Page 579

1 Okay. I see everyone nodding.

2 Mr. Registrar, my attention is being drawn ...

3 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

4 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, today is the turn of -- unless there are

5 preliminaries, which I see there aren't. The Defence for Mr. Coric.

6 Go ahead. You have two hours.

7 MS. TOMASEGOVIC-TOMIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your

8 Honours. Good morning to everyone in and around the courtroom.

9 Valentin Coric's Defence has organised its submissions in the following

10 way. The first part will be addressed by Mr. Dan Ivetic, who will

11 respond to the questions of the Chamber sent to us in preparation for the

12 hearing. And then I'm going to address the Appeals Chamber about the

13 legal and factual errors dealt with in our submissions. Hopefully we

14 will have enough time to deal with all of them in our submissions.

15 And now I give the floor to Mr. Dan Ivetic.

16 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, good morning to you all.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning.

18 MR. IVETIC: At this time we would like to address your first

19 question on the topic on the Trial Chamber's inquiry into the alleged

20 state of occupation being in existence during the relevant time-period.

21 I would like to note that we discussed this in detail at paragraphs 75 to

22 83 of our appellants brief and we stand behind those submissions in full.

23 We would like to stress at the outset that any inquiry into occupation in

24 this case, under this indictment, is based on error. There was never any

25 proper notice given to the Coric Defence in the indictment that

Page 580

1 occupation was part of the allegations charged that should be defended

2 against. No reasonable Chamber could read paragraph 232 of the

3 indictment as notice of occupation.

4 Similarly, in volume 1, paragraph 91 of the judgement, the claims

5 are that the allegation of occupation was made known to and applied

6 against Petkovic and Praljak, but what about notice to Coric? The

7 Chamber is silent on the issue because there was not proper notice given

8 to Coric in the indictment. Paragraphs 8 and 10 of the indictment,

9 Petkovic and Praljak are alleged to have "exercised de jure and/or

10 de facto command over Herceg-Bosna/HVO armed forces," but there is no

11 mention of occupation. Where are the key words that are necessary to

12 provide adequate notice? Although the Prosecution claims a waiver on the

13 issue of occupation in their response at -- response brief at

14 paragraph 69, this argument fails as to Coric, because in that same

15 paragraph the Prosecution concedes the Coric Defence did object to the

16 same. We objected as soon as the Prosecution revealed occupation as part

17 of their case, which was only at the phase of the final brief and closing

18 arguments. Waiver is thus not an available argument.

19 Further, assuming arguendo, even if the notice requirement were

20 to be ignored, the Trial Chamber still erred in the course of its

21 inquiry. We would join in the arguments made by our Defence colleagues

22 that went before us this week, arguing against both the findings of an

23 international armed conflict and occupation. Rather than repeating the

24 same, I will add on to what has been said.

25 The Trial Chamber made an error of law because it did not mention

Page 581

1 invasion as an essential element of establishing a state of occupation.

2 The crime does not cite to evidence nor conclude that the HVO as a

3 foreign army invaded -- that territory, after that time, is said to be

4 occupied. The HVO did not invade from Croatia. The HVO, rather than

5 being some foreign power, was comprised of lawful, domestic inhabitants

6 of the very areas where they were located. That the alleged borders and

7 occupied areas were often crossed to supply the other party, i.e., the

8 ABiH and the HVO, with weapons, ammunition, training, et cetera, was

9 mentioned by some of our colleagues on the other Defences earlier this

10 week. This evidence showing the integration and the close links between

11 the HVO and the armija BiH cannot be reconciled with the alleged

12 existence of an international armed conflict, nor occupation of areas by

13 hostile HVO foreign forces. We submit that the Prosecution's quotation

14 in footnote 266 of their response confirms that very fact.

15 All authorities agree on the same definition, namely, that a

16 territory is occupied when it is placed under the authority of a hostile

17 army and the state to which it belongs has ceased to exercise its own

18 authority. According to ample evidence as we have heard this week,

19 including, among other, 4D410, and including statements by BiH authority,

20 the HVO was an equal and constituent part of the RBiH armed forces, on

21 par with the armija BiH. Thus, the HVO cannot be a foreign power. As

22 established by the Constitution of the SRBiH in Article 256 and by the

23 Law on All People's Defence in Article 63, the Croatian communities

24 instituted Territorial Defence and civilian protection structures, in

25 accordance unity and neighbouring municipalities as established by the

Page 582

1 BiH state.

2 Thus, it must be stressed that not only the HVO was not on --

3 that the HVO was on that same territory from the beginning and did not

4 invade, but the HVO structures were lawful structures made up of persons

5 who had similar positions on that territory even before the war. For

6 instance, and it is of significance that in some area, such as Posusje,

7 Grude, Tomislavgrad, and other places, there was not any combat nor

8 change of authority such that existing structures and local municipal

9 organs remained the same, even though falling under the HVO. Thus, there

10 is no hostile force nor "invasion" and the lack of any grounds for

11 occupation, due to the fact that these HVO areas that never could be

12 called occupied, the whole concept of occupation fails.

13 An armed conflict can be characterised as international if a

14 foreign state has an overall control over subordinated armed forces that

15 do not directly belong to it. But according to the Tadic appeal

16 judgement, paragraph 137, the control exercised must comprise more than

17 the mere provision of financial assistance or military equipment or

18 training.

19 No reasonable Chamber can conclude that an international armed

20 conflict existed or that the HVO was a foreign army, or that the Republic

21 of Croatia provided assistance only to the HVO and not the ABiH. I will

22 not repeat the plethora of evidence which we've heard this week of the

23 military supplies and weapons given by Croatia to both the HVO and the

24 armija BiH, but I will stress one bit of evidence in the case that

25 90 per cent of the weapons and the material technical supplies of the

Page 583

1 armija BiH were provided by the Republic of Croatia and the HVO. That's

2 at transcript page 42146.

3 I would also stress during all times the BiH President,

4 Mr. Izetbegovic, travelled to other countries across Croatia. We have

5 already heard from other Defence teams this week of the Agreement on

6 Friendship and Co-operation in February of 1992, which recognised the

7 armija BiH and the HVO as integral parts of the same BiH armed forces.

8 On June 29, 1993, President Izetbegovic himself declared the HVO

9 as a constituent part of the BiH armed forces. On April 24, 1993, the

10 presidents of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the HVO met in Zagreb to

11 discuss a joint command between the HVO and the ABiH. Thus,

12 Your Honours, if we were to follow the Prosecution's logic as to some

13 sort of de facto organ or proxy due to the support that the HVO received

14 from Croatia, under the evidence, the armija BiH would also have to be a

15 de facto organ or proxy of Croatia under that definition; hence, with no

16 grounds for inquiry into occupation - no application of the additional

17 protections that would apply in the case of occupation - is necessary.

18 Your Honours, now I would like to address your question number 4

19 as it relates to the hypothetical reversal of the Trial Chamber's finding

20 on the intent of HVO forces with regard to the deaths of the civilians

21 who had taken refuge in Enver Sljivo's house, including the impact of the

22 scope of the common criminal plan of the joint criminal enterprise and

23 the alleged mens rea of our client, Valentin Coric, for murder under the

24 first category of JCE.

25 As a preliminary matter, I believe it was our colleague Mr. Kahn

Page 584

1 who mentioned earlier in the week a case from the United Kingdom, the

2 Jogee case, Regina versus Jogee, cited 2016, the reference is UKSC 8,

3 wherein the Supreme Court of England and Wales - and that came out after

4 our briefs and therefore I think it merits a further mention - but the

5 Supreme Court of England and Wales has essentially found that the

6 position in English law at the time of Tadic and upon which the Appeals

7 Chamber in Tadic relied - and look to paragraph 224, footnote 287, of the

8 Tadic appeals judgement - upon which it relied in formulating the ICTY's

9 JCE model was wrong. Per the Supreme Court, the correct position is that

10 the secondary party will only be guilty of the crime committed by the

11 principal if he intended it. That intent may be conditional upon the

12 occurrence of facts leading up to the commission of the crime. Foresight

13 that the crime might happen is not the correct standard, but rather, it

14 should be based on evidence of possession of the requisite intent.

15 That's paragraphs 83 and 92 of the Regina versus Jogee case. As the

16 Supreme Court commented, this ruling corrects:

17 "The striking anomaly of requiring a lower mental threshold for

18 guilt in the case of the accessory than in the case of the principal."

19 Paragraph 84 of the Jogee case.

20 I leave it to Your Honours if the ICTY will correct or change its

21 jurisprudence on the current state of law on JCE to be in line with the

22 decision of the Supreme Court of England and Wales.

23 We will deal with Your Honours' inquiry as to JCE 3 liability

24 later when we discuss the two documents in relation to question 4(c)(ii).

25 I will also try not to repeat too much what other Defence colleagues have

Page 585

1 said on the issue of -- of -- of question 4, and hereby adopt by

2 reference especially - but not only - that events in Gornji Vakuf were an

3 isolated local incident that cannot prove any common criminal purpose in

4 existence. If this finding that the shelling of Enver Sljivo's house as

5 crimes of wilful killing and murder is overturned, then the Trial

6 Chamber's findings about the existence of a clear pattern of conduct of

7 HVO attacks will also have to be overturned. And their conclusion of

8 murders and wilful killings in Mostar and Heliodrom in the later period,

9 after 30th June 1993, must also be overturned if favour of the defendant.

10 The reason for this is rather simple. The Trial Chamber relied upon its

11 findings of murders and wilful killings such as this shelling of

12 Enver Sljivo's house in the course of attacks as to Gornji Vakuf and

13 Mostar as the basis for its finding of a common criminal purpose.

14 The Trial Judgement at paragraph 65 of volume 4 based its

15 conclusion on a common criminal purpose on an alleged "clear pattern of

16 conduct" on the part of HVO forces. Thus, if the aforesaid shelling of

17 Enver Sljivo's house is overturned, then the finding of wilful killings

18 and murder in Gornji Vakuf has no evidence to support same. Thus, the

19 entire concept of a "clear pattern of conduct" on the part of HVO forces

20 is then called into question and nullified, especially since there are no

21 similar findings of wilful killings and murders in relation to other

22 municipalities except later in Mostar. It does not fit into the theory

23 of a Prosecution JCE. No clear pattern of conduct means no common

24 criminal purpose, which defeats JCE 1 responsibility as to the

25 municipalities. This means that Mr. Coric cannot be said to have had any

Page 586

1 JCE 1 criminal liability.

2 Now, if we shift our focus to events in Mostar. First of all, if

3 there is no viable conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence that

4 there was a "clear pattern of conduct" and if - as we've heard from other

5 teams this week - there is no original JCE in existence as to the

6 municipalities, then it becomes illogical that this non-existent JCE

7 would be expanded to include Mostar, as the Trial Chamber erroneously

8 found in volume 4, paragraph 59 of the judgement. Murder as a "clear

9 pattern of conduct" is essential to the Trial Chamber's conclusion that

10 there existed a common criminal plan; and without a substantial finding

11 of murder under the evidence, then Your Honours must acquit Mr. Coric for

12 Count 2 and Count 3. As well as especially if it is reasonable under the

13 evidence that the alleged crimes can also be reasonably understood as the

14 result of strictly military operations over which Coric had no role; and

15 second, in the -- in regards to the extended period after January until

16 late June and July, where there is essentially no military operations

17 whatsoever.

18 Further, if we return to Enver Sljivo's house, the Defence must

19 point - in addition to what our colleagues have already said - that the

20 Prosecution draws attention to smoke rising from a chimney, but the

21 Prosecution ignores its own concession that armed defenders were within

22 tens of metres of that same house, or the references of my colleagues to

23 evidence demonstrating that armed offenders were even closer to the

24 house. Thus, there was no proper analysis performed to exclude that this

25 shell was not part of a legitimate military operation between two

Page 587

1 opposing armed forces, wherein the unfortunate deaths of civilians would

2 be collateral casualties.

3 Thus, the Trial Chamber committed a legal error by merely

4 generically categorising such shells as inherently indiscriminate weapons

5 without doing the proper analysis called for. I remind Your Honours of

6 the Galic Appeals Chamber that established that a shelling can only be

7 determined to be "indiscriminate" after "determining that no reasonable

8 or possibility existed that the victims ... were unintentionally harmed

9 by combat in their vicinity."

10 That's paragraph 232 to 235 of the Galic appeals judgement.

11 There are many alternative reasonable conclusions. For instance,

12 if there are civilians in the front lines or if defending ABiH, armija

13 BiH, forces placed their own units near civilian structures, many

14 conclusions which qualify the deaths as unintentional and ones for which

15 one cannot be found militarily nor criminal liable. We also draw Your

16 Honours' attention to the fact the Prosecution is presenting a different

17 version than that found by the Chamber. Namely, the Prosecution says

18 that a very precise direct fire tank round was used. If the Prosecution

19 persists in this argument - as it has this whole week - then,

20 Your Honours, the Prosecution is itself telling you that the trial

21 judgement is in error. They can't have it both ways.

22 Moving to the mens rea elements for Count 2 and 3. The Defence

23 has consistently and in detail in its appeals brief demonstrated that

24 Coric neither received combat reports nor had any command authority over

25 military operations, nor even over the military police when they were

Page 588

1 used in those operations, and he was not present in the zone of combat in

2 Gornji Vakuf. In fact, we have several bits of evidence that demonstrate

3 that during relevant time-period, Mr. Coric is in the hospital in Zagreb.

4 P1350; transcript testimony 50967, 51082, 51087 through 8. In volume 4

5 paragraph 920 to 921 of the judgement, the sole basis of Coric's

6 knowledge that crimes must have occurred in Gornji Vakuf are cited as

7 P1635 and P3090. At issue are reports only giving statistics of combat

8 casualties of the military police, which can be understood as legitimate

9 combat, and then also mentioning combat and capturing of armija BiH

10 combatants as well as reporting on the need to increase anticrime

11 activities. Your Honours, such reports cannot form the basis for any

12 criminal mens rea of wilful killing or murders in Gornji Vakuf on the

13 part of Mr. Coric.

14 Additionally, for instance, in paragraph 33 of our appeals brief,

15 we have discussed some of the many facets of evidence that have

16 demonstrated that Mr. Coric did not the requisite mens rea, including his

17 conduct in the proper professional training of military police, including

18 on the topics of international law and the humane treatment of detainees.

19 In paragraph 34 of our appeal brief, we discuss Coric's efforts

20 to organise courses with the International Red Cross to further train the

21 military police to act properly. In paragraph 35 of our appeal brief, we

22 cite to evidence that no fewer than 2.000 criminal reports were filed by

23 the military police against Croat perpetrators of crimes, and these

24 criminal reports were then left to be dealt with by the appropriate

25 judicial organs. The Defence presented copies of just some of the

Page 589

1 military prosecution office registers that it was able to find from

2 several offices. And that is 5D4288. A large number of unfinished cases

3 were transferred by the judicial organs -- transferred to the -- to the

4 judicial organs to be dealt with. A large of number unfinished cases

5 were transferred after the Washington Agreements. We have 5D5027,

6 5D5032, 5D5024, and the testimony of witness Vidovic at transcript page

7 51562 through 9 telling us that.

