Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 3137

1 Tuesday, 16 April 2002

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

5 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Ryneveld.

6 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes, Your Honours. Just before I call the

7 Prosecution's next witness, I wonder if I might have the Court's

8 permission to deal with a matter of housekeeping from one of the last

9 witnesses that I dealt with.

10 You'll recall that when I spoke -- when I led the evidence of

11 Mr. Loku, there were some questions during cross-examination by

12 Mr. Tapuskovic about some further photos that might be available in the

13 bundle of photos available to the Prosecution concerning the hole -- the

14 holes in the mountainside and perhaps the foliage that might have affected

15 his ability to see what he testified about. We had promised at that time

16 to produce the balance of the photos in our collection, and due to

17 circumstances, those appeared not to have ever been presented into

18 evidence, and I propose to do that now, if I may.

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. You will have to remind us of what a convenient

20 number is going to be.

21 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes. I believe those photographs -- do we have a

22 number?

23 JUDGE MAY: It may not matter just for the moment.

24 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes. They appear to have gone in -- the original

25 ones went in as 56 and 57, so perhaps we could make it 57A.

Page 3138

1 JUDGE MAY: Yes, 57A.

2 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you. That matter attended to, the

3 Prosecution proposes to call Richard Ciaglinski. Ciaglinski is spelled

4 C-i-a-g-l-i-n-s-k-i.

5 JUDGE MAY: Pronounced Ciaglinski.

6 MR. RYNEVELD: Pronounced Ciaglinski. I don't know where the "N"

7 comes from, but that's the way it's pronounced.

8 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

9 [The witness entered court]

10 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness take the declaration.

11 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

12 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

13 JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.

14 THE WITNESS: Thank you.


16 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

17 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honour.

18 Examined by Mr. Ryneveld:

19 Q. Witness, I understand that you're presently a Colonel with the

20 British Armed Forces and at present a defence attache to Bulgaria and

21 Sophia; is that correct?

22 A. That's correct, yes.

23 Q. Is it right, sir, that from the 5th of December 1998 to

24 approximately the 23rd of March 1999, you served with the OSCE in Kosovo?

25 A. I did, as a member of the Kosovo Verification Mission.

Page 3139

1 Q. I see. And just briefly, by way of background, sir --

2 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers pause between answer and

3 question, thank you.


5 Q. I understand, sir, that you joined the British Armed Forces in

6 August of 1974, attended and graduated the Sandhurst Military Academy and

7 received your commission in 1975.

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. Then in 1994 to 1997, you served as a British Military Attache to

10 Poland.

11 A. I did.

12 Q. And you hold a Bachelor of Arts degree in mathematics, a Master of

13 Education degree, and you're a first-class interpreter in Polish?

14 A. Yes, I hold all the above, and I am an interpreter in Polish.

15 Q. And I understand - this is particularly relevant to the issue that

16 I'm going to be asking questions about later - you completed a host of

17 military courses, particularly in the areas of weapons recognition; is

18 that correct?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. Sir, is it also true that you commenced your operational duties

21 with the KVM in December -- on December 5th of 1998 in Pristina as part of

22 Major General Drewienkiewicz's staff?

23 A. Yes. I arrived on the 5th of December, did some training in

24 Brezovica for two, three days and then moved down to General DZ's staff.

25 Q. And by "General DZ," that's -- we accept that that's a shortening

Page 3140

1 of "Drewienkiewicz"; is that correct?

2 A. That's correct, and it saves a lot of time.

3 Q. Yes. Now, sir, when you were there, did you assume the role of a

4 particular aspect of the Verification Mission?

5 A. Yes, I did. Because of my previous experience as a military

6 attache and other types of work I had done in the British Armed Forces,

7 General DZ asked for me to actually join the mission and to work on his

8 weapons and arms verification team.

9 Q. And you agreed to do that, I take it, and as a result of that,

10 what kinds of things did you do?

11 A. Well, the intention was that, in accord with the various

12 agreements, my job was to try to design a method of inspection to verify

13 that the agreement was being carried out in order that we could see that

14 the troops were in barracks, the tanks were in barracks, the number of

15 weapons of certain calibres were also being stored in barracks or not

16 there at all.

17 Q. All right. Now, sir, if I remember correctly, you said something

18 in pursuance to the agreements. What types of agreements are you

19 referring to?

20 A. There were two main agreements. There was the agreement which was

21 signed which allowed us to operate, which I think was referred to as the

22 Holbrooke agreement but in fact I think it was an agreement signed by

23 Mr. Geremek, the head of the OSCE, which specified exactly the size of the

24 force, the size of the KVM, and what responsibilities we had pursuant to

25 verification.

Page 3141

1 Q. And was that the agreement the basis upon which you conducted your

2 particular aspect of the mission?

3 A. Yes. That and the Sean Burns document which also then specified,

4 went into a little bit more detail about, for example, the number of MUP

5 patrol points.

6 MR. RYNEVELD: Might the witness be shown Exhibit 94, tab 3, Madam

7 Registrar.

8 Q. First of all, Witness, if you could look at that and tell us if

9 that in fact is the agreement to which you've made reference.

10 A. Yes, it is.

11 Q. All right. And did you have reference to that document during the

12 course of your duties?

13 A. I kept the document in my pocket throughout the entire time I was

14 in Kosovo.

15 Q. All right. And secondly -- I don't know if we need to show that

16 on the ELMO.

17 MR. RYNEVELD: I believe it was shown on the ELMO during the

18 evidence of the last witness, Your Honours. We can perhaps refer to that

19 later, if need be.

20 Q. The second document that you referred to --

21 MR. RYNEVELD: Might the witness be shown tab 4 of Exhibit 94,

22 please.

23 Q. And this document, if you recognise it, perhaps should be put on

24 the ELMO.

25 First of all, Witness, do you recognise it?

Page 3142

1 A. I do.

2 Q. Is that the document to which you have referred as the Sean Burns

3 document?

4 A. It certainly is.

5 Q. And did you have reference to that document during the course of

6 your duties?

7 A. Yes, throughout the entire time I was there.

8 Q. What kinds of issues were of particular relevance contained in

9 that document to your particular task?

10 A. Well, it was very important that the verification went according

11 to the agreements, and therefore we tried to sort of keep both sides to

12 these two documents. And it was important that the number of the MUP, the

13 MUP patrols, was kept down to the number specified in this document,

14 otherwise movement around Kosovo would have been impossible because there

15 would have been so many checkpoints that no one could have moved. And so

16 this is the main relevance, is just limiting the number of MUP patrols and

17 checkpoints throughout Kosovo.

18 Q. Yes. Now, as a result of this, did you in fact visit various

19 parts of Kosovo in the course of your duties of verifying that these

20 agreements were being adhered to by both sides?

21 A. Yes. So for example, we did try to carry out a verification of

22 barracks and military VJ locations, and we also carried out a spot check,

23 at one point in our tour during our stay in Kosovo, of the number of MUP

24 locations that were actually on the ground at any one time.

25 Q. Yes. Witness, part of the difficulty of you and I both speaking

Page 3143

1 the same language is that there can be immediate response and answer.

2 A. Sorry.

3 Q. We need to wait for the interpretation.

4 Now, did you have unlimited access to MUP and VJ sites?

5 A. No, not at any time.

6 Q. Tell us about that.

7 A. Well, when we first tried to carry out our very first

8 verification, which was of the barracks, the Junik barracks just west of

9 Pristina, we were met with a very hostile reception. We were not allowed

10 into the barracks. We were threatened that we were parking illegally,

11 obstructing the barracks, and this went on for some time.

12 Q. Yes.

13 A. This was just the very first attempt to verify, and this was done

14 with the presence of General DZ and a number of other verifiers.

15 Q. Allow me to interrupt at this point to ask when your initial

16 attempts would have been, in time.

17 A. This would have been at the beginning of January 1999 -- sorry,

18 wrong. It would have been about a fortnight after I started my work in

19 Pristina, which would have been the second or third week in December

20 1998.

21 Q. All right. And you've told us about your initial attempts. Did

22 you ever visit some other three main VJ sites?

23 A. Yes. After a great deal of negotiation with the Serbian

24 Cooperation Commission in Pristina, we were allowed to take a team to

25 visit three particular sites at various locations around Kosovo.

Page 3144

1 Q. And did you have reasonable access to those sites?

2 A. Yes. Obviously our visit was awaited and prepared for, and

3 therefore, we were shown what the VJ wanted us to see. But certainly we

4 had no difficulty with access on those days.

5 Q. Had they had notice, through these negotiation proceedings, of

6 your impending arrival for inspection?

7 A. Yes. On every occasion, we gave notice. For the three

8 inspections, there was a great deal of notice. For the -- our first

9 inspection at the Junik barracks, it was a very short notice, I think,

10 less than 24 hours. And then we also tried an inspection at the barracks

11 in Prizren for which we gave more than 24 hours notice, and we were also

12 met with a very hostile reception, eventually being allowed to accompany

13 the commanding officer to his office to carry out some discussions but not

14 allowed to carry out any inspection.

15 Q. I see. Had you requested to visit other sites and were you given

16 permission?

17 A. Yes. We -- there were two tiers of inspection. There was the

18 high-level tier where the actual headquarters, myself, I would organise

19 the high-level visits; and each of the Regional Centres would also, as

20 they controlled or looked after certain parts of Kosovo, they would also

21 try to carry out their own local inspections. Certainly, even with

22 notice, the only inspections we were allowed to carry out were the three I

23 just mentioned. All the others were turned down or they were not

24 answered.

25 Q. How many sites had you anticipated wanting to visit? In other

Page 3145

1 words, how many permissible sites were there, according to the agreement?

2 A. According to the agreement, we had free access to the whole of

3 Kosovo and, therefore, every site was permissible.

4 Q. Are you able to give a numeric number to the amount of sites, VJ

5 sites that you would have wanted to visit? I realise all of them

6 throughout Kosovo, but do you know how many there were?

7 A. Well, we -- well, we certainly would have wished to visit all the

8 permanent fixed garrisons and fixed locations. We -- anything to do with

9 air defence was excluded because that was covered by a different

10 agreement. But on top of the fixed locations, there were also deployed

11 units that we wished to visit. So in total, there probably were 30 or 40,

12 at least, sites that we should have been able to visit.

13 Q. Now, your initial attempts were, as you say, a fortnight after you

14 started so that puts us about the third week of December 1998. Did this

15 continue on into the -- into 1999, January and February, these attempts at

16 verification?

17 A. Well, yes -- yes and no. It became more and more difficult,

18 impossible to verify. So I continued to negotiate with the Commission for

19 Cooperation for access for myself and also for the teams out on the -- in

20 the regional areas. But slowly we had to change our method of operation,

21 and so, for example, eventually we had to, when carrying out the

22 inspection of the number of MUP patrol points, we had to mount a spot -- a

23 surprise check on them.

24 Q. Yes. When --

25 A. Sorry.

Page 3146

1 Q. I'm waiting for translation. Did there come a time in February of

2 1999 when you decided to send out, shall we say, a mass cover of all of

3 the known sites?

4 A. Yes, we did. The way we did this was to plan this beforehand

5 using about 40 teams from the Regional Centres. We sent the teams to all

6 the locations which were declared by the MUP as patrols, patrol bases, and

7 we also sent additional teams to areas where we knew that the MUP had

8 operated from before. And in the process, we also identified a number of

9 other areas that we hadn't previously noted where the MUP were actually

10 operating.

11 Q. I see. And I don't know if you've actually said this: You said

12 there was sort of a spot check. I take it that means you gave no notice.

13 A. No. We wanted to -- there was no notice given as we wanted to see

14 exactly what on any one day was deployed, because our feeling was that

15 movement was very, very restricted throughout Kosovo.

16 Q. Do you know how many sites that your teams visited that day?

17 A. Yes; up to 40.

18 Q. And what were the results of that inspection, to the best of your

19 knowledge?

20 A. Well, the MUP were allowed 29 points at any one time which they

21 could actually be in, but on this occasion there were almost 40 points

22 where the MUP were actually located, therefore contravening the agreement

23 they had with Burns.

24 Q. Did you report those findings to anyone?

25 A. Yes. A report was written. A detailed report was compiled from

Page 3147

1 the older regional teams and passed to the OSCE chief of operations,

2 General DZ.

3 Q. I see. Now, you've just referred to the fact that they had too

4 many MUP units as a breach of the Sean Burns agreement. Were there any

5 other breaches of the agreement that your inspection teams noted? And

6 what did they -- what were they, if any?

7 A. Well, as time went along, we certainly noticed that activities

8 were increasing and the deployment of troops outside barracks, which was a

9 clear breach of the agreement, had taken place. This was around

10 Christmas, when the Serbs deployed military units just to the south-east

11 of Podujevo in large numbers; tanks and self-propelled artillery and

12 mortar. That was just one of the examples of how -- what they were doing.

13 Later on, they were bringing in additional equipment. New types

14 of tanks were coming in, much more advanced tanks than the ones which were

15 presently in Kosovo, based on the T72, I believe the M84 type of tank came

16 in.

17 They seemed to stop the conscripts going back after the end of --

18 at the end of completion of the conscript's service, thereby extending,

19 increasing the number of troops in Kosovo.

20 There were regular convoys coming in now from along the main

21 supply route which is a road that went from Nis past Podujevo into

22 Pristina, and these were convoys of ammunition, equipment, people.

23 And then later, of course, we had problems at the border.

24 Q. Now, I just want to question for clarification before I ask you to

25 comment on your last recitation of breaches. The first incident you

Page 3148

1 referred to referred to the MUP, which is the police; is that correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And that was they had more units than they were permitted by the

4 agreement, and that is the police arm of the Serbian forces?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. The second -- the second incident you referred to, I believe you

7 use military forces and you referred to tanks and matters like that. Was

8 that the MUP again or was that now the VJ or what? Can you help us with

9 that?

10 A. Yes. Excuse me. The -- sorry. The MUP were the police units.

11 My second reference to the tanks deploying and supplies arriving mainly

12 applies to the VJ, the Yugoslav army. However, the MUP were also

13 increasing their forces with the quality and type of equipment they were

14 bringing in.

15 Q. To your knowledge, did the MUP have access to tanks and things

16 like that or was that more the domain of the military?

17 A. The MUP did not have access to very heavy equipment, so they did

18 not have access to -- they didn't have their own T55s or M84s or heavy

19 artillery, but they did have access to smaller wheeled armoured personnel

20 carriers and sort of medium gunnery equipment as well as mortars.

21 Q. Now, Witness, you've already referred to the agreement that was --

22 went in as tab 4, as well as tab 3. You then recited to us a number of

23 matters that you deemed were breaches, and I think you recited those for

24 us. Would you also look, please, at Exhibit 94, tab 52 in these

25 proceedings.

Page 3149












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 3150

1 A. Thank you.

2 Q. Before it's placed on the ELMO, you can tell us whether, first of

3 all, you recognise this document.

4 A. I do.

5 MR. RYNEVELD: Might it be placed on the ELMO.

6 Q. It refers to the 26th of February, 1999. Can you tell us what

7 this document describes and how it is that you know about it?

8 A. Certainly. Every single day the OR KVM units throughout Kosovo

9 would compile a report on the previous 24 hours. These reports were then

10 passed to our headquarters in Pristina where they were then, if you like,

11 fused into one document which would cover the sort of main activities

12 which had taken place in Kosovo in that period. And therefore, this is a

13 document I would see every single day on first coming in to work.

14 Q. This is but one of a daily report that would pass your desk; is

15 that correct?

16 A. It certainly is.

17 Q. And would you at times have also been the source of the material

18 contained in those reports?

19 A. Yes, I would.

20 Q. Looking at Exhibit 94, tab 52, would you describe for us, if you

21 would, please, what kinds of matters are covered in this particular daily

22 report.

23 A. Certainly. As you can see, first of all, the sort of a summary

24 showing the developments, and then any major issues before the security

25 situation and any other major issues which have taken place, as well as a

Page 3151

1 state of the number of people within the mission on any particular day.

2 Q. And then it seems to divide the security situation into various

3 districts; is that correct?

4 A. Yes, that's correct.

5 Q. Their Honours have a copy, I believe, so perhaps you could just

6 tell us, roughly, what some of the notations were with respect to this

7 particular date.

8 A. All right. Well, something of particular interest is that, for

9 example, the Mitrovica district reported that at 1330 hours, the VJ

10 declared Bukos an area of a permanent garrison, which, to us, was

11 extremely significant.

12 Q. The next line after that. Were you given access?

13 A. No. As I said, it was generally denied, and the only way we could

14 gain access was if the patrols, the teams on the ground came back to

15 myself, I would then contact the -- somebody from the Cooperation

16 Commission. If it was army, I would contact Colonel Kotur or General

17 Loncar. If it was the MUP, I would contact Colonel Mijatovic and try and

18 agree access for the -- for our units on the ground. Usually the access

19 was denied.

20 Q. Sir, is the expression "winter exercises" in relation to your

21 duties in Kosovo a term that is known to you?

