Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 13169

 1                          Thursday, 21 November 2002

 2                          [Open session]

 3                          [The accused entered court]

 4                          [The witness entered court]

 5                          --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

 6            JUDGE MAY:  Yes, Mr. Nice.

 7            MR. NICE:  Can I return to the question of how much time should be

 8    available for the evidence-in-chief of this witness?

 9            JUDGE MAY:  Well, we've heard submissions on this, if I may say,

10    very adequately presented by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.  We've had the

11    opportunity of reflecting on the matter and we've made a decision.  I'm

12    not sure there's really anything you can add to it.

13            MR. NICE:  Your Honour, first -- two points I'd like to clarify --

14    three, if I may, and I am only doing it because of my role in charge of

15    the case as a whole and there's one thing I want to say.

16            First of all, in case there's any ambiguity, what we're seeking is

17    six days, not four, that is, two additional days.  We hope that was clear.

18            Second, the Prosecution's position is that it would be wrong,

19    frankly wrong, given the quality, the integrity, and the detail of this

20    witness to exclude any of his evidence.

21            Third, and I think this was not available in detail last night,

22    there is the statistics of the number of witnesses who would be saved

23    having to give evidence, and some analysis of the material that would be

24    lost if it was other than the full six days available for evidence.  And

25    the statistics may help the Court, and I hope they will enable you to

Page 13170

 1    review any decision tentatively made or provisionally made other than to

 2    grant the two additional days.

 3            Originally, we were allowed 71 witnesses for Croatia.  We forecast

 4    - obviously these things are not capable of the greatest precision - that

 5    the fifth day of evidence of this witness would enable us to save eight

 6    witnesses who we otherwise had a settled intention to call; some four

 7    experts, two low-level insiders, and two verifiers of a document.  The

 8    sixth day would enable us to save a further five crime-base witnesses and

 9    one journalist witness dealing with crime-base matters.  Accordingly, the

10    total potential saving for those two additional days would be some 14

11    witnesses, which is in the order of 20 per cent of the allocation.

12            And in our respectful submission, it is entirely right that the

13    witness should be heard in full.  If he is not heard in full, material

14    that will be left out would include direct contacts between the witness

15    and other members of the joint criminal enterprise plus evidence simply

16    not available elsewhere of the military structures of the areas of the

17    crimes allegedly committed.  In our submission, this is material that the

18    Chamber should have, can have in the most economic form from this witness,

19    and that it would be inappropriate or wrong to exclude.

20            Thank you for allowing me to add to the arguments that were, as I

21    entirely accept, fully expressed -- not fully expressed, but expressed

22    before she had an opportunity with the team to do the research last night

23    by my learned colleague.

24            JUDGE MAY:  Well, I must say that I think this part of the case

25    has been going very slowly indeed.  In twenty-plus days we've heard about

Page 13171

 1    12 witnesses.  And of course, it is a matter of concern as to how you're

 2    going to get through your case by the dates which we've allocated, with

 3    such adjustment as there must be for illness.

 4            MR. NICE:  May I respond?  Or maybe Your Honour hasn't completed

 5    what you're going to say.  The suggestion that the evidence has been going

 6    slowly is one that we couldn't accept.  The evidence is entirely different

 7    in character because it's so much denser in content and we have taken

 8    every available procedure to make matters go swiftly.  We are, of course,

 9    bound by the decisions of the Chamber in relation to matters of 92 bis and

10    so on, but we forecast that the very character of the evidence that is

11    coming in at the beginning of this phase of the trial will in fact enable

12    us to prove our case in, we hope, and realistically expect, the original

13    overall time allocations made by the Chamber.

14            JUDGE MAY:  Well, I think it was the 12th of May.  That day stands

15    for the moment.  We will make such adjustment as we can and we think

16    proper for illness, but that is the date which you must have in mind, Mr.

17    Nice.

18            MR. NICE:  We have.  And of course I will do, in respect of

19    remaining witnesses, everything that can be done, as the whole team has

20    been doing so far, to make use of procedural steps to abbreviate evidence.

21    But we are bound by the Rules of the Tribunal and the practices of the

22    Chamber.  So we press you to say that it is simply inappropriate to

23    restrict this witness's evidence and economic --

24            JUDGE MAY:  Well, it's not the evidence; it's the speed with which

25    it's being taken.  It can be taken more expeditiously, in my view.

Page 13172

 1            MR. NICE:  Well, I respectfully differ from that view, and my

 2    learned colleague is, of course, master of the detail, as is the witness,

 3    and the evidence is necessarily delivered at a speed that is going to be

 4    capable of being understood and assimilated.  There are other ways

 5    evidence can be given.  I'm only too happy for that to be dealt with.

 6    Statements can be read, pre-read, and a witness can adopt his statement,

 7    but those are not practices that this Chamber is yet in a position to

 8    accept, and therefore we have the viva voce system of question and answer,

 9    and I would reject entirely any suggestion that my learned colleague has

10    not been proceeding with this matter other than at a good speed.

11            JUDGE MAY:  Not my view.  Not that -- no criticism, may I say, but

12    -- because counsel, of course, approach things in their own way, and I

13    accept that.  And counsel, as we recognise, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff considers

14    the duty which she has to put the matter before us and also the witness on

15    occasion replies at a bit of length.

16            Well, we'll consider the matter and we'll reflect on it.

17            MR. NICE:  Thank you.

18            JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nice, I think I can see your point, but what was

19    the base then when the Prosecution at the outset had said that it expected

20    to conclude this witness in three days and a half and how was it changed?

21            MR. NICE:  You know, until you -- until you do these things, you

22    can never be quite sure, and of course Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff was well aware

23    of the considerable pressure that would be on her from the Chamber to deal

24    with matters at a particular speed.  Until you actually do it in court,

25    you can't know.

Page 13173

 1            Now, this witness -- and again, this is something that we have to

 2    take into account.  Witnesses are not as we would like them to be; they

 3    are as they are.  He's a meticulous man who gives evidence in detail,

 4    according to the process of his memory and thought processes, and there is

 5    a limit to which you can make one witness into a witness of another type.

 6            JUDGE ROBINSON:  Mr. Nice --

 7            MR. NICE:  Yes.  I'm grateful to Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.  Of course,

 8    we have to remind the Chamber, we pressed you to apply the provisions of

 9    92 bis, which would have saved many hours or days, but the Chamber took a

10    different view.  We would have preferred all the background material to

11    have been pre-read in a way that we respectfully press on the Chamber is

12    entirely appropriate, safe, and preserving of the accused's rights.  But

13    the Chamber took a contrary view, which we have, of course, respected.

14            JUDGE ROBINSON:  Mr. Nice, I'm not saying that I would accede to

15    the request, but it would seem to me that if we were to consider it

16    favourably, we would have to hold you very strictly to the 14 witnesses

17    whom you say you will not call.  I would like to see the names of those

18    witnesses.

19            MR. NICE:  I would always hope my word in court is something that

20    will be accepted.  As to holding us to account, if that's expressed in the

21    view that my word is accepted, then of course I have absolutely no problem

22    with that as a proposition.  I'm in a position to provide the list of the

23    names of those who we at present regard as witnesses we would no longer

24    seek to call.  Yes, I can provide you with a list.

25            JUDGE MAY:  Very well.  We'll consider the matter.

Page 13174

 1            MR. NICE:  Thank you very much.

 2            JUDGE MAY:  Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

 3            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 4                          WITNESS:  WITNESS MILAN BABIC [Resumed]

 5                          [Witness answered through interpreter]

 6                          Examined by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff: [Continued]

 7       Q.   Good morning, Witness.

 8       A.   Good morning.

 9       Q.   Can you speak into the microphone?  The interpreters couldn't hear

10    you.

11            Witness, yesterday we spoke about the removal of Frenki and

12    Captain Dragan from the region in August, and I would like to ask you in

13    this context about a meeting.  I would like to do that in private session.

14   [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of the Chamber]

15            JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, I would be grateful if you would

16    remind us in terms of where we are, in which paragraph, from time to time.

17            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.  We are now in paragraph 191.

18            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in private session, Your Honours.

19            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

20       Q.   Witness, after Frenki had left the region, did you meet Mr.

21    Stanisic in Knin?

22       A.   Could you repeat that question?  Who are you referring to?  Who

23    did you say?

24            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I didn't get any interpretation.

25            THE INTERPRETER:  Can you hear the English channel?  Can you hear

Page 13175

 1    the English?  Yes?

 2            Could you repeat the question, please?  Whom were you referring

 3    to?

 4            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 5       Q.   Did you meet Mr. Jovica Stanisic, Mr. Martic, and Mr. Orlovic in

 6    August 1991 in Knin; and if so, where did you meet and what did you talk

 7    about?

 8       A.   That's right.  We did meet.  It was after Frenki's removal and

 9    Captain Dragan.  Jovica Stanisic arrived in Knin.  I was called to come.

10    He was there and Martic was there, in a cafe called Vrelo near Knin, and

11    in my presence, Stanisic criticised Orlovic for the events that had

12    occurred before that.  Martic just laughed to himself.  He didn't feel

13    that the criticism was addressed to him specifically, and Orlovic as well.

14    He accepted the criticisms that were made, but he didn't feel that they

15    were against him.

16       Q.   During this conversation, did Mr. Stanisic make any reference to

17    Mr. Milosevic?

18       A.   No.  Oh, I beg your pardon.  Yes.  Yes, of course.  In the course

19    of that conversation, yes, he did say.  He said, "Why are they doing the

20    things the way they're doing?"  And he was referring to Knin, what was

21    happening in Knin, so that President Milosevic has to intervene.

22       Q.   Witness, what was Stanisic's role and relationship vis-a-vis Mr.

23    Milosevic?

24       A.   He was the executive official for Mr. Milosevic, and I saw him as

25    the Number Two man in Slobodan Milosevic's regime.  So the Number Two man,

Page 13176

 1    second in importance.

 2       Q.   Did Mr. Stanisic say anything to this effect to you?

 3       A.   Well, there was lots of information, lots of facts pertaining to

 4    his relationship with Milosevic.  A case in point, an example from

 5    Serbia's internal policy.  Stanisic, for example, said at one point that

 6    Milosevic, the president, is dealing with foreign affairs and I deal

 7    internal affairs and I won the elections for him.  Then there was another

 8    example with respect to involvement in Bosnia around Gorazde, in 1994, in

 9    the month of April or towards the end of April, May perhaps.  He said,

10    after Milosevic and Karadzic, with representatives of the international

11    community agreed upon a truce, a cease of hostilities around Gorazde in

12    Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jovica commented -- Jovica Stanisic commented on that

13    and he said that their special units, the special police units - I think

14    he mentioned Frenki as being at the head of those units - had made the

15    greatest contribution in the fighting over there but that they did this

16    sidestepping Milosevic's orders.  That is to say, there weren't any orders

17    and as the president, he did not know about that.  But he said it in such

18    a way as to imply -- he wanted actually to conceal Milosevic's role in

19    those events.  He was an executor and a protector of Milosevic, in a way.

20       Q.   When did he make this remark of this, or these special units in

21    Gorazde?  To which time period did he refer?

22       A.   This referred to the period of March/April 1994, thereabouts.

23            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  We can go back into open session.

24                          [Open session]

25            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

Page 13177

 1            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 2       Q.   We have mentioned several times Mr. Martic.  You have also

 3    referred to the support that he received from Serbia.  Was Mr. Martic

 4    loyal to Mr. Milosevic?  Can you say?

 5       A.   Yes.

 6       Q.   Did Mr. Martic acknowledge his loyalty publicly during the

 7    election campaign that he held in 1993/1994?

 8       A.   Yes, publicly.  During the election campaign and after the

 9    campaign as well, he said that he would be the provisional president of

10    Krajina, and once -- that he would be only the provisional president and

11    that he would hand over the baton to Slobodan Milosevic, the relay baton,

12    sort of, hand over the office.  And people made jokes about that in Knin,

13    saying that he would hand over his police baton to Milosevic.

14            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Private session, please.

15   [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of the Chamber]

16            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in private session.

17            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

18       Q.   Did you have a discussion with Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Martic in

19    August 1991 in relation to the position of the TO commander in the

20    Krajina?

21       A.   That's right.  I did have that conversation in Mr. Milosevic's

22    offices.  I was invited to go to Milosevic's offices and I met Martic

23    there.  Martic was already at Milosevic's.  And without any great

24    introduction, Milosevic said the following:  He said, "Let Mile be the

25    commander of the Territorial Defence," and he was thinking about Mile

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Page 13179

 1    Martic, who was present there, and he repeated that.  I think that the

 2    conversation went on for about two hours.  Milosevic kept repeating that

 3    sentence.  And I think he repeated it countless times; at least, many,

 4    many times, just that sentence.

 5       Q.   Did you object against Martic being the TO commander; and if so,

 6    why?

 7       A.   That's right.  I did object, and that is why Milosevic kept

 8    repeating that particular sentence, because he felt that I was opposed.  I

 9    asked for some objective reasons, quite simply.  I said, "Well, he's a

10    policeman.  He can't -- you can't have a policeman command the Territorial

11    Defence.  You would need a general, the rank of general or colonel or

12    somebody who has been trained in the National Defence School and has the

13    rank of general.  It's a professional post and he needs to have a staff of

14    at least ten persons."  So my objections went along those lines and I

15    objected to his proposal.

16            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  We can go into open session again.

17                          [Open session]

18            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session.

19            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  With the help of the usher, I would like to

20    put to the witness the Exhibit tab 64 in Exhibit 352.

21       Q.   Witness, it's an appointment of Milan Martic to the position of

22    deputy commander of the TO of the SAO Krajina.  Why was he appointed into

23    this position, and what competence did go along with this position?

24       A.   He was appointed because he was the Minister of the Interior, and

25    in that way the police in Krajina were incorporated into the new system

Page 13180

 1    and placed under the authority of the government of Krajina.

 2       Q.   Witness, yesterday we spoke about a report.  It was an exhibit,

 3    tab 67, a report on the military activities in the region in August 1991.

 4    This report that also went to Frenki.  And in this report, there was

 5    mentioned a ceasefire, an order that Mile Martic gave regarding a

 6    ceasefire.  Was a ceasefire actually agreed upon on the 6th of August,

 7    1991?

 8       A.   Yes, it was.

 9       Q.   Despite the ceasefire, was Kijevo attacked in August 1991?

10       A.   On the 26th of August, it was attacked, yes.  And before that,

11    Milan Martic laid down an ultimatum to the police and inhabitants of

12    Kijevo, telling them to leave Kijevo, on the 18th of August, I believe.

13            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  With the help of the usher, I would like to

14    put to the witness tab 68 from Exhibit 352.

15       Q.   Is that the ceasefire -- the ultimatum that you just mentioned?

16       A.   It is.

17            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Private session.

18   [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of the Chamber]

19            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in private session.

20            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

21       Q.   When you got information on this ultimatum, what was your reaction

22    to it?  What did you do?

23       A.   I learnt of this ultimatum from the media, and I issued a denial

24    through the media, saying that the armed forces of SAO Krajina would not

25    violate the ceasefire.  I think it was the next day after I had heard

Page 13181

 1    about the ultimatum on the media, so it was the 19th or the 20th.

 2       Q.   And your denial, was it made publicly?

 3       A.   Yes, publicly.  It was in the press.  The press carried it.

 4       Q.   And did this -- did your denial, did it cause a reaction by

 5    Martic, the JNA, or the Belgrade authorities?

 6       A.   No, with the exception of the fact that they were more intolerant

 7    towards me personally.

 8       Q.   Were you called to go to Belgrade on the 25th of August, 1991?

 9       A.   Yes, that's right.  I was invited to go to Belgrade and to report

10    to President Milosevic.

11       Q.   What did you talk about on this occasion?

12       A.   About two things:  First of all, when I arrived, President

13    Milosevic asked me how things were down there in Knin, and I said that

14    there were problems, that the Croatian police from Sinj had gone there to

15    mistreat the population in the village of Otisic and that there was no JNA

16    there to protect them.  And he said, "Hasn't that already been settled?"

