Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 16975

1 Thursday, 27 February 2003

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, I understand from the registrar that

7 there is a difficulty about the witness list, which has not been

8 transmitted to you. If that's so, it's obviously something we should look

9 into, but what we will do is we will hear the witness now that the witness

10 is here, and we'll look into those matters when his evidence is over or at

11 a convenient time during it.

12 Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. Perhaps you could look into this matter

13 of the witness list. One was apparently promised but has not been sent.

14 In any event, we'll hear about it in due course.

15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. And I would like to stress

16 that the witness is under a certain time constraint and, therefore, we

17 would suggest that all procedural matters be discussed after we heard --

18 JUDGE MAY: It is normally my practice, as you will have seen, to

19 discuss procedural matters when the witness is finished. Yes.

20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: He has to be sworn in.

21 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is not even a procedural

23 matter; it is a question of a correct attitude. I have no information as

24 to who the next witness will be after Mr. Okun.

25 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Mr. Milosevic, I'm not going to interrupt

Page 16976

1 you further, but we will deal with that later in the day. Let us hear the

2 witness first.

3 Yes. If you'd take the declaration, please.

4 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

5 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

6 JUDGE MAY: Thank you very much. If you'd like to take a seat.


8 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour.

10 Examined by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:

11 Q. Please state your name for the record.

12 A. My name is Colm Mangan.

13 Q. You are the chief of the defence staff of the Irish national

14 defence force?

15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. What is your rank?

17 A. My rank is Lieutenant General.

18 Q. You were a team leader of the European Community Monitoring

19 Mission in Croatia in 1991 and 1992?

20 A. I was a member of the monitoring mission, and at times I performed

21 the duties of team leader, yes.

22 Q. When exactly were you in Croatia?

23 A. From July 1991 until the end of January 1992.

24 Q. Can you briefly summarise the mandate and duties of the ECMM and

25 yourself.

Page 16977

1 A. We went to the area initially to monitor the cease-fire

2 arrangements in the Federal Republic of Slovenia, and thereafter we became

3 involved in the monitoring of the ongoing conflict in the Federal Republic

4 of Croatia.

5 Q. In March 2001, you gave a statement to the OTP that you did review

6 yesterday and confirmed in a legal proceeding with an addendum; is that

7 correct?

8 A. That is correct.

9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, we would like to tender this 92

10 bis statement.

11 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll have an exhibit number, please.

12 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 399, Your Honour.

13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: There is the addendum, Your Honours. The

14 addendum is at tab 9.

15 Q. In the addendum that you corrected, you corrected a reference in

16 paragraph 8 and 9 of your statement in relation to Dr. Milan Babic; is

17 that correct?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. These paragraphs, 8 and 9 of your statement, do they deal with the

20 cease-fire negotiation in September 1991 in the Osijek region?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. You were present?

23 A. I was present for a short period in that location, yes.

24 Q. The person you met as the chief negotiator on the Serb side, how

25 was he introduced to you, and who was he?

Page 16978

1 A. He was introduced to me as the Minister for Agriculture in the

2 Republic of Baranja, Srem, and Slavonia.

3 Q. While you had a discussion in preparation of your testimony, did

4 you review a list of ministries and officials in this SAO Slavonia,

5 Baranja, and Western Srem?

6 A. I did.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I want to avoid to put it to the

8 witness again. It's Exhibit 327, tab 6. We have discussed this list.

9 Q. And did you see there the Minister of Agriculture listed with the

10 name Slavko Dokmanovic?

11 A. I did.

12 Q. Did you have a recollection of this person and this name?

13 A. The man that we were negotiating with was the Minister for

14 Agriculture at that time and not the man I originally stated, yes.

15 Q. Did you ever meet Dr. Milan Babic, the president of the SAO

16 Krajina?

17 A. No, I didn't meet him.

18 Q. While you gave your statement, did you also provide copies of

19 several ECMM reports as attachments?

20 A. I did.

21 Q. These reports, do they deal with the overall situation in Croatia,

22 including Dubrovnik?

23 A. They do, yes.

24 Q. Where and by whom were such documents drafted?

25 A. The documents were drafted by a number of people who were working

Page 16979

1 at the tasking cell. That was at the headquarters of the mission in

2 Zagreb. They received reports from the various teams that were operating

3 throughout the country, and they consolidated those reports at the

4 headquarters, and they were then transmitted in the form of a report to

5 The Hague. It was the Dutch presidency at the time. These reports were a

6 consolidation of the reports that were made by the various teams that were

7 operating throughout Croatia.

8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, the tab numbers are tab 1 to

9 tab 8, and they are actually listed in the proofing summary, and we would

10 like to tender the proofing summary and have it marked as -- marked for

11 identification, not as an exhibit.

12 JUDGE MAY: Do you want the reports to be exhibited,

13 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?


15 JUDGE MAY: Would it not be convenient simply to exhibit those

16 reports? They are attached to the statement. Can we discuss this with

17 the registrar about a convenient way to deal with it?

18 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Yes, Mr. Kay.

20 MR. KAY: There's one issue arising, and that was the missing

21 document RMCM01 which Your Honour will remember we didn't have when we

22 dealt with the 92 bis written argument. It's attachment 1.

23 Within that, in the second half, there's a section called

24 "Monitoring Experiences in Yugoslavia," and I've noted from the additional

25 statement provided by the witness for these proceedings today that there

Page 16980

1 is a disclaimer as to that part of the evidence, that it's anything that

2 he had written or to do with him.

3 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, we note the disclaimer. We can take that

4 into account.

5 MR. KAY: Perhaps it should be taken out of the exhibit.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I will discuss this attachment

8 in particular with the witness.

9 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll hear about it. Yes.

10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the attachments will be marked

11 Prosecutor's Exhibit 400.


13 Q. While you were in Zagreb, did the ECMM get information that the

14 JNA were preparing an attack on Dubrovnik?

15 A. We received information from the Croat authorities that this --

16 that Dubrovnik was threatened, yes.

17 Q. What was your reaction to this information?

18 A. I have to say that we were disinclined to believe it at that

19 stage.

20 Q. And why?

21 A. Because all of the activities of the JNA before that time had been

22 in support of the indigenous Serb population, and we were aware that there

23 were no or very few Serbs in Dubrovnik, and consequently, we didn't

24 consider that the JNA would be threatening the city of Dubrovnik because

25 we couldn't see any reason for that.

Page 16981

1 Q. Did Dubrovnik have any military significance that you could see?

2 A. Not that we could see, no.

3 Q. Was an ECMM team with the name Whisky dispatched to Dubrovnik?

4 A. They were the first team that were dispatched to Dubrovnik to

5 check the reports that we were receiving of the city under threat.

6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to

7 put to the witness tab 1 of Exhibit 400.

8 Q. It's actually several documents included here. The first

9 document, with the headline "Visit by Team Whisky," is that the report of

10 this team, the first team that went there?

11 A. That's a report of the team, yes.

12 Q. In the second last paragraph on the first page, there is a

13 reference to a press conference of this team appealing in the name of the

14 EC mission for those concerned to desist at once from these apparently

15 unprovoked attacks. Are you aware of this press conference or this --

16 A. I am aware that that was the opinion of that team who were in

17 Dubrovnik at that time, yes.

18 Q. And on the second page, in the first paragraph, there is a

19 reference made to extraneous attempts to contact the JNA directly but

20 without success. Were you aware that that was the situation?

21 A. When we took over from that team, we were aware that was the

22 situation. They so informed us.

23 Q. And in the middle of the second page there is a reference to the

24 successor team, Charlie. Would that be your team?

25 A. That is correct.

Page 16982

1 Q. If you would please now turn to the next document that is part of

2 this same exhibit. It's with the headline, "Subject: Visit to Dubrovnik

3 on the 29th of October, 1991."

4 Were you aware that ambassadors, politicians went there on that

5 day?

6 A. We were aware of that, yes.

7 Q. And I would like to quote from the first paragraph. It says here:

8 "Although physical damage to the old city centre is slight, the direct

9 surroundings of Old Dubrovnik shows random shelling, damage to streets,

10 houses and cars that can only serve one purpose; psychological warfare on

11 the civilian population in order to empty Dubrovnik of its people. The

12 party received information about far more extensive damage to the villages

13 immediately surrounding Dubrovnik for which there seemed to be no military

14 need either."

15 Was that the --

16 THE INTERPRETER: Could we ask counsel to slow down, please.

17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Sorry.

18 Q. Was that the prevailing opinion at that time?

19 A. Yes, it was.

20 Q. Would you now please turn to page 3 of this same Dubrovnik visit

21 document, and in the last paragraph, it says here: "All members of the

22 party, including those with military expertise, agreed that no conceivable

23 military purpose could be served by either destroying the city or emptying

24 it of its civilian population of which there still are tens of thousands

25 around."

Page 16983












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Page 16984

1 Could you comment on this paragraph?

2 A. That would have been not only the views of those who were on that

3 visit but it would have been widely held also within the ECMM at that

4 time.

5 Q. And your own view?

6 A. That would have coincided with my view, yes.

7 Q. And I would like you to turn now to the next document which is

8 called monitoring experience in Yugoslavia. Could you comment on this

9 document without going into the details?

10 A. I would just make one comment, and as you have seen in my

11 disclaimer, it was contained in the bulk of reports that I submitted, but

12 it is not a report. It's a highly personalised individual account and is

13 not one of the official reports. I don't know who wrote it, and I don't

14 know the origin.

15 JUDGE MAY: Having read the first sentence, I don't think it would

16 be right to put it in.

17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I do not insist on putting it in. It was

18 just the -- this group of documents that were provided during the

19 statement and -- yes.

20 JUDGE MAY: We will have it out. We will remove it from the

21 bundle.


23 Q. And if you turn to the next document that belongs to that same

24 exhibit, it's called "Name Doc Dubrovnik," and I would like to quote to

25 you from page 1, paragraph 3: "The process at work in Dubrovnik,

Page 16985

1 Dalmatia, and along the other frontlines is one of deliberate

2 intimidation. The purpose is not necessarily occupation, which the JNA

3 now seems increasingly unlikely to sustain; but it is certainly

4 depopulation. To drive Croatians out of the agricultural and economic

5 heartlands of Dalmatia and Slavonia, wreaking havoc with their economy and

6 leaving them no homes to return to if, in any event, the JNA do withdraw.

7 A deliberate scorched earth policy."

8 Could you comment on this paragraph?

9 A. That paragraph is, as I said, put together in the headquarters in

10 Zagreb, and it would have been a distillation of the reports of various

11 teams working in the area, but that would have given a good sense of the

12 type of report that was being delivered by the teams working in Croatia at

13 that time.

14 Q. And I would like to quote also from paragraph 4.

15 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters don't have the documents.

16 JUDGE MAY: The interpreters don't have the documents, they say,

17 so have you got a copy for them? Oh, they apparently do.

18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: They should have it. I'm just told it should

19 be under tab 1.

20 THE INTERPRETER: The English booth has the document, Your Honour.

21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. And it's an English document.

22 JUDGE MAY: Well, let's see how we get on. Perhaps you if you are

23 going to read, could you do it slowly.


25 Q. I quote now from paragraph 4. It begins with -- it's about a

Page 16986

1 pattern that is described here as such. It begins with: "Limited fire,

2 such as mortars, giving civilians the chance to escape with minimal

3 casualties. Then it escalates to tanks and artillery to destroy the

4 abundant villages more systematically."

5 And after some details, it then continues:

6 "These are the intentional product of this war, which explains

7 incidentally why the JNA are often keen to 'help' evacuate civilians, and

8 the Croatians sometimes reluctant to agree, vide Ilok."

9 Could you comment on these quotes that I just put to you.

10 A. That would be consistent with the nature of reports that were

11 being made from the EC mission in Zagreb at that particular time.

12 Q. And what happened in Ilok? Do you know that?

13 A. That was at the town of Ilok which was in Eastern Slavonia, and it

14 had been cut off in an occupied area but had not been subjected to any

15 shelling or destruction during the fighting in Eastern Slavonia. The

16 village was then evacuated by consent with the mayor of Ilok. The

17 Croatian authorities were somewhat disturbed by that, that the ECMM had

18 assisted in the evacuation of the village in that they were assisting in

19 the removal of the population.

20 Q. And further down there is a paragraph on Dubrovnik, speaking of

21 indiscriminate -- indiscriminate shelling and -- directed against civilian

22 targets. Is that something you --

23 A. That is correct. Indiscriminate insofar as that there were no

24 apparent military targets that would have been -- one would have

25 discriminated to take them on. So the targets were indiscriminate in that

Page 16987

1 sense.

2 Q. Yes. This would conclude this document. I would like now to turn

3 to paragraph 17 of the statement, and it refers to weapons used and your

4 observations in Sokar [phoen].

5 During your time in Dubrovnik, was the town shelled from land,

6 air, and sea?

7 A. That's correct, it was.

8 Q. And how many air attacks did you observe?

9 A. I would have observed one air attack, a naval bombardment, and a

10 number of mortar and artillery attacks on the town.

11 Q. And in which time period was that, approximately?

12 A. That was approximately the period from the 5th of October, 1991,

13 to the 7th of October, 1991.

14 Q. When you observed this naval attack, what did -- what was the

15 target, and what did you see?

16 A. The target was the Hotel Excelsior, which is just to the south of

17 the old town of Dubrovnik, and it was engaged by naval gunfire, either 57

18 millimetre or 76 millimetre cannon.

19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have the map in front of the

20 witness. That's the Exhibit 326, tab 24, the -- and --

21 THE WITNESS: I'm afraid my monitor is -- I've touched a button.


23 Q. Can you please point out the Hotel Excelsior. On the ELMO,

24 please.

25 A. [Indicates]

Page 16988

1 Q. Yes. Thank you. Given your military background and expertise,

2 could you comment on the accuracy and the effectiveness of this weapon

3 that you've just described?

4 A. The weapon would be regarded as a very accurate weapon. It should

5 have been able to hit a target with some precision. And I was in the

6 Hotel Argentina and was able to observe the shelling of the area of the

7 Hotel Excelsior. I have no doubt that that was the intended target of the

8 naval gunfire.

9 Q. And was the hotel at that time a military target? Do you know?

10 A. Not that I was aware of. There was no apparent military presence

11 there at all.

12 Q. In relation to the ground forces that you saw active, what weapons

13 did they use, and could you see from where they fired?

14 A. I couldn't see from where they fired because they were indirect

15 fire weapons that were being used. They consisted of both mortars and

16 guns, artillery.

17 Q. And could you comment on the accuracy of such weapons?

18 A. The artillery gun is a relatively accurate weapon. The mortar is

19 less so. But it is all very dependent on a number of factors, including

20 very much the training of the teams, the crews that are handling the guns,

21 the fire control directors, and indeed the meteorological conditions at

22 any particular time?

23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have now the map 326, tab 13 in

24 front of the witness. It's the wider map of Dubrovnik.

25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, for clarification for the record,

Page 16989

1 the map we just used is tab 23, not tab 24.


3 Q. Did you see which regions were targeted by the land forces? What

4 did you see? And please look at the ELMO. And could you tell us -- point

5 out and tell us what it is they targeted.

6 A. This area here is the area of a yachting marina that lay to the

7 north-east of the old town of Dubrovnik. That area was particularly

8 heavily engaged by mortar fire and caused extensive damage to both a large

9 number of very fine yachts and the buildings that were in the marina area.

10 Q. Was this region -- would you describe -- would you say this was a

11 military target or a civilian target?

12 A. I saw nothing of military value within the marina area.

13 Q. Did they also hit other regions at the time?

14 A. Yes. You would appreciate that it is at some time removed now,

15 and my -- there was quite a lot of shelling going on at the time, so I can

16 indicate the areas in which there was shelling ran along the area from the

17 marina.

18 Q. Yes.

19 A. In that area there, but also on Mount Srdj.

20 Q. Yes. And were there any military targets that were hit or -- yes?

21 A. The only overt military target that I observed was, in fact, Mount

22 Srdj. There was an old Napoleonic fort there that was occupied by armed

23 Croats and there was a communications mast also on that height.

24 Otherwise, the area that I indicated between the marina and south of the

25 town of Dubrovnik, as far as I could see, was occupied only by civilians.