8 We must stress that the role of either the military or civilian

9 police ends with the submission of criminal reports; even the trial

10 judgement concludes that in volume 4, paragraph 881 and 2, but we will

11 discuss that later.

12 In this regard it should be stressed that in the Milutinovic

13 trial judgement, President Milutinovic was found not guilty and acquitted

14 even though he had actually reporting of crimes because he at the same

15 time information and foresaw that appropriate law enforcement and

16 judicial organs were handling things to prosecute the perpetrators. This

17 is volume 3, paragraphs 132 and 143 of the Milutinovic trial judgement.

18 This is an acquittal the Prosecution did not appeal.

19 Coric's actions also demonstrate that he foresaw that law

20 enforcement and police organs would work together to prevent crimes and

21 took all steps available to him, whilst that both the military and

22 civilian police, to have those forces legitimately function to prevent

23 and punish criminal activity. It cannot be excluded under the evidence

24 that Coric too believed he was part of a legitimate state operating in a

25 legitimate police role and that crimes were investigated and punished in

Page 590

1 accord with the law. Thus, this is in fact a more reasonable conclusion

2 than any common criminal purpose that he would be a part of.

3 The most significant evidence as to the lack of intent to commit

4 crimes can be seen from two of Mr. Coric's own documents issued during

5 the same time-period. P5471, while at the military police

6 administration; and P6837, while at the Ministry of Interior. In both,

7 Mr. Coric is informing everyone else and, in essence, pleading with HVO

8 military commanders that he is lacking the military police - and then

9 later the civilian police - to properly prevent crimes and do police jobs

10 because the manpower has been taken and resubordinated to the HVO

11 military for combat. Coric is asking for their return so that they can

12 more effectively prevent and police against crimes.

13 Your Honours, under the totality of this evidence, it is

14 inconsistent and indeed illogical for anyone to conclude that Coric had

15 the mens rea for crimes in Counts 2 and 3, since he is espousing a desire

16 to prevent crimes across the entire territory. Thus, there is not any

17 evidence upon which the Trial Chamber could have properly relied upon to

18 infer that Coric shared or had any intent for these murders or a JCE.

19 Thus, if the findings as to the killings in Gornji Vakuf were

20 overturned, given this plethora of other evidence of Coric's

21 crime-fighting in other places, it would be impossible to assess to him a

22 criminal mens rea for JCE 1. Given the foregoing evidence, he simply

23 cannot share the intent of the possible or alleged co-perpetrators of

24 killings. It would be improper to do so merely based on his position as

25 an official in police and law enforcement activities.

Page 591

1 Turning now to the issue of mens rea for JCE 3 liability. As a

2 preliminary matter it should be stressed that if this Appeals Chamber

3 overturns the finding as to Enver Sljivo's house and the deaths in

4 Gornji Vakuf, then it negates even more the foreseeability of additional

5 JCE crimes for Coric. These death must have been foreseeable as crimes

6 of an existing common criminal purpose he agreed to - look to the

7 Sainovic appeals judgement paragraph 1557 - rather than due to legitimate

8 military action or some other cause like random crime, random crime that

9 he could perhaps foresee as a police official. Again, by virtue of being

10 a police official, Coric by definition foresees crimes; but that does not

11 mean that he intends or condones them or that he is part of a common

12 criminal purpose, especially, especially given the aforecited evidence

13 that he was doing his best with limited manpower to prevent crimes and

14 thus fulfil his police role.

15 Further, if the earlier finding that deaths in Gornji Vakuf as

16 murders are removed, there is no possibility for Coric to have foreseen

17 killings in Dretelj - as erroneously concluded in volume 4,

18 paragraph 1021 of the trial judgement, which occurred at a later date -

19 because he would have no -- he would have no prior notice to be able to

20 foresee the same.

21 Your Honours, I would now like to address question number

22 4(c)(ii) raised by Your Honours as to the significance of Exhibits P1414

23 and P1393 in relation to the assessment of Coric's ability to foresee

24 murders under JCE 3. As a preliminary matter we would stress that

25 Mr. Coric was never part of any JCE or common criminal purpose. We would

Page 592

1 also note that it is important to consider not only the substance but the

2 time-period of the stated documents to begin with this analysis, and to

3 look at the totality of other evidence, including the context of how

4 these documents were used in the trial judgement.

5 First, P1939 is a document of the Military Police Crime

6 Department reporting on certain less serious creams, most notably not

7 murder, committed by military police personnel against prisoners sent to

8 Coric in his capacity at the military police administration.

9 P1414, the other document, is Coric's immediate order - sent the

10 very next day after he received P1393 - seeking to investigate these

11 specific incidents of alleged crimes and to take action against the

12 wrong-doers.

13 In P1414, Coric undertakes all available means at his disposal

14 and acts properly as a military police officer. He asks, among other

15 things for a report to be submitted of events that resulted in the

16 maltreatment and infliction of injuries in the Tomislavgrad prison. He

17 asks for clarification of the circumstances surrounding the bodily

18 injuries of detainees in Ljubuski prison; to find out the names of

19 persons who participated in those events; and the names of units they

20 belong to; and for all stolen goods to be returned; and in the case of

21 missing items, written explanations to be submitted. P1414 thus

22 demonstrates that Coric neither intended for these crimes to occur nor

23 condoned the same. Rather, P1414 shows the proper and appropriate

24 reaction of Coric when he is informed that crimes are suspected or known

25 to have been committed by members of the military police. Indeed, the

Page 593

1 Trial Chamber treats P1414 as proof of Coric's good deeds to try and

2 combat criminal activity, not as incriminatory of him. Volume 4 of the

3 trial judgement, paragraph 881, footnote 1645, which we will discuss in a

4 bit.

5 The record in this case unfortunately does not demonstrate if

6 there was ever any written reply back to Coric about the results of this

7 particular investigation or if the perpetrators could be identified and,

8 if so, how punished. We do not know what the result was of this

9 investigation. However, we have other evidence which demonstrated that

10 Coric had a very strict view that forbade the commission of crimes by

11 military policemen. For instance, the record is clear that within his

12 limited competencies, Coric sought to have the behaviour of the military

13 police comply with the utmost professionalism. We have Exhibit P129 that

14 Coric sent military police units in the field rules of discipline they

15 should follow. Likewise, Coric's personal attitude was described at

16 trial at transcript page 50953 through 50954 as a very stringent policy

17 as to discipline of military police found to have engaged in such

18 misconduct such that, and now I quote:

19 "... any such perpetrators should be prosecuted and a criminal

20 report filed ... anybody who besmirched the name of the military police

21 on battle-grounds throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, that they should be

22 thrown out of the unit."

23 We have other evidence that when crimes were committed by

24 military police and made known to Coric, he adhered to precisely this

25 stringent policy stated above by a witness and dismissed the perpetrators

Page 594

1 from their duties and called for criminal reports to be forwarded to the

2 relevant prosecutors because, in his words as expressed in Exhibit P3571:

3 "The above-named have sullied the honour of the military police

4 and their further presence in the unit is detrimental."

5 In that particular instances, those dismissed and criminally

6 reported were perpetrators who had committed rapes.

7 Now this one that I just read, P3571, comes later in time than

8 P1414 and thus demonstrates that we can understand P1414 -- that is to

9 say after P1414, Coric as chief of the military police administration,

10 within his limited authority, fought and sought to prevent crimes

11 committed by military police members. Respectfully, the burden of proof

12 is not on the Defence to prove the results of the investigation ordered

13 by P1414, but in the context of this subsequent dated evidence showing

14 uniform conduct, it can be reasonably concluded that Coric did not

15 condone crimes. And thus we believe that P1414 is properly understood as

16 an order for investigations by the appellant and that it shows that he

17 took steps where he could within his limited competency to prevent or

18 punish crimes reported to him that involved military police personnel.

19 Returning to what we mentioned earlier, we have to emphasise that

20 in this light and context, P1414 is used as an example of Coric's efforts

21 at crime prevention. P1414 is mentioned in the trial judgement not only

22 in paragraph 881, footnote 1645 in a positive rather than negative sense,

23 but further the next paragraph of the judgement, paragraph 882, the Trial

24 Chamber states:

25 "In view of the above, the Chamber finds that as chief of the

Page 595

1 military police administration, Valentin Coric had the ability to

2 participate in fighting crime within the HVO but that his power was

3 limited to investigating the perpetrators of crimes, while the

4 responsibility for their prosecution rested within [sic] the Military

5 Prosecutor."

6 Your Honours, these paragraphs are in the section of the

7 judgement volume 4 entitled: "Valentin Coric's Powers in Fighting

8 Crime." Thus, it must be seen that while Coric took steps against crimes

9 known to him, he was limited by his position as to what he could do and

10 over whom he could exercise such discipline.

11 Relating to this, we would like to refer to P1678. It is Coric's

12 own document dated 17 March 1993, where he is talking about subordination

13 of units of the military police, and he is saying that they will

14 eliminate anyone from the military police whose work is objected to by

15 the military commander - to which they are subordinated - or SIS. It is

16 clear that Coric not only announces a fight against any form of crime or

17 lack of discipline in the military police, but he also states that the

18 military police administration would follow information received by those

19 to whom the military police units were subordinated - military

20 commanders - and those who would have the obligation to fight crime in

21 all HVO units without exception.

22 Thus, to the extent that Coric could foresee that other crimes

23 could happen, such as murders, we have to take into account that he

24 legitimately believed the perpetrators would be processed and punished in

25 line with his strict stance by the appropriate organs who were not under

Page 596

1 his authority nor competence. In this regard -- in this regard, it must

2 also be taken into account that the other document, P1393 that

3 Your Honours asked about, is not mentioned in the judgement in connection

4 to Mr. Coric. However, P1393 is an internal military police document.

5 So again in this instance, Coric reacts appropriately and in line with

6 the law when he is informed through the regular chain of informing within

7 the military police. Thus, these documents cannot be used to infer

8 Coric's ability to foresee murders that would not be likewise punished

9 and subjected to an appropriate legal remedy, as he did for other crimes

10 that he heard about.

11 Now, further, murder is not even mentioned in these two documents

12 that Your Honours have asked about, P1393 and P1414. Only thefts,

13 maltreatment, and beatings were mentioned. The Prosecution - in its

14 reply brief at paragraph 73 - concedes that foreseeability of murder is

15 based on knowledge of previous murders and not on other crimes like

16 theft, beatings, or maltreatment. Thus, even under the Prosecution's

17 accepted standard, P1393 and P1414 cannot be used to infer Coric's

18 ability to foresee murders that would not likewise be punished and

19 subjected to appropriate legal remedy.

20 All witnesses were clear that no post-combat reports were ever

21 sent to Coric in any form whatsoever by the military police subordinated

22 in combat zones to the military. The evidence is that the military

23 police administration only received statistics such as the location,

24 general situation of the military police such as numerical strength,

25 casualties, et cetera. You can look to 5D5110, paragraph 5 for reference

Page 597

1 to that. As to crimes that were reported and that he notice of, Coric

2 was put on notice that the relevant authorities were investigating,

3 arresting, and submitting criminal reports to prosecute the perpetrators.

4 P4058 is an example of that.

5 We would also in this case highlight 5D2113, a report from Coric

6 to the Defence Department that outlines anticrime measures that have been

7 implemented in Mostar with "noticeable results," namely when the military

8 police undertook control of parts of the city to prevent looting.

9 Similarly, we see in 5D4110 Coric taking those steps within his limited

10 domain to contribute to law enforcement efforts in Mostar, trying to

11 increase the effectiveness of anticrime measures, supporting training of

12 additional crime technicians needed, and encouraging the military police

13 to work more closely with the civilian police. He maintained a similar

14 position when he left the military police and became civilian minister of

15 interior.

16 Further, based on the two documents that Your Honours have asked

17 about, Coric could not foresee murders that came later in a different

18 time-period, under different circumstances, especially those carried out

19 by personnel not within his authority and beyond his limited competencies

20 and which were not reported to him. Time and context are quite

21 important.

22 It should be recalled that other evidence shows that Coric did

23 not even have competency over all the military police because of their

24 engagement in the front lines with the HVO military. Just the other day

25 Mr. Stringer at transcript page 422 to 423 represented to Your Honours

Page 598

1 that the majority correctly found that that other appellants had the

2 military police subordinated to them and did not mentioned Coric; but my

3 colleague will deal with the resubordination of the military and civilian

4 police later today and discuss efforts again of Coric to try to get both

5 the military and civilian police back from the front lines to engage in

6 law enforcement activities.

7 Thus, at all times, Coric - by virtue of his police role -

8 foresaw crimes but also foresaw that the law enforcement organs and

9 judicial organs would work to prevent such crimes. If necessary,

10 personnel were returned to be allowed to serve that function.

11 Respectfully, we are surprised by this Appeals Chamber's question as

12 raising new issues that neither the Prosecution's appeal nor the

13 Prosecution's respondent's brief raised, insofar as they do not cite to

14 these documents as to Coric.

15 The trial judgement, we submit in volume 4, paragraph 881 and

16 882, recognises that Coric fought crime. It used these documents -- this

17 document, P1414, as an example of how he performs his regular police

18 duty. JCE on the other hand, is a form of responsibility, and we submit

19 performing duty and fighting crime cannot be an especially part of a JCE,

20 nor can they be viewed as furtherance of a JCE. If performing the

21 regular duty of a police officer, to foresee and react to crime becomes a

22 key element of a JCE or proof of a later crime; and basically the only

23 proof then, the very essence of fighting crime itself becomes criminal,

24 which is totally opposite and absurd to the legal systems of the world.

25 We would remind Your Honours of the Appeals Chamber holding in

Page 599

1 the Halilovic appeal, at paragraph 59 of that judgement, wherein it is

2 stated:

3 "For example, a police officer may be able to prevent and punish

4 crimes under his jurisdiction, but this would not as much make him a

5 superior (in the sense of Article 7(3) of the Statute) vis-à-vis any

6 perpetrator within the jurisdiction."

