Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 25362

1 Wednesday, 27 August 2003

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.


8 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

9 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Doyle, let's just continue with the meeting

10 we were discussing, the one that was held in my office, since Mr. May

11 adjourned the session. Towards the very end, what you wrote here is the

12 following, and I'll read it out.

13 JUDGE MAY: Wait a moment. Let's just make sure we've all got the

14 tab. It's tab 12. The witness should have it.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I had assumed that he had it,

16 because that's where we broke off.

17 JUDGE MAY: Let's make sure that he has it.

18 Colm Doyle, have you got it?

19 THE WITNESS: Yes, I have, Your Honour.

20 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. [In English] "There was no alternative to the EC peace conference

23 for working out a solution to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was

24 impossible for anyone to emerge as a winner from war in the republic and

25 there were no innocent parties. Bosnia-Herzegovina was a state of three

Page 25363

1 equal peoples and" -- [Interpretation] Three equitable peoples. "[In

2 English] Any argument based -- any agreement" -- [Interpretation] I assume

3 that this is supposed to be "agreement" rather than "argument."

4 JUDGE MAY: [Microphone not activated] The third paragraph,

5 penultimate paragraph.

6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Presiding Judge, please.


8 Q. "Because the international community had been ill-advised to

9 recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina when it did, but Belgrade was doing

10 politically everything it could to bring about peace. It was obvious in

11 its interest to do so. Whereas, for the Muslim Izetbegovic was refusing

12 to negotiate and seemed inclined to continue the civil war. Belgrade

13 would take any concrete steps required of it to promote a settlement."

14 [Interpretation] Further on there is what you added in hand, but

15 even a person from elementary school in Yugoslavia would not say a thing

16 like that, that Sarajevo is a Muslim town. Everybody knew that Sarajevo

17 was a multi-ethnic town, Mr. Doyle. But I mentioned here that Izetbegovic

18 rejected negotiations and wanted to continue the war. What I'm asking you

19 now is -- I have this in front of me. Let me just take a look. Let's

20 just be quite clear on this, Mr. May. I am not exhibiting this statement.

21 I'm asking Mr. Doyle, because he is mentioned here, is this right.

22 In the statement made by General MacKenzie, which was provided

23 here - I have the page in front of me, ERN 0011 --

24 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not catch the exact number.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 25364

1 Q. It says - do you recall this? - "The 23rd of April, Philip

2 Morillon and I met with Lord Carrington and the special envoy of the

3 European Community, Colm Doyle. We said to them that we thought that the

4 Bosnian Presidency decided to compel the international community to act

5 militarily and that therefore they were not prepared to observe the

6 cease-fire. President Izetbegovic presented the position that Bosnia was

7 an internationally recognised country and that the world should save it

8 from its Serb enemies."

9 Do you recall that, Mr. Doyle?

10 A. No, I do not recall that at all. I recall the comments that you

11 passed in relation to the meeting I had with you in your office. Anything

12 outside of that, I don't have any detailed knowledge of.

13 Q. So MacKenzie says that he met up with you and with Carrington and

14 that he and Morillon said to you that the Muslim side actually does not

15 want to have a cease-fire effected.

16 JUDGE MAY: You read that and the witness doesn't remember it, so

17 there's no point reading it again.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. I just wish to point out that what they said to them then

21 coincides with the assessment I made in the talks, that the Muslims did

22 not really want a cease-fire and that they kept imposing a continuation of

23 the civil war, whereas the Serb leadership in Pale showed that they did

24 want a cease-fire and that they did want a political solution. I assume

25 that you were aware of that, Mr. Doyle.

Page 25365

1 A. All I feel I can say here is that I'm attempting to accurately

2 reflect the comments that were passed to you -- to me by you when we had a

3 meeting in your office, Mr. Milosevic. And that's all I can say. Whether

4 they were put into practice is quite another matter, but my function in

5 that meeting on the instructions I got from London was that I should go

6 and meet you in your office because it was at your request, I should

7 listen to what you wanted to say because we assumed that you'd want to say

8 to me and what you wanted the European -- or the peace conference to hear.

9 And I tried to do that in a professional manner as I could.

10 Q. All right. Yesterday, you gave evidence about these events that

11 related to the keeping of Izetbegovic after he returned from Lisbon. I

12 would like you to confirm or deny what General MacKenzie says about this

13 on the same page that I quoted to you a minute ago, because he was also a

14 participant in these events. I assume that you remember that. Is that

15 right, Mr. Doyle?

16 A. I assume, Mr. Milosevic, you're referring to the day the president

17 was returning from talks in Lisbon?

18 Q. Yes. This is what General MacKenzie says and you tell me whether

19 he presented things accurately or not. It is my impression that your

20 approach is somewhat different. "On the 3rd of May, in the morning,

21 Ejub Ganic, vice-president, came to my office and met with me and

22 Colm Doyle." So Ganic met with you and MacKenzie. "Ganic explained that

23 President Izetbegovic had been kidnapped at Sarajevo airport upon

24 returning from Lisbon and that the JNA was keeping him in custody in the

25 Lukavica Barracks, Lukavica. Ganic said that he was not a strong leader

Page 25366

1 and that he needed his president so that he would keep the radical leaders

2 of the Bosnian Territorial Defence under his control."

3 JUDGE MAY: Pause there. Just pause there and let the witness

4 comment, if he can, upon what has been put to him.

5 THE WITNESS: Yes. I agree that on the 3rd of May I was with

6 General MacKenzie as we attempted to negotiate, and a hostage release of

7 President Izetbegovic and the exchange with General Kukanjac and that was

8 negotiated in the office of General MacKenzie, in the presence of Deputy

9 President Ejub Ganic and General Aksentijevic.

10 Q. So Ganic said that he was not a strong leader and that he needed

11 his president in order to keep under his control the radical leaders of

12 the Bosnian Territorial Defence who were getting out of control rapidly.

13 Do you remember that? And General MacKenzie moves on to say the TO

14 forces --

15 JUDGE MAY: Wait a moment. Let the witness answer the question.

16 THE WITNESS: My recollection of that comment by Mr. Ganic was

17 that by virtue of the fact that he was only one single member of the

18 Presidency, he could not make any agreement in relation to the hostage

19 release unless it was sanctioned by the president himself. The reference

20 to the radical Muslims, I am not aware of. He may have said it, but I'm

21 not aware of it.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. So you do not recall that, what General MacKenzie says. Do you

24 remember the rest what he says? "I went with Colm Doyle," that is to say,

25 with you, "to the Lukavica Barracks and that's where I found the president

Page 25367












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Page 25368

1 with his daughter and bodyguards." At the moment when I arrived,

2 President Izetbegovic was talking on the telephone with General Kukanjac.

3 He told me that General Kukanjac agreed to have an exchange of the two of

4 us. "Will you organise this for us?" Do you remember that?

5 A. The portion that I remember is that I accompanied

6 General MacKenzie when both of us in an armoured car went to Lukavica

7 Barracks. When we arrived inside the barracks, General MacKenzie himself

8 went in to meet the president. I remained on the outside for

9 approximately two hours, after which time General MacKenzie asked me to

10 enter and meet the president and attempt to persuade him to carry out the

11 exchange as we had originally agreed upon. But I was not in the office

12 when General MacKenzie met the president on that morning. I was outside

13 and there is television footage to that extent available.

14 Q. All right, Mr. Doyle. Is it well known that the Territorial

15 Defence forces, that is to say, the Muslim forces, held under siege the

16 headquarters of General Kukanjac in the eastern part of town? Isn't that

17 right?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. General MacKenzie says that later an evacuation was agreed, the

20 evacuation of General Kukanjac and his entire staff, numbering 400

21 persons, as an exchange for releasing the president. It was agreed that

22 Colm Doyle would remain in Lukavica with the bodyguards and that I bring

23 the president and his daughter and that we arrange the exchange in that

24 way. Is that the way it was?

25 A. Yes, I agree with that.

Page 25369

1 Q. And now, the events that I imagine you are aware of. You had the

2 opportunity of knowing about all of this. "General MacKenzie said that we

3 set out for Sarajevo on a convoy. When we reached a hill from which

4 Sarajevo can be seen on the southern side, we could see that the town was

5 indeed a site of heavy fighting. As we were getting closer to the centre

6 of town, we came across numerous destroyed tanks and personnel carriers,

7 armoured personnel carriers. We saw the corpses of people. I never saw

8 such a picturesque condemnation of the folly of war. After we arrived in

9 the headquarters of General Kukanjac, the preparations for evacuation were

10 made official. When the set time came up, all of a sudden I received

11 information that Ganic had called our headquarters to say that the

12 agreement was called off. The president confirmed that we should go on

13 and we set out with the president and his daughter in one of our own APCs.

14 Soon after our departure, our convoy was ambushed by the Territorial

15 Defence during a brief skirmish, seven or eight JNA officers

16 were killed in cold blood. The Territorial Defence --"

17 JUDGE MAY: The witness cannot begin to comment upon all this

18 unless he's given a chance to do so.

19 Colonel, can you assist us with what the accused has been reading

20 out?

21 THE WITNESS: Yes, I can, Your Honour. I would like to say here

22 that as Mr. Milosevic has himself said, that when the decision was made to

23 move the president, I remained in Lukavica. I was not a voluntary person

24 who remained. I was held to a certain extent as collateral against

25 anything happening. This came about because when we had negotiated the

Page 25370

1 release of the president and we went to move the president, the senior

2 military officer in Lukavica turned around to me and said, "You have only

3 negotiated the release of the president. That does not include his

4 daughter or his security people." I strenuously objected to this and a

5 compromise was reached whereby I agreed that I would stay in Lukavica. So

6 all of the events that took place subsequent to that in relation to the

7 convoy, I was not a witness to. I saw coverage on television. I know

8 that some of the reports coming back to Lukavica were extraordinarily

9 exaggerated by JNA officers because I was taken out and a pistol was put

10 to my head by the senior military officer. I fortunately was in

11 communication with a member of the European Community Monitoring Mission

12 through a held -- a hand-held phone which I have, and he told me that

13 there were wild exaggerations as to what was happening. However, I do

14 agree with Mr. Milosevic when he said that there was an ambush on the

15 convoy, that some JNA officers were shot, and that some members of the JNA

16 were taken captive. My function at the end of this was attempt to ensure

17 that the agreement was carried out by doing everything I could to ensure

18 that those soldiers were subsequently released, which occurred. But I am

19 not in the position here to give a definitive definition on exactly what

20 happened on that convoy, because I at that stage was being held at

21 Lukavica Barracks.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. All right. You say that you heard that some officers had been

24 arrested, MacKenzie say that is six or seven officers of the JNA were

25 killed in cold blood, and about 200 soldiers were taken captive that's

Page 25371

1 what MacKenzie says. That is what MacKenzie wrote. That is a well-known

2 thing. I imagine that you had to have been aware of this?

3 A. I've just said that I agree with that, that there were JNA

4 officers killed and there was an ambush and soldiers were taken captive.

5 So we are not in dispute on this point.

6 Q. All right. Is this correct, what General MacKenzie says: "On the

7 5th of May --" he is talking about Marrack Goulding's arrival, the

8 deputy -- secretary-general for special political affairs about his

9 arrival in Pale?

10 A. And he says, "The European Community refused to include the

11 Bosnian Serbs in their cease-fire negotiations. For them perhaps it had a

12 diplomatic purpose, but it seemed ridiculous for the ordinary soldier not

13 to have one of the main parties to the conflict included in the cease-fire

14 negotiations. My question, Mr. Doyle, is: Why did you exclude the

15 Bosnian Serbs from the cease-fire negotiations? Why did you have such a

16 discriminatory attitude towards them, in view of everything that was going

17 on?

18 A. The agreement was -- that was to be negotiated was that when the

19 president was released and General Kukanjac had the cordon lifted from

20 around the barracks, that the president and the general would be brought

21 to the PTT building, which was now the headquarters of the United Nations

22 in Sarajevo, and there I would chair negotiations for a continued

23 cease-fire. After the events of the convoy, this changed, so I arranged a

24 meeting of all parties in the UN headquarters in order to negotiate a

25 cease-fire. The Serb delegation did not come to the PTT building because

Page 25372

1 they said they would not be safe, so I continued with the negotiations

2 with all the parties that were available to travel and they included

3 Mr. Abdic, Stjepan Kljujic, General Aksentijevic, the monitor mission and

4 members of the United Nations. And there was no occasion at that time in

5 Sarajevo that the Serb leadership would come to the PTT building.

6 Q. I'm not talking about the technical aspect of this, Mr. Doyle. I

7 am talking about General MacKenzie's assertion that the European Community

8 refused to include the Bosnian Serbs in their cease-fire negotiations.

9 JUDGE MAY: Let that be -- let that be put to the witness so he

10 can answer it. What is put by the accused is that the European Community

11 refused to include the Bosnian Serbs in the cease-fire negotiations. Now,

12 I think you've explained how that came about, but since that's put, that

13 the Community refused to include the Bosnian Serbs, is that right or not,

14 Colonel?

15 THE WITNESS: Well, Your Honour, it is not correct.

16 May I just add here that I was a representative of the peace

17 conference, not the European Community. But there was no blank refusal by

18 anybody to attend. We were informed that the Bosnian Serbs could not come

19 because they were worried about their safety and their security. At this

20 stage, Sarajevo was a dangerous place.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, just a small correction, in

22 view of what you said just now. It's not that I am claiming that. I

23 quoted General MacKenzie. And it says here verbatim that the European

24 Community refused to include --

25 JUDGE MAY: We have -- we have the point. But what he says in his

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Page 25374

1 statement, as you know, isn't evidence, and you're putting it to the

2 witness. But let's move on.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Sir, you are saying that what Mr. General MacKenzie said here is

5 not correct. Did I understand you?

6 JUDGE MAY: That's a comment.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Do you know anything about this, Mr. Doyle? General MacKenzie

9 speaks about the 6th of May. "I spent the day with Mr. Goulding. All

10 that morning I reported to him, and in the afternoon we went on a tour of

11 the city with President Izetbegovic. We were exposed to moderate fire.

12 In the midst of all the Muslim town. There were strong indications that

13 it was only a show staged for representatives of the media who were among

14 our entourage in order to present Serbs in a bad light. Fire came from

15 infantry weapons from the distance of 75 metres away from us within

16 territory under Bosnian control. At the end of the activities of the day,

17 Goulding held a press conference. We were feeling that it was very

18 important to condemn the Territorial Defence's attack on the JNA convoy."

19 Do you remember this and this whole show staged in order to

20 condemn the Serbs that was made in the Muslim part of town? And as

21 General MacKenzie says, that it was all organised for the benefit of the

22 representatives of the media? And do you know anything at all about this

23 practice of stage management by the Muslim forces for the benefit of the

24 media and of the European Community?

25 A. My diary reflects that I was all day on the 6th of May, the 7th of

Page 25375

1 May, and the 8th of May, based in the PTT building attempting to negotiate

2 the withdrawal of the federal army from all of Yugoslavia. What was

3 happening in the city, I had no knowledge of.

4 Q. Very well. So in certain matters you limit your evidence only to

5 what you saw with your own eyes, and in other matters you explain the

6 entire situation, whereas you served as chief of the monitoring mission in

7 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

8 JUDGE MAY: That's not a proper question. I don't understand the

9 basis of this criticism. What do you mean? What are you referring to?

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am referring to the fact that it

11 is logical to expect of the chief of the monitoring mission to have

12 information, because the monitoring mission covered the entire Bosnia and

13 Herzegovina.

14 JUDGE MAY: Let us ask the witness about that.

15 Although you were in the PTT building that day, Colonel, did you

16 have any information as to what was happening outside, particularly

17 the -- this alleged attack which the witness -- the accused is referring

18 to?

19 THE WITNESS: Just a correction here to Mr. Milosevic. At that

20 time, I was not the head of the European Community Monitoring Mission. I

21 was working on my own as the personal representative to Lord Carrington.

