Probably more in the second half.  4527.

 9        A.   It's a bit difficult to find.

10        Q.   I understand.  Sir, my question here is not so much about the

11     content of the document, other than the list of names that we see here.

12             For the record, this is a communication or order from a commander

13     in the military police, dated the 26th of August, 1993.  And if you look

14     at the nine names -- let me first ask -- let me first pause at

15     Mr. Stanko Matic.  Can you just remind us of the position held by

16     Mr. Matic as of the 26th of August, 1993?

17        A.   Stanko Matic was General Zarko Tole's deputy, the deputy of the

18     commander [as interpreted] of the Main Staff.  You knew that at the

19     Main Staff we had a commander.  That was the structure at the time.  So

20     he was the deputy, General Tole's deputy.

21             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I really have to

22     correct the transcript.  Line 16, it says "Commander of the Main Staff,"

23     whereas the general, in fact, said "the Chief of the Main Staff."  So

24     Stanko Bozic [as interpreted] was Zarko Tole's deputy or, rather, he was

25     the deputy of the Chief of the Main Staff.

Page 50330

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Stanko Matic, not Bozic.

 2             MR. SCOTT:  Correct.

 3        Q.   Sir, putting aside the military police --

 4             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I apologise.  The translation in

 5     line 22 is wrong again.  I said Stanko Matic was the deputy of the Chief

 6     of the Main Staff.

 7             MR. SCOTT:

 8        Q.   Putting aside, sir, the military police, would you agree with me

 9     this list of nine persons gives us a -- essentially a list of the very

10     top of the HVO military and defence structure, as of August 1993, either

11     in the Defence Department, Mr. Stojic, Mr. Bozic, Mr. Lucic, or in the

12     operations of the Main Staff, Mr. Praljak, Mr. Petkovic, et cetera?  This

13     gives us really the main players, doesn't it?

14        A.   These are the main players in the Defence Department or in the

15     Main Staff.

16        Q.   I'd like to ask you a few questions in this relation -- excuse

17     me, in relation to this structure and what we've been talking about so

18     far.

19             From the documents that I've seen, sir, the HVO command and

20     reporting structure essentially involved a daily report up the chain.

21     And by "up the chain," I mean if you want to say starting at the lower

22     levels, and I won't go too low, but for present purposes, you had a daily

23     report from the company commander to the brigade commander, from the

24     brigade commander to the operative zone commander, from the operative

25     zone commander to the Main Staff; correct?

Page 50331

 1        A.   That was a principle that one had to abide by, but there were

 2     cases in which this principle wasn't respected.  But that was the

 3     principle that was in force in the HVO.

 4        Q.   And it was required, wasn't it, that the commander at each level

 5     would have to sign off on this report or approve the report, the content

 6     of the report, or, of course, if the commander, himself, was not

 7     available, then someone who was authorised to act on his behalf, a deputy

 8     or some such person, a person in authority would have to sign off that

 9     the content was, so far as they knew, at least, true and accurate;

10     correct?

11        A.   Your Honours, it depended on the nature of the report.  If it was

12     treated as a regular operative report, then it would be drafted by an

13     operations officer who was on duty at the time.  Sometimes he would put

14     his name at the bottom of the document, because it was really the

15     operations officer, and sometimes the commander's name would be put down,

16     and it would be sent in that form.  So operative officers would sign

17     reports when they were on duty, and they would forward them up the chain

18     of command from brigades to the operative zone and then up towards the

19     Main Staff.  The commander of an operative zone would, on occasion, sign

20     the document if he was present there, if his name was placed on the

21     document.  But usually those in the operative service on duty had to

22     draft these reports, and they had the right to forward such reports, only

23     the reports they received from others.  They didn't have the right to

24     assess certain situations or draw conclusions.  They would draft the

25     final reports and then forward them.

Page 50332

 1        Q.   If Mr. Siljeg represented the situation this way, that he, as the

 2     operative zone commander, if he was present at the time, it would be he

 3     that would sign off on the reports before they went out, or if he was not

 4     there, then his deputy would do that for him, that would be the general

 5     practice, wouldn't it?

 6        A.   Your Honours, if it was an operative report, then Mr. Siljeg's

 7     name could be there, without him having signed the document, and it would

 8     then be sent.  The operative officer would sign operative reports.  At

 9     the end of his shift, he would draft an operative report.  He would then

10     inform Siljeg of the report, or, rather, any other commander present.

11     Siljeg might sign it, but not necessarily.  It could have been signed on

12     his behalf, and then it could have been forwarded in that form.  So it

13     wasn't necessary for each such report to be signed by the commander of

14     the operative zone.  The operative officer communicates with the

15     operative officer in the Main Staff, and they send these reports to each

16     other.

17        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And you and Mr. Praljak, at the time that you

18     were either number one or number two, so to speak, you were generally

19     available to your commanders, weren't you?  They could reach you if they

20     wanted to, normally, by telephone, by radio, by some means; you were

21     generally available to your commanders, weren't you?

22        A.   Each and every commander who felt the need to come and discuss

23     certain matters would have to be received.  If a commander said --

24        Q.   Excuse me, sir.  I'm going to have to begin -- you know our time

25     is precious, and I'm trying to be patient and I haven't been cutting you

Page 50333

 1     off, but I'm going to have to begin doing that more, I'm afraid.  I'm

 2     sorry if that's discourteous.

 3             But not just to come to you, sir, but you were available to -- by

 4     communication.  For example, Mr. -- if Mr. Siljeg represented that he

 5     was, for the most part -- and of course there were exceptions, but for

 6     the most part he was able to pick up the telephone at any time and reach

 7     you by phone, you would agree with that, wouldn't you?

 8        A.   He would phone me.  He had a phone.  His duty was to phone

 9     whenever he felt that he had to have contact with me.

10        Q.   My apologies, but the answer to my question is, Yes, one word,

11     Yes, he did.

12        A.   Yes, yes.  But you're talking about him coming by using the

13     phone.  That's not how it's done.

14        Q.   Well, sir, there could be any number of means.  I started my

15     question to you, and I'm not going to spend time arguing with you about

16     his, but I first simply asked you:  You were available to your commanders

17     by various means of communication, whether it was telephone, radio, face

18     to face, you were generally available to your commanders.  I believe you

19     said, Yes.  I further put to you that, in addition, generally speaking,

20     one could pick up the phone and reach you, and your answer just now was,

21     Yes; correct?

22        A.   Yes, yes, that's correct.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Now, in the course -- we've heard in the course of

24     your testimony, and in the testimony of others, for that matter, that you

25     obviously weren't sitting at your desk at the HVO headquarters all the

Page 50334

 1     time.  We know you were in Geneva, you were in Zagreb, you were in Split,

 2     you were in Grude, you were in Vitez, you were in Kiseljak.  When either

 3     you or Mr. Praljak would not be physically present at HVO headquarters,

 4     how would people trying to reach you or needing to be in communication

 5     with you, how would they reach you or communicate with you?

 6        A.   Well, it was possible to find out through the Main Staff where we

 7     were at the time.  And if there was a phone number, they could find out

 8     where we were, and they would then phone the number.  If I was in

 9     Sarajevo, I couldn't be reached.  If I was in Geneva, I couldn't be

10     reached.  But if I was in Citluk, then he'd have a look in the telephone

11     directory and phone the number in Citluk and ask the commander if the

12     general was there, Can I speak to him, he would say, and that's how he

13     could establish contact.

14        Q.   Well, sir, I dare to say you could be reached in Geneva and other

15     places.  I mean, people could find you if they wanted to.  Mr. Petkovic

16     is attending meetings in Geneva this week.  He can be reached through the

17     Croatian Ministry of Defence, he can be reached at Hotel so-and-so.

18     Surely people could reach you.  You're an important man.  People needed

19     to be able to reach you, didn't they?

20        A.   No one phoned me throughout that period of time, no one was

21     provided with the number.  When necessary, I would go to the Croatian

22     Embassy and establish contact.  On the 21st of January, for example, with

23     the HVO --

24             THE INTERPRETER:  On the 24th of January.  Interpreter's

25     correction, sorry.

Page 50335

 1             MR. SCOTT:  My apologies for cutting across.

 2        Q.   Let's just talk about some of the locations you did go within

 3     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  You spent -- you made a number of visits, from

 4     the documentation, to the Central Bosnia Operative Zone.  You went to

 5     Vitez and met with Mr. Blaskic on occasion.  How many times can you tell

 6     us that you were in Vitez in 1993?

 7        A.   Six or seven times.  I might be able to remember the dates when I

 8     was there.  There were conversations, discussions, with Halilovic --

 9        Q.   You've answered my question.

10        A.   -- in Zenica.

11        Q.   Six or seven times.  And can I ask you, approximately how many

12     times in 1993 were you in Kiseljak?

13        A.   I couldn't give you a number.  I went to Kiseljak quite

14     frequently because of the duties I had with regard to UNPROFOR or,

15     rather, the international community, and also to get out the wounded,

16     because we had a base where we had received the wounded, and this base

17     was located in Kiseljak, and that's where we evacuated them from in

18     Central Bosnia.  But I really couldn't provide you with a number.

19        Q.   A dozen times, 15 times, 20 times?

20        A.   Twenty times for sure, perhaps even twenty-five times.

21        Q.   And when you were in Vitez or in Kiseljak, how would the people

22     at your headquarters operations in Herzegovina, how would they

23     communicate with you?

24        A.   There was a telephone line between the Kiseljak Main Staff and

25     the Vitez Main Staff.  It has been shown here in these proceedings.

Page 50336

 1        Q.   Well, not just between the Kiseljak Main Staff and Vitez, but

 2     there were phone communications between headquarters in Herzegovina and

 3     Vitez, the Central Bosnia Operative Zone headquarters, and communications

 4     directly from Herzegovina headquarters to Kiseljak HVO, weren't there?

 5        A.   Yes, there were two lines with Central Bosnia.  One was with

 6     Vitez, and the other was with Kiseljak.

 7        Q.   And apart from -- or in addition to telephone communications,

 8     sir, between the Herzegovina headquarters and both the Vitez and

 9     Kiseljak, there was Paket communication, wasn't there?  And we've seen

10     many of those in the course of this trial.

11        A.   Yes, that's correct.

12        Q.   And I take it, sir, when you travelled on your official duties

13     through Bosnia-Herzegovina, you would keep your headquarters operations

14     informed as to your whereabouts and where you could be reached.  It would

15     be irresponsible to do otherwise, wouldn't it?

16        A.   Correct.

17        Q.   So if you were travelling, for example, in one of your 20 or so

18     trips to Kiseljak, you would have said to your duty officer or your aide,

19     whoever, or more than one, probably, you would say, I'm going to

20     Kiseljak, I'm going to be there for the next three days, I can be reached

21     through the Kiseljak HVO or through the operations there, something like

22     that; correct?

23        A.   Your Honours, it would have been sufficient to say, I'm going to

24     Kiseljak.  Everyone has the telephone directory for Kiseljak and knows

25     the number in Kiseljak, and that is the number that would be used.  It is

Page 50337

 1     not necessary to mention anyone.  It would be sufficient to say, I'm

 2     going to Kiseljak -- or, rather, it was my duty to tell my commander, I'm

 3     going to Kiseljak, or I'm going to Sarajevo, I'm going here or there, and

 4     then they could know how I could be reached.

 5        Q.   I want to touch, sir, moving forward, to subordination.  And

 6     there's been quite a bit of testimony on that, and it may be -- it may be

 7     that it seems relatively clear, at least from your perspective, so I'm

 8     not going to spend a lot of time on it.  But subordination involved

 9     one -- putting one unit that was not normally under someone's command in

10     the day-to-day course of events, but putting that unit subject to the

11     command and control of somebody else; correct?

12        A.   Yes, correct.  A unit that wasn't a part of a given structure,

13     but was sent to the structure, would then be subordinated.  It was a unit

14     that was part of Establishment A, and it was then sent to Establishment

15     B, and it would be subordinated to Establishment B.  So it wasn't part of

16     that structure, but it had to temporarily, at least, become part of that

17     structure.

18        Q.   And you would agree with me, wouldn't you, sir, that, in fact, in

19     the HVO every unit had to be under somebody's control; it could not exist

20     on its own and act on its own?

21        A.   If you have an HVO organisational unit, it has its own commander,

22     it has its command structure, and if that is the case, then naturally

23     it's under the control of the person who is at the head of that body.

24        Q.   If we could look, just to clarify or confirm that point, at -- in

25     Sanction, it's number 4, for my case manager.  This is what you said in

Page 50338

 1     Kordic, sir:

 2             "Every unit had to be under somebody's control; it could not

 3     exist on its own and act on its own."

