Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 27870

1 Wednesday, 22 October 2003

2 [Open session]

3 [The witness entered court]

4 [The accused entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

7 Mr. NICE: I have no further questions of the witness. There are

8 two administrative matters before cross-examination. The first, it would

9 greatly assist us if we could know how much cross-examination there may be

10 of the witness in order to make arrangements for calling or not calling

11 the next witness, who would be travelling some distance to The Hague.

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, we have in mind three hours, but then the

13 amicus may have some questions. I don't know who's representing the

14 amicus today. Well, we'll give some time for Mr. Tapuskovic.

15 Mr. NICE: It looks as though the whole day may be consumed.

16 JUDGE MAY: I would have thought effectively the whole day is

17 going to be taken up.

18 Mr. NICE: And 30 seconds, with your leave, in private session.

19 [Private session]

20 [redacted]

21 [redacted]

22 [redacted]

23 [redacted]

24 [redacted]

25 [redacted]

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Page 27872

1 [redacted]

2 [redacted]

3 [redacted]

4 [redacted]

5 [redacted]

6 [redacted]

7 [redacted]

8 [redacted]

9 [redacted]

10 [redacted]

11 [redacted]

12 [Open session]

13 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

14 Mr. NICE: Your Honours, I think I've explained I have no further

15 questions of this witness. I understand there are some observations that

16 she wishes to add to the evidence she gave yesterday, and I'll sit down

17 while she makes those observations.

18 JUDGE MAY: Mrs. Gajic-Glisic, if you want to add something to

19 your evidence, now is your opportunity to do so.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I should like to say that

21 everything that I wrote down in my book entitled "The Serbian Army,"

22 published in five editions, and everything that I made a note of, I did

23 publicly in the cabinet of the minister of the army, pursuant to

24 permission from General Simovic. I should also like to say that he

25 authorised it all twice; the first time was for the Nin publishers and the

Page 27873

1 second time was for the book itself. And I would like to say that what

2 you have before you, all the documents you have before you and the book,

3 that that is thanks, first of all, to General Simovic, and also thanks to

4 President Milosevic, of course, who could have prohibited it all and put a

5 ban on it had he wanted to.

6 I continued to maintain that I did my best to make a note of all

7 the facts and it was just supposed to be a report to my people and I never

8 imagined that this would be evidence in a court of law.

9 I should also like to state that in agreement with the

10 Prosecutors, we agreed, in fact, that I should be a witness here and that

11 I should say everything not only as a witness for the Prosecution but

12 everything else that I know about what was happening during that period of

13 time. So I am ready and willing to answer any questions to the best of my

14 knowledge and as far as I am able.

15 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

16 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.


18 [Witness answered through interpreter]

19 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

20 Q. [Interpretation] Mrs. Glisic, in the examination-in-chief -- I

21 don't think my microphone was switched on, was it?

22 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

23 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Ms. Gajic-Glisic, in the examination-in-chief you skimmed through

25 some matters briefly, so I should like to ask you now to give us some more

Page 27874

1 detailed explanations about some of these issues, to make them clearer,

2 and in order to make certain distinctions which I just saw some

3 intimations of in your explanations, probably due to the shortness of time

4 you were not able to go into them in any depth. But before I do so,

5 before I go on to my questions, I should like to ask you something with

6 respect to your status. I'm sure you know that until yesterday morning,

7 until you entered this courtroom, you were treated as a protected witness

8 by -- and you had a pseudonym and we were also told that we would be

9 having a closed -- a private session. Did you ask for that?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Well, how come that you suddenly changed your mind and decided to

12 testify in open session?

13 A. My sons asked that of me. They said, "This is an opportunity, an

14 occasion to take -- to state that you're not a spy, to take all this onus

15 away from you."

16 Q. And when did you make the decision, yesterday or earlier?

17 A. Yesterday morning I asked the gentleman, Mr. Nice, whether I

18 could ask Their Honours before I begin, Your Honours, can I now speak

19 quite openly and frankly? Because that's what my sons have asked me to

20 do.

21 Q. Very well. Thank you. I asked you that question because when

22 you had the protection -- protective witness regime, I was given some very

23 limited information about this because nobody is supposed to know who the

24 witness is except my two associates. And then, of course, it is very

25 difficult to collect the necessary information and material I need. But

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Page 27876

1 you've clarified that issue, and I have no questions.

2 A. I do apologise to you, but my life is an open book. In my 17

3 books, I have described my life, and I shall be happy to tell you anything

4 you need to know about my life publicly.

5 Q. Let's just clear up some matters first, some things that I think

6 have remained fairly -- have not been described sufficiently because of

7 your -- the briefness of the time you had. First of all, the question of

8 volunteers. May we observe -- or rather, is it true and correct that

9 there is a drastic difference between volunteers, the ones you dealt with

10 in the sense of assistance or recording and keeping records of them and

11 the paramilitary formations which you just mentioned by the by yesterday.

12 You mentioned certain formations such as the Dusan Silni, the White

13 Eagles, Paroski, Mauzer, et cetera, and you said yesterday that they

14 weren't within the system and that you had nothing to do with them nor did

15 the ministry have anything to do with them. Is that right?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. So there the difference is quite clear; right?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Now, what you say about volunteers applies exclusively,

20 therefore, to the volunteers who signed up to the JNA or the Territorial

21 Defence; is that right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. The JNA in 1991 was a regular army of the Socialist Federal

24 Republic of Yugoslavia throughout its territory; isn't that right?

25 A. Yes.

Page 27877

1 Q. The Territorial Defence, depending on where it was under the

2 command of the Territorial Defence of the municipality in which it was a

3 Territorial Defence; is that right?

4 A. Yes. The commanders of those staffs, commands, were the

5 presidents of the local community or municipality, and all together they

6 were under the command of the JNA, and I don't think I'm wrong there.

7 Q. Very well. Now, with respect to these other units which you

8 mentioned, you also mentioned, for instance, the Serb Volunteer Guards of

9 Zeljko Raznjatovic, Arkan.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And you also mentioned Captain Dragan; is that right?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Do you know that that Serbian Volunteer Guard of Zeljko

14 Raznjatovic, Arkan, was under the command of the Territorial Defence of

15 Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem?

16 A. Yes. But it was also linked up with the MUP of Serbia, and the

17 MUP of Serbia from time to time would mobilise certain members for

18 assistance to the Serbian Volunteer Guards.

19 Q. I don't know about that, so I'd like to ask you to explain it to

20 me. Because as far as I understand it, you received that information from

21 Simovic. On what grounds were you able to conclude that the Serbian

22 Volunteer Guards was linked up to the MUP of Serbia?

23 A. I got that information, first of all -- or rather, we received

24 that information from Minister Zoran Sokolovic. Now, if you will give me

25 a little time, I would like to give you an example to illustrate how I

Page 27878

1 know this.

2 Q. Well, tell me, please, but just briefly, because I have to take

3 care of my time.

4 A. I received information that I was to find a mobilised recruit

5 quickly for personal reasons, and I was told that his wife was in a very

6 difficult situation, that she was actually dying, and that he had been

7 mobilised and I was asked to find him and have him return to Belgrade. As

8 a wife and mother and woman, I did my very best to find the unit he had

9 been mobilised into, but we failed to find him in any of the war units of

10 the army. And then General Simovic asked, "Well, Zoran, where can we find

11 Pelovic? Who mobilised him in the first place?" and I said, "You General;

12 we did, General." And he said, "How come you?" "Well," they said, "we

13 sent him to help Arkan." And I rang up Arkan's headquarters and

14 Mr. Pelovic told me, "Well, my mother gave birth nine times and I came

15 here to fight. You don't suppose that I'm going to desert and leave home

16 [as interpreted] just because my wife is going to give birth." And then

17 Mr. Zoran Sokolovic said, "Well, we mobilise occasionally members from the

18 reserve force of our police to provide assistance to Arkan's volunteers."

19 So it is the present-day president of the Party of Serbian Unity,

20 in fact, that's the man I'm talking about, and that was the information I

21 had and I apologise to the Prosecutors for the fact that I have some

22 personal, very deep emotional ties with the daughter of Professor Dr.

23 Citic [phoen] from the medical military academy. She was married to Mr.

24 Pelovic, in fact, and Dr. Citic at that time operated on my son. And I

25 did my utmost to have this man returned from the battlefield.

Page 27879

1 Q. Well, Pelovic was in contact -- actually, he was in the Party of

2 Serbian Unity, that is not at issue.

3 A. The Party of Serbian Unity was, Mr. President, formed later on.

4 Q. Yes, that is quite true. But I don't know that he recruited on

5 the part of the ministry. All he did was -- I think he independently, as

6 a patriot and an intellectual, became involved in some assistance over

7 there.

8 A. I apologise, but he was president of the King Alliance of boxers,

9 I think. I don't know the sports organisations. But as such he was on

10 the war list of the police, the Serb police, in fact.

11 Q. Yes. But I assume that it was voluntarily that he joined the

12 Serb Volunteer Guards. It wasn't the police that could send him to the

13 Serbian Volunteer Guards because the Serb Volunteer Guards was never a

14 formation of the police force.

15 A. Mr. Zoran Sokolovic at the time claimed it was.

16 Q. I'm afraid that you might have misunderstood Sokolovic, because

17 that is impossible. But I assume that you are speaking in good faith and

18 to the best of your knowledge.

19 A. Yes. I am speaking in good faith, and I would like

20 whole-heartedly, first of all, to help you and my people, but primarily by

21 telling the truth.

22 Q. Yes, absolutely. So that's the only way that can be done. Tell

23 me this now, please: All the things you did with the volunteers, that the

24 Ministry of Defence did vis-a-vis the volunteers, was it in conformity

25 with the laws, the rules?

Page 27880

1 A. Yes. Yes.

2 Q. Now, Mr. Nice even asked you whether I knew about some provision

3 or decree that is brought in by the government or the ministry.

4 A. Yes. Provisions are enacted by the government at the proposal of

5 the various ministries.

6 Q. Now, as far as Captain Dragan is concerned, he was here and said

7 that he came from Australia alone. Nobody called him or invited him to

8 come. And he wasn't within the composition of the Ministry of the

9 Interior at all.

10 A. He said differently to us at meetings, and if you would like, I

11 should be happy to show you the original -- my original notes, in fact,

12 that I typed out and brought to your cabinet. And Their Honours can

13 ascertain and establish that those notes date back to those times. So I

14 don't know the other side of the coin; all I know is what he told us.

15 Q. Well, I assume you know that Captain Dragan exclusively became

16 involved as an instructor on different occasions and so probably in that

17 capacity with respect to the training of individuals from the police. But

18 that has nothing to do with his participation as a volunteer somewhere on

19 the battlefront, outside Serbia.

20 A. He told us that he was sent or invited by Mr. Radmilo Bogdanovic,

21 and that was all directed by Jovica Stanisic, and that with him there were

22 another six in that first departure for Knin, there were six more specials

23 from the state security who were in Knin as instructors.

24 Q. He testified here in this courtroom and said that he had come

25 alone himself and that he worked exclusively and as an instructor, that he

Page 27881












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Page 27882

1 was not in any combat, did not take part in any combat operations.

2 JUDGE MAY: Well, that's not my recollection of the captain's

3 evidence. I seem to recollect that he was involved in a combat operation

4 involving a police station. We can check it out. But in any event, I

5 mean, the important thing here is what he may or may not have said to this

6 witness. That's what's relevant. What he said here is not relevant

7 necessarily to that.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May.

9 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. You say that Stanisic orchestrated that, his arrival. And you

11 know that in 1991 Stanisic was not head of state security.

12 A. As far as I remember, Mr. Stanisic at the time was the chef de

13 cabinet of Mr. Zoran Sokolovic, and the head of state security was

14 Mr. Janjackovic. I had very good cooperation with Mr. Zoran Janjackovic,

15 and with Mr. Stanisic I just had several conversations with him over the

16 phone with our special telephone line.

17 Q. All right. As far as my information tells me, he wasn't even

18 Sokolovic's chef de cabinet. But never mind, we're not going to pursue

19 the point.

20 A. Mr. President, if you would like to see them, these are notes

21 from Botic's villa, from the meeting held there. I wrote that because my

22 conscience dictated that I take these notes without any intentions or any

23 thought of having an opportunity at some point in the future to show them.

24 So these are my notes from that period, from the meeting with Captain

25 Dragan, and he speaks about his combat activities there in that area over

Page 27883

1 there.

2 Q. So he is providing you, actually, with information about what was

3 going on and where he was involved; is that right?

4 A. Yes, that he was involved in combat action.

5 Q. But he is providing you with information. So this is a sort of

6 debriefing of Captain Dragan by the service and by you too from the

7 ministry, to get to know what was going on in the area.

8 A. Well, I see the meeting -- or rather, the meeting was organised

9 by the police and state security, and he was brought to Botic's villa by a

10 police car.

11 Q. Yes, I understand that. But let's clear this up. They were

12 gathering information, intelligence, about what was going on over there.

13 He was over there, so then he provided you with the information you wanted

14 to know from the defence and the police, to tell you what was going on

15 over there. So this link, this connection actually boiled down to

16 providing you with information about -- and intelligence about what was

17 going on over there. Had you sent him there, I assume you would have

18 known what was going on over there and you wouldn't have expected him to

19 have to tell you.