22 A. Yes. I have -- I came across this term.

23 Q. In what context?

24 A. Certainly when -- just before Christmas when we discovered -- it

25 was announced to us just after we started that the VJ were deploying units

Page 3152

1 to the Podujevo area. When I questioned this and pointed out it was a

2 breach of the agreement, I was then told: "It's not a problem. We need

3 to exercise. The agreement allows for exercises and therefore we are

4 exercising our troops and we are allowed to exercise our troops on our

5 training areas." When I pursued this further and asked for a

6 clarification of what a training area was or a permanent garrison was, I

7 was informed that the training area that the Serbian forces used in Kosovo

8 was in fact the area of Kosovo.

9 Q. And what did that interpretation do, from your perspective, to the

10 terms of the agreement?

11 A. Well, it was a total breach of the agreement.

12 Q. Thank you. Moving on to paragraph 6, if I may, Your Honours.

13 Now, apart from those earlier three VJ sites that you mentioned

14 that were -- that were inspected with prior notice, can you give a general

15 description of the scope of your mission and how successful it was in

16 terms of verifying adherence to the agreements?

17 A. Well, I would say that in -- if we tried to follow the agreement,

18 it was totally unsuccessful. It was a disastrous attempt at verification

19 by the sort of methods which we thought we had been allowed to carry out

20 in accordance with the agreement, and that's why we then had to think of

21 other ways of trying to see what was going on and trying to keep a record

22 of what was going on within Kosovo.

23 Q. And what tactics, if any, if I can use that phrase, did you then

24 adopt in an attempt to find a way to successfully monitor the situation?

25 A. Well, the only thing we could do was to flood the ground with as

Page 3153

1 many verifiers as possible, to have not only our bases within the main

2 sort of five regional locations headquarters, but we actually tried to get

3 as many people out, living in villages, in towns throughout Kosovo who

4 would actually report. They would note the movement of troops, they

5 would note the movement of the MUP, they would note the movement of the

6 vehicles and any aircraft that the Serbians were using. As well as we

7 would actually aggressively, if you like, follow, pursue any convoys or

8 any units that left their barracks or left their winter exercise

9 locations.

10 Q. So you'd sort of wait outside the barracks and, as they moved, you

11 would follow; is that what you're saying?

12 A. Exactly. It was a difficult task because in those sort of -- in

13 trying to carry this task out, we would be harassed to a great extent. We

14 had patrols who were threatened at gunpoint. We had patrols who were

15 deliberately blocked by armoured vehicles. We had two occasions, at

16 least, where our verifiers were beaten up.

17 Q. Part of this process that you've just described, this new tactic,

18 as it were, the movement of equipment, for example, how would you be able

19 to identify whether equipment from one place ended up in another place?

20 Is there some method of recording?

21 A. Yes. Fortunately, virtually every military organisation I know

22 has a system of putting numbers on their -- all their vehicles, all their

23 tanks. So it's very easy to see if a vehicle has moved from one location

24 to another location by just noting the number on -- painted on the side of

25 it.

Page 3154

1 Q. Now, having conducted this new tactic, how long a period of time

2 would you say you were involved in that method of attempted verification?

3 How long did that go on?

4 A. I would say that once we were -- we knew that we couldn't carry

5 out what we considered to be our sort of right of inspection, we carried

6 on this method virtually until the end.

7 Q. The end being near the 23rd of March, 1999?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. And what degree of success did you have with this new process?

10 A. We, I believe, were quite successful, as can be judged by the

11 amount of time that the VJ and the MUP would try to prevent us from

12 carrying this out, although the VJ and the MUP became much more aggressive

13 as we approached the 23rd of March.

14 Q. Did you come to any conclusions based on these records you kept

15 about troop movements, vehicle movements, et cetera, et cetera, in regard

16 to whether or not there was a breach of the agreements?

17 A. Yes, we did. The conclusion we drew is that they had virtually

18 more than doubled the size of the garrison in Kosovo as well as having

19 brought in a great many new pieces of equipment and equipment which was of

20 a much higher quality and greater lethality.

21 Q. Were those all matters covered by the agreement? Were those all

22 no-nos so to speak?

23 A. Yes, every one of those was a breach of the agreement.

24 Q. I'm going to ask you, sir, while you were engaged in your official

25 observer capacity, can you give us some specific instances of Serb forces

Page 3155

1 involving aggressive conduct by Serb forces?

2 A. Yes, I certainly can. One of the very first instances of this I

3 came across was the doctor's house just west of Podujevo in an area called

4 Lapastica where -- this was a doctor's house. It was a medical station

5 where the KLA, wounded KLA, were being treated. And it was shut up. The

6 doctor was murdered. The entire area looked as if it had been hit by a

7 nuclear bomb. A few days after the incident, we searched the area and we

8 also found the body of an 80-year-old man who had been shot, unarmed, in

9 part of the surrounding buildings.

10 Q. Just so that we can orient ourselves in terms of time, are you

11 able to give us an indication of when you made this inspection?

12 A. This was in December 1998.

13 Q. All right. And you say this is a doctor's house near Podujevo.

14 All right. And did you take any photographs or see any photographs of

15 this 80-year-old man in situ, as it were?

16 A. Yes. I had the opportunity to, and I thought it was important

17 that I should photograph the scene.

18 Q. You personally photographed the scene?

19 A. I -- yes. I took a number of photographs.

20 Q. I'm going to show you now a photograph with a number K021-8721.

21 MR. RYNEVELD: Mr. Usher, could you show a copy of that to the

22 usher and hand copies off to the other parties.

23 Q. Is that the photograph you took, sir?

24 A. It certainly is.

25 Q. And where was this individual found, the body of this individual

Page 3156

1 found in relation to the house?

2 A. The -- I would say about 30 or 40 metres from the house, in a

3 compound next to some stables where the man had obviously run away to

4 hide.

5 Q. And you said, I believe, in your evidence that he was unarmed. At

6 least, you found him to be unarmed?

7 A. The only thing you might see lying next to his body is an axe.

8 Q. Now, could you tell from what you saw about the doctor's house and

9 the immediate surrounding area how this -- how this death came about or

10 how the damage to the house came about?

11 JUDGE MAY: Exhibit number.

12 THE REGISTRAR: The photo will be Exhibit 96.

13 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honour.

14 THE WITNESS: I had a chance to speak to the -- the unit

15 overlooking the -- the Serbian unit overlooking this doctor's house, and

16 they informed me that they -- they confirmed that they had attacked this

17 house because it was a building that was being used for the treatment of

18 wounded, and they regarded this as a legitimate target and, therefore,

19 they had attacked it in force, using -- they had a T55 tank. They had a

20 weapon called the Praga which is a 30-millimetre heavy machine-gun usually

21 used in the anti-aircraft role, as well as mortars and small-arms fire,

22 but the target was fairly -- extremely well destroyed. Everything was

23 shot up. The entire building was shot up, the room had been trashed,

24 medical supplies had been destroyed. There were several other bodies not

25 far away.

Page 3157

1 Q. I believe you also indicated that the doctor himself had been

2 shot?

3 A. The doctor had been shot as well, yes.

4 Q. Was it clear to you from what you could see upon your arrival that

5 this in fact had been a medical facility?

6 A. It was very clear. In the first place, it was known as the

7 doctor's house, and secondly, there were medical supplies strewn all over

8 the place. Several rooms and around the outside of the house as well, the

9 -- there were syringes, there were bandages, there were various drugs,

10 saline solutions; and all this had been scattered around and destroyed.

11 Q. The injury to the 80-year-old man, now you've taken the

12 photograph, could you determine how it was that he came to his tragic end?

13 Could this have been as a result of shelling or mortar rounds or -- are

14 you able to tell us a conclusion that you may have come to?

15 A. Yes. Because of the weather conditions which, as you saw from the

16 photograph, there was snow on the ground and had been for some time, since

17 November, and the fact that he had two bullet wounds - one in his head,

18 one in his chest - and the fact there was no blood except where he was

19 lying, it would seem to indicate that he had actually been shot where he

20 was lying.

21 Q. When did you speak to the Serbian units who admitted

22 responsibility for this incident?

23 A. I had been visiting this military location for some time, and in

24 fact, I became very familiar with Podujevo and this particular location

25 which we referred to as Tank Hill, and probably on -- I would speak to

Page 3158

1 them almost every single day. They got to know me quite well. And the

2 day that we actually went down the hill to look at this building, before

3 we went down, they told me what they had done and why they had done it.

4 Q. So you knew before you went down what had happened because they

5 told you what they did?

6 A. Yes. And I also knew that the body of the old man was missing,

7 because some of the relatives had complained that they hadn't seen him for

8 some time and they were wondering whether he was still somewhere within

9 the complex.

10 Q. If I understand your evidence correctly - and please expand on

11 this if I have it incorrectly - you were told that they regarded this as a

12 legitimate military target; is that correct?

13 A. Yes. They said that because the KLA were being treated there, it

14 was a totally legitimate target.

15 Q. What was your view, and did you communicate that to them?

16 A. Myself and a colleague did in fact say that they should -- that

17 they must have been aware that it was a medical facility, to which they

18 replied that it was also a facility which treated terrorists and harboured

19 terrorists.

20 Q. From your understanding as a military man, sir, is that a

21 legitimate military target?

22 A. If the KLA had actually been using the house as a point from which

23 to attack or use as a fire base, then I suppose you'd have to regard it as

24 a legitimate fire target. But this was only ever used as a medical

25 facility. It was known throughout the area as the doctor's house. He was

Page 3159

1 the local doctor for that whole area.

2 Q. Thank you. That's one incident, sir. I'm going to perhaps focus

3 your attention: Were you familiar with an incident concerning villages

4 near Jablanica and Decani, and if so, can you tell us about that?

5 A. Yes, certainly. It's another area I know quite well, and around

6 the 10th of January, 1999, there was a certain amount of activity in the

7 area because of locations and movements of both the MUP, the VJ, and the

8 KLA. And it was also an area, especially Jablanica, where one of the top

9 KLA commanders had his headquarters.

10 I was down there on the 10th, carrying out various negotiations,

11 and shortly after my departure from this area, the Serb forces launched a

12 massive attack, using heavy artillery, against the villages from the

13 Decani area towards Jablanica, and they continued to shell the villages in

14 that area for two days.

15 Q. When you say, "shell the villages," they weren't shelling a

16 particular headquarters, or were they sort of mass shelling the village

17 itself?

18 A. It would be very difficult for them to know the exact location of

19 the headquarters of Mr. Ramush because it was an area that Serbs had

20 actually no access to. So that would have been an impossibility. They

21 were generally shelling the area and the villages and locations around

22 Jablanica.

23 Q. Did you notice during part of your verification duties, shelling

24 of another area?

25 A. Yes. There were at least two other occasions when I -- maybe

Page 3160

1 more, where I sort of watched the shelling. There was the shelling of an

2 area south of Podujevo. This was in March, where the tanks and artillery

3 were lined up along the main road between Podujevo and Pristina, and they

4 were just shelling the hillside. They were obviously shelling some

5 positions, but they were also shelling villages.

6 And on another occasion, near -- south of Mitrovica, one foggy day

7 they were shelling, firing at tanks, at targets somewhere to the south of

8 Vucitrn. As it was a foggy day, I asked the VJ what they were firing at,

9 and they said that they were just doing target practice as part of their

10 training, and they were firing against deserted villages. And I said,

11 "Well, how do you know that they are deserted villages because you can't

12 see them in the fog?" And he said, "Well, because, first of all, we

13 chucked the people out, and therefore we know they're empty villages."

14 Q. These incidents that you've referred to, how did you view them in

15 your official capacity in terms of whether or not those were legitimate

16 military actions or matters that you needed to report as a breach?

17 A. I was happy that one of the activities, the shelling of the trench

18 lines and bunkers to the west of the main road south of Podujevo was

19 legitimate, because they were KLA positions. But other instances were

20 definitely, in my view, illegal as they were against civilian targets.

21 They were indiscriminate, and we reported this to DZ in Pristina.

22 Q. Did you notice any incidents of looting of civilian homes?

23 A. Yes. I certainly on several occasions personally saw, at a

24 distance because we weren't allowed any closer, Serbs walking out or

25 military walking out with refrigerators, TVs, other goods, as well as on

Page 3161












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 3162

1 one occasion, in the Gornja Lapastica area, I actually went into a house

2 that had been looted previously by the Serbs and there was nothing left in

3 there of value.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Colonel, just to return to what you said earlier,

5 that you are satisfied that certain positions were KLA positions, how did

6 you satisfy yourself as to that?

7 THE WITNESS: Sir, I was in a very good position - in an open area

8 with binoculars, with two of my colleagues - and we were able to observe

9 -- we were actually in between -- halfway between where the guns were

10 firing and where the positions were. So the actual rounds were flying

11 over my head. And I was able to see quite clearly the KLA positions and

12 the KLA fighters in those positions.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.


15 Q. Sir, I'd like you to turn next, if I may, to -- you've mentioned a

16 number of times your dealings with the Serbian Commission on Cooperation;

17 is that correct? Perhaps you could give us a very brief idea at this

18 point in terms of the make-up of that committee -- that commission, its

19 mandate, who did what, and what role you played with them.

20 A. As far as we understood and what we were told was that the Serbian

21 Commission of Cooperation with the OSCE was the official Serbian body that

22 the OSCE did all its business with and through.

23 Q. Yes.

24 A. The commission was headed up by a retired general, Dusan Loncar,

25 and his second-in-command or his military person on this committee was a

Page 3163

1 Colonel Kotur, Milan Kotur. He also occasionally would have on this

2 committee a VJ representative, Colonel Mijatovic, who was probably the

3 most -- second-most senior MUP person after General Lukic in Kosovo.

4 Q. Was there any -- sorry.

5 A. There were also at times a member of the Ministry of Foreign

6 Affairs from Belgrade on the commission, a Mr. Babic.

7 Q. How often -- I'm sorry, that's the Serbian representatives.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. The OSCE would meet with them. Who, on a regular basis, would

10 meet with these individuals, from the OSCE or KVM?

11 A. The senior representative would have been General DZ -- DZ,

12 accompanied by myself as the liaison, Serbian liaison officer for the

13 OSCE, with the OSCE to the commission, and usually with one or two

14 interpreters, a Ms. Irina Babic or Mr. Dejan Trga. However, what -- the

15 way we began to work was, because these meetings were on a daily basis,

16 every day at 10.00, and the meetings could go on for as long as five hours

17 at a time, this was not seen as a good use of DZ's time, and therefore he

18 delegated to me that I should attend all the meetings, and this is what I

19 did.

20 Q. During the course of these daily meetings, who appeared to have

21 the authority on behalf of the Serb leaders of this commission?

22 A. Certainly initially I would say that General Loncar started off

23 very confident and able to answer most of our questions. But as time went

24 along, we noticed that he had to refer more and more often back to

25 Belgrade for guidance and solutions.

Page 3164

1 Q. And when you say "back to Belgrade," did you then know or later

2 discover who, if anyone, he was consulting with in Belgrade in order to

3 deal with the issues that were raised at the meetings?

4 A. Yes, we did. We discovered this probably for the first time on

5 the 27th of December when there was a serious breach of the agreement by

6 the VJ. And there was a possibility of a very serious conflict breaking

7 out between the KLA and the Serbian security forces.

8 Q. You told us when you discovered it. Can you tell us what you

9 discovered?

10 A. What we discovered in this incident was that the -- there was a

11 Serbian farmer who had been taken prisoner by the KLA. There had been an

12 attempt by the MUP to get him out, and it ended up with the MUP patrol

13 having to withdraw because of the amount of KLA fire that was coming from

14 that area. I was then informed at this meeting, at the end of this

15 morning meeting, that the decision had been taken to send in a very large

16 force against this position, against the KLA in this area, and to extract

17 this man by force.

18 I'd said that it was crazy because in the -- in the process of

19 getting one man out, they would lose a great deal of people and so would

20 the KLA, resulting in huge loss of life, especially as I knew what the KLA

21 had actually prepared for the Serbians. They had actually -- at that

22 time, they possibly had between 1.000 and 2.000 fighters not far from this

23 village. They had moved equipment, truckloads -- tractor loads of

24 ammunition in preparation for the Serbs. The Serbs also had a large

25 force. So I suspected that if this action took place, there would be a

Page 3165

1 huge loss of life. Therefore, I volunteered, prior to any activity, to go

2 in and attempt to try to get this farmer released by the KLA to prevent

3 any further sort of fighting.

4 Q. How was that proposal by you met?

5 A. When I gave this proposal to General Loncar, he said he was unable

6 to stop the activity and to affect the activity, however, he would have to

7 refer to Belgrade and -- for a ruling.

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. So he then left the room, went next door. I could hear him on the

10 telephone. I mentioned to Colonel Kotur, you know, "Who is he ringing?"

11 And he indicated that it was probably Mr. Sainovic he was ringing in

12 Belgrade. I later -- the following day, when the whole activity was over,

13 I came back and sort of mentioned this again to him about who he'd called,

14 and I mentioned Mr. Sainovic's name. And he said, "No. It was even

15 higher. You have no idea how high level General Loncar spoke to in

16 Belgrade."

17 Q. To your knowledge, who, if anyone, was even higher than Sainovic

18 at that place?

19 A. Well, I don't know anyone any higher than Mr. Milosevic.

20 Q. Did you at any time have discussions with General Loncar about, on

21 his trips back and forth to Belgrade, who -- the kinds of people he would

22 be meeting with and did he name any names?