17    And I said, "I don't know."  After the meeting I heard -- it was reported

18    to me, I was informed that that morning that the JNA and all armed

19    formations under its control had attacked Kijevo and the region.

20            And then he asked me about General Spiro Nikolic.  I couldn't say

21    anything for or against that man who was the commander of the Knin Corps.

22            Then he said, "Frenki needs to be down there in Krajina.  He needs

23    to go back there.  He's a good man, Frenki's good."  That was his comment.

24            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  We can go back into open session.

25                          [Open session]

Page 13182

 1            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session.

 2            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 3       Q.   While you were away from Knin in this conversation that you just

 4    had, was it on that exact day Kijevo attacked?

 5       A.   That's right.  It was attacked on that day, in the morning.

 6       Q.   Which forces were involved in this attack?

 7       A.   The JNA corps from Knin, units of the Krajina police, and the

 8    local TO.

 9       Q.   How do you know that?  Did you see anything to this effect?

10       A.   The next day, I passed through the area and I saw the commander of

11    the Knin brigade, Colonel Djukic, and officers from his group.  And he

12    said that the chief of staff of the corps, Ratko Mladic, was in front of

13    him, going towards Otisic.  I saw a tank column of which Djukic was in

14    command, and this was in front of Vrljika.  I saw a unit of TO of Cetine

15    on the edges of the village of Cetine, towards Vrljika.  And they told me

16    that the police had been there too, Martic and Milenko Zelenbaba.  And

17    this was shown on Belgrade television as well.

18       Q.   Did you see that on Belgrade television, Martic in Kijevo?

19       A.   Yes.  Belgrade television showed two scenes from Kijevo.  One was

20    Martic and Zelenbaba removing the Croatian flag from the police station

21    and embracing each other, and the other was Vesna Jugovic, a reporter of

22    Belgrade television, interviewing a soldier of the JNA on the road through

23    the village of Kijevo.  That is, a talk between him and an old man from

24    Kijevo, an old Croat who had stayed behind.  And this soldier asked him

25    the following:  "Did you kill my grandfather in 1941?"  And the man says,

Page 13183

 1    "I did not."

 2       Q.   [Microphone not activated]  Let me stop you there.  Witness, you

 3    said that you came through this region a day later.  What did Kijevo look

 4    like?  Did you see any Croats?  Was it intact?

 5       A.   The place was deserted.  The inhabitants could not be seen.  It

 6    had been destroyed by artillery fire.

 7       Q.   On that day, did you see Mr. Mladic actually in the field?  On

 8    this day or the next days?

 9       A.   In the next day or two, after I was again passing along that road,

10    that is, through Vrljika.

11       Q.   What was he doing when you saw him?

12       A.   He was returning from Otisic.  He was accompanying a group of

13    representatives of the Croatian authorities from Sinj and Split.  He was

14    accompanying them to Vrljika, which was under his administration.

15       Q.   Mr. Mladic, did he actually participate in fighting activities on

16    the ground?  Do you know that?

17       A.   Yes.  Yes.  He participated and he was in command.  The reporters

18    even said that he was in the front lines and that he de-mined obstacles

19    and he appeared on all parts of the front suddenly, on his own, with

20    groups.  And I remember that when the new Corps Commander arrived, General

21    Vukovic, and Mladic asked him to report to him where the corps units were

22    deployed.  Then Mladic showed on the map that there were small groups of

23    units of the corps on various parts of the front in the area of northern

24    Dalmatia.  And then the general said, "Where is the corps?"  But that is

25    the way Mladic commanded the corps.

Page 13184

 1       Q.   You said that Mladic commanded the corps.  Was he the Corps

 2    Commander or what was his position?

 3       A.   Mladic, from the summer and through the autumn of 1991, he was

 4    Chief of Staff of the corps.  For a time, that is, in September, when

 5    Spiro Nikolic, the previous general, was moved to another position before

 6    Vukovic arrived, he was the most senior officer.  In 1992, he was for a

 7    time the Corps Commander, that is, Mladic.

 8            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I would like to go into private session again

 9    for the next meeting with Mr. Milosevic.

10    [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of the Chamber]

11            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in private session.

12            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

13       Q.   Did you meet Mr. Milosevic in September 1991 in relation to a TO

14    commander for the Krajina?

15       A.   Yes, around the 12th of September, 1991, in connection with the TO

16    staff.  Officers for the TO staff of SAO Krajina.

17       Q.   Did you have a proposal to make as to the new TO commander?

18       A.   I did.  Borivoj Rasuo and Zoran Kalicanin, a man from the

19    information service of the JNA.  They recommended to me Radosav Maksic, a

20    colonel that I met on that occasion, and who had volunteered to go

21    together with ten other officers and form the Main Staff of the TO SAO

22    Krajina.  But Maksic wanted me to seek approval from Milosevic for him to

23    be discharged as he was in active service in Belgrade.

24       Q.   And what was Mr. Milosevic's position when you informed him?

25       A.   That he would do what is necessary for them to come.  And he was

Page 13185

 1    in a very good mood then.  That is when I met Jovica Stanisic, in his

 2    offices; not in the same room, but the room next to his.  That was when he

 3    was in the best mood, compared to all the other encounters I had with him.

 4    He even shared his lunch with me.

 5       Q.   Does that mean Mr. Milosevic agreed to your proposal to appoint

 6    Maksic as the TO commander?  What did he say to you?

 7       A.   "That's right.  They will come -- he'll come."

 8       Q.   And you mentioned Mr. Stanisic, that you saw him also on that day.

 9    What was his contact -- what was your contact with him?  How did that come

10    about and what did you talk about?

11       A.   Before I entered into the study of President Milosevic, the

12    secretary said that the president was having a break, that he was having

13    lunch, and that I should wait in the room next to hers, or the one next to

14    it, towards the corner.  And I went inside, and Jovica Stanisic was

15    standing behind the desk, and there was a military map in front of him

16    with the lines drawn in of the deployment of the army.  He just showed me

17    with his eyes that I should look at the map.  I looked, and then he took

18    me to the next room.  This was a semi-oval room on the corner.  He closed

19    the door and he said, "This is the room for reporting."  And when I went

20    back, the secretary said, "You can go in, the president will receive you."

21    And the president received me, though he hadn't finished his lunch.  He

22    shared his lunch with me.

23       Q.   Witness, let me stop you here.  What did you see on the map that

24    Mr. Stanisic was dealing with?  Do you recall what kind of a map or what

25    kind of a region it dealt with?

Page 13186

 1       A.   It was a military topographical map, and the scale, I think, was

 2    about 1:50.000 or 1:100.000.  And it had a red line drawn on it in the

 3    area of Northern Dalmatia.  I am familiar with the area, the topography of

 4    the area, and I knew that the army was there.  And the line indicated the

 5    positions of the army, across the Perucac Lake, the Svilaja mountain,

 6    Petrova Polje, Cikova, and the surroundings of Benkovac.

 7            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  We can go into open session.

 8                          [Open session]

 9            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session.

10            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

11       Q.   Did the -- did Colonel Maksic actually arrive, and his ten

12    officers?

13       A.   Some ten days went by and they didn't arrive, and I called

14    President Milosevic's secretary on the phone and I asked for the

15    president, and she said he wasn't there but she would connect me to him.

16    And I asked him, "What about the officers?"  And he said, "They're coming

17    tomorrow."  They didn't come tomorrow, but they came five or six or seven

18    days later.  But not ten officers; Maksic and another two.

19       Q.   Did they arrive, and what position did they take?

20       A.   Colonel Dusan Kasum came as the chief of staff of the TO SAO

21    Krajina; Colonel Vuletic, as the chief of communications; and Colonel

22    Maksic, as the operative chief.  They came to Martic's at the Knin

23    fortress, and they called me to come there and I arrived and I saw only

24    three of them, and they just shrugged their shoulders.  And I asked, "Is

25    Martic the commander?"  And he said, "Call General Simovic."  He was the

Page 13187

 1    Minister of Defence of Serbia.  And I called him and I asked, "Is Maksic

 2    the commander of the TO staff of SAO Krajina?"  And he said, "We have

 3    designated General Djujic."  And he gave an explanation for Martic, an

 4    excuse why he couldn't hold that position.

 5       Q.   And what was the reason why General Djujic was supposed to take

 6    the position?

 7       A.   Simovic said that Maksic was an alcoholic.

 8       Q.   Did --

 9            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  With the help of the usher I would like just

10    to put to you the decisions made in this regard.  It's tab 69, appointment

11    of General Djujic, Maksic, Kasum and Vuletic; tab 70, appointment Colonel

12    Djujic; tab 71, appointment Maksic; tab 72, order to relieve Djujic; tab

13    46 -- sorry, 49.6 is a decision to appoint Colonel Tabok; and tab 51.1 and

14    50.2, decisions to relieve Dusan Starevic from -- and Velibor Matijasevic

15    from their positions.

16       Q.   Are these decisions taken in relation to the TO command and the --

17       A.   Yes.

18      Q.   Did you actually, in the Krajina, make the substantial decisions,

19   or are these just the official documents confirming decisions taken by

20   others?

21       A.   These were formal, legal decisions confirming decisions taken by

22    the competent authorities in Belgrade, in this case, the General Staff and

23    the Secretary of National Defence.  These two documents about Matijasevic

24    and Starevic, they are not directly linked to the Main Staff of the TO but

25    rather linked to the obstruction of the Assembly, which was done by a

Page 13188












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Page 13189

 1    parallel structure with a view to influencing negotiations in The Hague.

 2       Q.   Witness, those TO commanders that were then appointed, were they

 3    controlled by the politicians in the Krajina?  Did they report to the

 4    politicians in the Krajina or not?

 5       A.   No, they did not.  They themselves didn't establish control over

 6    the unified TO of SAO Krajina, but it remained subordinated to the

 7    competent units of the JNA, according to various regions, and they

 8    themselves were subordinated to the JNA command.

 9       Q.   I have to put to you just another document in this context, and

10    it's tab 73 of the Exhibit 352.  This is an order -- a certificate,

11    actually, by the SFRY Presidency signed by Vice-President Branko Kostic

12    and Colonel Milo Kostic, in relation to promotion of Colonel Kasum to the

13    Chief of Staff of the TO Defence in April 1992; correct?

14       A.   He's promoted to the rank of general, but he was previously

15    appointed to the Chief of Staff of the TO of the Republic of Serbian

16    Krajina.

17       Q.   Does that mean afterwards - we are talking now about April 1992 -

18    this relationship between the TO --

19       A.   Yes, that's right.

20       Q.   This relationship of the TO staff, the officers there, and the

21    JNA, or VJ, as it later was called, remained the same?

22       A.   It remained the same until August 1995.  Virtually, it was

23    Slobodan Milosevic who appointed the commanders of the Serbian army of the

24    Republic of Serbian Krajina.

25       Q.   Witness, in relation to the TO in the Krajina, did you have

Page 13190

 1    opportunity to review, during your conversations here in The Hague, a lot

 2    of documents that related to appointments, related to organisation of

 3    units?  Did you review these documents?

 4       A.   I did.

 5       Q.   Could you authenticate all these documents?  Could you -- did you

 6    know them?

 7       A.   Yes, that's right.

 8            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honours, I do not want to put all these

 9    documents to the witness.  I just want to read to you, and for the record,

10    which documents the witness reviewed and confirmed as being made by the

11    authorities there.  And it's actually all from the Exhibit 352, and it is

12    tabs 114, 115, 117 to 119, 121 to 141, 145, 148, 150, 151.  These are the

13    documents that I would like to refer to in this regard.  It's all

14    appointments and all formations.

15       Q.   These decisions taken, were they respected by the JNA and the

16    Martic police?

17       A.   Some decisions, yes; some, no.  The decisions relating to

18    active-duty officers in their role were respected.  A part of the

19    decisions that were passed in July, August, and September of 1991 were not

20    respected.

21            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Private session, please.

22            JUDGE KWON:  For the record, 151 was dropped; yes?

23            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Oh, yes.  Yes, Your Honour.  I just got the

24    note from my colleague here.  Thank you.

25    [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of the Chamber]

Page 13191

 1            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in private session.

 2            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 3       Q.   Witness, in relation to the problems that arose between decisions

 4    on TO from the local politicians and in relation to the JNA ignoring parts

 5    of them, did you have a meeting with General Vukovic and General Djujic in

 6    October 1991?

 7       A.   I did, around the 10th of October, 1991, in Benkovac.

 8       Q.   What did you talk about, and what was the result of these talks?

 9       A.   General Djujic initiated the meeting with General Vukovic that we

10    should address the question of competence over the TO; which would be the

11    competent command?  Would it be the corps command of the JNA or the staff

12    of the TO by SAO Krajina?  General Vukovic said that he was not competent

13    and that, in this connection, General Adzic should be contacted in the

14    General Staff in Belgrade.

15       Q.   And did you do that?  Did you contact General Adzic?

16       A.   Yes.  I was received by General Adzic, not in the command of the

17    General Staff but in another military institution.

18       Q.   And what did you discuss with him, and what was the result of it?

19       A.   This was one of the main topics: The outcome was that nothing

20    would be changed, that the competence of the command of the JNA remained,

21    that that is how it was envisaged in the system and that is how it would

22    remain.  Then there were other things discussed, and I took note of them

23    in my notebook that I took with me, as a memo.  The issues that Djujic

24    said I should address with Adzic regarding supplies, the status of the

25    people in the TO, et cetera.

Page 13192

 1       Q.   And what was Mr. Adzic -- General Adzic's position to demands that

 2    you made?  How did he react to this?

 3       A.   To the effect that there would be no problems.  He wasn't very

 4    specific about it.  That things would be resolved, words to that effect.

 5            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Open session again.

 6                          [Open session]

 7            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session.

 8            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  With the help of the usher, I would like to

 9    put to the witness the document tab 74 of Exhibit 352.

10       Q.   Witness, what kind of a document is this and who prepared it?

11       A.   This document was compiled in the Main Staff of the TO of SAO

12    Krajina, and it was a report, in fact, on the situation in the SAO TO of

13    the Krajina in 1991, October.

14       Q.   Did you --

15       A.   10th of October.

16       Q.   For whom was this prepared and to whom was this given?

17       A.   Well, it was prepared for the Prime Minister, first and foremost,

18    and then it was drafted for the General Staff of the JNA, to be handed on

19    to them.

20       Q.   Was it handed to General Adzic?

21       A.   I don't know that exactly, but he did receive information about

22    these issues, as we had discussed them previously.

23       Q.   Those matters raised here, the needs of the TO, were these the

24    matters that were discussed with General Adzic on the occasion that you

25    described?

Page 13193

 1   A.   Yes, they were, briefly.

 2       Q.   Witness, I would like now to move on to discussions held about the

 3    Carrington plan and the future Yugoslavia.  What were the proposals for

 4    the Krajina?  What were the proposals for the Krajina?

 5       A.   In Lord Carrington's general plan, proposals were made for three

 6    types of relationships amongst the republics of the former Yugoslavia.

 7    For areas inhabited in individual republics with ethnic communities having

 8    certain characteristics, it was provided that they should be granted a

 9    special territorial status, and this referred to Krajina as well.

10       Q.   What was -- was there stated a certain autonomy within the

11    Croatian context?

12       A.   Yes, that's right.  Territorial autonomy within Croatia.

13            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Private session, please.

14   [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of the Chamber]

15            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in private session.

16            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

17       Q.   Did you take part in several -- actually, in three negotiations

18    with Mr. Wijnaendts, the Dutch ambassador, in relation to the Carrington

19    plan?

20       A.   That's right.  Every time before the plenary meetings would take

21    place.

22       Q.   And before you went to these negotiations with Mr. Wijnaendts, did

23    you meet Mr. Milosevic in Belgrade before you went there?