20 A. Well, he began talking of his own bat. The meeting began that we

21 were engaging him to train volunteers in Bubanj Potok.

22 Q. That's a different matter altogether, whether you're going to

23 engage him for training volunteers, but the meeting that you were having

24 and the notes you made from the meeting meant collecting information from

25 him as a man who was present in the area at the time, and that's what he

Page 27884

1 talked about here; isn't that right?

2 A. Well, you could put it that way too.

3 Q. All right, then. Now, something else, please: Please, as we are

4 talking about volunteers, we have now drawn a clear distinction between

5 those volunteers that you kept records of and the paramilitary formations

6 that had nothing to do with the state. Is this correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. I would like you now to briefly go through a few documents that I

9 have here and to tell me whether they confirm that, as far as volunteers

10 are concerned, all this was in compliance with the regulations. For

11 example, I have here instructions on the receipt of volunteers into the

12 Territorial Defence.

13 A. Yes, I am familiar with this document.

14 Q. Please take a look at it.

15 A. Could you please just help me by telling me the tab number.

16 Q. I have not received this from those who called you to testify.

17 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. This may be a document which the

18 accused has got and you won't have.

19 So, Mr. Milosevic, if you hand it over so the witness can have a

20 look at it.

21 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Please take a look. Here it talks about the way in which

23 volunteers are accepted, about their health checkups, their security

24 checks. All these aspects are familiar to you, I assume, but please take

25 a look at this instruction and tell me whether it's authentic or not.

Page 27885

1 This is an instruction on the receipt of volunteers in the Territorial

2 Defence.

3 A. I have the method of admission of volunteers to the Territorial

4 Defence under tab 12(A), and I think that here --

5 JUDGE MAY: Could you -- I'm sorry, we must -- we must try and

6 follow this in a fairly orderly way; otherwise, we shall get in a muddle.

7 Could you just look at that document which Mr. Milosevic has given you.

8 Could you confirm, if you can - or if not, say so - that it is what he

9 described, that it's authentic. He says it's an instruction on the

10 receipt of volunteers in the Territorial Defence. Can you confirm that

11 that is right, please?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can.

13 JUDGE MAY: Perhaps before -- just while you've got it, could you

14 help us with this so we can identify the document. Who gave the

15 instruction? Who was it to? And what is the date?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the -- pursuant to Article 9 and

17 so on of the law on defence, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia,

18 number 45/91, the minister of defence and the command of the Territorial

19 Defence of the Republic of Serbia have issued an instruction on the

20 admission of volunteers to the Territorial Defence.

21 JUDGE MAY: Have we -- is there a date on it anywhere?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Not on the document itself, no. At

23 least, I don't see one. But I think that I have the law on defence from

24 that period, and -- this is the same instruction here from the law that

25 was published during the period while I was the chef de cabinet, and it's

Page 27886

1 a valid document, Comrade President, if you remember.

2 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Yes. That's why I'm giving you this instruction, so everyone can

4 see that there is no mystification here. An instruction was given as to

5 how people were admitted, what conditions they had to fulfil, that they

6 had to go through training, that they had to be fit, that they couldn't be

7 under 18 or over 60, that according to the regulations - and I marked this

8 - they had to undergo a security check.

9 A. Yes. But this instruction was issued only a little later, a

10 little bit after volunteers began to arrive, because this was adopted in

11 July. The instruction was signed by General Tomislav Simovic, who was

12 officially appointed minister of defence on the 26th of September, at the

13 Serbian parliament. And these documents that you have given me are

14 practically a page from this book.

15 Q. Is this identical?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. In that case, there's no issue. This -- these instructions are

18 in accordance with the law. Is that correct?

19 A. Yes. This is the law under which we operated.

20 Q. Yes. Very well. So this is not contested.

21 JUDGE MAY: [Previous Translation Continues] ... Do you want that

22 document exhibited, although it's documents?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will hand you the whole law.

24 JUDGE MAY: Thank you very much. But we have got -- just for a

25 moment. We've got an awful lot of paper in this case, so we're trying to

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Page 27888

1 keep it down to a minimum. But thank you for volunteering that. If you'd

2 like just to keep it for a moment. And then if something turns on it,

3 we'll, of course, come back to it.

4 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

5 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Mrs. Gajic-Glisic --

7 JUDGE MAY: We have a torn bit of facts here, but we will put it

8 together. We will admit it. We'll let the Prosecution have a look at it.

9 We'll give it the next D number.

10 Just a minute.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I?

12 JUDGE MAY: Let the registrar go first.

13 THE REGISTRAR: Defence Exhibit 203, Your Honour.

14 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Yes.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is document number 19, which I

16 have already given to the Prosecution

17 Mr. NICE: We will have better versions probably of this

18 document, complete versions. We'll make them available.

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. And when the complete version is available, it

20 can be substituted for what the accused has handed in.

21 Yes.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the complete version. But

23 because it was faxed, it's a little torn into three bits. But nothing is

24 missing. It contains everything from the preamble to the signature.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is correct, Comrade President.

Page 27889

1 All the paragraphs start with the same words.

2 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Yes. And they're in the same order.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. There was one thing I wanted to clarify with you, but please let

6 us go more expeditiously.

7 JUDGE MAY: [Previous Translation Continues] ... have you now got

8 a complete version?

9 Mr. NICE: Got it. And in English. But, of course, not copied

10 at the moment in enough numbers for everyone, because we don't know what

11 documents are going to come up.

12 JUDGE MAY: Very well. If that can be put -- that can be put

13 together with the original exhibit. We'll rely on the registry to clear

14 it up.

15 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

16 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Mrs. Gajic-Glisic, if possible let us try to save time. So

18 please could you please go through some other documents I have here now.

19 There is also an instruction here on the admission of volunteers to the

20 JNA of the 13th of September, 1991. And this instruction was signed by

21 the Federal Secretary for National Defence, which also contains all these

22 aspects of their admission in accordance with the law and also

23 emphasises - and I have underlined this here; it's paragraph 5 - it

24 underlines there must be a security check when admitting volunteers

25 according to the rules of the security service, and these must be strictly

Page 27890

1 adhered to. And the same provision exists in the instruction we have just

2 seen. Is this correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. For this reason, I find it impossible to believe, and I would say

5 it's just a rumour that people were released from prison to be sent to

6 certain units.

7 A. I simply said what Minister Zoran Sokolovic told us in the

8 cabinet of the minister of defence. I am familiar with the decree you

9 mention. Unfortunately, I don't have a copy here, because we were not

10 part of the JNA. The Ministry of Defence of Serbia was separate from

11 them.

12 Q. Of course. And you had no competence over the JNA.

13 A. No.

14 Q. Look at this instruction, please. You're probably familiar with

15 it. Because I wish to tender it into evidence. This is a complete

16 document, and the fax has not messed it up.

17 JUDGE MAY: While the witness is looking at it, Mr. Nice, I have

18 a recollection of seeing this document. I may be wrong.

19 Mr. NICE: Your Honour's recollection is, as ever, spot on. I

20 think it's Exhibit 406, tab 14, if information coming to me is accurate.

21 JUDGE MAY: We'll let the witness comment on it.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I have seen a similar

23 document in the Office of the Prosecutor, and the way in which the stamp

24 has been placed on it and the words "military secret, confidential," and

25 the seal at the bottom, all this, except that the signature is illegible,

Page 27891

1 indicates that -- it's in compliance with the way things were done at the

2 time. So I'm 99 per cent sure that this is an authentic document.

3 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. May I draw your attention to another document, which is in fact a

5 photocopy --

6 JUDGE MAY: Let us -- let us just make sure that we get this

7 right and in order. That has been exhibited. We will make a note of

8 that, but I would be grateful if the Prosecution would check the number

9 and perhaps make sure --

10 Mr. NICE: Certainly. I'll check. I haven't yet --

11 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

12 Mr. NICE: Mr. Theunens, who's been able to advise me and is

13 usually master of the documents, suggests 406, tab 14.

14 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We will admit this one. It may be a slightly

15 different version of the same. But we can note -- it will be on the

16 transcript -- that it's the same number.

17 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Look --

19 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment, while we sort this out.

20 We'll get a new D number for this one.

21 Is it the same? Very well. Further inquiries show that it's the

22 same, so we don't need a new number.

23 Yes, we'll look at the next document.

24 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Are you aware that the instructions were issued pursuant to a

Page 27892

1 decree issued by the government of the Republic of Serbia? Mr. Nice was

2 mentioning a decree law, but there is no such thing. There is simply a

3 decree on the conscription of volunteers. And in Article 1, it says that

4 this -- that it prescribes the way in which volunteers may join, and then

5 it goes on to talk about replenishing the JNA with volunteers in

6 accordance with the federal regulations. So this is fully in compliance,

7 and it was issued on the 14th of August, 1991. This is a photocopy of the

8 Official Gazette, which is authentic. It's an authentic Official Gazette

9 in which laws are promulgated and all legal and physical entities

10 interested in legislation receive this. Would you take a look at it,

11 please.

12 JUDGE MAY: Again, I think that's a document we've had, the 14th

13 of August, 1991, Republic of Serbia. Again, my recollection is that we've

14 had it.

15 Mr. NICE: We'll search for it.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. This is a document -- or

17 rather, the document I was talking about. I apologise for calling it a

18 decree law. I am an electro -- technical engineer, so in my vocabulary

19 this is what we called in the cabinet, this is what we called it. We were

20 doing something that was in accordance with the law. So yesterday, and

21 when preparing to testify here, I always said that everything that I did

22 and everything that we did there we did pursuant to documents and

23 regulations, and as I was told, with President Milosevic's knowledge. We

24 didn't do anything behind Comrade Milosevic's back.

25 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

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Page 27894

1 Q. Everybody did their job, I hope, Ms. Gajic-Glisic.

2 A. I hope so too. I worked sincerely. I worked from my heart for

3 the defence of the poor Serbian people on the war-affected territories.

4 Q. Mrs. Gajic-Glisic, there is one other thing I would like us to

5 clarify: You know that the state organs responded on several occasions to

6 the existence of several paramilitary formations and they endeavoured to

7 -- to get everything done in accordance with the law and to eliminate

8 these formations. You yourself said -- we won't list them again -- that

9 these units were not part of the system, that they had nothing to do with

10 the state, and as you say later in your statement, it was organised by

11 various parties and so on.

12 A. Yes. And I described this in detail in my book, and I would like

13 to draw attention to the period -- or rather, to the chapters in which

14 Pejicic talks about the way volunteers were organised by the Serbian

15 Renewal Movement, and they were sent there bypassing the legal

16 regulations.

17 Q. As far as I remember, the Serbian Renewal Movement was the

18 largest opposition party of the time.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Please look at the decree issued by the Presidency of the SFRY.

21 Mr. NICE: The last exhibit, Your Honour, I think is 406, tab 13.

22 JUDGE MAY: Tab 13. Very well.

23 Mr. NICE: Thank you to Mr. Whiting for tracking that one down,

24 and I'll hand the original, or the accused's version, back.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, this is not my version.

Page 27895

1 It's the official text from the Official Gazette, which was officially

2 applied. The Official Gazette publishes exclusively regulations --

3 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We have that. We have it, Mr. Milosevic.

4 We'll just see if it's the same.

5 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes. It's the same, and so we don't need a new

7 number for that. And you can have the -- your fax back.

8 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. I draw your attention to the order on recruiting volunteers

10 during an imminent threat of war of December 1991. And this mentions all

11 these criteria that we've talked about. And I will read you only

12 paragraph 7 and 8. I hope you are familiar with this as well.

13 What's this? Oh, this is it in English, instruction. Very well.

14 I'm glad I also have it in English. It's good to accumulate as much paper

15 as possible.

16 So paragraph 7, the volunteer units that are now engaged outside

17 the units of the JNA. So there was a constant problem of various units

18 that were outside control. You remember this?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. This is an effort on the part of the Presidency to put everything

21 under control, everything -- and it was very difficult to do this in that

22 chaos, and it says that these units and volunteers that are now performing

23 certain military tasks or are within the units of the JNA have to regulate

24 their position in the armed forces and bring it into compliance with the

25 provisions of this order. And on the territory for which the units of the

Page 27896

1 JNA are responsible, they are to remove all individuals and volunteer

2 units that fail to join the JNA in the manner prescribed by this order,

3 that is, those who are not subordinate to the chain of command and to

4 discipline, so they are not to be used in any other way.

5 And the next provision relates to the volunteers who fail to

6 comply. There were certain volunteers who reported but then again did not

7 respect discipline. And in paragraph 8, it says that "... persons found

8 in uniforms and with the insignia of members of the Armed Forces of the

9 SFRY but who have not joined the Armed Forces in the prescribed manner and

10 regulated their position in compliance with this order will be subject to

11 legal measures." So the highest organ, the collective Supreme Commander,

12 which is the Presidency of the SFRY, ordered that order be introduced and

13 that those who were not members of the armed forces and who were there on

14 their own initiative be removed, and they say that the unit -- the

15 commands of the units are duty-bound to remove all such people from their

16 area of responsibility. Are you aware of this?

17 A. I was not connected to the JNA. I am aware of this, but I have

18 not seen this order, this decree.

19 Q. It's an order. Would you have a look at it to see if it's

20 authentic or not, because I wish to tender it into evidence.