Page 16990

1 Q. And those shells that landed in the civilian regions, could that

2 have been accidentally?

3 A. I don't think so, no.

4 Q. Why don't you think that?

5 A. I think that the distance for error and the nature, the intensity

6 of the bombardments would indicate that, even allowing for a lot of

7 mistakes by the crews that were serving the weapons, I don't think they

8 were accidental fall of shot on the civilian area, no.

9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you. The maps can be turned away.

10 Q. Can you explain to the Court very briefly and in general terms the

11 degree of preplanning, coordination, and command and control of troops in

12 a joint operation of land and navy forces.

13 A. For a combined forces operation of land, sea, and air, there has

14 to be control and coordination by the commander of the operation, and to

15 do that, he has a coordination or a fire direction centre under his

16 command to coordinate the various fires. And they would plan the

17 resources that would be allocated to any particular target for engagement

18 and the fires that would be available to the elements on the ground. It

19 would take good coordination to mount a joint services operation.

20 Q. To your information, who was the -- this overall commander?

21 A. I was informed that it was General Strugar.

22 Q. Did you know his exact position at that time -- rank -- rank and

23 function?

24 A. We were informed that General Strugar was the operational -- the

25 commander of the Operational Group, and he had also been the regional

Page 16991












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Page 16992

1 commander in the area.

2 Q. Can you explain how the selection of targets is made in such

3 operations, in particular given the fact that there was residential areas

4 and even a cultural monument.

5 A. Well, the first factor that would be taken into consideration

6 would be the achievement of the mission, the most effective targets to be

7 hit to achieve the mission. The second factor taken into consideration

8 would be the safety and security of one's own forces. And the other

9 factor then of the -- both heritage or civilian areas and heritage. They

10 would also be taken in after the other two factors had been considered.

11 Q. From what you saw happening, could you -- could you conclude what

12 the mission was that was to be achieved?

13 A. It wasn't apparent what the mission at that particular time was.

14 Q. You have already mentioned the fire plan, that is preplanned. Are

15 there also situations when during an attack there are impromptu targets,

16 and can you explain that?

17 A. Yes. Obviously you can't cater for everything in preplanning, so

18 the fires that take place before the start of an operation can all be

19 preplanned, but once your operation starts, targets will appear that will

20 threaten the accomplishment of your mission or endanger the safety of your

21 own troops and those targets will then be engaged.

22 Q. And you have already mentioned that the overall commander, in this

23 case here Strugar, would be involved in the preplanning. What about the

24 impromptu targets? Who would make these decisions?

25 A. The decisions for impromptu targets could be made at a lower level

Page 16993

1 from the unit or formation that's under threat, but it would be

2 coordinated and the headquarters would be informed about the actions

3 taken.

4 Q. And what you personally observed in Dubrovnik, would that indicate

5 a preplanned fire plan or impromptu actions or targets?

6 A. I would not be in a position to say whether it was preplanned or

7 impromptu, but I would tend to the view that they were preplanned fires at

8 that particular stage.

9 Q. And why would you think that?

10 A. Because the -- there was nothing occurring that would direct

11 impromptu fire there. Obviously the shelling was -- to us, it was obvious

12 it was taking place against targets that had been there for quite some

13 time and nothing new had arisen that would cause them to be engaged in an

14 impromptu fashion.

15 Q. You have mentioned that the preplanning would be on a level of

16 Strugar. Would the planning of the attack on Dubrovnik that you saw also

17 involve the General Staff?

18 A. I would be surprised if it did not, that such operations had not

19 been coordinated with them.

20 Q. And would -- while these operations were ongoing, would the ground

21 troops be in constant contact with the overall commander, and would the

22 overall commander be in contact with General Staff, according to

23 experience that you have?

24 A. I would imagine so. I would be surprised if they were not.

25 Q. The navy involved in the action, even with impromptu targets,

Page 16994

1 would they coordinate with the land forces?

2 A. In an operation like that, I would imagine that they would have to

3 coordinate with the land forces, yes.

4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: With the help of the usher, I would like to

5 put to the witness the Exhibit -- tab 2 of Exhibit 400. Tab 2.

6 Q. And I would like you to look at page 2 on this paragraph on

7 Dubrovnik, and it says here: "In Dubrovnik, our team also reported heavy

8 bombardment during the evening. JNA/Serbian forces appear so far to be

9 sparing the old town, but the naval and mortar attacks launched were aimed

10 at the civilian population. There were no military targets in the area."

11 Would that have been your observation at that time?

12 A. Yes. That report was compiled on foot of reports that we were

13 making from Dubrovnik.

14 Q. On the same page, under the headline "Beyond Zagreb," paragraph 3,

15 there is a reference to -- in the middle of this paragraph is a reference

16 to what happened in Karlovac, and there is mentioned: "JNA-backed Serbian

17 irregular forces." Were you aware of such forces?

18 A. If you mean was I aware of such forces in the Karlovac area at

19 that time, I have to remind you that I was in Dubrovnik, and I was not

20 aware of any such forces in the Dubrovnik area.

21 Q. And when you dealt with Osijek, were you aware of any such

22 irregular forces there?

23 A. At an earlier time in Osijek, I was aware of some irregular forces

24 in that area, yes.

25 Q. And would you know who commanded them?

Page 16995

1 A. No, I would not know who commanded them.

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would now like to put to the witness tab 4

3 of the Exhibit 400, and it's another report.

4 Q. On the first page, the last paragraph, it says here: "I should

5 like you to be aware that those indiscriminate attacks continue despite

6 statements to the contrary by the Serbian and federal authorities."

7 Can you explain this paragraph?

8 A. That particular paragraph refers to statements that Dubrovnik was

9 not being engaged, and that was issued by the headquarters in Zagreb, but

10 I was present in Dubrovnik on Sunday, the 6th of October, and was a

11 witness, as were the other members of my team, to the attack on the town.

12 Q. And when you say "issued by the headquarters in Zagreb," which

13 headquarters do you mean?

14 A. I mean the headquarters of the EC Monitoring Mission.

15 Q. Do you know with whom they were in contact? Because it says here

16 "... statements to the contrary by the Serbian and federal authorities."

17 A. They had contact with an Admiral Brovet in Belgrade. I think he

18 had been assigned as the liaison or contact person for the ECMM by the

19 federal authorities, but I know that that was the point of contact in

20 Belgrade.

21 Q. And on page 2 of this same report, there is a reference to the

22 population. It says here: "Meanwhile, the population bolstered by an

23 influx of refugees faces not only shortages of water and electricity but

24 also a deliberate campaign of intimidation." And then there comes some

25 details. Was that actually what you found at the time?

Page 16996

1 A. Yes. There was a large number of refugees in Dubrovnik or in the

2 Lapad area of Dubrovnik. They had been accommodated in hotels, and we

3 visited them and we got firsthand accounts from them of the leaving of

4 their homes, they had been driven out of their homes, and destruction and

5 looting that was going on in the homes.

6 Q. And here is mentioning of a deliberate campaign of intimidation.

7 Was that your position, your finding at that time?

8 A. The type of treatment to which the people were subjected to would

9 lead me to believe, yes, that they were being intimidated.

10 Q. Yes. Thank you. That should be enough for this report.

11 While you were in Dubrovnik, did you see hits in the old town?

12 A. You appreciate that it's quite some time ago now, but to the best

13 of my knowledge and memory, I, at maximum, saw two hits in the old town.

14 Q. And do you think -- according to what you observed, would you say

15 these were deliberate targeting the old town or more overshots or

16 mistakes?

17 A. I would be very much of the opinion that they were wayward shells,

18 that the old town was deliberately -- was not targeted. Because there was

19 so much shelling going on in other areas that it was apparent that the old

20 town at this stage was not being targeted.

21 Q. Are you aware that the old town was targeted in November,

22 mid-November and on the 6th of December, 1991?

23 A. At that stage, I was working in the headquarters of the EC

24 Monitoring Mission in Zagreb, and I was aware that Dubrovnik was targeted.

25 I'm talking of the old town of Dubrovnik was targeted at that particular

Page 16997

1 time, yes.

2 Q. Did you actually see a video or -- a video showing the December

3 shelling?

4 A. Not at that time but at some remove later I did, yes.

5 Q. And what you saw happening there, would that suggest to you that

6 it was preplanning or a, let's say, a spontaneous activity on the 6th?

7 I'm particularly referring to the 6th of December.

8 A. I would imagine by the level of activity and the intensity of the

9 fire that there was a level of preplanning had gone into it, yes.

10 Q. And just to give an idea, preplanning at that level and at that

11 time, what kind of a time frame would the preplanning take? Just an hour,

12 or more, or days? Could you say?

13 A. It would certainly have taken a lot more than an hour. It would

14 have taken 24 hours, 48 hours. I couldn't put an exact time limit, but I

15 -- the planning of a major operation like that would take quite some time.

16 Q. While you were in Dubrovnik, did you have free and uncontrolled

17 access to parts of the city not controlled by the JNA?

18 A. Yes, we did.

19 Q. And did you meet members of a Crisis Staff?

20 A. Yes. We met the chairman of the Crisis Staff and also the mayor.

21 Q. Was this a civilian Crisis Staff or a military body?

22 A. No, it was a civilian Crisis Staff.

23 Q. What was their stage of organisation?

24 A. It was chaotic, I think would be the best way of describing it.

25 They were extremely shaken by the events that were taking place in

Page 16998

1 Dubrovnik. They were certainly traumatised by the situation they found

2 themselves in.

3 Q. Did you see armed personnel in Dubrovnik, and could you estimate

4 the number?

5 A. In the entire Dubrovnik region, I would not be able to estimate a

6 number. In the old city, I saw, at most, ten to 15 armed Croats.

7 Q. Would the -- yes. Please continue.

8 A. But outside of that, at various occasions I did see armed Croats

9 in Mount Srdj and in other areas.

10 Q. Were these --

11 A. But not many. I saw very few.

12 Q. Were these professional soldiers to what you saw?

13 A. No, mostly not. I did see a number of the National Guard but not

14 many.

15 Q. And can you describe the uniforms, weapons that you saw on these

16 armed Croats.

17 A. The uniforms on the small number of National Guard that I saw were

18 of the disruptive pattern material type, DPM. I then saw police uniforms,

19 and the rest were civilians.

20 With regard to armament, it was all light weaponry; sniper rifles,

21 assault rifles. The heaviest weapon I saw with any one person was a

22 RPG-7. That is a hand-held anti-tank rocket. And the only other weapon I

23 saw was an armoured car with a light machine-gun in the police station.

24 Q. Beginning October at the time when you were there, was there any

25 effective defence in Dubrovnik?

Page 16999












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Page 17000

1 A. No. There was no defence put in place in any way. I could not

2 describe Dubrovnik as a defended city.

3 Q. Did the JNA know that, do you know?

4 A. I'm not party to what the JNA knew or did not know, but I would be

5 very surprised if they did not know the state of the defences, because

6 they had direct observation onto the area from the naval forces that they

7 had deployed offshore.

8 Q. While you were in Dubrovnik, did you observe any Croatian

9 positions or preparations for positions in the old town or near the old

10 town?

11 A. No, I did not.

12 Q. Did you see any such positions or preparations for positions in

13 the refugee hotels that you mentioned?

14 A. No, I did not.

15 Q. You mentioned the armed men that you saw in the old town. Were

16 they present there in any offensive or defensive role? Could you see

17 that?

18 A. No. They were not in any describable military role. The numbers

19 I saw appeared to be exhausted, they appeared to be traumatised by events

20 that took place in other areas, and certainly were in no fit condition to

21 fight.

22 Q. Did you see anything that -- did you see the Croats provoking the

23 shelling of the JNA?

24 A. No, I did not.

25 Q. Was the JNA under threat through the weapons that the Croats had?

Page 17001

1 A. Not under any threat or major threat that I could see.

2 Q. Was there any military advantage that the JNA could gain by their

3 attack on Dubrovnik that you could see?

4 A. No. I could not see that there was any great military advantage

5 to be gained by taking the city of Dubrovnik.

6 Q. While you were in Dubrovnik, did you also try to reach the JNA to

7 solve the situation through negotiations?

8 A. Our main mission in going to Dubrovnik was in fact to try and

9 effect a cease-fire in the area, and we made numerous attempts to contact

10 the JNA authorities. I should say that before we went to Dubrovnik, we

11 had been given the name of the commander, General Strugar, and we had been

12 given a telephone number, or telephone numbers, to contact his

13 headquarters. So when we were in Dubrovnik, during the time we were there

14 we made numerous attempts to contact the JNA by telephone. All of those

15 attempts were in vain.

16 Q. Was it because there was no connection did you actually get a

17 connection?

18 A. I had a member of my team who was a Serbo-Croat speaker, a Dane

19 Lars Boland. He made contact on a number of occasions and got somebody on

20 the other end of the line, and as soon as they heard that we belonged to

21 the ECMM, the phone went dead.

22 Q. Did you form an opinion about the JNA's willingness to negotiate?

23 A. It was obvious that they didn't want to have any contact with us.

24 Q. What about the Croatian authorities?

25 A. The Croatian authorities at this stage, as I have described, were

Page 17002

1 in a very bad and excitable situation and were desperate to achieve a

2 cease-fire.

3 Q. What about the Belgrade or Zagreb level? Any negotiations there

4 at that time, and between whom?

5 A. We were in contact with Zagreb, our headquarters in Zagreb, by

6 telephone, and we were describing the events in Dubrovnik, and we were

7 assured that efforts were being made to get the assault stopped at the

8 level of the headquarters. I understood that the headquarters were in

9 contact with the authorities in Belgrade, and I understood that it was

10 Admiral Brovet that they were in contact with.

11 Q. Were complaints from the ECMM lodged against what was happening?

12 A. We were assured by our headquarters that protests were lodged

13 about the matters that were taking place in Dubrovnik.

14 Q. To whom were these protests addressed? Do you know?

15 A. I was told that they were addressed to the authorities in

16 Belgrade.

17 Q. The military authorities?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. What about the political authorities? Do you know whether

20 complaints were lodged with them?

21 A. No. The contacts, as I said, were with the General Staff contact,

22 Admiral Brovet.

23 Q. And what were the reactions on those protests? Do you know?

24 A. There appeared to be little or no reaction to them that I could

25 perceive from my position on the ground.

Page 17003

1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would like to put to the witness tab 6 of

2 Exhibit 400. And it is a report again, and it's from the 10th of October,

3 1991.

4 Q. And I would like to direct you to page 2, the paragraph 5, and it

5 says here: "A bombardment directed from JNA positions around Cavtat and

6 Plat ceased within an hour of notification to Belgrade, indicating that

7 the news of the cease-fire may not have reached the units concerned."

8 Can you comment on this paragraph.

9 A. Well, the -- the hour delay would be indicative of the time lag

10 for the instructions to filter down from Belgrade to the units on the

11 ground, because that is not an instantaneous thing, it takes time to

12 happen.

13 Q. And given your experience, does that indicate anything in relation

14 to command and control?

15 A. Well, it would indicate that the units that were fighting in the

16 Dubrovnik area were in the command chain from the General Staff in

17 Belgrade.

18 MR. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And now I would like to put to the witness

19 tab 8 of Exhibit 400.

20 Q. And in relation -- on page 2, there are several paragraphs

21 relating to Dalmatia, referring to discussions about -- or even

22 cease-fires, in relation to deblocking barracks and cease-fires along the

23 coastline. Are you aware of that?

24 A. Yes, I am aware of that.

25 Q. And in paragraph 11 of that document, there is a reference to

Page 17004

1 cease-fire violations, and it says here -- it gives here two

2 choices: "There could be a selective minimum associated with regrouping,

3 or equally the product of an imperfect control of local JNA and irregular

4 units." Could you please explain this.

5 A. That is somebody in the report offering a reason for the breaches

6 that may have occurred within that area.

7 Q. And it is here the Vukovar area. Did you observe anything or did

8 you get information on anything happening to this effect in Dubrovnik?