7 Again, this is paragraph 59.

8 Respectfully we would ask that the same analysis be applied as to

9 JCE in any form. Coric's role as first a military and then a civilian

10 policeman cannot be used to impose liability against him because his

11 official duty always had him foresee crime but also foresee the

12 appropriate enforcement of law by relevant organs to prevent and punish

13 such crime, like any other policeman in the world. Any other result

14 would make it a crime to act as a policeman. And again we must stress

15 that these two documents at issue in question 4(c)(ii) of Your Honours'

16 questions, they're not talking about some selective crime fighting by

17 Coric, but they're specifically talking about prevention of crimes and

18 punishment of those committing crimes against the most vulnerable group

19 at that time, Muslim prisoners. So for Appellant Coric to be convicted

20 and criminally punished for performing his police duty in an honourable

21 manner would be a bad precedent for further judiciaries. The question

22 that arises is: If anyone undertakes efforts to prevent and punish

23 crimes by virtue of their police role in fighting crime, is such a person

24 to be held automatically and strictly liable and responsible for all

25 future crimes committed by perpetrators that he neither knew of nor could

Page 600

1 stop? Will he be punished for doing something good? Any policeman has

2 to fight crime - that is his duty - he cannot be punished for that. And

3 unfortunately, unfortunately, no policeman in the world - not even

4 Mr. Coric - can be 100 per cent effective and successful in preventing or

5 punishing all crimes that are committed within their jurisdictional area

6 nor that he can foresee might happen.

7 Thus, in finishing this question, we would stress that under

8 JCE 3 what is at issue is the dolo eventualis standard, which applies

9 when the accused did not intend to bring about a specific result but was

10 aware that the actions of a group would lead to that result and - this is

11 the key part - willingly took that risk. Neither of these two documents

12 in this question, nor the totality of the evidence demonstrate that Coric

13 either intended the crimes to occur go unpunished, let alone that he

14 willingly took such a risk. To the contrary, he did all within his

15 limited competencies and means to fight against that risk and tried to

16 ensure that if crimes occurred, perpetrators were investigated and

17 punished.

18 Your Honours, I would like to now address question 5 as to the

19 proposed overturning of the Trial Chamber's findings that property

20 destruction caused in Dusa, Hrasnica, Zdrimci and Uzricje was

21 indiscriminate, wanton, and not justified by military necessity. Again,

22 some of my colleagues that have spoken already have addressed this topic,

23 and we would join in most of those submissions rather than repeat

24 everything here. I will try only to stress a few things such that in

25 trial judgement, volume 3, paragraph 1569, the Chamber confirms that it

Page 601

1 received evidence that members of the armija BiH were present in the

2 towns of Gornji Vakuf and, precisely, in the villages of Dusa, Hrasnica,

3 Zdrimci, and Uzricje at the time of the HVO attack and the alleged

4 destruction of the houses. Some armed Muslim men were even hidden inside

5 the houses from time to time. Yet, the Trial Chamber established that

6 the shelling of these villages was indiscriminate. Further, the Trial

7 Chamber explicitly found that in Uzricje, where military policemen

8 resubordinated to the HVO military were deployed, there were also armed

9 Muslim men. This village was thus defended by an armed opposing military

10 force comprised of Muslim men. Look to the trial judgement volume 2,

11 paragraph 370, and the same was true for the situation in Zdrimci and

12 Hrasnica. These are not undefended localities.

13 We do not have any information on the placement of the civilians,

14 that is to say how far were the civilians from the combat zone, from the

15 front lines, or the defenders or combatants; nor do we have any

16 information on the quantity of the shelling; nor do we have expert or

17 other evidence that would clearly describe all the conditions related to

18 the shelling which would be necessary to assess the same. The burden of

19 proof is on the Prosecution, and they did not present any evidence on

20 that matter. So no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that there

21 was only one conclusion available under the evidence; namely, that is

22 indiscriminate, because there is a reasonable doubt in that conclusion.

23 Multiple, alternative conclusions are available under the evidence,

24 including legitimate combat.

25 Furthermore, the Trial Chamber does not draw distinction

Page 602

1 between when military necessity ends and indiscriminate acts begin, at

2 what moment something that had a military necessity becomes

3 indiscriminate. This is strange, having in mind that the Trial Chamber

4 recognised that there were armija BiH fighters on the ground and even HVO

5 combat losses from fighting with the ABiH forces in these same villages.

6 The other day I heard Prosecutor Stringer downplay the level of

7 combat in this area. That was transcript page 419. But please we urge

8 you to look at the evidentiary record that you have before you, where

9 there were significant casualties from this combat in these villages.

10 For instance, P3090. Here we see that just from the military police that

11 were subordinated to the HVO military in that area in this time, they had

12 10 dead and 63 wounded resulting from battles. This means, at the very

13 least, that there was some degree of legitimate combat that must have

14 existed. But the Trial Chamber ignored this evidence and thus ignored

15 this alternative reasonable -- this alternative conclusion reasonable

16 under the evidence, in violation of in dubio pro reo. I'll remind

17 Your Honours that the Prosecution the other day also kept saying: This

18 judgement is reasonable. This judgement is reasonable. Your Honours,

19 that's not the correct standard for a conviction to stand. It must be

20 the only reasonable conclusion under the evidence, not just a reasonable

21 conclusion under the evidence.

22 There is no analysis in the trial judgement as to the acceptable

23 margin of error for artillery shelling. There is no setting of a clear

24 standard that would separate shelling due to legitimate military action

25 and military necessity and one that is not. Unfortunately, Your Honours,

Page 603

1 as we all know, even legitimate military shelling can cause unintended

2 collateral damage to property.

3 But even more so, the Trial Chamber in volume 2, paragraph 353

4 confirms:

5 "It has admitted evidence that the destruction, in particular, of

6 houses in the town of Gornji Vakuf did not merely result from HVO

7 shelling but also from fighting inside the city between HVO and ABiH and

8 from shelling by the VRS."

9 Your Honours, given such a finding, no Trial Chamber could thus

10 conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the destruction in question was the

11 result of indiscriminate or wilful and wanton acts of the HVO, let alone

12 Mr. Coric.

13 Now, Your Honours, we would like to address the tenth and last of

14 your specific questions addressed to our Defence, which asks us to

15 comment upon the potential impact upon the JCE 3 conviction of our client

16 if you were to grant Ground 1(A) of the Prosecution's appeal.

17 First of all, we note that granting of Prosecution's subground

18 (A) of their appeal would not have any effect on the JCE 3 convictions

19 that we are appealing from. I would direct Your Honours' attention first

20 to paragraph 198 of our appellant's brief, where we specify that the

21 "possibility" standard is the proper measure for JCE 3 and wherein we

22 state that the Trial Chamber erred in applying that standard to conclude

23 crimes were foreseeable to Coric because he did not have any knowledge to

24 properly foresee that these crimes were possible as part of anything he

25 intended.

Page 604

1 Additionally, we note that although the Trial Chamber admittedly

2 does act in a sloppy manner linguistically, using terminology of

3 probability and possibility, that as far as the additional crimes wherein

4 Coric was convicted of JCE 3 liability, it is clear that the Trial

5 Chamber actually already applied the correct possibility standard but

6 applied it erroneously to find Coric guilty of those crimes which in fact

7 he could not foresee under such a standard.

8 For example, we would direct Your Honours to paragraphs 200, 207,

9 and 209 of our appellant's brief for example. Now -- where we detail and

10 describe the Trial Chamber's errors in applying the possibility standard

11 to wrongfully convict Coric as to these additional crimes. I will point

12 to just one example for the same of time. Volume 4, paragraph 1018,

13 1020, Coric is being erroneously convicted by the Trial Chamber for JCE 3

14 liability for killings in Dretelj precisely using the correct standard

15 and the correct language "might be committed" to assess foreseeability.

16 So, irrespective of your finding as to the Prosecution's appeal,

17 Your Honours should acquit Mr. Coric of liability for all the JCE 3

18 crimes he is currently wrongfully convicted of.

19 Further, as we have already detailed in the remainder of the

20 paragraphs of Ground 8 of our appeal, under the evidence it is irrelevant

21 if probability or possibility standards are applied because no reasonable

22 Trial Chamber could find Coric guilty under JCE 3 using either standard,

23 because he could not foresee crimes given the totality of the evidence

24 that would go unpunished. Thus, the Prosecution's appeal has no

25 relevance to our appeal from the wrongful convictions suffered by

Page 605

1 Mr. Coric for JCE 3 crimes.

2 The Prosecution appeal submits that the appeals jurisprudence

3 confirms that JCE 3 liability arises if the JCE members know that the

4 commission of crime is a "possible" consequence of the execution of the

5 common criminal purpose.

6 Furthermore, in its appeal, the Prosecution states that the

7 correct standard for JCE 3 mens rea means that the crimes "might be"

8 perpetrated in executing the common criminal purpose and the accused

9 willingly took that risk by deciding or continuing to participate in that

10 enterprise; but Mr. Coric never participated in any enterprise. And

11 however, as the Prosecution at paragraph 198 of its appeal highlights and

12 indeed introduces precisely the reasonable doubt we're talking about as

13 to Mr. Coric, they say:

14 "By remaining in positions of authority, intending or aware of

15 ongoing crimes committed ..." and then they continue, stating that he

16 willingly took the risk that JCE 3 crimes might be committed.

17 Respectfully given his police role, it is not enough to say as to

18 Mr. Coric that he was aware of crimes. He also must have intended

19 crimes, and the analysis shows he went to great lengths to try to prevent

20 crimes, which is contrary to an intent to willingly take part in any

21 crimes let alone any enterprise. We must stress again that the Sainovic

22 appeals judgement, paragraph 1557, states that it must be foreseeable to

23 the accused that the crimes might be committed - and this is the part I

24 stress: "... in order to carry out the actus reus of the crimes forming

25 part of the common purpose."

Page 606

1 As we have shown, Mr. Coric was never part of any common criminal

2 purpose, and my colleague will deal with that more.

3 The Prosecution alleges in subground 1(A) of its appeal that

4 under the proper foreseeability standard Coric would be -- should be --

5 would be convicted, not acquitted as he was of certain crimes. But

6 again, apart from using imprecise language, the Chamber appears to be

7 applying the same possibility standard both when convicting and when

8 acquitting Mr. Coric. The Coric Defence gave a very specific and

9 detailed answer to subground 1(A) of the Prosecution's appeal in

10 paragraphs 19 to 23 of its respondent's brief, and we would refer

11 Your Honours to those as we stand behind them today. And we must stress

12 again as I just read from paragraph 198 of their appeal, the Prosecution

13 concedes reasonable doubt exists as to Coric's intent.

14 If Coric was merely aware of crimes occurring within the

15 territory, which is the common duty of every policeman in the world, and

16 if he did not intend such crimes therefore he cannot be held responsible

17 for them. In paragraphs 186 to 210 and elsewhere in our appeal brief, we

18 cite to ample evidence that Coric could not even have known of certain

19 events due to, for instance, for being hospitalised in Zagreb in a

20 certain time-period and due to the military police being resubordinated

21 to the HVO military and then also -- because he could legitimately

22 interpret information that he was receiving as lawful combat and lawful

23 application of the law on abandoned property. Likewise, in those same

24 paragraphs, we clearly cite to numerous evidence that demonstrate that

25 neither Coric nor the military police tolerated crimes and undertook

Page 607

1 actions to prevent the same and punish perpetrators. Coric's behaviour

2 in acting against crimes therefore prevents any reasonable Trial Chamber

3 from concluding that he willingly and knowingly took the risk that his

4 acts or contributions to any legal effort might possibly lead to

5 commission of crimes. One is in contradiction to the other. Further, he

6 could not foresee the possibility of deaths that were never reported to

7 him and were different in nature to those which occurred earlier which

8 were in combat, as is the case with the deaths in Dretelj, for instance,

9 and which we discuss in paragraph 208 of our appeal.

10 We return to the simple fact that the Trial Chamber did not use

11 the wrong standard, despite what the Prosecution alleges, besides the

12 fact that the Trial Chamber linguistically was challenged and imprecise

13 with the use of words "probability" and "crime would be committed"

14 alongside "could" and "might be committed," the totality of the Chamber's

15 findings must be taken into account. It is respectfully submitted that

16 when the totality of the findings are considered, the Trial Chamber did

17 not use the wrong standard and the acquittals were properly rendered in

18 accord with the proper standard.

19 In fact, the Trial Chamber cites in volume 1, paragraph 1 -- 216

20 to 217 as to the JCE 3 standard precisely some of the appeals

21 jurisprudence that the Prosecution accepts as the correct standard in

22 paragraph 30 of their appeal and also cites to the appeals jurisprudence

23 that the -- that arises from the trial judgements that the Prosecution is

24 relying upon as the proper standard.

25 Further, we can -- further as to ground 1 of the Prosecution

Page 608

1 appeal -- 1(A) of the Prosecution appeal, we can say: Considering the

2 statements of the Chamber in regards to the murders in Stolac and

3 Capljina and for Dretelj prison, the Chamber utilised the proper analysis

4 and the proper standard, such that these acquittals are also proper;

5 namely, the consequence of the lack of evidence, not application of a

6 wrong or different standard to weigh the evidence. So these acquittals

7 would not be affected by any finding of accepting ground 1(A) of the

8 Prosecution appeal. In -- one moment.

9 In summation, apart from the occasional linguistic lapses in the

10 use of the words "probable" and "would be" in passing and in dicta, the

11 Trial Chamber actually applied and relied upon the possibility standard

12 in its holding and rulings by its essence; and that is what the

13 Prosecution admits by saying that the Chamber used this standard in the

14 judgement "occasionally."

15 The Prosecution is now just using verbal interpretation of

16 expressions in paragraphs 216 and 220 of judgement and not a -- not the

17 logical and systemic interpretation of law and the legal text cited by

18 the Chamber in its findings. So the Prosecution's allegations are

19 baseless. The Chamber used the correct standard as developed and applied

20 by the relevant Appeal Chamber jurisprudence; and for this reason, we

21 believe that subground 1(A) should not be granted of the Prosecution's

22 appeal.

23 For the foregoing reasons, the Coric Defence respectfully submits

24 that criminal liability for additional JCE 3 crimes should not attach to

25 Mr. Coric since they were not foreseeable to Coric even under the

Page 609

1 possibility standard because the information that he had at hand was not

2 sufficient to put him on notice of the possibility of crimes, especially

3 when in the hospital in Zagreb, and the fact that he did not intend any

4 crimes in the first place. And further still, his actions undertaken to

5 prevent crimes demonstrate he did not willingly and knowingly take

6 part -- take the risk that crimes would occur, but rather fought against

7 crimes at all times.

8 I thank you and now my colleague will take over --

9 JUDGE AGIUS: Wait. Wait, wait, wait, a bit.

10 Mr. Ivetic, I refer you to page 4 of the transcript, the very

11 beginning, the first four lines.

12 MR. IVETIC: If I can have access to the transcript, I'm -- one

13 moment.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: I can explain to you and you check later.

15 MR. IVETIC: That's fine.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: When you were dealing with occupation and the

17 aspect of notice, you said: Although the Prosecution claims a waiver on

18 this issue of occupation in their response at response brief -- at

19 paragraph 69, this argument fails as to Coric because in that same

20 paragraph the Prosecution concedes the Coric Defence did object to the

21 same. We objected as soon as the Prosecution revealed occupation as part

22 of their case, which was only at the phase of the final brief and closing

23 arguments.