21 A. We just can't see the signature, Mr. Branko Kostic here, who at

22 that time was the president of the Presidency of the SFRY.

23 Q. You can't see that but you can see his name?

24 A. Yes, you can see his name.

25 Q. And in the Official Gazette, it isn't signatures that are printed

Page 27897

1 but just the name of the person that has signed it, along with the date,

2 et cetera.

3 A. Yes, I agree with you on that score. But I don't know how far

4 this is under my competence, how far I can approve this or not approve it,

5 in view of the fact that the date is the 12th of December and the

6 government fell on the 12th of December.

7 Q. All right. So you're not competent to approve that. I accept

8 that answer.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I should like to insist,

10 Mr. May that, this order be tendered into evidence, because it does

11 indicate --

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let's have it.

13 Yes.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I can be of assistance, Your

15 Honours. I do believe that this is a true and exact document. But I

16 should like to emphasise once again that it doesn't come under my

17 competency, giving a judgement on orders of this kind.

18 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We will -- we will give it the next

19 number.

20 THE REGISTRAR: Defence Exhibit 204, Your Honour.

21 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. I assume, Mrs. Gajic-Glisic, that when you wrote your book, you

23 wrote it to the best of your understanding and knowledge of the events

24 that were taking place and your participation in them.

25 A. I did my best.

Page 27898

1 Q. So I assume that what you wrote then you stand by now and you

2 think the same.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Now, I should like to remind you of several excepts from your

5 book. And I can see you have the book beside you.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Could you turn to page 51, please. And General Simovic is

8 responding there. He is answering some questions. They asked him, "What

9 are the goals of the policies of Serbia, whether to reject the Croatian

10 policy and to have Yugoslavia remain as a whole or to create a Greater

11 Serbia, as some people are claiming?" Have you found that passage?

12 A. Yes, I have.

13 Q. Am I quoting from your text exactly?

14 A. Yes, you are.

15 Q. And now we come to Simovic's answer. Simovic says the following:

16 "Serbia at times of crisis, as well as during the KPJ, Communist Party of

17 Yugoslavia, comes out in favour of each and every nation having the right

18 to declare itself and the right of national minorities to be citizens on a

19 footing of equality in Serbia."

20 Mr. NICE: Has the Chamber found it?

21 JUDGE MAY: No. In English --

22 Mr. NICE: 35 at the top right-hand corner.

23 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

24 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. I should just like to ask us to follow this passage. Is that it?

Page 27899












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Page 27900

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. When the crisis blew up and the military aspects, Serbia opted

3 for a peaceful settlement to the situation. Is that right?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Unfortunately, the armed forces -- armed force began to be used

6 in Slovenia and then in Croatia. The Serbian government considered that

7 the Ustasha paramilitary formations carried out massacres as a result of

8 that which are unfortunately repeating themselves in history once again.

9 Is that so?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Is that how it was?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. In the interests of time, you go on to speak about the Second

14 World War, et cetera, and then you continue: "In all this, the Yugoslav

15 People's Army, pursuant to a decision by the Yugoslav state presidency, is

16 given the task of setting up a buffer zone between the Ustasha formations

17 of Croatia and settlements inhabited by Serbs from times gone by. It is

18 not a question of creating a Greater Serbia but it is a question of

19 protecting the Serb population which through force of circumstance is the

20 most numerous in Yugoslavia and, therefore, populates the greatest

21 territory." Is that right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. So was that an exact description given by General Simovic in

24 response to the questions asked?

25 A. Yes. And I have here the authorised first version and this

Page 27901

1 second version.

2 Q. You don't have to prove that to me. I'm just quoting from your

3 book. And you stand by what you say there. And you consider it to be

4 true and correct. Is that right?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Now, turn to page 54, please. And it is in the middle of that

7 page, in the middle of that paragraph --

8 Mr. NICE: Your Honour, while the --

9 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Mr. Nice.

10 Mr. NICE: While the Court is looking for the page, it may be

11 assisted by noticing that at the beginning of the tab 9 there is an index

12 that approximates B/C/S to the English. This should be, if it's 54, it

13 should be something in the order of page 37, I would have thought.

14 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

15 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. I am quoting once again and asking you for your confirmation

17 whether that was so. And I'm quoting you. Simovic says, "From the very

18 beginning of the secession, the Serbs were said to be guilty for the war

19 for the sole purpose of asking that Serbs be treated as equal citizens

20 with the citizens of Croatia." Is that right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Is that how it was, Mrs. Gajic-Glisic?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Then it goes on to say, "I think that the Serbs in Yugoslavia --

25 that Serbia and Yugoslavia is one and the same," and Simovic's response is

Page 27902

1 this, "So I'm asking you now why don't you stand up to this?" And he

2 said, "I'm sorry that you didn't notice that the JNA is making efforts to

3 protect the Serbs from genocide and not to cause an armed struggle but to

4 work towards creating conditions for a political settlement to the crisis,

5 which means peacefully, by peaceful means." Is that right,

6 Mrs. Gajic-Glisic? Is that what it says in your book?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Is this an exact description of the situation which prevailed at

9 the time?

10 A. Which was waged by Serbia at the time.

11 Q. And then I should just like to ask you a few more things. We

12 have Minister Simovic's reactions. It is on page 76. And the heading

13 there is "The Reactions of the Defence Minister Lieutenant General

14 Tomislav Simovic to the Serbian Renewal Movement." And he says --

15 JUDGE KWON: It's page 53.

16 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. -- that as the Serbian Revival Movement, which was very strong in

18 creating the situation, Simovic says, "The prevention of the slaughter of

19 the Serbian inhabitants in Serb lands and freeing our sons, members of the

20 JNA, who were made -- held as prisoners in the barracks. Isn't that clear

21 to everybody by now?" Was that how it was?

22 A. Yes. And I will confirm that thousands and thousands of

23 soldiers, children from the age of 18, were shut up in the barracks in

24 Croatia, that they had no electricity, they had no water, they had no

25 food. And the women in black would send out their love to them and sing

Page 27903

1 for them around them but that they were in a very poor situation, these

2 children there.

3 And I also wish to say - and it is very difficult for me to

4 remain calm in saying so - that for days and nights I did my best to --

5 through our connections and links, set up links with Croatia, and that I

6 asked them to tell us what was going on with those children there, the

7 soldiers there, those children of 18, 18 years old, are they still alive,

8 how are they? I wanted to get any kind of information that I could, but

9 connection would always break down and all we could hear was the term

10 "nazocni" being used, the duty officer. Now, that is the worst period in

11 my life and I can't rid myself of those images to the present day.

12 Q. Yes, I do believe you there when you say that.

13 Now, would you please take a look at page 144, the penultimate

14 paragraph. This is Simovic's explanation once again, and he says this:

15 "Different armies clashed. The one wanted to liberate Osijek; the others

16 wanted to take over Western Slavonia although that was not the object."

17 Is that what Simovic says, this was never a goal, this takeover? And he

18 continues and says, "Because we were fighting for places where the Serb

19 population was in the majority but each one pursued his policy and tasks.

20 And when they would encounter a trap, they said that the army was disloyal

21 and would not help them in the fighting."

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. So these people who were outside anybody's control called the

24 army a traitor army; whereas, the army tried to play, as Simovic had said

25 - and I quote him from your book - the role of a buffer zone between the

Page 27904

1 attacks and attackers and to protect the settlements which were supposed

2 to be protected and defended from these individual, mutual clashes.

3 A. Yes, Comrade President, that is correct.

4 Q. Then in the next sentence he goes on to say, "The army did not

5 wage a war of conquest. They were fighting for places in which the Serbs

6 lived as the majority population and the fighters from those parts wanted

7 to liberate their own thresholds." He goes on to explain that. "But not

8 in places where they were in the minority and the fighters from those

9 places wanted to defend their own thresholds." And that's where the

10 confusion sets in that he talks about, and which the State endeavoured at

11 the time to calm down and not to allow this chaos to break out, the chaos

12 that was developing and the situation to which Simovic reacted. Isn't

13 that so, Mrs. Gajic-Glisic?

14 A. Yes.

15 Mr. NICE: Mr. Whiting thinks page 105. You're probably there

16 ahead of us.

17 JUDGE KWON: It's in -- in page 104, in the penultimate

18 paragraph.

19 Mr. NICE: Thank you very much.

20 I've got to withdraw for just a couple of minutes. Mr. Whiting

21 will remain, representing us.

22 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. And take a look at page 169 now, please, the end of that

24 penultimate paragraph. Otherwise, the chapter is headed "Secret Bad Sides

25 and Open Good Sides." "The army has no pretension with respect to any

Page 27905












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13 English transcripts.













Page 27906

1 Yugoslav republic, but it cannot sit with its hands crossed while some of

2 its garrisons were still found under siege," said Simovic. Was that so or

3 not?

4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

5 A. The barracks were under siege and Croatian wives were standing

6 around. A large number of barracks throughout the territory of Croatia

7 had been held under siege. The soldiers were left without electricity,

8 food, without anything, in fact, and that is why we organised the column

9 of buses taking mothers to visit their sons. The title of that chapter

10 was, "Secret Faults, Open Virtues."

11 Q. I should like to draw attention to page 152, the middle passage.

12 Simovic says, "There were 14 truces thus far and all of them broken by

13 Croatia. During those truces, according to the data which I have, your

14 country" - because he's being asked by a Hungarian journalist, it seems -

15 "Hungary is flying planes into our air space and weapons are being

16 imported through your country." Is that how it was?

17 A. Yes. And I should like to remind you, Comrade President, that

18 there were municipalities with a majority Hungarian population and that

19 the danger existed of new conflicts breaking out all the time, because the

20 Hungarians wanted to join up with Hungary, the state of Hungary. And I

21 think that it was in agreement with you that the foreign minister of the

22 day, Vladislav Jovanovic sent a letter of protest to the embassy of

23 Hungary, if you remember.

24 Q. Yes. There was quite a lot of that going on. And probably it is

25 as you say it is.

Page 27907

1 JUDGE MAY: Just one moment. We need to find this latest

2 quotation. Can the Prosecution assist?

3 Mr. WHITING: I haven't found it yet. I'm looking.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 222 of the book. It is the

5 middle paragraph.

6 JUDGE MAY: 222? You said 122. Let's find -- let's find 222

7 then.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 250.

9 JUDGE MAY: Which --

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 232.

11 JUDGE MAY: 232.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, page 232.

13 JUDGE MAY: All right. We will find it. Just one moment while

14 we find it.

15 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. "So far there have been 14 truces or cease-fires." It is how the

17 middle paragraph begins.

18 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Whiting.

19 Mr. WHITING: It's the middle of the page, 167.

20 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Yes.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope you've found it?

22 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

23 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. It says, "14 truces, each violated by Croatia," and then goes on

25 to speak about the infiltration of weapons, et cetera.

Page 27908

1 And then one more sentence - that comes at the end, the

2 epilogue - on page 313, you say, "The minister of defence, without an

3 army, the president of the republic, without the capacity of having the

4 Supreme Command." I'm just quoting that for the moment.

5 Mrs. Gajic-Glisic, you know that it was always our option to

6 favour Yugoslavia.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. You know that in the constitution of Serbia, which was written in

9 such a way, that Serbia has all -- enjoys all the competencies when the

10 crisis was in its throes, when the constitution was written, in fact. But

11 in one article of the constitution it says that the competencies and

12 authority enjoyed by the federal state, pertaining to the federal

13 constitution, are executed in the federal state and in conformity with the

14 federal constitution. Therefore, is it quite clear that the Republic of

15 Serbia, with respect to the Yugoslav People's Army, did not have any

16 competencies?

17 A. Yes. You were not the Supreme Commander of the Yugoslav People's

18 Army. And as far as I - if Their Honours will believe me when I say

19 this - as far as I was able to note, the army -- or rather, the person who

20 had the weapons wielded the power.

21 Q. Well, yes, that is quite usual and customary, especially in war

22 situations. But according to what you said, and because Mr. Nice did not

23 let you finish what you were saying, you said that there are laws which

24 show that the apparent authority was in the hands of the president of the

25 republic, as if I had taken over this competence from Simovic's hands.

Page 27909

1 Neither Simovic nor myself had any competence and authority over the

2 Yugoslav People's Army, nor could we have had it. Is that right?

3 A. Yes, that is right. But let me just remind you that when I was

4 speaking about national defence and the law on national defence and the

5 competencies and authorities there over the Defence Ministry, having said

6 that General Simovic did not have any authority, not even to measure up

7 with an accountant, as I put it, I said that pursuant to an article of the

8 law, that is to say, Article 6 of the law, which stipulates that the

9 president of the republic in the organisation and preparation for defence

10 heads the armed forces in peace and war, including authority to solve

11 organisational and personnel matters in the Territorial Defence. So I

12 wasn't speaking about competence and authority in respect of the JNA.

13 That doesn't come under my competence.

14 Q. Yes. And do you remember that since you were in the Ministry of

15 Defence yourself that it was even the command of the republican staff of

16 the Territorial Defence that was nominated and appointed by the SFRY and

17 not the president of the republic in any of the republics until these

18 other republics had seceded, but in Serbia, for instance, that was at that

19 time the competence and authority of the Yugoslav state presidency? I'm

20 sure you'll remember that.