24       A.   Always.  That's right.  Always before that, there would be a

25    meeting with President Milosevic.

Page 13194

 1       Q.   Did you go there to get instructions, or why did you meet?

 2       A.   We were invited to go to Belgrade to receive instructions as to

 3    what stand to take.

 4       Q.   When did you go there for the first time?

 5       A.   Around the 13th of October, 12th or 13th.  But anyway, before the

 6    14th.

 7       Q.   And what instruction did you get?

 8       A.   The instructions were that the plan was a good one for us.  Not to

 9    accept it directly, but the suggestion was that, in general terms, the

10    plan was a good one for us.  That was from President Milosevic and a few

11    people that he had called in to his offices to explain the plan to us.

12       Q.   Who explained the plan to you?  Were these officials from the

13    Belgrade government?

14       A.   One was an advisor to President Milosevic, Mr. Kutlesic.  The

15    others were people with whom President Milosevic associated.  They were

16    professors, university professors Smilja Avramov, Ratko Markovic, Kosta

17    Mihajlovic, Vasilije Krestic.

18       Q.   That first time when you had this meeting in Belgrade, did

19    anything happen?  Did anything happen in Knin that alerted you?

20       A.   That's right, yes.  What happened was that after we started off

21    towards Belgrade -- two things actually happened.  Velibor Matijasevic,

22    president of the Assembly of the SAO Krajina, convened an Assembly

23    meeting, asking for a report on the work of the government of SAO Krajina.

24    And the other thing that happened, the second thing - and Ljubica Solaja

25    conveyed this to me - that in the police station in Knin, Frenki was

Page 13195

 1    informing or inciting the Serbs present in the police station that Babic

 2    was a traitor.  So that was before my departure.  During the meeting with

 3    Milosevic, I was under this pressure that I had to go to The Hague -- I

 4    apologise, to Paris for a meeting with Wijnaendts, and that I was required

 5    to give a report to the Assembly.  And at one point, I said -- and

 6    Milosevic was standing there by the table or walking around the table

 7    while we were sitting down, I said, "I can't be in Paris and in Knin at

 8    the same time, simultaneously."  And he said to me, "I know nothing about

 9    that."  I said, "Well, Jovica does," and I meant Jovica Stanisic.  "He

10    knows about it."  And Milosevic left the room, and a little while later I

11    was told that the Assembly had been cancelled, that Matijasevic had in

12    fact cancelled the Assembly meeting.

13       Q.   So you went to Paris, and what position did you take there?  Did

14    you accept the plan or speak in favour of the plan?

15       A.   No.  I didn't, and neither did the other members of the

16    delegation.  They didn't adopt the plan.  They didn't come out in favour

17    of the plan.  But we expressed our readiness to continue discussing the

18    plan.

19       Q.   After you returned to -- from Paris, did you report about the

20    negotiations to Mr. Milosevic?

21       A.   Milosevic did receive information about the negotiations because

22    we went to see him once again before we left for the 18th, the second

23    meeting.  And on that occasion, I remember that he was very energetic in

24    his reactions towards me.  He said, "Accept it and let's get this over

25    with.  Serbia has the chance of bringing -- having a state, being a state,

Page 13196

 1    and everything else will be engulfed in darkness."  But I didn't accept

 2    that proposal.

 3       Q.   What does that mean?  What exactly did he say in relation to

 4    Serbia has a chance of having a state, or being a state?  What does that

 5    relate to?

 6       A.   To survive as a state, and all the rest would become chaotic, one

 7    general state of chaos, war or whatever.  And that of all the Yugoslav

 8    republics on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, it had the chance of

 9    obtaining status -- the status of a state, that all the rest would be

10    engulfed in darkness and that they would become colonies of the powers

11    that be.  Something along those lines, anyway.

12       Q.   Does that refer to Croatia and Slovenia and Bosnia?  Did he say

13    anything?

14       A.   He said all that, except Serbia.

15       Q.   And on this second meeting with Wijnaendts, what position did you

16    take there?  Did you accept the plan?

17            JUDGE MAY:  I'm not following this story.  He's told by Mr.

18    Milosevic to accept the plan.  But it now seems he doesn't accept the

19    plan.  And I just don't follow what's being said here at all.  Perhaps he

20    could explain his position and how this all comes about.

21            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

22       Q.   Witness, can you explain Mr. Milosevic's position when you came

23    there for the second time to, as you say, get directives?  What was Mr.

24    Milosevic's position in relation to the Carrington plan, and what did you

25    afterwards then do?

Page 13197

 1       A.   The position of President Milosevic was that we should accept the

 2    plan, the portion relating to us, which means special status within

 3    Croatia.

 4            JUDGE MAY:  Yes.  And were you prepared to do that or not?

 5            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We were not prepared at that point

 6    in time to accept that.  We understood that President Milosevic wanted to

 7    pull himself out of the war and leave us to the Croats to take their

 8    revenge on us.

 9            JUDGE MAY:  Yes.

10            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

11       Q.   While you were in Paris after this second meeting with Wijnaendts,

12    did you make a public statement as to your position?

13       A.   The second meeting took place in The Hague, at the Foreign

14    Ministry in The Hague, and I did make several statements.  One was to the

15    effect that I was representing the SAO Krajina and the Autonomous Region

16    of Bosnian Krajina there, which was not quite proper and was not what had

17    been agreed upon at the meeting itself.  And we did not accept the plan on

18    that occasion either.  The proposal at that time was in fact - that is to

19    say, Ambassador Wijnaendts' - that we look into the status of the Tyrol in

20    Italy and in that way to see whether that could be a possible model for

21    Krajina within Croatia, to follow the Tyrolean model.

22       Q.   And did you meet Mr. Milosevic afterwards, after this second

23    meeting with Wijnaendts?  Did you have a conversation with him then again,

24    in October 1991?

25       A.   That's right, yes.  On the 20th of October and on the 23rd, I

Page 13198












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Page 13199

 1    think it was, October.  The first time was in his offices and the second

 2    time in the Palace of the Federation in New Belgrade.

 3       Q.   Let's speak about the meeting on the 20th of October.  What was

 4    the purpose of the meeting, and what was said?

 5       A.   The purpose of the meeting was for him to tell me that I was

 6    supposed to go to Banja Luka, to a meeting there with Radovan Karadzic -

 7    Karadzic had organised a meeting there - to reject Carrington's plan.

 8    That means that the representatives of the Serbs from Bosnia and SAO

 9    Krajina, Western Slavonia, should reject the plan, and at the same time --

10    I don't know whether this was his intention previously, but he did tell

11    me, he swore, Momir Bulatovic, in very explicit terms, said he was a

12    traitor and said he had his people there, a party there, who would replace

13    him and bring him to order, Momir Bulatovic, that is, in Montenegro.

14       Q.   What had Momir Bulatovic done that Mr. Milosevic was angry about?

15       A.   At the second plenary conference in The Hague, Bulatovic accepted

16    Carrington's plan.

17       Q.   Witness, you just told us that Mr. Milosevic had given you,

18    actually, the directive to accept the Carrington plan.  Can you explain

19    that?

20       A.   Well, this was quite a different reaction from the previous two

21    times.  Whether the cause of that was that the plan looked at the status

22    of Kosovo, as it had in 1974, or whether it was what was criticised, that

23    Milosevic criticised and everybody around him, and that Yugoslavia and the

24    concept of Yugoslavia was being denied in that way, and the preservation

25    of that part of Yugoslavia that he came out in favour of.  So these were

Page 13200

 1    two things that they put forward in public, publicly, as reasons for

 2    rejecting the Carrington plan.

 3       Q.   So the proposal at that time was different from the proposal that

 4    Mr. Milosevic had asked you to accept?

 5       A.   That's right, and that was the same thing on the 23rd, when he

 6    proposed that for the upcoming meeting with Wijnaendts this be done, when

 7    he put forward four points for our position in the Palace of the

 8    Federation, the meeting that we attended together at the Federation Palace

 9    building in the New Belgrade district of Belgrade.

10       Q.   This is now the meeting -- you're referring to the meeting on the

11    23rd of October?

12       A.   That's right, yes.

13       Q.   And who was present during this meeting?

14       A.   Present were many people; representatives of Serbia, Montenegro,

15    and the Serb people from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the SAO Krajina, Western

16    and Eastern Slavonia.  Which means Slobodan Milosevic, the president of

17    the Assembly of Serbia; academician Kanazir, president of the Serbian

18    Academy of Arts and Sciences; members of the Presidency, Branko Kostic,

19    Jovic and the rest, Karadzic, his people from Bosnia --

20            JUDGE MAY:  And what was the outcome of that meeting on the 23rd?

21            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The outcome of the meeting was that

22    Branko Kostic, who chaired the meeting, counted that there were more

23    people in Yugoslavia in favour of Yugoslavia.  He calculated 10 per cent

24    more and that it was noted that as the majority were in favour of

25    Yugoslavia, that Yugoslavia should remain and that that was the position

Page 13201

 1    that should be put forward at The Hague conference with respect to Lord

 2    Carrington's plan.

 3            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 4       Q.   Did Mr. Milosevic give you a special instruction on that occasion?

 5       A.   Yes, he did.  He said that Wijnaendts was expecting me in Paris --

 6    I beg your pardon?  Yes, in Paris, that's right, for the third time, and

 7    he gave me four items, four points to discuss, my positions to be

 8    advocated there by me.  The first was a special status for the SAO Krajina

 9    and the other three points I can't remember now.  I wasn't -- I was a bit

10    wary and I asked where special status, and he said on Yugoslav territory,

11    and he gave me this piece of paper.  And the paper is -- remained with

12    Borivoje Rasuo, I think.  I took the paper from him.

13            And at the conference in Paris, in fact, Ambassador Wijnaendts --

14    as soon as we began, I didn't expound my position, but he said, "Mr.

15    Babic, we can accept everything."  That's what he said, "And we can accept

16    point 1, item 1," and I assumed that Milosevic had already informed them

17    of our so-called positions.  Actually, he instructed us in those

18    positions.

19       Q.   This paper that you got from Mr. Milosevic, was it made by him?

20    Was it in handwriting?  What kind of a paper was it?

21       A.   It was typed out.  Four items typed out, and in hand he had added,

22    "On Yugoslav territory."

23       Q.   Does that mean special status on Yugoslav territory?  Is that what

24    he suggested?

25       A.   That's what it meant, although it could have been interpreted

Page 13202

 1    otherwise as well.  I wasn't quite clear on what it actually meant, and I

 2    couldn't take it, and I didn't want to go to Paris.  I went to Knin and I

 3    said I was ill.

 4       Q.   Did you nevertheless go to Paris, and why?

 5       A.   He called me up on the telephone again several days later.  That

 6    was around the 28th or 29th of October.  And he said, "What's happening to

 7    you?  What's up with you?"  And I said I was ill and he said, "I don't

 8    believe doctors who are ill themselves.  Go on, Wijnaendts is waiting for

 9    you," he said.  And I went.

10       Q.   How did you get there?

11       A.   I went by plane.  We flew there.  Small planes, first and second

12    occasion, once owned by the federal government, and the second time it was

13    a small military plane and the pilots were soldiers and it left from the

14    military airport of Batajnica.

15       Q.   Witness, did you meet Mr. Milosevic end of November/beginning of

16    December 1991 regarding the Vance plan?

17       A.   That's right, around the 23rd of November, that was.

18       Q.   At that time, was the Vance plan already accepted by

19    Mr. Milosevic, Kadijevic, and Tudjman?  Do you know?

20       A.   That's right, yes.  It had already been accepted.

21       Q.   What did you talk with Mr. Milosevic about it then?

22       A.   Milosevic set out the basic concepts of the plan that had been

23    accepted and he showed a map and indicated the territories.  He showed me

24    a map, and in yellow -- yellow marked the municipalities in Croatia and

25    the territories of the municipalities to which the plan referred.  These

Page 13203

 1    areas were marked in in yellow.  But parts of the municipalities were not

 2    highlighted in yellow.  The municipalities, or one of the municipalities

 3    which had -- was joined to SAO Krajina in Banija, Lika, and Kordun.  And I

 4    said that, but he didn't want to discuss this issue, this point, with me.

 5    He just said, "Go down there and talk to the international delegation of

 6    the United Nations" which was there in the salon adjoined to his offices

 7    one floor below, and I found Ratko Jovanovic there and he interpreted for

 8    me.  He interpreted the conversation I had with the representatives of the

 9    Security Council of the United Nations.  And they put forward this same

10    concept for the plan that I had heard earlier on from him.  And already at

11    that time, I began making some remarks of my own, and the positions that I

12    stood by, and I did this over the next two months or more.

13       Q.   Did Mr. Milosevic ask you to accept the Vance plan when you met

14    him on that day?

15       A.   Yes, he did.  He wanted us to say that we accepted it.

16       Q.   And you did -- did you do that?

17       A.   No, I did not.

18       Q.   Did you request amendments; and if so, which?

19       A.   That's right.  I did request amendments.  I asked that the JNA

20    remain in Krajina, that the peace forces be deployed along the line of

21    conflict between the two warring sides, the Serbian and Croatian side.  It

22    was called the green line, modelled upon the Cyprus model.  And I asked

23    that the laws of Croatia not be applied to the SAO Krajina territory and

24    that the Territorial Defence of SAO Krajina not be disbanded.

25            JUDGE MAY:  Just remind us, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.  Perhaps you can

Page 13204

 1    do this through the witness shortly -- the basis of the plan, and then we

 2    can find out why the witness took the view which he did.

 3            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 4       Q.   Witness, what was the main point in relation to the Vance plan?

 5    You have already mentioned the territories that were specially marked in a

 6    map.  What was supposed to become out of these territories?

 7       A.   It was a provisional plan through which demilitarisation of those

 8    areas was to be conducted, and this was marked as Krajina Sector West and

 9    Sector East, and later on they were referred to as Sector East, Sector

10    North, Sector South and Sector West; and the JNA was to withdraw from

11    those areas and that all the units remaining, the armed forces remaining

12    in the area, should be disbanded, including the Territorial Defence units;

13    and that all volunteer units should be withdrawn outside the territory of

14    Krajina, those who had come in from outside into the territory; and that

15    all that should remain of the armed formations in the area in all three,

16    or rather, four areas, sectors, should be the police, with their arms at

17    their waists, that is to say, without any long-barrelled weapons, and that

18    it should be proportionate to the population structure before the conflict

19    - police with sidearms -  until a political solution for the area was

20    found.  And in item 1, point 1, it was stated that there were nine regions

21    to which the plan referred.  They were different areas within Croatia.

22       Q.   Witness --

23            THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May --

24            JUDGE MAY:  Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

25            THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I'm sorry to have to

Page 13205

 1    interrupt you once again, but I have become very tired reading from the

 2    transcript.  I was saying, it's very tiring for me to have to read from

 3    the transcript what this witness is saying, because I cannot hear the

 4    witness at all.  He has turned towards that side over there and is

 5    speaking into his beard.  The interpreters can hear him because he has a

 6    special microphone for the interpreters, but he has no microphone for the

 7    Serbian language because he has been granted voice distortion.  I

 8    understand that.  But could he please be asked to speak louder?  And I

 9    believe that Mr. Tapuskovic probably can't hear him either, but he doesn't

10    dare complain.  He is reluctant to complain.

11            JUDGE MAY:  If Mr. Tapuskovic wanted to complain, he would.  No

12    doubt about that.

13            MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I did complain on

14    one occasion, but I didn't want to tire you with my complaints.  If you

15    remember, the day before yesterday I said that I cannot hear the witness

16    at all, and I complained on the first day.  When he is going into

17    explanations in private session, he speaks louder, but when he's

18    explaining matters in open session, it is very difficult to understand

19    what he's saying.

20            JUDGE KWON:  I note Mr. Mueller is on his feet.  Yes.

21            MR. MUELLER:  Thank you, Your Honours.  I just wanted to inform

22    you that my headphones are absolutely impeccable, means to say that I hear

23    the voice of the witness very clearly, as I do the English translation.