23 A. General Loncar began to visit Belgrade more and more often, and

24 more and more often he wouldn't be present at the -- at our meetings in

25 the mornings, and he began -- indications I had by talking to him

Page 3166

1 informally and to Colonel Kotur was that he was having high-level meetings

2 in Belgrade, usually with Mr. Sainovic.

3 Q. Now, returning to this particular incident, the phone call is

4 made, the speculation is that it's Sainovic. You later find out it was

5 someone higher than Sainovic who you then understood to be Mr. Milosevic;

6 is that correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Now, as a result of that telephone communication, was there an

9 answer given to you about your offer to negotiate to attempt to prevent

10 this massive loss of life?

11 A. Yes. There was. There was an immediate -- following the

12 telephone conversation, I was given an immediate answer that I could

13 proceed, together with the Red Cross, in trying to extricate the Serb, and

14 the Serbian forces were pulled back to their start line, to their starting

15 locations, and we were given access, freedom to move across sort of the

16 line, if you like, to negotiate with the KLA and to -- by the -- sort of

17 by the time it got dark, we had just managed to get the Serb out and there

18 was no activity. There was no action. So we prevented this conflict that

19 day.

20 Q. How -- I'm sorry, how did you manage to resolve the conflict?

21 A. Well, because we handed the Serb -- we took him from the KLA and

22 delivered him to the -- to the police station in Podujevo, to the police.

23 Therefore, that was immediately -- the Serbs were immediately informed in

24 Pristina that the man was out and, therefore, they kept their word and

25 they didn't attack that day.

Page 3167

1 Q. So as a result of your intervention at that particular point,

2 there was no armed conflict between the two sides.

3 A. Right.

4 Q. Now, I understand, sir, that humility may prevent you from

5 volunteering this, but did you receive any commendation for your efforts

6 in this instance?

7 A. Yes. I was awarded a British Gallantry Award.

8 Q. Now, sir, I'd like to move on to January 6th of 1999. Were you

9 present at a meeting that occurred that particular day?

10 A. Yes. Yes. Uh-huh.

11 Q. Can you tell us who you may recall, if you have recall of this,

12 who may have been present?

13 A. I believe this was the meeting with Mr. Sainovic.

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. This was a meeting that Ambassador Keller, one of the deputies of

16 the OSCE mission in Pristina, was heading, and I was there as the -- again

17 as the Serbian representative, and the other side was headed up by Mr.

18 Sainovic, and Mr. Andjelkovic was also there.

19 Q. Do you recall whether General Loncar may have been there?

20 A. I think he probably was. I can't swear I remember now.

21 Q. Would you happen to recall if Brigadier General Maisonneuve was

22 there?

23 A. Yes, General Maisonneuve definitely was there.

24 Q. And I understand, sir, that this particular meeting on the 6th of

25 January was held at the request of the OSCE/KVM because of what you

Page 3168

1 collectively deemed to be a deteriorating situation as you've outlined to

2 us. Do you remember what, if anything, occurred at that meeting after it

3 started?

4 A. Yes. There were a number of issues that we discussed and points

5 we made to Mr. Sainovic, as he also made points to us. Mr. Sainovic

6 accused the OSCE, and in particular the Americans and the Germans, of

7 actively supporting and helping the KLA, which we obviously rebuffed.

8 We -- we made a number of points. We spoke about the continued

9 difficulty we were having in the Serbs allowing us to keep -- to have a

10 medical evacuation helicopter, our own helicopter, which was an unmarked

11 civilian helicopter as opposed to the ones that we were being offered by

12 the Serbs, which was a military helicopter and military markings at the

13 time and of a type that would immediately have the KLA firing at it, which

14 wouldn't have been good for medical evacuation. There was a problem of

15 fuel delivery to the OSCE. Occasionally we had difficulty in obtaining

16 diesel for our vehicles because petrol stations refused to sell it to us.

17 And we also spoke about the prisoners, the KLA prisoners who were

18 in a gaol somewhere in Serbia, that we wished to visit and to negotiate

19 their release.

20 Q. During the course of this meeting and the topics that were

21 discussed and Sainovic's participation in this meeting, did you personally

22 form any opinion with respect to the authority that Sainovic may have had

23 on behalf of the Serbian government? The Federal Government, sorry.

24 A. Mr. Sainovic came across as an extremely confident and competent

25 Minister who we had no doubt represented the Federal Government. He was

Page 3169

1 able, on his own, to make a decision, far-reaching decisions. So for

2 example, he allowed us instantly to visit the prison in Nis. And the

3 following day, I had my very first visit with the prisoners in Nis.

4 He was able to give us answers immediately on the helicopter, the

5 fuel, border access. And we also discussed the funeral arrangements for

6 Racak, and he was able to give us absolutely definite answers which were

7 not maybes, but they were, Yes, this will happen. So we had no doubt at

8 all that he had the support of Belgrade when he made these answers, gave

9 these answers to us.

10 Q. Now, were there, during the course of time, some other matters

11 that you discussed with General Loncar which were ultimately referred to

12 Sainovic? For example, you mentioned the permission to visit the 11

13 prisoners, the KLA prisoners, in Nis. Were there some other examples

14 where matters had to go from Loncar to Sainovic?

15 A. I'm sure there were, but my mind's gone blank. I'm sorry.

16 Q. All right. For example, did you ever make any requests about

17 information about troop movements?

18 A. I'm sorry. Yes, of course. Yes. One of the -- part of the

19 agreement did actually state that any troop movements would be notified to

20 us. And similarly, we had an agreement that every day we gave our sort of

21 daily records to the Commission of Cooperation, and this is in fact one of

22 the topics that was discussed with Mr. Sainovic on this particular

23 occasion. Because although we'd asked Loncar repeatedly for these

24 documents to be given to us, we never actually received any troop movement

25 details. For example, we would often find out or be told in the morning

Page 3170

1 meeting that two hours ago, at the start of this meeting, a troop movement

2 had actually already commenced. When asked why, they wouldn't inform us.

3 They said well, because they didn't trust us, that if they passed

4 information to us, we'd pass the information to the KLA and the KLA would

5 then attack this convoy. So they felt no respect and no trust for us

6 whatsoever.

7 Q. While we're on that point and before I move to another example,

8 maybe you could clarify to the Court something I understand from your

9 answer, and that is you would have these daily meetings with them and you

10 would give them daily reports about things that you saw about their own

11 troops, I take it. Similarly, would you have also had negotiations or

12 discussions with members of the KLA from time to time?

13 A. Yes. I certainly would pass on all our requests for information

14 and also any protests that we had on a daily basis. So I would protest

15 any violations. I would protest any sort of activities which were out of

16 proportion to the amount of force that -- and violence that they were

17 using.

18 I personally, from about the end of December, had no more contact

19 with the leadership of the KLA. I felt that my position as the liaison

20 officer with the Serbs would have been compromised if I had been regularly

21 meeting with the various KLA commanders. So another one of my colleagues,

22 David Wilson, his job was to -- he was the KLA -- liaison officer to the

23 KLA, and we would meet several times a day or in the evenings or somewhere

24 out on the ground if there was an incident taking place, and we would sort

25 of exchange information. Therefore, I was very aware of what the KLA were

Page 3171

1 doing but I wasn't personally talking to the KLA.

2 Q. The follow-up to that question is: Were you or was your

3 colleague, to your knowledge, passing information from one side to the

4 other in terms of what the other side was doing?

5 A. We were regularly accused of this by the Serbian Cooperation

6 Commission, but I can very honestly under oath say that at no time to my

7 knowledge did any of my colleagues or myself communicate any equipment to

8 the advantage of the other side. It would have been unethical and broken

9 the agreement. It would have compromised our position as verifiers.

10 Q. Another example, sir. I'm not saying a final example, a final one

11 I'm going to ask you about: Racak funeral arrangements, was that another

12 issue that may have been referred by Loncar to a higher authority?

13 A. Yes. I mean, this was obviously one of the main occurrences in

14 Kosovo and the funeral itself was going to attract a huge amount of public

15 and international interest, and therefore, we spoke over several weeks

16 while the bodies were being forensically examined and the examinations and

17 investigations were going on. There was quite a long delay between the

18 massacre and the funeral itself, so we had a lot of time to discuss this,

19 and we were continually asking for a dignified, quiet funeral.

20 Loncar was fairly adamant, certainly in my discussions with Loncar

21 and Kotur. We kept being told repeatedly that if any KLA were seen at the

22 funeral, for example, the VJ and the MUP, especially the MUP forces, would

23 go in and sort it out. And during our discussions, this meant that if any

24 terrorists were seen down there during the funeral, they would actually

25 open fire and, you know, try -- upper hand, trying to kill the terrorists.

Page 3172

1 During these five weeks, we did in fact manage to persuade them that there

2 were other, better ways of dealing with funerals and these types of events

3 based on the UK experience of Northern Ireland and dealing with similar

4 types of events, and in fact, eventually as a result of our discussions

5 and as a result of discussing it with Mr. Sainovic, we were able to sort

6 of implement this more peaceful way of dealing with the funeral. So that

7 was one of our successes.

8 Q. That is a decisions that Sainovic made. You're nodding

9 your head, meaning yes?

10 A. Yes.

11 MR. RYNEVELD: Your Honours, with this 9.00 schedule, I'm not sure

12 when the break is.

13 JUDGE MAY: Half past.

14 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you. I'll continue with the examination.

15 Q. Now, sir, are you familiar with General Brankovic?

16 A. Yes, I am.

17 Q. And how it is that you came to know him?

18 A. What happened was that as the -- the activity of the Serbian

19 security forces was increasing and growing, so we felt that General Loncar

20 and his commission were becoming -- having to refer more and more often

21 back to Belgrade. And also, you know, in his frequent absences, we were

22 not surprised to be informed one day that there was going to be a brand

23 new commission of new experts coming out who would be able to deal with

24 this more directly. And in fact, my very first meeting with General

25 Brankovic, he did inform me that he was not just there to represent the --

Page 3173












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 3174

1 the VJ and the military but he was actually a direct representative of the

2 Belgrade government.

3 Q. And by "Belgrade government," you're talking about the Federal

4 Government --

5 A. Federal Government, yes.

6 Q. -- headed by the accused.

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. And what would you -- so was Loncar still there at that time? Did

9 he replace him or were there -- were they there together, or -- tell us

10 about that.

11 A. No. What had happened is that at the few meetings I had with

12 General Brankovic, which were fairly acrimonious because of the way he

13 tried to treat us and -- he was -- basically, he became very difficult.

14 He became a difficult man to speak to. He insisted on all topics that

15 were to be discussed being submitted 24 hours in advantage. He wouldn't

16 take any sort of current questions without notification. Meetings had to

17 start exactly when he insisted, making our -- this would have made our

18 work impossible because sometimes we'd have up to two or three meetings a

19 day during the escalation of events and there was no possibility of

20 notifying him, giving him this type of notification. So Brankovic was

21 there for a few times, difficulty to see, these meetings no longer

22 happened on a daily basis.

23 Loncar had disappeared. Kotur had told me that he had had enough

24 of this politicking and he had asked to go back to his military unit, and

25 so he was also out of the commission.

Page 3175

1 Q. Are you able to give us a rough time frame of when this transition

2 took place? Are we talking December 1998, or January or February?

3 A. This was March.

4 Q. March 1999?

5 A. 1999.

6 Q. Thank you. Okay. And who were some of the -- okay. So we've got

7 Loncar disappearing, Kotur returning -- Kotur returning to his unit and

8 he's no longer in the commission.

9 A. No.

10 Q. Who are some of the other Serbian staff? Are you able to remember

11 or --

12 A. I'd have to refer to my notes which I've left downstairs, but --

13 Q. All right. Well, perhaps --

14 A. -- there were at least two other colonels who came in but

15 Mijatovic still remained as part of the commission.

16 Q. All right. And since you mentioned Mijatovic, what dealings would

17 you have with Mijatovic, under what circumstances?

18 A. Colonel Mijatovic, we took to be the second in command of the MUP

19 Kosovo, and he would usually come along to the meetings on an infrequent

20 basis, usually to inform us that one of his patrols or his policemen had

21 been attacked or killed or wounded, and -- excuse me. And we would then

22 be sort of subject to a good half hour, 40 minutes of abuse about our

23 inefficiency in preventing these killings and only wishing to verify the

24 one side and not verify what was happening to the Serbian side, which was

25 totally untrue.

Page 3176

1 Q. I see. Do you recall the name of the colonel who replaced

2 Colonel Kotur?

3 A. I'm not sure if it was Petric or Petrovic.

4 Q. And if it was Petrovic, he would have replaced Kotur as the VJ

5 liaison officer?

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. And then we have Mijatovic as the MUP man basically?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And who is Lukic, Sreten Lukic?

10 A. General Lukic was the chief of the MUP in Pristina, in Kosovo.

11 Q. Right. Do you know where Mijatovic and Lukic may have operated

12 from, their headquarters or where they were located?

13 A. Yes. I -- even though Colonel Mijatovic rarely came to the

14 commission for the meetings, I would -- there were occasions when I would

15 go to his headquarters to have meetings in his office. So both Lukic and

16 Mijatovic worked in the sort of operational part of the MUP headquarters

17 which was based behind -- between the stadium and the main administrative

18 part of the MUP headquarters, not far from the OSCE headquarters, in the

19 centre of town.

20 Q. A little later in your evidence I may ask you actually to look at

21 some maps and describe some things for us. And now, this -- this

22 location, do you know whether helicopters had access to that location?

23 A. Yes. The next to the operational headquarters was the sports

24 stadium, and there were regular helicopters arriving and landing in this

25 airfield. For example, when Mr. Sainovic flew in, he would often land in

Page 3177

1 the stadium with the helicopter.

2 Q. And just so -- I may have not have -- this is in Pristina, I take

3 it?

4 A. It's right in the centre of Pristina.

5 Q. Now, sir, in the time remaining before the break, you've talked to

6 us about winter operations or winter exercises, and you've talked to us

7 about the agreement that you were verifying or observing. Can you give us

8 a list of things that you witnessed which gave you some indications of

9 perhaps planned operations for the springtime?

10 A. Yes, there were a number of indicators which not only showed us

11 that there was something being prepared but also which then prevented us

12 from operating and working to our mandate. So as you say, the first thing

13 was the deployment of troops outside the barracks into their winter

14 exercise areas; the fact that the conscripts were not being allowed to go

15 home, they were being kept on for an extra term, thereby increasing their

16 numbers; the fact that these ammunition columns were coming in; the fact

17 that we saw trains arriving with tanks at Mitrovica and being driven to

18 locations around Kosovo.

19 Q. I believe you mentioned earlier in your evidence about the

20 improved material. I think you said certain kind of tanks and things like

21 that were of a better quality. What significance did you place on it?

22 A. Well, it wasn't just the fact that new equipment was coming in of

23 a better quality and greater performance and lethality but we also noticed

24 that there were a greater number of MUP coming in and a type of MUP which

25 we had not seen before. The normal policeman in town is dressed almost

Page 3178

1 like your average policeman. The MUP which operated out in the field wore

2 a form of combat kit, not very modern -- with not very modern equipment

3 being carried, or modern helmets. Whereas suddenly the MUP who were

4 appearing in Kosovo, these were people wearing the very latest kevlar

5 helmets, body armour, a new type of combat clothing which we hadn't seen

6 before, carrying weapons which were of a quite different sort, short

7 barreled -- shorter-barreled weapons, automatic weapons of MP5 Scorpion

8 type. These were qualitative improvements and changes. And also these

9 troops were -- it was very obvious from the way they acted and carried out

10 operations that we saw, these were a qualitative jump, increase in the way

11 they performed, they looked, and what they did, and their general

12 aggressive behaviour.

13 Q. And you were able to note that when? When did this --

14 A. This was all happening in March.

15 Q. Now, in addition to better equipped MUP units, or as you've

16 described these, you've also referred to the fact that there were people

17 being replaced on this commission. Did that factor into your indications

18 as well, the fact that you had Loncar and Kotur leaving and new people

19 coming in?

20 A. Yes. When you factor in the increase in number of troops, the

21 equipment, the extension of the border area, which I should have

22 mentioned, and the fact that what had become a reasonably good working

23 relationship with the Loncar commission, the commission had now been

24 replaced by an aggressive organisation which made our work virtually

25 impossible and wouldn't really listen to reason. These were all

Page 3179

1 indicators that things were changing and drastically changing in Kosovo.

2 Q. You also mentioned Exhibit 52, where there was a declaration of

3 Bukos as a permanent garrison. You recall that?

4 A. Uh-huh.

5 Q. I'm sorry, that was Exhibit 94, tab 52. What, if anything, did

6 that factor in for your assessment?

7 A. What was happening were these garrison areas, as they were

8 referred to, which were areas of open countryside or strategic positions

9 within Kosovo, these were now becoming areas, huge areas which we had no

10 access to and therefore the Serbs could carry out their activities

11 whatever they may be, training or what they were doing, without any

12 observation possible by the Verification Mission. So when they set up one

13 of these garrison areas, they would -- they would block off with armed

14 guards every single access route, track, road, and we were stopped at

15 gunpoint. In fact, on one occasion myself, DZ, a number of other people

16 from the headquarters, we tried to move around the Vucitrn area and we

17 spent several hours detained by VJ on this occasion, troops at gunpoint,

18 with cocked weapons, ready to shoot us if we carried on and tried to enter

19 one of these areas.