21 A. Probably. But allow me to say that I can't know everything, and

22 I don't claim that I do know everything.

23 Q. Of course. You needn't know everything. That's quite true.

24 So you talked about an event here. You said that when there was

25 some sort of crisis where in those conflicts in Slavonia, as far as I can

Page 27910

1 remember, a large number of civilians was at risk and members of the

2 Territorial Defence, and you said this was in October or November 1991,

3 and I asked Simovic to entreat the people in the JNA to fly over in

4 planes, not to drop bombs, but to fly over in order to help them.

5 A. Yes. I didn't say that you issued the order. I didn't say that

6 he was able to issue an order to them. I said that both you and he

7 entreated them to do that.

8 Q. So I am asking Simovic, because he was a general and before that

9 he was the commander of a military district, the Skorpion military

10 district, and he was a very high-ranking general, I was asking him to use

11 his influence and to entreat them to fly over in order to help those

12 people there.

13 A. Yes. Yes. What's in dispute here?

14 Q. Nothing. Nothing.

15 A. Thank you. I thought I said something wrong.

16 Q. No, no. Nothing was wrong.

17 JUDGE MAY: [Previous Translation Continues] ... just remember,

18 Mr. Milosevic, this isn't a private conversation. It's got to be

19 interpreted. So will you leave a pause, and would the witness be kind

20 enough to leave a pause after he's spoken. Thank you. So remember the

21 interpreters.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise to Your Honours.

23 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Mrs. Gajic-Glisic, this event that you described is something I

25 wanted to clarify again for a simple reason, because you as an eyewitness

Page 27911












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13 English transcripts.













Page 27912

1 are saying that I asked Simovic to ask his colleagues from the JNA to fly

2 over for the simple reason, as I said, is that the claim is being made

3 here that I commanded the JNA. And you as an eyewitness say that I had to

4 entreat Simovic to entreat those people of his over whom he did not have

5 any command either to fly over. Had I been commander, I would not have

6 had to ask Simovic to ask them to do that; I could have ordered it. Is

7 this clear or not?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Thank you very much. Let's go on.

10 You described -- I made a note here during your

11 examination-in-chief -- you described a meeting between Simovic and Hadzic

12 where Hadzic was to be introduced to the Serbian public because he was

13 representing the Serbs from Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem at

14 the conference in The Hague. Is this correct?

15 A. Well, you've confounded two time periods. But let me hear your

16 question to the end.

17 Q. I just wanted you to explain what you said later without being

18 asked, in connection with this, that I didn't even know who Hadzic was. I

19 wrote down, "Milosevic asked Simovic, Who is Goran Hadzic?" You said

20 that?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And he was already in The Hague.

23 A. He was already on his way to The Hague.

24 Q. He was already in The Hague as a representative of the citizens

25 of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem. I am not contesting the

Page 27913

1 right of the citizens in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem to

2 elect Goran Hadzic and send him there as their representative. This is

3 not in dispute and this is not what I'm asking. But is it in dispute that

4 when he was already in The Hague as an elected representative I didn't

5 even know who he was?

6 A. Unfortunately, Comrade President, when Goran Hadzic came to the

7 Ministry of Defence, Goran Hadzic didn't even know what he was president

8 of. Later on you asked, "Well, who in fact is this Goran Hadzic?"

9 General Simovic called General Nenezic to ask where Goran Hadzic was

10 coming from. General Nenezic said that Goran Hadzic was a relative of

11 his, that he had been a warehouse-keeper in the area, that General Nenezic

12 wanted to push him as a politician and that he was in fact the self-styled

13 president of the area and that it was too late now to correct all this

14 because Goran Hadzic was already in The Hague. I describe that in detail

15 in my book.

16 Q. We don't have time to go through that. I just wanted to

17 establish on the basis of your testimony as an eyewitness of these

18 material facts that at the time that he was already at The Hague and I

19 asked Simovic, Who is Goran Hadzic? I didn't even know who Goran Hadzic

20 was.

21 A. Well, I assume you didn't have all the correct information, that

22 General Nenezic and the others around you had misinformed you.

23 Q. Well, I don't even remember General Nenezic. What was he doing

24 there?

25 A. He was organising the rebellion of the Serbs over there in those

Page 27914

1 areas.

2 Q. Was General Nenezic already retired?

3 A. Yes, he and General Pekic were the ones who went to those areas.

4 Often they went back to their youth and raised revolutions.

5 Q. But these were pensioners, old-age pensioners who were doing

6 things on their own initiative.

7 A. Yes, that's correct.

8 Q. And then you mentioned something about a conversation of mine

9 with Simovic - I just want us to clarify this - in connection with the

10 Territorial Defence in Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem. You said that

11 there was some confusion and that Hadzic appointed Stojicic as the

12 commander of the Territorial Defence. Did you say that yesterday?

13 A. Yes, I did.

14 Q. Do you know that Stojicic was a volunteer, that he went there as

15 a patriot to help?

16 A. I'm not aware that he went there as a volunteer. Nobody told me

17 that, that he had gone there as a volunteer.

18 Q. And Goran Hadzic appointed him commander of the Territorial

19 Defence?

20 A. Well, that was the source of the confusion, because he was a

21 policeman from Belgrade who went with his special unit.

22 Q. He didn't go with a special unit, he went in another way, but he

23 went there as a volunteer and patriot. And Goran Hadzic appointed him

24 commander of the Territorial Defence. Is this in dispute?

25 A. No, it isn't.

Page 27915

1 Q. And it's not in dispute either that I said to Simovic, "There's

2 some confusion over there. Hadzic appointed Stojicic commander of the

3 Territorial Defence."

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Thank you very much.

6 Tell me, please, before we move on, I understood that you wanted

7 to say more but due to shortage of time Mr. Nice interrupted you, so I

8 will use my time now to ask you what did you know about the sufferings of

9 the Serbs in Croatia while you were in the ministry and before and after

10 your work in the ministry? What did you find out about the sufferings of

11 the Serbs in Croatia?

12 A. It was dreadful. It was dreadful. The Serbs were expelled from

13 their homes. Serbs had to flee with only a plastic bag in their hands.

14 Those rooms in the 13th of May that were used for training and to put up

15 those who were being trained, the first Serbs who were expelled after the

16 arrival of Franjo Tudjman in power, the first refugees were Serbs. These

17 Serbs would come and they had nothing, nothing. Many of them lost their

18 families. They didn't know where their families were. We received

19 photographs of slaughtered Serbs. I think, Comrade President, that we

20 prepared a bundle of those photographs for you as evidence for The Hague,

21 but unfortunately I gave the photographs I had to my friends with approval

22 of a colonel from the -- who approved that this be given for them to show

23 their families in Switzerland. They were all burnt. I apologise to Their

24 Honours, what I have to say when I remember those pictures, their limbs

25 had been cut off and pushed into their mouths. There were very many

Page 27916

1 refugees. For example, at that time in Serbia there were 150.000 refugees

2 from Western Slavonia. And according to the lists and our knowledge, in

3 Western Slavonia there were 60.000 people, 60.000 Serbs, and suddenly in

4 Serbia 150.000 refugees turned up and most of them were in Novi Sad, in

5 Sid.

6 Representatives of trade unions came to see us because they were

7 unable to find firewood, heating fuel, there were no classrooms, there was

8 not enough money to buy books for those children. They didn't have food.

9 At the time it was awful. On the other side, we had Milan Babic, who kept

10 coming to the cabinet and kept threatening to bring 300.000 Serbs more

11 unless we mobilised Serbs from Serbia to go and defend the Serbs from

12 Croatia. It was a terrible time. At that time, children were imprisoned

13 in barracks in Croatia, mothers -- mothers wept, screamed. They burst

14 into the government buildings. Nobody dared go and face them. I think

15 you asked Simovic to send me to talk to those mothers, and I wept in front

16 of them, and I begged them to go on our knees, to bring our sons back and

17 to look for them, even if we were killed. There were -- it was terrible.

18 In Serbia there was not enough fuel. There was not enough food. There

19 was not enough firewood. The situation was terrible. Those who were

20 mobilised came back from the war front. We had invalids who arrived

21 without legs, without arms, and we were unable to provide them with their

22 basic means. They would sit there with their crutches in front of the

23 government building, and we had to jump over them. The situation was

24 terrible.

25 Sometimes I didn't leave the cabinet for days, and we worked for

Page 27917












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Page 27918

1 days on end.

2 Q. Thank you. You could probably say a lot about the sufferings of

3 the Serbs in Croatia --

4 A. Oh, yes.

5 Q. -- at the time, but due to time constraints, I can't ask you to

6 do that.

7 You provided here an interview given by Lieutenant General

8 Tomislav Simovic on the 19th of November, 1991. I took this from your

9 tab. The ERN number is 02905739. When I say "yours," I don't mean -- I'm

10 not talking about you.

11 A. Yes. I have the original text here.

12 JUDGE MAY: I think -- I think, Mr. Milosevic, before we go into

13 the document, it is in fact time to adjourn. So we'll -- we'll return to

14 it. We'll get the tab number from the Prosecution. I take it to be one

15 of their documents that's being referred to.

16 We'll adjourn now, and we'll come back in 20 minutes.

17 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

18 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

20 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. I assume, Mrs. Gajic-Glisic, that you are aware of the fact that

22 the General Staff of the JNA, in that period, that is, the period when you

23 were working in the Ministry of Defence, when talks had already started

24 with Mr. Cyrus Vance, the emissary of the UN, about the arrival of the UN

25 forces -- so do you know that the General Staff kept insisting that the

Page 27919

1 barracks be unblocked so that the army could withdraw from there without

2 casualties and without conflicts?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Do you remember applying to Lord Carrington that there were

5 agreements between the JNA and Croatia, that this should be made possible,

6 but that this was not made possible?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. I now draw your attention to this interview. And I have told you

9 the ERN number. I will not read it all, of course.

10 Mr. NICE: It's tab -- it's tab 1 of Exhibit 568.

11 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. In the middle column of the interview, the question is put

13 whether the JNA was mostly a Serbian army according to its composition, as

14 was often heard. And his reply was, "It is just partly correct.

15 According to its ethnic structure, the JNA has still got approximately 27

16 per cent members of other nations and nationalities, aside from the Serbs

17 and Montenegrins. It means that realistically its permanent and variable

18 peacetime structure mainly consists of members of the most numerous

19 nation, the Serb one in this case, which was the case before as well but

20 to a smaller extent. The fact that that ratio is now somewhat bigger is a

21 consequence of the past political and military developments in the

22 territories of Slovenia and Croatia and the behaviour of leaderships of

23 certain nations and nationalities in Yugoslavia. I can say that the JNA

24 was turned into a Serb army, referring to its structure, exactly by those

25 leaderships who invited their peoples to abandon it and start fighting

Page 27920

1 against it." Is this an indisputable fact and is what General Simovic

2 says in accordance with the actual situation and the events in the period

3 that you are testifying about?

4 A. Yes. General Simovic gave this interview to Mr. Ivica Dacic in

5 my presence, in our cabinet. And it's an authorised interview. It's

6 correct.

7 Q. In the first column, he speaks of the protection of the Serb

8 people from the renewal of genocide. You have just spoken of the

9 sufferings of the Serbs in Croatia, of the 150.000 refugees then in

10 Serbia. Is it contested that the Serbs at that time had very serious

11 reasons to be afraid, because they were exposed to physical extinction?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. At the end of his first reply, in the first paragraph, he says,

14 "Objectively the Yugoslav People's Army did not have any other option

15 facing the situation when the Ustasha units were adamant in their

16 intentions to destroy the Serb populace." Was this the reality everyone

17 was facing?

18 A. Yes. We were all very afraid of this. At any moment Serbia was

19 threatened with attack, and you know that it was attacked in Sid. Sid was

20 attacked. You were in The Hague at the time, and we were all

21 communicating at that time.

22 Q. It was shelled from Croatian territory?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. On the territory of Serbia.

25 You go on to say -- just let me find it here -- that there was a

Page 27921

1 meeting between General Jovic, who was already retired, is this correct,

2 at the time?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And he was at one time in the peacekeeping forces of the UN?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. One of the peacekeeping missions that Yugoslavia took part in.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And he knew Marek Goulding who was the assistant of the

9 secretary-general for peace operations.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And he met him in private?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And this conversation that you describe in fact took place

14 because everyone was interested as it was at the height of Cyrus Vance's

15 activity and negotiations all over Yugoslavia with representatives of the

16 authorities of the Krajinas, with us in the Presidency of the SFRY, in the

17 Presidency of Croatia, and so on, about bringing in peacekeeping forces.

18 A. As far as I can remember, Marek Goulding was the first person to

19 propose bringing in peace forces, and you accepted that the moment it was

20 mentioned.

21 Q. Well, you don't know that.

22 A. Of course.

23 Q. Because this was in the context of negotiations held by Cyrus

24 Vance. Marek Goulding came along with him, and he was the assistant for

25 peacekeeping operations. You drew up this note, which is tab number 7. I

Page 27922

1 won't quote it in its entirety, but it boils down to, as I see, a

2 telephone conversation between Jovic and President Milosevic from your

3 cabinet, the cabinet of the minister of defence, where he is giving

4 information to you and by telephone to me about his conversation with

5 Marek Goulding.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And you drew up these minutes in order to have information

8 recorded on what was essential in that conversation; is this correct?

9 A. I made an effort to take down everything to the best of my

10 ability. And immediately afterwards I typed out these minutes and brought

11 them to your cabinet personally.