22 But I do know that on that day in question I was aware of the fact that

23 General MacKenzie was accompanying the president downtown Sarajevo. Apart

24 from that, I'm not aware of what was happening.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 25376

1 Q. If you say so, Mr. Doyle.

2 Is this true? "After several days, that is, on the 11th of May,"

3 says the statement of General MacKenzie, the 11th of May, page 0112194,

4 "the European Community has been conducting marathon negotiations for

5 several days trying to exclude Bosnian Serbs from the castle, and

6 therefore they became less and less popular among them. In the meantime,

7 Bosnian Serbs, led by Dr. Radovan Karadzic, were becoming more and more

8 independent of the JNA. There were even reports about Bosnian Serb

9 attacks on JNA units who were trying to turn over their weapons,

10 ammunition, and equipment in exchange for a safe exit from Bosnia." Do

11 you know anything about that, about this claim of General MacKenzie?

12 A. I have no knowledge of that claim by General MacKenzie, and I

13 certainly was not aware of the comment that you've passed, that we were

14 trying to exclude the Bosnian Serbs, because that in my view is totally

15 incorrect.

16 Q. Very well. He says that you continued to exclude them from

17 negotiations, and in the next passage he says, "In the afternoon, we were

18 visited by the representative of the European Community, Colm Doyle, who

19 came together with Mr. Santos. Colm informed us that Bosnian Serbs were a

20 threat to the lives of his colleagues and their negotiations were leading

21 nowhere." Therefore, General MacKenzie also says that you were excluding

22 Serbs from negotiations and that you told them that negotiating with

23 Bosnian Serbs was leading nowhere and that they were a threat to human

24 lives. Is that correct, Mr. Doyle, or not?

25 A. I -- I have no knowledge whatsoever of that statement.

Page 25377

1 Q. I have to skip a number of questions.

2 Mr. -- In fact, MacKenzie speaks about the blockade of Marsal Tito

3 Barracks in the centre of Sarajevo and says, "Forces of the Bosnian TO

4 held under blockade this barracks for months. Every time a sniper killed

5 somebody inside the barracks, Serbs would respond with artillery fire from

6 the base in Lukavica. Thus they were responding to the killings executed

7 by Muslim forces holding the barracks under siege; is that correct?

8 A. This is the first time I've heard any reference to the fact that

9 the -- this barracks was under siege for months. That's an impossibility.

10 I had been in that barracks some weeks before the siege took place, so

11 certainly the question of it being besieged by months, my recollection is

12 that the barracks was possibly besieged -- and when I say "besieged," I

13 mean surrounded, where nobody could leave or nobody enter. It was my

14 understanding that that took place for approximately two days.

15 Generally, whatever else General MacKenzie says may be his

16 opinion. I'm not in a position to verify, because he was working with the

17 United Nations and I was working with the peace conference. So I have

18 really no comment on what General MacKenzie may have said, because I'm not

19 in a position to verify his comments or otherwise.

20 Q. So you have no idea that they were reacting to killings executed

21 by snipers, by forces who were surrounding the barracks. This is what

22 General MacKenzie talks about. And you know nothing about it?

23 A. All I can say at this stage is that I was very well aware that

24 there was conflict occurring in the city of Sarajevo, which takes all

25 sorts of sides to be involved. The exact details of individual incidents,

Page 25378

1 I'm not able to comment upon. But as a military person, I am aware that

2 in a situation of conflict, all sides take part.

3 Q. How about this claim of General MacKenzie: "Serbs were

4 outnumbered" - that's what General MacKenzie says - "by the less

5 well-trained forces, infantry forces of the Territorial Defence, Muslim

6 forces. However, they were anxious that they would be overrun by Muslim

7 forces and chose to fight them from a distance." Is that correct?

8 A. I have no knowledge of it and I have no remark to make on it.

9 Q. I will not ask you anything about the meeting between Nambiar and

10 MacKenzie, because I see that you did not attend.

11 MacKenzie says that "TO forces, just as the Serbs, represented an

12 obstacle to the attainment of this goal of stopping the bloodshed." Was

13 this also an impression that you shared?

14 A. I think I was sufficiently long enough in the city and having

15 worked there to know that that could be said for any side, as long as

16 conflict was going on, as long as people were being killed, the

17 objective -- or my objective, as the representative of the peace

18 conference, was to try and negotiate cease-fires so that the killing would

19 stop. Who did what, who attained what, I really don't have much comment

20 upon.

21 Q. All right. You have no comment on this.

22 Is MacKenzie correct on this? "There was no doubt that it was a

23 general exchange of fire." Was that an impression that you shared?

24 A. I don't understand that question. I don't understand, "there is

25 no doubt that it was a general exchange of fire." Could you elaborate on

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Page 25380

1 that, please.

2 Q. Well, General MacKenzie says that "The 40-hour cease-fire broke

3 down on the 17th of June," and then he speaks about the monitoring, about

4 John Wilson, the monitors who were on the roof of their building in order

5 to verify who is shooting, where from, et cetera.

6 "Both sides seldom admitted that their troops executed any action,

7 and in rare occasions when they did admit, they said they were provoked.

8 Artillery had caused large fires in the old part of the town. Every

9 couple of seconds I could hear explosions. So there was no doubt that it

10 was an all-out exchange of fire." Here I've read to you an entire passage

11 from General MacKenzie's statement. Was there any doubt in the sense that

12 maybe Serbs had attacked the Muslims, as you claim, or was this really, as

13 it says here, a conflict provoked by the Muslims, as we established,

14 beginning with the murder in the centre of Sarajevo, followed by a series

15 of --

16 JUDGE MAY: Stop. We've established nothing. No doubt we'll be

17 able to determine the evidence in due course. But you can't make that

18 sort of generalisation. Now, what's the next question?

19 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, if I may just mention here that when

20 Mr. Milosevic refers to the 17th of June and that the monitors were in the

21 building, the entire team of the -- of the European Community Monitor

22 Mission were withdrawn from Sarajevo on the 12th of June and redeployed to

23 Split in Croatia. I was evacuated from the city of Sarajevo on the 12th

24 of June to Belgrade and then within 24 hours I was in London. So when you

25 refer to the 17th of June, I was not in the country, nor were any of the

Page 25381

1 monitors. They could have been United Nations military observers and the

2 question of the United Nations was not within my remit.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Very well. But we have gone through in great detail this event

5 that happened in the night between the 2nd and 3rd of May, the attack on

6 the column, the gunfire, the exchange of Izetbegovic with the help of

7 Kukanjac and his staff. Is this statement by General Nambiar, the force

8 commander then, correct? That is, 00966038, page number. General Nambiar

9 says, "The shelling began mainly after the events of the 3rd of May, 1992.

10 Before the 3rd of May, there was no shelling of Sarajevo because at that

11 time JNA was still there. There were shootings aimed at soldiers in the

12 city. This was the general background against which the events took

13 place."

14 Can we see from this, Mr. Doyle, what it was that caused the

15 escalation of the conflict, this event, the attack on the column, the

16 killing of people, the taking of 200 soldiers prisoner, and all the rest

17 that was done by the extremist forces on the Muslim side?

18 General Nambiar says it all happened after the 3rd of May.

19 JUDGE MAY: Do you have a question?

20 Yes, Colonel, if you'd like to, if you can, respond to what the

21 general said in his statement.

22 THE WITNESS: I don't have any comment on what the general said,

23 because I'm not party to it. But what I can say from my own experience,

24 having been there, is that the -- there was an escalation in the conflict

25 after the 3rd of May, because that was the date that the president was

Page 25382

1 released. But it was also the date that the commander of the JNA was

2 released, General Kukanjac. And when he returned to Lukavica, he

3 intimated that he would deal with Sarajevo as he felt he would. And we

4 were very well aware that he was now in a position of taking some action

5 against the city, because he had been held captive in his own

6 headquarters, which was very embarrassing for him. So where I agree that

7 the conflict seemed to intensify after that incident, I am not in a

8 position to indicate who was responsible for it being so intensified.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Mr. Doyle, who was it that attacked the army column and killed all

11 these officers in cold blood, as General MacKenzie says, causing great

12 bloodshed? Who captured 200 --

13 JUDGE MAY: What the witness has said is that he is not in a

14 position to say how it was or who caused the intensification of the

15 conflict. Now, that's what he says. And if he's not in a position to

16 comment on it, there's no point asking him more questions about it.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. General Nambiar goes on to say, "This entire incident involving

19 the ambush of the JNA column on the 3rd of May, 1992 was observed by my

20 own soldiers. What the soldiers, the troops of General Nambiar, the force

21 commander of the UN witnessed is verifiable and true, or do you dispute

22 that as well?

23 JUDGE MAY: You can call General Nambiar in due course. No point

24 asking this witness about what General Nambiar says he saw --

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not asking him what

Page 25383

1 General Nambiar said, but instead, quoting General Nambiar's words and I'm

2 asking him whether that coincides with his information, his knowledge,

3 because both he, General Nambiar, and General MacKenzie were there, unlike

4 me, and I'm only looking at their statements --

5 JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues] ... as you frequently

6 do, you're arguing with the witness, trying to get him to say something

7 which he cannot say. He cannot go beyond the evidence which he's given.

8 There's very little point arguing him -- arguing with him for your own

9 point of view. Now, I'd remind you that your time is limited. You've got

10 about 20 minutes left. If you've got any other topics you want to ask him

11 about, you better do so.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Certainly, Mr. May.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. I just want to get one thing clear, Mr. Doyle: What General

15 Nambiar says concerning the detention of Izetbegovic is a bit different

16 from what you've said. And I would like your comment on it. He says,

17 "When on the 2nd of May, 1992 he returned --" meaning Izetbegovic

18 returned, "he did not inform either us or anybody else about his arrival.

19 When he arrived, the Serbs took him away and notified Colm Doyle, the

20 European Community negotiator, that Izetbegovic was their guest." Was

21 that the way it was?

22 A. The arrangement that was put in place for President Izetbegovic

23 was that when I was informed by the Presidency that he was due to come

24 back to the city, I would request an escort from the United Nations. On

25 the morning in question, there was heavy fighting in the city and I was

Page 25384

1 very busy, and in the middle of this I received a phone call which

2 allegedly came from the Presidency to inform me that because of the

3 intensification of the fighting in the city, President Izetbegovic would

4 not be returning to Sarajevo on that day. I found out subsequently that

5 the phone call did not come from the Presidency but came from some other

6 source who obviously wished me to ensure that there would be no UN escort

7 for the president, because when I received the first phone call, I

8 requested the United Nations to stand down the escort because there would

9 be no need, as the president was not returning. I was incorrect in this.

10 The president did return and was taken into custody at the airport,

11 subsequently to be taken to Lukavica Barracks. I can only surmise that it

12 was not from the Presidency I received the phone call that he would not be

13 returning.

14 Q. General Nambiar says that he did not inform anyone that he was

15 returning. That is a bit different from what you describe.

16 A. I can't comment on what General Nambiar says. I can only let you

17 know what did happen, as far as I was concerned.

18 Q. Very well, Mr. Doyle. Generally speaking, concerning the role of

19 the European Community, whose representative you were, and bearing in mind

20 that you were part of that mission which was officially called the

21 European Community Monitoring Mission in Yugoslavia - that was its name -

22 do you know that the European parliament, that is an organ of the European

23 Community, adopted on the 9th of July, 1991 a resolution on Yugoslavia not

24 lending its support to the unilateral secessionist acts of Slovenia and

25 Croatia?

Page 25385












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Page 25386

1 A. My interest at that stage in July 1991 was as an officer of the

2 Irish defence forces. I was not involved in anything with the European

3 Community, and therefore, I have no knowledge of what you're referring to.

4 Q. All right, Mr. Doyle. But since you did serve on the monitoring

5 mission in Yugoslavia, that was the name of the mission, and you were a

6 representative of the European Community, you must have been briefed on

7 the positions and stances of the European Community. Somebody must have

8 briefed you regarding the European Community's position vis-a-vis the

9 country they were sending you to. Or you were not briefed on anything at

10 all?

11 A. I received a standard operational briefing at my own headquarters

12 on the immediate concerns that existed within the former Yugoslavia. It

13 did not have any regard to the area that you refer to.

14 Q. So nobody told you anything about the stance of the European

15 parliament adopted regarding the crisis in Yugoslavia. Were you perhaps

16 familiar then, if you knew nothing about the stance of the European

17 parliament, that the ministerial council and -- of the European Community

18 supported the integrity of Yugoslavia and the European Community

19 emphasised that a unified and democratic Yugoslavia had the best chances

20 of harmoniously integrating with the new Europe? Do you know anything at

21 least about the declaration of the European Community on Yugoslavia? You

22 must have been as a representative of the European Community about to

23 leave for that country.

24 A. I was generally aware that at that time it was put out that

25 Yugoslavia might better be served if it continued to be a federation of --

Page 25387

1 of the various republics. The exact details, I would not have been aware

2 of. But I had a general understanding of what the situation was, but no

3 great detail.

4 Q. Are you aware that even the council of ministers of OSCE at the

5 meeting in Berlin in its declaration where it also expressed its support

6 to the unity and the territorial integrity on Yugoslavia, that was in June

7 1991?

8 A. No, I am not aware of that.

9 Q. Are you aware that even the state secretary of the US, James

10 Baker, at the end of his visit to Yugoslavia in end June 1991 said that

11 the USA supports democratic and unified Yugoslavia, and solutions for its

12 future should be sought through agreement, and the US would not recognise

13 unilateral acts of secession? Are you aware of that?

14 A. Yes, I'm aware of the statement of James Baker.

15 Q. And do you know anything about the statements of Carrington, Cyrus

16 Vance, and a number of other politicians who spoke about the fact that a

17 premature recognition of these republics in fact caused the failure of the

18 peace process in Yugoslavia? In fact, peace itself, because peace existed

19 before that.

20 A. I am aware of the fact that Lord Carrington expressed his view as

21 chairman of the international peace conference that a premature

22 recognition of the republics would not help the situation that he was

23 trying to deal with in Bosnia. Beyond that, I only have a general

24 knowledge, but no detail.

25 Q. As you're aware of all these things and you're aware of all these

Page 25388

1 positions of the European Community, the OSCE, the United States, et

2 cetera, what explanation would you -- were you given as the head of

3 mission regarding the entirely opposite acts, that is, the recognition and

4 the treatment given to the Yugoslav crisis? Were you given any

5 explanation for that?

6 A. I wasn't given any explanation, nor did I seek any.

7 Q. Would you agree that it was rather hypocritical on the one side to

8 support the unity of a country and its integrity and on the other --

9 JUDGE MAY: That's not a proper question for the witness.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Mr. Doyle, in your testimony you mentioned and made reference

12 exclusively to the beginning of arming by the Serbs. This is paragraph 7,

13 page 3, "The Community became aware that a part of population, that is,

14 the Serbs, that the Serbs were beginning to arm themselves." Did you have

15 any knowledge about the arming of the Muslims? Because you make no

16 mention of that, yet you were a monitor. And we saw what was going on.

17 A. During that period when I was head of the monitor mission and

18 before that, when I was a member of the mission itself in Banja Luka, I

19 had visited locations like Doboj, Gracanica, Srbac, Kobas, Derventa,

20 Teslic, Maglaj, and in all of those areas we met with the local Serb

21 leadership, Muslim leadership, and Croat leadership. And in most of the

22 cases the mission was aware of the fact that it was the Serb community

23 that were being mostly armed by weapons been given to them from the JNA.

24 And this occurred because when President Izetbegovic declared that there

25 should not be a call-up for mobilisation of the citizens of Bosnia, most

Page 25389

1 of the Muslims and the Croats did not come up for mobilisation, whereas

2 the Serbs did. And because the Serbs were mobilised to come up for their

3 approximate two months of military service with the JNA, they were allowed

4 to retain the weapons when they finished that mobilisation. That was the

5 mission's clear understanding. And a consequence of that obviously was

6 that if the Serbs were coming up for mobilisation and being allowed to

7 hold onto their weapons, there was going to be a gradual increase in the

8 amount of weapons that were available to the Serbs. And this was a factor

9 that was repeated in a lot of the opstina that the monitor mission visited

10 at that time.