20 Q. My final question before the break, if permitted, is you referred

21 to I believe border areas earlier in your evidence. Can you lay out for

22 us what you mean by that?

23 A. Yes. A very important aspect of our work, because these were very

24 sensitive areas, especially the border between Albania and Kosovo, was

25 that we have access to this area because there were a great many incidents

Page 3180

1 taking place. In December, for example, there was a very major ambush by

2 the Serbian forces of a KLA rearmament, re-equipment convoy, and a great

3 number of the KLA were killed.

4 Our problem, our mandate was to verify these events. Now, at the

5 beginning, we had some access. The access to the border areas became more

6 and more restricted, even though the document did state that we have free

7 access around the whole of Kosovo. In certain areas, like the Prizren

8 area, the border where General Maisonneuve had his regional

9 responsibility, the access became virtually nonexistent. He had to apply

10 on a daily basis, which was normally refused, for access to any of his

11 patrols to go into the border zone, which was a zone about four or five

12 kilometres in depth.

13 In March, we were suddenly informed that this border was growing.

14 It was going to be extended to possibly 14 or 15 kilometres, and access to

15 it was definitely restricted. We would not be able to, at any time, enter

16 this zone. Now, this now took in a huge area where there were a large

17 number of Albanian villages, villages that the Serbs saw that I believe

18 that these were villages occupied by terrorists and therefore we would

19 have no ability to verify or to even try to prevent any fighting. And

20 this, to us, was a major indicator that, (a), we couldn't carry out our

21 work, and if we tried to carry out our work in these areas and in fact

22 increasingly more in all areas, there was a danger to our verifiers, a

23 physical danger, of either them being beaten up, roughed up, or actually

24 shot or crushed by one of the large vehicles because we only had light --

25 well, non-armoured and lightly armoured jeep-type vehicles.

Page 3181

1 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

2 JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now. Colonel, would you remember

3 this, in this and any other adjournment there may be in your evidence, not

4 to speak to anybody about it, including the Prosecution, until it's over.

5 We will adjourn now for 20 minutes.

6 --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.

7 --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.

8 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Ryneveld.

9 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honour.

10 Q. Witness, in the course of the last answer you gave before the

11 break, you referred to access to an expansion of the border area. Might I

12 invite you, please, to turn with me to Exhibit 94, tab 63.

13 Now, 63 is -- appears to be a chronology of major events. Are you

14 familiar with that document? Perhaps we'll wait until you get it. And

15 then turn to our internal markings, it's about four or five pages into the

16 document, K00078021, page 021. And that page has in fact got a serial

17 number, numerical from 118 to 140. I'd like you to look at lines 128 and

18 129, referred to as events on the 16th of March.

19 Now, is that the date, looking at that -- first of all, I should

20 ask this question: Are you familiar with a chronology of events of this

21 nature?

22 A. I am, yes.

23 Q. And by looking at the 16th of March entry at lines 128, 129, and

24 130, does that refer to the incident that you indicated to the Court, for

25 example, where it says,"enlargement of border zone from five kilometres to

Page 3182

1 around ten kilometres"?

2 A. Yes. In fact, I can say also that serial 128, T72 tank, I was

3 actually in Mitrovica and I saw the train and I then followed the tanks

4 down to the Glogovac area. So I can confirm that myself. And the border

5 area was, say, extended from five to around ten, which also meant up to 14

6 or 15 in some areas.

7 Q. And the next entry, at 130, "extension of VJ conscript service by

8 30 days," is that in reference to the other matter that you mentioned, the

9 retention of conscripts beyond their normal term of service?

10 A. Correct. That would be confirmation of -- by then, we knew it was

11 happening but we suspected it was happening before as well.

12 Q. Thank you. All right, sir. Now you've told us, sir, that you had

13 meetings with various individuals, including Mr. Lukic. How did you know

14 Mr. Lukic, and how did you know -- I think you said that he was the head

15 of the MUP for Kosovo. How did that information come to your attention?

16 A. Well, certainly on arrival and being briefed as to how the

17 organisations were constructed. I was informed that General Lukic was the

18 man in charge of the MUP. I was also -- this was also confirmed at many

19 occasions during my 10.00 meetings with the commission, and on the rare

20 occasions that I managed to meet him, he was also announced as the head of

21 the MUP in Kosovo, as well as the day when I was introduced to the new

22 commission, General Lukic was present and that was confirmed that he was

23 the boss.

24 Q. I see. And one other question by way of background, in our

25 earlier references to Sainovic, you mentioned that he did -- you did see

Page 3183

1 him on occasion. How often would you say that he visited Kosovo from

2 Belgrade during your tenure?

3 A. Well, the first thing I have to say is that his -- each visit he

4 made, he did not necessarily see any representatives from -- of the OSCE,

5 the Kosovo Verification Mission. So -- but we were occasionally aware

6 that he was there. I personally saw him three or four times, but I know

7 he was there more often, having meetings with, for example, Ambassador

8 Keller, who was one of his main points of contact with OSCE mission.

9 Q. So over, say, a three-month period of January, February, and

10 March, are you able to give us a rough estimate of how often he would come

11 to Kosovo?

12 A. I would say he was probably there every few days, maybe every two

13 or three days.

14 Q. Thank you. Now, sir, talking about the MUP, did you, during the

15 course of your tenure in Kosovo, form any opinion about the role that the

16 MUP played in Kosovo?

17 A. Yes. The -- the first thing I learnt was that the MUP really

18 wasn't particularly interested in carrying out ordinary policing

19 activities. They certainly did not behave like any police force I've ever

20 come across before. They were not particularly interested in local crime,

21 traffic control, you know, sort of presence in the streets, doing what we

22 think policemen do. They were mainly in their infantry/military role. So

23 whenever we saw the MUP out in the field, they would be carrying assault

24 rifles, wearing combat kit, combat-type uniforms with some sort of

25 helmets.

Page 3184

1 Q. All right. Perhaps this might be an appropriate time to show you

2 some photographs.

3 MR. RYNEVELD: Madam Clerk, can the witness be shown Exhibits 17,

4 18, and 21A and B, and I'll just do all of them at once.

5 Q. While those are being gathered to show you, sir, I believe you

6 mentioned earlier in your evidence that there were different kinds of

7 police, that there were some kind of police wearing normal uniforms and

8 then there was the different kind of police, better equipped, totally

9 different. Would you be able to recognise those uniforms if you were to

10 see them again?

11 A. I think so.

12 Q. Well, then we'll wait for the exhibits and ask you to look at

13 them.

14 Perhaps we can look at the uniforms first, and I think that's

15 Exhibit 18. Let's display it on the ELMO first of all.

16 Looking at Exhibit 18 - and I'll describe it briefly - there

17 appear to be a series of ten photographs on this sheet, depicting

18 individuals wearing different kinds of uniforms. From your experience as

19 an observer and your military background, sir, are you able to indicate to

20 us whether or not you saw any troops or individuals wearing uniforms of

21 these kinds, and if so, can you describe them?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. By number.

24 A. Yes, I certainly saw all these types of uniform being worn in

25 Kosovo. So the first -- number 1 is a typical VJ uniform.

Page 3185












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 3186

1 Number 2 is probably also a VJ unit. They're preparing a track

2 change.

3 Three is definitely the type of police force that was used by --

4 in Kosovo for sort of routine operations and clearing villages and working

5 around Kosovo on Tank Hill, for example, overlooking Lapastica near

6 Podujevo.

7 Number 4, this is something that appeared much later, probably

8 mid-March, and this is a new type of police force which appeared with no

9 real insignia, except it does say "Policija" on the man's arm, but he was

10 not displaying any unit. And also the type of weapon he was carrying

11 would indicate it was some type of special forces of specially trained

12 police.

13 Q. If I can just back up to photograph number 3. Is that Cyrillic

14 writing on the shoulder patch of the individuals in number 3?

15 A. Yes. Because I speak some Bulgarian, Bulgarian is in Cyrillic so

16 I do read Cyrillic.

17 Q. And what does that patch say? Are you able to --

18 A. Yes, "Policija."

19 Q. That's also police, eh? And the weapons, if you're able to tell

20 from the restricted view you have of what they're holding?

21 A. Well, number 3, they're an AK47 variant but the Yugoslav-produced

22 variant of the AK47. I think it's called an M70.

23 Q. I see.

24 A. Number 4, this seems to be possibly an AK47 type of weapon with a

25 folding stock, which is usually for parachute type forces or special

Page 3187

1 forces use.

2 Q. Number 5.

3 A. Number 5, although this looks like a combat uniform of the VJ,

4 this is again a police unit. These are some of the two types of uniform

5 that appeared on the police arriving much later. So you also see in 6,

6 the same type of helmet is being worn but whereas on the left it appears

7 to be a sort of greeny-olive camouflage kit, on the right they are wearing

8 the typical dark blue of the MUP.

9 In 6 -- well, in fact in both 5 and 6, the soldier in the

10 foreground is holding a sniper rifle. This is another version of the AK47

11 but a long-barreled weapon, a longer-barreled weapon.

12 Q. And again there appear to be pocket flashes indicating -- is that

13 again?

14 A. That's policija again, yes.

15 Q. And in number 6, there appears to be a blue uniform with, is that

16 a green kind of a vest or something they're wearing?

17 A. That's their vest in which they keep their ammunition and bits and

18 pieces.

19 Q. I see.

20 A. It's typical combat clothing worn by combat troops.

21 Q. Number 7, if you're able to assist us.

22 A. Yes. Again, number 7 is something which is a bit more than

23 ordinary police. It's -- they're not army. It's difficult to tell if

24 they're police, but I think, looking at the shoulder flash, it's difficult

25 to make out, but I think this is another special type of police unit.

Page 3188

1 Q. And the weapon?

2 A. AK47.

3 Q. Number 8.

4 A. This is -- I can only surmise that this is more of a some sort of

5 paramilitary unit with heavy machine-gun. I can't really tell what type

6 of vehicle it's mounted on, but these units were seen around and they were

7 associated with the Serbs.

8 Q. Nine.

9 A. Number 9 is a truck full of VJ soldiers, it looks like. This is

10 typically the webbing they wore. The helmets, I'm now guessing that this

11 -- if this was the VJ, then this would have been taken towards the end of

12 the campaign when the Serbs were leaving Kosovo, judging by their sort of

13 overgrown appearance.

14 Q. All right.

15 A. Number 10 is certainly a KLA fighter. He doesn't have a -- well,

16 the uniform is unusual. This might even be sort of a German or Swiss

17 patterned uniform, with UCK on the shoulder, indicating he is KLA.

18 Q. And are you able to tell from the very small portion what kind of

19 weapon that might be, if that indeed is a weapon?

20 A. Looking at the magazine, it appears -- it's an automatic magazine

21 weapon, so again, it would be the back side of an AK47, which was the

22 weapon of choice of both sides.

23 Q. While we're at photographs, we may as well deal with -- you

24 referred to equipment you saw. Perhaps Exhibit 17, please. Now, Exhibit

25 17, just so that we're clear, is a multi-page document, but again it has

Page 3189

1 four different pages, each numbered, with some vehicles on it, from 1 to

2 15. If you can tell us, first of all, if you saw vehicles of this type

3 during your tenure, and if so, if you're able to identify any of them,

4 that would be of a great assistance. Starting perhaps, with number 1.

5 A. Yes. I mean, I recognise all these vehicles as vehicles that were

6 used in Kosovo. Certainly 1 and 3 came in much later, whereas we saw more

7 of 2 and a great deal of number 4. If you -- I prefer to go backwards

8 from 4.

9 Q. Sure. Just let us know which one you're talking about.

10 A. Number 4.

11 Q. Yes?

12 A. This is the vehicle we referred to as the Praga, which is actually

13 an anti-aircraft weapon of quite a high calibre, rapid firing, which was

14 used extensively throughout the entire time I was in Kosovo, usually

15 against buildings or positions held by the KLA. It's a direct firing

16 weapon of high velocity.

17 Q. So it would be used for purposes other than aircraft, at least,

18 while you were there?

19 A. While I was there, it was regularly used to -- in actions against

20 the KLA and against KLA villages or against Albanian villages.

21 Q. And that's a Praga, then.

22 A. A Praga, yes.

23 Q. Go ahead.

24 A. The vehicle above number 2 is called a BTR60, and again this is a

25 vehicle which can move troops and also commandos. These vehicles, I used

Page 3190

1 to see down at Prizren, at the barracks in Prizren, usually used by the

2 army but not exclusively.

3 Q. And if they're used to move troops, would they also be referred

4 to colloquially as "APCs," meaning armed personnel carriers?

5 A. It could be. Certainly number 1 is -- is a true APC, although

6 number 2 is a wheeled, if you like, APC, armoured personnel carrier,

7 whereas number 3 is more of an armoured fighting vehicle, which is --

8 which can be used to deliver troops, but it also has a fairly heavy gun

9 which can actually be used as part of an assault.

10 Q. And did you in fact see those vehicles in operation in assault

11 type of situations?

12 A. Yes. Yes.

13 Q. Next page, if you would, please, numbers 5 through 8.

14 A. Number 5 is a variant of the T72 which was brought in in March

15 through Mitrovica, referred to as -- its correct designation is M84. And

16 this is a much more powerful, potent weapon than the number 6, which is a

17 T55 type of vehicle, which is very old a 1950s generation tank. Still

18 very effective but nowhere near as fast and manoeuverable or fire control

19 system as good as the M84. And 5 is what raised our sort of hackles, if

20 you like, when we saw these things arriving at Mitrovica, that something

21 was afoot.

22 Q. I see. Now, I'll ask perhaps a couple of naive questions, but 5

23 and 6, you've given them numbers, I take it they're tanks?

24 A. Sorry. Yes, they are tanks, yes.

25 Q. And from your earlier evidence, you understood that to be VJ or

Page 3191

1 army type equipment and not MUP?

2 A. This is army equipment, yes.

3 Q. And in fact, the individuals riding in the top of number 6 are

4 wearing what?

5 A. They are wearing typical tank clothing with the protective head

6 gear.

7 Q. I see. I forgot to ask you earlier: The vehicles 1 through 4,

8 would they be MUP or MUP and VJ or just VJ, or are you able to say?

9 A. They were certainly driven around by the -- by the MUP, except --

10 well, both, because, for example, 4, it was usually used in support of the

11 VJ -- of the MUP, and that would actually have a VJ gunner sitting in the

12 back there, firing the gun. Again, 2 could be used by either, whereas 1

13 and 3 were seen usually sort of by the MUP.

14 Q. I'm going to pause here to ask a question about what you actually

15 saw. When you saw operations --

16 A. Uh-huh.

17 Q. -- against villages, was it exclusively the MUP or exclusively the

18 VJ or were they together or what can you tell us about that?

19 A. Certainly the normal method of operation was that the -- that the

20 MUP would actually lead the entire operation, and the MUP would provide,

21 if you like, the infantry soldiers on the ground who would actually

22 advance toward the position and take the position.

23 The VJ role initially was to provide heavy fire support. So they

24 would have an outer ring, if you like, of artillery or tanks who could

25 either, beforehand, soften up the target or at any time required could

Page 3192

1 actually shell the target by indirect and direct fire. But all the

2 activity, the sort of going into the villages, clearing the villages that

3 we ever saw, was carried out by the MUP.

4 Q. When you say, "carried out by the MUP, going into the villages,"

5 were the VJ present as well?

6 A. Yes. The actual assault would be carried out solely by the MUP.

7 Only later would the VJ, the soldiers, the army, move in. Except for one

8 occasion just north of Kosovo -- of Pristina, in the town called Lebane,

9 where a patrol of VJ one day were driving through and a sniper KLA,

10 presumably sniper, fired and wounded one of the soldiers, an officer, in

11 one of the four-wheel drive vehicles. And then the operation, the

12 response, because this was an attack directly against the VJ, the response

13 was purely VJ, and the VJ then assaulted the village.

14 But for the first time, I actually saw a different type of

15 assault. So rather than shelling the village or doing a lot of damage in

16 the village during the assault, they surrounded the village and carried

17 out a meticulous search but without actually any firing taking place. And

18 we went in the village later and there was no sort of wholesale

19 destruction at all.

20 Q. I'm not sure, because of my non-military background, that I'm

21 not quite sure when the word "shelling" is used, what is shelling? Is

22 that from big -- big guns or does it mean bombs or what does that mean?

23 A. It means all of those. I'm basically -- prior to an assault or if

24 you want to destroy a target by indirect - in other words, without

25 actually soldiers going in and fighting house to house - what you can do

Page 3193

1 is -- I've used aerial bombardment to bomb an area. You can use

2 artillery, which is indirect, which can be from a range of 20, 20-odd

3 kilometres out, you can shell a village from; or if you're using tanks, it

4 has to be direct fire because their range is no more than a few kilometres

5 and they have to fire in a straight line. So -- and also if you use

6 mortar fire, for example, which is also indirect. So to create a great

7 deal of damage, sort of damage to buildings and personnel if there are any

8 open, you would use shelling as opposed to putting infantry into a village

9 and doing house-to-house fighting where the soldiers would obviously have

10 to take house by house, building by building, block by block, making sure

11 that there was nothing left of these buildings.

12 Q. So if I understand you correctly, the process that you normally

13 saw would be shelling first, then the MUP going in.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. I see. And the shelling would be performed by whom; the MUP or

16 the VJ?