9 A. At this particular time, I was not in Dubrovnik, but I was aware

10 that the Dubrovnik area was part of the wider cease-fire, and that had

11 taken place within that area. Our successor team, I was aware that they

12 had made contact and had effected a cease-fire.

13 Q. Summarising what you saw happening in Dubrovnik while you were

14 there and also what you heard afterwards, would you call this a battle

15 between two opposing forces?

16 A. No, I would not call it a battle between two opposing forces. As

17 I have said earlier, I saw very little evidence of Croatian armament or

18 preparation for actions and, consequently, it could not have been said to

19 be a battle between two forces.

20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, these are the questions of the

21 Prosecution.

22 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

23 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

24 Q. [Interpretation] A preliminary question first, General. Most or

25 almost all of your testimony relates to Dubrovnik.

Page 17005

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. When you came here, did you come to testify with the conviction or

3 any knowledge that the Republic of Serbia had any connection -- the

4 Republic of Serbia and I personally, for instance, had anything to do with

5 those events around Dubrovnik?

6 A. I did not have a conviction or evidence that you personally were

7 connected with the events in Dubrovnik. I have evidence of what I saw

8 within Dubrovnik and the factors that indicated to me that what was taking

9 place in Dubrovnik was taking place with the control of the General Staff

10 headquarters.

11 Q. I am not speaking only about me, because I hope that is not in

12 dispute, me personally, but I'm asking about the Republic of Serbia. Did

13 you come to know that the Republic of Serbia had any role in the events

14 that you have described?

15 A. The forces that were engaged in the Dubrovnik area were the forces

16 of the JNA, as far as I was aware.

17 Q. Thank you. Were you present during any meeting between

18 representatives of the authorities of Dubrovnik and representatives of JNA

19 command staff in the area?

20 A. No, I was not. As I said, we made strenuous efforts on numerous

21 occasions to make contact with them, to no avail.

22 Q. Yes, but you probably know that there were a number of such

23 meetings that have been testified about by witnesses sitting in the same

24 seat that you're occupying now and who had attended those meetings, and

25 they were held almost or most frequently in the presence of

Page 17006

1 representatives of the international community. Do you know anything

2 about those meetings?

3 A. I know that subsequent to my time in Dubrovnik, the team that

4 succeeded us conducted meetings in the Cavtat area with the JNA and the

5 Croatian authorities, I do.

6 Q. And do you have any information gained from documents, because you

7 were not there, the same way that I learn about these things from

8 documents, that the main demand of the JNA, the main and only request was

9 for the armed formations, irregulars -- irregular armed formations to

10 leave Dubrovnik and that they did not make any other demands?

11 A. I'm aware that those demands were made, yes.

12 Q. Now, I find something rather strange or illogical. A moment ago

13 you were saying that there was some sort of intention - and I really hear

14 this for the first time - on the part of the JNA to depopulate Dubrovnik,

15 whereas at meetings held between the JNA and representatives of Dubrovnik,

16 there is exclusive emphasis on the demand for armed groups to leave

17 Dubrovnik with their weapons and along secure routes where they would not

18 be exposed to any danger. Are you aware of that?

19 A. I am aware that that took place subsequent to my time in

20 Dubrovnik. The events that I spoke about were from the 5th of October to

21 the 7th of October, and at that time, there were no -- there was no

22 significant armed presence of Croats within the area.

23 Q. What do you consider to be "significant armed presence"? You said

24 that "there was no significant armed presence." Why would there be any

25 military presence in Dubrovnik, which was a demilitarised town for

Page 17007












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Page 17008

1 decades?

2 JUDGE MAY: There are two questions there. The first question --

3 THE WITNESS: Significant armed presence, if I could take that. A

4 significant armed presence would be a coherent, directed, and armed with,

5 I would suggest, more than assault rifles and light weapons. I would have

6 expected to have heavier weaponry in a coherent force that would present a

7 threat to the very considerable force of the JNA within the area.

8 The second question: Why should there be an armed presence within

9 the area at all? Well, the light arms that I saw were certainly not a

10 significant armed presence, and why they should be there at all, the

11 reports we had received, which initially I said we were disinclined to

12 believe, about the city of Dubrovnik becoming under threat turned out to

13 be very real indeed. So I would have thought that there would have been

14 some necessity for it.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Very well, General. Let us try and be efficient and cover the

17 matters you have testified about.

18 In July 1991, you were based in Zagreb. This was a monitoring

19 mission of the European Community in those days to prevent the crisis, as

20 the wording was in those days.

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. Do you know who are the signatories of the memorandum on the

23 presence of the monitoring mission of the European Community? It was

24 signed on the 13th of July, 1991, and it served as the basis for your

25 presence there.

Page 17009

1 A. I am afraid at this remove I don't remember who the signatories of

2 that document were.

3 Q. Well, let me remind you. Representatives of the Federal Ministry

4 for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, Slovenia, and Croatia. And on behalf

5 of the European Community, an ambassador in the Foreign Ministry of the

6 Netherlands because, as you quite correctly noted, the Netherlands at the

7 time was chairing the European Community, and the name of the Ambassador

8 was Christiaan Kroner. Do you now remember?

9 A. I don't remember that ambassador as being the head of mission of

10 the EC monitor mission. In July 1991, Van der Valk [phoen] was the head

11 of mission. He subsequently handed over, in September, to Van Houten.

12 Q. I'm talking about the signatories on the memorandum and not who

13 headed the mission.

14 Tell me, please, very briefly with a yes or no, were you familiar

15 with the contents of the memorandum of the mission of which you were a

16 senior official in those days?

17 A. At this remove, I'm not familiar with the memorandum you mention,

18 but I certainly would have been at that time.

19 Q. Is it true that the main mandate of the monitoring mission was, A,

20 to assist in stabilising the cease-fire within which the blockade of units

21 and facilities of the JNA would be lifted; and B, to oversee the

22 suspension of the declarations on independence for three months, as agreed

23 on by Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Croatia, the parties hosting the missions.

24 Do you recollect that? Is that what is stated in the memorandum?

25 A. Perhaps not in those exact words, but that was the sense of the

Page 17010

1 memorandum, yes.

2 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, if you're going to quote from the

3 document and you want to rely on it and ask the witness questions about

4 it, the fairest thing is to put the document to him. Now, have you got it

5 in English so that we can all see it?

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't have it, Mr. May. But if

7 the witness believes that I didn't quote from it correctly, he can simply

8 say that he doesn't remember or that it is not right so that I am not in

9 any way trying to mislead him in his testimony.

10 JUDGE MAY: No, I'm not saying you are trying to mislead him, but

11 for the efficient conduct of the case, if this is a document of

12 importance, we should have it.

13 Perhaps the Prosecution can assist us, in due course, if they've

14 got a copy of it.

15 Yes.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope that the opposing side can

17 gain possession of that document, because it must exist in their archives

18 and in the archives of Yugoslavia, too.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. So on the 13th of July, 1991, when the memorandum was signed, the

21 mission's task was to assist in stabilising the cease-fire within the

22 framework of which the lifting of the blockade would take place of the

23 units and facilities of the JNA, which only confirms that those facilities

24 and units were already under blockade at that time.

25 And secondly, which is extremely important from the political

Page 17011

1 standpoint, to supervise the suspension of the implementation of the

2 independence declarations for three months, as the parties had agreed.

3 The federal government of Yugoslavia had agreed on this with the

4 leaderships of Croatia and Slovenia. Is that right, General?

5 A. As far as I can remember, that is correct.

6 Q. And do you remember, General -- I'm just asking: Do you remember

7 that that memorandum should have ensured the consistent implementation of

8 the so-called Brioni declaration which, on the 7th of July, 1991, which

9 means only a few days prior to that, had been issued in the presence of

10 the ministerial troika of the European Community? Again, it was in the

11 presence of the federal authorities and representatives of Slovenia and

12 Croatia. And then this was followed as a consequence of that declaration

13 by this memorandum. Do you remember that?

14 A. I don't remember the -- I remember the Brioni agreement, the

15 issuing of it. In what presence it took place, I don't remember that.

16 Q. Very well. Without any doubt this can be found in documents, so I

17 won't insist on it, but do you recollect, as you say you know of the

18 Brioni declaration, that Slovenia and Croatia had pledged through that

19 declaration that they would deblock all units and facilities of the JNA

20 and restore the former regime on the frontier of SFRY within a period of

21 24 hours? Do you remember that?

22 A. I cannot remember all the detail of it, but I do remember that

23 certain undertakings were made with respect to the blockades, yes.

24 Q. And is it correct to say that representatives of Slovenia and

25 Croatia undertook specifically to refrain from any unilateral acts of

Page 17012

1 violence --

2 JUDGE MAY: You know, it would be much simpler if we just had the

3 document rather than asking the witness for a memory test. The chances of

4 remembering this kind of detail is small.

5 We'll get both these documents, please. Just a moment. We'll get

6 both these documents. If the Prosecution would get them during the break,

7 please.

8 I think we've had the Brioni declaration. I have a recollection

9 we've got that exhibited, but I may be wrong.

10 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The Brioni declaration is one thing,

12 and then came a second document, the memorandum on the presence of the

13 monitoring mission of the European Community, dated the 13th of July,

14 1991.

15 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll get both.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. I don't want to fatigue you, General, with questions regarding

18 general political matters.

19 On page 1 of your statement, and I quote, you said that you were

20 first sent to Slovenia to monitor the safe withdrawal of the JNA from

21 Slovenia. Is that right?

22 A. Among other duties that we had there, that is correct.

23 Q. And do you know that what was involved was the relocation of the

24 commands and units of the JNA from Slovenia to other parts of the Federal

25 Republic of Yugoslavia on the basis of a decision of the Presidency of the

Page 17013

1 SFRY taken on the 18th of July, 1991?

2 A. Yes, I am aware of that, and we witnessed the withdrawal of the

3 JNA units from Slovenia to other parts of the Federal Republic, that's

4 correct.

5 Q. And did you have in your hands this decision of the Presidency?

6 I'm asking you this because the decision was taken to relocate them

7 outside of Slovenia, but that that would not preempt the future regulation

8 of relations in Yugoslavia nor would it call in question its territorial

9 integrity. Did you have access to that Presidency decision, the

10 consequences of which you were monitoring?

11 A. I don't remember that we had access to that Presidency decision at

12 the time.

13 Q. If you did not, do you remember that after that decision and after

14 the decision started to be implemented, that in spite of this goodwill

15 shown, that both in the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia,

16 a series of attacks were launched against JNA units?

17 A. No, that's not my memory, particularly in respect of Slovenia.

18 The situation in Croatia was a lot more complicated than that, but again,

19 I am not mindful of any attack that took place in Slovenia after that.

20 Q. Since you are not aware of it, I will not ask you any more

21 questions about it.

22 Did you ever receive any information as to the number of attacks

23 made by the police and the Territorial Defence of Slovenia against

24 officers, soldiers, and JNA convoys during those activities, including

25 their mistreatment, harassment, and where these incidents took place? Do

Page 17014

1 you know anything about that?

2 A. I have to be very clear on this one at this stage. There were

3 reports of conflict between convoys and police and armed elements in

4 Slovenia prior to our arrival in the area, which would have been at the

5 end of June 1991 and early July, perhaps. But from the end of the -- from

6 the implementation of the Brioni agreement and our arrival in the area,

7 there were no reports and no evidence was offered to us of any conflict

8 between the Slovenians and the JNA subsequent to that time.

9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, just that the Brioni declaration

10 was just mentioned. It is Exhibit 330, tab 35. But it is only marked for

11 identification. It was actually part of the binder from President Mesic,

12 and it's only marked for identification, and maybe this is the possibility

13 to now actually tender it.

14 JUDGE MAY: Let us deal with that after the adjournment. We will

15 find it, and we can deal with it. And if you would get us, if you can,

16 the 13th of July memorandum, if you can get that up during the break. We

17 will come back to it afterwards.

18 Thank you. I've just been handed a copy. It might be convenient

19 to exhibit it.

20 We will exhibit the Brioni declaration separately now. I will ask

21 that copies be made and it will take the next Defence exhibit number.

22 THE REGISTRAR: It will be Defence Exhibit 104, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE MAY: Can I hand it back. Thank you very much.

24 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 17015












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Page 17016

1 Q. Since you're saying that there were no attacks after this document

2 and signature of representatives of Slovenia and Croatia together with

3 representatives of the federal authorities, are you aware and there is any

4 report of your mission about Croatian paramilitary units, the National

5 Guards Corps, on the 29th of August - so you see yourself how much later

6 this was - attacked a railway column, 29 freight trucks in the village of

7 Ivankovo when the escort was disarmed and JNA property looted. This was

8 during the process of dislocating this development from Slovenia and on

9 the railroad, a part of the railroad running from Zagreb to Belgrade.

10 JUDGE MAY: Now, we are moving from the witness's evidence. Since

11 he was present, I take it, in Croatia at the time he can answer it, but it

12 may be he's got no particular knowledge of this matter.

13 THE WITNESS: Could I emphasise one thing? When I said that there

14 were no attacks or fighting between the JNA and the Slovenians, I meant

15 exactly that in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia. What the

16 defendant has just referred to took place on Croatian territory, and I

17 would have to refresh my memory on the reports with regard to that

18 particular incident. I don't remember it. But it's -- I'm not -- I am

19 not ruling it out. What I'd specifically said was that there were no

20 attacks within the Slovenian area. That's what I was referring to.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. I'm talking about the memorandum that followed the Brioni

23 declaration and that was signed by the authorities of the Slovenia,

24 Croatia, and the federal authorities. So it is one whole.

25 Tell me, do you recollect that armed members --

Page 17017

1 JUDGE MAY: No. Mr. Milosevic, you specifically asked the witness

2 about Slovenia, and he's answered. Now you want to move on to Croatia.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I asked him this happened in

4 Croatia, but I had in mind that the general was a senior officer in the

5 monitoring mission of the European Community in Zagreb, and that's why I'm

6 asking him this.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. And do you know that armed members, or do you remember that armed

9 National Guards Corps members on that same day and the next day again, on

10 the 30th of August, in the village of Mirkovci, again looted JNA property,

11 seizing quartermaster supplies and other supplies? Do you remember that

12 incident?

13 A. I don't remember that specific incident. I would have to refresh

14 my memory on any reports we had on it.

15 Q. And is it correct that the mandate of the monitoring mission of

16 the European Community was reinforced and expanded on the 2nd of

17 September, 1991, with a memorandum on the monitoring mission?

18 A. The precise date I don't remember, but it was in September, yes.

19 Q. Tell me, please, in principle, since you probably cannot give me a

20 very concrete answer, but as concretely as you can, within the context of

21 your monitoring of what you said the safe withdrawal of the JNA from

22 Slovenia and Croatia, in view of these attacks on JNA property, tell me,

23 please, the monitoring mission of the European Community, in your opinion

24 - and I'm asking you for your opinion - did it successfully fulfil its

25 mandate of the 13th of July, 1991?

Page 17018

1 A. The specific instance you've mentioned, I would have to refresh my

2 memory of them, as I said, from reports at that time. Whether you're

3 asking me in the overall whether the European Monitoring Mission was

4 successful, I would have to say that in the -- with respect to preventing

5 an outbreak of fighting in the area, it certainly didn't succeed in

6 preventing large scale fighting taking place, because as you well know, in

7 November and December, which was much later, there was very heavy fighting

8 throughout the area of Croatia.

9 Q. All right. And is it true that you could have assessed and

10 investigated the violation of the agreement about a cease-fire, which was

11 agreed upon on the 1st of September, 1991, in Belgrade? Once again,

12 between the federal authorities.

13 A. The investigation and reporting on the numerous cease-fires that

14 were agreed was the mission of the monitor mission, and they saw reported

15 upon all of the breaches that took place in respect of cease-fires, yes.

16 And the expansion of the mission that you referred to on the 2nd of

17 September would have encompassed that, and the monitor mission became much

18 more active in the area of Croatia after that.