12 Q. Yes. And now I wish to draw your attention to page 2 of these

13 minutes. In the paragraph before last, he's describing how Goulding came

14 to Yugoslavia to see about the possibility of bringing UN peacekeeping

15 forces to Yugoslavia. And he says that they talked about the Yugoslavia

16 of 1918 to 1941 through 1945, and he understood the role of Germany in all

17 this, accepted the thesis about the Fourth Reich and the revision of the

18 Second World War. "He knows what Milosevic has done for Serbia. I

19 familiarised him with what Gorbachev did. I told him the US will be sorry

20 for breaking up Russia," and so on.

21 And then you say -- not you, but you drew up the minutes -- he

22 asked who Babic and Hadzic were and whether they could provide guarantees.

23 Everybody then wanted guarantees that nobody would attack the UN

24 peacekeeping forces. Is this correct?

25 A. Yes.

Page 27923












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Page 27924

1 Q. That they would accept the peacekeeping forces of the UN. That

2 was our stance from the very beginning, to accept the UN peacekeeping

3 forces, to put an end to all conflict, and to seek for a peaceful

4 resolution of the crisis.

5 A. Yes. This was your sentence, which I was not allowed to take

6 down. I could only take down what was said inside our cabinet.

7 Q. And he was asking about the volunteers and so on. He said he

8 knew who the black-shirts were and asked for a guarantee from Paraga. You

9 know who Paraga is; is that correct?

10 A. The leader of the paramilitary organisations in Croatia.

11 Q. At the time, did these paramilitary forces commit atrocities

12 against the Serbs?

13 A. Yes, as far as we were able to ascertain. And General Vracarevic

14 spoke of this, and this is in a part of my book entitled "The Dogs of

15 War."

16 Q. Very well. And at the end of this paragraph, he says, "The

17 principle of the UN boils down to understanding the technicalities of

18 separating the sides at contact point." And he was confused about the

19 behaviour of the Croats and the request that peacekeeping forces be

20 deployed along the administrative borders. He's not clear about the

21 volunteers. Then we come to the demand that a Serbian army be

22 established. And as this idea was not accepted by Serbian policy, the

23 advocates of a Serbian army were recorded as volunteers, registered as

24 volunteers. And then there is mention of the "Guard" and that a company

25 does not go over 1.000, and so on.

Page 27925

1 Is it in dispute that he says that "The creation of a Serb army

2 was not well received in Serbian political circles"? We were in favour of

3 Yugoslavia, Yugoslav institutions and the JNA.

4 A. But at that time we simultaneously worked on the draft bill on the

5 armed forces of Serbia. You know this. But the idea, after it was

6 published in the press on the 5th November, was ferociously attacked by

7 the JNA.

8 Q. We did not want to make the position of the JNA more difficult,

9 or of any Yugoslav institution in any way. Is this correct?

10 A. Yes, this is correct. And in my book, I speak of the

11 reorganisation of the JNA in the existing borders, the new borders,

12 whether it would be a rump Yugoslavia or a Yugoslavia consisting only of

13 Serbia and Montenegro, or whether it would be just Serbia alone. And this

14 draft bill on the armed forces of Serbia had three versions, three

15 variants.

16 Q. But you remember that in April the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

17 was promulgated and that according to the constitution the army of

18 Yugoslavia was established?

19 A. In 1992.

20 Q. Yes, in 1992. This was several months later, after those others

21 were recognised, when the FRY was established and the same joint session

22 of the parliaments of Serbia and Montenegro on the part of the Yugoslav

23 parliament that stayed behind, a declaration was issued that the FRY did

24 not have territorial pretensions towards any Yugoslav state. Do you

25 remember that?

Page 27926

1 A. Yes. But that was after I was driven out of my job in the

2 ministry. So this does not belong to what we are talking about here.

3 Q. Your testimony. Yes, I accept that, and I will not ask you about

4 this further.

5 In your book, as I see in the summary, you mention me quite a

6 lot. In your book, I came across a passage where you -- and please

7 correct me if I'm wrong, because I had to skim through the book -- but you

8 mention me in five places. For example, on page 60, the chapter is

9 entitled "Genocide Before the World." And you say the following in that

10 first sentence there: "During those days, there was a meeting, a

11 tete-a-tete, between Simovic and Milosevic." And then he started to

12 say -- this is at the bottom of the page -- what had to be done urgently,

13 and then goes on to explain what the urgent tasks were. He says that all

14 photographs and tapes, which we have and which relate to relations with

15 respect to the genocide of the populace in Serbian Krajina, should give to

16 the -- be given to the Ministry of Information for a book to be published

17 and for documents to be compiled for The Hague. Is that right?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. So this talks about efforts to hold political talks and to

20 present the truth as clearly as possible about the actual state of affairs

21 in which the Serb population in Croatia found itself and the dangers which

22 were ultimately the reason for which the UN peacekeepers arrived and

23 proclaimed zones under their protection, UN-protected areas. Is that

24 right?

25 A. Yes.

Page 27927

1 Q. So when The Hague is mentioned here, it is mentioned in the

2 context of the peace conference and not in the context of this

3 institution.

4 A. Yes. I think that that was on the 18th of October, The Hague

5 Conference. Put me right if I'm wrong.

6 Q. Yes, in 1991. I don't know the exact date, but it's not

7 important. The important thing is that that first meeting that you

8 describe here in your book has no -- nothing to do with any armed

9 operations, but what it is about is the gathering of information geared

10 towards political negotiations through the mediation of the international

11 community. Is that right?

12 A. Yes, that's right. And as far as I remember, you were in The

13 Hague on the 18th of October and later on, on the 5th of November, if I'm

14 not mistaken.

15 Q. Yes. There were several occasions.

16 A. Well, I apologise, a lot of time has gone by since then.

17 Q. Yes. There were a lot of meetings, but the point of what this is

18 about is that the talks related to the preparation of information with a

19 view to political negotiations and talks and not any kind of military

20 operations.

21 A. Does it say "military operations" here?

22 Q. No, no, it doesn't. I just wanted to clear that point up.

23 A. Thank you for that. Yes, that is correct. And I believe I

24 described it correctly.

25 Q. Now take a look at page 112, where you mention me once again.

Page 27928

1 And you say the following - and this is in the paragraph that is in the

2 middle of the page - "Our position at this meeting, and it is the Assembly

3 meeting, expressly demands the formation of a Serb army. It was clearly

4 requested that the president of the republic, Slobodan Milosevic, take on

5 the role of the Supreme Command of the army of Serbia. And that is

6 something that was not supposed to be uttered then and I don't suppose

7 today either." Now, this explanation, that we were quite clear in our

8 stance in favour of Yugoslavia and for preserving Yugoslavia and that we

9 considered it indispensable to support the Yugoslav People's Army as a

10 Yugoslav institution; is that right?

11 A. Yes, that is right. But I don't contest the fact either that at

12 the same time we were working on the law for armament of the Republic of

13 Serbia.

14 Q. Yes. That's another matter. Professional work to prepare a

15 bill.

16 A. Mr. Nice referred to a secret law or bill of some kind. There

17 was no secret bill or law. You worked to prepare the law as every

18 ministry does within the field of its responsibility, and once it is

19 prepared it goes to the assembly boards and goes to regular assembly

20 procedure. It is never secret.

21 A. Well, I didn't understand Mr. Nice to say that it was a secret

22 law. What I understood him to say, that everything that was done in the

23 ministry was to a certain degree of secrecy and confidentiality. And what

24 was being done there couldn't be presented to the public just like that.

25 Q. Well, yes, of course. And that is natural for ministries such as

Page 27929












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Page 27930

1 the Defence Ministry, the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

2 A. Yes, Comrade President. And this was a precedent, in fact, that

3 somebody should put forward and state what was going on in a series of

4 articles in the Nin magazine, and that led to a whole affair that was

5 equated to the Watergate affair.

6 Q. Yes. But there were no consequences?

7 Mr. NICE: The issue of secrecy was, I think, initially raised in

8 a neutral way and I think it was the witness's first answer that spoke of

9 the way in which matters were dealt with and I will have to check the

10 transcript to find whether she used the term "secret" or not. I'm not

11 sure that I used the word "secret" after that. But the evidence emerged

12 from the witness's mouth, not from mine on this topic.

13 JUDGE KWON: And for the sake of the record, the passage of page

14 79 of the English translation.

15 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Very well. Now, the third place in your book, where you mention

17 Milosevic again, in the context this time of your description of what

18 Simovic talked about to Babic, that is page 159. Have you found page 159?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And then Babic replies - and that's how the page begins - and in

21 paragraph 1 he says, "The President is accusing us -" the President,

22 meaning me -- "is accusing --"

23 A. Could you repeat the page number, please.

24 Q. It's 139. I apologise for reading it out wrong. Have you found

25 that?

Page 27931

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Babic's answer was -- and you recorded this, because you attended

3 the meeting between Babic and Simovic. He says, "The President is

4 accusing us, and first of all I was surprised because I asked you to leave

5 the TO as an armed force and not to withdraw the JNA." And Simovic says,

6 "This has nothing to do with the withdrawal of the JNA, nor was that what

7 was being asked." And then you go on to say --

8 JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues] ...

9 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Then you go on to say that Simovic was already quite irate and

11 said what Babic was asked to do was neither a request made by Milosevic or

12 Simovic. And he adds, "What am I here? Just a balance between the two of

13 us? I want you to know that that is so because that is the sole condition

14 for the arrival -- the only precondition for the deployment of the United

15 Nations forces. Babic would not accept it," and so on and so forth.

16 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

17 JUDGE MAY: The record should show, as Judge Kwon said earlier

18 but it wasn't taken down, that this appears at page 100. It's important

19 that we have for the record not only the B/C/S version but also the

20 English version so those who come after us can follow what's being said.

21 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

22 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Therefore, he is emphasising, and I repeat the last sentence of

24 that quote, the one that I selected where my name is mentioned: Simovic

25 says, "I would like you to know that that is -- I want you to realise that

Page 27932

1 this is so because that was the only precondition for the deployment of

2 the UN forces." So this is prevailing upon Babic to accept the arrival of

3 the UN forces; is that right?

4 A. Yes, as far as I remember, you had a great deal of problems with

5 Babic at that time, who did everything off his own bat.

6 Q. All right. So this third excerpt from your book, where you

7 mention me, that too is geared towards a political settlement and the

8 arrival here in actual fact of the UN forces for which we are advocating,

9 which Serbia is advocating and which the president of the SFRY advocated

10 and which I was in favour of personally.

11 A. Yes. We were all in favour of the arrival of the UN forces. We

12 all advocated that. And we were even prepared to make all the concessions

13 necessary.

14 Q. And the reason for that?

15 A. Was peace.

16 Q. Exclusively?

17 A. Peace.

18 Q. Yes, that's right.

19 Then you go on to mention me for a fourth time in your book, once

20 again. It says, "Put off until eternity." This is page 202 of your book,

21 I don't know what the page is in English, where you say that "the proposal

22 came from this ministry," which means your ministry was proposing that

23 General Veljko Kadijevic - General Veljko Kadijevic at that time was the

24 Federal Secretary for National Defence, the number-one man in the JNA -

25 and the president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, should have a meeting and

Page 27933

1 decide what to do next. "Simovic insisted that this should come about as

2 soon as possible."

3 JUDGE MAY: Yes. And the English, please?

4 Mr. NICE: 146.

5 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Then on the next page, it goes on to say that "Since the problems

7 that exist --" or rather, "The JNA has great problems because of all these

8 events." And we've already mentioned that. And you go on to say in

9 paragraph 2 on page 203 that "The clear question should be asked which the

10 key problems are in taking over the territorial organs and territory, how

11 far we have come in that regard, and what it is that the Republic of

12 Serbia has still not done in order to make the mobilisation successful."

13 So we are talking about that part of the competency, that was the sole

14 competency that the Defence Ministry had, that is to say, with respect to

15 mobilisation, keeping military records, and so on and so forth. It was

16 that portion which belonged to the republican ministry, that came under

17 the republican ministry, with respect to administrative matters having to

18 do with military recruits from its territory.

19 A. Let me just remind you that the Defence Ministry of Serbia did

20 not have any competence and authority over the mobilisation of military

21 conscripts unless the reconnaissance and notification service -- unless

22 you mean that.

23 Q. Yes. Thank you for adding that. So it only had these very

24 limited duties.

25 A. Yes.

Page 27934

1 Q. And that is why it is stated here that it should be clearly seen

2 what Serbia has failed to do, because the question keeps cropping up about

3 why the problems with respect to mobilisation, what we hadn't done and

4 which was under our competency.

5 A. Yes. The mobilisation process had been taken over by the

6 military departments, which had now come under the Yugoslav People's Army

7 and its departments.

8 Q. And finally, on page 204 -- it is the last sentence of this

9 chapter, on page 204, it says, "The Milosevic-Simovic-Kadejivic meeting

10 never came about. Nor did a Serb army ever come about."