24 I've checked para 69 and it says nothing like what you are

25 alleging. In fact, it gradually goes exactly against what you say. It

Page 610

1 says:

2 "The indictment alleged the existence," I'm referring from the

3 Prosecution response brief, paragraph 69:

4 "The indictment alleged the existence of partial occupation of

5 BiH, putting Coric on notice that a state of occupation formed part of

6 the case against him. Coric understood this. In his PTB, Coric

7 characterised the Prosecution's position as contending that the HVO was

8 the occupier of HVO-controlled territory. Coric was also aware that

9 notice of occupied territory was challenged by other accused at the

10 trial. His failure to object to any perceived lack of notice at trial

11 must be regarded as a waiver."

12 So nowhere did the Trial Chamber -- did the Prosecution concede

13 what you say it conceded, but this is not the end of it. The -- you also

14 then referred to a paragraph, and you can go to transcript pages 19, last

15 couple of lines, and 20 first couple of lines when referring to

16 paragraph 73 of the Prosecution response brief, and according to the

17 transcript you said:

18 "Now, further, murder is not even mentioned in these two

19 documents that Your Honours have asked about, P1393 and P1414. Only

20 thefts, maltreatment, and beatings were mentioned. The Prosecution in

21 its response brief at para 73 concedes that foreseeability of murder is

22 knowledge of previous murders and not other crimes, like theft, beatings,

23 and maltreatment. Thus, even under Prosecution's accepted standard,

24 P1393 and 1414 cannot be used ..." et cetera, et cetera.

25 If you look at the Prosecution's paragraph 73, again, it says:

Page 611

1 "Coric's arguments regarding invasion are misplaced. The Chamber

2 found that, operating under Croatia's overall control, the HVO conducted

3 military operations ..."

4 And I can continue reading, but it has got absolutely nothing to

5 do with what you said. So I suggest that you check. I will now give the

6 floor, et cetera, and at the end or before the Prosecution starts this

7 afternoon you will --

8 MR. IVETIC: Perhaps after the break we'll come back and --

9 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Thank you.

10 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.

11 MS. TOMASEGOVIC-TOMIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I am first

12 going to deal with a number of documents of doubtful authenticity for

13 which there is a series of indications that they are patent forgeries, on

14 which documents the Trial Chamber based its judgement when deciding on

15 the liability of my client. Due to the brief time available to me, I

16 note that this topic was dealt with in detail in paragraphs 262 to 265,

17 296 and 297 of our appeal.

18 The first two documents that I wish to draw your attention to are

19 documents P0316 -- 03216 and P03220. It's actually the same document

20 with two different numbers. The Trial Chamber, for example, in volume 1,

21 paragraphs 912 to 914 of the judgement, made its conclusions on the basis

22 of these documents which no reasonable Trial Chamber should reach, in

23 view of the fact that questionable documents cannot eliminate reasonable

24 doubt, particularly when you take into account that numerous other

25 documents contradict them and impose the opposite conclusion.

Page 612

1 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please slow down.

2 MS. TOMASEGOVIC-TOMIC: Sorry.

3 [Interpretation] The conclusion would acquit the accused of

4 responsibility. Relying on these documents and ignoring numerous

5 evidence that proves the opposite, the Trial Chamber made an error and

6 violated the principle of in dubio pro reo. I believe, Your Honours,

7 that you will take note of this error, correct it, and ensure a just

8 outcome.

9 These documents are frequently the only evidence on which the

10 Trial Chamber bases its conclusion that my client had responsibility for

11 prisons and the release of prisoners from prison. I note that the Trial

12 Chamber failed to evaluate these documents in the proper manner and to

13 apply the correct legal standards. In accordance with the presumption of

14 innocence, the Prosecution must prove each of its assertions beyond a

15 reasonable doubt. Equally, the Trial Chamber must resolve each doubt in

16 favour of the accused in keeping with the in dubio pro reo principle.

17 That is why I assert that the conclusions of the Trial Chamber regarding

18 the responsibility of my client relating to prisons are not the only

19 reasonable conclusions on the basis of admitted evidence which could not

20 be challenged by other reasonable conclusions.

21 Furthermore, other numerous credible documents and witnesses

22 heard in the proceedings clearly indicate that these documents are

23 forgeries and that no conclusion or decision should be based on them.

24 Due to the time available to me, I cannot describe in detail the

25 contents of these two documents and there is no need because they were

Page 613

1 processed in detail in our appeal in the paragraphs I've referred to at

2 the beginning of my submissions.

3 All I will say is that in the Trial Chamber in volume 1,

4 paragraph 912 to 914 of its judgement established on the basis of these

5 documents that Mr. Coric is replying to an earlier document from

6 Colonel Obradovic and concluded that the documents prove that military

7 prisons were solely under the responsibility of the military police

8 administration and that the military police administration was authorised

9 to grant the release of prisoners.

10 Although the Trial Chamber notes that the Defence warned about

11 the forgeries, that these documents were forgeries, it did not see fit to

12 analyse whether the Defence was correct or not or was it reasonable to

13 conclude that these were indeed forgeries. Is it reasonable to conclude

14 that the Defence was right or is there at least reasonable suspicion that

15 the documents are forgeries?

16 First I would like to note that evidence proves that Coric was

17 not the author of these documents and they do not originate from the

18 military police administration either. In relation to that, I would like

19 to note that the witnesses to whom the document was shown confirmed that

20 the document does not bear my client's signature, and I speak about that

21 in more detail in our appeal, paragraph 264. It is true that the

22 signature on the document resembles the signature of my client's deputy,

23 Lavric; however, evidence indicates that this is not his signature

24 either. Witness Slobodan Bozic, department chief of the Defence

25 Department, who was very familiar with the signatures of my client and

Page 614

1 his deputy, clearly stated that that was not signature of either of them.

2 A more detailed analysis of this argument can be found in our

3 appeals submission, paragraph 264, and in the transcript of the testimony

4 of Witness Bozic on pages 36413 to 3614 [as interpreted]. Even though

5 the argument is a significant one, it certainly would not have the weight

6 it had if their other arguments did not exist, which clearly show the

7 forgeries that I'm talking about.

8 Your Honours, during the proceedings the following Prosecution

9 witnesses and Defence witnesses were heard: E, C, Vidovic, three of

10 whom -- two were Prosecution witnesses, who confirmed that they saw these

11 contested documents in the courtroom for the first time and not ever

12 before. Why is this important? It is important because these witnesses

13 by their function had to have seen these documents at the time that they

14 were drafted. What does this prove? It proves that these documents at

15 the alleged time of their drafting did not exist.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Slow down because I'm receiving comments from the

17 interpreters that you're running too fast. Thank you.

18 MS. TOMASEGOVIC-TOMIC: [Interpretation] What does this prove?

19 This proves that these documents at the alleged time of their drafting

20 did not exist. They did not exist, Your Honours. Nobody knew of them.

21 You can find the information in the testimony of these witnesses on this

22 matter in paragraph 264 of our appeal and also in the relevant footnotes.

23 Let us continue. These documents were addressed, among other

24 recipients, to the Heliodrom prison. I would like to remind the Appeals

25 Chamber that the document log of Heliodrom, Exhibit P285, was admitted as

Page 615

1 an exhibit in the case. I would like to remind the Chamber that at the

2 beginning of my submissions, I noted that these contested documents

3 allegedly constitute a reply to a document signed by Colonel Obradovic,

4 document P0321. What can we establish when we examine the document

5 log-book of Heliodrom? We can establish that under 683, the document by

6 Colonel Obradovic is registered but the contested documents are not

7 registered. They're not there. They do not exist. Nobody ever saw them

8 nor knew of them at the relevant time. Nobody acted pursuant to the

9 requests stated in those documents.

10 The way in which the Trial Chamber treats my client as far as its

11 findings relating to that exhibit, the document log of Heliodrom, is

12 unfair and places my client in a -- at a disadvantage. The Trial Chamber

13 in volume 2, paragraph 1431 of its judgement confirms the authenticity of

14 the document log-book of Heliodrom and its credibility. So then it is

15 hard to explain why that same Trial Chamber does not take into account

16 and does not evaluate the fact that these contested documents were not

17 registered in the log-book, even though they should have been. And if

18 this argument is not sufficient for reasonable doubt regarding the

19 authenticity of these documents, I don't know what would be enough to

20 substantiate that. I assert that these arguments as well as all the

21 other exhibits in the case is something that the Trial Chamber should not

22 have based their decision on. These are forgeries. And, at the very

23 least, the Trial Chamber should have concluded that there was reasonable

24 doubt as to the document being a forgery. Any reasonable trier of fact

25 here would apply the principle in dubio pro reo here. Instead of

Page 616

1 applying this principle, the Trial Chamber, in volume 1, paragraph 813,

2 footnote 2234, only tersely cites that the Defence did not request a

3 certification to appeal the decisions admitting those documents into

4 evidence. With all due respect, in the proceedings the Defence opposed

5 the admission of these documents, in the hearings as well as in motions;

6 for example, the joint Defence motion to dismiss certain Prosecution

7 motions for admission of documentary evidence as an abuse of process.

8 The motion was filed on the 4th of September, 2007. I note that there

9 are no obstacles for the Appeals Chamber to assess the authenticity of

10 these documents, taking into account our arguments as well as all the

11 other exhibits admitted in the case.

12 Why is it important to devote particular attention to the

13 elevation of these documents? This is important because these are

14 documents on which the Trial Chamber bases its findings and conclusions

15 regarding the alleged responsibility of Mr. Coric in respect of prisons.

16 Without those documents --

17 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. Let me interrupt you a minute because

18 I'm not seeing clear on this. Look at the transcript. Page -- the

19 current page, 38, line 6:

20 "The Trial Chamber in volume 1, para 813, footnote 2234 only

21 tersely cites that the Defence did not request a certification to

22 appeal ..."

23 And I put an emphasise on the words "certification to appeal."

24 "The decisions admitting those documents into evidence."

25 Then you continue:

Page 617

1 "With all due respect, in the proceedings the Defence opposed the

2 admission of these documents in the hearings, as well as in motions."

3 And then you cite an example of a motion filed by -- on th 4th of

4 September, but this was a motion to dismiss certain. The judgement --

5 part of the judgement referred to refers to as certification to appeal,

6 which is completely different.

7 MS. TOMASEGOVIC-TOMIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, perhaps I

8 was imprecise. Perhaps I should have phrased it differently. What we

9 wanted to say is that we did not dispute, we did not request

10 certification for appeal; we don't dispute that. But it is not correct

11 that we did not indicate that there were problems with these documents

12 throughout the proceedings. And we believe that regardless of the fact

13 that we did not request certification to appeal, that there is it no

14 reason for the Appeals Chamber not to review our arguments regarding

15 those two contested documents. This is what I meant to say, and perhaps

16 I was imprecise.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: [Microphone not activated]

18 MS. TOMASEGOVIC-TOMIC: Thank you.

19 [Interpretation] Why is it important to -- devote particular

20 attention to the evaluation of these documents? Because these are

21 documents on which the Trial Chamber bases its conclusions regarding the

22 alleged responsibility of Mr. Coric in respect of prisons. Without those

23 documents, Coric's connections or links to prisons and his alleged

24 responsibility or membership in the alleged JCE would not exist or would

25 have had to have been significantly differently evaluated. Your Honours,

Page 618

1 there are a few other documents without stamp or signature of doubtful

2 authenticity on which the Trial Chamber bases its findings, volume 3,

3 paragraph 75; volume 1, paragraph 405. The Defence dealt with those

4 documents in its appeal, paragraph 298.

5 Why does the Defence insist on a detailed analysis of these

6 documents, both in relation to their contents and forms but also in the

7 way that they correlate to other documents in the case? We insist,

8 Your Honours, because it is very indicative that when we look at

9 thousands and thousands of documents that the Trial Chamber looked at

10 that are uncontested in relation to their signature and stamp - whose

11 contents were confirmed by witnesses heard in the proceedings - they

12 based their decision on Mr. Coric's responsibility on several documents

13 which are the only ones without stamp or signature and whose authenticity

14 and contents were not confirmed by a single witness and whose contents

15 contradict the contents of these other valid documents and testimonies of

16 witnesses heard in the proceedings.

17 Your Honours, during the proceedings, the Defence tried in vain

18 to find the log-books of documents received and dispatched of the

19 military police administration. Regrettably, they have disappeared

20 without a trace. Had they still been there, we could have had with

21 100 per cent certainty establish the credibility and authenticity of each

22 document which allegedly originated from the military police

23 administration. Still, even without those log-books - in a careful

24 analysis of those documents individually and in correlation with other

25 documents - at the very least it would have been possible to establish at

Page 619

1 that there was a reasonable doubt as to their authenticity. The Trial

2 Chamber failed to carry out such an analysis and, for that reason, I

3 assert that the Trial Chamber committed a serious mistake and it also

4 constitutes a glaring example of a miscarriage of justice.

5 The next error by the Trial Chamber I'd like to point it your

6 attention to, Your Honours, is ignoring Defence evidence. The most

7 drastic example of such treatment is Exhibit 5D04288. It concerns the

8 log-books of registers of several courts and prosecutor's offices from

9 the time and locations relevant to the indictment recorded on three CDs.

10 Besides these registers, the register of the military court in Mostar was

11 also admitted, Exhibit Number 5100 and P101.

12 Your Honours, those registers contain hundreds of criminal

13 reports submitted by the military police to the prosecutor's offices,

14 they contain hundreds of proceedings conducted against known and unknown

15 perpetrators for very diverse crimes committed against Muslims. After

16 the Washington Agreement, the registers and measures registered therein

17 were taken over by the competent courts and prosecutor's offices in the

18 BH and continued working with them.

19 Your Honours, the Trial Chamber found Valentin Coric responsible

20 because the perpetrators of these different crimes were not prosecuted

21 and sentenced. And yet in paragraph 882 of volume 4, the Trial Chamber

22 established that Coric, as the head of the military police

23 administration, had the possibility to combat crime but his authority was

24 limited to investigations, whereas prosecuting was in the hands of the

25 except military prosecutor's office. Your Honours, these exhibits, these

Page 620

1 registers, prove that the military police did submit criminal reports to

2 the competent authorities. Had the military police or the accused had

3 the intention to incite crimes against Muslims, why would they have

4 submitted reports against HVO members for such crimes? The finding of

5 the Trial Chamber was that these crimes represent an integral part of the

6 plan intended to further the criminal purpose, and Coric took part in it

7 by trying to minimise the importance of serious crimes or failed to

8 report, them that he failed to follow up on different investigations, and

9 failed to prevent and sanction them. This finding by the Trial Chamber

10 shows that it completely ignored the evidence which shows otherwise. Had

11 the Trial Chamber considered and assessed such evidence, this conclusion

12 would not have been possible. These registers, Your Honours, are crucial

13 proof of this Defence; they that he that Valentin Coric did combat crime.