19 Q. All right, then. And is it true and correct that, pursuant to

20 that agreement, and you were duty bound to supervise its implementation,

21 that all the paramilitary and irregular forces and units had to be

22 disarmed and disbanded, including the reserve forces of the Croatian

23 National Guard Corps? And that's what it says in Article 1 of the

24 mentioned memorandum of the 2nd of September, 1991. It is the memorandum

25 concerning your monitoring mission.

Page 17019

1 Do you know that? Do you happen to remember that?

2 A. As I said to you, I can't remember the detail, but I remember that

3 the mission did undertake the supervision of cease-fires within the area

4 and that there were certain conditions attached to it. But this is

5 another document, and I ask that I should have sight of it also.

6 Q. Unfortunately, I haven't got it here with me?

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I'm sure you will be able to

8 find it in the archives, and could you provide the witness with a copy,

9 please.

10 But the point is, on Article 1 of that same memorandum, where all

11 the paramilitaries and irregular units had to be disarmed and disbanded,

12 including the reserve force of the Croatian National Guard Corps.

13 JUDGE MAY: We've already dealt with this. Again, perhaps we can

14 try and find that memorandum of the cease-fire. Perhaps the Prosecution

15 can assist us with those two documents now.

16 It's time for an adjournment.

17 Mr. Milosevic, you can have another three-quarters of an hour, if

18 you want it, in cross-examination. That will allow for the fact that the

19 witness has given live evidence but also that his statement was admitted.

20 You get extra time for that.

21 General, could you be back, please, in twenty minutes. I must

22 formally remind you not to speak to anybody about your evidence until it's

23 over, and that does include the members of the Prosecution team.

24 We will adjourn now for 20 minutes.

25 --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.

Page 17020

1 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. We have located both

3 memoranda.

4 JUDGE MAY: If we could have them, please.

5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And, Your Honour, they are not exhibited so

6 far.

7 JUDGE MAY: We'll deal with this now.

8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the memorandum will be Defence

9 Exhibit 104, and -- Your Honours, I apologise for that. The memorandum is

10 Defence Exhibit 105, and the memo of the cease-fire, dated 2nd September

11 1991, is Defence Exhibit 106.

12 Your Honours, Defence Exhibit 106 is titled the Memorandum of

13 Understanding on the Extension of the Monitoring Activities of the Monitor

14 Mission to Yugoslavia.

15 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We've now got those documents, Mr. Milosevic.

16 If you want to ask the witness about any of them, then he will need a

17 copy. Yes.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I assume that the witness now

19 has a copy of this. Is that right?

20 THE WITNESS: That's correct.

21 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. As I mentioned a moment ago, General, in Article 1, towards the

24 end of the page, everything else is enumerated before that, and then at

25 the very end of that page, it says: "The Croat National Guard reserve

Page 17021

1 forces shall be demobilised." And so on and so forth.

2 So that's what I was referring to when I asked you about it.

3 So tell me now, please, General, in your statement, on page 2,

4 paragraph 1 of your statement, you say that on one occasion you went to

5 Slavonia with a man named Branko who was a member of the National Guards

6 Corps; is that right?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Did you know at the time that the Croatian National Guard Corps

9 was in fact a paramilitary and illegal armed formation precisely

10 incorporated in this agreement?

11 A. Yes, and there were other forces precisely incorporated in the

12 agreement in the Osijek area at that particular time; the weapons and

13 equipment of the JNA that were operating in the area and irregular forces.

14 That was the reason for our presence there, was trying to negotiate a

15 cease-fire between the two elements so that this agreement could then be

16 properly implemented. That is the reason. That was the purpose of the

17 monitor team that had been sent to Osijek at that particular time.

18 Q. All right. Now, do you know that, with respect to the illegal

19 formation of the Croatian National Guard Corps at the end of June 1991,

20 the federal government of Yugoslavia took steps before the Constitutional

21 Court of Yugoslavia calling for the fact that the ZNG as a professional

22 armed formation be characterised as an unconstitutional and unlawful act

23 on the part of the Republic of Croatia? Are you aware of that?

24 A. I'm not aware of the detail of that particular legislation, but

25 what I am aware of is that there were a number of armed elements on both

Page 17022

1 sides of the equation during the hostilities in Croatia, and as I said to

2 you, our objective was going there to ensure the carrying out of the

3 agreement and to bring about a cease-fire and peace to the area.

4 Q. And do you know that the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, on

5 the 16th of October, 1991, made the decision to proclaim it irregular and

6 unconstitutional, this formation and establishment of the National Guard

7 Corps? Because -- that apart from the armed forces of Yugoslavia, no

8 other armed formations could be set up, as did the Republic of Croatia in

9 placing the National Guard Corps under the command of the Ministry of

10 Defence of the Republic of Croatia. Are you familiar with that? Just

11 give me a yes or no answer, please.

12 A. As I said to you, I'm not familiar with the precise legislation,

13 but I have to say that there was a number of armed elements operating at

14 that particular time, and our objective was to bring about a stand-down of

15 all in a coordinated and precise manner, which we found, as I have to say,

16 extremely difficult.

17 Q. I understand that, General. But this question doesn't refer to

18 you yourself personally. What I'm asking you is whether you consider that

19 your mission consistently insisted upon the disarming and disbanding of

20 the ZNG and other paramilitary formations that were established at that

21 time in Croatia, at least with the same intensity that it attended the

22 dynamics of the dislocation of the JNA units from Slovenia.

23 A. I consider that the EC monitor mission carried out their mission

24 in Croatia in as evenhanded a fashion and as just a fashion as they

25 possibly could. I would have no doubt that they did not show fear or

Page 17023

1 favour to either side. But they did stand for the peace-making and for

2 human rights.

3 Q. In your statement, you say that the JNA forces at that time were

4 exposed to attacks when they were in their bases and barracks in Croatia;

5 is that right? And do you know anything about the number of attacks that

6 were launched, how intense they were, and so on?

7 A. It is not correct to say that I said in my statement that they

8 were exposed to attacks in their barracks and bases in Croatia.

9 Q. Well, were they or not?

10 A. They were on occasions, yes.

11 Q. All right, then. Now, did you know about - and I assume that you

12 would have had to have known - about the report by the Federal Secretary

13 for National Defence, General Veljko Kadijevic, dated the 12th of

14 September, 1991, in which it is stated that up until that date, that is to

15 say up until the 12th of September, 1991, or, rather, from the 2nd of

16 September, 1991, ten days, all the barracks and facilities of the JNA were

17 under a complete siege, complete blockade? Did you know about that?

18 A. I was aware of the barracks and facilities being blockaded, yes.

19 I would like to remind the defendant that at this particular time, I was a

20 monitor. I wasn't the executive chief of the EC monitor mission. Very

21 often I was in the field with a monitor team, so consequently, I would not

22 have been aware of the detail of all of the announcements and agreements

23 that possibly were made. But naturally in the spirit and in the carrying

24 out of our mission, I would have been made aware of the contents.

25 Q. And do you know that as of the date the agreement was signed, up

Page 17024












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Page 17025

1 until the 11th of September, the Croatian forces carried out 115 attacks

2 against members of the JNA and that in the barracks at that time five

3 officers were killed, six soldiers, and 40 members of the JNA wounded?

4 Did you have reports to that effect? So they were in their barracks.

5 They weren't engaged in any other kinds of activities.

6 A. That level of detail with regard to reports, I have no memory of

7 it at this time. I am aware that there were a number of attacks on the

8 barracks that were occupied by the JNA in Croatia at that time.

9 Q. So you do know that there were attacks against barracks and that

10 people were killed and so on. Have I understood you correctly? Was that

11 your answer?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. And can you tell me, please, what your mission undertook with

14 respect to these flagrant violations of the cease-fire agreement, that is,

15 by the Croatian forces?

16 A. The mission, when there were breaches of the cease-fire agreement

17 on any side, endeavoured to negotiate with the parties and to bring them

18 to the realisation that it was only by cooperation with the mission and

19 the full implementation of the agreement could peace be restored to the

20 situation. So as I said, they operated in an evenhanded fashion to both

21 sides.

22 Q. But I was asking you, General, about these attacks against

23 soldiers sitting in their barracks. So they weren't in any kind of

24 military operation and activity except that they were in the barracks

25 where they had been for 50 years, in garrisons throughout Yugoslavia.

Page 17026

1 So in your own country, General -- let me ask you this, in view of

2 your experience and your official function: In your own country, attacks

3 on the regular army, the regular army of a sovereign country, in view of

4 the fact that you are well placed to respond to that question --

5 JUDGE MAY: I think this is going to be a question which is -- is

6 going to be a matter which we're going to have to decide it may be

7 ultimately. It's not a hypothetical question for the witness.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I understand, but I'm asking the

9 witness, Mr. May, whether in his own country --

10 JUDGE MAY: And I'm stopping you. So could you go on to the next

11 question, please.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. All right. Tell me this then, please: Is it correct and true

14 that in the Republic of Ireland there is a law in force against acts of

15 violence and terror which is called Offences Against the Act, and it is

16 the 31st --

17 JUDGE MAY: It is irrelevant what the Republic of Ireland's laws

18 are. What we're concerned with is what happened in Croatia. We'll

19 consider the situation in due course.

20 Now, would you move on to another topic, please.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Well, as to what happened in Croatia, can these attacks being

23 characterised as acts against the state and crimes against the state and

24 security of the state?

25 JUDGE MAY: Well, General, if you think you can answer it, do.

Page 17027

1 It's probably a matter which we're going to have to decide.

2 THE WITNESS: What I would like to say in that respect, there was

3 a particular situation pertaining at that time in Croatia, and the

4 legitimacy or otherwise of the regime that was in force is a political

5 question which I was not a party to and will not offer an opinion on at

6 this particular time. So consequently, I'm not going to stray into that

7 area.

8 I offered my evidence as to the facts of what I saw when I was

9 there and the manner in which we carried out our mission, and I'll confine

10 myself to that.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. All right. Fine, then. I won't ask you any more about that.

13 Now, when you talk about your stay in Dubrovnik in the Hotel

14 Argentina during a period of six days, I think you said that several

15 shells fell quite near to your hotel; is that right?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. And some witnesses who were here before you said that the forces,

18 the Croatian forces, in fact, had deployed combat positions around that

19 hotel. Is that right or not?

20 A. Not at that particular time, they hadn't. During the time I was

21 there, they had not. The hotel in question was the Hotel Excelsior.

22 Q. Well, when you talk about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of

23 military targets in the Dubrovnik area, and you mean the targets hit by

24 the JNA when you say that, are you quite sure that what was hit by the JNA

25 in fact was an illegitimate military target?

Page 17028

1 A. If you wish to describe it as such, yes.

2 Q. And I assume most probably, General, that you know about The Hague

3 rules, about the laws of war and customs of war, 1907, determining the

4 status of an undefended place or town?

5 A. I do.

6 Q. Therefore, I assume that a place or town, in order to have the

7 status of undefended, it must fulfil the following conditions: That all

8 the fighters, military materiel and movable equipment have been evacuated,

9 that immovable military installations and facilities are not used for

10 hostilities, that the authorities and population do not take any military

11 acts or to support military operations. So those several elements. Let's

12 take them. Are you aware of those elements?

13 A. I am aware of that. And when I -- I didn't describe Dubrovnik as

14 and undefended city in the context of The Hague Convention, it having been

15 declared as such. So it was in the context of the verb "to defend," and

16 purely on that basis, on the military basis, that I was dealing with it.

17 Q. But I assume that you're not challenging the fact that members of

18 the armed forces were located in the town, however you wish to call them

19 or qualify them; regular, irregular, or whatever. From what you yourself

20 say on page 6: Groups of armed people with Kalashnikovs, snipers, hunting

21 rifles, et cetera, that you saw a mortar and that the Croatian National

22 Guard Corps had several mortars in its possession. This is on page 5 of

23 your statement. And so on.

24 So are you challenging that?

25 A. No, not at all. In fact, that is my evidence. The only thing I

Page 17029

1 will challenge is you say that I saw a mortar. I didn't say I saw a

2 mortar. I said I heard them.

3 Q. All right. You heard it, which means that fire was opened against

4 the JNA. Are you challenging that?

5 A. No. That is correct.

6 Q. And do you know how many members of the JNA were killed in the

7 Dubrovnik region from that fire, from the shooting?

8 A. No, I do not.

9 Q. Well, as you're a professional soldier yourself and occupy the top

10 positions in your army today, if I tell you that 152 soldiers lost their

11 lives in the Dubrovnik region, fired on and shot at by the Croatian sides,

12 do you consider that this shooting could be characterised in some kind of

13 non-intensive shooting or - how shall I put this? - weak fire or anything

14 of that kind?

15 A. Well, first of all, I would like clarification of the period in

16 which the 152 soldiers lost their lives, because as I said, I was there

17 from the 5th to the 7th of October inclusive. So was it during that

18 period 152 soldiers lost their lives? Is that what you're telling me?

19 Q. No, not during the time that you were there. I wasn't claiming

20 that, General. I'm just asking about this figure, whether you know about

21 this figure of persons killed in the area.

22 A. No, I do not know that that was the figure. And certainly the

23 amount of fire that I observed from the Croatian side would be -- would

24 not indicate to me that any number of casualties of that nature were

25 inflicted.

Page 17030

1 Q. You mentioned, General, a moment ago during the

2 examination-in-chief, the fact that you had received information to the

3 effect that Dubrovnik was in danger, and your comments were that you

4 considered this information to be unfounded. When did you receive that

5 piece of information? That's my question.

6 A. The precise date I couldn't say, but it would have been towards

7 the end of September 1991, to the best of my knowledge.

8 Q. All right. Now, did you receive similar information and compare

9 it with the information that your team received, which was in Dubrovnik at

10 that time? I think the code name was the Whisky team, I think, as yours

11 was Charlie. The Whisky dispatch and yours was Charlie, I believe.

12 A. I think I'd better clarify something in that respect. The Team

13 Whisky was dispatched to Dubrovnik as a result of those reports we had

14 received, to confirm them or otherwise. That's the reason why they went

15 to Dubrovnik at that particular time.

16 Q. All right. But you received that information from the Croatian

17 side; isn't that right?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. And could we then conclude that giving out this kind of

20 information was in fact preparation for a future provocation against the

21 JNA by the armed forces concentrated around Dubrovnik at that time?

22 A. No, I wouldn't conclude that.

23 Q. But you mentioned that the reports in Zagreb were written by

24 people who were actually sitting in Zagreb and were not in the field on

25 the ground. Isn't that right, or have I misunderstood you?

Page 17031

1 A. The reports were sent by monitors in the field to the

2 headquarters, and the reports that were subsequently sent to The Hague

3 from Zagreb were constructed by people operating in the headquarters.

4 That is correct.

5 Q. And tell me, General, just in a few words if possible, why did you

6 give up this RMCM01 exhibit that Mr. Kay mentioned?

7 JUDGE MAY: The witness explained it had nothing to do with him.

8 It was somebody else's observations. So he can't produce it. That's what

9 he explained.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. General, you spoke about the JNA. Tell me, why when you're

13 referring to the JNA in your statement and the attachment which is number

14 RMCM02 of the 6th of December, 1991, why do you equate it with the Serb

15 forces?

16 JUDGE MAY: Would you like to have the document in front of you?

17 THE WITNESS: I would like to see the document, yes.

18 JUDGE MAY: Find the attachment and the tab number. Can you say

19 what it is, please, for the record.

20 Mr. Milosevic, let's find this document so we can make sure we

21 have it. It's -- you've mentioned the 6th of December. Do you mean the

22 6th of October for the numbered attachment?

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The 6th of October, that's it.

24 JUDGE MAY: It's our Exhibit 400, attachment 2. And you can

25 remind us what it is you put to the witness. Mr. Milosevic, where is it

Page 17032












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Page 17033

1 in the document?

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I haven't got it in front of me just

3 now, but he equates the JNA with Serb forces. That's how he refers to

4 them and --

5 JUDGE MAY: Very well --

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- conceives of them.

7 JUDGE MAY: Let's find the passage that you're referring to.

8 MR. KAY: Paragraph 7, which is the second page, in the bottom

9 paragraph there. "JNA/Serbian forces."