11 Q. So the arming of the Muslims and Croats was not of interest to

12 you; is that right? You had no knowledge of that.

13 A. I had no knowledge of that, and I'm not saying that it was not of

14 interest to me. Of course it was. It was my duty to accurately reflect

15 the role of the monitor mission, which was to observe and report. And

16 this is what we reported.

17 Q. I didn't notice anywhere in your statement that you make any

18 mention of the other sides to the conflict. Maybe I missed something,

19 Mr. Doyle.

20 A. It was never an issue for the monitor mission in their reports.

21 There was no allegations, for example, by the Serbs that the Muslims and

22 Croats were arming. Our information at the time and what we could see on

23 the ground indicated to us that it would be very difficult for the Croats

24 and Muslims to get weapons, because they had no means of doing that. I'm

25 not saying that they didn't get some weapons from some sources. But we

Page 25390

1 have no evidence of it and it was never mentioned to us by the Serbs. But

2 it was continuously mentioned to us by the Muslims and the Croats that it

3 was the Serbs that were gaining access to weapons.

4 Q. You say that there is no evidence, yet Lord Owen, as you know, was

5 not involved in any kind of monitoring missions or observing arming or

6 anything like that, but he was a negotiator on behalf of the international

7 community and in his book, "The Balkan Odyssey," on page 146 says, and I

8 quote him, "The picture of the Bosnian Muslims deprived of weapons, the

9 picture, the image of Bosnian Muslims without weapons was not disturbed

10 even when Alija Izetbegovic openly admitted on television that the Bosnian

11 government had, through secret channels, smuggled in weapons." And then

12 he speaks of millions of rounds, mines, rifles, et cetera, not to mention

13 what they seized from the JNA. So this picture of the Bosnian Muslims

14 that were unarmed, that was created by the media throughout, even he says

15 that this picture was false. Do you think that he says so without any

16 foundation?

17 A. I don't generally comment on what Lord Owen may have said. I know

18 he wasn't in the country when I was there, which was 1991, and I'm giving

19 you the evidence of what was known to me at that time from my experience

20 of being in the country and visiting a very large amount of the

21 municipalities. I have no comment on General Owen's [sic] opinion as to

22 what happened. I did say before that I'm not saying that no weapons were

23 given to the Muslims, and there's no question in Lord Owen as to when

24 exactly the weapons were given out. I don't know when it refers to, so I

25 would prefer not to comment on that book.

Page 25391












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Page 25392

1 Q. Very well, Mr. Doyle. But here is a very specific question: I

2 assume that the Monitoring Mission of the European Community in Yugoslavia

3 and you personally must have known that the Croatian and Muslim

4 groupings - and when I say "Croatian," I'm referring to the regular

5 Croatian army - in the village of Sijekovac near Bosanski Brod committed a

6 massacre against unarmed Serbs on the 26th of March, 1992, when several

7 dozen civilians were killed, and more than 50 houses torched and

8 destroyed, old men, children, et cetera. Surely you know about that as a

9 monitor of the European Community in Yugoslavia. And this was precisely

10 in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and it took place on the 26th

11 of March, 1992. Did you make a report about that?

12 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer.

13 THE WITNESS: On the 26th of March, I was in Ireland. I had

14 finished my mission in Bosnia as head of the monitor mission, so I have no

15 comment on that. I was not aware of it.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. When did you come back again, Mr. Doyle?

18 A. I returned on the 10th of April.

19 Q. So 14 days after this massacre, in the surroundings of Bosanski

20 Brod, and you learnt absolutely nothing about it?

21 A. When I returned on the 10th of April, we immediately went into

22 negotiations with the party leaders, as in my statement. I also mentioned

23 that the monitor mission teams were finding it increasingly difficult to

24 get access to locations where some incidents may have taken place. I made

25 reference, for example, to Zvornik. And it became the practice of the

Page 25393

1 mission not to pass any comment on -- on rumours of what may and may not

2 have occurred unless they had first-hand knowledge of it. So where we

3 were aware that there was a lot of conflict, I cannot make a specific

4 reference to that specific incident because it occurred when I was in

5 Ireland and I was concerned about what was happening on the ground when I

6 was there and my energy was put into that at that stage.

7 JUDGE MAY: You have two minutes left, Mr. Milosevic, if you want

8 to ask the witness about something else.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Very well. Since you returned on the 10th, do you know that

11 between the 3rd and 6th of April, 1992, that is, just four days prior to

12 your return, that the army of the Republic of Croatia in Kupres, in

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, killed 56 Serbs from various locations and took 168

14 into captivity? Surely you knew about that. It wasn't a negligible

15 incident.

16 A. All of my work dealt with the Republic of Bosnia. I had no

17 experience at all of what was happening in Croatia. It was not within my

18 remit, so I have no comment on it because I was not aware. I was aware in

19 general terms --

20 Q. This was in Bosnia. Kupres is in Bosnia, Mr. Doyle.

21 A. I beg your pardon. I thought --

22 Q. I am talking about the presence of the regular Croatian army

23 within the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and these events that took

24 place there. Do you know anything about the presence of regular Croatian

25 forces in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, therefore, also

Page 25394

1 about this massacre of Serbs only four days prior to your return? And it

2 happened in Kupres. Do you know anything about it?

3 A. I'm not aware of the details of that incident. I'm sorry I

4 misinterpreted you. I thought it was within the Republic of Croatia.

5 Yes, I know that Kupres is in Bosnia, but I have no intimate detail of

6 that incident, except being aware that an incident had occurred and that

7 some Serbs were killed.

8 Q. And do you know anything at all about the presence of regular

9 Croatian forces in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina during your term in

10 the monitoring mission and as an envoy of Lord Carrington?

11 A. Yes. It was of concern to me that there were incidents of

12 soldiers of the Republic of Croatia entering into Western Herzegovina, and

13 that was of concern and was submitted as part of a report I made out to my

14 headquarters.

15 JUDGE MAY: This must be your last question, Mr. Milosevic.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Mr. Doyle, since I have mentioned some really major incidents

18 here, do you know that on the 15th of May, 1992 in the centre of Tuzla

19 during the evacuation of the remaining members of the JNA and the

20 remaining equipment from their barracks, an ambush, a pre-prepared ambush

21 was staged and the column attacked and people were burning like torches, a

22 real massacre was committed? Do you know that? Did you compile a report

23 about that? Did you react to that?

24 A. It wasn't my wont to make reports on military incidents that

25 occurred when I was no longer head of the monitor mission. At that time I

Page 25395

1 was Lord Carrington's personal representative, so I'm not familiar with

2 that specific incident.

3 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.

4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

5 Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:

6 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Doyle, I would just like to ask you about the

7 events linked to the period of time when you were in Sarajevo. You

8 arrived in Sarajevo on the 24th of November as head of the monitoring

9 mission for Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And with brief interruptions, so far as I can see from your

12 statement, you stayed in Sarajevo up until the 24th of August, 1992; is

13 that right?

14 A. No. I was evacuated from Sarajevo on the 12th of May in 1992, and

15 thereafter I was mainly based in Belgrade. I did return on a few

16 occasions to Sarajevo, but not many.

17 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 55 of your statement to the investigators

18 of the Tribunal, you said roughly the following: "The JNA did not

19 interfere in the referendum. It did not take part in the blockade. And

20 it remained in its barracks throughout." Is that right, more or less?

21 A. Yes, that's more or less correct.

22 Q. Major movements from the barracks occurred on the 3rd of May, when

23 what you've already described took place; isn't that right? When the

24 officers and soldiers were killed.

25 A. Yes.

Page 25396

1 Q. And then in the next paragraph, paragraph 56, you said in the

2 first sentence, "Shooting had started around the town with random shooting

3 to and from the barricades." Does that mean that on the 1st of

4 March -- or, rather, the next day all the parties were already armed

5 obviously when it was possible to have shooting to and from the

6 barricades? So they must have all been armed by then.

7 A. People were certainly armed on that occasion. I don't mean that

8 everybody was armed, but I came across an incident at the Bristol Hotel

9 where shooting was taking place between two sides. So obviously they were

10 armed, yes.

11 Q. Did the JNA interfere at all in that conflict at the barricades?

12 A. To my knowledge, they did not.

13 Q. Then in paragraphs 57 and 58, you go on to say that the JNA

14 assisted you with a convoy to the airport. You even said that, "We had to

15 pass through eight checkpoint or barricades and that at each of them a JNA

16 liaison officer and I had to negotiate our passage." Is that right?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. A moment ago you were asked but you didn't answer that question,

19 because no one asked you to pay attention to it, because indeed in the

20 statement given by General MacKenzie to the OTP here the following is

21 stated: "There were even reports about attacks by Bosnian Serbs on JNA

22 units which tried to hand in their weapons, ammunition, and military

23 equipment to TO forces in return for their safe departure from Bosnian."

24 Are you aware of any such reports, and is this true?

25 A. I'm not aware of any such reports.

Page 25397












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Page 25398

1 Q. In that connection, I would just like to ask you one more thing:

2 In paragraphs 13, 14, and 15 of your statement, you speak of the period

3 when you arrived in Yugoslavia, which still existed at the time. This is

4 the period of October 1991. And in paragraph 15, in the last sentence,

5 you say, "The federal army was also becoming very much a Serbian army."

6 You had in mind the way the army acted. You were aware of how the army

7 was acting in Sarajevo. Was the army on anyone's side over there?

8 A. I was aware that the -- that the majority of the members of the

9 army were Serbs. The monitor mission opened up contact with the JNA who

10 did not recognise our mission at the start. After I met with

11 General Kukanjac, I went on a tour of the country and I met all of the

12 divisional commanders, and it was after that that the JNA admitted to me

13 that it was a mistake on their part not to make the monitor mission

14 welcome. Thereafter, we set up a liaison team with the federal army when

15 we had frequent contact.

16 Q. I was actually inquiring, Colonel, regarding the time when you

17 arrived in October, because in paragraph 15 you speak about things from

18 those times and you said then that the army had already become a Serbian

19 army. Is that your opinion on the basis of your own insight, or did you

20 hear this from someone else?

21 A. That was my opinion on the basis of my own insight.

22 Q. As early as October?

23 A. No. I would say it was towards the -- not until sometime after I

24 had taken over as head of the mission, so I would say towards the end of

25 1991.

Page 25399

1 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 70 of your statement, you said that "The

2 European Community recognised Bosnia as a sovereign state on the 7th of

3 April." Of course, that is not at issue, is it? But what I would like to

4 draw your attention to has to do with something that is contained in a

5 statement given by General MacKenzie and it is related to what you

6 testified about yesterday in the examination-in-chief, and it deals with

7 the period when you were in Sarajevo. And he said the following: "Up

8 until the 20th or 21st of April, actions by forces of the Bosnian TO

9 conducted throughout the new state had serious repercussions in Sarajevo.

10 And then he says, "On the 12th of April, or around about that date, it was

11 ordered to the TO that it should block JNA barracks, occupy its arms

12 depots and communications centres, and attack JNA soldiers and their

13 families with the view to chasing them out of Bosnia." He says this in

14 his statement and it refers to the month of April, when you were in

15 Sarajevo. So do you know anything about that?

16 A. I have no detailed knowledge of that. You must remember that

17 General MacKenzie commanded a large military organisation in Sarajevo. I

18 was an individual person working for the conference in Yugoslavia, and

19 that's where I contained my work to. So I'm not -- I'm not doubting what

20 he said, but nor can I verify it either.

21 Q. I understand that. But my question relates to what you spoke

22 about yesterday, and that is your attempt to go to Foca to check out the

23 things with reference to the refugees in the area. So what is mentioned

24 here in General MacKenzie's statement, was that one of the reasons why the

25 JNA could not guarantee your safe passage to the location where the

Page 25400

1 refugees were? Could you explain that to Their Honours, please.

2 A. First of all, just a correction. It wasn't me who was attempting

3 to go to Foca. I was aware that there was a team from the monitor

4 mission, of which I was no longer a part, attempting to go to Foca. I

5 have no -- I have no idea as to why the JNA advised the team that they

6 could not get to Foca. All they said was, "We cannot guarantee your

7 safety and security, and therefore you won't have the freedom of

8 movement." Why this took place, I simply don't know.

9 Q. Thank you. Then in paragraph 96 of your statement, you said that

10 from May you chaired daily meetings between members of the Presidency,

11 Mr. Abdic, Mr. Kljuc, and General Aksentijevic over the withdrawal of the

12 JNA. And then you said you had the strong impression that the JNA wanted

13 to withdraw from Bosnia. Is that right?

14 A. That is correct.

15 Q. And then in those negotiations you spoke about the airport, the

16 exchange of prisoners of war, the withdrawal of weapons, and those talks

17 were particularly directed, as you stated, towards achieving a cease-fire

18 agreement.

19 A. Correct.

20 Q. Colonel, I think I and of course the Chamber in the first place

21 are surely interested in how those talks evolved and what results they

22 produced. I didn't quite understand, and for the benefit of the Chamber,

23 could you comment. General MacKenzie says that he had a meeting with you

24 and Lord Carrington on the 23rd of April. Do you remember whether you had

25 that meeting?

Page 25401

1 A. Yes. On the 23rd of April, I attended a meeting that -- because I

2 had arranged this meeting to be held at the airport for the visit of Lord

3 Carrington and Joao Pinhiero from Portugal, and I was at that meeting.

4 Q. But as General MacKenzie says, and I am sure that the Chamber

5 would find it interesting, if you could explain to them whether you

6 remember that it was read out to you a moment ago, that Philip Morillon

7 and General MacKenzie drew your attention to the fact that the Bosnian

8 Presidency was not ready to respect the cease-fire, that this is something

9 they told you? Do you recollect that?

10 A. No, I do not.

11 Q. Thank you. But I should now like to show you another report which

12 MacKenzie sent Nambiar in New York to the UN on the 22nd of June in 1992.

13 Do you remember -- or did you see that document, which is an official

14 document in which under paragraph 2 it says: "We, like the majority of

15 the people, have the impression that the president --" it doesn't say

16 "Izetbegovic," but obviously he is implied -- "wants a major military

17 intervention to return to him his country and his capital." And then

18 later on it says: "It is a fact that the TO forces had initiated clashes

19 and fired grenades and maybe even artillery projectiles on the main

20 Serbian base south-east of the airport." And finally it says: "Until one

21 side sees a strategic benefit from the cease-fire, the fighting

22 continues."

23 Do you remember seeing that report or not?

24 A. You're referring to that report as a document that was sent to the

25 United Nations by General MacKenzie through his force commander General

Page 25402

1 Nambiar. I certainly don't have any access to those weapons. I'm not a

2 member of the United Nations. I was not a member of the United Nations

3 then. Therefore, there's no reason why I should have access to that -- to

4 that particular report.

5 The second point is that this was on the 22nd of June in 1992. On

6 the 22nd of June, 1992, I was based in Belgrade. I had been evacuated

7 from Sarajevo, so there's no reason that I would have had access to that

8 report, so I know nothing about it.

9 Q. As I don't have much time, let me end with a few points taken

10 again from General MacKenzie's statement. And they have to do with events

11 in Sarajevo. And I would like to ask you kindly to explain if you know

12 anything about them. In one -- he says at one point that "Sarajevo was

13 frequently the target of fierce shelling. Most of the damage was

14 inflicted by cannons of the Bosnian Serbs located on the hills around

15 Sarajevo, but the local citizenry was not aware of the fact that

16 government forces, the TO, had initiated many incidents." Are you aware

17 of this or not?