14 From such evidence, it is clear that the Prosecutor did not, beyond

15 reasonable doubt, prove their assertion that Coric intended that crimes

16 against Muslims be committed and that they go unpunished. Except for

17 ignoring documentary evidence, the Trial Chamber - without any plausible

18 explanation - refused in part or in entirety the testimony of certain

19 Defence witnesses, as discussed in detail in the paragraphs of appeal 301

20 to 303 and 305 to 308. The Trial Chamber refused to accept such

21 testimony, irrespective of the fact that these witnesses testified in

22 accordance with the documentary evidence on file and the testimony of

23 other witnesses led by both other Defence teams and the Prosecution. On

24 the other hand, the Trial Chamber without scrutiny accepted the testimony

25 of Witness E, for example. For him there is indicia on the record

Page 621

1 testifying to his lack of credibility. He contradicted himself, he

2 contradicted the testimony of other witnesses presented by the

3 Prosecution as well as Defence as well as documentary evidence - the only

4 instances in which the Trial Chamber did not admit or, rather, ignored

5 his testimony where he confirmed the thesis of the Defence.

6 Your Honours, ignoring such evidence amounts to another example of a

7 miscarriage of justice at the expense of my client.

8 The next error by the Trial Chamber I wanted to point out is the

9 way the Trial Chamber assessed the authority of my client over the

10 military police during the relevant time, thus assessing his contribution

11 to the JCE. It was discussed in detail in Ground 2 paragraphs 39 to 58

12 of our appeal. For reasons of economy, I wanted to point out but several

13 important errors.

14 The Trial Chamber based its conclusions on Coric's effective

15 control exclusively on his de jure authority, completely ignoring the

16 de facto situation which was equally described by many witnesses on the

17 Prosecution side as well as and the Defence side. Testimony of witnesses

18 about the de facto situation runs counter to the conclusions of the

19 Chamber about effective control. We can see that in volume 4,

20 paragraphs 871, 872, 876, and 878 of the judgement and paragraphs 39 to

21 58 of our appeal. Despite such witness testimony, the Trial Chamber in

22 its conclusions discusses a phantom dual chain of command and confusion

23 in terms of command over the military police. The Trial Chamber reached

24 this finding by misinterpreting witness testimony and dismissing such

25 witness testimony that does not squarely fits this unfounded finding. To

Page 622

1 illustrate, I will point out an example of the Trial Chamber's erroneous

2 finding.

3 The Trial Chamber stated in its conclusions that the reforms

4 conducted in the military police in July and December 1993 clarified the

5 chain of command. In doing so, the Trial Chamber erroneously quoted

6 Witness Biskic, saying that upon his departure the command chain was more

7 transparent and the system of reporting was improved. But what did the

8 witness actually say? Your Honours, Witness Biskic said that by

9 December 1993 the units of the military police were withdrawn from the

10 front line, enabling them to become more efficient, transcript pages

11 15181 and 15182. So this witness did not discuss any phantom dual chain

12 of command. He simply said that the military police could not conduct

13 its duties because it was engaged in fighting.

14 Concerning this topic, I also wanted to draw your attention to

15 certain contradictions in the judgement itself. When reading volume 4,

16 paragraphs 624 to 628, and paragraphs 661 to 663, 816 to 818, 872, 876,

17 and 878, what watch catches one's eye is that they are mutually

18 contradictory and the findings tailored to fit the purpose, which was to

19 establish liability for three different accused. Your Honours, the

20 existence of several different commanders of the same rank in the same

21 area commanding identical units is illogical and it is impossible to put

22 into practice. It runs counter to military doctrine, especially in

23 wartime conditions. In continuing, Your Honours, we will deal with the

24 application of the principle in dubio pro reo in the findings of the

25 Trial Chamber about the responsibility of Mr. Coric and his contribution

Page 623

1 to the JCE. I wanted to point your attention to paragraphs 1000, 1001 of

2 volume 4.

3 Your Honours, unlike the Trial Chamber, I believe there is a lot

4 of evidence in the case that indicate there is at least one more

5 reasonable inference on the evidence for each of these paragraphs. In

6 this connection, we wish to draw your attention to just one example.

7 I'll ask my colleague to show our first slide.

8 That's a excerpt from document P5471, and that's the request by

9 Mr. Coric to reconsider assigning military police units at the forward

10 front lines addressed to several persons on 29 May 1993. My time is

11 brief. I'm not going to read it. In any case, Mr. Coric requests his

12 military policemen be returned to him because he hasn't enough men to

13 fight crime and because they are assigned to front lines, they cannot

14 conduct normal military police duties. In view of this, the logical

15 question arises if Coric had the powers over the military police that the

16 Trial Chamber decided he had, why didn't he simply command military

17 policemen to withdraw? The answer is simple. Obviously he did not have

18 the powers the Trial Chamber ascribed to him or, at the very minimum,

19 there is a reasonable doubt because another reasonable inference imposes

20 itself different to the one chosen by the Trial Chamber. Furthermore,

21 the Trial Chamber accepts it's the only reasonable inference, the theory

22 that Coric turned a blind eye to crimes and that they remained

23 unpunished. I again remind you of the log-books mentioned at the

24 beginning of my presentation. There is in this case file a large number

25 of criminal reports, investigation documentation, and judgements; all

Page 624

1 these documents cast doubt on such findings. That's our appeal brief,

2 paragraph 154 and 278.

3 Now, we have a document P3571. This is a document that went out

4 under the document -- under the name of Mr. Coric and speak to his

5 attitude about crimes against Muslims in Mostar. In this document,

6 Mr. Coric orders that these military policemen who committed the crime be

7 relieved of duty, be dismissed from the police, and turned over to the

8 prosecutor's office. Is this the conduct of a person who wants to let

9 criminals go unpunished, somebody who wants to incite crime as the Trial

10 Chamber concluded? We deal with the responsibility of Valentin Coric for

11 detention centres in our appeal brief Ground 6 subgrounds (b), (c), (d),

12 (e), (f), (g), (h) and Ground 7, paragraphs 161 to 185. We have no time

13 to elaborate. It's just one of the reactions of Mr. Coric after he

14 received information ...

15 JUDGE AGIUS: Please slow down.

16 MS. TOMASEGOVIC-TOMIC: [Interpretation] From everything cited in

17 these paragraphs, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that

18 Mr. Coric failed to take every measure within his power or that he

19 enabled bad treatment of prisoners.

20 To conclude, Your Honours, I only want to mention regarding our

21 17th ground of appeal that in our entire appeal brief, we dealt with this

22 in detail, that if the Appeals Chamber does not overturn the judgement

23 and turn in the judgement of acquittal, at least the time spent in

24 hospital should be reckoned as part of the sentence.

25 The purpose of justice, Your Honours, is for justice to be done.

Page 625

1 Whether justice is done or not depends on -- does not depend on whether

2 the accused goes free or to prison. The purpose of justice is for the

3 guilty party to be declared guilty and an innocent man let go free. This

4 is only possible with a guarantee of a fair trial and only if both

5 parties have an equality of arms. That's why we ask you to remedy the

6 errors made by the Trial Chamber, not only for the sake of our Defence

7 but in the interests of international justice. This Defence suggests

8 that you vary the trial judgement and bring a judgement of acquittal of

9 Valentin Coric.

10 My colleague tells me that I have five minutes left, so I would

11 like to use them. Then I can -- then I can --

12 JUDGE AGIUS: Your colleague is perfectly correct.

13 MS. TOMASEGOVIC-TOMIC: [Overlapping speakers] --

14 JUDGE AGIUS: You have five minutes left.

15 MS. TOMASEGOVIC-TOMIC: [Interpretation] Then I will go back to

16 this document that we have in front of us and then everything will make

17 more sense.

18 So the evidence in the case shows that Valentin Coric did

19 everything he could to deal with the problem of prisons and detention

20 centres. After his warning, the first one in June -- in July,

21 commissions were established, the top commander Boban named the top

22 person responsible for all detention centres, footnotes in our appeal

23 brief 350 and others. After learning that no significant change occurred

24 at document --

25 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please just let us find this.

Page 626

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, one moment. Give the interpreters a chance to

2 locate this document.

3 THE INTERPRETER: Yes it's all right.

4 MS. TOMASEGOVIC-TOMIC: [Interpretation] After learning that no

5 significant change occurred and after collegium meeting on the 2nd

6 September 1993, document P4756, page 4 in English, Mr. Coric says:

7 "Equally bad is the work in military prisons."

8 We can reasonably infer based on this that Mr. Coric considered

9 the conditions in the prisons were bad and he issued several warnings

10 against this. After this collegium meeting in September in the same

11 month, a bit later Boban issued an order regarding the treatment of

12 prisoners; and finally, the same person in December disbands all

13 detention centres. Paragraphs 141 and 142 of our appeal brief, footnotes

14 352, 353, and 354.

15 Your Honours, I will turn back to the conclusion of my

16 presentation. We were a bit confused towards the end because I'm looking

17 at a different clock. And please, I appeal to you, Your Honours, once

18 again to remedy the errors made by the trial to follow the principle of

19 in dubio pro reo, fairness of proceedings, and equality of arms and bring

20 a judgement of acquittal for Mr. Coric.

21 Thank you.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

23 Mr. Ivetic, are you in a position to enlighten us on

24 paragraph 69?

25 MR. IVETIC: I may be, but I'd rather -- I have one document I'm

Page 627

1 missing. I'd rather want to see it with my own eyes, rather than to

2 misrepresent something to you --

3 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Okay. Thank you.

4 So we will have a 30-minute break now. Thank you.

5 --- Recess taken at 11.33 a.m.

6 --- On resuming at 12.00 p.m.

7 MR. IVETIC: Mr. President, if I may, I do have the information

8 you requested that I did present before the Prosecution's response.

9 [Trial Chamber confers]

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, go ahead.

11 MR. IVETIC: In response to your first question relating to

12 paragraph 69 of the Prosecution's response, Your Honours, we would direct

13 to paragraph -- pardon me, footnote 242 of that paragraph which cites to

14 the Coric pre-trial brief in paragraph 75. That pre-trial was written by

15 prior counsel and is not as eloquent as we would like, but we believe

16 that it does present exactly the argument that we were making; and thus,

17 the Prosecution is citing, on the one hand, the Coric's Defence objection

18 to occupation and then arguing waiver. But we leave it for Your Honours

19 to decide upon comparing the language of both with what the case actually

20 is.

21 In relation to the second matter you raised which was my citation

22 to the response brief of the Prosecution at paragraph 73, I meant and

23 should have referred Your Honours to the appellant appeal brief of the

24 Prosecution, paragraph 227, wherein for foreseeability of murders, it

25 talks only about not -- prior knowledge of murders and wilful killings in

Page 628

1 Gornji Vakuf, not other crimes, and that was the basis of these

2 submissions that we made at that point.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, thank you.

4 Prosecution, you have one hour and they we take a break.

5 MR. GILLETT: Much obliged, Mr. President, Your Honours.

6 Your Honour, Mr. Coric has presented a full and thorough Defence

7 throughout his trial and again on appeal, he has presented comprehensive

8 arguments including the detailed pleadings you've heard this morning.

9 But it is our respectful submission that he fails to show any

10 error in the trial judgement undermining his convictions and his

11 arguments should be dismissed. Your Honours, Valentin Coric was a

12 willing and significant participant in the joint criminal enterprise. As

13 the chief of the military police administration, Coric should have been

14 repressing crimes by HVO members. Indeed, that is a core function of the

15 military police. It is perhaps their most important function. Instead,

16 Coric used his position and his powers to contribute to the crimes

17 against the Bosnian Muslims. He engaged military police in violent

18 eviction and arrest operations which targeted Muslims en masse. He

19 played a key role in the brutal detention network and deadly forced

20 labour that Muslim detainees were subjected to over months and months.

21 And he ordered the large-scale expulsion of Muslim detainees through

22 so-called releases from detention.

23 All the while Coric was shielding HVO perpetrators from criminal

24 responsibility for their acts. He shielded them from responsibility for

25 brutal expulsions of civilians from West Mostar in May, June, and later

Page 629

1 in 1993, and these were expulsions were Muslims were intimidated, beaten,

2 robbed, and in some cases raped before being herded across the front

3 lines. He shielded HVO members from responsibility for forced label, and

4 as I've mentioned this was in some cases deadly, fatal for the Muslim

5 detainees.

6 Today the Defence hasn't mentioned these eviction operations from

7 West Mostar. They haven't mentioned this forced labour programme, these

8 deaths, this mutilation, this wounding of detainees during forced labour.

9 And I'd like to you bear that in mind as I proceed with my submissions.

10 Your Honours, Coric's actions and his lack of response in the

11 face of these crimes, crimes which he was well-informed of was a cruel

12 inversion of the duty that he owed to the citizens, the civilians, the

13 Bosnian Muslims that he should have been protecting.

14 On appeal, Coric has challenged almost every finding against him

15 through his brief and as you've heard in his submissions today. He

16 argues that he had no authority over the military police and detention

17 camps, this despite orders and even reports drafted, issued by himself,

18 showing that he did have such powers. He argues that news of crimes

19 against Muslims did not reach him; however, he was informed and he was

20 informed by multiple sources, by internationals, and by members of his

21 own HVO. Many of these reports were addressed to him personally.

22 Your Honours, confronted with exhibits showing his involvement,

23 his deep implication in deadly forced labour and mass expulsions, these

24 are crimes that are at the core of the joint criminal enterprise, he

25 argues that they must be forgeries. And I'll address in due course the

Page 630

1 arguments that you heard concerning P3316 and P3320. Suffice to say at

2 this point that the Trial Chamber dealt with these in the judgement and

3 there are many other documents that build a web of corroborating evidence

4 showing his role in these programmes. In relation to expulsions, for

5 instance, can you see P4263, P4404, P10188, and P10187. That's just the

6 tip of the iceberg. There are many more. Your Honours, his arguments do

7 not stand up to scrutiny. The evidence against him is robust and

8 mutually reinforcing.

9 Instead of attempting to address all of his arguments, I will

10 focus on two areas today; but I will cover the submissions that he has

11 made this morning. I'll first address his arguments concerning his

12 authority, particularly over the military police; and then I'll address

13 his arguments concerning his willing contributions to the joint criminal

14 enterprise. After that, I'll go through his arguments -- his responses

15 to Your Honours' questions as set out in the Scheduling Order.

16 Three notes. My references today will be to the trial judgement,

17 unless otherwise indicated. I will refer to some materials that were

18 testified to in private session, but I will not identify the source. And

19 in relation to any arguments we do not cover, we rely on our written

20 submissions.