 4             And you stand by that, don't you?

 5        A.   Only organisational units that listed as HVO units.  If there

 6     were any other units of any other kind, well, then they weren't part of

 7     our structure.

 8        Q.   In terms of professional and special units, I believe, again, we

 9     can touch -- pass through that quite quickly.  But, again, the principle

10     was essentially the same.  As we spoke, excuse me, a few moments ago --

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, I have a major

12     follow-up question.

13             General Petkovic, the Prosecutor's question was an important one,

14     and you answered it.  Well, to make it clearer, listen carefully.  In the

15     geographical zone of a brigade, if there is a Unit A, a Unit B, a Unit C,

16     or possibly a unit that would be a D unit, in your view, is it so that

17     the brigade commander in this zone has authority over A, B, C, and D

18     units?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, it would be necessary

20     to discuss the location in question.  If it's a separate municipality and

21     there's a brigade commander and another HVO unit that isn't his unit,

22     well, then he would be in command of that unit.  Naturally, it would be

23     necessary to draft the relevant orders stating that they were being

24     subordinated to him.  However, if we take the Vitez area, it's a specific

25     area.  There's a brigade there, the military police headquarter is there,

Page 50339

 1     there's a special purposes unit there.  In such a case, the brigade

 2     commander wouldn't have authority over those units in Vitez, and police

 3     would be the higher command or the commander of the operative zone who

 4     would have such authority.  So it depended on the situation.  It was

 5     different, depending on the location.  As a rule, all the units in a

 6     given area should be placed under the command, at least temporarily while

 7     they are there, of one commander.  No one should act independently and as

 8     they saw fit.

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, we have a few

10     minutes left before the break.

11             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Mr. President.

12        Q.   Just to touch briefly, then, because I don't want to spend too

13     much time on it, but on the professional units, if we could go to -- in

14     Sanction, to slide 5.  I think this sums it up.  Again, sir, from your

15     testimony in the Blaskic case:

16             "Professional units were linked to the Main Staff, and they could

17     have carried out assignments issued by the Main Staff, but they could

18     also have been subordinated to a certain commander to carry out

19     assignments on his orders in a certain zone ...

20             "So I'm claiming and stating that they were linked to the

21     Main Staff and the Main Staff had either the right to use them on their

22     own or to subordinate them to another commander, a commander of an

23     operative zone who could use them on the basis of his own needs and

24     tasks, and we know what the subordination of a unit means.  This

25     subordination involves the responsibility of the commander and the

Page 50340

 1     responsibility of those who are being subordinated to him."

 2             And you would stand by that, wouldn't you?

 3        A.   Yes, I stand by that.

 4        Q.   And as an example, just to take one example, and I think it came

 5     up, perhaps yesterday, or some day in the last day or two -- it wasn't

 6     yesterday, but it came up.  The Vitezovi unit, which was one of these

 7     professional units that was in Central Bosnia, and I believe you

 8     testified in both Blaskic and Kordic that the Vitezovi, for example,

 9     during most of 1993, was subordinated to Mr. Blaskic, but, in any event,

10     that there was no one who could have controlled the Vitezovi during that

11     period except you and Mr. Blaskic; correct?

12        A.   From the 15th of January, Colonel Blaskic had exclusive control

13     over Vitezovi.  I couldn't have control over them, because from April, I

14     couldn't gain access to that territory to gain an idea of what was

15     happening.  That's why it was subordinated.  If you haven't got an

16     overview of it, then it has to be subordinated to someone who can have an

17     idea of the situation, and this was the commander of the Central Bosnia

18     Operative Zone.  It's the order of the 15th of January, which you have,

19     which refers to all elements of combat organisation.

20        Q.   I fully agree with you, sir.  But it's also your testimony, and

21     you made it very clear in Blaskic, that throughout that time-period, as

22     the commander of the Main Staff, as the Chief of the Main Staff, you also

23     retained, throughout that time-period, responsibility.  It was

24     subordinated to Blaskic, but you also maintained responsibility and

25     authority over that unit, didn't you?

Page 50341

 1        A.   I testified that I did not separate it from the Main Staff,

 2     because if I had done that, it would have become part of the structure of

 3     OZ Central Bosnia and I would have lost it in the structure of the

 4     Main Staff, as shown earlier.  So I maintain that it still was a unit of

 5     the Main Staff.

 6             MR. SCOTT:  If I can finish this topic, Mr. President, before the

 7     break.  I just have one or two more questions, and then I'll be changing

 8     topics.

 9        Q.   Just finishing on this concept, then, of control, as much as

10     we've been able to cover it so far this morning, we sometimes hear of

11     units being out of control.  But in reality, sir, units were under

12     always -- virtually always under somebody's control.  They couldn't, in

13     fact, act on their own; isn't that correct?

14        A.   I said earlier, and I'm still saying, and you can find that in my

15     documents, all organised units.  And when I say "organised," I mean those

16     that were established in the HVO in its official documents, they were

17     under control.  All units or groups of persons that were not established

18     that way were not under the control of any commander of the HVO.

19        Q.   Let's look, please, on Sanction -- in Sanction at slide number 6,

20     your testimony in the Kordic case under oath, page 26746:

21             "Q.  So there can be no question, can there, of units operating

22     in Vitez terrorising the local inhabitants and being out of control

23     because they were either under your control or they had been specifically

24     subordinated to Blaskic, you would say?

25             "A.  Your Honours, yes.  Every unit had to be under somebody's

Page 50342

 1     control; it could not exist on its own and act on its own."

 2             And you stand by that now, don't you?

 3        A.   Yes, these are HVO units that must be under control.  Outside the

 4     HVO, we have no control over units.  So this referred to HVO units,

 5     irrespective of their size or name, but they were HVO units that must be

 6     under control.  Other units that we did not establish or didn't provide

 7     rules for them in our documents could -- could act otherwise.  We could

 8     have -- there could have been incidents with them, et cetera.  So I was

 9     referring to HVO units, our units.

10             MR. SCOTT:  I understand.

11             Your Honour, that would be a time to break.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, let's have the break.

13                           --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.

14                           --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I believe the Stojic Defence

16     has something to say about a technical question relating to a document.

17             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honours.  Thank you.

18             I didn't want to interrupt Mr. Scott.  I would just like to point

19     it out to the Trial Chamber and have it recorded in the transcript that

20     the document that he showed, and that is document 11123, which is a

21     schematic of the structure of the HVO for the period from 1992 to 1993,

22     is mistranslated into English, and that document is an exhibit as 4D618.

23     And the correct translation has an IC number, 1169.

24             Thank you, Your Honours.  That's what I had to say, for the sake

25     of the transcript.

Page 50343

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine, thank you.

 2             Mr. Scott.

 3             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Mr. President.  And there is no dispute

 4     about that.  It's been -- counsel have discussed it before.  The

 5     Prosecution has taken the position that since it was -- if it's an

 6     admitted exhibit in another case, that we couldn't unilaterally change it

 7     because it's a matter of Tribunal record.  But we agree that's what it

 8     would properly show.

 9        Q.   Sir, I'd like to turn to something that you touched on your very

10     first day, and that is you agreed that -- in fact, Ms. Alaburic put the

11     question to you this way:

12             "In a well-organised society, do civilian authorities exert

13     control over the military?"

14             And your answer was:

15             "The civilian authorities do excerpt control the military."

16             And that was the case in the HVO, wasn't it?

17        A.   Yes.  It was set up that way to provide for the possibility of

18     controlling the military.

19        Q.   And if we just pause briefly a little bit further, a lengthier

20     part of your testimony on slide number 7 in Sanction:

21             "Q.  Still, if we are trying to defined the position that applies

22     to other social communities, irrespective of the concrete situation in

23     Croatia, would you say that it is normal and that the civilian

24     authorities should, indeed, control the military?

25             "A.  Absolutely.  It would be bad if it was the other way around

Page 50344

 1     or if the army controlled itself.  That army would be good for nothing,

 2     or far be it for anybody from the military to control the civilian

 3     authorities.  That would be bad."

 4             Staying on that topic, sir, would it be fair to say, and I'm

 5     going to put it to you, that in connection with the civilian control of

 6     the HVO military, that the three principal civilians having such power or

 7     control were Mr. Boban, as the president of Herceg-Bosna, as

 8     commander-in-chief, Mr. Stojic, as head of the Defence Department, and

 9     Mr. Prlic, as head of the government?  That would be the case, wouldn't

10     it?

11        A.   Mr. Boban had the right to directly control.  Mr. Stojic was in

12     the system of the military, and Mr. Stojic could exert indirect control

13     through the Department of Defence.

14        Q.   And Mr. Prlic, as head of the government, exercised substantial

15     authority or influence over defence and military matters, didn't he?

16        A.   Mr. Prlic was -- headed the provisional authority of the HVO, and

17     his influence was limited by the Decree on the Armed Forces and by the

18     organisational structure of his administrative bodies.

19        Q.   Well, sir, I'm not talking now about, necessarily, issuing

20     directly military orders, but you'd have to agree with me, wouldn't you,

21     that in the HVO authorities, as relates to military and defence matters,

22     there couldn't be three more powerful people than Mr. Boban, Mr. Stojic,

23     and Mr. Prlic, could there?

24        A.   That's how it is set out in the -- laid out in the Decree on the

25     Armed Forces.  It defines the powers of the head of the Department of

Page 50345

 1     Defence and other government officials.

 2        Q.   In fact, sir --

 3             MR. KHAN:  I'm sorry, Mr. President.  I'm sorry, my learned

 4     friend Mr. Scott.

 5             Your Honour, can I just say for the record that slide number 7

 6     refers to transcript page 49297-98 [Realtime transcript read in error

 7     "4929798"] it would be useful, perhaps, and a matter for my learned

 8     friend, either to have all the extracts that are in Sanction with the

 9     slide number labelled, then would obviate the need to refer every time to

10     the transcript number.  Or, alternatively, always when my learned friend

11     refers to the Sanction slide number, also to give the transcript page

12     number.  Sometimes today it's been given, sometimes we haven't got the

13     record.  I'm grateful.

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, well, it might be

15     useful if when you give the number of the slide and you give us the

16     transcript page number, please.

17             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Your Honour.  I'll endeavour to do that.

18             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  On the transcript, we have many, many pages, but

19     we don't have 4 million, as indicated here, almost 5 million.  Perhaps it

20     would be good to repeat.

21             MR. SCOTT:  That's true.  In terms of the current slide, which I

22     believe is slide number 7, it should be transcript 49297, continuing to

23     98.

24             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.

25             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you.

Page 50346

 1        Q.   Sir, what I was about to put to you was:  In fact, Mr. Stojic, in

 2     a sense, had -- in terms of the structures that you've told us about and

 3     what we otherwise know, Mr. Stojic had a relationship to Mr. Boban, as

 4     commander-in-chief, but at the same time Mr. Stojic was the head of an

 5     executive department that was part of Mr. Prlic's government, wasn't he?

 6        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 7        Q.   And when Mr. Stojic want to do have funding, and logistical

 8     support, and guns and food and medical supplies, it was through the

 9     government -- he had to go through the HVO government, the HVO HZ-HB, to

10     seek those resources, didn't he?

11        A.   The funds for procuring everything were provided at the level of

12     the HVO authorities.

13        Q.   Now, returning -- or staying on Mr. Stojic for a moment,

14     Mr. Stojic -- you considered Mr. Stojic, in fact, to be your superior and

15     a person in the structure of things who had more power than you did;

16     correct?

17        A.   He was my superior.  That is normal, because I was in the

18     structure of the Department of Defence.  I was responsible to him for my

19     duties.  And by virtue of his being a member of the Cabinet, and I'm not

20     sure which positions you mean, but clearly due to that he could -- he had

21     wider scope of powers and was able to carry out more activities than I.

22        Q.   Now, just to clarify for a moment, to avoid possible objection,

23     we do know, and I think we can agree, that the proper terminology until,

24     perhaps, late 1993 was he was the head of the Defence Department.  And it

25     wasn't until some later reorganisation that these were renamed ministries

Page 50347

 1     or the "Ministry of Defence."  But you frequently refer to Mr. Stojic as

 2     "minister," didn't you?

 3        A.   It is correct to call him "head" for the time-period until the

 4     ministry was established.  From that point on, he was minister.  I'll try

 5     to call him "head" in one period and "minister" in the period when

 6     ministries were established, when -- that is, at the time of the Croatian

 7     Republic of Herceg-Bosna.

 8        Q.   And if we can go to slide number 8, which is your --

 9             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Mr. Scott, excuse me.