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Why do you equate that, take that to be the same thing, General?

12 A. That is a report that was submitted at that time from Zagreb to

13 The Hague. That was the manner in which it was written. I -- it was a

14 perception at that particular time that on -- and I say it from a point of

15 simplicity, that there were Serbs and Croats in conflict with each other.

16 But strictly speaking, and the point is that as far as we were concerned,

17 at that time those of us who were in Dubrovnik, it was the JNA.

18 Q. So not Serb forces but the JNA; right?

19 A. That's my understanding, yes.

20 Q. And do you know the multinational structure of the JNA? Are you

21 aware of that, even at that time, particularly the officers, officer cadre

22 of the JNA, that they were multi-ethnic?

23 A. Yes, I am aware of that.

24 Q. You mentioned, General, the fact that there were certain protests

25 against the monitoring mission because of its activities in the Dubrovnik

Page 17034

1 region, and you said there were no reactions to the protests by the army.

2 Did I understand you correctly?

3 A. At our time there, you understood me correctly that the protests

4 were made by our mission headquarters in Zagreb. It didn't bring about a

5 reaction on the ground, yes.

6 Q. Well, if that's so, General, would you please comment on the

7 following -- this is also a document that I received from the other side

8 over there, Mr. May, and it is 00544945, page -- that's the page. And it

9 is a letter by the Deputy Federal Secretary for National Defence, Admiral

10 Stane Brovet, to the head of the monitoring mission, Ambassador GDY Horten

11 [phoen] in Belgrade. The 6th of November is the date.

12 And in that letter, among others, he says: "With respect to the

13 protests of the monitoring mission of the European Community for the

14 activities in the Dubrovnik region on the 2nd and 3rd of November, we have

15 collected information from which the following emerges."

16 And now I would like to ask you whether you were aware of that

17 information and facts. First, it says here, and I'm sure you know,

18 General, that Admiral Brovet was the Deputy Federal National Defence

19 Secretary, a Slovene by ethnicity. Are you familiar with that?

20 A. I am, yes.

21 Q. And first of all, it says: "On the 2nd of November, 1991, from

22 1300 to 1420 hours, the JNA positions in the Glogov-Kamen region, sniper

23 and mortar fire was opened on them from the Babin Kuk position, Mala Petka

24 [phoen], Lapad and the Nunziata fort [phoen]. And from the same

25 positions, opened fire between 15 and 1620 hours, from guns -- 85

Page 17035

1 millimetre guns and mortars of 82 and 102 millimetres -- 120 millimetres.

2 And the deployment of the fighter units, groups of six, members of the

3 Croatian National Guard Corps, a diversionary group, infiltrated into

4 their ranks; and it says that on the 2nd of November, all the JNA units

5 were ordered to cease fire at once because in agreement with the EEC

6 monitors work was started to set the Komuvac [phoen] transformer station

7 into operation and the Crisis Staff of Dubrovnik was informed of this as

8 was the EC mission with the violations of the cease-fire agreement. As

9 the attacks did not cease but, on the contrary, were intensified, about

10 1730 hours mortar fire and machine-gun fire was opened from the positions

11 from which the Croatian armed formations were active. And this is what

12 the letter to the head of your mission, Ambassador Van Houten contains.

13 Do you know about that?

14 A. I'm not familiar with the detail in that letter. As I said, my

15 period in the Dubrovnik area was not at the period that you're referring

16 to there.

17 Q. I am speaking about a response to protests because the JNA had

18 opened fire, and Admiral Brovet, in his letter, explains the attacks that

19 came prior to this response.

20 JUDGE MAY: The witness has said that he's not familiar with the

21 detail. He wasn't there at the period. Now, you can put it to other

22 witnesses or you can give evidence about it, but there's no point asking

23 the witness about something which he knows nothing of. It just takes up

24 time unnecessarily.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 17036

1 Q. Well, General, is it clear that at an adequate level of

2 responsibility held by Admiral Brovet provided an adequate answer as to

3 why fire had to be returned against positions from which it had been

4 opened against the JNA?

5 A. On that particular occasion, it would be -- appear to be the

6 response of Admiral Brovet. That is quite correct, in respect of that

7 particular incident of which I said I have no knowledge.

8 Q. And are you familiar with the letter of the Federal Secretary for

9 National Defence, General Veljko Kadijevic, addressed to the chairman of

10 the ministerial council of the European Community, Hans van den Broek and

11 the head of the monitoring mission, Ambassador van Houten, in which he

12 says - and this was dated the 6th of November, too - that on the 10th of

13 November, the conclusions of the government of the Republic of Croatia

14 come into effect, and after that date, members of the JNA in the territory

15 of Croatia would be treated as members of an occupying hostile army and

16 clearly Croatia wishes a further escalation of the conflict with

17 unforeseeable consequences. This is corroborated by the fact that

18 Croatian forces bombed certain areas in the Republic of Serbia, including

19 the town of Apotin.

20 Are you familiar with the contents of that letter?

21 A. I'm not familiar with the contents of that letter, no.

22 Q. And are you familiar --

23 JUDGE MAY: If this is another November letter, I think it's just

24 wasting time. Now, your time is going on.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May. I have quite a

Page 17037

1 number of documents here which I consider to be important to clear up this

2 matter. I too would like to clear it up. But let me move on then. I

3 will not refer to further documents.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. On page 6, General, you analyse the justification of the entry of

6 the JNA into the Dubrovnik harbour. You even link this to other naval

7 bases on the Adriatic as part of the protection of the integrity of the


9 So my question really is: Why would the regular army, on its own

10 territory in this case, a part of that army that is called the Navy,

11 should not use its own harbours and coastline, and on what basis are you

12 saying that the Dubrovnik harbour had no military, strategic or economic

13 significance for the JNA?

14 A. I didn't say that it had no economic significance for the JNA, but

15 what I was saying there is that they were not using Dubrovnik harbour at

16 that time, and they had a number of other bases in the Adriatic. So I

17 couldn't see that they needed to take on a new base in Dubrovnik. That

18 was the case I was making.

19 Q. That is the point, General, when you talk about taking. Don't you

20 think it is extremely illogical for the army to take the territory of its

21 own state? You also mention capitulation, that its own population should

22 capitulate. What logic can there be in this or what explanation can be

23 given for this?

24 A. That logic would be to ignore the factual situation that was

25 taking place on the ground, and that was that there was a state of

Page 17038

1 confrontation between the army that you mentioned and the population

2 within Croatia. Consequently, that was the situation that we were trying

3 to normalise and which we were trying to pacify. That was the whole

4 purpose of us being there.

5 Q. Yes, but, General, the behaviour of the JNA which held positions

6 on the fringes of the town and which never entered the town, doesn't that

7 confirm the statement of the JNA leadership that the army had no intention

8 of taking Dubrovnik? But it was the media manipulations and provocations

9 that turned this into a political event which was construed on the basis

10 of those provocations in order to speed up international support for

11 something absurd, as an attack on a tourist centre and a historical

12 monument would be. That was certainly not the intention of the army.

13 A. I was at a loss to interpret the intentions of the army at that

14 particular time, but I was aware that while I was there, whereas the old

15 city hadn't been shelled, the areas around it inhabited by the civilians

16 had been, and it was in that context that I was talking of the attack on

17 Dubrovnik.

18 Q. General, I find something illogical there. You use the

19 explanation that the probable intention was to depopulate Dubrovnik. On

20 page 2 -- no, not of your statement. But on the other hand, you also

21 mentioned Ilok, which was not attacked at all but was evacuated. I assume

22 because it was close to the area of conflict. It was not destroyed or

23 damaged in any sense, but it was evacuated by the Croatian authorities and

24 the Croatian mayor. Why was it evacuated? You even say that

25 international monitors assisted in that evacuation. Why was that town

Page 17039

1 evacuated when no one was attacking it? And here you say that it was

2 attacked for the population to leave.

3 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Question.

4 THE WITNESS: Information that we had in respect of Ilok was that

5 the people felt increasingly threatened in the town of Ilok, and they

6 asked that they would be evacuated. It struck me as strange that people

7 would be asked to be evacuated from their town unless they were under some

8 threat. So it is not illogical to say that the attack on the population

9 of Dubrovnik would bring about an evacuation.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. But didn't you know that at meetings held by the authorities of

12 Dubrovnik with JNA representatives in the presence of international

13 representatives, the only demand of the army was for the armed formations,

14 the irregulars, foreign mercenaries leave Dubrovnik?

15 JUDGE MAY: You've already been over this ground and the witness

16 has answered that he was not involved in any of these negotiations,

17 although he'd heard of that demand. No point going over that ground

18 again.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But that demand, as far as I

20 understood the witness, the witness said that he knew about it, the demand

21 for the armed formations to leave the town, Mr. May, nothing more than

22 that.

23 JUDGE MAY: Yes, exactly. Now, what new do you want to ask?

24 You've got about five minutes left.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will finish in five minutes,

Page 17040












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Page 17041

1 Mr. May.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. You said, General, that when you were in the old town of Dubrovnik

4 you saw only two minor damages and that your professional judgement was

5 that these had occurred incidentally.

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Allegations here are being repeatedly made that the army wanted to

8 capture Dubrovnik, and Dubrovnik was not captured. Allegations are being

9 presented that the army wanted to destroy Dubrovnik, and Dubrovnik was not

10 destroyed. Is that so or not, General?

11 JUDGE MAY: It's not for the general to comment on allegations

12 such as that, which in my recollection have not been made. I think that's

13 your misrepresentation. Now, move on.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. General, do you know that Croatian paramilitary forces - and your

17 mission was informed about this - opened fire in the area of Dubrovecki

18 Glebane [phoen] from a vessel against a vessel of the Yugoslav navy? Did

19 you have any report of that? This, for instance, occurred on the 11th of

20 November, 1991.

21 A. At this remove, I can't remember that particular incident as I

22 wasn't in that area. On the 11th of November, I was probably back in

23 Zagreb. But I can't remember that incident.

24 Q. Do you remember that fire was constantly opened against JNA units

25 in the villages of Bosanka, Kriza, Bogeja [phoen] and Knezica? Did you

Page 17042

1 have such a report? Did you have access to that information?

2 A. We had information that -- of fire being directed by one side

3 against the other throughout a number -- a large number of locations

4 within Croatia. I don't remember those precise locations on that

5 particular date. I think that there -- only those who were there at that

6 the time or those who would have made the exact report on it could be

7 expected to remember the detail of every incident that took place.

8 Q. General, you now use the expression "one side firing against the

9 other." Can we infer from that that there was a constant exchange of

10 fires between the two sides there, in your professional judgement?

11 A. I wouldn't use the word "constant," but there were outbreaks of

12 fighting quite frequently throughout November and December at that

13 particular time.

14 Q. So you're saying that there were outbreaks of fighting throughout

15 November and December, which means fire was opened by both sides. There

16 was a battle going on between two sides. Is that right, General?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. Do you know that in those battles members of the Croatian military

19 or, rather, paramilitary forces were also opening fire from positions

20 within the old town? I have here a bulletin of the Federal Secretariat

21 for National Defence dated the 12th of November, 1991, where this is

22 stated. I have no other sources of information, but I assume that this is

23 correct. Are you familiar with that? That is that fire was opened also

24 from positions within the old town.

25 A. That is dated the 12th of November. I have no knowledge of fire

Page 17043

1 being opened from within the town on that date.

2 But let me clarify something. Can we go back to the question and

3 the answer I gave. "... there were outbreaks of fighting throughout

4 November and December, which means fire was opened by both sides. There

5 was a battle between two sides. Is that right, General?" That question.

6 I said, "That is correct," but my understanding of your question was

7 throughout the Federal Republic of Croatia, on Croatian territory, not

8 within the Dubrovnik area, and my answer was made accordingly. Now you're

9 specifically saying on the 12th of December -- or I beg your pardon, of

10 November, within Dubrovnik. I have no knowledge of that particular

11 incident that you're talking about because, as I said to you, I wasn't

12 there at that time.

13 Q. Very well. But if we go back to the area of Dubrovnik itself once

14 again, did you say that there was fighting ongoing there too for as long

15 as they lasted, that is, that there was an exchange of fire on both sides?

16 A. When I was there, there was certainly fire into the Dubrovnik

17 area, and there was some fire from the Dubrovnik area, return fire, but

18 not from the old city.

19 Q. Very well. Not from the old city. Why do you call the fire

20 coming from Dubrovnik as return fire? Does that mean that the JNA forces

21 fired first and then the Croatian forces responded or was it perhaps the

22 other way round?

23 I've read to you parts of the letter by Admiral Brovet from which

24 it is evident what patience they showed in endeavouring to stop the fire

25 against JNA positions.

Page 17044

1 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, we've been over all this ground. It's

2 pointless going on. You can ask one more question and then your time is

3 up, if you've got something else you want to ask. We've been over this

4 ground.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Yes, General, do you know that throughout that period that you are

7 talking about, the role of the JNA was precisely to separate forces that

8 were in conflict, and they were conflict because of the violence which the

9 new Croatian authority had committed against the Serb population? Are you

10 aware of that, that the role of the JNA was that, that it endeavoured to

11 separate the warring parties? And the Serbs in Croatia were the party

12 that was attacked. Do you know that?

13 A. I was aware that that was the justification given for many of the

14 actions that were taking place, but that was at variance with what

15 actually took place on the ground.

16 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Kay, have you any questions?

17 Questioned by Mr. Kay:

18 Q. General, you were largely based in Zagreb; is that right?

19 A. Based in Zagreb and then we were deployed as teams to areas within

20 Croatia on occasions, yes.

21 Q. The ECMM, did it have only that main base in Zagreb or did it have

22 other bases or centres, if you like, elsewhere in Yugoslavia?

23 A. Initially it was in Zagreb, and then they developed a network of

24 centres, what they called Regional Centres, in a number of other

25 locations, first in Croatia and then in Belgrade.

Page 17045

1 Q. The setup in Belgrade was at what stage? Can you give us an

2 approximate date?

3 A. Approximately the end of October. I'm not sure exactly of the

4 date.

5 Q. The arrival of the ECMM to Zagreb, again, approximate date?

6 A. It would have arrived approximately the 13th of July.

7 Q. When you arrived, you were, so to speak, in the Croatian partition

8 of Yugoslavia.

9 A. That is correct.

10 Q. When you arrived, would it be fair to say that you were viewed

11 with suspicion by the other side, the side that was not the Croats?

12 A. Initially -- yes. I would think that that would be fair.

13 Q. You said that there was no contact or response from the JNA when

14 you were trying to perform your task of implementing a cease-fire, the

15 cessation of hostilities. Again, would it be fair to say from your

16 dealings on the matter that that would have been because the other side

17 viewed you as being partial to the Croatians? Whether that's right or

18 wrong is another matter, it's their perception that I would like you to

19 give evidence about.

20 A. I don't think that that would be fair to say, because on a number

21 of other occasions, the JNA did engage with us and cease-fires were

22 arranged. I had personal experience of it in the Osijek area myself.

23 Q. If we can just turn to tab 8, second page, paragraph 6, the

24 Dalmatia section. I take it from the date on page 1, the 14th of October,

25 that this may well have been after you had left Dubrovnik. From your six

Page 17046

1 days, it seems you would have left around the 12th; is that right?

2 A. No, that's not correct. I would have been there from the 5th to

3 the 7th or 8th of October. So I was well gone on the 14th.

4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, it's -- the document date is

5 actually the 11th of October.

6 MR. KAY: Thank you.

7 Q. Is it outside your time, this report, or within your time? Just

8 see if you can help us.

9 A. The actual report refers to the changeover time. As you see, the

10 team reports another quiet day. That would have been the team in situ,

11 and then the other team was arriving. So the report covers the period of

12 the handover, as far as I can ascertain from it.

13 Q. Paragraph 6 reads as follows: "The same team reports that the JNA

14 has for the first time made contact to talk."

15 A. Yes. That refers to our successor team. I think in my evidence I

16 mentioned that, that the successor team made contact and did have a

17 meeting with the JNA and the Croatian authorities at Cavtat.