17 A. By the VJ.

18 Q. So VJ first, MUP goes in later, and then VJ might come in after

19 that?

20 A. Yes. Uh-huh.

21 Q. So it's a coordinated type of activity?

22 A. Absolutely.

23 Q. All right. I'm sorry, I stopped you describing once. You told us

24 about tanks. Is there anything further you want to say about --

25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Ryneveld, before you go on. Earlier, the

Page 3194

1 Prosecution submitted a list of names of vehicles titled as Recognition

2 Guide for Vehicles.


4 JUDGE KWON: Could you clarify those names first with the

5 assistance of this witness so we can name the --

6 MR. RYNEVELD: Certainly. Now, this is not the witness who we

7 propose to call who composed these but he certainly will be able to do

8 that for us. Mr. Coo will eventually give evidence about all of this, but

9 I think -- I don't have that list right here. Perhaps -- do you have the

10 list, the recognition -- perhaps I'll ask a couple more questions, Your

11 Honour, and then --

12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, you can go on.

13 MR. RYNEVELD: -- while the list is being provided. I didn't

14 bring my copy of the list.

15 Q. Seven and 8, sir, appear to be like trucks, lorries, I suppose, in

16 Britain.

17 A. Uh-huh. Number 7 is what's referred to as a Pinzgauer.

18 Q. A Pinzgauer. And what is that used for?

19 A. It's used for transporting troops, as is number 8, which is

20 another type of vehicle used by the VJ. The Pinzgauer tended to be used

21 by the VJ -- by the MUP, sorry.

22 Q. Pinzgauer was largely by the MUP?

23 A. By the MUP.

24 Q. And in number 8, we see a number of people driving by -- oh, it

25 looks like a crowd there. What kind of uniforms are those we see?

Page 3195

1 A. Once again, that's the VJ army and it's another type of truck. I

2 cannot give you the exact specification though.

3 Q. All right.

4 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honour. I now have that list.

5 Perhaps that list, a copy of that list, can be shown to the witness. And

6 I see because it purports to name these, I should let him tell us first

7 and then ask to describe the terms. I will give you the vehicle list

8 first, the recognition guide.

9 Q. Have you been given a list? Now, Witness, just before we start,

10 you have not been shown this list before coming to court today?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Thank you. You have seen the photographs but you've not seen the

13 recognition guide; is that correct?

14 A. I have not seen the recognition guide.

15 Q. Looking for the first time at the recognition guide, the

16 photograph that you refer to as number 1, you've indicated is sort of an

17 APC; is that correct? That's what you told us earlier in evidence.

18 A. Yes, it is. Yes. That's the M60 APC.

19 Q. And number 2 --

20 A. Would be the RTR -- I called it the BTR because that's the Russian

21 designation of it, and the NATO designation is BTR60. "VB" indicates it's

22 a command vehicle.

23 Q. Number 3?

24 A. Can I just say that although -- recognition and identification are

25 two different skills, and whereas, you know, I'm quite good at the moment

Page 3196

1 on Bulgarian types of weapons, these skills very quickly degrade and

2 although I can recognise what each vehicle is, I don't necessarily -- I

3 can't guarantee that I can actually put, you know, each number to each

4 vehicle.

5 Q. Number 3, I don't recall what you called it or what you thought it

6 was.

7 A. It was -- it's -- it's -- I said it was a troop carrier but this

8 one actually had some gun on it so it probably is the M80 APC.

9 Number 4, as I said, is the M53 Praga, as it was referred to.

10 Q. And you've already described for us what a Praga was.

11 A. Yes, it's an anti-aircraft weapon.

12 Q. Number 5, I think you told us, was a tank.

13 A. M84, which I think I identified correctly, and a T54/55. The

14 difference between the two being the position of the muzzle break, as they

15 call it, where -- you know, where the fat bit on the gun is at the front

16 or at the middle. That differentiates whether it's a 54 or a 55.

17 Q. I see, so in all other respects, they look very similar?

18 A. Yes, they do, yes. Only train spotters can see the difference.

19 Q. I see. Number 7, you told us was a MUP type of transport carrier;

20 is that correct?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And would you have known what the name of or number designation

23 was or not?

24 A. No. No, I didn't know. It was Neimar-A [phoen].

25 Q. And number 8? I think you said that you didn't know the type of

Page 3197












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 3198

1 vehicle?

2 A. No, I didn't, no.

3 Q. But it's a VJ troop transport?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Number 9. What kind of vehicle is that?

6 A. Well, we call these Bobs. It's a particular Yugoslav vehicle that

7 is not seen anywhere else, it's their own development. So again, it's an

8 armoured personnel carrier, APC, as is number 10, as is number 11.

9 Although number 12 is based on a Russian type of vehicle which in fact the

10 correct designation is BRDM. It's a light-reconnaissance type vehicle.

11 This one is armed with a gun, machine-gun.

12 Q. And again, did you see examples of these vehicles in operation in

13 Kosovo during your tenure?

14 A. Yes, we saw -- I saw all of these vehicles in Kosovo.

15 Q. 13, 14, 15 appear to be what?

16 A. 13 is the -- and 14 are both Land Rovers, and 15 is an American

17 Humvee. The interesting thing is that 13 and 14 were the type of vehicles

18 that the units that -- the MUP units which came later were driving around

19 in. They were not blue or armoured but they were unarmoured, as you see

20 here, painted in a variety of colours. White, we -- we saw this at the

21 very beginning. We saw the Serbs using white vehicles which could be

22 confused for our OSCE vehicles. This is why DZ ordered the vehicles be

23 painted orange. And there was one occasion when some of the Serb vehicles

24 suddenly became orange as well and we protested this.

25 Q. I see. Sir, there is one final photograph --

Page 3199

1 MR. RYNEVELD: And Your Honours, I have not had an opportunity to

2 give copies to anyone before. I only have a single copy. Might the

3 witness be shown K0215385, and we'll put it on the ELMO.

4 Q. Tell us, sir, if you have seen any vehicle of this nature during

5 your tenure. First of all, have you ever been shown this photograph prior

6 to coming to the courtroom?

7 A. No. I have not seen this before.

8 Q. Do you recognise the vehicle depicted in the photograph at all?

9 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please pause between answer

10 and question.

11 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you. I'm sorry.

12 Q. If you're not able to say, that's fine.

13 A. I don't -- I can't hand and heart say that I can recognise -- it's

14 very difficult from the back and from the scale to -- whether there was

15 any foreshortening of the actual vehicle making it look larger than one I

16 would recognise.

17 Q. The troops, are you able to indicate what type of troops those

18 are?

19 A. They are police.

20 Q. Police?

21 A. MUP, yes.

22 Q. Thank you. Now --

23 A. Better trained and better equipped than the army.

24 Q. I think we're going to move on, if we could, to Exhibit -- the

25 uniforms. We've done that. So it's 21 and 21 -- 21A and B, please.

Page 3200

1 Weapons.

2 MR. RYNEVELD: Does Your Honour wish the recognition guide for

3 these? Yes? Okay.

4 Q. First of all -- I've got a copy of that.

5 A. Sorry.

6 Q. First of all, could you look at the photographs of certain weapons

7 and tell the Court whether or not you're familiar with these weapons.

8 A. Yes, I'm quite familiar with the four weapons shown here.

9 Q. And again, just for the record, we have two pages. One starts --

10 looks like a photograph, and the others look like they're -- well, I'm not

11 sure whether our 20 -- Exhibit 21B is the same as the one that the court

12 document is.

13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, this is 21A.

14 MR. RYNEVELD: 21A, the one on the ELMO?



17 Q. What are those photographs of, sir?

18 A. Well, number A1 is an artillery piece which I think is a D30,

19 which is an indirect fire weapon. You can fire at long range, 14, 15, 18

20 kilometres range, possibly more, depending on the type of ammunition that

21 you use. Used exclusively by the VJ, and we saw this weapon being used

22 in Kosovo.

23 Q. Okay. You are looking at something that's on the ELMO that I have

24 listed as 21 --

25 JUDGE KWON: This is B, yes.

Page 3201

1 MR. RYNEVELD: This is B. Yeah, that's what I thought.

2 Q. Perhaps, sir, you could be shown the recognition guide. We have

3 some copies here.

4 All right. Just so we're clear, we're now looking at the

5 photograph on the ELMO, and that is Exhibit B1, I believe. That appears

6 to be on wheels, is it, and is it sort of like the kind of gun you'd find

7 on a tank or smaller or larger?

8 A. No. In fact, according to the recognition guide, I said it was a

9 D30 to D20, which is a slightly different calibre. Again, one of the ways

10 you'll notice is by the thing on the end, called the muzzle break, which I

11 wasn't looking at too carefully but it's 152-millimetre, which is a large

12 round, it's a range of over 20 kilometres. And this is towed behind a

13 truck, on wheels, and then when it's put into position, the wheels come

14 off the ground and the trails here are spread out to give it stability.

15 And again this is a weapon that's used by the VJ.

16 Q. And you say it has a range of, like, 20 kilometres?

17 A. Yes, at least. Depending on the type of ammunition that you use.

18 Q. Number 2.

19 A. This is an infantry mortar, portable mortar, M70 commander mortar,

20 which is shoulder carried. It's only a small weapon which is -- fires

21 mortars a few kilometres maximum range. And this is the type of weapon

22 that was often see on the -- on the VJ -- on the MUP positions.

23 Q. Did you see either one or two in use at any time?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Number 3.

Page 3202

1 A. Number 3 is a Scorpion. I think they've got these the wrong way

2 around. The -- the MP5 is number 4. That's a Heckler Koch.

3 Q. So number 4 is actually --

4 A. An MP5, which is a German weapon. They're used by security

5 forces, people like the police, airport police would use this because it's

6 a short weapon. Fire 9-millimetre rounds. And it was used -- we saw this

7 in the possession of the -- of the MUP special forces as the newer, better

8 equipped forces came. Not a weapon we saw with the VJ. And as was number

9 3 here, which is a weapon called a Scorpion Zastava, which is a weapon

10 produced in Yugoslavia. Also again not used by regular forces but used by

11 the MUP.

12 Q. On any of the photographs in this page, did you see any of those

13 in use by KLA forces?

14 A. Well, they had a variety of mortar, and the odd KLA might have had

15 a three or a four, but only if they'd come into possession by you finding

16 it or from taking it from a MUP or VJ after some action. But these were

17 not weapons that were generally seen. Rarely seen, very rarely seen

18 amongst the KLA.

19 Q. The next page, which I have as A, 21A, do you recognise the five

20 weapons depicted in that exhibit?

21 A. Yes, I do; all five.

22 Q. And can you assist us in terms of what they are?

23 A. Yes. Well, numbers 1, 2, and 3 are basically the same type of

24 weapon based on the Russian Kalashnikov, AK47, which is the typical

25 infantry assault rifle used by both the MUP and the VJ. Number 1 -- the

Page 3203

1 difference between 1 and 2 is that 1 has a folding stock. In other words,

2 it can be shorten. The metal stock that you see can be folded underneath

3 making it a much shorter weapon for fighting in built-up areas, for

4 example.

5 Q. I see. The mechanism itself --

6 A. Is the same and they fire the same type of ammunition. They're

7 both 762, although there is a version that fires a smaller round and a

8 different designation.

9 Q. That's not depicted in these photographs?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Did you say that number 3 --

12 A. Is basically --

13 Q. -- is another variant of it?

14 A. Yes, but that was called a Zastava because it's produced locally

15 in -- but it's a machine-gun so it has a much heavier, longer barrel with

16 a bipod and a larger magazine for the ammunition.

17 Q. And a tripod, I take it, to steady it?

18 A. Yes, so -- because it's a longer-range weapon and it has a higher

19 rate of fire, it needs a longer, stronger barrel to withstand the heat and

20 obviously the tripod to stabilise it.

21 Q. And who -- did you see that weapon in -- or that type of weapon in

22 use?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. By whom?

25 A. By the VJ and the -- and the MUP.

Page 3204

1 Q. Number 4.

2 A. Number 4 is a sniper rifle. And this is quite a different calibre

3 because its designed for single-shot telescopic rifle, much longer barrel,

4 a better balanced weapon. Called the M76. And again we have seen

5 photographs of the MUP carrying this weapon.

6 Q. So this is -- this is the type of weapon that we've seen in the

7 uniform where they're carrying weapons; is that correct?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. All right. And because this is a Zastava, does that give you any

10 indication as to where it was produced?

11 A. Yes, it indicates it was produced in Yugoslavia.

12 Q. Okay. Number 5, is that the same case in terms of where it's

13 produced?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. What is that?

16 A. That's another -- we call it a general purpose machine-gun, GPMG,

17 Zastava M84. The same, except this time, rather than having a magazine,

18 it has a belt-feed but it's an automatic heavy machine-gun.

19 Q. All right. Thank you, Witness. I'm going to turn to a totally

20 different topic now, if I may.

21 Now, reference was made earlier in your evidence to an incident

22 involving Racak, and do you recall being present during negotiations at

23 the Stimlje police station concerning Racak, and if so, can you tell us

24 about that?

25 A. Yes. As part of the ongoing investigations being carried out by

Page 3205

1 Judge Marinkovic into the killings at Racak, we were having regular

2 meetings with the local police commander in Stimlje, and on this

3 particular occasion, we were informed that Judge Marinkovic was going to

4 visit the camp -- the village, sorry, of Racak to carry out further

5 investigations, and she was going to do this with the support and escort

6 of a large number of armed MUP with armoured vehicles, APC-type vehicles,

7 vehicles with heavy machine-guns to provide her with protection.

8 We knew from our discussions with the KLA that if the -- if the

9 Judge came in with this large police presence, armed police presence, they

10 weren't going to take this sitting down, and they would actually sort of

11 -- there would be a confrontation. So General DZ, General Maisonneuve

12 came up with a plan that we would flood the village with a very large

13 number of verifiers with vehicles and good communications, and we also had

14 discussions previously -- Maisonneuve's team had discussions with the KLA

15 to ensure that there were no KLA, armed KLA within the village which would

16 do any harm to Judge Marinkovic, and we had their assurance that nothing

17 would happen to Judge Marinkovic. But to ensure this, we would also

18 surround Judge Marinkovic with our own verifiers, almost like a human

19 shield, to give her the protection she required.

20 Now, we agreed to meet Judge Marinkovic with the local police at

21 Stimlje, and these discussions went on for most of the morning, several,

22 many hours, at which I was present all the time, and the conversation

23 basically hinged about not -- her not going into the village with the

24 police, and the assurance DZ was giving that this would be done.

25 The only condition that kept on being mentioned throughout this

Page 3206

1 conversation - this was mentioned repeatedly - was that if the judge

2 decided at any point to enter the village with armed escort, then we would

3 like at least ten minutes' notice to get our people out because our people

4 are unarmed and in unarmoured vehicles and the last thing we wanted was

5 for verifiers to be killed as well in the cross-fire. And the judge

6 acknowledged this but neither agreed or disagreed.

7 As the conversation went on and was coming to a conclusion, she

8 suddenly announced that ten minutes before, she had already ordered the

9 troops into the village to go into the village and secure the village, at

10 which point I immediately left the room, got on the radio to Maisonneuve,

11 and I just gave him a few words, and I said, this is -- "Maisonneuve, this

12 is CZ. Get out now." And he had ten minutes to get his people out of the

13 village. Well, he had less; he had no time to get out of the village.

14 And it was touch and go whether in fact his verifiers were going to get

15 out in time. And in fact, several verifiers were stuck in the village,

16 and there was a confrontation. We were very lucky not to take casualties.

17 The important thing, I think, in this instance was that DZ, on

18 several occasions, pointed out to Judge Marinkovic was that if anything at

19 all happened to his verifiers and because of her inappropriate anything

20 did happen to them, he would definitely pass her name -- her name would go

21 forward to The Hague, to the International Criminal Court as someone who

22 actually perpetrated a war crime in endangering the lives of verifiers

23 unnecessarily.

24 Q. Do I understand your evidence to be that an armed conflict in fact

25 did break out as a result of the MUP troops going in?

Page 3207

1 A. She went into the village and there was shooting, and in fact she

2 then withdraw with her people because she wasn't prepared to be there,

3 obviously, in the middle of a gunfight, although she did go in in an

4 armoured vehicle.

5 MR. RYNEVELD: Now, just before I go to the next topic, I wonder

6 whether the Court -- because this witness has referred to the recognition

7 guides, whether they should be given exhibit numbers. The vehicles then

8 would become 17A --



11 JUDGE MAY: No. We've got numbers.

12 MR. RYNEVELD: I'll move on.

13 Q. Ultimately, sir, in late March the KVM left Kosovo; is that

14 correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Why?

17 A. Because we had reached a point where our presence was no longer

18 safe or effective. For example, we were no longer able to access anything

19 worthwhile, and therefore affect any outcomes in Kosovo because we were

20 restricted in moving throughout Kosovo. We were restricted in going

21 anywhere near the border areas into this new enlarged border area. Our

22 verifiers were meeting with repeated hostilities from the -- both the MUP

23 and the VJ. So as I said, we had several instances where our verifiers

24 were severely beaten or threatened, and on numerous occasions our vehicles

25 were shot at and, in some cases, damaged with gunfire.

Page 3208

1 So we couldn't verify. We couldn't move. Our verifiers were in

2 danger of being killed or wounded. Our job basically was over. We could

3 not verify anything at this point, and that was the main purpose of our

4 mission.