10             Mr. Petkovic, you have said that Mr. Stojic had authority over

11     the military indirectly.  Could you specify what you mean by

12     "indirectly"?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Mr. Stojic was no

14     commander, so he didn't have direct authority, but he was at the head of

15     the Defence Department.  So in line with his position, his

16     responsibilities and duties, he had links with the military and duties

17     with respect to the military.

18             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.

19             MR. SCOTT:

20        Q.   On that point, sir, if we could then look briefly at slide

21     number 8, which is some of your testimony from the Kordic case;

22     transcript page 26749.  You testified under oath in that case, sir, and

23     you said:

24             "... Bruno Stojic, who was above me, because he was my minister,

25     and his powers were much larger than mine."

Page 50348

 1             And that remains your position and your assessment; correct?

 2        A.   It is quite logical that a person in that position has greater

 3     powers than me.  I had powers within the chain of command, and he had

 4     powers with regard to the Department of Defence, which later became the

 5     Ministry of Defence.

 6        Q.   And I take it from everything you've said so far, sir, that you

 7     accepted -- in fact, on a regular daily basis, if you will, as your

 8     regular practice, you accepted Mr. Stojic as your superior?

 9        A.   By virtue of his position and my position in the Department of

10     Defence, it is clear that he was my superior.

11        Q.   And would it also be fair to say, sir, that you had a good

12     relationship with Mr. Stojic, or the two of you together, both

13     professionally and personally?

14        A.   You mean that this originates from the position?  Well, people

15     are not necessarily in good relations because they are in certain

16     positions, but, yes, we did have.

17             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] I have an intervention with regard

18     to the transcript.  Page 46, line 3, in Mr. Petkovic's answer, the end is

19     missing.  He said "he was my superior with regard to certain matters."

20     This "certain matters" part is missing in the transcript.  Mr. Petkovic

21     can confirm whether I'm right or not.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When I say "superior," the minister

23     of defence is the superior of the chief of Main Staff, because the

24     Main Staff is an integral part of the Ministry of Defence, and that is

25     why the Department of Defence is headed by one person, which makes that

Page 50349

 1     person the superior of everybody else in that department.

 2             MS. TOMANOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise.  I wish to support

 3     Ms. Nozica.  This was an incomplete interpretation of General Petkovic's

 4     sentence, and I can confirm that Ms. Nozica is right.  The last part of

 5     this sentence is missing "in certain matters," and the general was only

 6     asked to corroborate whether or not he said that.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I said there were some matters

 8     in which I was directly responsible to the head of the Department of

 9     Defence.

10             MR. SCOTT:

11        Q.   And I suppose, sir -- based on these interventions, can you tell

12     us those matters in which you were directly responsible to, if you

13     will -- the word you just now said, you said, I was directly responsible

14     to the head of the Department of Defence in some matters.  Which matters

15     were those?

16        A.   I can give you a simple answer.  Everything but operative

17     matters; that is, the entire activity of the Department of Defence,

18     except for operative matters, where a person in my position was linked to

19     the supreme commander within that line of work.

20        Q.   All right.  And staying on this leadership -- civilian leadership

21     group, Mr. Praljak testified in the Tuta Stela case under oath, and we've

22     seen it before in this courtroom, that it was, indeed, Mr. Boban,

23     Mr. Stojic, and Mr. Prlic who were the prime players in that respect.

24     Would you agree with Mr. Praljak?

25        A.   Yes, they were the highest-ranking persons.

Page 50350

 1        Q.   I'm just trying to cut through a few things, sir.  Sorry for the

 2     delay.

 3             Just following on this topic, then, you also testified on your

 4     first day that the objectives -- the overall strategy of Herceg-Bosna,

 5     the overall objectives were set by the civilian authorities and

 6     communicated to the military; correct?  And we can look at -- we can look

 7     at slide 9.  That comes from your testimony in this case, 49292-93.  You

 8     agree with that and stand by it?  It's your testimony in this very case,

 9     so I assume, sir, you stand by that.

10        A.   Yes, I do, I stand by that.

11        Q.   Can you briefly explain to the Judges, sir, how were these

12     objectives, then, set by the civilian authorities, how would they be

13     communicated to you in the Main Staff?  In other words, how did you get

14     your marching orders?

15        A.   The basic objective at the political level was the defence of the

16     Croatian people in the area where Croats live in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

17     That was the basic objective, and that is why, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and

18     later on in the part called Herceg-Bosna, the defence of the Croatian

19     people against the Serbian aggression was organised then.  That was the

20     basic objective of the creation of Herceg-Bosna and of the establishment

21     of its structures.  It is normal that defence will be performed, for the

22     most part, by the armed forces, and others will participate in line with

23     their capabilities.

24        Q.   But beyond that, sir, there must have been times in 1992/1993,

25     apart from, Go forth and defend Herceg-Bosna, that certain policy

Page 50351

 1     decisions were made, certain strategic decisions were made, Let's go in

 2     this direction, Let's go in that direction, Let's launch a major

 3     offensive, Let's put most of our eggs in this basket over here, or, Let's

 4     go in the other direction over here.  When those decisions were made by

 5     the civilian authorities, how would they be communicated to you?  How did

 6     you -- did you get a telephone call from someone, did you receive a memo,

 7     did you go to meetings of the government where these decisions were

 8     announced to you?  How did you get your marching orders?

 9        A.   I'm not sure which offensive you mean.  I don't think we can make

10     up offensives here.  We should be specific.

11        Q.   Excuse me.  I don't want to lose time debating that with you at

12     the moment.  Operations.  There was a military operation, and someone

13     decides there has to be, at a broad strategic level, at least as far as I

14     know -- my understanding of how most armies work during war -- World War

15     II, do the Allies -- do they land at Normandy, or do they work their way

16     up from Italy, or both?  Those decisions were ultimately made

17     politically.  Roosevelt and Stalin and Churchill, they would decide and

18     they would say, Here's the basic plan, this is what we're trying to

19     accomplish.  So who -- how were those decisions communicated to you by

20     your civilian authorities?

21             MR. KARNAVAS:  If I may just launch an objection at this point.

22             That example, for instance, now, Mr. Scott is testifying, and

23     there's a certain presumption.  We actually don't know that, who was

24     actually making the decisions at that level.  So if this is just an

25     illustration, I think Mr. Scott would need to demonstrate that he has

Page 50352

 1     actual personal knowledge and from where he's getting this information.

 2     I don't think this is so notorious of a fact that we all can just assume

 3     it and that the Trial Chamber can accept it as an adjudicated fact, as it

 4     were.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, Mr. Karnavas

 6     is questioning the fact that during World War II, the Normandy landing

 7     was not decided by Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt.  Maybe he forgot

 8     about General de Gaulle, but maybe he was right to forget about him.

 9     Whatever the case may be, the question is a very interesting question.

10             When a marching order is given under military authority which

11     stems from the civilian authority, Mr. Scott is asking you how things

12     work, and he illustrates this by providing a well-known example drawn

13     from World War II.  What do you have to say to this?  It's your answer

14     that is interesting.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour Judge Antonetti, I

16     believe a better example would be one from Herceg-Bosna or

17     Bosnia-Herzegovina than an example from the Second World War.  We had to

18     defend the western part of Herceg-Bosna first, and Mr. Boban took the

19     decision that this part must be defended.  And so we started to set up

20     defence lines around Livno and Tomislavgrad, et cetera.  When we had to

21     cross the Neretva and liberate some areas occupied by the Serbs, the

22     decision was taken to launch such an operation, and then preparations

23     began and the operation was launched.  When events unfolded, when the HVO

24     in certain areas was in a poor situation, then measures were sought to

25     defend Croats in these areas.  So there are specific activities in each

Page 50353

 1     area.  And, of course, the authorities of Herceg-Bosna followed the

 2     events and took decisions to defend some areas and defend the interests

 3     or start negotiations with the other side to stop the conflicts between

 4     the ABiH and the HVO.  This is what went on in Herceg-Bosna at the level

 5     of government, at the level of the military, et cetera.

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

 7             MR. SCOTT:

 8        Q.   Let me be a bit more concrete, based on that.  And if we have

 9     time, sir, we'll get to -- we'll have to get to some of these documents,

10     but isn't it the fact that you attended a number of government meetings,

11     and when I say "government" now, I'm talking about the body headed by

12     Mr. Prlic, the HVO HZ-HB, and you would give a briefing on military

13     matters and defence matters.  And there were times then the government

14     would come back to you and say, All right, thank you for this briefing.

15     Here's what we want to do, and go forth and implement this decision.

16     That's how it worked, isn't it?

17        A.   I attended three or four governmental sessions that I was invited

18     to.  I briefed them on the military situation in certain areas.  At

19     certain points of time, decisions were taken by the government according

20     to which the HVO and other forces should take measures in order to

21     protect the interests of the Croatian people in that area in order to

22     mount a defence and to discuss matters with the other side, in order to

23     find an overall solution to the problems we were dealing with.

24        Q.   All right.  If we have time, sir, I'm going to suggest to you

25     that it was more than three times.  I think it was a significantly larger

Page 50354

 1     number than that.  But if we have time, we'll come back to that.

 2             I want to then go back to --

 3        A.   I wasn't there less than three times.  Perhaps it wasn't five

 4     occasions.  I accept that I was at every meeting that I attended.  We can

 5     go into that in detail.  I have the time to do so.  We have the time to

 6     do so.

 7        Q.   All right.  Mr. Petkovic, there's no doubt that I wish we had a

 8     lot more time.  I don't think there's no one in the courtroom that doubts

 9     that.

10             I want to go back to the question of HVO command and control.

11     And you basically agree, sir, that during at least 1993, because I don't

12     want to debate the entire time-period with you, but certainly in 1993,

13     there was a working system of command and control in the HVO, wasn't

14     there?

15        A.   The system, as such, existed on paper.  However, on numerous

16     occasions, the system wasn't implemented in the way it was intended to be

17     implemented.  So there were quite a few problems when it came to

18     implementing that system, to actually bring that system to life.

19        Q.   Sir, no one's suggesting that it was perfect, and I suspect

20     that -- everyone always wants to talk in here about NATO armies, and I

21     suspect even in NATO armies, so-called, they are not perfect systems.

22     But it was the case, wasn't it, that a chain of command had been put in

23     place, and it was in working order, and you've said so before, and that's

24     true, isn't it?

25        A.   A chain of command had been established.  As to whether it was

Page 50355

 1     functional or not, well, that is debatable.  It was functional to the

 2     extent that it was possible to make it functional at that time.

 3        Q.   Let's look at slide number 10, please, slide number 10, which

 4     comes from your testimony in the Kordic case, transcript page 26861:

 5             "Q.  And that shows, General, if I may suggest to you, that the

 6     chain of command was well identified, that it did what it was supposed to

 7     do, and that it operated in the manner that you would expect a military

 8     chain of command to operate in April of 1993.  Would you agree with

 9     that?"

10             Milivoj Petkovic's answer under oath:

11             "Your Honours, I have always claimed that the chain of command

12     had been put in place and that it was in working order.  I continue to

13     affirm that."

14             And you continue to affirm your testimony under oath in the

15     Kordic case, don't you?

16        A.   Yes.  I had in mind the level that I functioned at with my

17     immediate subordinates, so the Central Bosnian Operative Zone was what I

18     had in mind and the headquarters there.  So it was in that sense that the

19     chain of command had been established.  I didn't discuss lower levels.  I

20     was describing Blaskic and the problems of command he had, and I

21     emphasised all the problems from that level, and at lower levels too.

22        Q.   Well, actually, that's not -- that wasn't your testimony in the

23     Blaskic case, because you said in Blaskic -- you said in Blaskic that, in

24     fact, Mr. Blaskic never complained to you about lack of command and

25     control; that, again, as far as you knew and as far as Mr. Blaskic

Page 50356

 1     represented to you, there were no complaints.  Do you remember that?

 2        A.   That concerned the Blaskic-Kordic relationship, but you should

 3     read what I said about Mr. Blaskic.  I said there were command problems

 4     that he had.  He took certain measures, he couldn't go there, there were

 5     poor communications, so he took measures in order to have operation

 6     groups to make it easier to command.  So quite a lot was said about the

 7     command problems that existed.

 8        Q.   Well, sir, we don't have a slide of this, but this is what you

 9     said in Kordic at page 26883:

10             "And it's also true, General, I believe, that Blaskic made no

11     comment about any kind of lack of command or control over the 4th

12     Battalion of the Military Police, its sub-units, or the Vitezovi?"

13             Milivoj Petkovic's answer:

14             "No, Your Honours, there was no comment to the effect that he did

15     not have control over the Vitezovi or the 4th Military Police Battalion.