24    Thank you.

25            JUDGE MAY:  Thank you.  We've got comments all around.  I think

Page 13206

 1    we're going to adjourn now.

 2            JUDGE KWON:  Are we in closed session?

 3            JUDGE MAY:  Mr. --

 4            THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May --

 5            JUDGE MAY:  Just a moment.  I'm going to speak to the witness.

 6            You hear what's said, Mr. Witness MILAN BABIC.  One of the problems is

 7    that you're giving a great deal of evidence, and it's important that

 8    everybody follows it and understands it and takes it in, and it's rather

 9    difficult to do that if there's so much of it, and some of it, as you've

10    been asked, is in some detail.  It would help, it may help, if you would

11    speak into the microphone, as you've been doing, keep your voice louder,

12    and also if you would kindly, when you're giving your answers, perhaps

13    face us, the Bench, so that your voice may be heard elsewhere, yes, rather

14    than the Prosecutor.

15            JUDGE KWON:  And I have a comment to make.

16            Mr.  Milosevic --

17            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand, yes.

18            JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Milosevic, if you can hear the witness saying in

19    Serbian, why don't you use the headphone?  I'm saying this once again.

20    You can follow very easily.

21            And the second point is that we are going into private session so

22    often, and if you have -- find some difficulty in following the witnesses,

23    why don't you let your associate come in the courtroom and assist you in

24    that aspect?  I'm raising these issues while we are in private session,

25    and consider this matter later on.

Page 13207

 1            THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do not understand, Mr. Kwon, how

 2    somebody could help me hear better.  My associate can't help me hear

 3    better if I don't hear something.  For example, I just had a technical

 4    remark, saying that I can't hear what the witness is saying.  Otherwise,

 5    let me say that I never mentioned at all that Mr. Mueller couldn't hear,

 6    so I do believe that Mr. Mueller can hear very well.  I never said that.

 7    I was just making the remark that I myself could not hear properly.

 8            JUDGE MAY:  We'll adjourn.  Twenty minutes.

 9                          --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

10                          --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

11            JUDGE MAY:  Let's go into open session for one matter.

12                          [Open session]

13            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

14            JUDGE MAY:  Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, we've considered the application

15    which you and Mr. Nice make.  We will grant it.  You will have the six

16    days.  But we will expect the list of 14 witnesses within seven days.

17            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, Your Honour.  We actually have

18    identified the 14 witnesses, and we can provide it, actually, in one day.

19    Tomorrow you will have your list.

20            JUDGE MAY:  Very well.  Thank you very much.

21            Yes.  Do we need to go back into private session?

22            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No, Your Honour.  We can stay in open

23    session, and I would like to clarify a few points in relation to the Vance

24    plan, to make it perfectly clear what the provisions were, the suggestions

25    were.

Page 13208












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Page 13209

 1       Q.   First of all, Witness, did the Vance plan foresee the

 2    re-integration of the three SAOs into the Republic of Croatia within

 3    certain time periods?

 4       A.   The plan didn't address that directly, except in the introduction,

 5    which referred to areas that were in Croatia.  That is all that it said.

 6    The plan did not address the political solution.  It explicitly said that

 7    a political solution would be found later.  "Until a political solution is

 8    found."  So the plan refers to a period until a political solution is

 9    found, except in the first paragraph, which said what I said.

10       Q.   And the provision was demilitarisation of the -- all three SAOs,

11    with only a police force remaining, with the weapons that a police force

12    usually have.  Was that what you referred to?

13       A.   That's right.  That was the substance of the plan; the

14    demilitarisation of those regions.

15       Q.   Did the plan foresee the arrival of UN troops, and where would the

16    UN troops be?

17       A.   Yes.  The plan did envisage, after the demilitarisation, the

18    deployment of peace forces of the United Nations across the territory

19    within the territory of those regions, and those forces would control

20    roads, checkpoints, the entries and exits from the regions.  They would

21    check that no weapons were being introduced or carried within those areas.

22       Q.   And --

23            JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, do we have the document among our

24    binders, the Carrington plans and Vance plans?  If you assist us later on.

25    Thank you.

Page 13210

 1            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.  I'm not aware of this.  I think we

 2    don't.

 3            JUDGE MAY:  Perhaps we can get a copy.  If we can, it would be

 4    helpful.

 5            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

 6       Q.   And if I understood you, your concerns, some of the

 7    Serb-controlled areas were not included in this zone that UN troops would

 8    supervise.

 9       A.   That's right.

10       Q.   And was there a provision also in the Vance plan regarding the

11    return of displaced persons into this territory?

12       A.   Yes.  That was one of the objectives of the international mission.

13       Q.   Was there also a provision in the Vance plan regarding joint

14    police forces of Croats and Serbs within that territory?

15       A.   Yes.  As I said, it would be in proportion to the ethnic

16    composition of the population prior to the conflict.

17       Q.   Witness, at that time when the Vance plan was discussed, and you

18    said it took almost two months to discuss this, the pros and the cons, did

19    the -- was the RSK, the Republic of Serbian Krajina, established?

20       A.   Yes, on the 19th of December, 1991.

21            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  With the help of the usher, I would like to

22    put to the witness tab 68 of Exhibit 351, just to have a look at it, sir,

23    not to discuss the details.

24       Q.   Is this the constitution and constitutional law on implementation

25    of the RSK of 19 December 1991?

Page 13211

 1       A.   Yes, that's right.

 2       Q.   Why was the RSK formed at that time?  What was the purpose?

 3       A.   The international conference in The Hague had stated that it would

 4    recognise all the republics of the former Yugoslavia that requested

 5    recognition.  That virtually meant that the former Yugoslavia had

 6    disintegrated, as was stated by the Badinter Commission named by the

 7    conference.  That was one of the reasons why a part of the territory of

 8    the former Yugoslavia, that is, the SAO Krajina, proclaimed itself a

 9    republic.

10       Q.   Did the Republic of Serbian Krajina actually request international

11    recognition?

12            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And in this context I would like to put to

13    the witness tab 71.1 and 71.2 of the binder --

14       A.   Yes, it did.

15            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  -- Exhibit 351.

16       Q.   Are these the two letters to the international officials?

17       A.   Yes, that's right.

18       Q.   And were you recognised?

19       A.   No.

20       Q.   The territory of the RSK, was that identical with the SAO Krajina

21    territory, or did that include all three SAOs at that time, on the 19th of

22    December?

23       A.   On the 19th of December, the SAO Krajina became the Republic of

24    Serbian Krajina.  On that day, the Assembly of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja,

25    and Western Srem proclaimed unification with the Republic of Serbian

Page 13212

 1    Krajina, and two days later, the Assembly of SAO Western Slavonia also

 2    proclaimed its unification with Krajina.  But until the 26th of February,

 3    1992, they were not united.  All three regions on that date united, and

 4    that was when the unified Republic of Serbian Krajina was constituted,

 5    covering all three regions.

 6       Q.   We have talked about the Vance plan and what the provisions were,

 7    and in relation to demilitarisation of this region, did you in the Krajina

 8    oppose that?  I do not mean you personally, but the politicians in the

 9    Krajina.  Did you oppose the demilitarisation?

10       A.   That's right.

11       Q.   Why did you do that?

12       A.   Because the Vance plan covered a period of six months, upon which

13    there would be a discussion as to whether it should be extended or not,

14    and under those conditions, Krajina would be demilitarised, Croatia would

15    not, and Krajina would have to face the Republic of Croatia imposing a

16    political solution to Krajina by force of arms.

17       Q.   Did you have any -- did you object also against the arrival of the

18    UN troops?

19       A.   To the concept of their arrival.  We didn't oppose their coming

20    but the way in which they were to come.  The deployment was envisaged

21    according to the so-called green line, based on the Cypriot model.

22       Q.   What does that mean?

23       A.   It meant separation of the warring parties, that is, the Croatian

24    and the Serbian side, and not demilitarisation of the area as a whole.

25    And that is the amendment to the Vance plan that was requested.  It was

Page 13213

 1    accepted in principle, but this modification was requested regarding

 2    certain elements of the plan.

 3       Q.   Was there an option?  Was that an option, to get a modification of

 4    the Vance plan, or was that out of question?

 5       A.   As far as I know, there was an option, and some provisions were

 6    modified.  Regarding the initial deployment for a period of six months,

 7    and then it was extended to one year by the Security Council, the

 8    Secretary-General of the UN, in his report to the Security Council, made

 9    such a proposal, and that was accepted, and that is that Croatian laws

10    should not apply to those territories but the laws in force at the time.

11    There was also a discussion that the Territorial Defence should remain,

12    that the possibility should be given that it should be incorporated into

13    the police without long weapons, long barrels, but this was not resolved.

14    There was just the discussion about it.  So some elements were modified.

15       Q.   You mentioned that for about two months the Krajina Serbs opposed

16    the Vance plan, and did all of them oppose the Vance plan, or was there a

17    split within the Krajina politicians?

18       A.   At first they were all opposed, and gradually, more and more

19    politicians accepted the plan fully and unconditionally in the way that

20    President Milosevic had accepted it.  And finally, the president of the

21    Republic and the government and part of the Assembly continued to oppose

22    it, requesting modifications of the plan, and a part of the Assembly and

23    the politicians in Eastern Slavonia and Western Srem and part of the

24    Assembly of SAO Krajina and some politicians accepted the plan.  And the

25    Assembly, which met in Glina on the 9th of February, 1992, approved the

Page 13214

 1    plan after the pressure that came from President Milosevic, the Presidency

 2    of Yugoslavia, the General Staff of the army of Yugoslavia, the media

 3    campaign, and the like.

 4            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I would like to request private session to go

 5    into some details on the meetings in relation to the Vance plan.

 6   [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of the Chamber]

 7            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in private session.

 8            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 9       Q.   Witness, did you attend a meeting with Mr. Milosevic, Mr.

10    Karadzic, and Mr. Koljevic on this issue on the 23rd of December, 1991?

11       A.   Yes, that's right.  On that date, when there was an election of

12    the government of Serbia, in the office of President Milosevic.

13       Q.   Without going into many details of this discussion, what was the

14    position taken by you and by Milosevic, Karadzic, and Koljevic?

15       A.   I upheld the same position.  That meant the plan, with

16    modifications.  Milosevic requested that I accept it fully and

17    unconditionally and that -- make a statement to that effect for the

18    public.  Karadzic also emphatically requested that I accept the plan

19    without any changes, as did Koljevic.  Finally, Milosevic gave me a piece

20    of paper and a pen and said, "Go to the next room and write out an

21    announcement."  I went there and wrote an announcement on one page,

22    presenting all my positions.  He took the pen and said, "I won't cross

23    anything out, but I will underline what you need to leave out."  And he

24    underlined all the things regarding modifications of the plan, which I

25    should leave out.  I expressed my opposition, and he said, "This must go

Page 13215

 1    to the Assembly meeting.  Radovan Bojovic [as interpreted] will be the

 2    Prime Minister of the new government, and let him help you."  And when he

 3    left, Karadzic again started persuading me to accept it.  I said, "Come on

 4    Radovan, let's talk about Bosnia for a moment."  He went silent, and I

 5    left and made a public announcement in the way that I had drafted it.

 6       Q.   Witness, let me clarify.  I find in the transcript a remark that

 7    you said Radovan Bojovic will be the Prime Minister of the government.  I

 8    don't understand the context.

 9       A.   Radoman Bozovic, Radoman Bozovic.

10       Q.   What does it have to do with the Vance plan and the discussion

11    that you had with Mr. Milosevic and Karadzic and Koljevic?  I don't

12    understand the context.  Can you explain?

13       A.   Radoman Bozovic and the members of the new government of Serbia

14    were to be sworn in at the Assembly meeting, and that was the reason why

15    he had to leave his room and cross over to the building of the Serbian

16    Assembly.  And as he was leaving --

17            JUDGE MAY:  It's difficult for us to understand the context.  What

18    was the point of this remark?

19            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The point -- Your Honour, are you

20    asking me?

21            JUDGE MAY:  Yes.

22            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The context was the following:

23    After Milosevic having underlined in my statement what I should leave out,

24    he left the meeting because of the reason I just gave.  He left the

25    meeting, with me, Karadzic, and Koljevic, to go to the building across the

Page 13216

 1    road.  And he said I should continue discussing it with Karadzic and

 2    Koljevic.  And the words he uttered were, "Let Radovan help you to draft

 3    another statement."

 4            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Thank you.  That's understood now.

 5       Q.   Did you also discuss the Vance plan with General Adzic, in

 6    particular, your concerns for the safety of the Serbs in the Krajina?

 7       A.   Yes.  I went to see General Adzic, and I asked that the JNA remain

 8    in Krajina.  He said that the JNA would withdraw but that we shouldn't

 9    worry, because it would be deployed on the borders of Bosnia, towards

10    Krajina; that he would professionally employ 10.000 men from Krajina in

11    the JNA, in the territory of Bosnia; and if Croatia were to attack us,

12    they would reach Knin sooner than the Croatian army could reach it.  And I

13    said, "General, do you think that Bosnia will remain in Yugoslavia when

14    Bulgaria and Turkey have already declared that they would recognise the

15    independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina?"  He looked at me with

16    astonishment as to what I was saying, that that was nonsense, so that the

17    army would remain in Bosnia.  He felt that the army would certainly remain

18    in Bosnia, although Bulgaria and Turkey had announced that it would

19    recognise the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and even though the

20    Assembly of Bosnia had issued a declaration speaking about the

21    independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

22            JUDGE KWON:  Excuse me, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.  If the audiovisual

23    section could turn the -- turn down the volume of Serbian language in the

24    English channel.  It's very difficult for me to follow.

25            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, may I be of assistance?  That's

Page 13217

 1    what's happened to me in another day.  You can regulate it yourself on

 2    your board.

 3            JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Thank you.

 4            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 5       Q.   In relation to this dispute about the Vance plan, did you have an

 6    exchange of letters?  That is, Mr. Milosevic and you.  Did you, in January

 7    1992, exchange public letters?

 8       A.   Yes, we did exchange public letters, but we also exchanged private

 9    letters.  On the 8th of January, a letter was sent by President Milosevic

10    to me, and it arrived a couple of days later, by mail as well.  And it was

11    also published in the media, in the Politika and other daily newspapers,

12    and on television.

13            Several days later, I wrote my reply and made it public by fax for

14    the office of President Milosevic, and a copy was made available to the

15    public.

16            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  With the help of the usher, I would like to

17    put the Exhibits 79, 80, and 81 to the witness, referring to these

18    letters.  And as they're very particular letters, they have to be under

19    seal and we have to discuss it in private session, as we are now.  The

20    Exhibit -- the Exhibit 79 is the letter.

21            JUDGE MAY:  Which binder?

22            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  It's Exhibit 352.

23                          [Prosecution counsel confer]

24            JUDGE MAY:  Yes.

25            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Page 13218












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Page 13219

 1       Q.   The Exhibit 79, is this the letter that Mr. Milosevic wrote, and

 2    the exhibit tab 80, is it the letter that you -- your answering letter?

 3            JUDGE KWON:  I'm sorry.  78, 79, seems to be the Politika article.

 4            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.  Yes, Your Honour.  It's actually the

 5    complete -- in this Politika article, the letter is completely published.

 6    It's a complete publication of the letter.

 7            JUDGE MAY:  80 seems to be the correspondence between the two, and

 8    79, at least in mine, appears to be the Politika articles.

 9            JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  79 is an open letter to this witness from

10    Mr. Milosevic.

11            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  The witness actually has -- the problem is I

12    have, for some reason, only the B/C/S version and it's Cyrillic and I

13    can't read it, therefore I could only guess what it was.  I'm sorry.  This

14    is -- Your Honour, you are correct.  79 is the original letter from

15    Mr. Milosevic.

16       Q.   Witness, do you have the original letters actually with you?

17       A.   I do.  They are with my attorney, who is here present.

18            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honours, I wonder whether we would need

19    the original letters.  If you would like to have a look at it or if we

20    could deal with these copies as they are.