5 Q. So the decision to leave was made and implemented; is that

6 correct?

7 A. Yes. We had sort of mentioned, I think, previously, a month or so

8 previously that if the situation didn't improve and that this troop

9 concentration, troop additions and so on, if it didn't cease, then

10 obviously we would have to consider leaving because we couldn't carry out

11 our function.

12 Q. I will return to this general area at the end of your evidence,

13 sir. I want to move on now to another topic. When did the KVM leave,

14 approximately?

15 A. About the 23rd.

16 Q. The 23rd of March 1999?

17 A. 1999.

18 Q. And by that, you physically left Kosovo?

19 A. Yes. We formed a very large convoy of all our vehicles and

20 with the support and help of the Serbian Cooperation Commission and the

21 police, we managed to clear Kosovo very quickly and get through the border

22 very quickly.

23 Q. Did you personally ever return to Kosovo near the end of the

24 conflict?

25 A. I did. I returned on the very first day that the NATO forces

Page 3209












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 3210

1 entered Kosovo.

2 Q. That was the 13th of June?

3 A. 13th of June.

4 Q. 1999. And what -- what did you do upon -- where did you go and

5 what did you do?

6 A. By this time, I had actually reverted to my NATO role --

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. -- as a British army officer based at Rhinedahlen where the ARK is

9 based. I was then put on to General Jackson's staff and was part of his

10 command group together with DZ. And I came into Pristina, and on the

11 second day I was in Pristina I went to the old MUP headquarters where we

12 in fact set up a temporary office, DZ and myself.

13 Q. And while there, did you see any MUP officers doing -- engaged in

14 doing something?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. What was that?

17 A. The -- obviously there was a fair amount of damage in this area

18 because behind the MUP administrative building was the operational

19 building which had taken several direct hits, as did the communications

20 site. And so there was a large amount of damage to the admin building as

21 well. But what we saw on arrival were employees of the building, MUP and

22 civilians employed by the MUP, removing huge quantities of documents and

23 taking them down to trucks and having them shipped out. But the other

24 thing that was very obvious was in a little alcove, an open area by the

25 buildings as part of the building, there was a very large pile of -- there

Page 3211

1 was a large fire burning which looked like rubbish or documents. This was

2 a pile of about the size of a large truck which had been burning for some

3 time and the smoke had permeated the whole building and there were bits of

4 paper flying around. And on the second day I was there, I was tempted to

5 go down and have a look and see what this pile of documents was, and I

6 actually picked up several handfuls to discover -- from different parts of

7 the pile to discover that these were applications for travel, they were ID

8 documents, these were passports, applications for passports. So amongst

9 this huge pile of burning rubble it seemed to be mainly documents to do

10 with personal identification.

11 Q. Did you look at any of the names on any of these documents?

12 A. Yes. I looked through the applications and all the names of these

13 people were Albanian.

14 Q. Now, I understand, sir, that you actually took photographs of that

15 pile, did you?

16 A. I did, yes.

17 Q. And you don't have those available?

18 A. I'm afraid that, as I moved from the UK to Bulgaria, a lot of the

19 stuff disappeared into long-term storage and I thought I had taken them

20 out, but I'm afraid I didn't.

21 Q. You say that the size of this pile of documents was about the size

22 of a large truck?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. A truck?

25 A. Yes, a large truck.

Page 3212

1 Q. Now --

2 A. It burned for several days. It carried on burning for about a

3 week, this pile.

4 Q. Now, in relation to -- I think you indicated earlier that in

5 Pristina there was the headquarters of Lukic and some people in a stadium,

6 and I told you we'd come back to a map.

7 MR. RYNEVELD: Perhaps the witness could be shown -- is it Exhibit

8 61 that is -- I believe it is. No. Actually, I'm thinking of the -- no,

9 the -- there's a Kosovo atlas, and I'm afraid I didn't note down the

10 number of that. Madam Clerk? 83?


12 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you. If you could be shown Exhibit 38 and

13 turn to pages 19 and 20 of that.

14 Q. Now, sir, do you recognise at pages 19 and 20 a -- which purports

15 to be a map of downtown Pristina, do you recognise this map?

16 A. I do.

17 Q. Just so we're clear about a couple of things, perhaps you could

18 tell us, where is the stadium located on this map, if it's depicted at

19 all?

20 A. It's this oval location here.

21 Q. And for the record, you're pointing to what appears to be page 19,

22 there's sort of an oval with the number 108 in the middle of it; is that

23 right?

24 A. Correct, yes.

25 Q. And were the -- you indicated to us I believe that the general

Page 3213

1 headquarters was a building next to it?

2 A. Yes. The -- the main administrative MUP headquarters was this

3 building here, 79, 77 --

4 Q. Thank you.

5 A. -- as depicted on this map.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 A. And right behind it, what is shown as number 77, is in fact a

8 building which is there, which -- I was in Kosovo recently so I know that

9 this is an occupied building, but what is not shown is perpendicular to

10 that building, between that building 77 and the stadium, was the building

11 that was the operational MUP headquarters which was -- had received

12 several direct hits and was -- is now uninhabitable.

13 Q. All right. And where -- so -- do you know where the office was of

14 General Lukic and -- is it Mijatovic?

15 A. Yes. Both General Lukic and Mijatovic had offices in this

16 building. They're just behind, perpendicular to 77. And next to that was

17 the communications site, the large tower which allowed them to communicate

18 to Kosovo and elsewhere.

19 Q. And 108 would be where the helicopters would be landing; is that

20 correct?

21 A. Correct.

22 Q. And the area where you saw the documents burning, is that area

23 visible on this map?

24 A. Yes. It's probably where it says 79 and a little rectangle on 79.

25 Q. That you referred to as an alcove.

Page 3214

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. That would be a sort of outdoor area enclosed by the building

3 there?

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. I see. Now, these -- just wondering, sir, obviously you don't

6 have those photographs of the burning pile available now. If in the

7 course of events, you're able to have access to those photographs, could

8 you forward them to the Tribunal for future reference?

9 A. Certainly.

10 Q. Now, sir, after -- shortly after the KVM withdrawal from Kosovo,

11 did you go to the border crossing with Macedonia referred to as Djeneral

12 Jankovic?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And that is near, I take it, the Macedonian town of Blace, is it,

15 or Blace?

16 A. Bllaca.

17 Q. Bllaca, sorry. Thank you. When was that? When did you go there?

18 A. I was there -- after we left Kosovo, I would go back towards the

19 crossing point, especially if -- at this time there was indication that

20 there were refugees already sort of coming across the border around

21 different parts of Djeneral Jankovic, Bllaca, through the minefields and

22 possibly also coming down the road and trying to get through the main

23 crossing point.

24 Q. And did you have any discussion with any of the people that you

25 found at that area?

Page 3215

1 A. Yes. Especially on one occasion, and the exact date escapes me,

2 but on the day that for the first time we saw people walking down the

3 railway track, a long what looked like to be a kilometre or two kilometres

4 of people walking down a railway track, wearing coats and carrying

5 suitcases, which reminded me of a scene from the Holocaust, I sort of went

6 down to the field where they were -- they were coming in and I went to

7 talk to the people, find out what had happened to them, you know, how it

8 was that they were actually walking down the railway tracks. They then

9 informed me that somebody -- that the police -- not somebody but the

10 police in Pristina had been going round, telling people to take whatever

11 they could carry, get themselves down to the railway station because they

12 were going on a trip.

13 When they got to the railway station, most of them, because there

14 was some amount of chaos, most of them had their ID cards and ID documents

15 removed from them. This was a story that was recounted to me on many

16 occasions by many different people in this field at Bllaca. And when I

17 asked them why, you know, what was the purpose of, you know, sending you

18 down here without ID documents, they said, "Well, because we were never to

19 return to Kosovo. This was to ensure that there was no evidence of us

20 ever having lived or been citizens of Pristina and Kosovo."

21 Q. Did they tell you whether they left Pristina voluntarily?

22 A. Yes, they did tell me that, why they left, and they left because

23 they were -- they were forced at gunpoint to walk down to the railway

24 station, and by gunpoint they were shoved onto these carriages, not

25 knowing where they were going or why they were going.

Page 3216

1 Q. And where did they end up?

2 A. They ended up for the first three days, the people that came on

3 the train, approximately 20.000, 25.000 people, they were in the field

4 right next to the border, almost in sort of no-man's land. The first day

5 was a nice sunny day, they just sat around. And by the third day, people

6 were dying of disease, cold. By then it began to rain, the field turned

7 into a quagmire, while the others were trying to decide how best to deal

8 with them.

9 Q. Did the train take them right to the border?

10 A. Certainly not, no. It stopped -- according to the -- the -- the

11 stories I've been told by the refugees, as they were, they were dropped

12 several kilometres short of the border and they had to walk along the

13 railway track.

14 Q. Now, you say you estimate about 25.000.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. In what kind of an area?

17 A. Probably an area of a couple of -- couple of soccer pitches. So

18 people were crammed in. I mean, there was no space between these people

19 at all. I mean, there was -- you could maybe sit down, it was difficult

20 to lie down. There was no water, no sanitation, nothing.

21 Q. During the early stages of witnessing this event, did you take a

22 photograph of what you saw?

23 A. I took several photographs in this field.

24 Q. And after you took these photographs, did the numbers increase?

25 A. Considerably.

Page 3217

1 Q. I'm going to show you a blown-up photograph under number

2 K021-8722. I don't know whether these have been distributed before.

3 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 97.

4 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Madam Clerk.

5 Q. Witness, you brought a photograph with you to the Tribunal, and

6 we've had it blown up. Is this a good representation of the photograph

7 that you took?

8 A. Yes, it is.

9 Q. And what -- what is depicted in this photograph? Is this the

10 field of refugees or the early part when you first saw it?

11 A. This is still the very early part, because the field hasn't turned

12 into a field of mud and filth. So this is probably within the first 36

13 hours. This is probably, actually, the end of the first day.

14 Q. And it's your evidence then that the numbers considerably

15 increased; is that correct?

16 A. Yes. On subsequent photographs, you can't see anything in this

17 picture except black, except bodies, except people.

18 Q. And in your estimate, the total number was about 25.000?

19 A. We think in the first few days about 25.000 people came through.

20 MR. RYNEVELD: Turning now, if I may, to the additional summary of

21 evidence, Your Honours. During the course of this discussion, I'm going

22 to ask the Court for permission to move into a very brief private session

23 to ask one or two questions and then move back into open session.

24 Q. Sir, you've told us earlier about the departure of the KVM from

25 Kosovo, and was there -- and you've told us as well that you met on an

Page 3218

1 almost daily basis with the Serbian Cooperation Committee. Was there some

2 time when you met with that committee where the discussion about the

3 pending departure of the KVM was the topic of discussion?

4 A. Yes, there was.

5 Q. When, approximately, would you say that those discussions took

6 place?

7 A. In the -- virtually in the last few weeks, possibly the last few

8 days of our stay in Kosovo.

9 Q. And at one of these regular scheduled meetings, the departure of

10 the KVM was the topic of discussion?

11 A. It certainly was.

12 Q. And at the conclusion of that meeting, did something occur that

13 was particularly noteworthy to you?

14 A. Yes. I was given some information which I found rather

15 surprising.

16 Q. And without disclosing the name of the individual who provided

17 that information, can you tell us the general circumstances about how it

18 was that you had an opportunity to get this additional information?

19 A. At the conclusion of one of our meetings, when most of the members

20 who had taken part in this meeting had departed, myself and my interpreter

21 met with this official, and he put a map on the table and began telling us

22 exactly what the future options were for Kosovo.

23 MR. RYNEVELD: Might we move briefly into private session.

24 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

25 [Private session]

(Confidentiality lifted by later order of the Chamber)

Page 3219

1 MR. RYNEVELD: Once we've been assured that your comments can now

2 not be heard by anyone -- are we at that stage?


4 JUDGE MAY: We're in private session.

5 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

6 Q. Sir, who was the individual who you met with, in the presence of

7 your interpreter, who spread out a map?

8 A. Colonel Kotur.

9 Q. And just so that we know who he was, he was the gentleman who had

10 been part of the commission for some time?

11 A. Yes. He was -- he was there right from the very beginning as the

12 -- sort of the main VJ, serving VJ officer on the commission who had in

13 fact disappeared when the new Brankovic commission came in but

14 occasionally put in an appearance again.

15 Q. And he was present at this particular --

16 A. He was present at this meeting, and what happened was that it was

17 just himself, my interpreter and myself present when these discussions

18 took place.

19 Q. And how high a level was he with the VJ?

20 A. Well, he was an extremely experienced officer who had served for

21 more than ten years, possibly as much as 15 years in Kosovo, had a house

22 in Kosovo, had been -- had taken part in the activities in 1998 as a

23 commander in the Djakovica area where various events, fairly serious

24 fighting took place. He was also a commander prior to that in the

25 Mitrovica garrison. And although I can't verify this, by his knowledge,

Page 3220

1 his expertise, his stature, the type of uniforms he wore, he was a -- he

2 tended to wear a special forces uniform but he was very well-informed,

3 very well-respected, and certainly on my trips with him around Kosovo,

4 everybody would sort of defer to him regardless of their rank within

5 Kosovo. So he was known and deferred to. And he was extremely

6 knowledgeable on all matters military in Kosovo.

7 Q. His rank?

8 A. He was a colonel, full colonel.

9 Q. And he appeared to be immediately under whom?

10 A. He worked with the commission with General Loncar.

11 Q. Thank you.

12 MR. RYNEVELD: That's the end of private session. We can move

13 back into open session, if we may.

14 [Open session]

15 MR. RYNEVELD: Are we?

16 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session.

17 MR. RYNEVELD: Just waiting for the announcement. Thank you.

18 Q. Now, Witness, you say that a senior official spread a map out; is

19 that correct? And during the course of that, were there discussions about

20 what the plan was?

21 A. Yes. This official spread this map on the table in front of me,

22 and without any preamble at all, he told me exactly how the plan to deal

23 with the KLA would take place.

24 Q. Witness, if you are able, I'm going to hand you a copy of a map

25 that has been previously admitted in these proceedings as Exhibit 61.

Page 3221












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 3222

1 It's just a map of Kosovo. And I'm going to give you a green marker and

2 ask you if you could perhaps make markings on this in an attempt to

3 outline what it was that you were told and narrate, and then we can have

4 that marked as an exhibit. With the Court's permission, if that can be

5 done. I'm also providing a green marker.

6 MR. RYNEVELD: This is a colour map of the kind produced, Your

7 Honours, of Kosovo.

8 THE WITNESS: What we have to remember, that by this time, by the

9 time we left, there were already very large numbers of VJ and MUP

10 dispersed in strategic locations around -- around Kosovo. So what I'm

11 going to describe doesn't actually involve a chase. It actually involves

12 a predetermined strategy of eliminating the KLA through a series of

13 geographical points.

14 Q. Yes. And I want you to approximate as closely as possible what

15 this senior official told you and what he described to you.

16 A. Yes. I mean, he stood in front of me and pointed on the map, a

17 larger scale map, what they were doing, and he said, "Right. Basically

18 we're going to carry on our operations from Vucitrn and push the KLA

19 across towards Glogovac. At Glogovac, there is a large force of --" this

20 was where T72s and T84s were -- "we will then cut off and destroy any

21 stragglers that manage to make it over the hill towards Glogovac."

22 The next part of activity would be that the forces, the Serb

23 forces that were positioned around Podujevo would push Commander Remi's

24 forces over the mountains, down towards Vucitrn where in fact there would

25 be -- since there was a large garrison at Kosovska Mitrovica, they would

Page 3223

1 be cut off and killed, eliminated. So we've gone like this at the moment,

2 so we've cleared this whole area of KLA. They would then move down

3 towards -- by Stimlje and Suva Reka, which was another sort of very large

4 area of KLA. By this time, the -- most of the KLA resistance around

5 Kacanik had already been dealt with. This had been achieved before we

6 left. So this wasn't an important area. The greatest concentrations of

7 KLA were in this part of the country.

8 So through -- via Suva Reka, through the mountain passes, towards

9 Prizren, clearing up all the pockets. Again, Prizren had a very large

10 garrison, reinforced garrison, and they could deal with any sort of

11 pockets around this area.

12 Then moving up towards Djakovica, operations obviously on sort of

13 both sides, taking out any KLA. Orahovac, which was a problem area.

14 Working their way up to Decani, going east -- one part going east to

15 Decani to an area called Jablanica, where one of the most serious

16 commanders of the KLA had his headquarters, Ramush, and eventually ending

17 up in Pec. And therefore completing the operation to eliminate all the --

18 all the serious hot spots and major groupings of the KLA.

19 Q. I see. And that comment was with respect to how they would deal

20 with what?

21 A. This is -- it was purely to do with the elimination, total and

22 permanent elimination, as he put it, of the KLA.

23 Q. Did he at any point go on to say something else?

24 A. Yes, he did. Again, I found both these events quite

25 extraordinary, that he should tell me this, which is -- although it

Page 3224

1 appears a simplistic plan, a plan like this would actually require a great

2 deal of planning and coordination and staffing. This isn't something you

3 could start tomorrow morning because it seemed like a good idea. This

4 would require weeks, possibly months, of coordinated planning.