18 A. I am aware of the fact that one of the consequences of the

19 continuous shelling from the hills around Sarajevo was an attempt by the

20 local citizenry to carry out some acts to try and defend themselves. Now,

21 what exactly they did, where they did it, I have no knowledge. But as I

22 mentioned, I think yesterday, in a conflict of this nature, if there are

23 two sides involved, then obviously both sides will have certain weapons

24 and will carry out certain military actions. So I have no reason to

25 disbelieve what General MacKenzie is referring to.

Page 25403












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Page 25404

1 Q. And let me refer to only two more incidents described by General

2 MacKenzie for you to comment on if you know anything about them, but they

3 occurred in the period when you were there, true one on the 16th of July

4 and the other on the 22nd of July, and you returned to Sarajevo on the 1st

5 of August. But nevertheless, could you comment if you can remember, of

6 course.

7 General MacKenzie describes the first incident and says, "On the

8 16th of July, the day passed in explanations to a delegation of the

9 International Red Cross as to why it would be crazy for us to defend the

10 Kosevo Hospital. I said that the idea would have a meaning in any other

11 peace mission. But in Sarajevo, as soon as we were to position our men

12 round the hospital, forces of the TO would immediately bring their mortars

13 closer to the building, shoot against the other side, provoke reprisals,

14 and then accuse the Serbs of shelling the hospital. Had the hospital been

15 on the side of the Bosnian Serbs, the Serbs would have done the same."

16 Had you heard of this, this incident or others like it?

17 A. No, I was not aware of that incident. As I said, at that date,

18 the 16th of July, I was not in Bosnia, so I'm not in a position to verify

19 or deny General MacKenzie's report. I have no reason to dispute it.

20 Q. Colonel, on the 22nd of July, the previous afternoon, two soldiers

21 from the N Company noticed that TO forces were preparing a mortar position

22 50 metres from the outside edge of the BBR base, the UN base. They

23 informed their commander and lodged a protest. However, as soon as the

24 sun set, the mortars were still there with their crews. Immediately after

25 midnight everyone jumped out of their beds when fire was opened from these

Page 25405

1 mortars. Within one minute, 300 soldiers were in their bunkers, the base

2 was shaking, the projectiles exploded in the kitchen, in the dining room,

3 at the command post. Do you know anything about this incident or not?

4 A. I know nothing about that incident.

5 Q. Just one more thing. It has to do with what you testified about

6 in the examination-in-chief. You said that when you spoke to Karadzic

7 about these events, that he said that a conflict would break out. That is

8 the word you used, I think.

9 A. If you're referring to my question to Radovan Karadzic as to what

10 would happen at the event of independence, yes, that is what he said to

11 me.

12 Q. And you understood that to mean a war.

13 A. Yes.

14 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

15 Q. Thank you, Colonel.

16 JUDGE MAY: I'm looking at the clock.

17 MR. NICE: I have four questions, I think.

18 JUDGE MAY: Well, perhaps just four questions, yes.

19 Re-examined by Mr. Nice:

20 Q. Tab 5, please, which is the special report on the assembly meeting

21 of the 24th of January. Page 2 of that, under "Comments," this being a

22 meeting about which you've been asked many questions by the accused.

23 Under "Comments" you say this, "It would appear that the SDS, although

24 agreeing to attend the session, were only there for cosmetic purposes and

25 would only support the referendum on attaining unreasonable concessions."

Page 25406

1 Can you explain for us how you formed the judgement that they were there

2 for cosmetic purposes and would condition consent on unreasonable

3 concessions.

4 A. During my time in that parliament, I met a considerable amount of

5 parliamentarians of all sides. I cannot specifically recall what Serb

6 members of parliament I met, but I was under the distinct impression that

7 there was no way that they were going to support the question of a

8 referendum on independence if they were going to find themselves in a

9 minority overall in the parliament, because they were aware that the

10 majority -- the Serb or the Croats and Muslims would outnumber them

11 numerically.

12 And because they hadn't been to parliament in a long time, because

13 they had left the day-to-day running of parliament, as was mentioned by

14 Mr. Milosevic yesterday, the general feeling was that they were only there

15 to show up, to find out what was going to happen, to object to anything

16 that was going to be put forward, and the arguments that took place for

17 the many hours during that parliamentary debate that was translated to me

18 by my interpreter gave me that distinct impression.

19 Q. This came from direct face-to-face contact with Bosnian Serb

20 parliamentarians?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Tab 12, the record of your conversation with the accused,

23 page -- the fourth sheet of it, which begins with the word "Sarajevo," and

24 includes paragraphs 7 and 8. Before we come to it, my second of two

25 questions -- three questions -- or two questions on this document: You

Page 25407

1 haven't told us, but how well informed or otherwise did the accused appear

2 to you to be about matters in which you had an interest?

3 A. I got the distinction impression from meeting with Mr. Milosevic,

4 number one that, he was very well briefed on who I was. He was very

5 complimentary to, as he said himself, "what I had been told by the Serbs

6 that you are doing in Bosnia and that you're a person that could be

7 trusted." So my feeling at that stage was Mr. Milosevic had been well

8 briefed on who I was and what I was attempting to achieve.

9 And the second point is that it was my impression that

10 Mr. Milosevic wanted to send a message to the people that directed me to

11 attend the meeting and that I was just going to report back on what

12 Mr. Milosevic said because part of my instructions were not to get

13 involved in debate. So I was there essentially in my view on a listening

14 brief. And Mr. Milosevic mentioned these points about Serb irregulars in

15 the territory of Bosnia, about doing everything he could to stop the flow

16 of weapons.

17 Q. Very well.

18 A. Et cetera, et cetera.

19 Q. Paragraph 8, then, has him saying, according to your note, this,

20 "That Belgrade could not halt its supply of humanitarian aid to Bosnian

21 Serbs." And then in brackets there's a reference to clothing, food,

22 tents, and money. Did he specify at all what he meant by "money"?

23 A. No, he did not.

24 Q. My last question, this: His protestations about the illegality of

25 the attack on Sarajevo, a Muslim town, did he say anything about how the

Page 25408

1 funding of the VRS could be affected, could be withdrawn?

2 A. No, he did not.

3 Q. Yes. Very well. Nothing else. Thank you.

4 JUDGE MAY: Colonel, that concludes your evidence. Thank you for

5 coming to the International Tribunal to give it. You are free to go.

6 THE WITNESS: Thank you, my lord.

7 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, the tabs in the exhibits, we should tidy up.

8 [The witness withdrew]

9 JUDGE MAY: It would seem that the exhibit 515, tabs 13 and 14, 19

10 to 29 are tapes; tab 11 is a transcript and is therefore given to the

11 witness and is therefore a different position.

12 MR. NICE: Yes.

13 JUDGE MAY: But 13 to 14 and 19 to 29 do not seem to me admissible

14 through this witness.

15 MR. NICE: As Your Honour pleases. The document 19 itself I think

16 is the document whereby he produces his identification, so --

17 JUDGE MAY: Quite right.

18 MR. NICE: So in my submission, that should be admitted and the

19 others can then be withdrawn.

20 JUDGE MAY: You're quite right. 20 to 29 should be withdrawn, 13

21 and ask 14.

22 Very well. That will be done, and they can be reproduced in

23 another form by another witness.

24 MR. NICE: Very well.

25 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Thank you very much. We'll adjourn now.

Page 25409












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13 English transcripts.













Page 25410

1 Perhaps if the registrar would come up, please.

2 Twenty minutes.

3 --- Recess taken at 10.42 a.m.

4 --- On resuming at 11.07 a.m.

5 [The witness entered court]

6 MR. KAY: Your Honour, if the Court would forgive me --


8 MR. KAY: -- Before the witness is sworn, but there's an important

9 administrative matter that needs to be cleared up. It concerns a filing

10 on the 8th of August which relates to a Rule 92 bis (D) application by the

11 Prosecutor. There are three binders of transcripts and supporting

12 materials. That's only been received by the amici within the last 15

13 minutes. It had to be withdrawn for technical reasons. And so I'd ask

14 that if time could flow from now, rather than the 8th of August, because

15 we hadn't received it before. I would, however, anticipate dealing with

16 it within seven days, so I'd try and file it by next Tuesday.

17 JUDGE MAY: Yes, if you would. This is the Sarajevo material.

18 MR. KAY: Yes.

19 JUDGE MAY: But I'm sure technically you can have the extra time,

20 having been served on it.

21 MR. KAY: I'll do it quicker.

22 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

23 MR. KAY: Yes.

24 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Saxon.

25 MR. SAXON: Good morning, Your Honours. One other administrative

Page 25411

1 matter. It is my understanding that protective measures have been granted

2 for the witness who will testify following Mr. Kraljevic. And so just for

3 the record effectively that would require an effective change in the

4 witness order. Thank you.


6 Yes. Let the witness take the declaration.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

8 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.


10 [Witness answered through interpreter]

11 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

12 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, the testimony of this witness will deal

13 with matters related to page 23 of your Croatia atlas.

14 Examined by Mr. Saxon:

15 Q. Sir, is your name Stipan Kraljevic?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Were you born on the 8th of January, 1937?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. In November of 1995, did you provide a statement to an

20 investigator of the Office of the Prosecutor about your experiences in the

21 area of Ilok during the armed conflict in Croatia in 1991?

22 A. Yes, yes, I gave a statement.

23 Q. And at that time, as part of your statement, did you also provide

24 a number of documents to the investigator of the Office of the Prosecutor

25 that related to the situation in Ilok in 1991 and to the expulsion of

Page 25412

1 persons from Ilok between 1993 and 1995?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. More recently, on the 17th of June of this year, 2003, did you

4 have an opportunity to review that statement and make an addendum?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And did you certify to an officer of the Registry of this Tribunal

7 that the remainder of your statement was true and correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 MR. SAXON: Your Honours, at this time I would offer

10 Mr. Kraljevic's statement, the addendum, and the documents into evidence

11 under Rule 92 bis.

12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, Prosecution Exhibit 516.

13 MR. SAXON: Your Honours, in 1991, Stipan Kraljevic lived in the

14 predominantly Croat town of Ilok in Croatia. Ilok was part of the

15 Municipality of Vukovar and lies on the banks of the Danube River, close

16 to the town of Backa Palanka in the Republic of Serbia. A number of other

17 villages lie close to Ilok, including Lovas, Bapska, Sarengrad, and

18 Tovarnik. Prior to the start of the armed conflict, the majority of the

19 residents of these villages were Croat. By September 1991, many residents

20 of these villages had sought shelter in Ilok, which was completely

21 surrounded by JNA troops and artillery.

22 Mr. Kraljevic was elected president of a multi-ethnic commission

23 tasked with negotiating a peaceful solution to the crisis with the JNA.

24 On the 7th of October, 1991, when the commission met with

25 Colonel Grahovac, the officer in command of that area, Colonel Grahovac

Page 25413

1 told them that Ilok would be destroyed within two hours if the town did

2 not surrender control to the JNA. The commission returned to Ilok and

3 after discussions, informed the JNA that the residents of Ilok could not

4 agree to their demands.

5 On the 11th of October, 1991, the negotiating commission attended

6 a meeting in the town of Sid with Colonel Grahovac and

7 General Arandjelovic, commander of the JNA's Belgrade Corps. The

8 commission suggested that the residents of Ilok be permitted to hand over

9 their weapons to the local police and requested that the JNA not enter the

10 town of Ilok. The JNA officers gave the members of the commission a

11 written list of conditions for the surrender of Ilok, and General

12 Arandjelovic told them that if the residents of Ilok did not comply with

13 the JNA's demands, his units would level Ilok to the ground.

14 The commission returned to Ilok and decided to hold a public

15 referendum on 13 October 1991. The residents of Ilok and the displaced

16 persons located there were asked to consider two questions: 1, are you in

17 favour of surrendering all weapons and signing an agreement with the JNA;

18 yes or no? And 2, are you in favour of collectively moving away due to

19 the crisis situation; yes or no? Seventy-three per cent of the persons

20 who voted elected to leave Ilok. After further negotiations with the JNA,

21 a large convoy was formed on 17 October 1991 and approximately 8.000

22 persons, mostly Croats, left Ilok and were escorted by Serb forces to the

23 territory controlled by Croat forces. During the next few years, an

24 additional 1500 persons, mostly Croats, were expelled from Ilok.

25 And if I could impose on the registrar just briefly. If we could

Page 25414

1 show the document that is at tab 8 to the witness. And if the English

2 translation of that could be placed on the ELMO. I apologise. I meant to

3 say tab 6. As usual, Ms. Dicklich has the correct information.

4 This is a document that says: "The following is the text of the

5 first voting slip." And then it lists the two questions, the questions

6 that I have just read out. And it says below the second question:

7 "Indicate the number of persons that are to move." And then below it

8 says: "Constitutive part of the referendum was also the text of the

9 agreement, as ultimately given by the JNA represented by

10 General Arandjelovic on the 11th of October, 1991."

11 Q. Mr. Kraljevic, was this one of the documents that you provided to

12 the investigator from the OTP?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And does this document correctly show the questions -- the

15 referendum questions that were provided to the residents of Ilok on the

16 13th of October, 1991?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Can you explain to the Trial Chamber, please, why were these two

19 questions presented as the only options for the residents of Ilok at that

20 time.

21 A. Thank you for asking. I'll try to explain. The first question

22 was, "Are you in favour of handing over all weapons and signing an

23 agreement with the JNA?" As for that question involved in the referendum,

24 the majority of the population voted no; the reason for it being that in

25 the relations with the JNA until then there was such bad experience. For

Page 25415












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Page 25416

1 example, in Tovarnik, Ilaca, Lovas, Bapska, and in other places as well.

2 Wherever the JNA came in, great problems occurred and also the population

3 suffered. So the only hope was to preserve the safety of the town in this

4 way.

5 The second question is: "Are you in favour of collectively moving

6 out due to the crisis situation?" That has to do with the fact that Ilok

7 was surrounded for over a month. There was no electricity in Backa

8 Palanka. It had been cut off. There were constant attacks launched on

9 Ilok, and practically the only possibility for the population was to move

10 out of the area.

11 Q. If I can just clarify that. You say that "the only hope was to

12 preserve the safety of the town in this way." By "in this way --" and you

13 were referring to the first question in the referendum. Are you saying

14 that it would have been -- it would have preserved the safety of the town

15 in Ilok by surrendering weapons and signing an agreement with the JNA, or

16 are you saying something different?

17 A. I wish to say the following: There was peace in Ilok. There were

18 no ethnic conflicts. The police maintained law and order and peace, and

19 quite simply we asked that the police continue keeping law and order and

20 peace in town and that the army should not enter town.

21 Q. All right. And if the answer to the first question was no, that

22 the army should not enter the town, then why was the next option to

23 collectively move away?

24 A. The second option for a collective move away was due to what I

25 already mentioned, that is, the very bad experience with the Yugoslav army

Page 25417

1 to date in the villages that came under the command of the Yugoslav army.

2 There was a great deal of suffering there, and finally the entire

3 populations were expelled from those particular places.

4 Q. So what did you and your neighbours fear if the town were

5 surrendered to the JNA?

6 A. We were fearful because this ultimatum of the army said that they

7 had the right to enter any house, to search it, and to punish any person

8 they deemed should be punished.

9 MR. SAXON: Thank you. Nothing further.

10 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

11 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

12 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Kraljevic, you held political office in Ilok,

13 different offices, and as far as I could see you have a university

14 education; is that right?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. I assume that you are quite familiar with the situation and that

17 you understood the situation that prevailed in the time that you're

18 testifying about.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. You say that the inhabitants of Ilok lived in peace for years with

21 their neighbours, that the town had a mixed population from an ethnic

22 point of view, although the Croats did constitute a majority, and that

23 after the elections in 1990 tensions went up; is that right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Until then for decades there had been no problems; isn't that

Page 25418

1 right?

2 A. Well, we can't put it that way.

3 Q. Could you please explain what you said just now, that we can't put

4 it that way. What kind of problems were there?