21 Before entering the substance of his arguments on authority, it's

22 important to point out that many of his arguments are repetitions, often

23 verbatim, of his trial arguments. As you noted at the outset of the

24 hearing, this is not an opportunity for a trial de novo. His convictions

25 have been properly entered.

Page 631

1 Your Honours, in some instances the record is misstated in

2 Coric's arguments. For example, he argues at paragraph 162 of his brief:

3 The Chamber even found Coric was not informed of mistreatment and had no

4 reason to believe detainees were mistreated. However, the paragraph he

5 cites, volume 4, paragraph 955, states the exact opposite. It finds

6 Valentin Coric had reason to believe that the Heliodrom detainees were

7 being mistreated during detention. And the Prosecution raised this in

8 its response, paragraph 171, but Coric did not use the opportunity in his

9 reply to clarify this point. Than are more examples. This is not to

10 suggest any intentional misdirection, but it is to insist on a fair and

11 accurate reading of the trial judgement.

12 Turning to the first part of my submissions on Coric's authority

13 over the military police. Your Honours, as you are well aware, this was

14 not a short trial. Large amounts of evidence were submitted and not

15 least in relation to command and authority over the military police.

16 After reviewing the evidence at length, the Trial Chamber concluded that

17 as chief of the military police administration, Coric had command and

18 control over military police throughout his tenure. That's volume 4,

19 paragraph 1000. And the Chamber's finding is well supported by the

20 evidentiary record.

21 At the outset, I would like to say a few words about the military

22 police, who they were and what their role was in the JCE. The military

23 police were recruited for their loyalty to the ideal of a Croatian

24 homeland. That's volume 1, paragraph 848. By the end of 1992, there

25 were over 2.000 military police, who were generally organised in

Page 632

1 battalions, each with hundreds of members. You can see that P956,

2 page 7.

3 The primary responsibilities of the military police were to:

4 One, discover and combat crimes committed by or against HVO members; two,

5 guard detainees; three, control freedom of movement using check-points.

6 THE INTERPRETER: Kindly slow down for the interpretation. Thank

7 you.

8 MR. GILLETT: You can see this in volume 1, paragraph 888.

9 However, during the joint criminal enterprise, the military

10 police were centrally involved in many of the crimes. They participated

11 in evicting Muslim civilians in operations in Gornji Vakuf, Mostar,

12 Stolac, and Capljina, among others. They participated in the terrifying

13 siege of East Mostar's desperate Muslim inhabitants. They abused Muslim

14 detainees, thousands of them, in the Heliodrom, Dretelj, and Ljubuski

15 detention centres. I've mentioned that they used Muslim detainees for

16 perilous forced labour, and I've mentioned that they expelled thousands

17 of Muslim detainees.

18 As the Chamber rightly found, the military police were under

19 Coric's authority. You can look, for example, to P956, page 3, which

20 states:

21 "Mr. Valentin Coric was appointed assistant commander of the

22 security and information service and all existing military police units

23 were placed under his command."

24 It continues to state that in April 1992 military police stations

25 were organised in 25 municipalities of Herceg-Bosna under the joint

Page 633

1 command of the military police administration. The Chamber's detailed

2 nuanced findings as set out in volume 1, paragraphs 847 through 974, and

3 volume 4, paragraphs 864 to 915.

4 Now significantly Coric's power over the military police were not

5 exclusive. The Trial Chamber found that there was a dual chain of

6 command in operation, whereby HVO brigade commanders as well as the

7 military police administration could, in certain instances, both exercise

8 command over the military police. Coric argues that that finding was

9 erroneous; however, it is well founded on the evidence. And you can see

10 it in numerous exhibits, including reports from Coric himself, P957, page

11 5; as well as witness testimony at T22007.

12 Now, Coric argues that he lost all power over the military police

13 battalions when they were resubordinated -- the light assault battalion,

14 I should say, which were just some of the military police, when they were

15 resubordinated on 28 July 1993. However, the Trial Chamber properly

16 dismissed this argument you can see at volume 1, paragraph 964 and 970.

17 Its finding was well founded on the evidence. For example, on

18 the slide you see P4010 this is an order from Coric to the 2nd Military

19 Police Light Assault Battalion to deploy to Mostar.

20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Could we have the English version, please.

21 MR. GILLETT: Thank you.

22 What's important here is the date, that's 7 August, and you see

23 it at the top of the document, 1993. That's after the 28 July

24 resubordination order, in which Coric claims to have lost all powers over

25 the light assault battalions.

Page 634

1 And note that this is signed by Zoran Suton. He is Coric's

2 director of personnel and legal affairs, as shown in P5869.

3 Coric issued many other orders after July 1993, after the point

4 where he claims he had no authority. And these were orders to the

5 military police, including light assault battalions. You see deployment

6 orders such as P4151 from 13 August, sending military police to

7 participate in activities in Mostar. Discipline orders concerning

8 military police uniforms, P4126 on 12 August. Movement control orders,

9 P5863 on 13 October, requiring the military police to stop and search a

10 UNHCR convoy.

11 Your Honours, in response Coric argues - and he's repeated this

12 again today - that these are just de jure sources and they do not reflect

13 the de facto situation on the ground. You heard that this morning. That

14 is incorrect. There is a wealth of evidence showing that Coric's orders

15 were enacted, they were implemented. For example, there's P2535, a

16 report from the 4th Brigade Military Police of 27 May 1993, which states

17 that the military police are transferring prisoners from Ljubuski to

18 Heliodrom on the orders of Coric and Pusic. And the transfer took place

19 as confirmed in P2546.

20 In relation to P4010, which I just put on the slide, you can see

21 that it was implemented as well. And that's shown in P4103, page 4,

22 noting that the 2nd Light Assault Battalion indeed went to Mostar as

23 ordered by Coric.

24 Your Honours, the evidence clearly establishes that Coric's

25 powers, his authority were recognised by those below him. The evidence

Page 635

1 also shows that those above him in the joint criminal enterprise in the

2 power structures recognised his power and influence as well.

3 For example, in October 1993, the president of Herceg-Bosna,

4 Mate Boban, was notified that the ICRC had complained about the treatment

5 of detainees at Heliodrom prison. His response was to forward the report

6 with a handwritten note to Coric, asking him to deal with the matter.

7 P5792. These complaints were not minimal. The ICRC noted that the

8 detainees had been severely beaten by some of the units which take people

9 for work, and a number of detainees needed to be hospitalised for their

10 injuries. Where there was a problem with the prison network, Mate Boban

11 turned to Coric.

12 Then in November 1993, when Coric was nominated to be minister of

13 the interior of Herceg-Bosna, we see in a meeting between Franjo Tudjman

14 and Jadranko Prlic a discussion where Prlic says:

15 "For this position, we need the most forceful and authoritative

16 individual."

17 Prlic replied: "Coric absolutely is that."

18 And he then explained that Coric enjoyed the general confidence

19 of the army. That's P6581, pages 26 to 29. And Tudjman accordingly

20 awarded Coric the position of minister of the interior.

21 Your Honours, Coric fails to show that he had no powers over the

22 military police and that he could not exercise his influence in any way.

23 Turning to the arguments concerning Coric's significant

24 contributions to the JCE, he has challenged this at length in his brief

25 and touched on this in his pleadings today. Your Honours, Coric deployed

Page 636

1 military police units for mass eviction and arrest operations and he

2 equipped them with hundreds of thousands of bullets, thousands of

3 grenades, and other equipment. See volume 4, paragraph 1000, and P3090,

4 page 27. He was an architect of the network of brutal detention centres,

5 per volume 4, paragraph 982. He ignored repeated reports that Muslim

6 detainees were being wounded and killed while engaged in work on the

7 front lines, volume 4, 971. And he himself authorised detainees to work

8 on the front lines, unlawful labour. He sent troops to assist in the

9 siege of East Mostar, while also cutting off humanitarian aid to worsen

10 the situation of the desperate Muslim inhabitants.

11 And as I've mentioned, he played a key role ordering mass

12 expulsions of detainees, Muslim detainees.

13 But I'll look first to one of his central contributions to the

14 JCE which is his failure to fight crimes by HVO members. Your Honours,

15 again here his arguments repeat his trial submissions, often verbatim,

16 and we've noted that, for instance, in the response brief, paragraph 41.

17 He fails to show the Trial Chamber acted unreasonably in reaching this

18 finding and this finding that he did, in fact, ignore crimes and failed

19 to take the proper response, the proper measures in response to these

20 crimes. In fact the Trial Chamber held that he turned a blind eye to

21 vicious crimes and one example that I want to refer to is that of the

22 evictions in East Mostar. Your Honours, these evictions, the ones in

23 June 1993, involved HVO soldiers, including members of the Vinko Skrobo

24 antiterrorist group, subjecting Muslims to intimidation, threats, and

25 beatings, confiscating their property, raping Muslim women, and sending

Page 637

1 them across the front line to East Mostar. See volume 2, paragraph 872

2 to 876. Coric was informed of these violent expulsions. He was informed

3 by internationals, volume 2, paragraph 873. And you'll also see in

4 military police administration records accounts of these evictions in

5 which they call them ethnic cleansing. See volume 2, again

6 paragraph 873, and the evidence cited therein.

7 So how did Coric react to this information? To the

8 internationals he tried to brush the problem away. He said,

9 paraphrasing: It didn't happen; and if it happened, then it was done by

10 people they didn't have under control, criminals or whatever. You'll see

11 that transcript page 21047 to 21048.

12 But these were not out-of-control elements. In fact, it was

13 members of the HVO 3rd Brigade and the Skrobo anti-terrorist group who

14 were also under the command of the HVO, volume 1, paragraph 818 and 829,

15 carrying out these crimes.

16 One would expect the top military policeman's reaction to this

17 news to be quick and severe. Instead, Coric 's approach was

18 accommodating, both metaphorically and literally. For a start, the

19 perpetrators were not arrested or punished, volume 2, paragraph 898, and

20 P3666. But it went further. Coric specifically instructed his military

21 police to disregard crimes by these perpetrators. We have in evidence a

22 report, P3928, from the Military Police Crime Department that was part of

23 the military police administration. In it, the author complains that

24 Coric ordered his department to not investigate certain crimes committed

25 by the Vinko Skrobo anti-terrorist group, as the Chamber sets out in

Page 638

1 volume 4, paragraphs 931 to 933. Even further than this, Coric consented

2 to members of the HVO military police moving into the houses, the

3 apartments of evicted Muslims in West Mostar. See volume 4, para 929,

4 and P2879, and transcript page 25421.

5 You will also see this pattern of Coric allowing HVO members to

6 move into apartments of evicted, expelled Muslims occur in October. Look

7 at P6232, P5554, P5518, and transcript page 17208.

8 Coric's failures and his reaction, his accommodating reaction to

9 these crimes had severe implications for the Bosnian Muslim inhabitants

10 of Mostar and throughout these territories. The same Skrobo

11 anti-terrorist group continued to commit vicious crimes against Muslims

12 which included expulsions, thefts, rapes in Mostar in September 1993,

13 sometimes committed together with members of the military police. They

14 also caused detainees, Muslim detainees, to be used as human shields.

15 You see this in volume 3, paragraph 727, 782, and 933.

16 Your Honours, there is plenty more evidence of this nature. The

17 Trial Chamber acted reasonably in concluding that Coric contributed to

18 the joint criminal enterprise by protecting HVO members from

19 responsibility for their crimes against Bosnian Muslims.

20 Now, Coric has claimed today that he did, in fact, submit reports

21 and that he was attempting to do what he could in the circumstances.

22 However, the Trial Chamber has addressed these arguments, it's looked

23 into the details, and it's rightly, properly concluded that he failed to

24 do so where he was informed of crimes by HVO members against Bosnian

25 Muslims going to the core of this JCE, evictions in West Mostar, forced

Page 639

1 labour, detention crimes. You'll see in volume 1, paragraph 918 to 919,

2 that the Trial Chamber addressed these arguments. And you'll also see

3 that despite the fact that there were criminal reports being submitted,

4 these were primarily for crimes attenuated distinct from the crimes at

5 the core of this JCE, crimes like car theft, tax evasion. You see this

6 in P4699, page 24 to 25. When you look at the category of crimes against

7 the civilian population, genocide, terrorism, the crimes that we are

8 addressing at page 26, it notes - this is P4699 - that the reports

9 sent to the military prosecutor, these are the reports from the military

10 police, were exclusively against Serbs and Muslims who victimised Croats.

11 There is a mention of other crimes being prosecuted but no mention of

12 crimes against Muslims such as brutal forced labour, such as mass

13 expulsions, and such as evictions. Where are those crimes? What was

14 being done for those victims?

15 Your Honours, there are more examples. P3616, page 4, in a

16 meeting with military police personnel, 21 July 1993, the military

17 prosecutor, Jurisic stated:

18 "We are now overloaded with charges of failure to respond to

19 mobilisation orders, overloaded with charges against war criminals and

20 also charges against members of the Muslim armed forces, but there are no

21 charges against criminals in the town of Mostar."

22 And as we just saw, the serious charges against civilian

23 population, the war crimes types of charges, were not being charged for

24 crimes against Bosnian Muslims by HVO members.

25 Your Honours, the Trial Chamber built its conclusions on a solid

Page 640

1 foundation of evidence and Coric has failed to show that it acted

2 unreasonably.

3 He has also argued today that he made requests for the military

4 police to return from the front lines to enable him to do his job. And

5 he has cited P5471 and P6837. Again, the Trial Chamber took this into

6 account. It addressed it in volume 1, paragraph 972. And what Coric

7 omits to mention is that he was the one who had deployed the military

8 police to the front lines. In accordance with his role as a member of

9 the a JCE involving multiple people, he carried out his function. He

10 sent the military police to repeated eviction operations that I've

11 mentioned.

12 And it's also significant that these requests he has referred to

13 today are from September and November 1993. This is very late in the

14 game, Your Honours. But it's also at a time when Coric continued to

15 deploy military police to the front lines, including to Gornji Vakuf,

16 29 September 1993, that's P5478; and to Mostar, where he himself had

17 personally visited the front lines and seen the crimes that were

18 occurring, seen the results of the crimes. That's P5657 from

19 5 October 1993. In many instances, Your Honours, it was the military

20 police committing the crimes, bringing more back would have simply led to

21 more crimes against Muslims, and this was a result of the culture that

22 Coric fostered in the military police units. For instance, you see this

23 manifested in a report on activities in Prozor, 1993. P4177. This is a

24 HVO report. It says:

25 "The military police are implementing an order from a higher

Page 641

1 level to detain Muslims between the ages of 16 and 60 in their own

2 particular way, imprisoning men without exception, including those

3 younger than 16 and older than 60, and treating them in an extremely

4 inhumane manner."