11 A. Yes. And that was the last conversation that you and

12 General Tomislav Simovic ever had.

13 Q. Well, you have enumerated four such talks, four such instances.

14 JUDGE KWON: It's the last paragraph of page 146.

15 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. You enumerated four such conversations. And you also mention me

17 on one more page, 212. You say, "They can't decide about that." And then

18 you go on to say, "A meeting has been scheduled for tomorrow with

19 President Milosevic, which is compulsory, and General Panic with his

20 associates, Jokic and Sokolovic, Jokic, Commander of the Territorial

21 Defence, Minister Simovic, to be present. Minister Simovic should come a

22 little earlier. However, this meeting was called off at Milosevic's

23 request as there would be no meeting and a solution would follow." I

24 mention this because no meeting ever took place.

25 So judging by what you write here in your book, I had three

Page 27935












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Page 27936

1 meetings in actual fact with Simovic, the one where I mentioned -- and one

2 of the ones I quoted was a meeting with Babic, where he says that they

3 were not the demands made by either Milosevic or Simovic but it was a

4 precondition for bringing in the UN forces. So -- and now this fifth

5 instance where I mention the meeting wasn't ever held; it was called off.

6 Is that right, Mrs. Gajic-Glisic?

7 A. Comrade President, how many meetings you actually had with

8 General Simovic I did not count them all. There was another meeting where

9 I arrived with General Simovic, and then I wasn't able to enter your

10 office. So that was one more meeting. And General Simovic told me that

11 he was going to have a meeting with you, he was going to you for a

12 meeting. When I wrote this book, I did not write it for the Tribunal. I

13 did not write it for check ups of this kind. So I can't say exactly how

14 many meetings you did have in actual fact. All I can do is to speak about

15 the telephone conversations which I attended, the ones you had. And so I

16 speak here about what you call - I don't know - firsthand, secondhand, or

17 third-hand knowledge. I just told you what General Simovic told me.

18 JUDGE MAY: Wait a moment. The reference in the last passage is

19 154 in the English.

20 Yes.

21 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Mrs. Gajic-Glisic, I'm not questioning your goodwill to testify

23 to the best of your knowledge and to answer questions frankly and

24 sincerely. All I'm doing is and I assume you will allow for the

25 possibility of the fact that you couldn't have known certain things, when

Page 27937

1 you're talking about Marek Goulding, for example, as making the proposals

2 and that it was Cyrus Vance's idea and that it is indeed called the Vance

3 Plan. But that doesn't matter. I'm just quoting that by way of an

4 example. But you allow for the possibility that perhaps you didn't know

5 everything fully, perhaps you didn't hear properly about certain things in

6 a situation of tension. You might have even interpreted things

7 differently.

8 A. Well, no, but all of us are prone to make mistakes.

9 Q. All right. Well, let's take another example here, something that

10 I would say is fairly - how shall I put this - radical. Take a look,

11 please, at your statement in which you say the following: "That it was

12 precisely because of that law, the one that was being drafted, that

13 General Zivota Panic --" What was General Zivota Panic at the time?

14 A. Commander of the 1st Army District.

15 Q. Yes, commander of the 1st Army

16 A. And I think he was the commander for combat in Vukovar.

17 Q. He stormed into my cabinet wearing full military gear, combat

18 gear. And I'll read paragraph 103 of your statement, which states as

19 follows: "General Zivota Panic entered Milosevic's cabinet with his

20 escorts. He allegedly accused Milosevic of creating a Serb army. General

21 Panic forced Milosevic to order the Prime Minister of the Serbian

22 government, Dragutin Zelenovic to tender his resignation so that the

23 government of Serbia could not adopt a law on the armed forces of Serbia."

24 Don't you think this to be highly improbable?

25 A. Comrade President, the secretary, Mrs. Mira, called me up on the

Page 27938

1 phone and said, "Dobrila, don't give out any information to the

2 information media because General Panic, in full army combat with all his

3 entourage, stormed into Mr. Milosevic's office and solutions will follow,

4 settlements with follow." So that was the conversation between myself and

5 your secretary. I didn't even take this too seriously -- or rather, I

6 didn't understand the seriousness of the situation.

7 A little before that, in our cabinet, we had the presence of

8 Mr. Dragutin Zelenovic. He was there talking to Simovic. And we leafed

9 through the documents that had already been typed out, the documents

10 compiled in Batajnica on the 13th of May. The president of the commission

11 was Buda Kosutic. We were discussing having this discussed at a closed

12 government meeting. So I attended that particular conversation when

13 General Simovic went to attend a government meeting. He came back some 20

14 minutes later and said, "The government has fallen and Zelenovic has

15 tendered his resignation." And then I told him what Mira, your secretary,

16 had told me prior to that. And he said, "Well, a putsch has taken

17 place." I said, "What putsch?" He said, "A coup d'etat."

18 Q. Mrs. Gajic-Glisic, from what you're saying, General Simovic

19 informed you all of his conversations with everybody else. I can see that

20 that would emerge from the way you put things. Now, I'm not entering into

21 his methods of work. However, as far as I'm concerned, I never informed

22 my secretary about the contents of my conversations with anybody. Nor did

23 I have this kind of relationship with her that I felt it necessary to

24 inform her of my conversations.

25 JUDGE MAY: Wait a moment. The witness can't answer for that.

Page 27939

1 She can't know what you told your secretary. All she can say is what the

2 secretary told her, and that's her account. Now, if you have some

3 information that that account is wrong, of course you can put it. But you

4 can't -- she can't answer for your relations with your secretary.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, the witness, in point 103,

6 says that General Panic forced me. I don't know how he could force me.

7 But she says he entered armed to the teeth. That is a complete untruth.

8 Panic never entered with an entourage of any kind into my office. He did

9 come to see me, but he wasn't armed to the teeth, of course, and not to

10 threaten me and to frighten me and to make it impossible for me or for

11 Serbia to pass a law of any kind. So I hope you will allow for the

12 possibility of the fact that you, Witness, understood this wrongly,

13 because my secretary could never say something --

14 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am here under oath, and I

16 remember very well to the present day the sound of her words, and I stand

17 by what I said, that that is what Mira told me on that occasion. Now,

18 what happened --

19 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Mrs. Gajic-Glisic, I really don't want to enter into what

21 secretaries talk about amongst themselves, but can you conceive of a

22 situation in which any general could storm into my office, whether Panic

23 or anybody else, armed to the teeth and force me to do anything and that I

24 would be frightened by that and to say, "All right, that was a joke.

25 We're not going to pass a law and Zelenovic can tender his resignation"?

Page 27940

1 A. It's a fact that on the next day Zelenovic resigned.

2 Q. Well, of course you didn't attend the cabinet session at which he

3 resigned.

4 A. No, I didn't.

5 Q. Do you know what Zelenovic gave as the reasons for his

6 resignation? It had nothing do with the enactment of the law on the armed

7 forces. It had not even been prepared for the parliament.

8 A. He didn't give any explanation, apart from the letter I handed

9 and which you have amongst these documents.

10 Q. Zelenovic's letter?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. What does the letter say? Tell me, please - since you handed it

13 in, I don't have it with me now - but what does Zelenovic say in that

14 letter? Every Prime Minister has the right to resign.

15 A. It's very brief, just two sentences. Should I --

16 Q. Yes, please read Zelenovic's letter of resignation.

17 A. Can you help me? Can you give me the document number? What's

18 the tab? Since --

19 Q. Unfortunately, I cannot. I have too much paper here. I can't

20 help you.

21 JUDGE MAY: One moment. We'll -- we'll see if the Prosecution

22 can help.

23 Mr. NICE: We're identifying it from rather a large number of

24 documents, but we'll get there.

25 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, why don't you go on to some other

Page 27941












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13 English transcripts.













Page 27942

1 topic and they can look and we can return to it. It's a matter for you.

2 If you want to wait, of course you can.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Of course I don't want

4 to wait, because time is precious, Mr. May, but this claim is so

5 unbelievable for anyone who knows.

6 JUDGE MAY: That's a matter of comment.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, it's not a matter of comment.

8 This is the first time I've heard that someone committed a coup d'etat in

9 Serbia and the government fell for this reason.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This was General Simovic's

11 explanation, and I wrote it down for my book and not for the Tribunal. I

12 stand by the conversation we had in the cabinet. That's how I noted it

13 down. And it's not for me to think about what really happened in your

14 cabinet and what you talked about with General Panic.

15 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. General Panic, madam, General Panic had no competence. He was

17 the commander of one strategic -- he had no competence to deal with any

18 political issues.

19 JUDGE MAY: Look, that's not for the witness to answer. That's

20 what she says she was told happened. Now, we will have to decide in -- in

21 due course what weight to put on the -- the evidence. I suggest we find

22 some other topic.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've just found the letter.

24 JUDGE MAY: Very well. The letter has been found. Perhaps you

25 could read it for us.

Page 27943

1 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Yes. Read it.

3 A. "Dear Comrade President, In accordance with Article 93 of the

4 constitution of the Republic of Serbia and Article 45 of the rules of

5 proceeding of the parliament of Serbia, I hereby resign as the Prime

6 Minister of Serbia. I take this opportunity, Comrade President, to thank

7 the deputies for their understanding for the work of the government and

8 for keeping their integrity and my integrity and for their cooperation

9 with this office. I wish you all much success in your further work.

10 Yours sincerely, Dragutin Zelenovic." It's his signature.

11 Q. Very well. So this is resignation of the Prime Minister. What

12 has it got to do with the law on the army and what has it got to do with

13 military matters at all?

14 A. Before writing this letter, he was sitting in the cabinet and

15 talking to General Simovic about the draft bill on the armed forces.

16 Q. Well, he could have sat in anyone's cabinet and talked about

17 various bills that were being prepared, but he did not resign because of a

18 particular bill. The Prime Minister would resign in connection with a

19 bill when it was rejected by the parliament, not when the cabinet hadn't

20 even considered it.

21 JUDGE MAY: That's all a matter of comment. You've heard what

22 the witness -- what the witness has said. Now, do you want that letter

23 exhibited?

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have heard what the witness said.

25 Yes, you can exhibit it or not, but these are incredible things, really.

Page 27944

1 Please.

2 Mr. NICE: It's available in both languages.

3 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Thank you. We'll get the next D number,

4 please.

5 THE REGISTRAR: Defence Exhibit --

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, she read it, I suppose.

7 JUDGE MAY: Don't interrupt.

8 Let us have the number.

9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, Defence Exhibit 205. For the

10 record, Defence Exhibit 204 is also exhibited as Prosecution Exhibit 387,

11 tab 12.

12 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Very well. Mrs. Gajic-Glisic, you say that Simovic was then

14 replaced. You keep using the expression "the replacement of Simovic."

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Very well, Mrs. Gajic-Glisic, are you aware that when the Prime

17 Minister resigns, then the president of the republic gives a mandate to

18 somebody else to form a cabinet? Are you aware of this?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Well, then, the resignation of the Prime Minister means that

21 somebody else is given the mandate of forming a cabinet and this other

22 person then proposes the composition of the cabinet to the parliament. Is

23 this correct?

24 A. Yes, but previously consulting you.

25 Q. Whether they consult me or not. Well, there are some matters

Page 27945

1 they consult me on and others they don't, depending on their importance.

2 But what I'm asking you is this is not about the replacement of Simovic.

3 It's simply that the term of office of the then-Prime Minister had been

4 terminated and the new person who had been given the mandate to form a

5 government selected his own ministers, and this is nothing unusual,

6 because everyone who forms a government does so according to their own

7 views and their own plans. So the Prime Minister resigned and the new

8 Prime Minister is forming his cabinet. That's quite normal, is it not?

9 A. All this would be true, Mr. President, had not terrible

10 repression followed on this. Marko Negovanovic, a general, came and said,

11 "You wanted a Serbian army. I'll give you a Serbian army." And then he

12 said, "You, you brought all kind of riffraff here. You brought Mosa

13 [phoen] to my cabinet. What Serbian army? What law? Nothing will come

14 of this."

15 Q. He was doing his job and he was dealing with the law on the army,

16 which was part of his competence. Other ministers who arrived did their

17 work. But you were not the only ministry there. There were 20 ministries

18 in the government.

19 A. Well, not all ministers were replaced.

20 Q. Well, the new Prime Minister kept some and changed others.

21 What's so strange about that? A new cabinet was established. He took

22 some ministers from the previous government because he felt he had to keep

23 them. What's so strange about this?

24 A. Yes, quite, Mr. President, but after that I was punished, and

25 then I was banished from the ministry, and then I was banished to

Page 27946

1 Batajnica, and then General Kuzmanovic and General Negovanovic allegedly

2 ordered that I be liquidated urgently, and then Colonel Slobodan Jovanovic

3 took me out barefoot, to run out on the 13th of May to save my life, and

4 then even you intervened, according to what Mr. Milo Kligojevic [phoen]

5 told me, and he said my life was not to be imperilled, and then General

6 Aca Vasiljevic, who worked on part of the draft law on the armed forces of

7 Serbia was taken to prison, and many other things happened.

8 Q. What did Serbia have to do with Vasiljevic? Vasiljevic was then

9 in the General Staff. It has nothing to do with Serbia.

10 A. He attended meetings every Sunday -- or rather, every week, and

11 he consulted General Simovic about this.

12 Q. I won't go into that, but here is another absurdity for you. I

13 don't want to suggest by my means that you have told a lie. No, I simply

14 want to draw your attention to the fact that you must allow that things

15 may not have been the way you thought they were, especially as it was

16 quite impossible for certain things to happen in the way you say, for

17 Panic to burst into my office with weapons, for all of this to have

18 something to do with the law on defence, and we were advocating

19 Yugoslavia.

20 JUDGE MAY: You've already -- you've already covered all that.

21 We've been over it. Let's go on to something else.

22 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Please, then, be so kind as to look at this, which is also

24 absurd. Just let me find it. From what I see here - I'll read this out

25 to you, although in paragraph 111 there are many things - but I'll start

Page 27947












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13 English transcripts.