5 A. Well, for example, there wasn't a proper equality of rights. The

6 police was predominantly Serb, in terms of ethnic composition. The

7 leadership was of the same ratio in town, although 70 per cent of the

8 population was of the ethnic composition it was. However, the leadership

9 was quite different.

10 Q. All right. Could you explain to me, when you say "the

11 leadership," I assume that you mean the leadership of the municipality.

12 Is that right?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Who elected the municipal leaders? Was it the citizens who

15 elected the assemblymen, the members of the Municipal Assembly, and did

16 then the Assembly elect its president and its executive council and so on?

17 Wasn't that the way it was?

18 A. Well, yes, in a way, but we all know what elections are like in

19 socialism.

20 Q. All right. But you did elect your delegates to the Municipal

21 Assembly until then, didn't you?

22 A. You know, Mr. Milosevic, that there was a one-party system and

23 that everything was done on orders.

24 Q. I don't know that everything was done on orders. I know that

25 there were always several candidates in the elections and that citizens

Page 25419

1 voted for their representatives and sent them to different echelons of

2 government.

3 A. Theoretically, yes; practically, no.

4 Q. Did you hold an office until 1990?

5 A. I was director of the secondary school until 1973. Then after

6 that, I wasn't anywhere, except that I worked in the secondary school as

7 an agricultural engineer. In 1990, after the multi-party elections, I was

8 only in the local committee of the town of Ilok and I did not have any

9 other authority.

10 Q. On the basis of what you're saying, it can be derived that in

11 Ilok, which had a majority Croat population -- actually, was it a

12 municipality at the time?

13 A. Until 1963, it was a municipality. And from 1963 until 1993, it

14 was a local commune.

15 Q. Within the municipality of Vukovar?

16 A. Within the municipality of Vukovar.

17 Q. And who headed this local commune? Was it a Serb or a Croat?

18 A. It was a Serb.

19 Q. Do you know of any Croats who were also in the leadership?

20 A. There were some Croats too.

21 Q. You say that Serbs were predominant.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And you said on orders, that this is what was directed.

24 A. Well, if possible, I wouldn't like to answer any more questions of

25 that nature.

Page 25420

1 Q. Tell me, since you said that in the police at the time too, that

2 is to say, in the organs of the interior, the majority was Serb, in

3 Yugoslavia did anyone ever order someone to work in the police force or

4 did people apply on their own to attend police school and then to get a

5 job afterwards?

6 A. I have already stated that that's the way it was, and I don't

7 think I should answer any more questions of this nature, because it is

8 well known who appointed the police.

9 Q. Well, people were employed in the police, like anywhere else. As

10 far as I know, it was employment like any other.

11 A. Well, let the services who were in charge of that testify about

12 that. I was not in charge of that.

13 Q. All right, Mr. Kraljevic. Tell me, what caused this tension which

14 occurred after the elections of 1990, as you've said?

15 A. Before the actual elections in 1990, the multi-party elections,

16 something happened straight away. An allegedly unidentified group

17 destroyed a few monuments at the Orthodox cemetery in Ilok. Actually,

18 they were just turned over. And of course, the press immediately accused

19 the Croats of having done that. However, TV Novi Sad arrived at that

20 cemetery before the police had found out about it, so it was organised.

21 It was staged, in a way. For example, this is how tension was being

22 created.

23 Also, in August 1991, Express Politika, a daily newspaper, carried

24 an article saying that in Ilok 11 civilians were killed and that they were

25 being shown to all by way of a warning for all nationalists. So there was

Page 25421












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13 English transcripts.













Page 25422

1 not -- there was no such thing. Nothing like that happened in Ilok. This

2 was all made up, and it only served the purpose of creating tensions.

3 Similarly, it was published in the Belgrade press that, for

4 instance, the Principovac hospital, which is located on the very border

5 between Croatia and Serbia, in fact, part of it is in the territory of

6 Croatia and another part in the territory of Serbia, was a target of an

7 attack by Ustashas who came and mistreated children. It also caused

8 anxiety among the population.

9 Q. Is it true that there were no incidents at all in the municipality

10 of Vukovar in the time you are talking about? No incidents?

11 A. Well, there were some. For instance, on the 2nd of July, in

12 Borovo, 12 policemen were killed. Also, there were barricades in Trpinje,

13 in Borovo, Negoslavci, et cetera.

14 THE INTERPRETER: The date, correction, is the 2nd of May.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. You said that you were elected at the elections. You remember the

17 changes that happened in Croatia in 1991, changes to the constitution and

18 a series of other events, the new laws that were enacted, et cetera,

19 causing concern to the Serbs. Do you know anything about that?

20 A. I do, in fact. I know that a large part of the police force,

21 policemen of Serb ethnicity, reacted to the decision that the red star,

22 which was the emblem until then, should be replaced by the Croatian flag

23 by leaving their jobs and going to Backa Palanka to continue to work

24 there.

25 Q. And why did the policemen react to the chequer-board flag?

Page 25423

1 A. You call it the chequer-board flag, and we call it the state coat

2 of arms. I don't know, Mr. Milosevic, why they reacted. Those policemen

3 who remained in Ilok continued in their work as usual, although they were

4 of Serb ethnicity.

5 Q. Do you know with regard to these constitutional amendments that

6 Serbs no longer had the status of an equal people in Croatia and that a

7 series of new laws were enacted? I enumerated them here before. I have

8 no time to do it again. I know you are aware of them, being an educated

9 man. Do you know that they, among other things, were the reasons for this

10 anxiety and do you know that they were subject to various sorts of

11 pressure?

12 A. There were no pressures in Ilok, although I am aware that certain

13 people of Serb ethnicity went overnight to Backa Palanka and returned in

14 the day. But nothing happened to anyone at night or day, and the property

15 that was left behind was not damaged at all. It was preserved like any

16 other property.

17 Q. For those who are not aware of it, Backa Palanka is right across

18 the bridge.

19 A. That's correct. They have regular intercity communications and

20 there were two busses, one belonging to Backa Palanka, another to Ilok,

21 and the traffic between the two places was normal via these intercity

22 busses.

23 One day, some people intercepted the bus in Backa Palanka, the bus

24 was taken and given to Dunav Prijebus [phoen], a haulier's enterprise, and

25 it was practically stolen.

Page 25424

1 Q. Did you believe at the time when all this was going on - I also

2 mean the constitutional changes and the new laws - did you believe that

3 discrimination existed against the Serbs?

4 A. It is my opinion there was no discrimination. There was an

5 aspiration to establish equality among all the citizens in the Republic of

6 Croatia.

7 Q. How do you think equality was established by excluding Serbs as a

8 people from the constitution of Croatia?

9 A. I don't know that this happened at all.

10 Q. Until then, Croatia was a state of the Croatian, Serbian peoples,

11 and other citizens. Under the new constitution, Serbs were eliminated as

12 a nation.

13 A. I would not like to discuss legal enactments. I would leave it to

14 the experts.

15 Q. All right. These changes, without going into finer points of law,

16 do you believe that the chequer-board flag might have reminded Serbs of

17 Ustasha symbols from the Second World War?

18 A. I don't know what it reminded Serbs of, but the Croatian coat of

19 arms is an old one and it is not an Ustasha symbol.

20 Q. You can argue about it being an old symbol, but you know the

21 sufferings Serbs had gone through under that coat of arms in the Second

22 World War.

23 A. I believe I am giving evidence about the year 1991, and I don't

24 believe this trial is about 1941-1945.

25 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We've been through this. This is a complete

Page 25425

1 waste of time. Let's move on to more recent events.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Tell me, please: Since you say in paragraph 6, "Under the 1994

4 constitution, every city, every town had the right to form their own TO

5 units up to 500 men."

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. You rejected that constitution by amending it; is that so?

8 A. I don't know.

9 Q. After the proclamation of independence by Croatia, did the town of

10 Ilok set up units of civilian defence that were linked up with the police,

11 as you say in paragraph 6 of your statement?

12 A. Yes, it did.

13 Q. Is it true that the Croatia police then armed these men?

14 A. The weaponry of the Territorial Defence that was planned to be

15 used by Ilok was confiscated by the Yugoslav People's Army -- had been

16 confiscated by the Yugoslav People's Army earlier, so the weaponry that

17 was available consisted of several automatic rifles.

18 Q. Why was the civilian defence unit armed?

19 A. To maintain order in the city.

20 Q. Was there any disturbance in town so that civilian defence needed

21 to be engaged, in addition to regular police?

22 A. Yes. Army troops came to the border and wanted to enter.

23 Q. At the time which you are testifying about, the army was the legal

24 Yugoslav People's Army deployed throughout the territory of the former

25 SFRY.

Page 25426

1 A. I wouldn't agree with that.

2 Q. Well, whatever you say. Let it be your opinion. You don't

3 believe that it was the legal armed force of the SFRY at the time.

4 A. It did not treat everyone equally.

5 Q. Are you aware that there were mass layoffs of Serbs in Croatia

6 mostly in the police force but also Croats who were deemed unfit, not only

7 Serbs?

8 A. If we are talk about Ilok, this didn't happen.

9 Q. So all the Serbs who worked in the Ilok police force remained to

10 work there?

11 A. Yes. At least, I have no information to the contrary.

12 Q. All right, then. Were there any problems regarding the

13 Territorial Defence before in the territory of Ilok during the maspok

14 movement in the '70s?

15 A. I'd rather not discuss that.

16 Q. Do you know anything about that?

17 A. I know that there was political turmoil at the time, but I don't

18 know what happened with the Territorial Defence.

19 Q. Was it also a time when there were attempts to establish within

20 the TO some sort of youth units?

21 A. I don't know.

22 Q. Why was it, then, that President Tito replaced the Croatian

23 leadership at the time?

24 A. Again, I must say I wouldn't like to discuss that. I don't know

25 anything about it.

Page 25427












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Page 25428

1 MR. SAXON: [Previous interpretation continues] ...

2 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Twenty years before the events we are dealing

3 with are quite irrelevant. Move on.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. All right. You say that the JNA took over the weapons from the

6 depots of the Territorial Defence; is that so?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Do you know that this decision for the army to take over the

9 weaponry of the Territorial Defence applied to all of Yugoslavia, to all

10 republics?

11 A. I think - and I said this before - that the Yugoslav People's Army

12 did not treat all republics or all parts of our state equally. So I don't

13 know whether TO weapons were seized in Serbia, Bosnia, Slovenia, or other

14 parts of the country, but I know it happened in Ilok.

15 Q. It was not a question of seizing. It was a decision of the

16 Presidency of the SFRY that the army should take under its control the

17 weaponry of the TO in all republics.

18 A. All I know is that the JNA armed also the Serbian citizenry, which

19 is not according to the constitution.

20 Q. Did the army arm the Serbs in Ilok perhaps? Do you know that the

21 army armed the Serbs in Ilok?

22 A. I don't know that for a fact.

23 Q. All right. You say that in July the JNA shelled Ilok.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Without any provocation whatsoever on the 25th of May Bridge.

Page 25429

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Isn't quite the opposite true, that one tank was then destroyed

3 while crossing the bridge, the tank belonged to the JNA and it was

4 destroyed certainly by somebody who did not belong to the JNA?

5 A. This is what the event was like: The checkpoint of the Yugoslav

6 People's Army was located on the Ilok side of the bridge, where a police

7 checkpoint used to be. And at a distance of perhaps 200 metres there were

8 JNA men and the police of the town of Ilok. Suddenly a vehicle of the

9 police administration of Ilok was destroyed by artillery weapons. One

10 policeman was killed and three were wounded. There were four men in

11 total. The police vehicle burnt. One policeman who was nearby fired a

12 guided -- I don't know what it's called exactly -- from a hand-held

13 launcher and destroyed that tank, and the crew consisted of six or seven

14 men, I believe.

15 Q. They were deployed there?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. So according to you, was that the reason why the JNA demanded that

18 these weapons be put under their control?

19 A. Yes, that demand followed immediately. But they wanted these

20 weapons to be put under the control of the JNA, not the Ilok police.

21 Q. But was Ilok supposed to have rocket launchers capable of

22 destroying tanks as part of police weaponry? Is that a proper part of

23 police weaponry?

24 A. No.

25 Q. All right. Do you know that with the beginning of the crisis in

Page 25430

1 1990 and 1991 the focus of activities related to the secession of Croatia

2 was precisely this war of the -- war against the JNA and its break-up?

3 A. That's what you say. I don't know.

4 Q. Do you remember the all-out attack on barracks throughout Croatia,

5 the blockades of barracks --

6 JUDGE MAY: He's giving evidence about Ilok. Now, confine your

7 answers to that or matters that he can deal with, relevant matters. We've

8 heard other evidence about these matters, and there may be other witnesses

9 who can deal with them, but just concentrate on Ilok for this witness.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. But even what happened

11 on the 8th of July, 1991, on that bridge when that tank was destroyed,

12 that was also one of the attacks against the JNA.

13 A. Yes. But before that, as I described, policemen were killed. And

14 the following day, JNA aircraft opened fire from machine-guns on

15 Principovac hospital, also wounded several policemen, and killed one of

16 them. These people were playing football.

17 Q. Please tell me. You said "open machine-gun fire, killing

18 policemen from Ilok." It was before this event; right?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Who shot at the policemen?

21 A. The JNA.

22 Q. Do you know this for a fact?

23 A. Nobody else could have.

24 Q. You conclude that nobody else could have shot at the policemen and

25 that's why you ascribe it to the JNA, but you didn't see it with your own

Page 25431

1 eyes.

2 A. Of course I didn't.

3 Q. Why would the JNA shoot at a police vehicle without any

4 provocation, without rhyme or reason?

5 JUDGE MAY: Well, that's a matter for the JNA to answer, not for

6 him.

7 Is there any reason -- we can perhaps put it this way: Is it

8 known what reason or was it obvious what reason there might have been for

9 the JNA to shoot at the police?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know exactly what the reason

11 was. Until that time, traffic of citizens between Ilok and Backa Palanka

12 had been normal. And when I say "normal," I mean that at all times it was

13 under the supervision of the police but also the JNA. We can only guess

14 at what happened. I wouldn't like to guess. But it is highly probable,

15 in fact 100 per cent certain, that the JNA did this, because they admitted

16 to it. Captain Grahovac admitted that it was they who did it. I know

17 this for a fact.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. So what did he cite as a reason, if he said that it was they who

20 shot at the police vehicle? What was the reason? You say you have

21 personal knowledge that he confirmed it.

22 A. He referred to some sort of incident. I don't know where, and I

23 don't think he mentioned it.

24 Q. So are you saying that because of some incident elsewhere somebody

25 shot at a police vehicle out of the blue?

Page 25432

1 A. There was no previous incident to explain it, but that's what

2 happened.

3 Q. Since you say that you didn't see it yourself, you only surmised

4 that it could only have been done by the JNA.

5 A. I am not surmising. It is an admission made by Captain Grahovac

6 and the whole police force knows it to be true.

7 Q. Very well. And do you know -- I have seen many documents about it

8 and also listened to testimony even here, that JNA units until they

9 themselves became the target of attack had the sole role of separating

10 parties at conflict and preventing conflict. Is that true or not?

11 JUDGE MAY: The witness can only answer in respect of Ilok.

12 Was it your impression in Ilok and the surrounding areas that the

13 JNA were merely there to separate the parties?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. They stated clearly that they

15 wanted to enter Ilok and take control. At all meetings, that was their

16 main motto. So there's no reason to say that they wanted to separate them

17 only.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. But, Mr. Kraljevic, a tank was destroyed and the JNA wanted the

20 JNA to enter to put that area under its control and for the weapons to be

21 surrendered; isn't is that so? Wasn't that the sequence of events?

22 A. There were demands before that too, but let's say that that was --

23 that is so.