16     I never received any report until then or after that that either the

17     military police or the Vitezovi were uncontrollable."

18             That's the testimony you gave, isn't it?

19        A.   Yes, and I stand by that.  But the system of command -- the chain

20     of command doesn't involve only these two units; far more than that.  But

21     as far as these two units are concerned, I stand by what I testified

22     about them.

23        Q.   Well, Mr. Petkovic, not to get too bogged down in this, because

24     we have many other things to talk about, but the reason those particular

25     two units were so important was because those were two of the units that

Page 50357

 1     were accused of committing many of the crimes in Central Bosnia.  It was

 2     the 4th Battalion Military Police, by your own assessment, that committed

 3     the crimes in Ahmici.  It was the Vitezovi which committed many crimes

 4     against Muslims in Central Bosnia in 1993.  And you came and told this

 5     Tribunal that you never received any complaints from Mr. Blaskic in 1993

 6     that either of these units were out of control, didn't you?

 7        A.   Yes, I said that they were under control, but I didn't say that

 8     the Vitezovi had committed numerous crimes.  All I said is that the

 9     Vitezovi were not in Ahmici, that they provided security for the command

10     building for Colonel Blaskic.

11        Q.   The Vitezovi may not have been in Ahmici on the 16th of April,

12     1993, but Pasko Ljubicic and the military police certainly were, weren't

13     they?

14        A.   Yes, that's what I said.  You misunderstood me.  I wanted to say

15     that the military police was there, but the Vitezovi were not.  According

16     to what I was aware of at the time, they weren't in Ahmici.  That's what

17     I said in the trial, and I stand by that.  I said that at the time the

18     Vitezovi were 200 or 300 metres in front of the hotel, and it was at that

19     line that they were providing security for the command of

20     Colonel Blaskic, because he was 300 or 400 metres away from the ABiH

21     towards the old part of Vitez, and that is where that hotel is, in fact,

22     located.

23        Q.   And, in fact, sir, just to finish on this specific example, not

24     only -- not only was there no complaint from Mr. Blaskic about control of

25     the Vitezovi and the 4th Battalion Military Police, but according to your

Page 50358

 1     testimony in Kordic at page 26885, Mr. Blaskic, after the actions in

 2     mid-April 1993, commended the behaviour of both of those units, didn't

 3     he?

 4        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 5        Q.   There's been some issues raised in this case about alleged local

 6     political interference with or control of the HVO military.  But in fact,

 7     sir, as you've already testified today, and in your experience, that

 8     wasn't true, was it?

 9             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have to object to

10     this question now, because if my memory doesn't fail me, this is not what

11     the witness said.  However, if I'm mistaken, could my colleague Mr. Scott

12     give us the necessary reference in the transcript?

13             MR. SCOTT:  Well, for one thing, and I'll move on to his

14     testimony in the other cases, but one of the things he said this morning,

15     for example, was he had put an end to the municipal staffs and to

16     municipal control of the militaries, and that was what the reorganisation

17     of the HVO military and brigades was partly all about.  And he said he

18     had brought that to an end.

19        Q.   And, sir, if we can go to slide number 10 -- let's look at the

20     Kordic case, let's look at the Kordic case, slide number 11, and Blaskic.

21             In the Blaskic case, slide 11, page 24025, Milivoj Petkovic,

22     under oath:

23             "I wish to state the following:  Civilian officials did not have

24     any powers whatsoever in terms of commanding the military police or any

25     units of the Croatian Defence Council."

Page 50359

 1             Your testimony in the Kordic case, 26675:

 2             "In my command, I never received any objection from any of the

 3     commanders under me that they received some orders from outside, that is,

 4     outside the HVO military chain of command structure."

 5             You testified not on one occasion, but on two occasions, under

 6     oath, that there was no outside political interference, didn't you?

 7        A.   Your Honours, I testified about two levels, a military level in

 8     the operations zone and another level which was the political level that

 9     had to do with Mr. Kordic, and I said, and I stand by what I said, that I

10     never received information from Blaskic about that level.  And you can't

11     include Mr. Kordic in the municipal level.  I never received information

12     that that level had influence on Mr. Blaskic.  But in the case of

13     Blaskic, I said that in Vitez they didn't consider him

14     the commander of Vitez.  That means that the people from

15     Vitez didn't accept him as such.  So let's leave the levels that I have

16     testified about; Blaskic, the operations zone; Kordic, politics, which is

17     higher than the municipal level.  And at that level, with regard to the

18     command of the operative zone, Siljeg, Lasic, or Blaskic couldn't be

19     influenced by politics.  But there were local brigades and so on and so

20     forth, and then the relationship between the political structures and the

21     brigade remained very strong there.  So I wanted to clarify this matter

22     of level.

23             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I'd just like to correct

24     something.  Line 4 on the current page, it says that the witness said "in

25     Vitezovi," whereas the witness said "in Vitez," in the town of Vitez.

Page 50360

 1             MR. SCOTT:

 2        Q.   Sir, we all accept that -- we know the context of the Kordic and

 3     the Blaskic cases involved directly Central Bosnia, but I put it to you,

 4     sir, that your testimony was broader than that.  It evolved into a

 5     broader discussion, and you weren't distinguishing that.  And I put to

 6     you, and I'm not going to read them to you again, but everyone can see

 7     them on the screens, you said, generally, civilian officials did not have

 8     any powers:

 9             "I never received any objection from any of the commanders under

10     me that they would receive orders from outside."

11             And as you have just said, that included Siljeg, Lasic, Blaskic,

12     all the operative zone commanders, and none of them ever complained to

13     you that they were getting local political interference, did they?

14             Sir, you just said so; right?

15        A.   Yes, that's what I said, and I mentioned the relevant levels.  I

16     know what I said in my reports.  I never said that someone was exerting

17     an influence on Siljeg or Blaskic and Lasic, but at the level of

18     operative -- or, rather, at the level of brigades, in each and every

19     report it said that there was interference in the influence of the

20     brigade.

21        Q.   Well, that's not really exactly true, is it, sir, because

22     Mr. Filipovic testified in this case, and Mr. Filipovic testified both in

23     the Prlic case and in the Kordic case that, again, at the brigade level,

24     he never received any directions or interference from outside the HVO

25     chain of command.  In Kordic, he said that at page 17070, as to military

Page 50361

 1     matters, the organisation, especially conduct, were "always within the

 2     chain of command, they were not commanded by politicians."

 3             Now, that's at the brigade level, sir, by a witness you called in

 4     this case, Mr. Filipovic; correct?

 5             Also, sir, while you're considering that --

 6             MR. KARNAVAS:  We're waiting for the translation.

 7             MR. SCOTT:  I know that, Mr. Karnavas.  I'm trying to save a

 8     little bit of time here.

 9        Q.   While you're considering that, sir, Mr. Filipovic said also in

10     Kordic, 17138, that he never took orders from, he was never subordinated

11     to any political or municipal leader.  And you agree with that, don't

12     you?

13        A.   Yes, I do, and I never said that the chief was in command.  I

14     said there was influence that was exerted in various kinds.  The chief

15     didn't command the brigades.  I was in charge.  But we have said that

16     influence was exerted on the brigades in various ways, but no one drafted

17     orders for the brigades.  But I can stand by what Filipovic said.  When

18     we refer to orders, we know what is at stake.  When we say exerting an

19     influence in various other ways, well, this means something else.  That

20     is not an order, but it is a manner of influencing the brigades in a

21     different way.

22        Q.   Let's look, please, at slide number 12, your testimony in the

23     Kordic case at page 26805-06.  Answer to the question:

24             "Your Honours, the orders followed the chain of command

25     vertically from the supreme commander down to the Main Staff.  I didn't

Page 50362

 1     receive any orders outside of that.

 2             "Q.  Did you receive orders or directives from other politicians

 3     other than Mr. Boban at any time during your service as head of the armed

 4     forces of the HVO?

 5             "A.  No, Your Honours.  Nobody outside this vertical chain of

 6     command, Boban, Stojic, issued orders to me or the army."

 7             And that's the case, isn't it?

 8        A.   Yes, I'm saying no one issued orders to me outside that chain of

 9     command.  But you should understand the following:  It has to do with

10     issuing orders.

11        Q.   I'm going to -- I'm going to have to, Mr. Petkovic, with

12     apologies, begin to start cutting you off somewhat, because our time is

13     just too limited.  I wish I could allow you more time.

14             But let me be clear here.  When you're talking about the chain of

15     command in this instance, you're talking about the chain of command

16     Boban, Stojic, Main Staff, correct, as you say in your answer here at

17     page 26805-06 of Kordic?

18        A.   Yes, that's correct, and lower down to the operation zone.

19     I think I said that.  I must have said that.

20        Q.   In fact, sir, just to finish on this topic, let me put some other

21     testimony from Mr. Filipovic to you, and I'll ask you if you agree.

22             More generally than this, would you agree -- do you recall that,

23     in fact, the HDZ political party, as of June 1992, in Bosnia-Herzegovina

24     was not particularly active, and, in fact, as Mr. Filipovic said in

25     Kordic at page 17038, the HDZ party at that point in time, for practical

Page 50363

 1     purposes "had ceased to exist."  You agree with him, wouldn't you?

 2        A.   The HDZ had frozen its activities.  I don't think that it had

 3     dismantled itself, but it had frozen its activities.  So the HDZ didn't

 4     gather any levels at the lower, mid levels, or higher levels.  So in the

 5     course of the war, it quite simply ceased to operate.  But I don't think

 6     that that is tantamount to dismantling the HDZ, because after the war it

 7     continued with its work, it froze its work, suspended its work.  It did

 8     not gather, it did not work, it didn't assemble, and it didn't take any

 9     decisions.

10        Q.   And, in fact, to close on this topic, if we can go to slide

11     number 13, your testimony in Kordic at page 26804-05, the question which

12     might have been put even in this case:

13             "Q.  Some of the international observers have speculated that the

14     HVO army affairs were subject to pervasive political control exerted by

15     the HDZ BiH?  Is that true, that there was such control exerted by that

16     political party?"

17             Milivoj Petkovic, under oath:

18             "Your Honours, that is not true.  It is another matter that our

19     supreme commander, Mr. Boban, was both the supreme commander and the

20     president of the Croat community, subsequently Croat Republic of

21     Herceg-Bosna, and that, in point of fact, he was the man number one of

22     the HDZ.  But I do not see that the HDZ ever ran the army or the HDZ, as

23     such, as a party, imposed itself on the military.  And as far as I know,

24     I think that the work of the party was frozen for a while."

25             Which is actually consistent with what you said just a moment

Page 50364

 1     ago; correct?

 2        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 3        Q.   The people who were making the decisions in 1993, sir, was the

 4     military leadership inside the HVO Main Staff, and the HVO government,

 5     led by Mr. Prlic, wasn't it?

 6        A.   Could you please read that out again, please?

 7        Q.   Certainly.  The people who were making the decisions in 1993,

 8     sir, because we've been talking about the HDZ as a political party, the

 9     people making the decisions was the military leadership inside the

10     Main Staff, that is, you, Mr. Praljak, other senior staff perhaps, and

11     the HVO government, and I'm talking about the HVO HZ-HB, headed by

12     Mr. Prlic?

13        A.   Yes, everyone took the relevant decisions within his own sphere

14     of competence.

15        Q.   Staying in the political arena a bit, sir, I'm a bit confused, in

16     fact, and we've touched on the HDZ, whether you were a member of the HDZ

17     or not.  You seem to -- I don't remember if you specifically addressed

18     the question in this case or not.  But, sir, in the Kordic case you

19     testified -- and if we can look at slide 16.  In the Kordic case, you

20     testified, at page 26804:  "Your Honours --" under oath:

21             "Your Honours, I was not a member of any party at the time,

22     because the decree even specified that we were prohibited from joining

23     parties or creating parties.  The only party at that time was the HDZ,

24     and I was not a member of the HDZ."

25             But when we have your curriculum vitae from the Croatian

Page 50365

 1     government or Croatian Army, which is marked as P08731, you say:

 2             "Since 1992, I have been a member of the HDZ."

 3             So can you tell us which of those statements is true and which

 4     one is false?

 5        A.   Both are true.  At the time that I gave my testimony in the year

 6     2000, I was no longer a member of the HDZ.  That's what that refers to.

 7     In the Croatian Army, the work of the HDZ had been prohibited.  I'm not

 8     sure when I was struck from the list, whether it was in 1998 or 1999.