Page 27948

1 with what it says near the end of paragraph 111: "On the 14th of

2 February, 1992, Tomislav Simovic arrived unannounced, which was unusual.

3 He usually called before coming and announced his visit. This time he was

4 devastated. He showed me the decision on his retirement. He told me that

5 he had been called back from annual leave to the General Staff of the JNA

6 and that there was no one in his office when he arrived. In the meantime,

7 he had been promoted to colonel general and he worked in the General Staff

8 of the JNA."

9 A. On the 21st of December, he was promoted to the rank of colonel

10 general.

11 Q. Yes.

12 A. And he was moved to the General Staff, transferred there.

13 Q. He was no longer a minister but he was a general and he was given

14 an assignment.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Now, please pay attention to this part of your statement. You

17 say - I've just read this - "There was no one in his office when he

18 arrived." I don't know why there should be someone in his office when he

19 arrived. Probably as colonel general he had an office of his own, he

20 didn't share it with anyone. And it says, "After some time, General

21 Tumanov arrived." Tumanov was in the security service; is that correct?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. I think that at the time he was a colonel and not a general.

24 A. After this, he was promoted to general very soon.

25 Q. Well, this doesn't matter really. I heard that he worked in the

Page 27949

1 security service and that he did a good job.

2 A. Yes, evidently.

3 Q. General Tumanov arrived after a time and put a request to -- a

4 retirement request on the desk.

5 A. Yes. He put this request on Simovic's desk.

6 Q. And Simovic was supposed to sign it.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. So this request was already drawn up, and Simovic just had to

9 sign it and he would be pensioned off.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. So he put this request on his desk, pointed a pistol at his right

12 temple, and ordered him to sign. He put the request on his desk, ordered

13 him to sign it, and put a pistol to his temple. General Tumanov ordered

14 him to sign this; otherwise, it would look like suicide. Did you write

15 this?

16 A. Yes, I did write this. General Simovic stated this when he came

17 to see me.

18 Q. He stated this?

19 A. He told me about this. And that night he told Zoran Bogavac

20 about this and many other things, and Zoran Bogavac promised never to make

21 this public. General Simovic immediately afterwards, faced with enormous

22 threats and pressures, changed his story and said, "Oh, yes, I wanted to

23 retire. I didn't get where I wanted. I didn't manage to set up a Serbian

24 army. The Serbian variant has fallen through, I want to retire." And

25 very soon he changed the story that he told me when he came to see me, and

Page 27950

1 this same story he told Zoran Bogavac in his house that night.

2 Q. Very well, Mrs. Gajic-Glisic, I don't want to put you into a

3 difficult situation, I really don't, and I don't know any of the -- the

4 character of the dramatic relationships between General Simovic. But I

5 have here a photocopy of the request by General Simovic. I have a

6 photocopy here. And it has been registered in the Federal Secretariat for

7 National Defence. The number is -- and it is authorised, the authenticity

8 has been certified, et cetera. So here you have the request for General

9 Simovic's pensioning off, that you say Tumanov put a gun to his temple,

10 but this entire request was written out in hand, written by General

11 Simovic himself in his own hand, so he couldn't have placed this on the

12 table with a pistol to his head. And it says "Request for cessation of

13 AVC," which is active military service. And then the title, sent to the

14 chief of the General Staff of the armed forces of the SFRY in person. All

15 this has been written out in his own handwriting, and it says, "In view of

16 the fact that I have over 40 years of service, I hereby request that the

17 AVS --" that is to say the active military service -- "that my active

18 military service cease forthwith." And the next sentence is, "Please

19 forward my request to the PSU" or, rather, the personnel department. The

20 15th of January, 1991 is the date. Colonel General Tomislav Simovic,

21 followed by his signature. So this completely refutes what you claim,

22 Mrs. Gajic-Glisic, and it is very improbable. This is the first time that

23 I've heard anything like this, that somebody placed a pistol to --

24 JUDGE MAY: Now, we've -- we've heard enough now. You're

25 supposed to be asking a question. I've allowed you to read the letter.

Page 27951

1 But you must now show it to the witness and allow her to comment on it.

2 Mr. NICE: It's tab 10 of the exhibits.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This seems to me to be

4 General Simovic's handwriting. This is General Simovic's signature.

5 General Simovic could not have had 40 years of service at that point in

6 time. As far as I recall, General Simovic was born in 1933, and we're

7 talking about 1991 here. So it says here that this document was

8 registered on the 15th of January. I'm talking about the 14th of January.

9 According to my notes, it was the 14th of January. I have nothing to say

10 in this regard, pursuant to this document. I stand by what I said

11 previously and what I wrote previously, that that was how it was and that

12 the general told me that story on that day. And General Simovic, under

13 different pressure, would very often change his statements.

14 I should just like to ask you to take a look at page -- a page in

15 my book. It is page 293, where it -- "We're all posthumous." And even

16 when he authorised my manuscript in its first version prevented me and

17 prohibited me from having it printed. And then he changed his mind and

18 authorised the portion he had banned, banned being printed, and allowed me

19 to publish it.

20 JUDGE MAY: Just one matter that I want clarified. The year was

21 given as 19 -- January 1991. Is that the right year?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The month of January, 1992.

23 JUDGE MAY: Yes. That's how it is. Yes, thank you.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It says that on the document,

25 Mr. May.

Page 27952

1 JUDGE MAY: Yes. But it was translated or came out as 1991. That

2 is why I was questioning it.

3 Yes. Do you want this exhibited?

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course, Mr. May. This is a

5 notorious fact.

6 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Hand it -- hand it in, and we'll give it

7 the next number.

8 THE REGISTRAR: Defence Exhibit 206, Your Honour.


10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I understood it, Mr. May, that

11 yesterday Mr. Nice had said that General Simovic would be testifying. He

12 mentioned that.

13 Mr. NICE: I --

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So --

15 Mr. NICE: I said no such thing at any stage.

16 And while I'm on my feet, by the way, just to correct something

17 else. The references to "secret" were both made by the witness in answer

18 to neutral questions by me, the one about a level of publicity and the

19 other to like effect.

20 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I've just been given a copy of

22 Dragutin Zelenovic's resignation. I don't want to read it out again,

23 because I'm quite sure that the witness read it out very correctly. I

24 simply wish to draw your attention to the fact that this resignation was

25 addressed, as it says, "Comrade President." That is not me. I don't want

Page 27953

1 that to be misunderstood, because you have different expressions for that.

2 But this resignation was addressed to the person it was intended to, the

3 President of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, because the

4 National Assembly nominates the government, appoints the government. And

5 that's what it says in this translation here. So I just wanted to draw

6 your attention to that. And he did this pursuant to the rules and

7 regulations for this kind of thing. The president of the republic

8 proposes the mandate. The National Assembly appoints the government

9 pursuant to proposals of the mandate. And it is only the Assembly that

10 can dismiss or appoint anybody. And the oath is taken before the

11 Assembly.

12 I don't know. But I understood it that an announcement was made

13 yesterday to the effect that General Simovic would come in to testify.

14 But if I have understood incorrectly, then I'm sorry.

15 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Do you remember anybody mentioning that?

17 A. No, I didn't understand it that way.

18 Q. Very well.

19 A. Well, Comrade President, perhaps --

20 JUDGE MAY: Let's make it plain. There was no such announcement

21 yesterday by the Prosecution.

22 JUDGE KWON: I just note that Mr. Nice said yesterday while he

23 mentioned about the book, "We are -- we will be hearing in due course

24 Mr. Simovic." Yes. It's on page 27793, line 20.

25 Mr. NICE: That simply must be a transcript error. I have never

Page 27954

1 had that in any mind and I certainly have no recollection of saying that.

2 I'll look it up and see what it must be a mistranslation or a misrecording

3 of.

4 JUDGE KWON: No. I remember I heard that.


6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I also remember that well, having

7 heard something to that effect. That's why I brought it up. And I

8 wouldn't have any reason for bringing it up except for having heard it

9 with my own ears. And as you can see, His Honour heard that too.

10 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Otherwise, the transcript as we

12 know --

13 JUDGE MAY: Let us -- let us have the matter clarified. But the

14 answer is no.

15 Now, let's move on.

16 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Mrs. Gajic-Glisic, is it contested or not that you in your

18 statement in many places, or to be more specific -- well, yes, in many

19 places don't only write about things you heard directly and saw directly

20 but you're talking about things you heard from others as well and also the

21 conclusions you made about what you heard and which was grounds for the

22 observations you make?

23 A. I used my diaries, my own notebook, my book, my knowledge in

24 order to write out my statement in detail.

25 Q. Yes, I understand that. But without a doubt, in many places you

Page 27955

1 write about what you had heard from others, mostly from General Simovic;

2 isn't that right?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. All right. Are you sure that it was from your observations and

5 from the things you heard that the right conclusions always emerged, that

6 you made the right conclusions about what you say and specifically, in

7 concrete terms, the matters I asked you about?

8 A. Had I not been sure, I would not have put them there.

9 Q. Very well. Tell me this now, please: I noticed --

10 Mr. NICE: Your Honour, while that's being dealt with -- I'm so

11 sorry. Forgive my interrupting.

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

13 Mr. NICE: Ms. Dicklich has found the passage that His Honour

14 Judge Kwon has referred to, and I can pretty well recollect what was said

15 and -- certainly what I intended to say and indeed what I think I did say.

16 I think you'll find this is an early passage of the examination-in-chief,

17 and I was putting a question of one of those passages which didn't require

18 evidence in full from the witness. And I was saying that this was checked

19 for the content of its accuracy by a man called Simovic, of whom we will

20 be hearing in due course. Certainly what was intended to be said --

21 because at that stage you -- well, you may have known, but from the

22 evidence we got to that far, you wouldn't have known exactly who we were

23 talking about. That's all.

24 JUDGE KWON: That's quite right.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

Page 27956

1 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Now, you in your CV mention many things that do not have a direct

3 bearing on your testimony or the time during which I performed some

4 political function. But could you please clear this point up. You say

5 that upon return from America, you wrote a report, 360 pages, but that

6 work of yours was banned. Is that right?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. As far as I can see, that was in 1983. Is that right?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. How do you mean banned, when it wasn't published in the first

11 place?

12 A. Well, this manuscript of mine was taken away from me by the state

13 security.

14 Q. In 1983?

15 A. Yes. Because the manuscript -- as the manuscript probably is

16 still in existence in the archives of the state security somewhere, and

17 since I believe that you might dig it up, and so that I should prevent you

18 from saying that I was telling lies or not telling the truth, in agreement

19 with the OTP I put that sentence in, to the effect that all of us in our

20 lives have some things that happened to us and which should be mentioned

21 for me to be completely pure and clean here. Of course, that has nothing

22 to do with you. I didn't know that you existed at all at that time. But

23 of course, some information and knowledge that I got there, heard about,

24 wrote down. I was young. I didn't believe in some of those things. I

25 was told that I wasn't to speak about those things or write about them,

Page 27957

1 nor could I publish them anywhere.

2 Q. All right. Regardless of the fact that this was all happening in

3 1983 - and I really don't know anyway, nor can I have any idea about it

4 all and what you say - but what was the name of the member of the state

5 security who advised you not to publish that work of yours? What was it

6 that you wrote in that work that was so dramatic?

7 A. Well, quite obviously you know about it very well.

8 Q. I don't know whether that is obvious or not. I know nothing

9 about it.

10 A. I can see that on your face clearly, and quite obviously you know

11 all about it.

12 Q. Well, regardless of what you assume, can you tell us what it was

13 that you wrote at the time?

14 A. At the time, I listened -- and this seemed to me to be a joke by

15 Kundara [phoen] or Orwell's 1984 to the effect that communism would topple

16 in the whole Eastern Bloc according to the domino system. It would fall

17 down like dominos and that the Soviet Union would disintegrate and that

18 the Serbs would be disbursed and resettled and up rooted from its

19 territories. And that in Yugoslavia there would be blood up to the knees

20 and that Kosovo would be joined up with Albania, part of Macedonia, and

21 Greece and that a greater Albania would be formed, and so the siptars

22 could breed over there and that part of Macedonia would be attached and

23 conjoined to Bulgaria and that part of Vojvodina would be joined to

24 Hungary, that there would be great divisions in Europe generally, and that

25 that was a long-term plan that was being prepared.

Page 27958

1 Now, at that time, my country was the greatest and most beautiful

2 country in the world, and I found this all to be a science fiction, highly

3 improbable. And I wrote all this down from one day to the next, and I

4 wrote a diary, in manuscript form, 360 pages long, and I thought I'd

5 publish it and that this would then be a big book. However, when I handed

6 it over to the director of the Obecija Novina [phoen] publishing house,

7 they called me to come to their premises. They introduced me to a man

8 whose name was Liki --

9 Q. Let's not go further into all this. All I wanted to hear from

10 you was what you wrote. And that what you wrote seems to be coming true,

11 what you heard over there when you were in America.