24 Q. But let us go on to deal specifically with the things you've said.

25 You said that on the 28th of October the inhabitants of Bapska were given

Page 25433












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Page 25434

1 an ultimatum in which it said until they -- unless they surrendered their

2 weapons by 1600 hours -- and I am quoting from what is stated here --

3 "your village will no longer exist on the map." And this was stated in

4 writing.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. This handwritten paper, isn't it?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Allegedly it was signed by a major, whose signature is illegible;

9 is that right?

10 A. Slobodan Barjaktarevic.

11 Q. Did you know him? Did you meet that man?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Does such a man exist at all?

14 A. Surely he does.

15 Q. A major can be in command of a battalion, to say the least. Does

16 this resemble a JNA document? Every company has a typewriter and the

17 possibility of communicating in a decent manner. To me this looks like an

18 ordinary forgery.

19 A. That document was brought by a worker called Boro Todorovic, I

20 think -- no, sorry, Tomic. I apologise. Tomic. Boro Tomic, who is from

21 Sid, and who was employed in the cooperative farm in Bapska, and he

22 brought this document and handed it to representatives of the local

23 community of Bapska.

24 Q. So even the carrier, the person bringing that message, was not a

25 representative of the JNA.

Page 25435

1 A. He was not. But later on, that Slobodan, this major, spoke to

2 representatives of the local community because they went to attend a

3 meeting with him the next day, and they also say the same regarding that

4 document.

5 Q. What is stated here is not in dispute. What is in dispute is that

6 this could be a JNA document.

7 A. But he sent it. He admitted to sending it.

8 Q. So you know that. The person who signed it?

9 A. I'm told that. I was told that by the persons in the local

10 community to whom it was addressed, because they spoke to him.

11 Q. So this document is dated the 28th of September, 1991.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. You know that prior to that, by activities which were in a sense

14 headed by Lord Carrington at the time, an agreement was reached to the

15 effect that all armed activity must cease and that all of us supported

16 this?

17 A. Yes, we remember that. And that gave us hope that a peaceful

18 settlement would be found for the whole area.

19 Q. And it's stated in that agreement that it was necessary for all to

20 withdraw to a sufficient distance, for all fire to cease, for all

21 paramilitary forces to be disarmed and disbanded, for the reservists of

22 the Croatian National Guard to be demobilised and for units to return to

23 barracks. Do you know that your side did not comply with that agreement?

24 A. Our people in Ilok, Sarengrad, Bapska held guard duty only in the

25 town or at the very entrance to the town and nowhere beyond that.

Page 25436

1 Q. Very well. I don't wish to elaborate and expand my questions to

2 anything beyond Ilok, but you as a person who was involved in politics in

3 those days and as an educated man must have known that the agreement was

4 not complied with and that conflicts continued, and Kadijevic himself,

5 who's also from Croatia, wrote to Lord Carrington and warned him of this

6 and this was published in all the media. You remember that?

7 A. I remember everything. But I also know that the army kept

8 advancing and taking control of one place after another. Tovarnik was

9 razed to the ground, then on the 24th Ilica, then there was an attack on

10 Lovas when the army and paramilitary unit entered, they took people out of

11 their houses and 23 men were killed on that occasion. All this was

12 happening around that time.

13 Q. Are you making a distinction between the army and paramilitary

14 units?

15 A. I am.

16 Q. And doesn't it seem to you, at least on the basis of the

17 information that you have, that this was not done by the army, by members

18 of the army, but various paramilitary units that were clashing?

19 A. Mr. Milosevic, one thing is beyond doubt, that those paramilitary

20 units -- some of them came there under the protection of the army and that

21 the army armed them and that they wore such uniforms.

22 Q. Well, the reservists had a military uniform all over Yugoslavia.

23 You know that, don't you?

24 A. That's how they came, wearing uniforms.

25 Q. Very well. But let's go back to this meeting with the JNA. You

Page 25437

1 say that you met with Colonel Grahovac.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. All that was required of you was that you surrender your weapons.

4 A. To surrender weapons and to deposit them at the bridge where they

5 would be under the supervision of the JNA.

6 Q. Was this something illogical and unreasonable to ask?

7 A. Yes. But after that, the army was supposed to enter and establish

8 its control and command there.

9 Q. What would the army command over? They wanted to enter to check

10 whether any weapons remained, whether the weapons had been surrendered,

11 whether the agreement was being carried out, nothing more than that. Is

12 that so or not?

13 A. The police of Ilok was capable of maintaining peace and order, and

14 it was peaceful. There was no need for the army to enter the town.

15 Q. Did the army without reason consider its competent for seizing

16 weapons that could cause tragedies and that it should make sure that all

17 the weapons were surrendered? Wasn't that its work, its job?

18 A. No, it wasn't. It was the job of the police.

19 Q. But all this was happening after the army was attacked and a tank

20 destroyed.

21 A. The army was not attacked. There was strict prohibition on

22 opening fire.

23 Q. Except for the tank on the bridge?

24 A. Yes, and nothing more than that. Not a single other shot was

25 fired at the Yugoslav army in Ilok.

Page 25438

1 Q. Yes. But throughout Croatia there was.

2 A. Yes, but in Ilok there wasn't.

3 Q. And surely they didn't take a position on the basis of a situation

4 in one single town, but the situation throughout Croatia where barracks

5 were blocked and many people killed.

6 A. Talk to others about that.

7 Q. Does that fit within that context or not, Ilok was not the central

8 issue.

9 A. Ilok was surrounded, and the closest part of the rest of Croatia

10 was 60 kilometres away, so that there was no danger threatening from Ilok.

11 Q. I won't ask you about other matters, though I hope you will agree

12 with me that it is difficult to draw out of context a single town. One

13 has to observe the whole situation, and I assume that the army adopted its

14 position on the basis of the overall situation, and I assume you will

15 agree with me in that respect.

16 You remember, for instance - and the whole of Yugoslavia knew

17 about this - when 13 soldiers were massacred in the Karlovac barracks on

18 the 21st of September, 1991. You know what the attitude was towards the

19 army.

20 A. I must tell you that information hardly reached Ilok because all

21 communication means were destroyed, ranging from the TV transmitter in

22 Tovarnik, Papuk, and all the other localities, so that Ilok was virtually

23 isolated. We didn't even have electricity, power later on, though we

24 could listen transistor radios. We could listen to Belgrade and Novi Sad.


Page 25439












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Page 25440

1 Q. Yes. But you could hear Radio Osijek, surely, and some other

2 local stations.

3 A. If we had better quality transistor radios, yes.

4 Q. Do you remember that on the 1st of November and later Croatian

5 forces staged the all-out attack on Western Slavonia and Maslovina [phoen]

6 and mostly the Serb population was victimised and chased out and there

7 was general chaos at the time? Do you remember that, Mr. Kraljevic?

8 A. Let me put it this way: As far as I know, this happened when we

9 went into exile. But I heard many statements by the people of Ilok who

10 remained in Ilok, who stayed behind, and who were told by these refugees

11 that the army simply told them to go into exile and via Banja Luka they

12 went to Backa Palanka and Ilok and that many of them were forced by the

13 army. I'm not claiming that all of them were.

14 Q. The people of Ilok?

15 A. No, the Serb population in Western Slavonia.

16 Q. Which army had forced them?

17 A. The Yugoslav army.

18 Q. Very well, Mr. Kraljevic.

19 A. This is claimed by many people of Ilok who stayed behind in Ilok.

20 I cannot comment on that in any other way.

21 Q. To save time, I, too, am unable to comment on that. There's

22 common knowledge about the attack on Western Slavonia, how many people

23 were killed, who carried out the attack, all this is common knowledge.

24 JUDGE MAY: Yes. If you have any questions, ask them, rather than

25 commenting.

Page 25441

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. You say that on the 8th of November, three European monitors

4 arrived in town, and in the next three days another two; is that right?

5 A. That was on the 8th and 10th of October.

6 Q. I noted down that you said November.

7 A. Not November, but October.

8 Q. October. Very well. Yes, yes, October. And among them, there

9 was Hugh Cunningham and Petr Kypr, and what did they report?

10 A. We asked Hugh Cunningham to go and check out the situation in

11 Sarengrad and Bapska. He was given permission by the Yugoslav army to go

12 there, to go to Sarengrad, but not to go to Bapska. In those days, both

13 localities were destroyed and mostly under control.

14 Secondly, on the next day, on the 10th, he went to Lovas. I think

15 this was on the 11th. They came to Ilok on the 10th, but on the 11th they

16 went to Lovas. And then they informed me - me and others, representatives

17 of Ilok - that they had spoken to the new president of the local commune

18 in Lovas, and to put it briefly, I can say the following as regards to

19 what he said: There's a local committee consisting of five members. He

20 is a Serb, as the president; his deputy is again a Serb, and three are

21 honest Croats. He said that in Lovas 50 per cent of the population were

22 of local origin and others had settled there from Lika, that these

23 settlers from Lika, that 80 per cent of them should be expelled.

24 According to this statement, he was completely drunk, but never mind. He

25 also received a list of 21 victims that they had buried in a mass grave,

Page 25442

1 which had been killed by these units the day before.

2 Q. So this leadership consisted of two Serbs, three Croats, and they

3 were protesting against the behaviour of refugees coming from other parts

4 of Croatia.

5 A. No, no refuse had come from the Serbian part of Croatia. This was

6 just before Christmas.

7 Q. Well, where did these people come from? Why did they go there?

8 A. This was the population that had settled there earlier on.

9 Q. Oh, you mean after the Second World War.

10 A. Yes. Yes.

11 Q. Oh, I see.

12 Now, tell me, please: Since this seems to me to be quite

13 unbelievable, will you please explain to me. You say that you were

14 present when Mr. Rendulic, your man in Sid, asks General Arandjelovic why

15 some people were killed in Lovas and he answered, "It was revenge for the

16 killing of a JNA soldier and his body being found in a cornfield." Is it

17 possible that you heard such a conversation and that a JNA general would

18 explain that the JNA did this out of revenge?

19 A. No, not that I heard it but there were nine representatives of the

20 town of Ilok at that meeting. This multinational commission, there were

21 two Serbs, two Slovaks and Muslims and others on this commission and all

22 of them heard it.

23 Q. I understand that he interpreted what could have been the reason,

24 but not that the JNA had acted out of revenge.

25 A. No, the JNA had done it out of revenge.

Page 25443

1 Q. The JNA? Very well, Mr. Kraljevic. That statement I find quite

2 unbelievable and that's why I wanted to clarify it.

3 You mentioned the referendum, and a moment ago Mr. Saxon asked you

4 about this referendum. However, talking about the voting, do you know

5 that in that area, at those elections of 1990, the majority of Serbs voted

6 for the League of Communists of Croatia, the SDP of Ivica Racan, and that

7 on that list the number of -- a number of Serbs entered the Croatian

8 Assembly, from that list? So the Serbs from the area did not vote for any

9 Serb nationalist parties but they voted for the SKHDSP. Do you know that?

10 A. There were multinational elections. There were several parties,

11 and everyone voted as they wanted to vote. I am familiar with the results

12 of the elections.

13 Q. Are they the ones that I just pointed out to you?

14 A. I don't know. But I know the results of the election.

15 Q. The referendum. You explained the questions, and I am not going

16 to lose any time over those questions any longer. Since I do not know

17 except for these documents that were submitted to me, I don't know

18 anything else about your testimony. I read this agreement. I took the

19 agreement and I read it. I got it from the representatives of Mr. Saxon,

20 who put questions to you.

21 "Article 1: On the basis of the request of Ilok, Bapska, and

22 Sarengrad, and after --"

23 MR. SAXON: Could it simply be clarified which agreement

24 Mr. Milosevic is referring to? Because I believe we have more than one

25 document.

Page 25444

1 JUDGE MAY: And the witness should have a copy of it.

2 JUDGE KWON: I think it's tab 7.

3 JUDGE MAY: Is that right, Mr. Milosevic, tab 7? The agreement

4 refers to Sid --

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think so, yes. Yes. Seven, yes.

6 JUDGE MAY: Make sure the witness has got it before it's put to

7 him.

8 Mr. Kraljevic, I think it's coming up for you.

9 Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Yes, we now have it.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Article 1 reads as follows -- that's why I don't find what you're

12 saying very clear. How should I put this? You're talking about a kind of

13 behaviour from the JNA that would be quite unacceptable and it doesn't

14 stem from this agreement and that's why I want to have this clarified. I

15 see who the representatives were and I don't have to read all that out and

16 inter alia, you were there too, as a representative of the commission.

17 And then it says, "Based on the request of the residents of Ilok, Bapska,

18 Sarengrad, and after the referendum, all citizens of these settlements as

19 well as the refugees who happened to be in these places can move out if

20 they so wish along with the members of their families." So they can move

21 out. Those who wish to do so can do so, along with the members of their

22 families.

23 And Article 5 says: "Upon the exit of the citizens from the

24 above-mentioned settlements --" and there's a mistake there, a typo, "and

25 before convoys are formed, members of the JNA in the presence of MUP

Page 25445












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13 English transcripts.













Page 25446

1 organs and members of the European Community mission will search all

2 objects if there is a need for that."

3 And this is an agreement that was signed in the presence of the

4 representatives of the European Community. The JNA is make it possible

5 for everyone to leave all of those who wish to leave, that is.

6 And then Article 6, please: "JNA members take it upon themselves

7 to ensure the personal property and safety of citizens who will stay

8 behind in these settlements, as well as the property of citizens who used

9 to live in these settlements."

10 So when one reads this agreement, if I understand it correctly, a

11 number of citizens wished to move out, to leave in a safe way. And due to

12 the circumstances involved, they asked the JNA to make this possible for

13 them. They asked the JNA to make it possible for the citizens to do what

14 they wanted to do. And in Article 6 they say they take it upon themselves

15 to guarantee the safety of all of those who wish to remain as well as the

16 property of those who leave and nevertheless leave their property behind.

17 Isn't that right, Mr. Kraljevic?

18 A. We have to be aware of the conditions under which this agreement

19 came into being. First of all, this agreement, when it was signed, the

20 representatives of the international community were there, as is written

21 here. The behaviour of the Yugoslav army was quite different at that

22 point in time. Then at the previous meeting, when there were no

23 representatives of the international community present --

24 Q. Mr. Kraljevic --

25 A. Well, it's written here that this agreement, when you say here,

Page 25447

1 "On the basis of requests put forth by the residents of Ilok," that was

2 dictated. The citizens of Ilok did not wish to leave. They did not wish

3 to move out. We said quite clearly at that meeting that we did not want

4 the army to enter town. We said that arms would be handed over to the

5 police but that the army should not enter town. However, the army did not

6 agree to that. And we do know what had happened before. I've already

7 said this a few times. In all the places where the army walked in, it was

8 the paramilitaries who also came in under the protection of the army and

9 of course massacres happened.

10 Q. Oh, please. So they were not forced to go. They expressed their

11 wish to go from that area.

12 A. After the war, they returned. So who would move out of his house?

13 You know, wishing to do so. It's really a dubious wish when you have the

14 sword of Damocles hanging over your head.

15 Q. Were conflicts underway?

16 JUDGE MAY: Wait a moment. Wait a moment. You're both speaking

17 at the same time.

18 We're going to adjourn now.

19 You've got five minutes left, Mr. Milosevic, and then the amici,

20 if there are any questions.

21 Mr. Kraljevic, just a warning we have to give to all witnesses.

22 Don't speak to anybody about your evidence until it's over, please, and

23 that includes the members of the Prosecution team.

24 Twenty minutes.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, may I get a bit more than

Page 25448

1 five minutes? I mean, five minutes is truly not sufficient for me to

2 complete this examination.

3 JUDGE MAY: We'll consider that.

4 --- Recess taken at 12.20 p.m.

5 --- On resuming at 12.47 p.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: You have ten minutes, Mr. Milosevic.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]

8 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters cannot hear this, I'm afraid.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation].