5 But the second thing he told me, which -- I remember the exact

6 words. He said to me, "And when we have finished dealing with the KLA, we

7 will remove all the Albanians from the territory of Kosovo forever."

8 Q. When this senior official told you this, about how this plan was

9 to be carried out, did you understand that to be solely a VJ operation or

10 what?

11 A. No. This was -- none of these operations at this scale could be

12 solely VJ. These had to be coordinated MUP, VJ, special forces,

13 paramilitaries. This had to be a combined action.

14 He also informed me, by the way, that -- at the conclusion of

15 this, when I looked sort of completely puzzled, he said we're only doing a

16 job. We're only saving NATO and you and a job, because if we don't deal

17 with the KLA and the Albanian problem, then you will have to at some time

18 in the future.

19 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Ryneveld, that is a convenient moment.

20 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honours.

21 JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now for 20 minutes.

22 --- Recess taken at 12.20 p.m.

23 --- On resuming at 12.42 p.m.

24 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Ryneveld.

25 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honours.

Page 3225

1 Q. I have only one question, but before I do that, I wonder whether

2 the map that the witness marked be given an exhibit number.

3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 61A.

4 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

5 Q. Witness, in the discussion of the uniforms, I believe you referred

6 to the -- you referred to the word "webbing." Again from my non-military

7 background, I assumed that you meant camouflage pattern, or you may be

8 referring to something totally different. Can you help us with that?

9 A. Yes. The -- the camouflage uniform would be just referred to as a

10 combat uniform. The webbing is the sort of harness you wear on your chest

11 which contains ammunition, water, medical supplies, maps, spare

12 ammunition, grenades, this sort of stuff. So it will enable the soldier

13 to carry a lot more equipment on his body.

14 Q. So, for example, when I asked you about the MUP soldiers wearing a

15 blue camouflage uniform and a green vest, the vest is in fact the webbing?

16 A. Yes. We would call it webbing. You would call it a vest.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 MR. RYNEVELD: Those are the questions I have of this witness,

19 Your Honours. Before Mr. Milosevic commences his cross-examination, I

20 wonder whether the Court would consider instructing him to obviously

21 respect the area of closed session. I just want to ensure that he

22 understands the name of the individual is intended to be kept

23 confidential, which is why I asked for private session. If there's some

24 way the Court can control that, I would be very grateful.

25 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, you've heard that comment by the

Page 3226

1 Prosecution. It is endorsed by the Court. The name is to be kept

2 confidential. Of course you can ask questions about the rest. If you

3 want to ask something about the name, then we should go into closed

4 session to do it.

5 Yes.

6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

7 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

8 Q. [Interpretation] In the KVM, you worked on the verification of

9 arms; is that right?

10 A. That was one of my jobs, yes.

11 Q. What were all the other jobs you had in addition to this activity

12 related to arms verification? What else were you entrusted with? What

13 other kinds of activity?

14 A. It was not solely the verification of arms. It was the

15 verification of military activities and military personnel within Kosovo.

16 I was also responsible for helping with the training of new verifiers as

17 they came in through our training centre at Brezovica. And of course my

18 major job was to be the liaison officer with the Serbian Cooperation

19 Commission.

20 Q. In your statement, you mentioned that you were an intelligence

21 officer of the British army.

22 A. I never said anything of the sort. I said that -- I think it was

23 pointed out by the Prosecution counsel that I am a military attache. I

24 was one in Poland, and I'm now the defence attache in Bulgaria. I don't

25 see what connection that has with being an intelligence officer.

Page 3227

1 Q. Well, here in paragraph 4 of your statement, it says, "My career

2 in the military has largely revolved around training systems, support, and

3 in the intelligence areas." And you were the British military attache in

4 Poland, that is to say, in line with your profession.

5 Is it your assertion that this job of yours, as you put it, in

6 training systems, support, and intelligence areas, it has nothing to do

7 with intelligence?

8 A. It depends, Mr. Milosevic, how you define intelligence and

9 intelligence work. As an attache, my job is to -- one of my jobs is to

10 gather information, as is every diplomat's job in an embassy, on the

11 country and to analyse it and to report. It is certainly not my job, if

12 this is what you're insinuating, that I run some sort of network of agents

13 and gather intelligence in some covert way. Everything I do and have done

14 in my work in the military has been a different type of intelligence, and

15 this is often a misunderstanding between what used to be NATO and Warsaw

16 Pact, is that intelligence officers are some sort of counter-intelligence,

17 agent-running officers. This is not anything which I do.

18 Intelligence, in my case, is information gathering, purely and

19 simply.

20 Q. Well, that is precisely what intelligence officers do. But I did

21 not focus on your duty as military attache but the first part of the

22 sentence, where you say, "around training systems, support, and in the

23 intelligence areas." So the intelligence area is your profession, isn't

24 it?

25 A. It is an area I've been involved in, but my major work has been

Page 3228

1 carried out around training.

2 Q. Awhile ago, you mentioned when you were explaining the range of

3 your activities that you worked on training the newly-arrived verifiers.

4 Since your profession, as you had written it down here as I had quoted it,

5 related to training and intelligence, did you train the verifiers in

6 respect of their intelligence activity?

7 A. I was training the verifiers in observation and

8 information-gathering activities.

9 Q. Well, to the best of my understanding, in other words, this is

10 intelligence work. Yes or no.

11 A. We were not there as intelligence officers. We were there to

12 carry out our mission as verifiers. The only way to verify anything is to

13 actually go out and observe and gather information. Now, I would not call

14 this intelligence work. This is purely observation and monitoring,

15 something the UN asked us to do.

16 Q. Since you say that your military career has largely revolved

17 around training and the intelligence area, do you consider yourself to be

18 an expert, a specialist in intelligence activity?

19 A. I would not consider myself to be an expert on intelligence

20 activity as I have spent most of my life being a trainer and, for example,

21 I was responsible for training -- designing the military training of the

22 first armoured division in Germany for two and a half years just before I

23 came to Kosovo; nothing at all to do with any form of intelligence or

24 information gathering.

25 Q. I am just ascertaining what your profession is on the basis of

Page 3229

1 what you've written here, but let's move on to the next question.

2 Are you aware how many members of the KVM came from intelligence

3 services?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Are you aware of the conditions, the prerequisites for taking

6 people into the KVM?

7 A. As far as I understood, what happened was that countries were

8 asked to nominate personnel to attend. In my case, I received a message

9 in Germany, asking if I -- if any lieutenant colonels at the time were

10 willing to go to Kosovo to act as verifiers. I was a serving officer, as

11 I am now, and I was not of any particular conditions that were set on who

12 verifiers should be. All I can tell you is that gathering a force

13 together, quickly, of people who can be sent to a hostile area, a

14 dangerous area to carry out verification without any preparation, without

15 any facilities being in place, can only really be done by, I believe, a

16 military force or an ex-military force because these people are trained to

17 survive in difficult conditions. You could not send pure civilians into

18 those conditions because they would be just unable to cope in the initial

19 stages.

20 Q. And are you aware of the criteria according to which the selection

21 of personnel was carried out for the Verification Mission?

22 A. What I'm aware of is that each country made a nomination of its

23 personnel with a brief description of their training and experience and

24 qualities, and these descriptions were sent to Vienna, to the OSCE, and

25 the OSCE held boards to actually put the people in the right slots once

Page 3230

1 they got to Kosovo.

2 Q. My understanding of what you have said just now was that you

3 volunteered to work in the Verification Mission. What were your motives

4 for applying to do this work?

5 A. I think there were several motives. I was appalled about what was

6 happening in Kosovo, and I felt that my sort of experience and knowledge

7 of not necessarily the Balkans but of Eastern Europe, having worked in

8 Poland for several years, there might be some benefit from the language.

9 The Polish I speak might allow me to understand some Serbian. I felt also

10 that my broad career background would actually enable me to work in a

11 mission like this; and I just felt that it was something that I

12 desperately wanted to do, to help just not the people of Kosovo but to

13 take part in this mission which would try and resolve the problem.

14 Q. And are you aware of whether the other members of the Verification

15 Mission were volunteers as well, the other members of the Verification

16 Mission, that is to say, your colleagues, the other members?

17 A. All I can tell you with certainty is that I understood that every

18 single person volunteered. There were -- there were far more volunteers

19 than there were people who were actually accepted. So whoever was doing

20 the acceptance and judging the criteria, I cannot say how they did this

21 and how they whittled down the few hundred British names, for example,

22 down to the 115 British personnel who eventually went. So, no, I cannot

23 tell you how they were selected.

24 Q. So the selection was carried out from the group of names of

25 persons who had volunteered, if my understanding of what you've been

Page 3231

1 saying is correct.

2 A. You are correct.

3 Q. Yesterday during his testimony, your superior, General

4 Drewienkiewicz, said that the military personnel of the mission was there

5 -- were there because civilians could not be ordered to become members of

6 the mission, whereas military men could be ordered to do so. So since

7 military persons could be ordered to become members of the mission, they

8 were indeed ordered to become members. How come your boss gave a

9 different explanation, saying that you were ordered to go there, and your

10 explanation is quite different, that you all volunteered?

11 JUDGE MAY: Even if it was different, it's not a matter for this

12 witness. You can comment on it if you want.

13 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, all I can say is that I don't know what

14 General DZ meant by what he said --

15 JUDGE MAY: No. No, exactly.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. But there is no doubt that Drewienkiewicz yesterday said that the

18 members of the mission were --

19 JUDGE MAY: There's no point going on with this. The witness has

20 given his evidence. You can't ask him to comment on what somebody else

21 has said. It's pointless.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, then I would like to indicate

23 that to you, this divergence in explanations.

24 JUDGE MAY: This isn't the time to be indicating things to us.

25 You'll get a chance to do it in due course.

Page 3232

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There are too many of these

2 contradictions, so no time would be sufficient.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. In the OSCE and in the KVM, who decided on who would be admitted

5 and who would not be admitted? Who actually did the deciding?

6 A. For the British - and I can only speak for the British - it was

7 done at two levels. As I said, there were a number -- several hundred

8 volunteers from the United Kingdom British forces. These names were

9 submitted by the British foreign office to the OSCE, and the final

10 selection of personnel was carried out by the OSCE. Not only that, but

11 the timing of when they arrived in Kosovo was also determined by the OSCE

12 in Vienna.

13 Q. You said in your statement that when you applied as a volunteer

14 and then were taken in in the space of a few days, that you started your

15 training for the task in hand. Now, how long did that training last and

16 where did it take place?

17 A. Right. We had two training sessions. One was in the UK, and I

18 think most nations carried out some -- this type of training, and I'm

19 happy to tell you about the type of training. And then when I arrived in

20 Kosovo, in Brezovica, there was a further two and a half, three days of

21 training carried out in our training centre in Kosovo.

22 Q. And what did the training consist of?

23 A. In the UK, the training -- the major part of the training -- there

24 were two parts of the training: One was mine awareness, knowing how to

25 deal with mines; if you drive into a minefield, if you are stuck in a

Page 3233












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 3234

1 minefield, how to get out of the minefield; how to recognise mines, types

2 of mines, and booby-traps, because these types of devices could be, from

3 my experience in other parts of the Balkans, could be the most dangerous

4 aspects to our personnel. So that was that training.

5 Secondly, we spent a lot of time on first aid training, how to

6 deal with an injured person, how to give life-saving first aid to these

7 people who you might come across; it could be your partner, it could be a

8 policeman, it could be a KLA fighter. You know, what to do in the first

9 instance, you know, how to help him and to save his life.

10 And on top of that, there were sessions on the history. We had

11 people come in from the Balkans to tell us about the situation in the

12 Balkans, the situation in Kosovo. We had briefings of all sorts to do,

13 (a) with the situation and the history, because the history was very

14 important, obviously, as to how the whole thing -- why it had taken place

15 and what was going on.

16 Q. And after you joined the KVM mission, you as a British officer,

17 English officer, were you still officially under the command of your own

18 army?

19 A. I was still an officer employed by the British army and paid by

20 the British army. However, once the British army seconds personnel to a

21 mission, any type of UN mission, or in this case the OSCE, we are under

22 the command and control of that mission. So I did not report to anybody

23 in the UK. My immediate boss would have been General DZ, because I was in

24 the operations department of the mission. He was director of operations

25 and so I answered to him, but not as a member of the British army.

Page 3235

1 Q. And did you have any orders whatsoever from the British army

2 during your mission?

3 A. I don't recall any occasion when anybody from the British army

4 gave me a direct order. I only took my instructions from the Head of

5 Mission, from Ambassador Walker, or from the deputies or from General DZ.

6 Q. So I can take it that during your entire mission, you had no

7 contacts with your British command; is that right?

8 A. During my time in Kosovo, I did not have direct contact with the

9 British command, you're quite right.

10 Q. And at a higher level, higher up from your level, did anybody send

11 your information to your British command, with your knowledge?

12 A. I think you will find that in any international mission, that the

13 mission is a grouping of international countries who do actually need to

14 report back to their own countries what is happening with their soldiers.

15 I mean, it would be wrong to deploy a force from the UK and not actually

16 inform the British Ministry of Defence or the Prime Minister or the

17 foreign office if we had injuries, if we had problems, if we had

18 difficulties and what we were doing. So to my knowledge, yes, every

19 single country within the mission would have a link back to their country

20 to report what was going on to their -- as DZ would say, to their boys and

21 girls, what's happening to the boys and girls.

22 Q. But you were a member of the OSCE mission. Wouldn't it be logical

23 for you to report to the OSCE headquarters, to inform them, report back to

24 them, especially in view of the fact that this was, as is emphasised, a

25 civilian mission, and that is what it says in the agreement with

Page 3236

1 Yugoslavia?

2 A. Yes. We did, in fact, as I say, report back to our foreign

3 office. And the OSCE would not really be interested in the great mass of

4 trivia that we sent back, asking for spares and bits and pieces of

5 equipment that we required in order to keep our British part of the OSCE

6 running. We did send back -- I mean, DZ every single night sent a report

7 back to the OSCE, pointing out the major events of the day, but as I say,

8 OSCE were not interested in the myriad of minor details that each part of

9 the mission was carrying out.

10 Q. You mentioned Donna Phelan whom you helped for a time. Was Donna

11 Phelan a military person or a civilian person?

12 A. Donna Phelan was a civilian who had been working -- I think when

13 she was seconded to the OSCE, she was actually working on the CFE, on the

14 weapons arms control part of the OSCE, UN. So she was an expert, I

15 believe originally from the State Department in America now working with

16 the weapons verification. And this is why I understudied Donna because

17 she had a great deal of knowledge on procedures for weapons and arms and

18 troops verification.

19 Q. When she left, I didn't understand what you said perhaps, or,

20 rather, did I understand you to say that you replaced her once she left?

21 A. Yes. I took over the function which she had carried out, which

22 was to design and facilitate the conduct of verification.

23 Q. So you did replace Donna Phelan.

24 A. I suppose you could say that, yes.

25 Q. Here in the statement of General Drewienkiewicz, it says that

Page 3237

1 Donna Phelan left and went to the United States and that then her function

2 was taken over by Roland Peter from the United States, that he took over

3 her function and post. Is that some misunderstanding or perhaps a mistake

4 in the explanation?

5 A. It's possible that DZ split the function of Donna Phelan. But the

6 verification part of Donna Phelan's function, I assumed.

7 Q. You spoke about the fact that you were not enabled to tour certain

8 barracks. Now, do you know that in the agreement that was made up and

9 that you had in your pocket that this was not provided for, the fact that

10 you should control the army within its barracks? That was not a provision

11 of the agreement you had.

12 A. I'm surprised to hear it from you, Mr. Milosevic, because the

13 agreement actually says that we had access and freedom of movement

14 throughout Kosovo. And if we were trying to verify anything at all, then

15 we'd obviously need to have access also to barracks. I mean, how else

16 would we know how many weapons and tanks and guns you had unless you

17 actually allowed us into your barracks to verify this?

18 Q. But you were well aware of the fact that the army, according to

19 that agreement, was not engaged and involved except for three units which

20 were company size in strength.

21 A. If you're referring to the three units that we were eventually

22 allowed to visit, this (a) took a lot of work to get to these units to see

23 them. Weeks and weeks, if not months, of effort was required to visit

24 these, and we were only ever allowed one visit to these three units.

25 Q. Well, that's what I want to define. According to the agreement,

Page 3238

1 the Pristina Corps was in its barracks and undergoing its regular

2 training, and it did not have any connection with your verifications

3 because its units were not used, were not deployed except for three units

4 which were the size of a company. And according to the agreement, they

5 were precisely deployed in three locations in Kosovo, and that is what it

6 said in the agreement.

7 Now, can I take it that you believe that your verification related

8 to the positions of those three units and their functions?

9 A. Mr. Milosevic, in the first place, the units which were garrisoned

10 in their barracks did deploy. And when they deployed, we were still not

11 allowed anywhere near those units; we were kept at arm's length.

12 Secondly, the agreement, the way it is written is obviously,

13 you're telling me now, open to different interpretation. The way we read

14 the agreement was that we had access not only to those three company

15 groups but also to the barracks. And in fact, in furtherance of this, I

16 believe that a letter was written to you, specifying exactly how we

17 intended to carry out verification, of what units, and to what level, to

18 which we never received a reply.