 9     All of us who had become members of the HDZ were no longer members in the

10     Croatian Army.  I don't know whether it was in 1998 or 1999 our

11     membership was terminated.  I know that this, however, continued in the

12     year 2000, when everyone had to leave the political parties.  At the time

13     that I gave that testimony, I wasn't an HDZ member, but I did join the

14     HDZ, and I was also taken off the list of HDZ members at a subsequent

15     date.

16             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment, please.

17             General Petkovic, I'm listening to your answers whilst

18     remembering the questions put by the Prosecutor on the military police

19     and on Ahmici.  In the Blaskic case, you testified - this is well known

20     because all this is now in the public domain - and the Prosecutor

21     cross-examining you was Mr. Kehoe, unless I'm mistaken, who's now one of

22     the Defence counsel for General Gotovina.  And he asked you, at

23     page 22524 in the French version - I don't have the English version,

24     unfortunately, with me - and he asked you what Mr. Blaskic told you over

25     the telephone as to what had happened in Ahmici.  And this is what you

Page 50366

 1     answered:

 2             "Well, he assumed that among the police officers, at least among

 3     those who were in Ahmici, there were some who had behaved

 4     uncontrollably," out of control.

 5             What did this mean, exactly, because the Prosecutor is now asking

 6     questions as to the chain of command, and Blaskic, the commander of the

 7     operations zone, says that there are policemen who behave out of control.

 8     What did you mean in saying so?

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I received this

10     information when visiting Central Bosnia, information according to which

11     there was a group that was out of control, they acted willfully, and they

12     didn't carry out the tasks assigned to them by the commander who was in

13     command of the operation in Ahmici.  I had Mr. Ljubicic in mind.  So

14     there were groups that were out of control and failed to act in

15     accordance with the tasks assigned to them.  That is what one has in mind

16     here.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.  But back then, you were

18     the Chief of the Main Staff.  You were the superior of Mr. Blaskic,

19     hierarchically speaking, so also superior to these policemen that had

20     been assigned to Ahmici?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, that is an unjustified

22     conclusion.  The Main Staff didn't command that way, nor did it command

23     the action in Ahmici.  The chain of command went as far as the operative

24     zone.  The Main Staff got involved to stop the operation in Central

25     Bosnia and then took steps, together with the other side, to go there

Page 50367

 1     personally and calm down the situation to bring it back to normal.

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] At the time in April 1993, did

 3     you know that within the HVO, in all of its components, the military

 4     police, the military component - I won't go into detail on that - but

 5     that there were uncontrollable elements, rogue elements?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Your Honours, you cannot know

 7     that some elements are out of control.  If we were able to identify them,

 8     we would remove them from the HVO or take other adequate steps.

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As I understand it, when

10     Mr. Blaskic told you that the policemen in Ahmici were out of control,

11     that was something you just learned, that was first news for you.  Was it

12     so?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I received that

14     information only upon my second visit to Bosnia on the 28th or 29th of

15     April, 1993.  My first visit, on the 20th and 21st, wasn't an occasion

16     when anything was said about Ahmici or anybody's behaviour there.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right.

18             MR. SCOTT:

19        Q.   Sir, in your CV you say, and it's P08731 and --

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Coric, what do you

21     mean to say?

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.  We cannot really hear

23     Mr. Coric.

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, you have to

25     turn off -- switch off your microphone, because when there are too many

Page 50368

 1     mikes on, it doesn't work.

 2             THE ACCUSED CORIC: [No Interpretation]

 3             [Interpretation] I switched it on.  Is it better now?  We can

 4     hear now.

 5             General, do you know that --

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Now we can no longer hear anything.

 7             MR. STEWART:  Sorry, Your Honour, I don't know whether

 8     Mr. Scott's going to object, but what is -- what is happening here?  We

 9     don't understand that the procedure simply allows some cross-examination

10     by interjection.

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.  Mr. Coric, I thought you

12     wanted to take the floor to address a problem in the transcript, but

13     you're not allowed, at this stage of the proceedings, to ask questions of

14     the witness who's testifying; namely, General Petkovic.  If you have a

15     substantial problem, you can address that when you call your own

16     witnesses or when you testify in person.  So as to substance, the general

17     answers questions, gives his point of view, and you may contradict him

18     later; but not now, and now is the stage when we have the Prosecutor and

19     General Petkovic.

20             THE ACCUSED CORIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour Judge Antonetti,

21     I'm intervening --

22             THE INTERPRETER:  We can no longer hear Mr. Coric.

23             THE ACCUSED CORIC: [No Interpretation]

24             [Interpretation] We'll try this one.

25             THE INTERPRETER:  We cannot work this way.  We're getting strong

Page 50369

 1     interference.

 2             THE ACCUSED CORIC: [Interpretation] Is it better now?  Yes, it is

 3     better.

 4             Your Honour Judge Antonetti, I reacting to the question you asked

 5     about Ahmici.  You asked such questions, and comments were made that are

 6     contrary to the decisions of some Trial Chambers and the final decisions

 7     of the Trial Chambers of this Tribunal.  I'll be specific.

 8             This is about the Bralo case, a man who was directly involved in

 9     the Ahmici operation, who was not a member of the military police.  And

10     together with all Croats, he was released from prison during the night

11     preceding the Ahmici operation and was a commander at Ahmici with other

12     military police.

13             MR. STEWART:  Your Honour, this is not acceptable.  It's the

14     microphone that had the right idea by cutting off Mr. Coric before he

15     started.  It's absolutely impermissible, in our submission, and he is not

16     allowed to argue, he is not allowed to throw in comments, he's not

17     allowed to interject questions.

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Coric, according to our

19     procedure, you are not entitled to interject.  My question was a very

20     simple one.  During Mr. Kehoe's cross-examination relating to a meeting

21     between General Petkovic and Colonel Blaskic, Colonel Blaskic mentioned

22     this, and General Petkovic told him what Blaskic had said.  Now that the

23     Tribunal ruled otherwise, that is another question, and you can submit

24     your arguments then, when the time comes.  The only point of interest now

25     is to know what Blaskic had told General Petkovic, and General Petkovic

Page 50370

 1     confirmed that that was, in effect, what Blaskic had told him.  Perhaps

 2     Blaskic had made a mistake, perhaps that was wrong.  That is a totally

 3     different issue.  You can address that when the time comes.  This is not

 4     the right moment.

 5             Do you understand that?

 6             THE ACCUSED CORIC: [Interpretation] Ahmici isn't part of the

 7     indictment, and we shouldn't be discussing that at all.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We have a problem with the

 9     microphone.

10             THE ACCUSED CORIC: [No interpretation]

11             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreters note:  The microphone isn't

12     functioning properly.  We cannot hear Mr. Coric.

13             MR. STEWART:  Mine is functioning, and I sustain my objection,

14     Your Honour.  We invite Your Honour to tell Mr. Coric specifically that

15     he is to sit down and say no more.

16             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Coric, you must sit down

17     and not say any more about it.  There is no justification for this right

18     now.  You may address this issue when the time comes.  This is not the

19     right moment.

20             THE ACCUSED CORIC: [No interpretation]

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please proceed, Mr. Scott.

22             MR. SCOTT:

23        Q.   I'm afraid, Mr. Petkovic, we now have to go back some minutes to

24     the topic we were talking about, and that was your membership in the HDZ

25     party.

Page 50371

 1             I want to suggest to you, sir, with great respect, that when you

 2     testified in previous cases, no one was particularly interested at that

 3     time about whether you were a member of the party in 1988 or 1999, that

 4     the important time was the time of these events in 1992, 1993, perhaps

 5     1994.  And if we look at your CV, and it is P08731, unfortunately the CV

 6     itself doesn't bear a date, but I've been scanning through it, and about

 7     the last date that I can see, a little below halfway down the second page

 8     in English, is you make reference to -- and you'll remember this, you'll

 9     know.  This is your biographic -- this is your bio.  You know:

10             "In November of 1996, I assumed the duties of the deputy head of

11     Osijek Military District."

12             So we know the CV must have been written at least sometime after

13     November of 1996, but you say on the last page, on the last line of the

14     entire CV:

15             "Since 1992, I have been a member of the HDZ."

16             Now, I read that to mean that this document was created sometime

17     in or after 1996 -- November 1996, that at least as of since 1992 and

18     continuing since then, you were a member of the HDZ.  Weren't you?  Or as

19     I said before, which of these statements is true and which one is false?

20        A.   This was written in December 1996, I believe, this CV of mine,

21     because I was required to submit it to the Personnel Administration.  And

22     I was a member of the HDZ starting from 1992, but I believe in 1998 or

23     1999, it was at the time when I was already in Dubrovnik, serving in

24     Dubrovnik, I had been deleted from the list of members of the HDZ,

25     because as the general --

Page 50372

 1        Q.   My apologies, but time is precious, and I don't really care, for

 2     these purposes, what you did in 1998 or 1999.

 3             You were a member of the HDZ, you tell us now, even though you

 4     told the Court in Kordic -- and clearly you were talking about the

 5     importance -- once again, we have the whole transcript here and we can

 6     read out pages of context, if need be.  We have the whole transcript

 7     right here.  What you were talking about at the time was 1993:

 8             "I was not a member of any party at the time."

 9             Now, sir, you either lied to the Kordic Chamber or you lied on

10     your curriculum vitae.  Now, which one is it?

11        A.   In 1998 or 1999, I ceased to be a member of the HDZ.

12        Q.   Sir, I don't care about 1998 or 1999.  In 1993, you say -- in a

13     document you say you created in -- excuse me, you say you created it in

14     December 1996, and in that document you say:

15             "Since 1992, I have been a member of the HDZ."

16     And when you testified in this case -- in the Kordic case, and they were

17     asking you about your membership at the time in question, you said that

18     you were not.  You gave false testimony to this Tribunal, didn't you?

19             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Objection, Your Honours.  The

20     question in the Kordic case was not specific with regard to the time at

21     which the general was or wasn't in the HDZ.  I ask my learned friend not

22     to misrepresent General Petkovic's statement.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I stated then that I was no longer

24     an HDZ member, because in 1998 or 1999 I was -- I ceased to be a member

25     of that party because, as a high-ranking officer of the Croatian Army, I

Page 50373

 1     couldn't be a member of a political party, and my status until then was

 2   frozen.  We all were deleted from the list of members. When I gave evidence

 3   in the year 2000 - I don't remember which month it was - I really wasn't a

 4   member of any political party.  But since 1992 or1991, whenever the war

 5   started, the army didn't accept for its officers to have positions in a

 6   political party.  I'm not saying that I wasn't an HDZ member ever, because

 7   I was for 5 or 6 years, but I was deleted as I was told that I couldn't and

 8   all my documents stayed behind in Slavonia.  I never got them again.

 9             MR. SCOTT:

10        Q.   You were since 1992, sir, by your own CV:

11             "I have been a member since 1992."

12             And, again, I have the transcript, and I beg to differ with my

13     good friend Ms. Alaburic.  I'm looking at page 26803.  Questions are

14     being asked about June 1992.  Later on, Blaskic takes a different

15     position in May 1994, whether there were some political officers in the

16     army.  And they're not talking about 1998 and 1999, sir.  They're talking

17     about the events in question.  And you told -- you told Judge May and

18     Judge Bennouna and Judge Robinson under oath in the Kordic case that you

19     were not a member of the HDZ, when in your curriculum vitae you said you

20     were.  That's just the simple truth of the matter, isn't it?

21             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this question has

22     been answered, and, therefore, I object.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] During -- or at the time that I

24     gave evidence, I had already been deleted from the listed members of HDZ.

25     I joined that party in 1992, and I'm not denying that.  That's why in

Page 50374

 1     1996 -- or, that is, 1998, I wrote that I was deleted from the list of

 2     members, because, as a general, I couldn't have a status in a party.  And

 3     we all got a document that we had been deleted.  In 2002, at the very

 4     latest, everybody had to leave the party.  So I was a member of the HDZ.

 5             MR. SCOTT:

 6        Q.   Excuse me, we're not going to go on on this topic.  We're going

 7     to end this topic except for this, my last question to you on this topic,

 8     unless the Judges want to pursue it further --

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

10             MR. SCOTT:  Yes, sir.

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could you tell me what the

12     exact page number in the Kordic case is where he stated that he was not a

13     member of the HDZ, because I have transcript page number 26803.  Could

14     you give me the exact page number, please?

15             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I can assist.  It's page, actually, 26804, lines

16     17 following:

17             "Your Honours, I was not a member of any party at the time,

18     because the decree even specified that we were prohibited from joining

19     parties or creating parties.  The only party at that time was the HDZ,

20     and I was not a member of the HDZ."