21            JUDGE MAY:  Unless there's any dispute about it, it seems to me

22    for the moment we can go on with the copies which we have.

23            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.  I think so too.  Actually, I don't want

24    to go into the details of these letters because they speak for themselves.

25       Q.   What I only would like to know from you, Witness: Did you

Page 13220

 1    understand these letters to be a threat, or include any threats for your

 2    dismissal from your position you had at that time?

 3       A.   Yes.  It is stated in the letter of Slobodan Milosevic that I

 4    should be replaced, and others elected, or rather, it is stated in a

 5    particular manner.

 6       Q.   Yes.  And what was your --

 7       A.   In the last sentence, it is stated.

 8       Q.   And the last -- where do you find this remark?  Can you please

 9    read it.

10       A.   Last sentence in the letter.

11       Q.   Yes.  Please read the sentence that you understand to be a request

12    for your dismissal.

13       A.   It says in the letter:  "The assistance of Serbia to the people of

14    Krajina will not be called in question in peace even, but the citizens of

15    Krajina need to know that, by their actions, they have lost all our

16    confidence and that in the future, for relations with the authorities in

17    the republics of Serbia, they must delegate people for whom the national

18    interests will be above personal political prestige."

19       Q.   And what was your response to this in your own letter?

20       A.   In my letter, I said that I considered that to be a call for my

21    replacement or dismissal.

22       Q.   We do not need to go into more details because the letters

23    actually speak for themselves.

24            Witness, did you also then take part in the extended Presidency

25    session on the 31st of January, 1992?

Page 13221

 1       A.   Yes, for three days, and on the 1st and 2nd of February.

 2       Q.   We have already heard from another witness details on this

 3    meeting, but I still would like to speak about a few points with you as

 4    well.  You said it lasted for three days.  Were you able to leave the

 5    meeting as you wished, or were you not allowed to do so?

 6       A.   No.  Everyone could leave it except me.  I had to stay at the

 7    meeting until I stated that I favoured the complete and unconditional

 8    acceptance of the Vance plan.

 9       Q.   Who said that to you, or in which way were you forced to stay on

10    until you changed your mind?

11       A.   Branko Kostic and Borisav Jovic were chairing the meeting that was

12    attended by the members of the Presidency, the General Staff, and other

13    participants.  The meeting was conducted in such a way that the session

14    continued, and it was telecast directly with two cameras, and the public

15    was aware of the session going on.  During the meeting, somebody said to

16    me that Milosevic had ordered that I shouldn't leave the meeting, that I

17    may not leave the meeting until I agree to the Vance plan.

18            And it was conducted in such a way that it went on and on.  There

19    were just two breaks for members of the government to come, the presidents

20    of municipalities.  The second break -- in the second break, I was allowed

21    to go and call in presidents of the municipalities, and actually, I didn't

22    come back.  That is when I walked out.  In fact, I fled from the meeting

23    on the third day.

24       Q.   Witness, you mentioned that someone told you that Mr. Milosevic

25    had said you are not supposed to leave.  Who said that to you?

Page 13222

 1       A.   I think it was either Radoman Bozovic, the Prime Minister of

 2    Serbia, or somebody said that Radoman Bozovic had said that.  Anyway, the

 3    information came through Radoman Bozovic.  Jovica Stanisic told me later

 4    on, when we met in 1993, that Milosevic had given him orders to arrest me

 5    if I left.

 6       Q.   What was the occasion that Mr. Stanisic told you that?

 7       A.   In 1993, at a celebration of the day of the police, in a

 8    restaurant.

 9       Q.   During the meeting, or during the breaks of the meeting, were you

10    intimidated, pressured, or threatened in any way?

11       A.   Borislav Jovic said that they could replace me and that they could

12    do all kinds of things to me.  And I said, "You can, but I have my

13    position and I'm going to abide by it."  General Adzic even wanted

14    physically to attack a member of the government, calling him nasty names.

15    This also applied to other people from Krajina, giving them names.  And I

16    was told this by participants, because I was outside the meeting hall,

17    making an announcement for the public.  Adzic was very angry.  He couldn't

18    wait for me.  He asked that the meeting continue without me.  However,

19    Jovic and Kostic didn't want to do that.  He was so irritated that he

20    wanted to physically attack people from Krajina.

21       Q.   Did you oppose the Vance plan throughout or did you change your

22    mind at any point in time?

23       A.   I abided by my position up to the end, but in February I amended

24    my suggestion and asked that we introduce complete protectorate of the

25    United Nations, that is, that Krajina should be given provisional

Page 13223

 1    protection by the United Nations until its status was settled.  I'm sorry;

 2    at the beginning of March, in 1992.

 3       Q.   The Vance plan meeting that you discussed, you said you left it,

 4    you finally fled it.  When you were gone, did someone from the Krajina

 5    government agree to the Vance plan instead of you?

 6       A.   Yes.  Mile Paspalj, president of the Assembly of Krajina, agreed,

 7    and he made a statement to the effect that in the absence of the president

 8    of the Republic, he had the authority to take over the function of

 9    president of the Republic, and in that capacity he said yes, the plan had

10    been accepted.

11            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  We can go into open session again, Your

12    Honours.

13                          [Open session]

14            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session.

15            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

16       Q.   While Mr. Paspalj authorised -- accepted the Vance plan in the

17    Krajina, the politicians in the Krajina who opposed it, did they continue

18    to oppose it and even call for a referendum on the matter within the

19    Krajina?

20       A.   Yes, that's right.  Part of the Assembly and the politicians who

21    were opposed called a referendum for the people to state their views about

22    the plan.  And the two questions of the referendum were:  Were they in

23    favour of the plan completely and unconditionally as the plan had been

24    accepted by Kadijevic, Milosevic and Jovic -- no, I beg your pardon,

25    Tudjman was the third one -- or whether they were in favour of a modified

Page 13224

 1    plan, following the lines of the Krajina government draft.

 2       Q.   Witness, you have already mentioned the Assembly session in Glina

 3    on the 9th.  And this Assembly session, was it an official Assembly

 4    session called by the president of the Assembly?  Did all Assembly members

 5    take part in it?

 6       A.   No, not all of them did.  My information told me that it was a

 7    minority, in fact, which participated.  But the delegation from Belgrade

 8    did take part.

 9       Q.   You mentioned the delegation from Belgrade did take part.  Who

10    took part from Belgrade in this meeting?

11       A.   The members of the Presidency of the SFRY, Branko Kostic and

12    Yugoslav Kostic; the head of the General Staff, Adzic; and several other

13    generals and their escorts and the people who accompanied them; the

14    ministers and people from Serbia.  Actually, it was a very numerous

15    delegation.

16            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honours, we have prepared tab 88 of the

17    Exhibit 352, and it is a video.  A part, a small speech given on this

18    Glina session by the president of the Presidency, Kostic, or rather,

19    vice-president, and the translation of what is said you actually have

20    under this tab.  It will only be -- you have actually the speech, the

21    entire speech, but we will only play the section page 35, the last

22    paragraph, to page 36, the middle of the page.

23            And when you are ready in the technical booth, we could do that

24    now.  Thank you.

25                          [Videotape played]

Page 13225

 1            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 2       Q.   Is this the Belgrade delegation arriving, sir?

 3       A.   Yes, it is; Branko Kostic, Adzic, and his escorts.

 4            THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreters apologise but they do not have the

 5    text of this tape.

 6            THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] Mr. Kostic, good day to you.  Welcome

 7    to Glina.  You have come here to attend the Krajina Assembly.  What do you

 8    expect of the meeting?

 9            Well, we have come and there are quite a lot of us here, and after

10    a rather extensive discussion held in the Yugoslav state Presidency to

11    take part in the work of the Assembly of Srpska Krajina and on the one

12    hand to reject all the accusations, refute all the accusations that have

13    been unfoundedly spread among these people, that we are leaving those

14    people in the lunch.  Also to tell the Assemblymen of the Serbian Krajina

15    Assembly, as well as to all the people, that that is a crude lie, flagrant

16    lies, that we have been and are remaining by the side of these people.  In

17    addition, to help inasmuch as we can, for reason to prevail, and that

18    these people, as well as the Assemblymen, realise that that which has been

19    gained through war until now can be defended by peace in the best possible

20    way from now on, with the assurances of the Security Council, a world

21    organisation, and the engagement of the Blue Helmets.

22            Thank you very much on behalf of the Novi Sad television.

23            Thank you too.

24            Mr. Kostic, what is your message to the people of Glina and

25    Krajina?

Page 13226

 1            That we have stood by and are going to stand by these people.

 2    However, choosing between the peace option and the war option, the time

 3    has come to defend peace, what these people have gained by war, not by

 4    continuation of a long and precarious war that might be spread out to the

 5    hinterland and Bosnia and sweep over the entire Yugoslavia or even wider

 6    in the Balkans.  That can obviously finally result in the loss of

 7    everything that these people have gained by war so far.

 8            Thank you.

 9            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  We can stop here.  We can stop here.  Thank

10    you.

11            Your Honours, as you can see from the transcript, there is

12    following a speaker of the RSK Assembly on the conference giving a small

13    speech, listing all the people that are present there from Belgrade.

14    That's actually following in that next chapter on page 36, and I don't

15    think we need to play it on the video.  You can read it and Mr. Milosevic

16    can read it also, and the amici.

17       Q.   You already mentioned another Assembly session in Glina.  Was

18    there an Assembly session in Glina on the 16th of February, 1992, and was

19    the then Prime Minister dismissed?

20       A.   That's right.  The Prime Minister of Srpska Krajina was dismissed.

21            THE INTERPRETER:  The president of the Republic of Srpska Krajina.

22    Interpreter's correction.

23            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

24       Q.   And in the subsequent meeting on the 26th of February, 1992, was

25    Goran Hadzic elected the next president of the RSK?

Page 13227

 1       A.   That's right, yes.

 2       Q.   Did any officials from Belgrade attend this session?  Do you know?

 3       A.   I heard that will Budimir Kosutic was there.  I don't know about

 4    anybody else.  They said that some people were there, but as I wasn't

 5    there myself, I can't say.

 6            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  With the help of the usher, I would like to

 7    put to the witness tab 74 of the binder Exhibit 351, and it is actually

 8    the decision of the RSK Assembly, dated the 26th of February, 1992, in

 9    which the SAO Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem and the SAO

10    Western Slavonia join the RSK officially.

11       Q.   Is that correct?

12       A.   Yes, that's correct.

13       Q.   We do not need to go into details of this decision.

14       A.   Rather, note is taken that they have united into the territory of

15    Serbian Krajina.

16       Q.   Thank you.  Goran Hadzic, what was his position before the war?

17       A.   Goran Hadzic, from the summer of 1990, was the president of the

18    municipal board of the SDS in Vukovar.  Later on, he was elected as

19    president of the Serbian National Council of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja,

20    and Western Srem.  And then, subsequently, at the beginning of the autumn

21    or at the end of summer of 1991, he was elected Prime Minister of the

22    government of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem.

23       Q.   What was his profession before the war?

24       A.   I didn't hear that from him personally, but everybody said that he

25    was a warehouse clerk, or rather, an official, a clerk, a worker, in some

Page 13228












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13   English transcripts.













Page 13229

 1    warehouse, something to that effect.

 2       Q.   Did you have opportunity to see him during meetings?

 3       A.   Yes, quite a few times.

 4       Q.   Did he have the political skills and intellectual level to fulfil

 5    the position of the President of the RSK?  You observed him.  Can you

 6    comment on this?

 7       A.   It's a little difficult for me to speak about somebody's

 8    qualifications for a particular job, the job that he did anyway, but what

 9    I can say is that he wasn't particularly eloquent, and his political

10    appearances did not correspond to the model we have, the image we have, of

11    a politician.  But people from Eastern Slavonia told me that he had been

12    elected to these posts because he was brave and courageous in standing up

13    to the Croatian police in Vukovar and that he first jumped up onto a

14    tractor and thus became a well-known personality.

15       Q.   Was he actually the dominant political authority in the RSK, or

16    someone else?

17       A.   Well, in the RSK, no.  The authority, the power -- he had power

18    and authority.  Milan Martic and his structures had power and authority,

19    parallel structures, in fact, and they were the powers that be in that

20    part of Krajina.  Goran Hadzic, for the most part, spent his time living

21    in Novi Sad.  I don't know how far he was influential in Eastern Slavonia.

22    He would come to Knin from time to time.

23       Q.   And when you speak about the parallel structure around Milan

24    Martic, is that the same parallel structure with Frenki that you mentioned

25    before, during the year 1991?

Page 13230

 1       A.   That's right, except at that time it was the official, formal

 2    authorities in power in the RSK.

 3       Q.   Do you know -- you have already mentioned the person Stojicic

 4    Badza.  What was his relationship or position in the SAO Eastern Slavonia,

 5    Baranja, and Western Srem?

 6       A.   He was the commander of Territorial Defence in the area.

 7       Q.   Did he have an influence on Mr. Hadzic?  Do you know?

 8       A.   As far as I know, Hadzic made frequent mention of him, Badza, and

 9    a certain man named Jajo, as the main people that he cooperated with.

10       Q.   What was Mr. Hadzic's relationship with Mr. Milosevic?  Can you --

11    did you make any observations to this effect?

12       A.   Complete obeyance.  Hadzic completely obeyed Milosevic.  He was in

13     -- he completely obeyed Milosevic.

14       Q.   What was Mr. Hadzic's relationship, if any, to Mr. Stanisic?

15       A.   Very close.  I know that Stanisic would accompany him sometimes to

16    the Presidency of Serbia, and people even said that he stayed in

17    Stanisic's apartment, that he slept there when he came to Belgrade and

18    that he was under Stanisic's complete control.  At one time he was even

19    said to wear a camouflage uniform in Belgrade when he went to meetings

20    with Milosevic.

21            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  With the help of the usher, I would like to

22    put to the witness the exhibit -- tab number 84 of Exhibit 352.  It's a

23    photo.  Can we put it on the ELMO, please.

24       Q.   And looking at it, can you say where these photos were made and

25    can you point out to us Mr. Hadzic, if he is on these photos, of course.

Page 13231

 1       A.   This photograph was taken on the 31st of January, 1992.  It is the

 2    expanded meeting of the Presidency of the SFRY.

 3       Q.   And is Mr. Hadzic on any of these photos; and if so, can you point

 4    him out to us?

 5       A.   These are members of his government.

 6       Q.   Can you move it?

 7       A.   Members of his government here.  You can't see him on the

 8    photograph.  But he looked like this man here, although this is Rado

 9    Leskovac, I believe, but they looked similar.

10       Q.   Thank you very much, then.  He's not on the photos.  Thank you.

11       A.   No, he isn't; at least, I can't see him.

12       Q.   Witness, we can --

13            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Usher, we can put that away.  Thank you.

14       Q.   Witness, you have told us the provisions of the Vance plan, and I

15    would like to know from you now whether this Vance plan was actually -- if

16    it was actually executed within the Krajina or the RSK.  Was it

17    implemented?

18       A.   No, it was not.

19       Q.   Were the territories demilitarised?

20       A.   No, they were not.

21       Q.   Why not?

22       A.   Because the weapons and military equipment and materiel was not

23    taken away from the area completely, and most of the equipment was hidden,

24    and through the Krajina police force, which was in possession of those

25    weapons still, the military units and formations remained armed in the

Page 13232

 1    area.  And also, later on, from the beginning of 1993, in fact, the heavy

 2    weapons were taken from the warehouses which were held by the peace

 3    forces, and from the beginning of 1993 onwards, the armed formation

 4    existed under the name of the Serb army of the RSK, although it existed

 5    from May 1992 in actual fact, this Serbian army with part of the weaponry.