19 Q. And that's what I'm talking about. You had those three companies,

20 and they were strictly enumerated in the agreement, and you were able to

21 control them, and you did have freedom of movement around Kosovo in that

22 respect. Is that correct or not?

23 JUDGE MAY: Well, so we can follow this, Mr. Milosevic, which part

24 of the agreement are you relying on and which agreement?

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The agreement about limiting the

Page 3239

1 number of policemen and which states that the army will be engaged in

2 their regular duties except for three companies, and the regular duties

3 were their regular peacetime duties, which means normal training sessions

4 and nothing more than that. And that is what it says in the agreement,

5 and it is in one of the sections that General Drewienkiewicz brought with

6 him here yesterday. He brought copies of those documents into court and

7 you will be able to find it very easily because I haven't got this large

8 binder with me here today. I don't want to carry it around with me.

9 JUDGE MAY: We'll ask Mr. Ryneveld. There are two agreements.

10 It's not clear which is being referred to. There's the 16th of October

11 agreement and there is what I think is called the Burns agreement.

12 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes, Your Honour. At tab 3, and we have additional

13 copies of --

14 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

15 MR. RYNEVELD: Sorry. At tab 3, we have the 25th of October

16 agreement which has a statement attached to it, talking about various VJ

17 units. Then at tab 4, you have the understanding dated the 25th of

18 October, signed by Sean Burns. So I believe there is a reference to both

19 of those, and I wonder whether the witness -- yes, I see the witness has

20 just been -- had -- been shown Exhibit 94, tabs 3 and 4.

21 I have an extra copy available for Mr. Milosevic, should he need

22 it.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't need an additional copy. I

24 know that according to the agreement, three companies were deployed and

25 that that could have been the subject of the verification. So that is not

Page 3240

1 something that is being challenged.

2 JUDGE MAY: Let's find the particular passage in the agreement.

3 Colonel, perhaps you can help us. We take it that the reference

4 is to the statement, which is in our tab 3. There's a reference to three

5 company-sized teams at paragraph 5.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's it precisely. Three units

7 the size of companies. That is what was provided for. And also,

8 provision was made for the level of the police force. And I remember

9 there were 10.024 policemen, and they rotated. A portion of them were

10 rotated. That's what the mission was entrusted to verify.

11 THE WITNESS: Earlier on, Your Honour, it does say that we have --

12 in the first paragraph, 1, towards the end of the paragraph, that we have

13 full freedom of movement, also citizens and state authorities

14 representatives as well as normal activity, and it doesn't actually say, I

15 don't think, in paragraph 5 that those are the only units we can actually

16 inspect.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Well, you had to tour what was in the agreement and in the

19 terrain. That's logical.

20 A. Well, that's right, Mr. Milosevic. So for example, when paragraph

21 2 says with those goals in mind, the state authorities, how they announced

22 the following measures, for example any additional materiel, heavy weapons

23 12.7 millimetres and above, into Kosovo will be withdrawn from Kosovo and

24 returned to the VJ. Now, how can we verify this? Because this is

25 something we're verifying. How can we verify this unless we can actually

Page 3241

1 go and have a look inside your barracks? You know, do we rely just on

2 what you tell us?

3 Q. You do so by not finding it on the terrain, in the field. If it

4 has been withdrawn, then it's not on the terrain. And what's in the

5 barracks is up to the Yugoslav army and the corps, the Pristina Corps that

6 was there. So I don't know whether it is clear that your right did not

7 compass examining the barracks.

8 A. Yes. And what about the fact that you did deploy the units from

9 these barracks into your winter training locations, into your winter sort

10 of exercises and still didn't give us access to those locations?

11 Q. Units throughout Yugoslavia, both before, at the time, and

12 afterwards, were engaged in their regular training sessions. And as you

13 well know as an officer, you cannot conduct exercises within the barracks

14 compound but you have to go outside in the localities which are allotted

15 for this purpose. So that was not something which was brought into

16 question in any way. But let's move on.

17 In your statement, you speak about your duties and tasks that

18 incorporated organisation, touring, et cetera, et cetera, and you say --

19 and this is at the end of paragraph 7: "These visits --" it is the last

20 sentence of paragraph 7: "These visits necessitated utilising various

21 military units to assist me in visiting VJ and MUP units." That's what it

22 says in your statement.

23 Now, I'm asking you which military units assisted you in visiting

24 the army of Yugoslavia and MUP units.

25 A. Sorry, I don't have my statement in front of me.

Page 3242

1 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness have a copy.

2 MR. RYNEVELD: Would the Court like a copy to follow?

3 JUDGE MAY: We have one. Is this the witness statement or the

4 summary?

5 MR. RYNEVELD: No. They are now referring to the actual witness

6 statement, which I do not believe the Court has.

7 JUDGE MAY: No. We better have the statement.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's the statement, not the summary.

9 MR. RYNEVELD: The paragraphs in the statement are not numbered.

10 That's perhaps where the -- when he refers to paragraph 7, the summary has

11 numbered paragraphs but the statement does not. It's on the first page, I

12 believe, of the statement, it's called page 2, and the sentence is the

13 second to the last paragraph, at the end of it.

14 THE WITNESS: What I would have referred to here is the fact that

15 obviously I could not myself have organised any of these visits, so I

16 would have go to the Cooperation Commission with Colonel Kotur and then

17 we'd decide which units we'd like to visit and get their help in

18 organising these visits because we were in no position to coordinate this;

19 it could only be done by the VJ. So it does not refer to any outside

20 units outside Kosovo, and it does not refer to any other units than

21 Serbian military units.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. All right. So this sentence here -- have you found the sentence I

24 referred to, where it says, "These necessitated utilising various military

25 units to assist me in visiting the units of the army of Yugoslavia, or VJ,

Page 3243

1 and MUP units."

2 Now, my question is what other units of the Yugoslav army helped

3 you? Did I understand you to say that other units helped you?

4 A. No. We were just helped by the Yugoslav army units. So, for

5 example, if we were going down to Mitrovica, we would probably go up with

6 General Kotur, speak to the commander, and try and work out exactly what

7 we'd like to do or what we'd like to organise. That's what I meant by

8 cooperation from the other military units.

9 Q. Was that cooperation good?

10 A. It was eventually successful in trying to -- in verifying the

11 three combat groups that you said we were allowed only to see. Yes, that

12 was a very successful visit. But other visits were impossible.

13 Q. But in the next paragraph of your statement you say - and you can

14 follow that easily now because you've found the spot I'm referring to -

15 "There were three main VJ sites that we wanted to visit, and through

16 negotiation, we were able to achieve this goal," et cetera, et cetera.

17 A. Yes. We were given reasonable open access on one occasion to

18 visit each of those sites.

19 Q. As we're on your statement, in order to make rational use of time

20 we can go on discussing it, and in the following paragraph, you say, "In

21 about February 1999 we also attempted a MUP verification visit --" that is

22 to say, of the Ministry of the Interior, that is what the MUP is short

23 for, just to make things quite clear, the police ministry, in fact --

24 "where we sent 30 to 40 teams to every known MUP checkpoint."

25 You say that that was in February, although you say "about

Page 3244

1 February," but I'm not questioning that. I'm not challenging that. But

2 you visited the 27 known sites and identified nine or ten more. And then

3 you go on to say that you confirm that the MUP were breaching the

4 agreement as to how many checkpoints they were permitted to operate.

5 Now, you know full well that in the agreement which you quoted a

6 moment ago and which you quote in your statement as well, it says that the

7 MUP may, if it -- if there are justified reasons to do so, to increase the

8 number of its patrols. Now, do you know that at that time in February, it

9 was a period in which there were very many attacks by KLA terrorists and

10 that therefore, it -- there was no question of whether MUP could increase

11 its patrols. It could in localities where they considered it necessary

12 for security reasons, the checkpoints. So why, then, did you say that the

13 MUP was violating the agreement when that is precisely what is stated in

14 the agreement and according to your statement?

15 A. Because the actual -- in the agreement, it does say that 27

16 observation posts, of which one-third will be manned, so that makes

17 nine, and on this occasion, we found nearly 40 that were manned.

18 JUDGE MAY: I think the point is this, that the understanding goes

19 on to say that in cases of incidents or increased tension, the police will

20 have the right, upon notifying KDOM/OSCE, to perform patrol duties in

21 armoured vehicles, et cetera. So I think what is being put was that this

22 was a time of increased tension and they were entitled to do so.

23 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I think what it was doing, it was

24 actually increasing the tension just by sort of having this increased

25 number of patrol bases which made them targets, invited sort of

Page 3245












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 3246

1 retaliation from the KLA. And it does actually say that the -- the

2 Serbian Cooperation Commission should have informed, given us prior notice

3 of any increase, which it never did.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. On the contrary, it did. But as you've just said this, are you

6 saying that it is the fault of the police for having appeared at all

7 because the KLA attacked it, because the KLA terrorists were shooting at

8 the police, it is the fault of the police for having existed at all, for

9 having been visible?

10 A. Not at all. Of course there is a right to protect and

11 self-defence, but an overreaction and an over -- a larger force than what

12 you actually sort of need, which oppresses the local population from

13 moving, from conducting their ordinary business, will actually cause

14 resentment amongst the population. That's just my opinion.

15 Q. That means that the appearance of the police justifiably provoked

16 the KLA to shoot at the police?

17 A. I didn't say that either. I said that the overpolicing, the sort

18 of strictures imposed on movements and of normal life could irritate the

19 local population, which could in turn, for some people, be they terrorists

20 or whatever, use it as an excuse to actually attack your police.

21 Q. And then it's the fault of the police, not the fault of the

22 terrorists who are attacking them, according to this logic that you seem

23 to be resorting to?

24 JUDGE MAY: The witness has explained his answer.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 3247

1 Q. In the next paragraph, you make a very profound statement. You

2 say: "The method we used, as planned initially by Donna Phelan, was very

3 confrontational." Them, I mean, the army, the police. "And the Serbs

4 were not happy with this."

5 My understanding has been that according to its letter, this

6 mission was a mission of cooperation. Yesterday your superior,

7 Drewienkiewicz, said that you made an effort to establish cooperation.

8 And what you are saying here and now, "The method we used, as planned

9 initially by Donna Phelan, was very confrontational and that the Serbs

10 were not happy with this.

11 How could anyone be happy with confrontation from the side of

12 those that they were supposed to cooperate with? Can you explain this?

13 A. Yes. I think I sort of need to tell you that the first attempt to

14 verify at the barracks just outside Pristina, the Junik barracks, was

15 undeclared by us, or if it was declared, we gave very minimal notice, and

16 we arrived at the barracks, saying what we wanted to do and what we

17 believed the agreement allowed us to do. As this was totally unsuccessful

18 and we got nowhere with this methodology, once Donna Phelan left, I then

19 believe it was, from my experience as an attache, my experience working

20 with other forces, other country's forces, is it's better to, you know,

21 use a policy of diplomacy and negotiation. And so I did begin a complete

22 series of negotiations through the Cooperation Commission to try to

23 rectify this. And even though we attempted to do this and, for example,

24 invited General Loncar to come to the next verification we attended, we

25 gave plenty of notice. That also was unsuccessful. It was only much,

Page 3248

1 much later, after a great deal more of negotiating, trying to explain to

2 the Cooperation Commission why we were doing this and what the reasons for

3 the verification were, an openness to show the world that you were not

4 hiding anything, this was my intention to actually show this, that you

5 didn't have weapons above the quota, you know, that was specified in the

6 agreement.

7 That was after a long, long serious of negotiations, we finally

8 got permission to visit those three sites, and I believe that was a

9 breakthrough. However, after that, we had no more access, because once

10 your troops were deployed in the field, again you closed the sort of

11 access to the deployed units to your exercises, which, incidentally, were

12 unusual exercises because these exercises involved shooting at real people

13 and real property which we don't normally do during training. So we then

14 came up with another method of trying to verify where I would go around

15 personally with somebody from the VJ in sort of joint transport and try

16 and see what was going on. But our patrols, our people on the ground

17 could not get into any of these areas at all.

18 Q. I hear this explanation of yours concerning your work. However,

19 my question was for you to explain what it says here. "The method we used

20 was very confrontational."

21 You say that this method was planned initially by Donna Phelan.

22 I'm not interested in who planned it initially. Can you tell us something

23 about this method that you used as you say it was very confrontational, in

24 the Serbian translation, opposing to a maximum.

25 JUDGE MAY: I think the witness has dealt with this when he

Page 3249

1 described what they did when they first went into the barracks at

2 Pristina, and I understood that to be his description of confrontational.

3 Is that right, Colonel?

4 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, that's absolutely correct.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Please. An incident, an individual occurrence cannot be

7 identified with an explanation of that which is defined as a method. A

8 method means the use of certain actions or taking certain measures

9 permanently. The method that we used that was initially planned by Donna

10 Phelan. So this is a planned method that was used was very

11 confrontational.

12 JUDGE MAY: Let's get on with it, if we can.

13 Can you describe Donna Phelan's method in any other way than you

14 have already or can you add something to what you've said?

15 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. The method -- I mean, because

16 Donna was an experienced weapons -- a CFE weapons inspector, verifier

17 sitting in this world of verification, she adopted those techniques which

18 basically is to give a short amount of notice to the country being visited

19 and then to have complete access to everything within the barracks and

20 within every unit, within every sort of barracks, within every training

21 area in that country. This is just a standard procedure for doing weapons

22 and arms verification.

23 Now, because we sort of chose this method, and also at the same

24 time Donna Phelan and DZ had written a letter to Mr. Milosevic outlining

25 how we'd like to do this and had no response, she assumed that no response

Page 3250

1 meant that we had no other option at that point but to carry on with the

2 method we'd thought of.

3 When this method didn't work, that's when we changed it. Almost

4 immediately. Mr. Milosevic believes that we continued this way. We did

5 not continue the confrontational technique. We went away from that. I

6 toured Kosovo, all the Regional Centres --

7 JUDGE MAY: I think that's a separate point --


9 JUDGE MAY: -- than the one he was asking about.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. I am not aware of having receiving letters from Donna Phelan, from

12 your verifiers, any one of your verifiers, I have to say that. But in

13 relation to this, what you have just described, that you found, in terms

14 of the verification of the MUP, that is to say, your teams did, did you

15 send a report on this to the Yugoslav authorities, or, rather, did you

16 discuss this with the Yugoslav commission that was headed by General

17 Loncar in Pristina?

18 A. Yes. First of all, the letter was drafted by Donna Phelan and

19 given -- signed by the Head of Mission. That was sent to you. And

20 secondly, the letter that was -- the full report of our findings of the 27

21 positions that were more was passed to General Loncar of the Cooperation

22 Commission, the full report.

23 Q. And did you discuss this question with General Loncar and his

24 associates?

25 A. Absolutely. DZ personally discussed it with General Loncar.

Page 3251

1 Q. So did he discuss it fully with General Loncar? When I say "you,"

2 I'm not referring to you personally. I'm referring to you the

3 Verification Mission, the appropriate representative, that is. If it's

4 Drewienkiewicz, then it's him, or Walker, or Keller. That's not what

5 matters, as far as I'm concerned.

6 So I'm saying whether you discussed this.

7 A. It was discussed with the Cooperation Commission and

8 General Loncar, yes.

9 Q. And was it cleared up?

10 A. No, it was left as a protest from us because in our opinion, you

11 had breached the agreement.

12 Q. And Loncar was not in a position to give any explanation of this?

13 A. I think we heard many of the same arguments that we hear from you

14 today, sir.

15 Q. Well, that stems from the letter of the agreement. You wrote here

16 as well that, "In addition to this task of verification of arms, I also

17 assumed the role of chief liaison person with the FRY." This is a fact

18 that is new to me, that you were the chief person liaising with the FRY.

19 Can you explain this, because it seems a bit unbelievable to me?

20 A. I think it's an error of sort of using careless comments when I

21 was making the statement. It obviously means chief of liaison with the

22 Cooperation Commission. I had no direct liaison with the FRY. But as the

23 Commission of Cooperation were the mouthpiece, I presume, of your

24 government, then I suppose indirectly I was speaking to the FRY.

25 Q. That's fine. When you say with the Commission for Cooperation,

Page 3252

1 but also when you say Commission of Cooperation, did you have the chief

2 role in the position of a liaison person? If we were to delete the FRY,

3 if we were to insert the Cooperation Commission with the FRY, weren't the

4 chief persons for this liaison Walker, Keller, Drewienkiewicz, and your

5 other superiors, members of the mission who were superior to you?

6 From what I can see from your explanations, they were at these

7 meetings and you accompanied them to these meetings.

8 A. As it turned out, because of the duration and the frequency of the

9 meetings, I attended without either DZ or Walker or any other Deputy Head

10 of Mission at these meetings, and it was myself and my interpreters, and I

11 would take other specialists along with me to support me to these

12 meetings, but I would also be representing the Head of Mission.

13 Obviously, any member of the mission was a representative of Mr. Walker,

14 including DZ.

15 JUDGE MAY: It's quarter to and we must adjourn now. Colonel,

16 would you be back, please, at 9.00 tomorrow morning.

17 We ought to have a number for the witness statement.

18 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 98.

19 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. We will adjourn now until tomorrow

20 morning.

21 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned

22 at 1.45 p.m., to be reconvened on

23 Wednesday, the 17th day of April, 2002,

24 at 9.00 a.m.