10 Q. It says that this is at the request of the residents of Ilok, and

11 it is stated quite explicitly that that was the case that the

12 representatives of the European Community were present, that -- it is also

13 said that citizens who stay, citizens who do not wish to leave, would have

14 their personal safety guaranteed, as was the safety of their personal

15 property. And already in Article 7 it says that, "The organs of the MUP

16 from Ilok, about 60 of them, who possess official weapons will keep these

17 weapons." So they are not even disarming the police. The policemen who

18 were in Ilok will keep their personal weapons and they will go with them

19 and make it possible for them to come.

20 So is it clear from this agreement that this is at the request of

21 citizens, that the army is making it possible for those who -- who wish to

22 leave to leave safely, in view of the great many conflicts that were

23 taking place in the area, that kind of guarantee had to exist; whereas,

24 those who are staying behind will have their safety guaranteed, as well as

25 the safety of their property? Is that right or is that not right?

Page 25449

1 A. After signing this agreement, which was dictated to a great

2 extent -- it was dictated by a lawyer from Sid wearing a military

3 uniform -- we explained to the citizens that those who wished to stay

4 behind can stay behind and that those who wished to leave can leave in a

5 convoy. Then this agreement was signed with the army and the army would

6 guarantee safety, and that is what happened. However, there were other

7 examples as well.

8 Q. Please, I'm asking you about this now.

9 A. Please go ahead.

10 Q. I'm asking you about this. Is it clear that this was not under

11 any kind of coercion, that this was your wish, just as those who stayed

12 behind wished to stay behind?

13 A. Mr. Milosevic, it says in that ultimatum, "The army shall enter

14 town, take over town and exercise control over town," and that's exactly

15 what they did when we left and they would have done it even without that.

16 And of course, there would have been consequences like those that happened

17 in other towns.

18 Q. We cannot engage in guesswork now, what would have happened had it

19 happened.

20 Let's clarify something else here. You say that they talked to

21 you differently when the representatives of the European Community were

22 not there, but then on this occasion the representatives of the European

23 Community were there, so you could have objected. You could have said,

24 "We wanted to change Article 1 or Article 6, 7, 8," any article, in terms

25 of form and in terms of substance. This is something that constitutes an

Page 25450

1 agreement between two sides.

2 A. Mr. Milosevic, we asked that the army not enter town. We said

3 that the police could guarantee safety in town, and this was not allowed.

4 Another matter: What would have happened? What happened

5 happened. We see that those who stayed behind, 1500 people had to leave

6 their homes over these past five years. So it can be seen what the actual

7 purpose of this was.

8 Q. Well, it cannot be seen from this agreement. If you think it can

9 be seen from something else --

10 A. It can be seen. The army was satisfied to see the population

11 leave and to ethnically cleanse this area.

12 Q. On the basis of what do you draw that conclusion, that the army

13 was satisfied if the population left and it is guaranteeing the safety of

14 those who stayed behind?

15 A. Well, they want the population to leave.

16 Q. So that they would not guarantee their safety, those who stayed

17 behind why would they do that? It is the will of the citizens to leave,

18 not of the army.

19 A. Mr. Milosevic, the guarantee is the kind that was given

20 beforehand. They never abided by it. One thing was said and another

21 thing was being done.

22 Q. All right. Was this agreement carried out the way it was written

23 here?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Did the policemen keep their weapons?

Page 25451

1 A. Yes, they did.

2 Q. Were people safely transported and were they taken over by the

3 Croat police?

4 A. Yes. Yes. I can say that from a political and propaganda point

5 of view this was suitable.

6 Q. Oh, so it's for a political and propaganda reasons that they did

7 this. All right. It seems to me that we have sufficiently clarified this

8 agreement, then.

9 Please, what does this document mean? I see in the upper

10 right-hand corner it says, "SK2." It is 00366022, that number of yours,

11 list of the victims of the war for the homeland in 1992. Please take a

12 look at this. Not a single person got killed in Ilok.

13 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness have the document, if he can identify

14 it.

15 Mr. Saxon, can you assist us as to which document it is, please.

16 MR. SAXON: I am not sure which document. It may not be a

17 document that is part of this package, Your Honour.

18 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

19 Yes, Mr. Milosevic, what is the question about the document? And

20 then let the witness see it.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's this list of the civilian

22 victims of the homeland war until the 17th of October.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Please take a look at this. Not a single person got killed in

25 Ilok here.

Page 25452

1 JUDGE MAY: Have a look. Let the witness see the document.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Eleven names.

4 A. Let me say this: Frano Dobrinja and Samjuel Fabri were killed in

5 Vukovar. They were in a passenger vehicle.

6 Q. We don't have time for that.

7 A. Yes. Nada Vrbanic -- Nada Vrbanic got killed in Bapska. That is

8 the area of Ilok. After this, practically at the time of the signing of

9 the agreement itself, on the 14th of October in Bapska. That's when she

10 was killed.

11 Q. I just want to have this established. I am showing you this

12 document, and I am telling you that no one here was killed in Ilok, and

13 you are talking about Ilok.

14 A. I am talking about Ilok.

15 Q. And then I'm asking you about other things, and then you say that

16 you are talking about Ilok. But now I am asking you about Ilok.

17 A. I am talking about Ilok because Sarengrad, Bapska, Mohovo are

18 within Ilok.

19 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness identify this document.

20 Mr. Kraljevic, what is the document that you've been handed? Yes.

21 Can you tell us what the heading is? Can you tell us what the heading is,

22 please?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "List of civilian victims of the

24 homeland war." We simply listed the people who got killed during the war.

25 JUDGE MAY: Is that a document which you yourself produced or were

Page 25453

1 involved in producing?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, it is. I made this while I was

3 mayor-in-exile in 1995. I simply took the personal details down for all

4 the people who made contact with me, including the details of their family

5 who got killed, including the way in which they got killed, without any

6 further ambitions. For instance, Jule Saracevic got killed during the

7 shelling by the JNA of precisely the town of Sarengrad. Miroslav Kolak

8 and Tivic [phoen] got killed precisely when they wished to leave this

9 occupied territory outside of the convoy. And these citizens in the lower

10 part of the list got killed in this way. Many of them wished to leave the

11 location even before the convoy was organised, but instead they were taken

12 to a camp in Begejci, mistreated, and so on and so forth. There is a lot

13 of information. It's difficult to cover it now.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. We've seen this list, but let us look at the following list, which

16 you also introduced. It says, "SK3," "List of victims after the 17th of

17 December." You signed this.

18 A. I also registered the people who got killed in various ways, in

19 various locations.

20 Q. All right.

21 A. I mean only the people who made contact with me or their families.

22 Q. I see. I understand this. Look at this list, following the list

23 of victims of the homeland war. Under number 2, it says, "Killed outside

24 of his own house." In --

25 MR. SAXON: Your Honour.

Page 25454


2 MR. SAXON: [Microphone not activated] The witness does not have a

3 copy of this list.

4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

5 JUDGE MAY: Wait a moment. Let the accused have the question and

6 then the witness can have a look at it.

7 Yes.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All I have is this one copy that I

9 received from the associates of Mr. Saxon and I have several questions

10 regarding this document.

11 A. I know which list you're talking about. Go ahead.

12 Q. For instance, you listed the victims of the homeland war. And

13 under number 3 it says, "Suicide." Number 4, "suicide." Number 5,

14 "suicide." You wrote it yourself. Under number 6, you said "died."

15 Number 7, "died in January 1992," and so on.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Number 9, "Died in Opatija." Then again under number 11, somebody

18 with your last name, Kraljevic, "died." Number 12, "Died in Ilok due to

19 injuries sustained during a burglary." Number 13, again, "died."

20 A. Can I explain?

21 Q. Then it says one of them died in hospital. And then you have here

22 another suicide, number 32. 34, again suicide; 36, a woman who died

23 around a certain date. Then number 39, "traffic accident." Number 40,

24 "Stepped on a mine." Followed by many other names, "stepped on a mine."

25 Another name, "Died in hospital in Vukovar."

Page 25455

1 JUDGE MAY: I'm going to interrupt you to find out what's the

2 point of the question. What do you want to question the witness about?

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am asking the witness what victims

4 of the homeland war he's talking about in this list which he signed

5 himself.

6 JUDGE MAY: We have it.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Because it says here among other

8 things "got killed in a traffic accident."

9 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters cannot hear this.

10 JUDGE MAY: I am stopping this.

11 Let the witness have the document in front of him, and then he'll

12 answer the question.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I highlighted most of these names

14 which I read out.

15 A. Number 2, Matisa Sopta, "got killed outside of his house by the

16 JNA, a military patrol." He was killed simply because he had visited his

17 friends on the second day after the departure of the convoy. He only

18 crossed the road. He was a retiree from the JNA.

19 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kraljevic, as you will understand, time is rather

20 limited. The point that's being made is that some people are being listed

21 as suicide and traffic accident and they're listed under "Victims of the

22 war." And what I think is being suggested is that they can't be victims

23 of the war if they're in that position, if they were killed in traffic

24 accidents or suicide. Perhaps you could clarify that for us, please.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Milosevic has read out only

Page 25456

1 names where it says "suicide." He only read the word "suicide." But

2 before that word, there is the word "mistreatment." I would not like to

3 comment further upon this.

4 In most cases, people had been mistreated, and even this case

5 involving a traffic accident, the reason for the accident was never

6 established. You have all sorts of traffic accidents. I don't know what

7 exactly happened in this specific case. But in most cases listed here

8 people were killed. For instance, "Zoran Urban, killed at night in the

9 Matija Gubac Street." He was not killed by the JNA but he was killed

10 during the occupation of Ilok and various killings happened during that

11 time, because law and order were not maintained at the time and that's why

12 a huge number of people left, moved out.

13 JUDGE MAY: Do you want -- do you want those two lists exhibited,

14 Mr. Milosevic?

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, since --

16 JUDGE MAY: Very well. They will be exhibited and given the next

17 two numbers, please.

18 THE REGISTRAR: Defence Exhibit 175, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kraljevic, can I ask you: Are you saying

20 that even in the cases of traffic accidents, that those persons were

21 mistreated by the JNA prior to their traffic accidents?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There is only one traffic accident

23 or maybe two on this list. I don't think either of them is -- involves

24 any mistreatment by the JNA. But they may be victims in some other way.

25 What I mean to say specifically, this does not involve the JNA.

Page 25457

1 JUDGE MAY: One more question, Mr. Milosevic, because your time is

2 well and truly up.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. May.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Let me just ask you a couple of things about the documents that

6 you produced. For instance, under number "SK4," you are providing a list

7 of people who stayed in Ilok after 17 October 1991 but were expelled. Tell

8 me, where were they expelled and who expelled them?

9 A. The pressure on people by the police of Krajina, who was in power

10 in Ilok, was constant, but there was also pressure by individual citizens.

11 Q. You have a list of people expelled in 1995. Who expelled them in

12 1995?

13 A. In 1995, particularly after the entry into Ilok of these refugees

14 from the area of Knin and other parts, there was enormous pressure on the

15 citizens still remaining.

16 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tapuskovic now.

17 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would kindly ask

18 Mr. Kraljevic to provide some more explanations about his statement given

19 on the 8th of November, 1995.

20 Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:

21 Q. [Interpretation] You said, Mr. Kraljevic, on page 4 that the total

22 population of Ilok at that time was 6.797. Is that true?

23 A. The number of residents, yes, according to the 1991 census, was

24 6.797.

25 Q. Then in paragraph 6 you said in June 1991, "Units were always

Page 25458

1 affiliated -- TO units were always affiliated to the JNA." But you say,

2 "After the proclamation of independence in June, the town of Ilok formed a

3 Civilian Defence Force which was affiliated to the police." Is that

4 correct?

5 A. I don't know where this passage is exactly.

6 Q. Paragraph 6. In B/C/S, it's page 2, second paragraph from below.

7 A. "Units of the civilian protection of Ilok consisted of up to 500

8 men."

9 Q. I'll ask you about that later. But you said further down that the

10 town of Ilok, following the proclamation of independence in June formed a

11 Civilian Defence Force which was affiliated to the police. Is that

12 written here?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Now, the last sentence: "The unit of the Ilok Civilian Defence

15 consisted of about 200 men. They were armed by the police and financed by

16 local donations. Their weapons were mainly rifles and later on they

17 procured five grenade launchers. Their commander was Josip Vuletic." Is

18 that correct?

19 A. Yes. Yes.

20 Q. Now, tell me only one thing: Why in the month of June, that is,

21 immediately after the proclamation of independence, with no conflict

22 around, was it necessary to arm 200 men out of the total of 6.997

23 population with rifles and grenade launchers?

24 A. I don't think it was exactly as it's written here.

25 Q. That's what you stated.

Page 25459

1 A. There were about 30 men, but in June they had only perhaps several

2 rifles. The rest of the equipment, the weaponry, was procured later.

3 Apart from that, there were those events on the bridge and they preceded

4 this.

5 Q. I'm quoting your words, when you were speaking about the June of

6 1991 and 200 men being armed with rifles.

7 A. That is not correct. There were not that many rifles then.

8 Q. Thank you. But if we look at tab 2 now, speaking about that

9 ultimatum. And it is addressed to the residents of Bapska village. In

10 the first sentence, tab 2 of the document, it says: "For some time now,

11 JNA units stationed in the municipality of Vukovar have been subjected to

12 attacks by members of the home guard -- National Guard Corps, the Croatian

13 MUP, and armed civilians." Is this correct? Because you've said that

14 they had put an ultimatum, in a certain sense. But is this first sentence

15 correct? Is it true that there were incidents like this, that armed

16 civilians attacked JNA units?

17 A. That is written by this JNA major, no one else. He is stating his

18 opinion.

19 Q. That's how I understood it myself. But you said in paragraph 15

20 of your statement, and you testified to it a moment ago, that you were

21 willing to turn over your weapons to the police, because it is the

22 police's task to maintain law and order. It says here: "We were not

23 ready to turn over our weapons to the JNA."

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. So you were not prepared -- you were prepared to give your weapons

Page 25460

1 to the police, who gave you those weapons in the first place, and not the

2 JNA.

3 A. That's right.

4 Q. Now, answer only a couple of more questions relating to the

5 document under tab 6. You did not wish to surrender your weapons to the

6 JNA and you decided to leave this territory instead.

7 A. The weaponry was at the end of the day surrendered to the JNA.

8 When we were leaving, we turned over our weapons to the JNA.

9 Q. You didn't mention it a single time until this moment.

10 A. It's written in the agreement.

11 Q. But did you really do it?

12 A. Yes, we did.

13 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Saxon.

14 Re-examined by Mr. Saxon:

15 Q. Mr. Kraljevic, during his cross-examination, Mr. Milosevic asked

16 whether you and your fellow citizens were forced to go when the convoy

17 left Ilok on the 17th of October. And you responded and made a reference

18 to a sword of Damocles hang over your head. First of all, did you leave

19 as well on the 17th of October in that convoy? Did you leave Ilok on that

20 day?

21 A. Yes, I did.

22 Q. Did you feel you had any choice?

23 A. I felt I had no choice.

24 Q. Mr. Milosevic showed you the document that was at tab 9, which is

25 a list of people who were expelled from the Ilok area during 1993. Did

Page 25461

1 you create that list?

2 A. Yes, I did.

3 Q. You mentioned that pressure was put on people who remained in

4 Ilok. What kind of pressure was put on people so that they felt compelled

5 to leave? Can you be more specific?

6 A. As soon as our convoy left Ilok, army troops entered. But the

7 police also organised themselves. I believe that in effect only one

8 policeman remained in Ilok. Many citizens were taken into custody to

9 police headquarters, to the basement of the police headquarters, and

10 mistreated. Many residents were forced to look where mines were located.

11 They were abused. It was indeed atrocious suffering for individuals, and

12 many people were also stigmatised. Fingers were constantly pointed at

13 people, saying that they belonged to the HDZ, that they were hiding

14 weapons, and it happened all over the place, in Sarengrad, in Bapska

15 village, but also in our town, in Ilok.