 6       Q.   Were multi-ethnic police forces, police units, established?  That

 7    is, Croats and Serbs?

 8       A.   No.

 9       Q.   Was the return of Croats to their villages implemented?

10       A.   No, it was not.

11       Q.   Why not?

12       A.   They were not allowed to return, by the authorities in Krajina.

13       Q.   When you say "the authorities in Krajina," whom do you mean?  In

14    which way were they prevented to return?

15       A.   The police prevented them, Martic did, and the political position

16    taken was that they shouldn't return.  This position was taken up by the

17    government.

18       Q.   Was Mr. Milosevic in any way involved in these reactions to the

19    Vance plan?

20       A.   Could you explain what you mean, please, and repeat the question?

21       Q.   You mentioned that the Krajina authorities did not implement the

22    Vance plan, and I was asking you whether Mr. Milosevic did in any way get

23    involved in this action or influence the authorities in Krajina not to do

24    that.

25       A.   Yes, Milosevic did perform militarisation, or rather, he held the

Page 13233

 1    position that demilitarisation shouldn't be put into effect.  Then he

 2    supported militarisation, or rather, the creation of military formations

 3    and the creation of an army, another army in Krajina, the Serbian army of

 4    the RSK.  He appointed commanders, financed them, gave logistics support,

 5    right up until 1995, August 1995, in fact.

 6       Q.   You mentioned that the JNA left the RSK.  When did they start

 7    leaving the RSK, and when was the withdrawal completed?

 8       A.   The withdrawal from Croatia across Krajina began in the month of

 9    October 1991.  Garrisons, Zagreb, Zadar, Sibenik, Sinj, and other parts

10    through the maritime coastal route, which I didn't see, but I heard about

11    them, and the withdrawal from Krajina itself, or that portion of Krajina,

12    was completed in May 1992.

13            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  With the help of the usher, I would like to

14    put to the witness now two exhibits: Tab 75 and tab 76 of Exhibit 351.

15       Q.   Tab 75 is a decision of the RSK Assembly dated the 18th May 1992,

16    amending the RSK constitution and law on defence to establish a Serbian

17    army of the RSK; and the other one is from 1993, a decision of the RSK

18    Assembly, dated the 20th of April, 1993, amending the RSK constitution to

19    change the structure of the Serbian army of the RSK and its command.

20            Is this the army that you referred to just a minute ago?

21       A.   Yes, that's it.

22       Q.   Yes.  Thank you.  I only want to refer to the document from 1992,

23    and there is the Article 1, where it says:  "The Republic of Serbian

24    Krajina shall have a Serbian army in peacetime.  The Serbian army shall

25    comprise TO units in the event of the imminent threat of war, and during

Page 13234

 1    wartime, special purpose police units shall join the Serbian army."

 2            Which special police forces are referred to in this article?  What

 3    does that mean?

 4       A.   They were the special police forces that existed since -- were in

 5    existence since 1991, and we've already discussed that issue here, talked

 6    about them.  The ones that began to be established in April 1991.

 7       Q.   Yes.  Witness, this Serbian army of the Krajina, did they take

 8    over the property of the JNA and the weapons that were left behind?

 9       A.   Yes, that's right.  Part of the weapons were hidden when the JNA

10    withdrew, and in 1993 it was taken from the warehouses which were guarded

11    by the UN peace keepers.

12       Q.   Was it an independent army?  We have already spoken about

13    financial dependence.  Was it an independent army?

14       A.   No.  It was part of the military structures of Yugoslavia.

15       Q.   What was the basis of -- in which way were they dependent, a

16    dependent part of the structure of Yugoslavia?

17       A.   Well, most of the commanding cadre, commanding staff, were active

18    officers of the JNA who were on the JNA payroll.  They were paid by the

19    General Staff of the Yugoslav army and appointed to those positions by the

20    personnel department of the General Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army.

21    The commanders of the army were appointed by the president of Serbia and

22    later the president of Yugoslavia - president of Serbia up until 1995,

23    Slobodan Milosevic - and it was financed, logistics support was given from

24    Yugoslavia.  As far as personnel were concerned, Krajina supplied the men

25    for the army and the regulations and provisions for it to be able to

Page 13235

 1    function.

 2       Q.   Witness, I would like to move now a little bit further in relation

 3    to meetings with Mr. Milosevic, and I would like to know if, in 1994, RSK

 4    officials took part in negotiations with the Croatian authorities.  Do you

 5    know that?

 6       A.   Yes, they did.

 7       Q.   When they went to meetings with the Croatian authorities, did they

 8    have contacts with Mr. Milosevic beforehand?

 9       A.   That's right, yes.  His approval was sought, and the contents of

10    the conversations, the discussions themselves, were determined by him.  He

11    would also follow the discussions as they proceeded and was informed of

12    the process.

13       Q.   Did you have to ask approval before committing to any agreements?

14       A.   That's right, yes.  It was a form of consultation.  But actually,

15    he determined whether something would be accepted or not, and what would

16    be accepted.

17       Q.   What would happen if anyone would not -- would take an isolated

18    action without consulting Mr. Milosevic first?  Do you know?

19       A.   Well, it couldn't have been done, because those people would have

20    been sanctioned and borne the consequences.  There were even instances of

21    physical jeopardy.  People were put in prison who had independently made

22    agreements with Croatia.  The Daruvar agreement is a case in point, where

23    people from Western Slavonia drew up an agrement with Croatia, and the

24    (redacted) example as well.

25       Q.   Did the officials from the Krajina ever make an agreement with the

Page 13236

 1    Croats without an approval, beforehand consultation?

 2       A.   I think that the Daruvar one could have been a case in point, but

 3    I'm not quite sure.  What I do know is that the plan Z-4 was accepted

 4    through Ambassador Albright.  Not directly, without Milosevic's approval

 5    beforehand, or prior to asking approval from Milosevic.

 6       Q.   Which negotiations took place in 1994?  What kind of negotiations

 7    were held with the Croats?  Were they related to a political solution or

 8    were they just on economical issues?

 9       A.   From mid-1994 until the beginning of 1995, there were -- they were

10    agreements about economic relations with Croatia: The oil pipeline, supply

11    of electricity, the water supply, the opening of the highway, the railway

12    transport system.

13       Q.   And did Mr. Milosevic allow you to agree to such economical

14    relations?

15       A.   Yes.  Yes.  And he took a very active part in the drafting of the

16    agreement itself, even with regard to the name of a mixed oil company that

17    had been established.

18       Q.   Witness, I would like to go now to a meeting on the 5th of

19    September, 1994.

20            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And I have to ask for private session for

21    this meeting.

22   [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of the Chamber]

23            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in private session.

24            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

25       Q.   Witness, did you participate in a meeting in September 1994,

Page 13237

 1    together with Milan Martic and Mr. Mikelic; and if so, what was discussed

 2    on that day?

 3       A.   I was at that meeting.  Jovica Stanisic, I think, was there.  We

 4    were in Milosevic's offices, and he offered a luncheon in the same

 5    building, in a room adjoining his offices.  In a strange, dark room.  At

 6    the meeting, he criticised Martic because Martic had declared his support

 7    for Radovan Karadzic regarding the plans for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 8       Q.   Let me clarify a matter.  Who criticised Mr. Martic; Mr. Stanisic

 9    or Mr. Milosevic?

10       A.   Mr. Milosevic.  He said to Martic, "I don't want to make a second

11    Karadzic out of you."  And he smiled.  He smiled timidly.  And he says --

12    he said, "Well, Babic is in cohorts [as interpreted] with the clergy,"

13    meaning in the political sense.  And to that I retorted, "That is the

14    spiritual dimension.  That is my personal choice."  I've just been

15    reminded of that.

16       Q.   Witness, you said that Mr. Milosevic criticised Martic because he

17    had declared his support to Radovan -- for Radovan Karadzic.  Report in

18    relation to what -- support in relation to what?

19       A.   Milosevic was exerting pressure on Karadzic and the Assembly of

20    Republika Srpska to accept the international plan for a peaceful

21    settlement for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in August, since Karadzic and the

22    Assembly of Republika Srpska rejected the plan, he imposed a blockade,

23    formally, on Republika Srpska.  Milosevic did this.

24       Q.   And in which way had Martic supported Mr. Karadzic?  What had he

25    said or done publicly?

Page 13238












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Page 13239

 1       A.   He publicly supported Karadzic in rejecting the plan.  He even

 2    went to vote, because there was a referendum after that.  He went to

 3    Drvar, within the territory of Republika Srpska, though he was not a voter

 4    from the area.

 5       Q.   You said that formally Milosevic did not support -- or impose,

 6    sorry.  Sorry.  He imposed a blockade formally, you said.  And did

 7    anything happen informally?

 8       A.   I do know that informally there was supply of oil derivatives and

 9    that the army of Republika Srpska was assisted by Milosevic.

10       Q.   And how do you know that?

11       A.   I know on the basis of a meeting at Bijeljina that I've already

12    referred to, when Stanisic and Karadzic asked me to make the payments.

13       Q.   Sir, let me stop you.  You do not need to repeat anything.  Do you

14    have anything in addition to that?  Do you have any information in

15    addition to that, that he continued to support?

16       A.   I heard, after arriving in Belgrade in 1995, that around

17    Srebrenica, the army of Yugoslavia had been involved in the wartime events

18    around Srebrenica.  The army of Yugoslavia from the territory of

19    Yugoslavia, across the Drina River.

20       Q.   Who told you that?

21       A.   People from Perucac, along the Drina, in Serbia, a place on the

22    opposite bank.

23            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  We can go into open session again, Your

24    Honour.

25                          [Open session]

Page 13240

 1            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session.

 2            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 3       Q.   Witness, you mentioned the Z-4 plan.  What were the main points of

 4    the Z-4 plan?

 5       A.   The main point, or the gist of the plan, was that the territory of

 6    the Republic of Serbian Krajina, which had earlier been known as the

 7    Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina and which was now known as Sector

 8    North and Sector South under the protection of the United Nations, should

 9    be given political, territorial autonomy within the Republic of Croatia.

10    It would have a parliament, a government, institutions, a currency that

11    would be special in appearance but it would be printed by the National

12    Bank of Croatia, competence over the regional police and the courts, which

13    would imply a high level of autonomy.

14       Q.   Who made this suggestion of the Z-4 plan?  Was it an international

15    proposal?

16       A.   The Z-4 was given that name because it was proposed by four

17    ambassadors in Zagreb, that is, by the international community.

18       Q.   In the transcript earlier on, it was said that -- it is actually

19    on page 61 of the transcript, line 14, it says that Ambassador Albright

20    accepted the Z-4 plan.  Is that correct, Ambassador Albright?

21       A.   Ambassador Galbraith, the ambassador of the United States in

22    Croatia, Peter Galbraith.  He was the main creator and proponent of that

23    plan.

24       Q.   This plan, did that actually mean the reintegration of the three

25    regions of the RSK, that is, Krajina, Western Slavonia, Eastern Slavonia,

Page 13241

 1    into the Croatian Republic?

 2       A.   That's right.  Only the Western Slavonia would be settled

 3    immediately, whereas Eastern Slavonia, within a period of five years, and

 4    the territory of SAO Krajina would have a high degree of political and

 5    territorial autonomy in Croatia.

 6       Q.   Were the politicians of the Krajina in a position -- did they

 7    accept this Z-4 plan, you in the RSK?

 8       A.   At the beginning of March/end of February, the politicians in

 9    Krajina rejected the plan.  The plan was accepted only by the last Prime

10    Minister of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in August 1995.

11       Q.   And when you said March and February, which year?  Is it also

12    1995?

13       A.   That's right, 1995.

14       Q.   Who opposed the Z-4 plan?

15       A.   The President of the Republic of Serbia, according to what Milan

16    Martic said, the President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, and he said

17    half an hour prior to the beginning of the meeting with the international

18    community that President Milosevic had said that the plan should not be

19    even considered.

20       Q.   When did Mr. Milan Martic consult with Mr. Milosevic, and of what

21    time period are you speaking when you say -- when you refer to a meeting

22    with the international community?

23       A.   It was that week.  I think it was the end of February/beginning of

24    March.  So the beginning of the week, Martic went to Belgrade for

25    consultations.  Whether it was Monday or Tuesday.  And then on Thursday,

Page 13242

 1    an announcement was issued of the supreme defence council of the Republic

 2    of Serbian Krajina, in negative terms, about the plan, and then I think it

 3    was the following Monday when there was the meeting with representatives

 4    of the international community at which Martic said half an hour prior to

 5    the meeting that Milosevic had said that the plan should not even be taken

 6    into consideration.  And at the meeting with representatives of the

 7    international community, Ambassador Farista Djijan [phoen] handed it to

 8    him.  He wouldn't even take it into his hands.

 9       Q.   On that occasion, then, did the Krajina authorities reject the

10    plan, in that meeting then with the internationals?

11       A.   Actually, it was not even taken into consideration, so it was not

12    accepted.

13            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  We would need to go into private session for

14    a meeting of the witness.

15   [Private session [Confidentiality lifted by order of the Chamber]

16            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in private session.

17            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

18       Q.   Did you speak with Mr. Milosevic yourself about the Z-4 plan?

19       A.   I did, at the beginning of April 1995.

20       Q.   What did you discuss?

21       A.   He was the first to mention the fact that the plan Z-4 was a good

22    one but that the territory of the municipality of Slunj should have been

23    divided lengthwise.  He didn't give any explanations for this.  And then

24    we actually discussed the events in Livanjsko Polje and the hinterland of

25    Knin, the aggression of the HVO towards Knin.  I've already spoken about

Page 13243

 1    that.  And then he also said that there weren't 300.000 people of Krajina

 2    towards 4 million Croats but that there was the whole logistics of Serbia

 3    behind us, and that was that meeting.

 4       Q.   Witness, you said that Mr. Milosevic was in favour of the Z-4 plan

 5    when you spoke to him; is that understood?  He had only some remark in

 6    relation to Slunj.

 7       A.   It appeared that way, yes.  However, one never knew with him for

 8    certain whether he really stood behind what he said; at least, I was not

 9    always sure.

10       Q.   You have already mentioned this meeting in relation to the

11    fighting that took place at the same time in Bosnia with participation of

12    Milan Martic and his forces, and you mentioned the region of Livno and

13    this gash and the line that Mr. Milosevic showed you to this effect.  Was

14    there also fighting at that time in the Bihac region, with participation

15    of RSK forces?

16       A.   Yes.  That was --

17            JUDGE MAY:  I see the time.  In fact, it's after a quarter past.

18    Can we go back, when we come back, into open session?

19            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, Your Honour.

20            JUDGE MAY:  Very well.  We'll adjourn now.  Twenty minutes.

21                          --- Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.

22                          --- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.

23                          [Open session]

24            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

25            JUDGE MAY:  Yes.

Page 13244

 1            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Thank you, Your Honours.  And Your Honours,

 2    for your orientation, we are at the moment at paragraph 280 of the

 3    proofing summary, but I will also address paragraph 312, because it fits

 4    into the context and would speed up matters.

 5       Q.   Witness, Martic or RSK force participation in Bosnia, did Milan

 6    Martic and RSK forces participate in the fighting in Bosnia and

 7    Herzegovina already as early as summer 1992?

 8       A.   That's right, in the so-called corridor in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 9       Q.   Is that the Posavina corridor?

10       A.   Yes, that's right.

11       Q.   What is the importance of the Posavina corridor for Bosnia and for

12    -- for the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and for the Serbs in the

13    Krajina region?  What was the importance of this corridor?

14       A.   It is the corridor linking Bosnian Krajina and the Republic of

15    Serbian Krajina with Serbia, or rather, the Federal Republic of

16    Yugoslavia.

17       Q.   And in which time period did RSK forces, with Milan Martic,

18    participate in the fighting in 1992?

19       A.   At the beginning of the summer of 1992.  In June already they were

20    there, at the end of June.