21             I must say, Ms. Alaburic, your objection is wholly unfounded.

22             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I merely want to say

23     that the time reference was not precise, because if the witness, in 2001,

24     speaks about something that happened in 1998, that was also an event in

25     the past.

Page 50375

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, as far as I

 2     understood the Trial Chamber, when I gave evidence in the Kordic case, I

 3     was not a member of the HDZ.  For two or three years, I had already been

 4     deleted.

 5             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  You are trying our patience, because you are

 6     always repeating that, and you have been told many things that -- many

 7     times now that this is not the issue.  And if you look at the page just

 8     quoted, one speaks of August 1994 at the top of the page, and there is --

 9     and then again mid 1994, and you say "at that time."  So it's really you

10     should stop insisting in that case.  I think your explanation, simply, it

11     will not hold water.  I'm very sorry.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can say that I understood the

13     Trial Chamber to mean what I have shown, and that's how I gave evidence.

14     Why would I be afraid to say that I was a member of the HDZ?  I'm not.

15     I, of course, didn't meddle with the transcript.  And when I appeared

16     here to give evidence, I was not an HDZ member.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

18             MR. SCOTT:

19        Q.   Moving forward, sir, your political party membership being

20     whatever it was, you were a part of the top Herceg-Bosna HVO

21     governmental/military leadership in 1992/1993, weren't you, the very top?

22        A.   Yes, that's correct.

23        Q.   And at that level, sir, you would agree with me, wouldn't you,

24     that you were more than just a political/military technocrat; you really

25     were wearing a political hat as well as a military hat, weren't you?

Page 50376

 1        A.   No, I didn't have a political hat of any kind.

 2        Q.   Sir, isn't it the case in virtually every system that the more

 3     senior a military officer becomes, in terms of his position, and

 4     especially at the very top, there is an increasing political dimension or

 5     cross-over to the political and policy side; isn't that true, sir?

 6        A.   That can be true, but I never went to -- into politics, nor did I

 7     ever have a political function until I came to the Detention Unit.

 8        Q.   Sir, I'm not talking about, now, whether you were, again putting

 9     aside the HDZ political party at the moment.  I'm talking about political

10     at a broader level, the policy level.

11             Give you another example, if I can hazard this as a hypothetical.

12     In the United States, during Desert Storm, the first Desert Storm, the

13     first Iraq operation, not the most current one, Colin Powell, commander

14     of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but at that point he was no longer acting

15     as a soldier, technocrat, he was sitting at the political policy table,

16     he was sitting across from President Bush and others and involved in

17     those decisions, wasn't he?  You would agree with that?

18             MR. KARNAVAS:  Again, I'm going to object on technical reasons,

19     we don't know that.  There was some controversy between him and Cheney at

20     the time, so --

21             MR. SCOTT:  Exactly, that makes my point, Mr. Karnavas.

22             MR. KARNAVAS:  Well, as a soldier.  As a soldier, he was the

23     chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, so obviously he's going to be

24     talking to the Secretary of Defence.  But I don't think that Mr. Scott

25     should be in a position of testifying as to what was going on over there.

Page 50377

 1     Otherwise, he's personally injecting himself into the picture.  These are

 2     not historical facts that are so notorious that you can just accept them

 3     as adjudicated facts.

 4             MR. SCOTT:  I don't want to get bogged down in this, Your Honour.

 5     It's not -- I don't want to use the time to debate it with Mr. Karnavas.

 6        Q.   The point is, sir, you would agree with me, wouldn't you, that in

 7     many military situations, and I take it the same is true in Croatia, the

 8     closer you get to the top, the more political and policy-oriented your

 9     position becomes, doesn't it?  You're no longer just talking about how

10     many bullets the guy gets in the fox hole; you're talking about broad

11     policy and political matters, strategy, budget requests, funding the

12     army, political support for the military strategy?  Isn't that true in

13     virtually every military organisation, whether it's the United States,

14     France, Switzerland, I dare say Hungary, and -- the United States and any

15     of the others?  Isn't that true, sir?

16        A.   No.  But why not mention Croatia.  In 2000 and something, only

17     due to the request of a number of generals for the supreme commander to

18     receive them, he removed them all from their positions because he said,

19     You have -- you shouldn't meddle with politics, you have nothing to do

20     with politics.  And 12 Croatian generals were -- simply had to retire.

21        Q.   You want to talk about Croatia, let's talk about Croatia.  You

22     used -- you gave two examples in your testimony on the 11th of February.

23     On the 11th of February, at transcript page 49296, on the one hand, you

24     said that your first deputy, when you took one of your positions in the

25     HVO -- excuse me, the Croatian Army:

Page 50378

 1             "My first deputy soon joined the Office of the President of the

 2     Republic, and there were also announcements that the commander would also

 3     leave and join the Ministry of Defence."

 4             People moved from the military side at those levels, they moved

 5     from the military side to the policy side, and that's -- look, there's

 6     nothing surprising or uncommon about that, is there?

 7        A.   No, my deputy was a military official in the Office of the

 8     President of the Republic, because there is such a thing, and he monitors

 9     events in the army and nothing else.  That's all his job.  And my deputy

10     was supposed to move to a position in the Ministry of Defence of Croatia,

11     in which case he would have become a civilian, because at that time

12     assistant ministers of defence were changing status from soldiers to

13     civilian persons.  And my deputy had a position in the president's

14     office.

15             MR. SCOTT:  I apologise for cutting across the interpretation,

16     but I do have to try to bring Mr. Petkovic's interventions sometimes to

17     an end, and I apologise to the interpreters.

18        Q.   Sir, let's move forward with your exact involvement.  You

19     attended, in fact, both -- or the only two sessions of the HZ-HB

20     Presidency between July 1992 and August 1993, where important decisions

21     were made and laws were adopted, including in July 1992, for example, the

22     Decree on the Armed Forces.  You attended both of those important

23     sessions of the Presidency, didn't you?

24        A.   Can you show me both so I can tell exactly which I attended?

25        Q.   I can tell you, sir, I will if I have time, but you were at the 3

Page 50379

 1     July 1992 meeting.  You were there, you spoke there.  You spoke about

 2     defence military matters.  It was at that session that the Decree on

 3     Armed Forces was adopted.  You were also present at the Presidency

 4     meeting on the 24th -- or the 28th, excuse me, of August, 1993, when the

 5     Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna was declared.  And if we have time

 6     later, I'll show a video of that, and you'll see yourself in the video.

 7     These are two of the most important -- in fact, there were only about

 8     four or five in the entire history during this time, but these were the

 9     two most important meetings of the HZ-HB Presidency, and you were

10     attended and acted in both of them, weren't you?

11        A.   I attended that meeting as a guest.  My role was to inform

12     everybody else, but otherwise I didn't have the right to speak.

13        Q.   Well, you certainly spoke at one of them, sir, and, again, we'll

14     get there if we can, because it's in the record.

15             You also attended sessions of the --

16        A.   Yes, I spoke about the military aspect, and that's why I was

17     invited, to familiarise everybody with the military aspect.  But I don't

18     have the right to vote at these meetings.  So I can only say what is

19     required of me, and that is the military situation.

20             MR. KOVACIC:  Line 24 on page 76, it was translated, and now

21     again the general said he didn't have the right to speak.  I think it's a

22     linguistical problem.  He said he didn't have a right to vote.  And it

23     should be -- and that is why the next question was put.  I guess it was

24     misunderstanding between speakers.

25             MR. SCOTT:  I was certainly reacting to the English translation.

Page 50380

 1     If it was "did not have the right to vote," then I accept that, and

 2     that's not really my point.

 3        Q.   You were there, and you participated, sir, whether you voted or

 4     not; correct?

 5        A.   Yes, I participated, and I informed those present about the

 6     military situation at the time.

 7        Q.   And in terms of Mr. Prlic's government, you attended at least --

 8     at least five of those sessions, didn't you?  On the 17th of April, 1993,

 9     on the 26th of May, 1993, the 31st of May, 1993, the 22nd of July, 1993,

10     and the 9th of October, 1993?

11        A.   And in October, too.  Yes, those are all those sessions.

12        Q.   And as part of all this, one of the things you did was provide

13     reports and information to the government - again, no surprise - about

14     what was happening militarily and on defence matters, and you would give

15     reports about that, didn't you -- wouldn't you?

16        A.   I had to write biannual reports, and as part of the Defence

17     Department's reports, they were sent to the government.

18        Q.   Well, let's look, as an example, at 2D -- in your binder, please,

19     2D01353 at the very -- toward the end of the binder, I believe, 2D01353.

20             This is a report -- while you're finding that, sir, and to save a

21     little bit of time, this is your report to the Defence Department, dated

22     the 21st of September, 1992, and in the first paragraph you say:

23             "Following a request of the HZ-HB government," that's Mr. Prlic's

24     government, "for a report on the implementation of the priority duties

25     and tasks regarding the establishment of the HVO Main Staff and the

Page 50381

 1     re-establishment," or "reorganisation" I believe might be a better

 2     translation, if I my be so bold, "of the existing units, we report as

 3     follows:"

 4             So this is an example, sir -- this is an example -- you were

 5     specifically requested by Mr. Prlic's government to report to it on

 6     military matters; correct?

 7        A.   Yes, that's a report that I drafted at the request of the

 8     government, and I sent it to them.

 9        Q.   And if we go to 1D02423, 1D02423, this is a record of one of the

10     meetings I mentioned to you a few moments ago, the 17th of April, 1993.

11     The session was attended by, among others, Dr. J. Prlic, president, who

12     chaired the session.  We can also see Mr. Stojic there, and down toward

13     the end of the line we see "Mr. Petkovic":

14             "Agenda:  Item 1.  Discussion of the military and security

15     situation in the area of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna."

16             There's a report -- obviously a report given.  This is April of

17     1993, a pretty critical time, April 1993.  You were at that time the head

18     of the Main Staff.

19             And if I can draw your attention to the second-to-last paragraph

20     of the document, in English page 2, first paragraph starting on that

21     page; but, sir, in the Croatian version, if you find your way, please,

22     to -- it's the next-to-last paragraph, obviously a report -- an

23     assessment had been given, and it says this:

24             "In accordance with these assessments, then, HZ-HB HVO adopted

25     the position that the military organisation of the HVO and its

Page 50382

 1     Main Staff, along with the HZ-HB HVO Department of the Interior, should

 2     take all available measures in order to protect the Croatian population,"

 3     et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

 4             Several lines down:

 5             "The HZ-HB HVO requires the HVO Main Staff and the HZ-HB HVO to

 6     organise an effective defence and full protection," et cetera, et cetera,

 7     et cetera.

 8             So in terms of some of things we've talked about this morning,

 9     this is an example, isn't it, where you go to a session of the

10     government, you give a briefing, and the government makes decisions and

11     gives you direction; correct?

12        A.   That's what I've already said, yes.

13        Q.   Well, I just want to make that, I suppose, very, very clear, sir.

14             Will you go to P04 --

15        A.   I would just like to add that the government won't contact me

16     directly.  It would go through its bodies that are responsible for

17     defence.

18        Q.   Well, sir, when you were there on the 17th of April, you were

19     there physically, apparently, according to this, and you were dealing

20     directly and, I suppose, face to face with Bruno Stojic sitting there and

21     Jadranko Prlic sitting there.  So that seems pretty direct to me; isn't

22     it?

23        A.   I was sitting in the area where all these present were.  I

24     provided them with information on the ABiH attack in the territory of

25     Konjic, and this has to do with that area.  It was my duty to brief the

Page 50383

 1     members of the government when I was invited to do so.

 2        Q.   Of course it was, of course it was.  And if you can go, please,

 3     to P04343 sir, this is a -- just a very short document, but this is

 4     Mr. Nussbaum, who is the secretary of the HVO HZ-HB, the HVO government.

 5     And Mr. Nussbaum on in this case was sending a report of the minutes of a

 6     working meeting held on 18 August 1993 for your use to Zarko Tole.  So

 7     isn't this another example of the government communicating directly with

 8     the military at the HVO Main Staff, communicating and sharing information

 9     back and forth, making reference to a working meeting on the 18th of

10     August?  That's what it says, doesn't it?

11        A.   Yes, that's what it says.  How else would you appear at a

12     meeting?  You can't just turn up.  You have to be invited.

13             MR. SCOTT:  Mr. President, I think we're at the time of the

14     break.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, let's have a break.

16                           --- Recess taken at 12.39 p.m.

17                           --- On resuming at 1.01 p.m.

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The court is back in session.

19             You may proceed, Mr. Scott.

20             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Mr. President.

21        Q.   Sir, had you occasions -- at least two occasion, perhaps more,

22     but I know of at least two, you had occasions to actually attend meetings

23     with President Tudjman in Croatia during 1993, didn't you?