18 Q. And from the way we read it, it seems as though the JNA made that

19 contact rather than it being the other way around.

20 A. Well, as I say, it was the successor team. I don't know who made

21 the initial contact in that case.

22 Q. Moving on to other matters, in your period in Zagreb, were you

23 able to receive reports as to the kind of information that was coming out

24 of the media in Croatia itself?

25 A. There would have been a cell at the headquarters there that were

Page 17047

1 receiving media digests from all of the interested parties.

2 Q. The issue I just want to look at briefly here is your experience

3 of that, or the ECMM experience of it, and whether there could be any

4 assessment of the kind of reporting that was taking place within Croatia

5 as to the events that were happening. Were those local reports from the

6 Croatia media exaggerations of the hostilities and conflicts?

7 A. There was a dedicated press section at the headquarters who would

8 have had the responsibility of analysing and dissecting the media, so I

9 would feel that it would be -- a comment of that nature would be more

10 appropriate to them than to me.

11 Q. But were you aware, rather than having someone else come along,

12 were you aware of those reports that were being made within the Croatia

13 media? I say that because of those comments that were within the document

14 that we withdrew this morning of which you were not the author.

15 A. There were comments made, yes, that like would not have been fully

16 reflective of the facts on the ground, yeah.

17 Q. I just want to deal with this point: That the reports within

18 Croatia as to what was happening were an exaggeration of the real events;

19 is that right?

20 A. I would prefer to say that some of the reports in the Croatian

21 media were an exaggeration of the real events.

22 Q. Gaining an understanding that that was the situation would not be

23 immediate, would that be right, when you and your ECMM team arrive in

24 Zagreb?

25 A. That would be correct, yes.

Page 17048












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Page 17049

1 Q. It takes time to work out what the realities are.

2 A. That is correct, but I think pragmatically one would expect the

3 reporting of one particular side or another to be of a rather subjective

4 nature.

5 Q. Yes. Just one other matter. You referred to one of these tabs,

6 it may even have been this one, as going to The Hague. I didn't quite

7 understand the context of that.

8 A. At that particular time, the Dutch had the presidency of the EU,

9 and the Dutch presidency then received the reports and circulated them to

10 all of the other participating countries at that time. They had that

11 responsibility.

12 Q. Thank you. I have no further questions.

13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I have a few questions.

14 Re-examined by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:

15 Q. General, in relation to your information on the imminent attack on

16 Dubrovnik, the accused put to you whether this was in fact preparation for

17 a future provocation against the JNA. Did you see anything in Dubrovnik

18 when you were there that could justify such a conclusion?

19 A. No, I did not.

20 Q. The accused also spoke with you about the amount of fire from the

21 Croatian side in Dubrovnik, and you yourself spoke about what you saw and

22 heard. Would that what you saw and heard coming from the Croatian side,

23 would it justify the bombardment from the JNA that you saw?

24 A. No, it would not.

25 Q. The accused also spoke with you about the agreement of the -- of

Page 17050

1 the 13th of July, 1991, and mentioned is here - and he pointed this out in

2 particular - the lifting of the blockade of the JNA units and facilities,

3 but it also says here "the unconditional return of the JNA units to their

4 barracks."

5 Did the JNA, to your information -- to your knowledge, did they

6 return unconditionally to their barracks?

7 A. No, they did not.

8 Q. And returning to blockades of barracks and the Dubrovnik scenario,

9 was in Dubrovnik any barracks of the JNA blockaded?

10 A. Not in the Dubrovnik area to my knowledge.

11 Q. Was Prevlaka, was Prevlaka threatened? The JNA in Prevlaka, were

12 they threatened?

13 A. Not to my knowledge.

14 Q. You've told us that you could not see any military reason for what

15 was going on in Dubrovnik. What did you believe at that time was the

16 reason for what you saw going on in Dubrovnik and what also continued

17 after you left?

18 A. It was not apparent to me what reason the attack was going on in

19 the Dubrovnik area, because as I have stated in my evidence, if the JNA

20 had wanted to take Dubrovnik, at that time it was so lightly defended it

21 would have been a very simple matter for them but they didn't do it.

22 Consequently, I was mystified.

23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE MAY: General, that concludes your evidence. Thank you for

25 coming to the International Tribunal to give it. You are free to go.

Page 17051

1 [The witness withdrew]

2 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, there is one matter, formal matter. We were

3 asked, with that last witness, and apparently the same thing happened to

4 the witness before, although I did not note -- did not take action at the

5 time, we were asked to mark the proofing summary for identification. Now,

6 that has not been our practice, as I recollect. We've not admitted the

7 proofing summaries, they having a totally different function, and at the

8 moment, I'm not minded -- I don't think we're minded, rather - I speak for

9 the Trial Chamber - to admit this one.

10 MR. NICE: The reason I think I'd mentioned it on two previous

11 occasions is simply if at any later stage there was any need to know what

12 was in a proofing summary and it's not marked for identification there

13 could be some difficulty or confusion. If something's referred to in, for

14 example, a passage of examination or cross-examination by reference to a

15 proofing summary, a later review of the materials without the proofing

16 summary would be a little difficult to follow.

17 JUDGE MAY: There haven't been any -- there haven't been any

18 references in the last witness to the witness summary. I would rather

19 that we kept the proofing summaries out, because it only adds to

20 confusion, quite honestly. If an issue arises, the proofing summary no

21 doubt you will retain and you can produce when need be. So we will not

22 mark those for identification. And that will also apply to the

23 ambassador's evidence where we seem to have marked one for identification.

24 We will remove them.

25 MR. NICE: If Your Honour pleases. We made good progress this

Page 17052

1 morning in time. The ambassador is due to come back, obviously

2 immediately. Before he does, a word about witness lists in light of the

3 accused's concerns. He may be confusing two types of witness lists. The

4 regular witness list, notifying him of next week's witnesses, is being

5 provided today. The other witness list, to which I was referring, was the

6 witness list which would be part of the discussion about procedure and

7 timetable. I'm just informed that it's pretty well in final shape. It's

8 just being reviewed. Although I shan't be here myself tomorrow we can

9 have it at least provided in courtesy copies, if that would help the Trial

10 Chamber over the weekend and indeed the accused, because I think

11 procedural matters must proceed next week.

12 If the ambassador's evidence is not -- doesn't take all of the

13 remainder of today and tomorrow, there's then a question of what to do

14 with the balance of tomorrow, because as I say, unfortunately, I shan't be

15 here, cannot be here. It may be we'll revert to Mr. Blewitt, who is our

16 most available filler witness. I don't think it's going to be possible to

17 go into one of next week's witnesses and advance them to tomorrow.

18 JUDGE MAY: It may be that we can go back to the Rule 92 bis

19 witnesses, which we still have a great number to get through.

20 JUDGE MAY: My learned friends can deal with those, yes, in my

21 absence.

22 JUDGE MAY: It might be sensible to do that tomorrow. We'll have

23 to see how long the ambassador is needed for.

24 JUDGE MAY: Otherwise, I am very anxious that I should lay out the

25 position about procedure and finish the financial argument --

Page 17053

1 JUDGE MAY: We can do that on Monday.

2 MR. NICE: I would hope so, yes. Well, we can't do it on Monday.

3 Absolutely it's a question of putting back the first witness perhaps to

4 the second session on Monday and hoping to conclude that witness and

5 the other witness by the end of Tuesday, but if we can't finish them by

6 Tuesday, one of them will have to come back.

7 MR. NICE: Are they -- do you know if they are substantial

8 witnesses, either of these?

9 MR. NICE: The first one is an expert, producing a number of

10 exhibits, so his examination-in-chief should not be particularly

11 substantial, and of course cross-examination will have to allow for the

12 fact that his material has gone in under the provisions of an expert

13 witness. The second one I'm not sure at the moment.

14 JUDGE MAY: Which expert is he?

15 MR. NICE: Grujic. Mr. Grujic.

16 JUDGE MAY: The topic.

17 MR. NICE: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff will deal with it.

18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Colonel Grujic is the head of the commission

19 of the Croats for missing and detained and killed people, and he will

20 provide a lot of statistical documentation on missing people, detained

21 people, killed people related to the indictment, the Croatia indictment.

22 This is the subject of his testimony.

23 JUDGE MAY: But --

24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And it's a huge amount of documents, but we

25 think we can get it in in a summarising fashion.

Page 17054

1 JUDGE MAY: I was going to say, you're not going to take very

2 long, then, in chief.

3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No. He has provided an expert report and I

4 would only address a few matters.

5 JUDGE MAY: What about the other witnesses? Is that a long one?

6 It may be it's a Bosnia witness.

7 MR. NICE: He deals with a number of detention camps. He's likely

8 to be quite substantial. And it simply may be that he'll have to return

9 from whence he came and come back again after our five-day break, or is it

10 six-day break?

11 JUDGE MAY: Since we must deal with these administrative matters

12 and not put them off, it would be sensible to take the first session on

13 Monday, then, on those and put the witnesses back.

14 MR. NICE: We'll try and provide -- or, we will provide by way of

15 courtesy copies the charts and lists that I'm going to refer to on that

16 occasion.

17 JUDGE KWON: I didn't follow well. What expertise does he have,

18 Mr. Grujic?

19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: He's the head of the commission who dealt

20 with all these matters, and he's also -- he was present during exhumation

21 proceedings and those kind of the matters.

22 [Trial Chamber confers]

23 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope that you will order them to

25 give me a list of witnesses so that the practice is for me to know at

Page 17055

1 least a week in advance which witnesses will be testifying for purposes of

2 my cross-examination, because surprises seem to be sprung all the time,

3 and it is not possible, with this mass of documents that the opposite side

4 is endeavouring to inundate me with, for me to identify overnight and to

5 read through the statements to see what it's all about. So I can't

6 understand, with the enormous apparatus that they have at their disposal

7 they're not in a position to give me a proper list of witnesses for one

8 week in advance, a valid list of witnesses and that they should adhere to.

9 And also I think that this practice of interrupting one witness,

10 putting another one in his stead leads to confusion. We had Okun

11 yesterday and then the general and then the cross-examination and now

12 we're going to carry on with Okun, and so on and so forth.

13 And I also wish to say that I don't understand what time you're

14 talking about tomorrow, because yesterday Okun testified throughout the

15 working day, and today, as far as I'm able to gather, he will be

16 continuing and completing his testimony. Perhaps I shall be able to start

17 my cross-examination, but I assume that I have the rest of tomorrow at my

18 disposal for it. Is that right? The whole day tomorrow?

19 JUDGE MAY: We will see. Yesterday, you may remember, was a short

20 day, it was only three hours. But you're right that he testified for

21 those three hours. We will add, of course, the time which he's testifying

22 today, and we'll consider the matter.

23 As for the interposing of witnesses, that is not a practice which

24 is encouraged, but occasionally when you have a witness such as the last

25 one who has important public duties to fulfil, it's important that this

Page 17056












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13 English transcripts.













Page 17057

1 Tribunal tries to fit those duties in as far as possible. And although

2 it's inconvenient from the point of view of the trial, sometimes the

3 witness's convenience has to come first, but obviously it's a practice

4 which should be kept to a minimum.

5 But let me inquire this: What the accused is certainly entitled

6 to is a list for the week after next so that he can prepare during the

7 break for that list. For the next two weeks, if possible.

8 MR. NICE: That will be provided to him. It comes, of course,

9 with the necessary caution that things can change for reasons outside our

10 control, but yes, we'll provide that to him.

11 JUDGE MAY: It may be convenient to deal with one other matter.

12 You asked us yesterday to consider Witness C-032, I think was the number,

13 who is a military witness, and you ask in your application that he be

14 allowed to deal with some matters by way of Rule 92 bis. They are matters

15 concerned with various laws, and I must say they appear to me - to us - to

16 be admissible under Rule 92 bis, but of course we'll have to hear.

17 Mr. Kay, anything you want to say about that?

18 MR. KAY: No. The Trial Chamber has given its initial ruling on

19 Rule 92 bis and there are no observations we have on this matter, this

20 aspect of that witness's evidence, and that's why we haven't put in a

21 written document.

22 JUDGE MAY: Very well. If you don't want to put in a written

23 document, just address us orally on all these witnesses.

24 MR. KAY: Yes. There's no comment we have on that or, for that

25 matter, Rousseau, who was the third addendum, because they've picked out

Page 17058

1 the areas which are suitable for it.

2 JUDGE MAY: And they're not in way connected with the acts or

3 conduct of the accused or for any other reason not admissible.

4 Mr. Milosevic, anything you want to say about this witness, C-032?

5 He will be called to give evidence but his statement will be admitted for

6 those paragraphs which I've identified.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't understand the question,

8 Mr. May. If you're referring to the testimony pursuant to 92 bis, then I

9 -- you know that I am against the use and application of that Rule,

10 because it shortens everything to a great measure and diminishes the

11 possibility for the -- for verifying the facts that are being presented.

12 You heard the general a moment ago. I had no objection to make or

13 comments to his priority. I know that he is Chief of the General Staff

14 the Irish army and that therefore he has his duties to attend to. And you

15 heard the general who rejected certain portions of what was provided here.

16 So when we follow Rule 92 bis, it is quite unclear whether it is a

17 statement by the witness or something written by the opposite side over

18 there. And that's the crux of the matter.

19 The second point is that I have very limited time for

20 cross-examining witnesses that are pursuant to that Rule.

21 JUDGE MAY: Yes. As for any suggestion that the statement is

22 written by the Prosecutor or the investigator, that is a suggestion which

23 is to be rejected. If that practice was going on, then it's a matter

24 which we would have to look into. But it's not suggested that that is so

25 here.

Page 17059

1 Your general objection you made before. We bear in mind the

2 amount of time which you should have in cross-examination depending on the

3 nature of the evidence, and so that is catered for.

4 We will admit the statement under Rule 92 business, those

5 paragraphs which appear in the application.

6 MR. NICE: Your Honour, we're obliged. The Chamber will remember

7 that when we first dealt with the first 92 bis, or partly bis'd, witness,

8 we reviewed in a public way the process by which 92 bis is applied. It

9 may be appropriate, in light of the accused's suggestion or allegation, it

10 may be appropriate with the next 92 bis witness simply to remind those

11 viewing, through testimony, how the 92 process -- 92 bis process actually

12 takes place.

13 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We will adjourn now, and we will continue

14 with the evidence of the ambassador in 20 minutes.

15 --- Recess taken at 12.15 p.m.

16 --- On resuming at 12.42 p.m.

17 [The witness entered court]

18 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Groome.


20 Examined by Mr. Groome: [Continued]

21 Q. Ambassador, when we concluded yesterday, you were discussing or

22 describing to the Chamber the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. I'm going to ask

23 that you be shown tab 10 of Prosecution Exhibit 396 now. I'd ask you to

24 identify it, if you're able.

25 A. Yes.

Page 17060

1 Q. And what is that document?

2 A. That is the text of the political section of the Vance-Owen Peace

3 Plan. There was also a military annex which is not in this document --

4 Q. Thank you.

5 A. -- concerning military dispositions.

6 Q. Yes. Can you describe for us Mr. Milosevic's position regarding

7 the Vance-Owen Peace Plan.

8 A. Yes, I believe I can.

9 Q. Please do.

10 A. In my judgement, Mr. Milosevic favoured the plan. I say that

11 based primarily on a lengthy meeting that Lord Owen and I held with

12 President Milosevic in Belgrade, I believe towards the end of April 1993,

13 at which he -- or to which, I should say, excuse me, to which he summoned

14 Radovan Karadzic, and in our presence they discussed the plan, and

15 President Milosevic spoke in its favour.

16 Q. And did you believe his efforts to advocate on behalf of the plan

17 to be sincere efforts?

18 A. They appeared to be.

19 Q. Ambassador, I'm going to ask you to comment briefly on what you

20 can tell the Chamber regarding the relationship between the JNA, the

21 Yugoslav People's Army, the Yugoslav army, the VJ, and the army of the

22 Republika Srpska, or the VRS, and I would direct the Chamber's attention

23 to paragraph 72 of the summary.