21       Q.   And who was in charge, in overall charge of the operations in the

22    Posavina corridor?

23       A.   The army of Republika Srpska and General Mladic.

24       Q.   You have mentioned the fighting in 1994, 1995, in the region of

25    Livno in Herzegovina, and my question was before the break:  Did forces

Page 13245

 1    from the RSK also participate in the fighting around Bihac?

 2       A.   They did.

 3       Q.   Who -- what were the forces on both sides?  Who was fighting whom

 4    in Bihac?

 5       A.   On one side, there was the 5th Corps of the army of Bosnia and

 6    Herzegovina, which was defending its territory, and it was being attacked

 7    by the forces of the army of Republika Srpska and the forces of the

 8    Republic of Serbian Krajina, consisting of the Serbian army, the police,

 9    and the state security service of Serbia.

10       Q.   Who --

11       A.   And - sorry - the forces of Fikret Abdic.

12       Q.   The forces of the police forces of the state security service of

13    Serbia that participated, who led them?  Who commanded them in this

14    fighting?

15       A.   I was told it was Frenki, that he was in command, or rather, the

16    DB from Petrova Gora.

17       Q.   And who told you that?

18       A.   People from Kordun, from the region, members of the government of

19    Krajina.

20       Q.   This participation of the RSK forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

21    did this cause problems for the position of the RSK towards the

22    international community and the Croatian authorities?

23       A.   Yes.  In 1994 in particular, and in 1995, this compromised the

24    position of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in relation to the

25    international community, because the area of Bihac was a protected area by

Page 13246

 1    the international community.

 2       Q.   Did it increase the danger of an all-out attack on the RSK by the

 3    Croatian forces?

 4       A.   Yes.  That was the reason why the Croatian army and the HVO from

 5    the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina launched an offensive to deblock

 6    Bihac.  That was what was publicly announced by the authorities in Croatia

 7    in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it meant cutting off the Republic of

 8    Serbian Krajina from Republika Srpska and Yugoslavia.

 9       Q.   Did the RSK authorities and the Republika Srpska authorities

10    actually have a military agreement on assisting each other in that time

11    period?

12       A.   I know there was an agreement between Martic and Karadzic, that

13    is, between the authorities of Republika Srpska and the Republic of

14    Serbian Krajina, and that agreement referred to brigades of the army of

15    Republika Srpska that would assist the army of the RSK.  As for other

16    parts of the agreement, I'm not sure about that.

17            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  With the help of the usher, I would like to

18    show the witness the Exhibit tab 96 of Exhibit 352.

19       Q.   Witness, this is a document of the 30th of July, 1995, referring

20    to a visit by Mr. Akashi, the special representative of the

21    Secretary-General of the United Nations, and other persons, in relation to

22    an agreement, a proposed agreement.  The proposed agreement referred to,

23    is that the Z-4 plan?

24       A.   No.  This was -- this should have been a component part of the Z-4

25    plan, or rather, a precondition for the implementation of the Z-4 plan.

Page 13247

 1    So this was an agreement on the disengagement of the army of the Republic

 2    of Serbian Krajina in the Bihac pocket; or, to be more precise, this was

 3    not an agreement, it's an announcement on agreement, announcement of

 4    approving the proposals made by Mr. Akashi to the leadership of the

 5    Republic of Serbian Krajina.

 6       Q.   And the proposal was that no troops or individual soldiers of the

 7    RSK would get engaged in the Bihac pocket, and refrain from any

 8    cross-border activities; is that what is proposed here?

 9       A.   That's right.

10       Q.   The person -- there is a handwritten note on it saying the 20th of

11    September -- or sorry.  No.  Thank you.  I withdraw my question.

12            This proposal to disengage in the RSK, was that actually

13    implemented?

14       A.   No.

15       Q.   What did happen?  What was instead done?

16       A.   Combat continued.  [Realtime transcript read in error "Maksic"]

17    Mrksic nor Milan Novakovic, who was in command there, nor Martic nor the

18    police nor the MUP of Serbia were they withdrawn from the fighting in that

19    region.

20       Q.   In the transcript, it says Maksic.  Is that correct or -- in the

21    document as such it says General Mrksic.

22       A.   That's right.  Mile Mrksic, General Mile Mrksic, the commander of

23    the army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

24       Q.   Yes.  Thank you.

25            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  We can take this away.

Page 13248












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Page 13249

 1       Q.   Witness, in 1994, did the Minister of Interior of the RSK have a

 2    problem to get control over the police in the territory of Eastern

 3    Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem?

 4       A.   Yes, that's right.

 5       Q.   Why did he --

 6       A.   The Minister of the Interior; is that what you said?

 7       Q.   Yes.  Yes.  Who was the Minister of Interior in 1994?

 8       A.   Until the end of 1994, it was Ilija Prijic, who was replaced in

 9    that capacity, and the Assembly nominated, appointed, Mr. Perisic, but he

10    didn't take up his post either in Eastern Slavonia or in the rest of the

11    RSK either.  So from the end of 1994 until August 1995, the RSK did not

12    have a Minister for the Interior.  One of the deputies was the acting

13    minister.

14       Q.   Did a delegation from the RSK then meet Mr. Milosevic to consult

15    him in this problem?

16       A.   Yes, that's right.  In 1995, April, around the 26th of April, in

17    fact.

18            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I have to apologise, but we need

19    to go into private session for this.

20   [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of the Chamber]

21            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in private session.

22            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

23       Q.   Were you part of this delegation?

24       A.   Yes, I was.

25       Q.   Who else was present?  Who else was present from both sides?

Page 13250

 1       A.   The delegation was led by -- yes, Borislav Mikelic, Uros Funduk,

 2    Slobodan Milosevic, Jovica Stanisic, as far as I remember.

 3    Whether there was anybody else, I can't quite remember now.

 4       Q.   What did you ask of Mr. Milosevic, if anything?

 5       A.   We asked that Milosevic allow Slobodan Perisic to be appointed, or

 6    rather, that Slobodan Perisic, who was elected the Minister of the

 7    Interior for RSK, should take over that function as Minister of the

 8    Interior of RSK.

 9       Q.   And what was Mr. Milosevic's reaction to this?  What happened at

10    the meeting?

11       A.   First of all, Jovica Stanisic commented this request, and he said

12    -- Jovica Stanisic, that is, "We have invested too much in all that," and

13    he was thinking of MUP Krajina, "for us to relinquish it to somebody

14    else now."  And to that, Slobodan Milosevic reacted and said the

15    following:  He told the delegation of the RSK, that is, to us, "You must

16    understand that we must assist you in this way, via the state security

17    service, because it works in a specific clandestine way, and that's why we

18    can't help you, assist you, through the public security service."  In that

19    way, he lent his support to Jovica Stanisic and his position on the issue.

20       Q.   Was that situation solved on the day of this meeting?  Was the --

21    could Mr. Milosevic help you in relation to the Minister of Interior?

22       A.   No.  The RSK was left without a Minister of the Interior.

23            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  We can go into open session again, Your

24    Honour.

25                          [Open session]

Page 13251

 1            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session.

 2            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  With the help of the usher, I would like to

 3    put a document to the witness, and it is tab 97 of Exhibit 352.

 4       Q.   Witness, this is a document referring to Minister Peric and his

 5    position, and it is also referring to people and their affiliation to

 6    certain police forces.  Who prepared this document?

 7            JUDGE KWON:  Are we now in open session?

 8            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

 9       A.   I learnt about this document from Slobodan Peric.  I got it from

10    him.

11       Q.   In this document, actually, at the -- the last paragraph, it says:

12    "At all the meetings, Milosevic agrees that Peric should take over the

13    MUP, while Stanisic immediately after that agrees with Martic that it

14    should be prevented."

15            Was the situation as described in this paragraph?

16       A.   Specifically, I know what I have described.  That was the

17    situation.  But yes, although I didn't hear that Milosevic had agreed, in

18    fact.

19       Q.   Was there a problem in May 1995 in relation to the commander of

20    the armed forces of the RSK after the Operation Flash?

21       A.   Yes, that's right.

22            JUDGE KWON:  You have something to say, Mr. Milosevic?

23            THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can't find this document, because

24    in tab 97, the one I have, I have an announcement for Tanjug by the

25    president of the Republic of Srpska Krajina, and not the document that

Page 13252

 1    you're talking about.  So I have taken this out very carefully from tab

 2    97.

 3            JUDGE MAY:  Coming up.

 4            Yes.

 5            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honours, I have no explanation for this

 6    situation.

 7            JUDGE MAY:  He's got a copy now.

 8            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Oh, okay.  Good.  Tab 97.  I don't think I

 9    need to repeat this now.

10            JUDGE MAY:  No.

11            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No.

12       Q.   Just one more question in relation to tab 97.  Did you provide

13    this document when you had your conversations with the Prosecutor in The

14    Hague?

15       A.   Yes.

16       Q.   I think you have not yet answered my question whether there was a

17    problem arising in relation to the commander of the armed forces of the

18    RSK after Operation Flash.  Who was the commander of the armed forces of

19    the RSK during the Operation Flash?

20       A.   General Celeketic.

21       Q.   Was he dismissed after the Croatian forces took Western Slavonia

22    in their Operation Flash?

23       A.   That's right, yes, around the 9th of May, 1995.

24       Q.   Did you, in the Supreme Defence Council in the Krajina - I don't

25    mean you personally, but the Supreme Defence Council of the RSK - agree

Page 13253

 1    about a new candidate, Mile Novakovic?

 2       A.   I have to explain that the Prime Minister of the RSK, as member of

 3    the supreme council, Defence Council, proposed General Mile Novakovic for

 4    the new commander.  However, Slobodan Milosevic refused, and he appointed

 5    General Mile Mrksic for the new commander of the Serb army of the RSK.

 6       Q.   Witness, did the Supreme Defence Council of the RSK agree?  Did

 7    the authorities in the Krajina agree on Mr. Novakovic?

 8       A.   It agreed with the decision that it be General Mile Mrksic, and

 9    this was formalised.  It was officially stated.

10            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I have to ask for private

11    session, to clarify a matter.

12   [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of the Chamber]

13            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in private session.

14            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

15       Q.   Witness, did you see Mr. Milosevic in relation to the TO

16    commander, the new TO commander, together with the delegation; and if so,

17    when?

18       A.   Yes, I did, about the 9th of May, or perhaps on the 9th of May,

19    1995, in the offices of President Milosevic.

20       Q.   When you went there with the delegation, who accompanied you?

21       A.   The delegation was led by the Prime Minister, Borislav Mikelic.  I

22    don't remember whether there was anybody else.  Yes, there was [redacted]

23    [redacted].

24       Q.   Did Mr. Mikelic make a proposal to Mr. Milosevic as to who should

25    be the new commander?

Page 13254

 1       A.   He proposed General Mile Novakovic, who, on one occasion, was the

 2    commander, in 1993.  He was the commander of the Serbian army of Krajina

 3    at that time.

 4       Q.   Did Mr. Milosevic reject this proposal, or how did he -- did it --

 5    how did it happen that suddenly it was Mr. Mrksic?

 6       A.   He rejected it, yes, and he gave some sort of reason.  And he also

 7    said it's been decided that it should be General Mile Mrksic.

 8       Q.   Do you know who made this decision that Mile Mrksic -- when you

 9    say he said it had been decided that it should be General Mile Mrksic, do

10    you know who he meant who decided it?

11       A.   I heard that Milosevic said that.  He interrupted the meeting,

12    left the room, and came back after a short period and said, "The new

13    commander will be Mile Mrksic."  Some people who were present heard

14    mention of the Supreme Defence Council, but I don't remember that.  I

15    heard that Milosevic had said that Mile Mrksic was the new commander and

16    that he had been appointed by Milosevic; at least, that's how I understood

17    it at the meeting.  When I said the Supreme Defence Council, the Supreme

18    Defence Council of Yugoslavia was mentioned by some people.

19       Q.   Yes.

20            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Open session again.  Thank you.

21                          [Open session]

22            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session.

23            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

24       Q.   Did the RSK government then approve the appointment -- or the

25    decision by an official appointment of General Mile Mrksic?

Page 13255

 1       A.   It followed the regular procedure via the Supreme Council of

 2    Defence for the RSK and the Assembly of the RSK as well, and that's how it

 3    was decided that Mrksic -- or rather, they adopted the proposal and

 4    verified it legally, that Mile Mrksic should be the commander.

 5       Q.   When did Mile Mrksic arrive in the RSK as commander?

 6       A.   He was seen on the 16th of May, 1995.  The Assembly appointed him

 7    between the 18th and 20th of May, 1995.

 8       Q.   What position did he have before he came to the RSK?  Do you know

 9    that?

10       A.   He was the commander of the Guards Brigade of the JNA in Belgrade,

11    and he was in command of it during the attack on Vukovar.  And before

12    that, he was something in the General Staff, held some post, but I don't

13    know what exactly.

14       Q.   When he arrived in the RSK, did he officially become an employee

15    of the RSK forces, or did he remain to be employed as a VJ officer?

16       A.   He was an officer of the army of Yugoslavia.

17       Q.   And the previous two commanders that you mentioned, Mile Novakovic

18    and Celeketic, were they also members of the VJ throughout their time in

19    the RSK?

20       A.   Yes.

21       Q.   During your conversation with the Prosecution in The Hague, did

22    you review several orders signed by Milan Martic related to the

23    appointment, promotions, and release of General Celeketic?  Do you recall

24    that?

25       A.   Yes.

Page 13256

 1            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honours, I don't think we need to put it

 2    all to the witness.  It's tabs 98, 99, 100, and 101 of Exhibit 352.  They

 3    all deal with General Celeketic, his promotion and his release.

 4       Q.   But I would like to put to you tab 102, and it's 102 of that same

 5    exhibit, 352.  And that is actually a document by Dusan Zoric, the

 6    military post 1740 -- 90, Belgrade, from 21st December, 1994, regarding

 7    the promotion of Colonel Milan Celeketic to the rank of Major General.

 8    Can you tell us who this person Dusan Zoric is, what position did he have?

 9       A.   He was head of the personnel department of the General Staff of

10    the army of Yugoslavia, or was the acting head.

11       Q.   Yes.  Thank you.

12            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, we have to go into private

13    session, and I'm dealing now with paragraph 293 and the following two in

14    the proofing summary.

15   [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of the Chamber]

16            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in private session.

17            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

18       Q.   Witness, did you have a conversation with Mr. Milosevic on the Z-4

19    plan in August 1995?

20       A.   Yes, a telephone conversation.

21       Q.   At that time, had you discussed the Z-4 plan with Mr. Galbraith?

22       A.   Yes, with Ambassador Peter Galbraith, on several occasions,

23    several times before that.

24       Q.   And immediately before you had this telephone conversation, what

25    was the option given to you by Mr. Galbraith?

Page 13257

 1       A.   He offered that we should accept and adopt the Z-4 plan and the

 2    disengagement of the armed forces of Krajina in the Bihac pocket.  He said

 3    that we should accept a new mandate for the UN peacekeepers, which was

 4    known as the UNCRO mandate, United Nations Croatia, and that

 5    communications and roads be opened in Croatia.

 6       Q.   At that time, were you the president of the RSK?

 7       A.   I was the Prime Minister of the government of the Republic of

 8    Serbian Krajina.  Martic was the president, in fact.

 9       Q.   Why did you not simply accept it?

10       A.   I accepted in my capacity as Prime Minister, but I informed

11    Ambassador Galbraith that this could not be put into practice without the

12    will and acquiescence of President Milosevic.

13       Q.   How -- and did you then -- you said you had a telephone

14    conversation with Mr. Milosevic on the 3rd of August, 1995.  How did you

15    reach him?  Did anyone help you?

16       A.   Yes.  Jovica Stanisic did, from Jovica Stanisic's cabinet or

17    offices.

18       Q.   Did you go to his office, and where was it?

19       A.   I did go to see Stanisic in his office, which was located in the

20    building of the Federal Internal Affairs Ministry.