24        A.   I remember November 1993 in Split.

25        Q.   Well, you met with him once on the 24th of April in Croatia,

Page 50384

 1     again a pretty important time-period, and you also met with him on the

 2     5th of November, 1993, just a few days after Stupni Do, didn't you?

 3        A.   Yes, I was invited to the meeting, and we went to Split.

 4        Q.   Mr. Tudjman -- President Tudjman, he considered you, in fact, one

 5     of the leaders of Herceg-Bosna, didn't he?

 6        A.   No, he couldn't have considered me as one of the leaders.  I was

 7     the Chief of the Main Staff in Herceg-Bosna.  As to who the leader in

 8     Herceg-Bosna was, that is well known.

 9        Q.   Well, sir, I put to you that being the number-one military

10     commander of almost anything makes you a pretty important leader, doesn't

11     it?

12        A.   It's an important role at the head of the army.  As to how that

13     should be compared with leaders outside the army, who occupy positions

14     within the governmental hierarchy, well, that is a different matter.

15        Q.   Well, let's go to slide 17, which is an excerpt of a presidential

16     transcript on the 2nd of July, 1993, which is Exhibit P031112 [sic],

17     page 54 of the transcript.  President Tudjman talking:

18             "Anyone else --"

19        A.   Let me find it, please.  Just a minute.

20        Q.   It's on the screen, sir.  You'll only see it on the screen and it

21     will be translated to you.  My apologies.  If you want to turn to the

22     transcript, it may or may not be in that binder.  The full excerpt is on

23     the slide.  Do you have it?

24             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Excuse me.  In the transcript, there is one "1"

25     too many.

Page 50385

 1             MR. SCOTT:  My apologies.  3112.  My apologies.

 2        Q.   I think if you want to look -- do you have it now, sir?  If you

 3     want to look at it, you can, but everything I'm going to read to you is

 4     on the screen.

 5             The Usher's assistance, I'm sorry.  Does he have it?

 6             I'm trying to assist you, sir.  You'll have the Croatian

 7     transcript there in front of you.

 8             President Tudjman:

 9             "Anyone else?  All right, gentlemen, let's finish.

10             "With regard to sanctions, I do not think that in such a

11     situation they pose a serious threat ... but we must be careful not to

12     give them any direct cause to serve as an excuse for their policy.

13     Clearly, we must not do this.  But at the same time, we must take steps

14     to protect Croatian interests in the territorial sense, too.  And, you

15     two, please, Minister Susak, General Bobetko, see about this and meet

16     with Herceg-Bosna leaders there, with General Praljak, Petkovic, and

17     Ambassador Sancevic, and their leaders there, with Boban and Prlic, to

18     discuss exactly what should be done.  But it goes without saying, do not

19     lead the operation in such a way as to make it a direct involvement."

20             I come back to you a question I put to you a moment ago, sir.

21     President Tudjman considered you to be one of the leaders of

22     Herceg-Bosna, didn't he?  Praljak, Petkovic, Sancevic, Boban, Prlic;

23     correct?

24        A.   It doesn't say "leader" anywhere here.

25        Q.   Well, certainly in English it does, sir.  And if it doesn't in

Page 50386

 1     Croatian, then you have me.  But it says here:

 2             "You two, please, Minister Susak," the Defence Minister Susak,

 3     "General Bobetko," the head of the Croatian army, "see about this and

 4     meet with Herceg-Bosna leaders there," leaders there, "with

 5     General Praljak, Petkovic, and Ambassador Sancevic, and their leaders

 6     there, Boban and Prlic ..."

 7             He talks about leaders twice, doesn't he, including you?

 8        A.   Here it says with the leadership of Herceg-Bosna, and then

 9     there's a comma, and then it says -- or adds "with General Praljak and

10     Petkovic," and then, "Ambassador Sancevic and their leaders there, with

11     Boban and Prlic."  So General Praljak and Petkovic aren't included in the

12     category of leaders.  There is a comma, after which you have the names

13     "Praljak" and "Petkovic."

14        Q.   I'm happy to leave it with the Judges.

15             Sir, you were also a member of the Bosnian Croat delegation at

16     number of peace negotiations and conferences, weren't you?

17        A.   Yes, it was the Croatian delegation from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

18        Q.   Approximately how many times did you attend such conferences or

19     sessions, just approximately?

20        A.   There were four conferences held in Geneva, and there were four

21     meetings.  The political aspect was dealt with in Geneva, or there were

22     political meetings in Geneva, and military ones in Sarajevo.

23        Q.   And finally, sir, on this set of topics, you also frequently

24     represented the HVO in front of the media, didn't you?  You gave

25     interviews, you had press conferences, and, in fact, you controlled the

Page 50387

 1     HVO's military's contact with the media, didn't you?

 2        A.   I alone gave interviews for the media, but I didn't establish

 3     contact with the media, as you are saying.  On occasion or from time to

 4     time, I would give interviews.  So I only gave interviews for the media;

 5     I didn't establish contact with them.

 6        Q.   Well, you controlled access -- the media's access to the HVO,

 7     didn't you, at least the HVO military?

 8        A.   I don't know what you mean, "access to the HVO."

 9        Q.   Well, the Chamber can certainly stop and look at them, if they

10     wish; but, for example, 2D00687 is an order that you issued on the 24th

11     of November, 1993, prohibiting all HVO military contact with the media

12     without your permission.  Exhibit P00679, your order dated the 31st of

13     October, 1992, right after Prozor, prohibiting contact with the media, or

14     expressing -- forgive me, expressing your concern about the media, that

15     "the coverage of some of these events were causing great problems for us

16     in the foreign media," you were cognizant and paid attention to the

17     media, didn't you?

18        A.   Yes, that was my duty.  Not each and every commander or officer

19     or HVO member should contact the media and give them statements of any

20     kind.  Information provided from the army, well, one knows who can

21     provide such information, under what conditions.

22             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Could I just make a brief

23     correction.  On the previous page, line 21, the year for the document is

24     wrong.  It should say "1992."

25             MR. SCOTT:  Counsel may be right, Your Honour, if I can just

Page 50388

 1     double-check.

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 3             MR. SCOTT:  Is counsel referring to --

 4             MR. KOVACIC:  Mr. Scott, I would be happy to help you.  It is the

 5     wrong number, if you -- if you looked at the screen, this document has

 6     nothing to do with media.

 7             MR. SCOTT:  I think, unfortunately, we're a document behind.  The

 8     document -- counsel's correct.  On 2D00687, it should be "1992."  I

 9     misspoke, and I apologise.

10        Q.   But as you said just now, sir, and it's again nothing surprising,

11     you can't just have everyone meeting and talking with the media

12     willy-nilly, so to speak, and you controlled and you set a rule in place

13     that there shouldn't be contact with the media without your permission;

14     correct?

15        A.   Yes, I said that contact shouldn't be established with the media,

16     because on item number 3 it is specified who can have contact with the

17     media.  Not just anyone can have the idea of contacting the media.  And

18     I think in all armies throughout the world, there are such provisions.

19        Q.   And in similar fashion, sir, you also controlled access or

20     communications with the international organisations, didn't you;

21     UNPROFOR, ECMM?  Those communications could only take place with your

22     approval?

23             And again while you're thinking about that, I'll refer to P00797,

24     again dated 24 November 1992, your order, sir:

25             "There can be contacts with UNPROFOR and --"

Page 50389

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic -- one moment,

 2     please.

 3             General Petkovic, you have this document on the screen.  You ban

 4     any contact with the media.  This is in the three paragraphs, but in the

 5     reasoning you say that it is because individuals from the HVO have

 6     revealed military secrets.  What did you mean by that?  Is it because --

 7     were you controlling the media by revealing military secrets?

 8             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, we did not receive

 9     the interpretation of your question.

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'm going to check.  I'm going

11     to ask the question again, sorry, because I didn't check.  You see,

12     usually when I ask a question, I look at the person I put the question to

13     and don't look at the transcript.  That's my mistake, because I'm not

14     used to using the transcript, as such.

15             So, General Petkovic, we have a document here in front of us.

16     You say that you control -- or any contact with the media must have your

17     prior approval.  And this document shows that apparently the rationale is

18     that there were individuals from the HVO who apparently revealed military

19     secrets.  What do you exactly refer to here?

20     THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, you know that information on

21     the army -- on anyone's army is confidential, it's a military secret. 

22     There were commanders who spoke about all sorts of things because

23     they weren't educated, they weren't well informed.  They also provided

24     information that did not fully correspond to the actual situation.  They

25     tried to emphasise their own importance and diminish the importance of

Page 50390

 1     others, and such a manner of communicating information is not permissible

 2     in any army.  I then drafted an order, and I said if it is necessary for

 3     someone to establish contact with the media in a given area, then I will

 4     be the one to provide permission for that, because no one can simply

 5     decide on how to provide information to the media in any army.  People

 6     simply didn't take into account the things that they were to speak about,

 7     the quantity of weapons, the situation in the army, et cetera, et cetera.

 8     Such matters are confidential, military secrets, and that is why we

 9     decided at all press conferences, and you can see this under item 3, we

10     said that all press conferences would have to be permitted by the IPD,

11     Defence Department.  They knew how information should be provided to the

12     media.  You know, the press conferences are organised, and not each and

13     every soldier can provide information or contact the media.

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

15             MR. SCOTT:

16        Q.   Sir, my pending question to you before was:  You also controlled

17     communications with UNPROFOR and the international organisations, didn't

18     you?

19        A.   I didn't have control over that.  I had contact with UNPROFOR

20     representatives, and at their request I would instruct my men as to how

21     to establish contact with UNPROFOR.

22        Q.   Well look, please, at P00797, which I began to refer to a few

23     minutes ago, 24 November 1992, your order:

24             "The commanders of the zones, staffs, and units can have contacts

25     with UNPROFOR and the European Community members, as well as provide the

Page 50391

 1     latter with certain information, only with the permission of the chief of

 2     the HVO Main Staff"; correct?

 3        A.   That's correct.  That procedure had been a procedure that had

 4     been agreed on with UNPROFOR and other bodies.

 5        Q.   The bottom line, sir, is that you played a very significant role

 6     in whatever information was provided to the media and whatever

 7     information was provided to the international organisations, didn't you?

 8        A.   I had contact with international organisations, at their request,

 9     and therefore I knew how I was to proceed, what I was to do.  And you

10     also don't allow anyone to write anything, so the army also has the right

11     to protect itself and not to allow hundreds of people to provide

12     information for the benefit of the media; therefore, yes, I stand by

13     that.

14        Q.   In fact, sir, throughout this time-period and what we've talked

15     about in the last hour or so, coming full circle, what I put to you an

16     hour, an half ago was:  You were not some apolitical soldier, technocrat;

17     you were a political policy actor as well, controlling access to the

18     media, controlling access to international organisations, attending

19     meetings of the government, attending meetings with President Tudjman,

20     attending meetings of the HZ-HB Presidency; you were a major political

21     actor; and, in fact, you felt often during this time more like a

22     politician than a soldier, didn't you?

23        A.   No, I wasn't a politician.  I was a soldier who, at given points

24     in time, went to certain meetings, when invited.  I wasn't a politician

25     at the time, nor am I a politician now.

Page 50392

 1        Q.   Well, let's look at -- this is a loose exhibit, not in the

 2     binders, a loose exhibit, P11167.  And we can also put it up on Sanction,

 3     slide 18.  This is from Exhibit P1167 [sic].

 4             Sir, you gave an interview to "Glas Slavonije" on the 31st of

 5     December, 1994, and the very first paragraph, easy to find:

 6             "Major-General Milivoj Petkovic is remembered by many for his

 7     frequent television statements in the time of the fiercest conflicts in

 8     Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992 and 1993, when he was Chief of Staff of

 9     the Croatian Defence Council.  Asked whether he felt more like a soldier

10     or like a politician in that time, he replied that it seemed to him that

11     he was more politician than soldier ..."

12             That's what you said in the interview on the 31st of December,

13     1994; correct?

14        A.   This does seem strange, the statement that I'm more politician

15     than soldier.  I really don't see myself as a politician.

16        Q.   Well, you may not, sir, but that's not what you said on this

17     particular day.  And I put it to you that given all your involvements

18     that we spent the last hour and a half talking about, you were much more

19     than a soldier, sir, weren't you?

20        A.   I was a general, sir, not a soldier, and I attended several

21     meetings which were political in nature or of an international nature

22     sometimes.  And if we add all that up, apart from doing military

23     business, I also participated in the -- in many meetings.