24 Could you briefly describe for us what you know about this

25 relationship that you learned from your official duties at this time.

Page 17061

1 A. Yes. The relationship between the JNA, the Bosnian Serb army,

2 which was its successor in Bosnia, were very close, were intimate.

3 Q. Can you please describe the -- in a little greater detail what you

4 know about the nature of that relationship, both prior to the withdrawal

5 of the JNA in Bosnia and subsequent to their withdrawal.

6 A. Well, the JNA, for historic and geographic reasons, regarded

7 Bosnia and Herzegovina as its heartland. This stemmed from the World War

8 II experience where the partisan movement was based primarily in Bosnia

9 and most of the fighting against the German occupying forces took place in

10 Bosnia. Tito declared the existence of the Republic in Jajce in November

11 1943, in Bosnia, and there were a host of other reasons.

12 Additionally, for geographic reasons, much of former Yugoslavia's

13 military industrial complex was located in Bosnia-Herzegovina since it was

14 in the centre of the country.

15 At the time of the cessation of hostilities in Croatia, the JNA

16 had probably between 90 and 100.000 troops already stationed in Bosnia.

17 They were to withdraw from Croatia, as we've already discussed, and by the

18 time -- or I should say when the fighting began to occur in May -- in

19 March of 1992 in Bosnia, the JNA probably had some something like 80,

20 90.000 soldiers there still.

21 In May of 1992, the JNA officially withdrew, or formally withdrew.

22 This was a paper withdrawal because in fact they did not withdraw from

23 Croatia until October 1992. But there was a withdrawal in May of 1992.

24 So at that point, the JNA was in Bosnia. It was later renamed the VJ, the

25 army of Yugoslavia. And again at that time, the Bosnian Serb army, the

Page 17062

1 VRS, was technically created. But what happened was, in English, to put

2 it plainly and leave the initials out of it, the JNA in effect became the

3 VRS, the Bosnian army.

4 Q. Okay. You --

5 A. And this was visible to us, because the gasoline, the ammunition

6 came from Serbia across the river, across the Drina into Bosnia. This was

7 no secret to anybody. After all, to maintain 80 or 90.000 fighting troops

8 in the field requires quite a lot of logistic support.

9 Q. Did you become aware of who was paying the salaries of the

10 officers in the VRS army?

11 A. Yes. We were widely informed, although I have no direct personal

12 knowledge of the fact, but we were widely informed that the salaries of

13 the Bosnian Serb army, that is the VRS, were paid by the Defence Ministry

14 in Belgrade.

15 Q. Then, Ambassador, if you can, could you comment on any knowledge

16 you have regarding General Ratko Mladic.

17 A. Yes. I met him several times, and I know of his reputation as

18 well. He had been the commander of the Knin Corps in Croatia, Knin being

19 the most sensitive and most Serb area on the territory of Croatia, and so

20 that position was already an important one.

21 He was widely said to be the most popular JNA officer in the army,

22 and particularly popular with the troops, that is the enlisted men. He

23 was even referred to as the George Patton of the JNA, George Patton being

24 a famous American general from the Second World War.

25 As I say, I also met him on several occasions.

Page 17063

1 Q. Now, Ambassador, how many pages altogether are the diaries that

2 you've been referring to during the course of your testimony? An

3 approximate number.

4 A. Close to 2.000, I should say.

5 Q. Did you, in the course of your preparation to testify here, did

6 you work with a member of the OTP staff to make some charts identifying

7 the most relevant entries into the diaries?

8 A. Yes, I did.

9 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, at this time I'm going to ask that

10 Prosecution Exhibit 396, tab 11, a demonstrative exhibit, be placed on the

11 overhead projector. I'm going to ask that the usher push the "off" switch

12 on the witness's console. And just a word of explanation: I will ask

13 Ambassador Okun to identify the most relevant diary entries. The diary

14 entries themselves will appear on the Sanction screen, and the

15 demonstrative exhibit will remain on the overhead projector.

16 Q. Ambassador, I'd ask you -- and I might add that the demonstrative

17 exhibits have been attached at the back of the witness summary that the

18 Chamber, Mr. Milosevic, and the amici have.

19 Ambassador, this first chart, does this chart indicate some of the

20 more relevant entries regarding Mr. Milosevic's relationship to

21 paramilitary organisations?

22 A. Yes, it does.

23 Q. I'd ask you to begin with the first entry and to summarise the

24 entry. The entry should appear on the screen in front of you if you want

25 to refer to it. Of course, feel free to go to the original notebooks if

Page 17064

1 you need. If it's a meeting that we have discussed already, I'd ask you

2 just to refer us back to your earlier testimony regarding that meeting.

3 A. Yes, if I may. The first meeting is dated 18 November 1991.

4 We've already discussed it here in this court. And it concerns President

5 Milosevic's assurance to Secretary Vance that in Serbia - and here I

6 paraphrase - in Serbia irregular or paramilitary troops are not allowed.

7 Q. Okay. The next item, please.

8 A. The next item is 21 November 1991, also mentioned in previous

9 testimony. The president informed Secretary Vance that we would have no

10 problem with the withdrawal of the JNA or Serbian irregulars from Croatia

11 with regard to the peacekeeping plan.

12 The next item --

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excuse me.

14 JUDGE MAY: Just one moment, please.

15 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps there's been some

17 misunderstanding, Mr. Okun. On the 21st, it says, "When Vance informed

18 [In English] Milosevic that Kadijevic was ready to withdraw the JNA from

19 Croatia, Milosevic told him," et cetera. [Interpretation] That means that

20 Vance informed me that Kadijevic was ready to withdraw the JNA. I did not

21 inform Vance. Is that right?

22 JUDGE MAY: We can clarify that in cross-examination, if you need

23 to, but since you've raised the matter now, yes, Ambassador.

24 THE WITNESS: Yes, that is correct, President. You confirmed the

25 withdrawal. You were confirming the withdrawal.

Page 17065












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Page 17066


2 Q. Please continue, Ambassador.

3 A. On the 23 November 1991, President Milosevic, again as we know

4 from previous discussion in this room, signed the Geneva Accord, which

5 bound all armed Serbian forces, including Serbian paramilitaries and

6 irregulars, and nobody from the Federal Presidency signed the document,

7 therefore indicating that President Milosevic's signature was controlling

8 for the Federal Presidency as well.

9 Shall I continue?

10 Q. Yes, please.

11 A. On the 2nd of December, 1991, when Secretary Vance asked the

12 president -- asked the president about the paramilitaries' reaction to the

13 cease-fire, President Milosevic informed him that they were observing the

14 cease-fire, having already told us that 95 per cent of the Serb

15 paramilitaries were organised and under the control of Goran Hadzic.

16 On 15 April 1992, a meeting which we have already discussed in

17 this Chamber, a meeting in which Secretary Vance strongly adverted to

18 President Milosevic about Arkan's continued activities, President

19 Milosevic stated - again I paraphrase - that only some individual

20 paramilitaries not under the control of Serbian authorities were active.

21 And that was the meeting after some discussion, Your Honours will recall,

22 that President Milosevic admitted, acknowledged to us that Arkan had been

23 in Bijeljina at the beginning of the fighting, and it was our contention

24 that he had been in other places as well.

25 On the 5th of June, 1992 --

Page 17067

1 JUDGE KWON: Is it 6th of May?


3 Q. I'm sorry, Ambassador, for this chart we use the European

4 convention of day, month, year, as opposed to the American convention.

5 A. Excuse me. On the 6th of May, 1992, President Milosevic committed

6 himself to Secretary Vance. He made the commitment that the

7 paramilitaries, by which all understood Serb paramilitaries, would be out

8 of Bosnia, that is withdrawn from Bosnia-Herzegovina within two weeks.

9 And the quote was: "All Serbs and the JNA will be out of

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina in two weeks." I think we've also discussed that here

11 previously.

12 MR. GROOME: I ask now that the witness be shown Prosecution

13 Exhibit 396, tab 12.

14 Q. Ambassador, does this chart summarise the most significant diary

15 entries relevant to Mr. Milosevic's relationship to the Yugoslav People's

16 Army?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. I'd ask you to guide us through this demonstrative exhibit now.

19 A. The first entry, dated 13 October 1991, we've already discussed.

20 This was the meeting at which General Kadijevic, the Federal Secretary of

21 Defence, told us that the JNA did not act independently, followed the

22 orders of the Rump Presidency, that its chains of command were intact, and

23 it had no rogue elements.

24 The next item, dated 6 November 1991, records the Prime Minister,

25 the Federal Prime Minister, Ante Markovic, informing us that the JNA was

Page 17068

1 becoming increasingly more Serbian.

2 JUDGE KWON: Did we deal with that phrase during the testimony?

3 THE WITNESS: Yes, we have already, Your Honour, I believe.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you.

5 THE WITNESS: The third item, dated 18 November 1991 --


7 Q. Ambassador, before you leave that comment that the JNA was

8 becoming increasingly more Serbian, did you, during the course of your

9 negotiations, learn the reasons behind or the forces that were resulting

10 in the JNA becoming more Serbianised?

11 A. Yes, we did.

12 Q. And can you explain that to the Chamber, please.

13 A. Yes, I can. There were several factors that caused the JNA to

14 become more Serbian. The first and primary factor was that officers and

15 men of the JNA, of the federal army, who came from the other republics,

16 were increasingly deserting, leaving the JNA to return to their federal

17 republics. I might cite as an example General Anton Tus, who was the

18 Commander-in-Chief of the Croatian armed forces in 1991. He had been

19 previously the commander of the air force of the JNA. And this went on by

20 the thousands when you considered the number of men as well.

21 Additionally, the call-ups, the conscription into the JNA were not

22 answered by the republics that were in secession.

23 And finally, many Serbian lads themselves chose not to answer the

24 call-up.

25 So for these three concurrent reasons, the JNA became increasingly

Page 17069

1 more Serbian and in effect a Serbian army.

2 Q. Please continue with the chart, Ambassador.

3 A. 18 November 1991, I believe we've discussed previously. This was

4 the meeting at which Secretary Vance made the initial formal proposal

5 suggesting a possible UN peacekeeping operation to President Milosevic, at

6 which meeting the president stated that the Serb side and the JNA would

7 accept and agree to the setting up of a peacekeeping operation.

8 The next item we've already discussed. In its chronological

9 place, this was the meeting that followed directly on the meeting of 18

10 November with President Milosevic. The meeting that followed it was with

11 General Kadijevic, and he accepted the plan.

12 Three days later, on 21 November, when Secretary Vance informed

13 President Milosevic that General Kadijevic was ready to withdraw the JNA-

14 and I repeat this was Secretary Vance informing the president - the

15 president responded: "Good. You'll have no problem with the JNA or the

16 Serbian irregulars."

17 The next meeting was 23 November 1991. Again this concerns the

18 signature of the unblocking and cease-fire accord in Geneva which bound

19 all Serbian armed forces, including the JNA, and bound the irregulars,

20 and this was the accord that was signed by President Tudjman and by

21 General Kadijevic and by President Milosevic and was not signed by anyone

22 from the Federal Presidency. At that time, as we've previously discussed,

23 Borisav Jovic was the federal president, and he was not even present in

24 Geneva for that meeting.

25 Q. Ambassador, before you leave that point, leading up to the signing

Page 17070

1 of the Geneva Accord, did Secretary Vance or yourself have any substantive

2 discussions or negotiations with Borisav Jovic himself regarding the terms

3 of the Geneva Accord?

4 A. I did. I believe Secretary Vance did not. But I recall, and

5 there's a diary entry, a meeting of the federal unit that was preparing to

6 receive the peacekeeping operation. President Milosevic suggested that I

7 meet with that unit to explain to them the conditions, and I did so. And

8 it was a rather large meeting in a big hall. There was 25 or 30 people

9 around a large table. And Mr. Jovic was the leader of the meeting at the

10 Yugoslav side.

11 I don't believe Secretary Vance ever dealt with or had more than a

12 handshake with Mr. Jovic.

13 Q. Please continue.

14 A. The penultimate item on that page, 2 December 1991, we've already

15 discussed, and this indicates President Milosevic's response to Secretary

16 Vance's question about Dalmatia and the fighting along the coast. The

17 president said that once the JNA garrison was unblocked, the army would

18 leave Dubrovnik alone.

19 The final item on this page, dated 6 May 1992, concerns the

20 meeting we've discussed a few moments ago, namely President Milosevic's

21 commitment to Secretary Vance that the JNA would depart from Bosnia within

22 two weeks, and it lists his statement already discussed that Bosnia and

23 Herzegovina were not within the competence of the Federal Republic of

24 Yugoslavia.

25 MR. GROOME: I ask now that the ambassador be shown Prosecution

Page 17071

1 Exhibit 396, tab 13.

2 Q. Ambassador, I'd ask you, does this demonstrative aid indicate

3 those most significant diary entries describing the relationship between

4 Mr. Milosevic and other Serb political leaders?

5 A. Yes, it does.

6 Q. I'd ask you if you could walk us through this chart.

7 A. The first item, dated 12 October 1991, I believe has not been

8 previously discussed in this court with me. It concerns the statement --

9 it describes the statement of the then Federal Foreign Minister Loncar,

10 who told us that the Serbian government was insisting on the right to

11 speak for the Serbs in Croatia. Loncar himself is a Croat.

12 The next meeting, dated 18 November 1991, we've discussed. It

13 itemises President Milosevic's statement to Secretary Vance that we would

14 not have any problem with the Krajina leadership of Milan Babic and Goran

15 Hadzic, and he added, "Believe me."

16 Item number 3 concerns the meeting of 21 November 1991, already

17 discussed here, at which President Milosevic told us once again that we

18 would not have problems with Hadzic. And when Secretary Vance asked for

19 maps and a list of places where Serbs lived, the president said he would

20 have Hadzic provide them for him.

21 The next item, in two parts, dated December 2, 1991, relates to

22 the discussion between President Milosevic, Secretary Vance, and myself,

23 in which the president stated that he had already spoken with both Milan

24 Babic and Goran Hadzic on the day after the signing of the accord of

25 Geneva. That day would have been 24 November 1991. And the president

Page 17072

1 said they would observe the cease-fire.

2 Referring to himself, President Milosevic said to Mr. Vance and to

3 me, "I promised and I did." Meaning, of course, that, "I promised you I

4 would speak with Hadzic and Babic, and I did so."

5 Later in that same meeting, and this we have already discussed,

6 President Milosevic suggested that we talk to the Bosnian Serb leaders.

7 We were given the name of Karadzic as the person who speak with. We asked

8 for a meeting, and a few hours later we met with Dr. Radovan Karadzic at a

9 house in a Belgrade residential neighbourhood.

10 The next meeting, dated 31 December 1991, the last day of the

11 year, contains a typographical error. May I inform the Court of it? The

12 date of the Implementing Accord is 2 January, not 7 January. That date

13 has already been given to the Court and is contained in the documents. It

14 is a mere typographical error.

15 In any case, as the date for the signing of the Implementing

16 Accord of 2 January drew near, we asked the president what could happen if

17 another Krajina leader like Babic might appear. The reason for that

18 question was that Babic was very recalcitrant initially in terms of

19 accepting the cease-fire, and the question was to elicit the guarantee, if

20 you will, from President Milosevic that that would not occur again, that

21 the paramilitaries and the political leaders, the political military

22 leaders in the Krajina, were under his control. And the president assured

23 us that would not happen. He assured us there would be no new Babic.

24 The penultimate item on that page, dated 4 March 1992, I believe

25 we've not discussed previously. It states that President Milosevic told

Page 17073












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Page 17074

1 Secretary Vance --

2 Q. Ambassador, since we have not discussed this, please feel free to

3 look at the entire diary entry, if you wish, and to go into a little

4 greater detail regarding what occurred during that meeting.

5 A. Thank you.

6 Q. And that's the 4th of March, 1992. And that would be in book 6,

7 page 92.