21       Q.   Who was present?  Who else was present when you saw him?

22       A.   Radovan Stojicic, nicknamed Badza was there, and so was the head

23    of the counter-intelligence service of State Security of Serbia, a man

24    whose name I don't remember, but he resembled Frenki.

25       Q.   Is that the same man you mentioned earlier on to have seen in

Page 13258












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Page 13259

 1    another meeting with Kertes?

 2       A.   That's right.  That's the man, on the 4th of January, 1992.

 3       Q.   Did you explain to these three gentlemen that you wanted to accept

 4    the Z-4 plan and discuss it with Mr. Milosevic?

 5       A.   That's right.  I said that I had accepted this with Galbraith, and

 6    they looked at each other in a slightly hostile fashion.  They were a

 7    little hostile.  But they did put me in touch with Milosevic.

 8       Q.   And what did Mr. Milosevic say to you in relation to the Z-4 plan?

 9       A.   He repeated -- or rather, he mumbled something.  To give an

10    example, it's as if he was speaking out of a dream.  He just said, "Yes.

11    Yes.  Just slowly, slowly, everything should be conducted calmly."  Those

12    were his words over the phone.  And he said, "Contact Vlatko Jovanovic.

13    Consult him."

14       Q.   And did you do that?

15       A.   Yes, I did.  I met Minister -- Foreign Affairs Minister Vlatko

16    Jovanovic.  He was the SFRY minister in the ministry building.

17            JUDGE MAY:  Yes.

18            THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just a technical correction.  The

19    witness says that I answered him calmly, and here it says, it's been

20    translated as, "Yes.  Yes.  Just slowly..."  So there's a difference

21    between "slowly" and "calmly," especially when we're talking about war and

22    peace.  There's a big difference between the two words.  So the witness

23    said "mirno," and it was translated as "slowly."

24            JUDGE MAY:  Yes.  That's to be noted.

25            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Page 13260

 1       Q.   Witness, what were the exact words that Mr. Milosevic said to you?

 2    Just to clarify this matter.  What exactly did he say to you?

 3       A.   "Yes.  Yes.  Everything should be done calmly, or peacefully,"

 4     "mirno."

 5       Q.   Witness, did you actually at that time have time to do it slowly

 6    or calmly, or was there an urgency?  What had Mr. Galbraith told you how

 7    much time would you have to make up your mind?

 8            THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, the witness didn't use the

 9    word "slowly" at all.

10            JUDGE MAY:  We heard.  Yes.

11            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

12       Q.   Witness, was there an urgency, a special urgency on the 3rd of

13    August, 1995?

14       A.   Yes.  Reactions were to come the following day.  I was to give a

15    statement, and this was to be implemented, what I had accepted and what I

16    was to make public by way of a statement.

17       Q.   Did you actually have an ultimatum from Mr. Galbraith to accept

18    the plan right now, otherwise consequences would happen?

19       A.   He said what we could expect if we didn't accept, which meant a

20    Croatian aggression, and that we could fare the same as Western Slavonia.

21       Q.   And did you accept it publicly, and could prevent this aggression?

22       A.   Yes, I did.  I made a statement to that effect, that I accepted.

23       Q.   Was the RSK then attacked?

24       A.   Yes, it was, the next day, in the morning.

25            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  With the help of the usher, I would like to

Page 13261

 1    show the witness the Exhibit tab 103 of Exhibit 352, and it relates to

 2    minutes of the first session of the RSK government from July 1995,

 3    referring to the international negotiations.  And there is no need to

 4    discuss it.  It speaks for itself.

 5            And in addition to that, I would like to put to the witness tab

 6    104 of that same exhibit, 352.  It is a coded cable dated 3rd August 1995.

 7       Q.   And I would like to quote from this document.  First of all the

 8    question:  Have you been shown this document and been translated part of

 9    it during your conversation with the Prosecutor?

10       A.   Yes, orally it was shown to me.

11            JUDGE MAY:  We need to know what this is, where it comes from.

12            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, it's a code cable from the UK

13    embassy in Zagreb, regarding a conversation between Ambassador Galbraith

14    and the Prime Minister of the RSK.

15            THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I'm afraid I have a record

16    from the first session of the government under this tab.

17            JUDGE MAY:  Make sure the accused gets the right document.

18            THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  I'm just checking the

19    transcript.  104.

20            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honours, when I read this quote, we need

21    to go into private session, because I just saw that it is necessary.

22            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in private session.

23            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Oh, yes.  Thank you.

24       Q.   The quote is:  "RSK Prime Minister tells my American colleague

25    that to avoid war he is ready to meet Tudjman's conditions and will

Page 13262

 1    announce this today.  Unclear whether he has other RSK leadership on

 2    board.  Milosevic being briefed by Americans on Galbraith's discussions

 3    with Babic, need to get Belgrade backing to lend credibility."

 4            Witness, was this the situation at that time, and is this quote

 5    correct as to your discussions with Mr. Galbraith?

 6       A.   Yes, with the exception of the fact that I don't know about any

 7    briefing of Milosevic by international factors.  All I know is that a

 8    member of the French embassy in Belgrade had told me that Milosevic did

 9    not support us.

10            JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, if you look at the paragraph 9 of

11    the same document, it says:  "Galbraith assured us that he had the full

12    support of state department."  What is -- who are "us" here?

13            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  "Us" is the UK embassy.  It's actually a

14    report of the US - sorry - the UK embassy, referring to a discussion of

15    Mr. Galbraith with the witness and their further discussions on the matter

16    and the considerations of Mr. Galbraith.

17            JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I was mistaken.  Thank you.

18            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

19       Q.   Did you see Mr. Milosevic after the attack, the so-called

20    Operation Storm, on the 8th of August, 1995?

21       A.   Yes, around the 8th of August, 1995, in the Boticeva Street, a

22    villa in Boticeva Street.

23       Q.   The villa in Boticeva Street, what is it?  What kind of a building

24    is it?  Is it an official building?

25       A.   It is the residence of the government of Serbia.

Page 13263

 1       Q.   Did you ask for this meeting with Mr. Milosevic?

 2       A.   The initiative first came from Buba Morina, the commissioner for

 3    refugees of the Republic of Serbia in Banja Luka, saying that I should go

 4    to Belgrade to see where the refugees from Krajina would be accommodated.

 5    So I went to Belgrade.  I reported to the Prime Minister, Mirko

 6    Marjanovic, who asked me for a statement.  After I had given that

 7    statement, he linked me with President Milosevic and he made the

 8    appointment for meeting Mr. Milosevic.

 9       Q.   What kind of a statement asked he of you to make?

10       A.   Mirko Marjanovic asked me to make a statement to the effect that

11    Yugoslavia was not to blame for the exodus of the Serbian people from

12    Krajina.  He even had a prepared text of a few sentences, and he also

13    indicated what I should write down.

14            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  With the help of the usher, I would like to

15    put the tab 105 of Exhibit 352 to the witness.

16       Q.   Is this the statement that you made on request of Mr. Marjanovic?

17       A.   Yes.

18       Q.   We do not need to comment on this further.

19            Witness, and when you then saw Mr. Milosevic, what did he -- what

20    did you ask of him, or what did you discuss with him?

21       A.   I came to see him.  This was on the eve of his departure for

22    Moscow for a meeting with Yeltsin.  First of all, the security would not

23    let me in and then he came out and let me in, and we spoke in the room

24    next to the entrance because in the conference hall there were other

25    officials from Yugoslavia and the army.  I could see this from the

Page 13264

 1    registration plates of the cars. This was a brief meeting that I had with

 2    him.  I asked where the people would be accommodated, the people from

 3    Krajina who had fled.

 4       Q.   What was his answer to this?

 5       A.   He said, "In Kosovo."  I asked, "How many people can fit into

 6    Kosovo?  It's overpopulated, and there was ethnic tension."  He said,

 7    "100.000, and many can also go to Republika Srpska and in Republika

 8    Srpska."  And I asked him whether we could go to Eastern Slavonia.  He

 9    said, "No, not for the time being."  Then I asked him, "And where will the

10    government go, the government of Krajina?"  And he said, "Let it stay in

11    Belgrade.  If necessary, for negotiations.  And you personally," he said,

12    "you can apply to Mirko Marjanovic regarding your own personal needs."

13       Q.   Did the --

14            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  We can go into open session, Your Honour.

15                          [Open session]

16            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session.

17            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

18       Q.   Did the refugees from the RSK actually end up in Kosovo or in

19    Bosnia and Herzegovina, or where did they go?

20       A.   At first, that same day, as soon as the refugees started coming

21    from Krajina, Ratko Mladic, the commander of the army of Republika Srpska,

22    blocked the bridge across the Vrbas, and he wouldn't let refugees go any

23    further. I went to see him.

24            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  We should go into private session for this

25    meeting.

Page 13265

 1   [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of the Chamber]

 2            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in private session.

 3            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 4       Q.   You said you went to see Mr. Mladic.  Where did you meet him, and

 5    why did you want to see him?

 6       A.   In Banja Luka, because Mladic had blocked the way and prevented

 7    people from moving any further.  And the refugees had formed two columns:

 8    One going from Bosanski Novi and Prijedor towards Banja Luka, and another

 9    one from Bosanski Petrovac, Mrkonjic Grad, via Manjaca, towards Banja

10    Luka.  So there was a block, and the situation was really difficult.  Many

11    had relatives in Vojvodina, in Belgrade, in other places, and they

12    couldn't stay there on the road.  And as far as I heard from the

13    authorities of Republika Srpska, they intended to put up the refugees at

14    the camp at Manjaca.

15            And I went to see Mladic to appeal to him to deblock the road, and

16    I went to see him in a building in Banja Luka.  He said that he would lift

17    the blockade but after Derventa.  He said they should stay here in

18    Republika Srpska.  This is our land.  And he did deblock the passage

19    across the Vrbas, but then he blocked the way at the crossings into Serbia

20    on the Drina and the Sava Rivers, where all adult males, able-bodied males

21    were separated from their families and made to stay in Republika Srpska

22    and the rest of their families crossed into the Republic of Serbia.

23            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  We can go into open session.

24                          [Open session]

25            THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session.

Page 13266

 1            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 2       Q.   Witness, you said that able-bodied males were separated from their

 3    families.  For what reason?  What were they supposed to do?

 4       A.   They were integrated into the army of Republika Srpska, and those

 5    who had crossed into Serbia, they were arrested and taken to Eastern

 6    Slavonia, to a camp under Arkan or to the front line, the so-called front

 7    lines.

 8       Q.   Does that mean they were forcefully recruited into the VRS and

 9    into the army -- into Arkan's unit?

10       A.   That's right.

11       Q.   Where did those who reached Serbia, where did they settle?

12       A.   They were accommodated in two ways:  First, people who had

13    relatives, close relatives, the first generation, could stay with their

14    families.  All the others were transported by the police to certain

15    centres all over Serbia, including Kosovo, in columns of tractors or cars

16    or in trains.  I heard the stories of many people when they arrived by

17    train in Pristina and other towns in Kosovo.  They were flabbergasted and

18    they took the first chance to flee from there.

19       Q.   Witness, did refugees from the Krajina arrive in Vojvodina?

20       A.   Yes.

21       Q.   Were Croatian inhabitants then driven out of Vojvodina?  Do you

22    know that?

23       A.   There was some incursion into Croatian homes and throwing the

24    inhabitants out; however, the Serbian police intervened and prevented

25    people moving into Croatian homes.

Page 13267

 1       Q.   Witness, I would like to go now into an entirely different

 2    chapter, and that refers to Milan Martic.  Was he arrested at some point

 3    in time in Bosnia?

 4       A.   Yes, in September 1991.

 5       Q.   Was there an arrest warrant against him?

 6       A.   Yes, issued by the Croatian government.

 7            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  With the help of the usher, I would like to

 8    put to the witness tab 111A.

 9       Q.   Witness, is this the arrest warrant, or rather, the decree, in

10    relation to Milan Martic?

11       A.   That is what it says here, but I know from the media that it

12    existed.

13       Q.   Were you shown this document during your conversation with the

14    Prosecutor?

15       A.   Yes.

16            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honours, for your information, the

17    Prosecution office received this document from the government of the

18    Republic of Croatia in a submission in May 2002.

19            With the help of the usher, I would like to put now to the witness

20    tab 111B of that same exhibit, 352, and that's also a document that was

21    received from the Croatian government, attached to the arrest warrant.

22       Q.   Witness, it is a decree in relation to an investigation conducted

23    into activities of Milan Martic and others.  And did you have time to read

24    this document?  Did you read it during your conversation with the

25    Prosecutor?

Page 13268












12   Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13   English transcripts.













Page 13269

 1       A.   I did.

 2       Q.   In this document, there is referred to the Council of Peoples

 3    Resistance that you have already mentioned as being the source of

 4    provocations, and there is listed a lot of events from October 1990

 5    through to April 1991, referring to attacks on the police, the Croatian

 6    police; the shooting on civilians, the destruction of shops, houses, and

 7    vehicles with explosive devices; and the attacks on railroad tracks.

 8            When you reviewed this document, did you find it to be correct?

 9    Those facts given in the document, were they correct?

10       A.   They are correct, yes.

11       Q.   Those people, or those properties that were destroyed, or people

12    that were harmed, were they Croats or, as you mentioned also earlier,

13    public property?

14       A.   Yes.  These were all Croats and public property, and Albanians.

15       Q.   Yes.  Thank you.

16            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  That should be enough for this document.

17       Q.   When Mr. Martic was arrested in Bosnia, what was he doing there,

18    and together with whom was he arrested?

19       A.   He was passing through Otoka, a village inhabited by Muslims next

20    to Bosanska Krupa.  Also with him was his escort and people from the JNA,

21    officers of the JNA.

22       Q.   Do you know what they were doing in Bosnia?

23       A.   I don't know exactly.

24       Q.   Where they were apprehended, was that a route used for the

25    transfer of weapons and equipment for the military forces in the Krajina?

Page 13270

 1       A.   Yes.

 2       Q.   At that time, was that the only route that was open, or were there

 3    various routes?

 4       A.   There were two routes.

 5       Q.   Which routes were taken for the transport of weapons?

 6       A.   Through Bosanski Novi and through -- via Grahovo.

 7       Q.   The weapons, where did they come from?

 8       A.   The weapons came from two sources:  One was Serbia, and the other

 9    was from JNA warehouses in the territory of Krajina.

10       Q.   Was there also a military warehouse, or sort of, in Bihac, where

11    you would receive weapons from?

12       A.   Yes.  Zeljava.

13       Q.   Is that near the Bihac airport?

14       A.   Yes.  It's actually the base of the Bihac airport.

15       Q.   To receive -- to receive weapons from the Bihac airport, to whom

16    would the authorities in the Krajina have to turn?  Who would facilitate

17    this?

18       A.   I know of Colonel Smiljanic.

19       Q.   Who was he?

20       A.   Chief of security of the JNA Zagreb Corps, when I met him.

21            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I just see that it's time.

22            JUDGE MAY:  Yes, it is time.  Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, contrary to what

23    was said earlier, we seem to have made good progress today.

24            MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, Your Honour, but there is one problem

25    for tomorrow, actually, upcoming.  It's not a problem, but it's a

Page 13271

 1    time-consuming exercise for tomorrow, because tomorrow we will go into the

 2    details of the Martic arrest and we will also go into a lot of intercepts.

 3      Today I skipped the intercepts to just make progress, but we have to

 4    come to the intercepts tomorrow, and I intend to do that in a group,

 5    because I think it's more expeditious to do that.

 6            JUDGE MAY:  Very well.  We've been warned.  We'll adjourn now.

 7            Could you be back, please, Witness MILAN BABIC, 9.00 tomorrow.

 8                          --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45

 9                          p.m., to be reconvened on Friday, the 22nd day of

10                          November 2002, at 9.00 a.m.