5 It notes that together with local soldiers, the military police

6 were involved in crimes, including murdering Muslim prisoners, stealing

7 their property, and raping and humiliating female Muslims, forcing them

8 to strip in front of their fathers and forcing their fathers to strip in

9 front of them. That's at pages 2 to 3 of P4177.

10 Your Honours, it's this culture, it's this trend, it's this

11 pattern that led one international who dealt with the military police to

12 describe them as the most counter-productive and radical in the field and

13 he described people commanding the military police as quite clearly

14 radicals. That's transcript page 25818, 25819.

15 Your Honours, turning to Coric's contribution to the joint

16 criminal enterprise through the detention network and forced labour. The

17 Trial Chamber found on a thorough review of the evidence that Coric

18 enjoyed extensive powers over the detention network. He established the

19 Heliodrom and Ljubuski prisons and had direct authority over their

20 wardens. He was responsible for the security of detainees at Heliodrom,

21 Dretelj, and Ljubuski. He authorised the use of prisoners for forced

22 labour, and he had the power to order these so-called releases, in

23 reality expulsions, of Muslim detainees.

24 Coric denies many aspects of his authority. For instance, he

25 claims he did not order the establishment of Heliodrom. However, the

Page 642

1 Trial Chamber's finding at volume 2, paragraph 1394, was securely

2 established on the evidence. For example, there's P6805, this is a

3 military police administration report which states that the military

4 detention facility in Mostar, that's Heliodrom, was relocated to

5 Heliodrom on the orders of the military police chief and that was Coric

6 at the time. His denial of that authority, of those powers was properly

7 rejected. And it's important to understand the context, the significance

8 of his denial of this authority, of his denial of this role. He received

9 repeated information about the deplorable conditions of prisoners and

10 detainees. And I've mentioned that earlier, the note from Boban to Coric

11 about serious mistreatment.

12 One of the worst forms of mistreatment that is at issue today and

13 which I have referred to is forced labour. And Coric was regularly

14 informed that Heliodrom detainees were being mistreated, wounded or

15 killed while working on the front lines. That's volume 4,

16 paragraphs 955, 966, 1001.

17 Now, what was this forced labour, what did it consist of? Well,

18 it was described by witness Mujo Copelj who said that when he was

19 detained at Heliodrom, the HVO soldiers took him and other detainees in

20 groups of 30 to the front lines. The HVO soldiers forced the Muslim

21 detainees at gunpoint to run out into exposed areas and each detainee had

22 to place at least five sandbags on the defence line. As the prisoners

23 did so, bullets rained down on them from the other side. Some detainees

24 were killed, and many were wounded, while Copelj looked on. Many other

25 witnesses gave similar accounts, for example, volume 2, 1602.

Page 643

1 Now, Coric argues again that he had no power to authorise or

2 approve the use of detainees for work. And, again, his denial of power

3 is incorrect. It's false. For example, if you look at P4039 which we

4 place on the slide, this is an order from Petkovic on 8 August 1993 and

5 it's sent to various HVO brigade commanders.

6 At point 1, Petkovic states:

7 "Immediately carry out maximum fortification of lines reached.

8 You may uses prisoners and detained Muslims to fortify the lines. Seek

9 the necessary approval from the military police department (which is in

10 charge of utilisation of prisoners)."

11 Numerous reports were submitted to Coric detailing the results,

12 the brutal and often deadly results of this forced labour. For example,

13 on 4 August 1993, he is told that Muslim detainees were beaten up when

14 taken from Heliodrom for work by the HVO 3rd Brigade. P3939.

15 On 16 August, he is told that one prisoner was killed and three

16 wounded when taken from Heliodrom to do forced labour. P4221.

17 And then we see on the slide a report, P5008, of

18 13 September 1993, another report, and there are many more of these,

19 which notes in the bold part:

20 "While carrying out their work obligations, 50 prisoners were

21 wounded while six were killed by the Muslim armed forces. While groups

22 of HVO soldiers took prisoners home and thereby made it possible for them

23 to visit their families, some of our other soldiers mistreated the

24 prisoners. In our reports 522/93 of 4 August and 524/93 of 7 August, you

25 have been informed of the mistreatment of prisoners of the 2nd Battalion

Page 644

1 of the 2nd Brigade and anti-aircraft defence of Siroki Brijeg."

2 Importantly, this report which is from the warden of the

3 Heliodrom prison, Stanko Bozic, goes on to inform Coric that, if we move

4 to the next excerpt:

5 "On 10 August, the International Committee of the Red Cross came

6 to visit the prison. They worked for three days, registering all the

7 detainees and prisoners. The representative of the ICRC,

8 Mr. Franco Faoro, discussed with the prison warden the question of the

9 inadequate conditions of solitary confinement cells, the quality and

10 quantity of food and its improvement, and the fact that detainees go to

11 work on the front line (forbidden under the Geneva Conventions) ..."

12 Coric argues that these reports of the Heliodrom warden were not

13 sent to him or the military police administration, and this repeats his

14 trial argument again. That was properly dismissed at trial, and you can

15 see that because many of these reports are addressed to him personally.

16 And you can see that on this report, for example, at the bottom in the

17 address tag.

18 Additionally, reports detailing the same mistreatment come from

19 multiple sources. There's a report on 30 September 1993 from the

20 5th Military Police Battalion and that said that Heliodrom prisoners were

21 taken to work at the front line, were sometimes wounded or mutilated, and

22 sometimes did not return at all. It's P5497. That was also sent to

23 Coric personally as you can see at page 16. There are many more examples

24 listed in the judgement such as at volume 2, footnote 3754. Coric's

25 claims of ignorance about this practice are false but they're also

Page 645

1 telling.

2 So how did Coric react to this information? Well, as the

3 Trial Chamber found, he did nothing to prevent the practice and, in fact,

4 he allowed it to continue, and he authorised it himself. We have

5 evidence showing that in August he authorised Muslim prisoners from

6 Vitina Otok, that's a different HVO prison. He authorised these

7 prisoners to taken for forced labour at the front lines as set out in

8 trial judgement volume 4, paragraph 977. Now, the evidence doesn't tell

9 us the fate of those specific prisoners, but it does tell us they were

10 sent to the front lines and it does tell us that Coric was authorising

11 and signalling his approval of this practice. Far from preventing it,

12 far from repressing it, as he was supposed to do.

13 Your Honours, these reports about forced labour, particularly the

14 ones from Stanko Bozic, plead to Coric to take measures. When you look

15 at them, you can see him requesting again and again for intervention. He

16 is asking Coric to do what Coric was required to do as the chief military

17 policeman. Coric did not. And in the meanwhile, dozens of Muslim

18 detainees were killed, hundreds were wounded and traumatised. His claim

19 of ignorance is a facade that was properly rejected at trial.

20 Your Honours, the third and final contribution that I'll address

21 is his involvement in this mass displacement, this industrial-scale

22 displacement of Muslim detainees from the detention network. Through the

23 system, detainees with letters of guarantees from third countries were

24 requested -- were released - sorry - from the brutal prisons and given a

25 short time, sometimes hours, to leave Herceg-Bosna, and they were

Page 646

1 required to leave with their families. This was an organised means of

2 expelling Muslims en masse. After assessing the evidence in detail, the

3 Trial Chamber found that Coric ordered and facilitated expulsion through

4 this process. Volume 4, paragraph 982. And its finding is well

5 supported by the evidence.

6 For example, in August 1993, Coric issued an order for the

7 release of Muslims from Ljubuski who had letters of guarantee, Muslim

8 detainees, I should say. These Muslim detainees who were subject to

9 Coric's order were given 24 hours to leave their homes and to depart to a

10 third country and had to leave with their families. This is noted in

11 volume 2, paragraph 1644, and you see also in transcript page 22095.

12 Pursuant to Coric's order, detainees were expelled from

13 Heliodrom, Vitina Otok, Ljubuski, Dretelj and Gabela prisons. Coric's

14 response in his arguments is complete denial. You've heard him today say

15 that he had no power to release prisoners, referring to P3316-P3320.

16 Your Honours, that is incorrect and it is shown to be incorrect by a

17 wealth of evidence. For example, we can look at P10191 which is on the

18 slide and you will see here that it says:

19 "In accordance with the law and pursuant to the order of the

20 chief of the military police, Mr. Valentin Coric, we ask the command of

21 Heliodrom in Mostar to release the people of Muslim ethnicity who possess

22 letters of guarantee. The detainees: Fadil Maksumic, born in 1955,

23 Ismet Micijevic, born in 1956, Admir Osmic, who are detained in the

24 military prison Heliodrom in Mostar should be handed over to the military

25 police in Ljubuski because their families are in Ljubuski and are being

Page 647

1 exiled from Croatia."

2 Exiled, Your Honours. There are many more examples. I listed

3 some of them at the outset of my submissions.

4 Your Honours, Coric knew that these expulsions through releases

5 affected a huge number of Muslim detainees and Muslim people in general.

6 For example, he knew that in Dretelj alone there were over 2.000 Muslims

7 that had been detained through mass arrest campaigns in Capljina. That's

8 volume 4, paragraphs 985 to 986, and 993.

9 Expelling them, together with their families, would clearly have

10 a huge impact on the psyche, the morale, the existence of the Muslim

11 population of Herceg-Bosna.

12 Coric argues that even if he was involved in these releases, it

13 was for the prisoners' own good. That's at paragraph 180 of his appeal

14 brief. Effectively he is saying he was improving their lot by releasing

15 them from these deplorable, horrific conditions. What he omits to

16 mention is that it was the HVO, including the military police in many

17 instances, who were committing the vicious crimes, who were responsible

18 for the deplorable, horrific conditions in these detention centres, and

19 it was these conditions that led the Muslim detainees wanting to leave. The

20 prisoners suffered in overcrowded, insanitary conditions. Cramped

21 together, they had to take turns to lie down to sleep. Some prisoners

22 received so little water they had to drink their own urine. You see that

23 volume 3, paragraph 1124. And each day they woke up to the prospect of

24 being selected for forced labour, effectively Russian roulette with their

25 lives. The terror and desperation is hard to imagine.

Page 648

1 Your Honours, that is the context in which these prisoners chose

2 to be released, if you could call it a choice at all. And Coric was well

3 aware of those conditions. The Trial Chamber assessed and validly

4 concluded that the prisoners did not enjoy genuine choice in these

5 circumstances, and it properly concluded that this was a means of

6 expulsion. See volume 2, paragraph 1648; volume 3, paragraph 817.

7 You've seen the orders showing that Coric played a key role in

8 this industrial-scale expulsion. It was validly taken into account as a

9 contribution to the joint criminal enterprise.

10 Your Honours, I will now turn to your questions as set out in the

11 Scheduling Order, and I'll focus first on question 4, which, as you are

12 aware, concerns the impact on the scope and the convictions under the

13 joint criminal enterprise, particularly for murder if the murder and

14 wilful killing conclusions related to Dusa in Gornji Vakuf were to be

15 reversed.

16 As you've already heard in relations to parts A and B of your

17 question, overturning these convictions related to Dusa would have no

18 impact on the scope of the common criminal plan, nor on the mens rea

19 under JCE 1 for murder of the appellants, and that applies in the same

20 respect for Coric. There were many murders under this joint criminal

21 enterprise. Removing one incident would have no impact.

22 So, Your Honours, I'll focus on question 4(c), concerning the

23 third category of joint criminal enterprise. And here you've asked and

24 heard about two documents, P1393, P1414.

25 Now, the short answer is that there would be no impact on Coric's

Page 649

1 convictions and there would be no impact that would undermine the

2 Prosecution's appeal in which it seeks further JCE 3 convictions for

3 murder.

4 If we look first to the JCE 3 convictions that were entered

5 against Coric, these were for two killings of Muslim detainees in the

6 Dretelj detention centre in August 1993. That's set out in volume 4,

7 paragraph 1017. The Trial Chamber took an extremely restrictive approach

8 in its analysis of joint criminal enterprise 3 mens rea, a

9 compartmentalised approach, and the Prosecution has submitted this is an

10 error as set out in its appeal brief and as you will hear in our appeal

11 submissions. But even on this strict approach, it nonetheless found the

12 evidence was sufficient for these two murders in Dretelj in August 1993.

13 Why was this? Well, this was because he had actual knowledge of

14 other killings of Muslim detainees in the same detention centre in July,

15 just weeks before these murders. Your Honours, this is sufficient notice

16 to put anyone on alert of the risk, the foreseeability that further

17 murders might be perpetrated. Anyone, let alone the chief of the

18 military police administration who was centrally involved in this network

19 of detention centres. Your Honours, you'll see the references in

20 volume 4, paragraph 1018.

21 If we look now and I see -- I see the time. And I could

22 suggest -- I'm about to turn to a new subtopic.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: You have six minutes left.

24 MR. GILLETT: I will continue. Thank you.

25 If we look now to the additional JCE 3 murders for which Coric,

Page 650

1 according to the Prosecution, should have been convicted, you'll see that

2 these concern eviction-related murders, detention-related murders as set

3 out in Prosecution appeal brief paragraph 242. In many of these cases,

4 the Trial Chamber simply forgot to adjudicate Coric's individual criminal

5 responsibility under JCE 3. And for these, the evidence would remain

6 entirely sufficient to convict him even if the Dusa killings were

7 removed. This is because, first, of his willing participation in this

8 joint criminal enterprise, this violent, ethnically animated campaign

9 against Bosnian Muslims which involved the deliberate use of extreme

10 violence. And it is also because of the repeated notice he got of

11 serious violent crimes against Muslims.

12 Looking to the first point, his role in the -- his participation,

13 I should say, in the JCE. As mentioned, the criminal campaign at the

14 heart of the JCE involved serious violent crimes, including murder. I've

15 set out at length Coric's role in the eviction operations, detention

16 crimes, and vicious murders of detainees used for forced labour and as

17 human shields.

18 Coric also contributed to the crimes in East Mostar, which

19 included murder. He had an office in central Mostar at the time and

20 visited the front line. See volume 4, paragraph 936, and transcript page

21 18341. He knew of the shelling and fire campaign, but nonetheless sent

22 military police units to assist the siege, and he cut off humanitarian

23 supplies to the desperate, trapped Muslim inhabitants. Volume 4,

24 paragraph 937 to 943.

25 Coric's role, his participation and his involvement in this

Page 651

1 campaign of extreme violence, violence committed on an ethnic basis, is

2 clearly relevant to his JCE 3 mens rea. And the Appeals Chamber has

3 confirmed the relevance of these factors to an accused's joint criminal

4 enterprise 3 liability and that they may be taken into account. In the

5 Sainovic appeals judgement, for instance, paragraphs 1089, 1591.

6 Your Honours, Coric, as I've mentioned, received repeated reports

7 of serious violence against Muslims, specific notice of crimes.

8 I see the time and if this is convenient, I will pause

9 submissions at this moment.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: It certainly is. We will break now and we will

11 resume at 2.30. Thank you.