8 A. Yes. Thank you. This was a discussion of more than three hours

9 with President Milosevic. It covered many subjects, including the JNA,

10 which we discussed a moment ago. And I note on page 90 parenthetically

11 that President Milosevic told us correctly that the JNA was being reduced

12 in size. This relates back to the question I was asked previously as to

13 the changing composition of the JNA, and we discussed the departure from

14 the JNA of troops from the various republics, and President Milosevic told

15 us it was being reduced in size.

16 Most of the discussion, however, concerned the worsening situation

17 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Again, this date was the 3rd of April, 1992. The

18 fighting had been under way for about a month by this time, and it was

19 getting worse and worse, and indeed, the ethnic cleansing was getting

20 worse. And when Secretary Vance raised this problem, President Milosevic

21 agreed that it was a problem and said that he wished to discuss it

22 privately with Secretary Vance and then stated, on the top of page 92: "I

23 called Karadzic and told him to cool it." In other words, "I called

24 Radovan Karadzic and told him to slow down, cease his activities, not be

25 so warlike." I mean, "cool it" is a perfectly acceptable somewhat

Page 17075

1 informal expression.

2 Q. Please continue, Ambassador.

3 A. The final item on the page is dated 2 October 1992. We have not

4 discussed this, I believe, previously in the Chamber. It concerns the

5 possible imposition of a no-fly zone over Bosnia. This was an idea being

6 pressed principally by the United States within the Security Council based

7 on the no-fly zones that the United States and the United Kingdom had

8 established over northern and southern Iraq, the same no-fly zones that

9 still are in existence. That led the United States to think that a no-fly

10 zone over Bosnia might be helpful in reducing the level of hostilities in

11 Bosnia.

12 Q. Ambassador, this -- this meeting of October 2nd, who was the

13 meeting with? This would be in the ICFY journals, book 3. The ICFY

14 journals.

15 A. This is the meeting of the 2nd of October. That was a meeting

16 with Karadzic alone on the Bosnian Serb side, and it was with Secretary

17 Vance, Lord Owen, myself, and some other members of our team.

18 Q. And was this idea of a no-fly zone in Bosnia discussed with

19 Radovan Karadzic?

20 A. Yes, extensively.

21 Q. And what did he say regarding that?

22 A. He said that he would be in big trouble if it were implemented.

23 Q. And when he made that statement, what did you understand him to

24 mean?

25 A. Well, we understood him to mean that he would be in big trouble

Page 17076

1 with President Milosevic and the JNA and the Yugoslav army, because the

2 planes belonged to the Yugoslav army.

3 Q. Ambassador, I'm now going to ask that you be shown Prosecution

4 Exhibit 396, tab 14. And this is another chart. You said earlier in your

5 testimony that part of your duties, as you saw them, were to notify

6 political leaders about crimes that were concerning in Bosnia and Croatia.

7 Does this chart summarise the most significant diary entries memorialising

8 the times that yourself and Secretary Vance informed Mr. Milosevic about

9 crimes being committed in those two countries?

10 A. Yes, I believe it does.

11 Q. I'd ask you to take us through this chart.

12 A. On 13 October 1991, at the first meeting of our first mission, I

13 asked President Milosevic about the Bosnian Serbs. The president said,

14 and we have reported this earlier in this Chamber, that they constituted

15 30 per cent of the population but occupied 60 per cent of the land. This,

16 by the way, was a common refrain not just from the president but we heard

17 this from many other Serbian and Bosnian Serb leaders. And it was clear

18 to me from this comment and from this meeting that the president

19 appreciated the possibility of a humanitarian catastrophe in Bosnia and

20 Herzegovina, because there was already made the very clear linkage between

21 people and land, and unfortunately, it turned out to be the case.

22 The next meeting is one that we have discussed previously. This

23 is the meeting of 21 November 1991, the meeting that we held with

24 President Milosevic shortly after our visit to Vukovar. At the meeting,

25 Secretary Vance informed the president of the extremely heavy damage and

Page 17077

1 the disproportionate use of force that we had seen there, as well as of

2 the paramilitaries that we had seen intermingling and fraternising with

3 JNA troops at the reception centre for refugees that we visited, and the

4 president responded that Vukovar was a special case and that the world

5 would understand Serb and JNA actions.

6 And at this meeting, we also conveyed to President Milosevic the

7 disturbing reports that we continued to receive of the depredations of the

8 Serb irregulars and paramilitaries in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

9 Q. Ambassador, in order to help orient us regarding the timing of

10 this, this meeting takes place, am I correct in saying this, a full four

11 months before paramilitaries actually begin to commit crimes in Bosnia?

12 Is that true or not?

13 A. That's right. This meeting took place in the middle/end of

14 November of 1991. The Bosnian referendum did not take place until 29

15 February and March 1 of 1992, at which point large scale fighting broke

16 out in Bosnia. So this activity preceded even that fighting by four

17 months.

18 Q. Please continue.

19 A. On the 2nd of December, 1991, a member of our party told President

20 Milosevic about reports we continued to receive concerning the activities

21 of Serb paramilitaries in the Krajina - that was the Croatian Krajina -

22 describing them as Seselj's and Arkan's men. And this was a conversation

23 which President Milosevic apparently did not wish to discuss that because

24 he changed the subject and, as we've already reported, raised the issue of

25 Croats stealing JNA uniforms in Pakrac and then killing people and doing

Page 17078

1 mayhem.

2 At that same meeting, President Milosevic did acknowledge to us

3 that he, as he said, read newspaper accounts of the atrocities committed

4 by the Serb paramilitaries and irregular forces, and he told us that 95

5 per cent of the paramilitaries were the local areas -- excuse me, that 95

6 per cent of the paramilitaries were local people who came from the areas

7 in which they fought, that they were well organised, and that they were

8 under Goran Hadzic's control. And we took that to mean that they were

9 also under his residual control since he had already told us on numerous

10 occasions that Goran Hadzic did not disobey his instructions.

11 Q. Ambassador, the next item on the chart -- you essentially read

12 most of the relevant portions to the Chamber. Could I ask you to please

13 skip through the last item on that chart just in the interest of saving a

14 bit of time.

15 A. Yes. This was on the 6th of January 1993. I imagine it took

16 place in Geneva, but we can check it, if you wish. In any case, it was

17 January 6, 1993. And in response to Secretary Vance expressing his

18 concern about the criminal activities - and I stress here that Vance used

19 the word "criminal activities" - of Seselj and Arkan and told the

20 president that these had to be stopped. And President Milosevic assured

21 him that anyone who was a problem would end up in gaol, and that indicated

22 strongly to Secretary Vance and to me that President Milosevic knew that

23 these indeed were criminal activities. He wasn't admitting them, but he

24 said that anyone who was a problem, committing criminal activities, would

25 end up in gaol.

Page 17079

1 Q. Now, Ambassador, when Mr. Milosevic gave you that assurance, did

2 you understand that to include both Seselj and Arkan as well?

3 A. Definitely.

4 Q. Thank you, Ambassador.

5 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I have no further questions of

6 Ambassador Okun.

7 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic.

8 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

9 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Okun, you were an advisor to Cyrus Vance

10 during the period of time that I know about, sometime from October 1991

11 until May 1993; is that right?

12 A. Yes, that's correct.

13 Q. I see from this here you say you attended on the 21st of November,

14 1991, a meeting that was held with me in my office, and as it says in the

15 summary which the opposite side has provided me with, that I on that

16 occasion in my office was the sole representative of Serb interests; is

17 that right?

18 A. May I consult my book?

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Ambassador, if at any time during the

20 examination you want to look at your book, do so. It's right that if

21 you're asked about entries and that sort of thing, you should have it in

22 front of you.

23 THE WITNESS: And excuse me, this was the meeting of November 21?

24 MR. KAY: Page 97.

25 THE WITNESS: Yes. I have it in front of me.

Page 17080

1 Yes, President, at that meeting, you were accompanied by a

2 note-taker.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Is that right, then, Mr. Okun? I was the sole representative in

5 my office of Serb interests. That's what you said, I think. And this is

6 in point 3, contained in point 3, the 21st of November, you say, "I

7 attended a meeting with Slobodan Milosevic in his office at which he was

8 the only representative of Serb interests."

9 A. You were the only person in the room except for the note-taker, so

10 I can't imagine that that's incorrect.

11 Q. Well, that's precisely why I'm asking you this, because I did not

12 understand your observation. Who else did you expect to see in my office

13 except for me? Mr. Vance and you asked to see me, and I said of course,

14 you're welcome, and you came to see me. You wanted to see me. That's

15 what you had requested. So who else did you expect to see in my office

16 except for myself?

17 A. Well, Mr. President, you're quite right. The use of the summary

18 phrase "sole interests," I think was designed simply to say that you were

19 in fact alone and not accompanied by Foreign Minister Jovanovic or

20 somebody else who might conceivably have been there. But it goes without

21 saying that we came to see you, and you and Secretary Vance were the

22 principal interlocutors at the meeting. But there was no negative

23 imputation in the phrase "sole representative of Serb interests."

24 Q. Very well. I'm happy to hear that and to have cleared that point

25 up.

Page 17081

1 Now, together with Cyrus Vance, you yourself, and sometimes Cyrus

2 Vance without you, would very often come to see me. Can we put it that

3 way, looking at that whole period?

4 A. We saw you frequently; that's correct. It is also correct that

5 you and Secretary Vance would frequently have a tete-a-tete before the

6 meeting or after the meeting. Sometimes he requested it; sometimes you

7 would request it. This is a perfectly normal procedure.

8 I don't recall any time that Secretary Vance went to see you alone

9 from beginning to end.

10 Q. Well, there were instances. You remember when the Federal

11 Republic of Yugoslavia was constituted, for example, at the end of April

12 1992. Is that right?

13 A. I would have to consult the diaries. I don't recall it. I do

14 recall the times that I saw you alone.

15 Q. There were occasions, because when the organs of the Federal

16 Republic of Yugoslavia were set up, then Cyrus Vance and Owen quite

17 logically continued to communicate with them. There was no need for them

18 to communicate with me. However, Cyrus Vance, although he attended those

19 meetings, would come to pay me courtesy visits, to see me, because

20 throughout that time we had had very good and might I even say friendly

21 relations.

22 A. I recall, Mr. President, the time we came to Belgrade with the

23 International Commission of Missing Persons, of which I was the special

24 advisor and Mr. Vance was the chairman and other members of that

25 commission were the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the president

Page 17082












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Page 17083

1 to the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other people of that

2 distinguished nature, and I do recall your kind invitation to have

3 breakfast alone with Secretary Vance in Belgrade during a visit of the

4 International Commission of Missing Persons. You may recall it as well.

5 But also I recall Mr. Vance discussing that with the other members of the

6 commission, and he felt and they felt that it would not be appropriate for

7 him to have breakfast with you alone, to accept your invitation, since he

8 was there at the head of a delegation that was a unified delegation.

9 So that is an example of his attitude. But certainly there was no

10 -- there was nothing negative in the invitation or in the rejection of the

11 invitation. The fact that you saw each other alone from time to time

12 during the period 1991 to 1993 was something that he and I regarded as

13 completely normal. But it did not occur very frequently, Mr. Milosevic.

14 Q. All right. Fine. I'll have to save time so I shall endeavour to

15 ask you short questions, Mr. Okun, because my time is limited here. I

16 have time restrictions. So please bear that in mind.

17 But as I say, I mentioned this meeting where you say I was the

18 sole representative. You've explained that to us. However, before, you

19 attended meetings in my office, for example, on the 13th of October, 1991,

20 did you not?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And on that occasion, did I tell you in no uncertain terms that a

23 peaceful solution was the only solution?

24 A. You made statements like that, Mr. President, on several

25 occasions. I would say perhaps on numerous occasions.

Page 17084

1 Q. And did I clearly state and let you know, because you had come to

2 me to speak about the current political situation in Yugoslavia, about my

3 position, how I saw things, et cetera, so did I clearly state to you that

4 Croatia and Slovenia had opted for secessionism and that that was the

5 problem that was the pivotal point and main problem in the territory of

6 the SFRY, and I told you that quite clearly at that particular meeting;

7 right?

8 A. Yes. That was always your position, that they had seceded from

9 the SFRY. Their position, of course, was that they had opted for

10 independence.

11 Q. We considered it secession, and I don't suppose that was in

12 dispute. But did I make it clear to you at the time that, unfortunately,

13 in Croatia, there were signs of Nazism being revived, fascism?

14 A. You made a number of points at that meeting, Mr. Milosevic, and at

15 other meetings, and certainly one of the points that you emphasised was

16 the resurgent -- resurgence of Nazism in Croatia. In order not to take up

17 too much of your time, I won't seek out the diary entries, but I do recall

18 quite clearly that at that meeting you also told us that the Serb people

19 in Croatia lived in highly compact areas, and this was another issue. So

20 there were many issued raised, points that you made.

21 Q. Compact areas. Yes. And did I indicate to you at the time as

22 well that any violent change of borders, frontiers, was illegal and

23 counter to the law?

24 A. Yes, that was your contention. You stated that the administrative

25 borders -- excuse me. You stated that the republic borders of the SFRY

Page 17085

1 were merely administrative borders and were not to be considered anything

2 but administrative borders and that, therefore in your view, the

3 secession, as you called it, or the independence, as the other republic

4 presidents called it, was illegal.

5 The view of the European Union, if I may add just briefly, as

6 expressed by the arbitration tribunal headed by Judge Badinter, was that

7 Yugoslavia was in a state of dissolution and that therefore it was not

8 merely a question of secession, and it was not a question of

9 administrative borders but that in fact the SFRY was in the process of

10 dissolving.

11 I mention that to indicate that there were very strongly held,

12 indeed powerfully held, legal arguments on the other side. But, yes, you

13 took the view that the borders of the republics were merely administrative

14 borders.

15 Q. Well, that was something you knew about, I hope, because as a

16 young analyst, you had in view the constitution of the SFRY and everything

17 that emanates from it and was established in the state. Isn't that right?

18 From the aspects of the constitution, this was illegal, unlawful, was it

19 not, sir?

20 A. I would not agree. I would respectfully disagree with that

21 contention, because the situation had changed. Over the years, Yugoslavia

22 had had several constitutions as you know better than I, Mr. Milosevic.

23 The operative constitution that the SFRY was working under in these years

24 of 1990, 1991, was the constitution of 1974, which contained provisions

25 for the individual republics to depart from the Yugoslav federation.

Page 17086

1 It was, however, a contentious point. No question of that.

2 Q. I shall be very grateful to you, Mr. Okun, if tomorrow you would

3 be able to show me where this is stated in the constitution. But let's

4 continue with the meeting of the 21st. On that occasion, did I tell you

5 that --

6 JUDGE MAY: I think we've got to bring this to a close. It's now

7 quarter to, and we've got another case this afternoon.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we just hear an answer to that

9 question, Mr. May.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. What I asked him was did I tell him at the time that Serbia, at

12 that first meeting I'm talking about, that Serbia had no territorial

13 pretensions whatsoever?

14 A. Yes. I recall your saying that they had no claims. "Pretensions"

15 was the word you used. I would like just to check that note, if I may.

16 Q. I'll read it out for you. I happen to have it here in front of

17 me, and you can check it out in your notes. It says 10.15 - 11.55 meeting

18 with president from Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, Serbian Deputy Prime

19 Minister as well. [In English] "Peaceful just solution to Yugo problem."

20 [Interpretation] You are, of course, writing this in telegraphic form,

21 just briefly. [In English] "Secession labels Croats fascism."

22 [Interpretation] Not Croats but fascists in Croatia turning into national

23 boundaries into state borders is illegal, and then Serbia has no

24 territorial claims, within brackets, "pretensions," because you're quoting

25 me so you put the word "pretensions" that I used in brackets. So it has

Page 17087

1 no territorial pretensions. That's what I said and that's what you

2 recorded. I'm quoting from your own notes, diary. With all the points --

3 I informed you of all those points at that first meeting.

4 A. That is correct. They are in the diary.

5 JUDGE MAY: Thank you very much. We will adjourn now. Nine

6 o'clock, please, tomorrow morning.

7 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,

8 to be reconvened on Friday, the 28th day of

9 February, 2003, at 9.00 a.m.