16 Q. Did Serb refugees from other parts of the region come to Ilok

17 after 1991?

18 A. The arrival of refugees from other parts of the country started

19 around Christmas of 1991. A little before that, some refugees had come

20 from Vukovar and they settled in empty homes and sometimes in homes that

21 were already inhabited by Croats and were then expelled.

22 Q. So did the arrival of Serb refugees in Ilok increase the pressure

23 on persons who had stayed in the town?

24 A. Yes.

25 MR. SAXON: Thank you. Nothing further.

Page 25462

1 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kraljevic, that concludes your evidence. Thank

2 you for coming to the International Tribunal to give it. You are now free

3 to go.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

5 [The witness withdrew]

6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, the next witness is a protected

7 witness. It's the witness C-1175, and some arrangements have to be made.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.


10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] [redacted]

11 [redacted]

12 [redacted]

13 [redacted]

14 JUDGE MAY: Could we have the current designation repeated. Could

15 you repeat it for us, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?

16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. It's C-1175.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18 [The witness entered court]

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness take the declaration.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

21 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.


23 [Witness answered through interpreter]

24 JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.

25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.

Page 25463

1 Examined by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:

2 Q. Sir, please have a look at the sheet of paper in front of you, the

3 pseudonym sheet, and is -- in the first line, is this your name?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. In these proceedings, you will be referred to by the number

6 C-1175. Your request for protective measures has been granted.

7 Witness, did you give a statement to an investigator of the Office

8 of the Prosecutor in the year 2001?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. In a subsequent session with this same investigator, were you

11 shown photos from which you identified a glazier and amateur photographer

12 that you knew from Vukovar?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Did you review this statement and its supplement in the presence

15 of a court officer in June of this year and confirm its correctness except

16 for one correction?

17 A. Yes.

18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, the Prosecution would like to

19 tender the 92 bis package for the witness, including two sketches and a

20 photo that were actually used during the interviews and referred to in the

21 statements.

22 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 517, Your Honour.

23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I would now like to read a

24 summary of the witness's evidence and just ask very few additional

25 questions.

Page 25464


2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Witness C-1175 is of Serb ethnicity. In 1991

3 during the events the witness lived in Dalj. End of August, beginning of

4 September 1991, for a period of three weeks the witness served in the

5 Territorial Defence of Dalj and was assigned to the Territorial Defence

6 headquarters. After that, after he left the TO, he used to visit the TO

7 headquarters frequently.

8 The TO headquarters was situated in the building of the local

9 community. The TO commander at that time was Pavle Milanovic, aka Pajo, a

10 certain Milorad Stricevic, who called himself Colonel, was in charge of a

11 the TO security and led a police unit. He resided in a building behind

12 the local community building. The witness observed that

13 Zeljko Raznjatovic, aka Arkan visited both Milanovic and Stricevic. He

14 also saw Radovan Stojcevic, known as Badza and a certain Zavisic come to

15 the TO headquarters. The witness provided a sketch of the layout of the

16 local community building.

17 The witness C-1175 observed non-Serb inhabitants, Croats and

18 Hungarians, being interrogated, mistreated, and beaten and also detained

19 by the TO and the members of the police unit command by Stricevic.

20 Volunteers also came from Prigrevica to Dalj to interrogate and beat

21 detainees. The witness made these observations during his time in the TO

22 and during his subsequent visits.

23 Could the sketch, tab 4 of Exhibit 517 be put to the witness. And

24 could it be put on the ELMO, please.

25 JUDGE KWON: Is it not under seal?

Page 25465

1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Oh, yes, it is.

2 We can put it actually on the ELMO, just not showing the -- the

3 initials on it. The reason why it's under seal, because of the initials

4 being put to this. Yes.

5 Q. Witness, could you point out to us with a pointer in which

6 building you worked and where the TO headquarter was?

7 A. [Indicates]

8 Q. For the record, the witness is pointing at a building indicated as

9 local community building TO headquarter.

10 And could you also point out the building where Milorad Stricevic

11 was residing?

12 A. [Indicates]

13 Q. The witness is pointing at the building on the right side behind

14 the community building indicated as offices and prison. Yes.

15 And the -- you mentioned that people were kept -- Hungarians and

16 Croats were kept and beaten in this facility. Can you point out where you

17 saw that happen?

18 A. Here.

19 Q. The witness is pointing at the right side building where "prison"

20 is indicated.

21 You also mentioned volunteers from Prigrevica. Where did you see

22 them beat people?

23 A. Here, also in the prison.

24 Q. The witness is again indicating that same building indicated as

25 "prison."

Page 25466

1 Yes, thank you. That's enough for this building.

2 And just one additional point: Where is Prigrevica situated?

3 A. Prigrevica is between Apatin and Sombor.

4 Q. Does that mean it's in Serbia?

5 A. In Serbia, yes.

6 Q. And these volunteers from Prigrevica, what did they look like?

7 A. They wore beards. They had Sajkaca caps on, the fur caps.

8 Q. Were they associated to any politician or any political party?

9 A. As far as I know, no.

10 Q. Did they cooperate with the Dalj TO or Stricevic?

11 A. They only came to see Stricevic.

12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, I'll continue now with the

13 summary.

14 Following the fall of Vukovar, a large number of inhabitants from

15 Vukovar were brought to Dalj by busses and trucks escorted by JNA. The

16 busses and trucks were first taken to the JNA headquarters in Dalj, which

17 was in the IPK Ratarstvo near the Dalj Railway Station. The women were

18 then taken to the Red Cross and transferred to the Dalj Cinema for

19 overnight accommodation and then sent by busses to Serbia.

20 A group of men from Vukovar was detained in the Dalj police

21 station that was situated in the building Stara Zadruga. Others were

22 detained in the TO building or the building where Stricevic was located.

23 From among the detainees from Vukovar held at the TO headquarter, the

24 witness was able to obtain the release of individuals known to him by

25 obtaining permission from Pavle Milanovic.

Page 25467

1 Q. In paragraph -- witness, in paragraph 16, in relation to your

2 efforts to get one of your friends released, you said that you were afraid

3 that something bad could happen to them. What did you fear could happen

4 to them?

5 A. I was afraid that perhaps the people from Prigrevica could get

6 hold of them or people like them.

7 Q. In paragraph 13 of your statement, you referred to the JNA

8 headquarter in Ilok. Did the JNA and the TO cooperate? Do you know that?

9 A. To some extent they cooperated, but I don't really know much about

10 that.

11 Q. Did you see them meet, that is, Mr. Milanovic or -- and the JNA

12 staff?

13 A. I saw Milovanovic going to the JNA.

14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, I'll continue with the summary.

15 Several days after the fall of Vukovar, TO Commander Milanovic

16 came to the witness's home and told him that he needed help with the

17 burial of dead bodies. Witness C-1175 together with Milanovic and a third

18 person drove to the Lovas Farm and observed approximately ten to eleven

19 dead bodies wearing civilian clothing scattered on a slope leading towards

20 the Danube River. The witness provided a sketch of the location

21 indicating the place where he found the bodies.

22 Milanovic told the witness that the victims had been killed by TO

23 members from Borovo Selo. A police officer, Mr. Obradovic from Vukovar,

24 also arrived and instructed the witness and that other person what to do

25 with the bodies. With the assistance of this third person, Witness C-1175

Page 25468

1 loaded the partially decomposed bodies onto the shovel of an excavator.

2 The excavator took the bodies to another place within the farm compound.

3 The witness recognised one of the dead as a glazier and amateur

4 photographer he knew from Vukovar.

5 Q. Witness, one additional question: Did the police officer

6 Obradovic explain why the bodies had to be removed?

7 A. Well, he said, first of all, that they needed to be buried and

8 that foreign monitors were expected, so that these bodies shouldn't be

9 found there when they came.

10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, these are the questions that

11 the Prosecution has.

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

13 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

14 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. 1175, you were born in Dalj; isn't that

15 right?

16 A. No. I was born in Vukovar.

17 Q. But during the time you're testifying about, you were living in

18 Dalj.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And all the things you're testifying about relate to Dalj; is that

21 right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Was there any JNA unit in Dalj?

24 A. A unit came to PP Dalj.

25 Q. What is that?

Page 25469

1 A. It's an agricultural cooperative.

2 Q. When did that unit arrive?

3 A. I can't tell you the exact date, but after the fall of Vukovar.

4 Q. Very well. Was that unit present when these events that you're

5 testifying about took place?

6 A. They were there in the cooperative.

7 Q. And those JNA members, did they have anything to do with any

8 illegal activities?

9 A. Up there as civilians we didn't really have much access. They

10 were mostly within that compound.

11 Q. Did you see that unit engaging in any kind of activities?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Did you see that unit arresting or mistreating anyone?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Tell me, please: Judging by what I heard at the beginning, you

16 were for a time a member of the Territorial Defence, weren't you?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. For how long were you a member of the TO?

19 A. For about a month.

20 Q. When did you join the TO?

21 A. Around the 25th of August, 1991.

22 Q. 1991. I see. Were only Serbs in the TO?

23 A. Mostly.

24 Q. But who else was in the TO, apart from the Serbs?

25 A. There would be one or two Hungarians.

Page 25470

1 Q. Any other ethnicity?

2 A. No, none.

3 Q. And as a Serb, you joined voluntarily. Nobody mobilised you, did

4 they?

5 A. No. I volunteered.

6 Q. And you left on a voluntary basis too.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. No one kept you. No one forced you to stay.

9 A. No.

10 Q. Which means that the TO of Dalj, all the members of that TO, were

11 local volunteers; is that right?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Were they all from Dalj or were there people from the area

14 surrounding it?

15 A. From Dalj -- mostly from Dalj.

16 Q. And apart from those that were from Dalj, where were the others

17 from?

18 A. There were some from Erdut.

19 Q. I see, from the environs, in other words.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Thank you. In your statement, you say that problems between Serbs

22 and Croats in Dalj started around March 1991; is that right, Mr. 1175?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Now, tell me, please: Do you mean, when you use the word

25 "problems", some sort of armed conflict or do you mean other problems?

Page 25471

1 A. Armed conflicts.

2 Q. I see. So in March 1991.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And who provoked those armed conflicts?

5 A. I think the Croats started it.

6 Q. In what way?

7 A. There was exchange of fire. There were quarrels and fights break

8 out, and then people were taken into custody.

9 Q. Taken into custody by the Croatian police?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And up until the 1990 elections and the formation of the new

12 police force, was it peaceful in Dalj and were relations among the

13 population good?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And there were no inter-ethnic clashes, hatred, quarrels, and so

16 on?

17 A. No, there weren't.

18 Q. From your statement, I see that some Croats in the village started

19 receiving weapons; isn't that right?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. As I understand it, these weapons were brought in in a TAM truck

22 and then distributed among the Croats.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Do you have any idea as to the quantity of weapons that were

25 distributed to the Croatian inhabitants of Dalj?

Page 25472

1 A. Well, quite a lot.

2 Q. Could you be a bit more specific?

3 A. A hundred or so barrels, for certain.

4 Q. When you say "barrels," you mean automatic rifles?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And before they were armed, that is, before this incident occurred

7 when you mentioned the TAM truck bringing in weapons, were there any

8 incidents provoked by the Serbs against the Croats?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Were there any incidents by the Croats against Serbs before this?

11 A. Yes, there were provocations and things like that.

12 Q. Tell me, after the weapons were distributed, what started to

13 happen?

14 A. Well, I don't know how to call them. Their patrols and guards

15 started roaming the streets and so on.

16 Q. Is it true that as early as April 1991 - because you said that the

17 clashes started already in March - that in Dalj a number of Serbs were

18 arrested and taken to Osijek? Is that correct?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And is it true that they were badly beaten up over there?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Did you have any idea what could have prompted their arrest and

23 beating in prison?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Did they do something that -- at least that you knew about or

Page 25473

1 heard about?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Well, why, then, in your opinion, were they arrested and taken

4 there and beaten up?

5 A. It is very difficult to explain the reason.

6 Q. And the incident in April, when a certain number of Serbs were

7 arrested and taken away and beaten up, did this cause serious concern

8 among the Serb population of Dalj?

9 A. Yes, it did.

10 Q. Did people spontaneously rally in front of the police building in

11 Dalj?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. What happened then? The people gathered there and they came to

14 protest, to inquire?

15 A. Yes, they demanded their immediate release.

16 Q. But there was no violence then?

17 A. No, there was no violence.

18 Q. Well, what was the response they were given?

19 A. The response was that they would be released shortly and they did

20 release them in the afternoon around 4.00.

21 Q. And then you found out that they had been beaten up.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. What did they tell you? Did you speak to any one of them? What

24 did they want from them?

25 A. Allegedly they found them in the park. They took them into

Page 25474

1 custody and beat them up.

2 Q. Because they were sitting in the park?

3 A. From what I heard, they arrested them in the park.

4 Q. Apart from this incident, do you recall - and this incident

5 obviously contributed to the concern of the Serb population in Dalj, as

6 you confirmed - do you recall the event that took place in Borovo Selo, a

7 neighbouring village?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Did this incident, too, have a negative effect on the feeling and

10 mood and did it prompt the fear among the Serbs in the area?

11 A. Yes, it did.

12 Q. And do you know that a serious conflict, armed conflict occurred

13 then between the Croatian police, which had attacked the Serb population

14 of Borovo Selo? Was that what happened?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Tell me, please: Is it correct to say that they broke into the

17 village and opened fire on the citizens?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Without any prior warning?

20 A. Without any prior warning.

21 Q. And this happened in the very centre of Borovo Selo?

22 A. Yes, the very centre of the town.

23 Q. Is the information I have correct, Mr. 1175, as this was in your

24 neighbourhood, that they killed one of the locals and in the clinic they

25 held hostage women and the staff of the outpatients clinic and children?

Page 25475

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Is it true that through the intervention of a JNA unit these

3 Croatian soldiers or, rather, policemen were saved and they were allowed

4 to leave the village? Is that right?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. On the basis of your own knowledge, is the announcement correct

7 issued by the command of the 1st Army the next day, that the members of

8 the JNA during the tragic events in Borovo Selo did not use firearms nor

9 did they fire a single shot but that thanks to the engagement of the JNA

10 unit, armed conflicts were prevented and further bloodshed?

11 A. Yes, that is correct.

12 Q. So this incident you are aware of that took place in your

13 neighbourhood. The JNA arrived and without using weapons managed to stop

14 the conflict and save the Croatian policemen that had attacked the

15 citizens of Borovo Selo.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Do you know anything about the fact that after this fortunately

18 unsuccessful operation in Borovo Selo groups were organised to terrorise

19 the Serb population, groups for silent liquidations, as they were known?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Do you know anything at all about the victims of those groups?

22 A. No.

23 Q. And do you remember that on the 3rd of May, 1991 the Sareka

24 [phoen] restaurant was blown up, the ownership of Djordje Pesic [phoen]

25 from Borovo Selo?

Page 25476

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. On the 15th of April, 1991, the Krajisk [phoen] coffee bar was

3 blown up, also the property of a Serb; is that right?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And on the 6th of May, a coffee bar called Tufo [phoen], and there

6 were various other planted mines and armed attacks on property owned by

7 Serbs.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Were those acts which should have made it clear to the Serbs that

10 they should leave, that they were unwanted there?

11 A. Yes.

12 JUDGE MAY: And that appears to be an appropriate time to break

13 off.

14 Mr. Milosevic, you will have you have to three-quarters of an hour

15 more cross-examination, if you require it, tomorrow.

16 Witness C-1175, could you remember not to speak to anybody about

17 your evidence during the adjournment, and don't speak to anybody until

18 it's over, and that does include the members of the Prosecution team.

19 Could you be back, please, at 9.00 tomorrow morning to conclude your

20 evidence.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I will.

22 JUDGE MAY: We'll adjourn.

23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m.,

24 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 28th day of

25 August, 2003, at 9.00 a.m.