12 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.00 p.m.

13 --- On resuming at 2.30 p.m.

14 MR. GILLETT: Thank you, Mr. President. Your Honours.

15 At the outset, a couple of corrections for the transcript to

16 verify that it is accurate and that I did not misspeak. At transcript

17 page 54, P5689 was recorded and I meant to say P5869.

18 At transcript page 61, where I cited volume 1, para 972, I should

19 have also cited volume 1, para 940.

20 And when I referred to two exhibits, P3316 and P3320, I should

21 have said P3216 and P3220. Thank you.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, thank you. Go ahead.

23 MR. GILLETT: Returning to my submissions before the break,

24 Your Honours, I mentioned that Coric repeatedly received notice about

25 violent crimes, including violent crimes against Muslims by HVO members.

Page 652

1 I'll look first to the documents that you've specifically highlighted in

2 your questions, P1393 and P1414, concerning joint criminal enterprise 3.

3 Your Honours, P1393 is a report from 2nd February 1993 from

4 Berislav Pusic and others in the crime police department of Coric's

5 military police administration, and it recounts that the Tomislavgrad

6 military police had beaten and robbed detainees in Ljubuski. The victims

7 were left with visible wounds and bruises.

8 Your Honours, the following day, Coric issues P1414, and here he

9 merely calls for a report into the circumstances and that the property

10 taken from the prisoners be given to the military police administration.

11 The Defence has argued that this indicates he took effective adequate

12 measures in the response, the appropriate measures in response to news of

13 serious violence. Well, the first point, Your Honours, is that this

14 issue, JCE 3, is about notice. Having learned of this serious violence,

15 you can't unring the bell, Your Honours. He doesn't lose that awareness.

16 But also, when we look at the record, there's reason to doubt

17 that he did take serious measures in response to these reports.

18 Your Honours, the report itself does not mention punishing the military

19 police, and what we do know is that the commander, the overall commander

20 of these military police, Zdenko Andabak, was appointed to a higher

21 position a few days later, 10 February 1993, on Coric's recommendation.

22 We also know that Coric permitted the Tomislavgrad military police, the

23 same unit that severely beat these detainees in Ljubuski, to continue to

24 guard detainees in 1993. You can see these in P1460 and P3551.

25 Moreover, Your Honours, this was not the first time Coric was

Page 653

1 learning of the criminal propensity of the Tomislavgrad military police.

2 In October 1992, he had been informed of the crimes and ill discipline by

3 the Tomislavgrad military police under Zdenko Andabak and he was asked to

4 take measures against them. The Trial Chamber assessed this evidence and

5 found that he failed to do so. That's at volume 4, paragraphs 1246 to

6 1252. And that's the basis for his Article 7(3) responsibility prior to

7 the commencement of the joint criminal enterprise.

8 Your Honours, the Defence has referred to the evidence of

9 Zdenko Andabak, transcript page 50953, in arguing that Coric fostered a

10 stringent culture in the military police. Well, first, the Trial Chamber

11 assigned little weight to Andabak's evidence in relation to these crimes

12 in October 1992 as you will see in volume 2, para 59.

13 You'll also see that this continuity in the perpetrators, the

14 identity of the perpetrators, is matched by a continuity of inadequate

15 response by Coric, and it's also matched by a continuity of crimes and

16 even an escalation of crimes to more serious crimes, Your Honours.

17 The key point for his joint criminal enterprise 3 mens rea is

18 that he was aware of the risk, the possibility of serious violence

19 against Bosnian Muslims in the implementation of the joint criminal

20 enterprise.

21 Your Honours, he was, as you know, found to be aware of the

22 violence, extreme violence committed during the operations in

23 Gornji Vakuf in January 1993. He also received numerous reports

24 referring to crimes, including murders, and including against Muslims.

25 He knew of the violent evictions in Mostar in May 1993. You see these in

Page 654

1 volume 4, paragraphs 926 to 928.

2 Your Honours, these evictions were brutal, Muslims were kicked

3 punched and hit with rifle-butts. HVO soldiers threatened to kill the

4 Muslims and pointed their guns at families with young children. That's

5 volume 2, paragraph 822.

6 There is a report from 9 June concerning Prozor, P2697. You see

7 at page 3 Coric - and this is addressed to Coric - that he is informed of

8 crimes including murder, arson, and looting. He is informed that the

9 military police have released murderers. He has released -- he is

10 informed that one prisoner was killed and that there have been other

11 incidents.

12 There's additional evidence showing that in mid-1993 Coric knew

13 that the HVO was holding Muslim detainees in Prozor. And that's set out

14 in volume 4, paragraph 998. And, Your Honours, the involvement of the

15 military police in crimes in Prozor was notorious. I have mentioned

16 P4177, a report that outlines the military police involvement in rapes,

17 murders, and mistreatment of Muslims.

18 In mid-July 1993, a representative of an international

19 organisation protested to Coric through a series of meetings and he

20 protested about evictions, looting, destruction of property, and the

21 general campaign against Muslims across the affected territories.

22 Although Coric said that steps would be taken, none ever materialised.

23 That's transcript page 18340 through 18344. You can look at P4058, a

24 report from Coric's military police administration that the Defence has

25 referred to this morning. That shows he was informed of forced evictions

Page 655

1 and the murders of numerous Muslims, liquidations of Muslims.

2 Simply put, Your Honours, Coric had abundant notice. He had

3 notice that would put any person on alert of crimes, serious violence,

4 including murders, against Muslims in the perpetration of the joint

5 criminal enterprise.

6 Your Honours, have asked about -- a question who was privy to the

7 contents of a report by Zeljko Siljeg, P1351, of 29 January 1993. And as

8 you've heard, that report describes killings and destruction that

9 occurred during the Gornji Vakuf operation. It's our submission that

10 Coric would have also received the information in that report. Along

11 with Petkovic, Coric was tasked with implementing the Gornji Vakuf

12 operation. P1140. Although he was not physically present during the

13 operation, he has said that he was in overall command of the military

14 police sent to Gornji Vakuf. P1053. And he reports after the operation,

15 volume 4, paragraph 921 to 923.

16 Your Honours, he was aware of this violence in Gornji Vakuf. He

17 knew about the violent campaign against Muslims, and he contributed to it

18 in multiple ways, through the brutal forced labour, through the

19 expulsions, and through many other crimes. I should say he contributed

20 to many other crimes committed as part of the JCE.

21 This readily satisfies the mens rea standard under Your Honours'

22 jurisprudence, and he should be convicted for the additional JCE 3

23 murders as set out in our appeal.

24 Turning very briefly to question 5 that you have heard from the

25 Defence on this morning. This concerns the destruction in villages in

Page 656

1 Gornji Vakuf. You will hear our submissions about this next week, on

2 Tuesday. Essentially, we argue that this was wanton, unjustified

3 destruction. There was a pattern in the crimes and the destruction, and

4 you will see that in the villages the HVO soldiers torched houses.

5 There's no military justification for burning down civilian houses.

6 A brief word on question 10, Your Honours, that was touched on

7 this morning. Your Honours, again, you'll hear more about this in the

8 Prosecution appeal on Tuesday. But the bottom line is that many of

9 Coric's arguments would be undermined by applying the correct standard

10 for JCE 3 mens rea, which is the possibility standard, not the

11 probability standard. For example, you'll see in his brief at

12 paragraph 187 concerning Gornji Vakuf that he argues that it was an error

13 to find -- or that the Prosecution has not shown, I should say, that he

14 knowingly took the risk acts of theft would be committed. That's the

15 probability standard he is applying.

16 In Mostar, paragraph 199 of his brief, again, he says knowingly

17 took the risk that acts of theft would be committed. And Coric could

18 reasonably have foreseen that the HVO members would commit acts of sexual

19 violence.

20 So his arguments would be affected, Your Honours.

21 Turning now to the issue of occupation that was raised this

22 morning.

23 Your Honours, he has failed to show any error in the

24 trial judgement. In arguing that the HVO could not occupy its own

25 territory, the Defence overlooks that this is occupation by agency. It

Page 657

1 is Croatia that is the occupying power. And you'll see this volume 3,

2 footnote 1175.

3 Again, contrary to the Defence arguments, a state of occupation

4 does not require and does not hinge on there being an invasion. As set

5 out in Article 2.2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention:

6 "The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total

7 occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said

8 occupation meets with no armed resistance."

9 And you've heard detailed submissions on the law on this issue

10 previously.

11 Additionally, that Croatia sometimes supported the ABiH with

12 weapons does not undermine Croatia's overall control of the HVO as this

13 related to times or areas other than those that we're concerned with in

14 this case. Moreover, as you have seen previously this week, the

15 presidential transcripts show repeatedly Croatia's control over the HVO

16 and show that it went beyond providing mere weaponry, that it included

17 organising these forces as well.

18 Your Honours, Croatia was properly found to have been involved in

19 organising and planning the military operations in BiH against the ABiH

20 for the HVO. This meets the test required under our jurisprudence.

21 Turning to the joint criminal enterprise existence challenges

22 that have been raised, Your Honours, the Defence first addressed the Law

23 on Joint Criminal Enterprise and asked Your Honours to reverse course

24 midstream, we would say, to change the law on JCE. And they referred to

25 the United Kingdom Supreme Court case of Jogee. The Defence argued, at

Page 658

1 transcript page 7 today, that the Appeals Chamber in Tadic relied on

2 English case law in reaching its finding that there exists a valid legal

3 doctrine of joint criminal enterprise in this Court's jurisdiction.

4 However, in reality, the Tadic Appeals Chamber relied on customary

5 international law in formulating JCE, and in contrast, it found that it

6 could not rely on domestic provisions in order to determine common

7 purpose liability. And you will see that in paragraphs 195 through 226

8 of the Tadic appeals decision.

9 Your Honours, the Defence points to paragraph 224, footnote 287,

10 in its argument that the Appeals Chamber relied on English law. But

11 actually in that footnote, this -- the citation to English law is one of

12 many which the Appeals Chamber summarised before concluding that these

13 provisions cannot be relied on as a source of international principles or

14 rules under the doctrine of the general principles of law recognised by

15 the nations of the world because of the lack of a common approach across

16 different legal systems. And since Jogee, Your Honours have issued the

17 Stanisic and Zupljanin appeals decision which again confirmed the

18 validity of joint criminal enterprise. You see that, for example, in

19 paragraph 974.

20 As to the existence of the joint criminal enterprise, the Defence

21 has missed, has not addressed the core of the Trial Chamber's analysis in

22 its arguments in pointing to assistance of arms, in claiming there was no

23 pattern of crimes, because the evidence underlying these findings is

24 clear and compelling. Your Honours --

25 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, Mr. Ivetic.

Page 659

1 MR. IVETIC: May I be excused to go pick up some documents that

2 we're printing. We have no one in the back to do so.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Okay. Thank you.

4 Go ahead.

5 MR. GILLETT: Thank you, Mr. President. Let me start with the

6 words of one well-placed international witness who said the Bosnian

7 Croats wanted to make it so that provinces 8 and 10 would have the

8 greatest majority possible of Bosnian Croats. For them, it was about

9 expelling from such provinces, the Bosnian Serbs and those they called

10 the Muslims, the Bosnian Muslims. Transcript page 17535, cited at

11 volume 4, paragraph 15. And provinces 8 and 10 contain the

12 municipalities in which the vast majority of the crimes that we're

13 addressing occurred.

14 Another well-placed witness who you will be familiar with,

15 Ambassador Herbert Okun explained the double game being played by the

16 Bosnian Croat leadership. He said, referring to 1993:

17 "In January, yes, the Bosnian Croats had signed the agreement

18 and, yes, they were conducting ethnic cleansing operations in Herzegovina

19 and Central Bosnia. They were doing both."

20 That's cited in volume 4, paragraph 45.

21 And, Your Honours, the evidence substantiates the pattern of

22 crimes, crimes including murder, that were part of the JCE. For

23 instance, in relation to these evictions, Your Honours, you will see that

24 the victims included families, a woman doing her laundry, this is in

25 Mostar when the attack started, a sick elderly man, and the HVO soldiers

Page 660

1 forced them to run across the front lines. They had gun-fire behind them

2 from the HVO and gun-fire in front of them from the ABiH who didn't know

3 who they were.

4 Your Honours, what military purpose did these crimes serve? It's

5 none. What they do serve is the purpose behind the joint criminal

6 enterprise.

7 Your Honours, I can refer to the demographics that you've heard

8 of and there's two points in this connection. Firstly, the JCE crimes

9 resulted in large-scale expulsion of the Muslim population; and,

10 secondly, that these expulsions reflected the words of JCE members. If

11 we look at the numbers, they largely speak for themselves. As the Trial

12 Chamber observed at paragraph 57 of volume 4, there were dramatic falls

13 in the numbers of Muslims in September and October 1993, which is when

14 the JCE was well into its operation. Most strikingly, the population of

15 Stolac, the Muslim population, I should say, went from 8093 to 0.

16 Your Honours have heard about the statements from JCE members.

17 You've heard Mate Boban's statement from 27 December 1991 about cleansing

18 border areas. You've heard Praljak's statement, September 1992, about

19 Muslim refugees and "unless we evict those people from there, we will not

20 have a majority there." That's volume 4, paragraph 522.

21 And you've heard Praljak's statement about homogenisation and

22 that was made at a meeting on 2 April 1993 that Coric attended. Praljak

23 said:

24 "Now we have got what we want. The homogenisation of our

25 population continues. We can only fence off what is ours and build there

Page 661

1 our own space and our own state. It is all as clear as noon on a spring

2 day."

3 That's P1788.

4 Your Honours, the Defence have not addressed this key evidence

5 going to the core of the existence of the joint criminal enterprise.

6 Ultimately, Your Honours, Coric was informed and he was informed

7 repeatedly about HVO crimes against Muslims. He was the chief of the

8 military police administration and his core job was to address crimes by

9 HVO members. Time and time again, he was silent in the face of serious

10 crimes. He was silent in the face of the mistreatment of Mujo Copelj and

11 the many other victims of forced labour at the front lines. And he was

12 silent in the face of the expulsion of victims from Ljubuski and the

13 exile of their families.

14 Why was he silent? Why didn't the dog bark? Well, the reason is

15 that he was contributing, he was a participant in the joint criminal

16 enterprise. He was deploying military police for these operations in

17 which large-scale crimes occurred. He was participating, facilitating

18 mass arrest of Muslims, indiscriminate arrests. He was participating to

19 the brutal detention network and the mistreatment and killing, the

20 murder, of Muslims during forced labour. And ultimately, he was ordering

21 the mass expulsion of Muslims including from the territory claimed by

22 Herceg-Bosna.

23 Your Honours, Coric has not showed that his trial was unfair or

24 that there was no reasonable basis for his conviction. The Trial Chamber

25 gave a full hearing to his arguments, and he has failed to show any error