24        Q.   Sir, because of your high level of involvement in all these

25     matters at both the military and the political level, the Tudjman

Page 50393

 1     government was very concerned when you were subpoenaed to testify in the

 2     Blaskic case, weren't they?

 3        A.   I don't know how concerned they were.  None of them ever told me

 4     that they were concerned.  But they invited me and gave me the summons,

 5     and they also took some steps for me to give evidence under certain

 6     conditions.

 7        Q.   Oh, sir, I bet you anything that you knew they were concerned.  I

 8     bet they told you how concerned they were, because in their own words,

 9     they thought, Petkovic is the man who knows too much, and for him to go

10     to The Hague and testify raises all sorts of risk, because Petkovic knows

11     too much.  That was their concern, wasn't it?

12        A.   But they didn't say that to me.  I don't know why they didn't.

13     If they were concerned, they were obviously speaking about that among

14     themselves.

15        Q.   Well, let's see.  When you were summoned as a Court witness in

16     the Blaskic case, you also received a set of questions or topics from the

17     Court prior to your testimony, so you knew what questions were going to

18     be asked; correct?

19        A.   Yes, that is exactly correct.

20        Q.   And the Tudjman government, or some of its representatives,

21     helped you to prepare the right answers to those questions known in

22     advance, didn't they?

23        A.   No, Your Honours, they did not assist me in that.  You could

24     easily call up the questions that I got from the Trial Chamber, and I was

25     the only one who knew the answers to those questions, and not the

Page 50394

 1     representatives of the Croatian government.  It would be good if you

 2     could show me the questions that I received during the proofing.

 3        Q.   Receiving those questions or topics in advance, in fact, was a

 4     condition of the Croatian government allowing you to testify at this

 5     Tribunal, wasn't it?

 6        A.   No.  And in the second instance, I also received the questions in

 7     advance, because the Trial Chamber thought that I needed some time to

 8     prepare.  In the second instance, also, because the Croatian government

 9     was even less concerned.

10        Q.   Sir, our time is precious.  You were accompanied and attended in

11     your Blaskic testimony by an American lawyer named David Rifkin and a

12     Croatian intelligence officer named Stefan Udiljak, weren't you?

13             For the record, Udiljak, and my apologies if I've mispronounced

14     it, U-d-i-l-j-a-k?

15        A.   You obviously did, but you mis-positioned the American lawyer,

16     because he represented the Croatian government, rather than

17     General Petkovic.  He obviously considered me a hostile witness, and he

18     was another party to the proceedings.

19        Q.   I'm not sure he considered you hostile, but he certainly did

20     represent the Croatian government and I agree on that.  But Mr. Udiljak

21     was a member of the Croatian intelligence services, and it was

22     Mr. Udiljak who contacted you about being a witness in the Blaskic case,

23     didn't he?

24        A.   No, he didn't contact me about being a witness in the Blaskic

25     case.

Page 50395

 1        Q.   Mr. Udiljak, sir, had become extensively involved by that time,

 2     in 1999, he had become extensively involved in matters concerning this

 3     Tribunal's efforts to locate and obtain the HVO archive, hadn't he?

 4        A.   I don't know about the HVO archive.  I don't know anything about

 5     that.  I left the HVO in 1994, and the archive stayed behind in the area

 6     where I was at the time.  I have no idea where the archive was.

 7        Q.   This was during the time, sir, and you know this, that the

 8     Tudjman government was concealing and keeping those archives from this

 9     Tribunal, wasn't it, and Mr. Udiljak was extensively involved in that;

10     correct?

11        A.   I don't know about that.  As far as I know, there was an inquiry

12     sent to Mr. Jelavic  - that's what I learned from the media - who at the

13     time was a minister of defence, or whatever he was.  And the Federation

14     of BiH and about the rest, I don't know.  At the time, I served in

15     Osijek, or maybe I was in Dubrovnik already.  I'm not quite sure.

16        Q.   Sir, at this time -- and the Chamber has heard this name now

17     several times, but you knew there was a man named Markica Rebic, who was

18     the head of the Croatian intelligence service called SIS, and he was also

19     the head of something called Operation -- or OA Haag, Operation Hague,

20     wasn't he?

21        A.   I don't know.  I learned about this for the first time from the

22     newspapers.  And about this Operation Hague, I heard for the first time

23     here in this Tribunal, when there was a witness, but I have no knowledge

24     about the Operation Hague.  And as far as I know, in that document nobody

25     has mentioned Petkovic.

Page 50396

 1        Q.   This was the same Mr. Rebic who was also convicted by this

 2     Tribunal for contempt of court for disclosing protected witness

 3     information, wasn't he?  In March 2006, this Tribunal issued a judgement

 4     of contempt against Mr. Rebic, and this was the man who was handling you

 5     in connection with your testimony in the Blaskic case; correct?

 6        A.   No, Mr. Rebic never contacted me.  The contacts in the Blaskic

 7     case were maintained by his Defence, and that's -- that applies to --

 8     that's usual for any Defence.

 9        Q.   And you and Mr. -- excuse me, strike that.  Mr. Rebic and

10     Mr. Bandic, who was a witness in this case in open session -- Mr. Rebic

11     and Mr. Bandic were, in fact, conducting intelligence operations against

12     this Tribunal, weren't they, trying to discover protected information,

13     trying to develop sources inside the ICTY; correct?

14        A.   I don't know about that.  You should have punished them if that's

15     what you found out.  It is hard to detect an intelligence man, especially

16     in this Tribunal.

17        Q.   Did you come to know, sir, that, in fact, Mr. Bandic at some

18     point, because of his activities, was encouraged -- encouraged to leave

19     the Netherlands?

20        A.   I really don't know that.

21        Q.   This is the same Mr. Bandic that you travelled with in Central

22     Bosnia and the same Mr. Bandic who participated in the investigation

23     concerning Stupni Do; correct?  Your personal bodyguard, an intelligence

24     operative, the man you travelled with repeatedly when you went to Central

25     Bosnia, Mr. Bandic, and that's the man you put in charge of the Stupni Do

Page 50397

 1     investigation, one of your closest, most loyal lieutenants?

 2        A.   You couldn't say that.  Especially when he was appointed to

 3     various diplomatic positions, I had no more contacts with him, and I

 4     didn't know what he was doing here in The Hague, whether he was with the

 5     Tribunal or with the embassy.

 6             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] I apologise, but I waited for

 7     Mr. Petkovic's answer.  But I really would like a reference for what the

 8     Prosecutor is saying.  This is the same Bandic who participated in the

 9     investigation concerning Stupni Do, I don't know the origin of that

10     reference:  For this, as far as I know, nobody has said anything like

11     this in the courtroom before.

12             MR. SCOTT:  My apologies.  It's in one of the investigative

13     reports by Mr. Bandic, and I would be happy to provide it.  I can't give

14     counsel the number at the moment, that Mr. Bandic was one of the persons

15     who authored one of the reports.

16        Q.   Sir, Mr. Bandic testified in this case, and he said that he was

17     the one that whenever you travelled to Central Bosnia, he went with you.

18     This is at 38245, 38246, 38259 to 60.  One function was to be his

19     bodyguard and then to actually conduct intelligence operations:

20             "I was a member of the secret Counter-Intelligence Service, and

21     this was part of my job.  If we were going to Central Bosnia, very often

22     it was only the two of us, Mr. Petkovic and I, and I drove."

23             In any event, sir, let's turn to -- we only have a few minutes

24     left, but at least hopefully we can start on this.  Let's turn to Exhibit

25     P08912 --

Page 50398

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But we haven't said everything.

 2     Bandic's departure from Herceg-Bosna is also his departure from Petkovic.

 3     I never again had the opportunity to meet him again.  So please don't

 4     link somebody's activities in one period to another period.  We have

 5     nothing in common.  He is not my superior, I am not his superior.  We

 6     never co-operated.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, the

 8     Prosecutor is putting questions to you on the circumstances in which you

 9     testified in the Blaskic case.  I have listened to you, and you said that

10     you testified freely, without any problem whatsoever.  Fine.

11             On looking at your testimony in the Blaskic case, there was a

12     problem at one point regarding the time.  The Trial Chamber had taken

13     some time and advised you of the fact that the hearing would resume on

14     the following day, and that's when the problem arose.  The Presiding

15     Judge asks you for your opinion and asked you whether that would be a

16     problem for you if the hearing were to resume on the following day, and

17     this is what you said:

18             "Your Honour --"

19             This is in the French text, so page 22502:

20             "Your Honour, when I was told last night that this would only

21     last one day, my minister was informed and told me this:  You may go

22     there for one day."

23             The answer you gave to the Presiding Judge seems to indicate that

24     the minister of defence was following this very closely, since he said

25     that you were only entitled to go there for one day.  He's on a

Page 50399

 1     first-name basis with you.  Do you remember this?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I told you that the

 3     Croatian government tried to agree with the Tribunal, and finally did so,

 4     and was represented, among others, by a Mr. Udiljak, and I was told that

 5     these persons would interrupt me and were entitled to do so if a question

 6     were to be asked to me concerning the Republic of Croatia or anything

 7     about it, and I knew that.

 8             At the same time, the Croatian government, in communicating with

 9     the Tribunal, said that Petkovic would give evidence for an entire day in

10     that trial, and it was accepted as such.  However, many questions were

11     still left, and the President of the Trial Chamber asked whether the

12     evidence could be extended for another day.  At that moment, Counsel

13     Rifkin said, Well, I had received guarantees for one day, I have no

14     guarantees for anything else.  And then the President of the Trial

15     Chamber addressed me, Mr. Petkovic, take my word for it, you have my

16     guarantee.  And I accepted that.  So I stayed and gave evidence for as

17     long as the Trial Chamber wanted.

18             My evidence, as I said, had been agreed upon without anybody

19     asking me anything about it.  How the Croatian government was able to

20     strike that agreement, I don't know.  And it also got the right to be

21     represented there by its lawyer.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] But before testifying, you were

23     in contact with the Croatian minister of defence, weren't you?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honours.  The Croatian

25     minister of defence received a summons for my testimony, and I received

Page 50400

 1     the summons from the Ministry of Defence, because I didn't receive it

 2     personally.  It was sent to the Croatian government, imposing an

 3     obligation on them to hand it to me.  And the minister of defence invited

 4     me to come to see him, and I travelled from Dubrovnik to Zagreb.  That's

 5     when I found out that Croatia would be represented by Mr. Rifkin and

 6     Mr. Udiljak.  There was a conversation with the minister of about one

 7     hour, and they explained to me that they had the right to protect the

 8     interests of the Republic of Croatia and that they would intervene if a

 9     question were to be asked concerning the Republic of Croatia to which I

10     didn't have the right to answer, because that was what the agreement was

11     about.  And I believe during my examination, there were two such

12     interventions.  Later on, everybody respected that and I was asked no

13     more such questions.

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, when I put

15     these questions to you about your testimony, I asked you whether your

16     presence was subject to the approval of the Croatian authorities.  Since

17     the Trial Chamber had prepared a whole list of questions, and you stated

18     what you had said, what I want to know is whether what you said had been

19     "controlled," quote/unquote, by the Croatian authorities.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour, nobody controlled

21     that testimony.  I basically spoke about the military police and the

22     authority over it.  That was the central topic of my testimony, and there

23     were also the special purpose units.  The Croatian government didn't

24     influence me in that respect.  And, anyway, I knew the subject matter

25     better than anybody else.  And I testified to the best of my knowledge,

Page 50401

 1     and the President of the Trial Chamber said to me, General, you gave a

 2     brave statement, and he thanked me.

 3             The Croatian government displayed no interest whatsoever in the

 4     contents of my evidence.  The minister of defence only spoke to me about

 5     Mr. Rifkin's representing the interests of Croatia during my testimony.

 6     That's the entire communication.

 7             And I can add that I asked the minister, at the end, whether I'm

 8     going there to testify in the Blaskic trial or in a trial where Croatia

 9     is being tried.  So that was all my communication with one person only,

10     and that was my then minister of defence.  I believe his name was

11     Mr. Miljavac.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, it's just about time

13     to stop for today.  There's one minute left.  Would you like to put

14     another question?  It's up to you.

15             MR. SCOTT:  No, Your Honour, thank you very much.  I'm about to

16     start -- we would start another major document, and it would be better if

17     we start tomorrow.  Thank you.

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Of course, as you all know, we

19     will be sitting tomorrow in the afternoon.  We will have only one break

20     tomorrow afternoon.

21             I wish you all a good afternoon.

22                           [The Accused Petkovic stands down]

23                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.44 p.m.,

24                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 4th day of March,

25                           2010, at 2.15 p.m.