12 A. Unfortunately, Comrade President, I told all this to

13 General Simovic in our first conversation and I told him that all this

14 was -- had been realised, right according to the domino system and in the

15 periods of time that they told me about over there then.

16 Q. Who told you that there? Who told you about this plan? Who put

17 it forward to you?

18 A. I was very young then. I was a correspondent for the paper

19 Komunist. I was a journalist but also an engineer in the Sloboda [phoen]

20 company and dealt with innovatory work there. I was an enthusiast, very

21 enthusiastic about the work I was doing, and I published my first book

22 "Mother, Give Birth to me Again." It was published by the Obecija Novina

23 publishing house in Gornji Milanovac. A businessman turned up from

24 America and he spoke Serbian very well.

25 Q. I apologise for interrupting but my time is very short. I just

Page 27959

1 wanted to hear about this all. I'm sure the history of it all is very

2 interesting, but we don't have time. But who did you learn about these

3 facts from, that is to say, how the Serbs would be disbursed and how

4 Yugoslavia would be destroyed and how a Greater Albania was to be created

5 and all the other things that you've just mentioned?

6 A. From people very close to the then-President Reagan.

7 Unfortunately --

8 Q. That was in 1983, was it?

9 A. Yes. And in my country, they ordered me not to speak about that

10 to anybody. They forbid me to speak about it to anybody, to publish a

11 single word of that, that I had to keep quiet about it and that it was

12 something that wasn't to be spoken about.

13 Q. Well, I really don't want to enter into all that, because to the

14 present day I couldn't understand the reasons for which you were not

15 allowed to write all that down or, rather, to publish it, because

16 everything else about Yugoslavia was published. I don't remember that

17 there were any bans of any kind. But -- so this is -- these are things

18 you learnt from people close to the American President, President Reagan,

19 in 1983; is that right?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. The Pope, in 1982, when --

22 JUDGE MAY: I think we are now getting a long way from the

23 subject. You've asked the witness about something which you've been

24 allowed to do. It may have affected or not the credibility. But it

25 sounds as though we're getting a long way from the topic.

Page 27960

1 Anyway, it's time to adjourn. Twenty minutes, please.

2 --- Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.

3 --- On resuming at 12.41 p.m.

4 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I only ask you to tell me

6 how much time I have left, as I have many questions to put to the witness.

7 JUDGE MAY: You've got 22 minutes -- 25 minutes.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You see, Mr. May, the statement of

9 Mrs. Gajic-Glisic has 307 paragraphs, 307. And there's the book, plus the

10 binder. If I were looking only at the paragraphs, it would mean 100

11 paragraphs an hour. That would add up to three hours. So I have to ask

12 for more time. I cannot go through everything, but at least allow me to

13 go through part of this statement.

14 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tapuskovic, how long do you think you might be?

15 Mr. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I always took

16 account of the time and try to make the best use of it. I think that 15

17 or 20 minutes would be sufficient for me.

18 JUDGE MAY: [Microphone not activated]

19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

20 JUDGE MAY: You can have additional time to allow Mr. Tapuskovic

21 15 minutes.

22 Five minutes for re-examination?

23 Mr. NICE: [Microphone not activated] There are eight questions

24 at the moment.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I will continue and you

Page 27961

1 will tell me when my time has run out. I assume you will use the usual

2 procedure.

3 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Mrs. Gajic-Glisic, in paragraphs 19 and 20 of your statement, you

5 say that in 1986 national tensions started in the JNA. And you're

6 mentioning the famous Keljmendi case.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. What did that Keljmendi do? Do you remember?

9 A. He killed JNA soldiers while they were asleep.

10 Q. You also say that this is when the first tensions began between

11 the republican Territorial Defences and the JNA, as well as the republican

12 police forces and the JNA. Is this correct?

13 A. Yes. At that time, I was head of the reconnaissance and

14 notification service of Cacak municipality, and information was available

15 to me that was not available to the public.

16 Q. And as you say, it then became clear that the Territorial

17 Defences are becoming separate armies.

18 A. Yes. General Simovic told me this in his interview in 1984, and

19 he said quite correctly, "If war breaks out one day, it will not be

20 because Yugoslavia has been attacked by a foreign aggressor. It will be

21 an ethnic and religious war between the Territorial Defence and the JNA."

22 Unfortunately, that interview was also banned.

23 Q. I won't go into who banned that interview.

24 Do you consider that these tensions had at their root the

25 nationalism and separatism of certain political structures at the time?

Page 27962

1 A. Yes. Should I explain?

2 Q. We don't have time for that. So such activities were an

3 introduction into what was to take place later on the territory of the

4 former Yugoslavia.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And to a large extent, this was in accordance with what you wrote

7 in your book which was never published.

8 A. You mean the interview?

9 Q. No. I mean that big work of yours where you wrote about

10 Yugoslavia disintegrating, Greater Albania, the expulsions of Serbs, and

11 so on.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. When you received this information, as you say, from people close

14 to the then-American President Reagan, that in 1992, in a meeting between

15 Reagan and the Pope, there was talk of Yugoslavia being broken up --

16 JUDGE MAY: We're now -- we're now moving a long way from the

17 witness's evidence, between any meetings of the Pope and President Reagan.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May.

19 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. But in fact, the formal excuse for your dismissal from the

21 ministry was that you had connections with the foreign intelligence

22 service.

23 A. General Marko Negovanovic told me this, but they also told me

24 that you defended me vehemently and that you pensioned off 40 generals for

25 my sake because you wanted them to prove what they were saying and they

Page 27963

1 didn't have a single piece of evidence to put before you. And now it's up

2 to you to say whether that's how it happened.

3 Q. I was unable to dismiss generals, but whenever somebody put

4 claims before me without evidence to support them, of course it was

5 logical for me to ask for evidence to support certain arguments.

6 A. Well, this is an occasion for me to say thank you for being on my

7 side at the time.

8 Q. In paragraph 40, you say that I asked Simovic whether he wanted

9 the post of minister of defence and whether he wanted to work on the

10 reorganisation of the JNA, and so on and so forth. Was it Simovic who

11 told you this?

12 A. Yes, Simovic told me this in one of our conversations.

13 Q. Then I won't into this, because we would simply be putting one

14 claim against another. I don't think he could have told you this, but

15 that's up to him.

16 Very well, Mrs. Gajic-Glisic, as you say here that I told him

17 that he was to work on the project of a Serbian army and so on, that for

18 11 years continuously I was the president, first of all of Serbia and then

19 of Yugoslavia. Is this correct? And during those 11 years, did I

20 establish a Serbian army?

21 A. There were a number of reorganisations of the JNA, as far as I

22 was able to follow this, because after that I was concerned mainly with

23 preserving my own life and not what you were doing. I interrupted my work

24 on the 1st of June, 1992, when I lost my job definitely and instituted

25 legal proceedings, which are still going on, which are still pending to

Page 27964

1 this day, and it was never established whether I was to blame for anything

2 or whether I should get my job back. After that, I was never able to get

3 a job in any government organ or to get a job anywhere else.

4 Q. I won't go into this, because I really don't know anything about

5 this. But in your statement, in paragraph 41, it says -- or rather, you

6 mention some sort of a viso orders. You say that I was issuing orders of

7 this kind. I have to tell you that this is the first time I've heard of

8 such orders, and you say that a person under certain conditions who

9 refused to carry out such an order could be eliminated. Did you write

10 this, or was this a mistake?

11 A. This is not a mistake. A viso orders are ordinarily used in

12 government organs when certain measures of readiness are in place or when

13 there is an imminent threat of war or during war, and these orders are

14 issued tete-a-tete, and issuing such an order meant it had to be carried

15 out.

16 Q. This is the first time I'm hearing this from your statement.

17 Tell me, do you have any experience, any personal experience, of me giving

18 such an a viso order?

19 A. I never received one from you personally, but others said that

20 when they came to see you and when you told them something, they were not

21 allowed to respond with a single word. They simply had to carry out the

22 order. When I asked General Simovic, "How can you mobilise someone when

23 you don't have legal authority to mobilise anyone?" he said, "He's my

24 president, and I cannot say I won't do it or I can't do it."

25 Q. Does this mean that I ordered Simovic to mobilise someone?

Page 27965

1 A. According to what he dictated to me, he said that a certain

2 number of volunteers were to be mobilised in one day, to bring up to

3 manpower level Territorial Defence units.

4 Q. What you have just said is contradictory, because to mobilise

5 excludes any kind of volunteering. Volunteers and mobilised soldiers are

6 two quite different things.

7 A. Yes. But you know that's not how things were. People are often

8 mobilised and then in their military booklets it was recorded that they

9 had volunteered. There were many such examples. And I came across these.

10 Many came to complain about this at the ministry.

11 Q. You mean if someone complained that they had been registered in

12 error as a volunteer, did you then relieve them?

13 A. What do you mean "relieve them"?

14 Q. Did you then have to send them to the organs mobilising soldiers?

15 You couldn't tolerate forged books or false books.

16 A. You know the case of the taxi drivers.

17 Q. What taxi drivers? I don't know anything about this incident.

18 A. When the army was mobilising their conscripts and sending them

19 off to the war-affected areas, people got scared. They left behind their

20 equipment, trucks, everything they had taken with them, they left it in

21 the war-affected areas and fled, and this equipment and these APCs had to

22 be brought back to Belgrade, so we recruited taxi drivers to organise

23 themselves as volunteers and bring back this equipment, these vehicles.

24 Later on, it transpired that nobody wanted to receive these taxi drivers,

25 that nobody wanted to inscribe into their military booklets that they had

Page 27966

1 been at the war front, that they had been mobilised. We even asked you to

2 intervene. And then -- and then in the end --

3 Q. So they went and brought back this equipment?

4 A. Yes, they did. But they didn't get anything for it. It wasn't

5 even put into their military booklets that they had done this.

6 Mr. Uskokovic did this, the president of the taxi drivers' association.

7 Q. I don't know who Mr. Uskokovic is.

8 A. And do you know what happened later? Colonel Velimirov, who was

9 in charge of all this, ascribed to himself, or somebody gave him, the rank

10 of general as a reward because the soldiers had heroically carried out

11 their obligation.

12 Q. I don't know anything about this. I won't ask you about this.

13 I'm really not interested.

14 Look at paragraph 48 of your statement. You say, as far as I can

15 understand, that on the 20th of September, 1991 you were, as you say,

16 angry - and I assume you were also sincere - and you said the following to

17 Simovic. I'm quoting you: "General, Yugoslavia no longer exists. This

18 nation expects you to save their soldiers, their children, to create a

19 Serbian army, to be their commander." Were these your words?

20 A. Yes. Yes. I argued with him then. I argued a lot. Because I

21 had been brought back, through the court, to my post of chief of the

22 reconnaissance and notification service, and they wouldn't give me the

23 documents I had created, they wouldn't let me work, nobody wanted to

24 protect me, and I said to General Simovic that I would sue him because he

25 wasn't intervening in my case. Nobody proved --

Page 27967

1 Q. I'm not talking about your case. But you said, "The people

2 expect you to save their children, to be the war commander, to command the

3 soldiers."

4 A. When I say "children," I mean --

5 Q. The point is here to create a Serbian army. That's what you

6 said.

7 A. Before that, we had talked about a Serbian army, when I was in

8 the cabinet with him.

9 Q. Was this your idea that he should create a Serbian army?

10 A. I wasn't my idea. But before that, in the days preceding this -

11 and it's in the paragraphs that you skipped over - it says that he talked

12 to you about setting -- about creating a draft bill on the armed forces of

13 Serbia.

14 Q. Well, drafting a bill is one thing and forming a Serbian army is

15 quite another. A Serbian army was never established.

16 A. At the time, it was said that the volunteers were the backbone of

17 the future Serbian army, which would be above party interests and would

18 defend the interests of Serbia.

19 Q. There were a number of volunteer detachments which had nothing to

20 do with either the state or any kind of conception.

21 In paragraph 50, you say that Simovic spoke before the Serbian

22 parliament when he took his oath as minister.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And you say that this speech was a page and a half long and that

25 it fascinated all of Serbia.

Page 27968

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. That's what you say. Do you have a copy of this speech?

3 A. No. I had a cassette, but the OTP would not accept it and we

4 sent it back to Belgrade.

5 Q. That means that he read a speech that you wrote for him. I

6 didn't suggest it to him.

7 A. I apologise. We wrote the speech together. I wrote it; he added

8 things, corrected things. And then he brought the speech to you, and you

9 agreed that he could read that speech out before the parliament. That's

10 what he told me.

11 Q. That's what he told you. And you wrote the speech.

12 A. We wrote it together. I was typing it and drafting it, and he

13 was adding parts of sentences.

14 Q. Very well. I won't burden you with this any longer. But judging

15 by everything, even by your statement, the setting up of a Serbian army,

16 which is both implicitly and explicitly ascribed to me, does not hold

17 water.

18 In paragraph 68, you say that a meeting was held between me and

19 Simovic. And you say that I then told Simovic to prepare lists of JNA

20 generals to be pensioned off. Is that what you're saying?

21 A. General Simovic dictated this to me after coming back from your

22 office. That's what he told me, that he'd come back from seeing you.

23 Q. From what we concluded together here, during this examination, is

24 it clear or should it be clear that neither I, as president of Serbia, nor

25 Simovic, as the minister of defence of Serbia, were able to dismiss or

Page 27969

1 replace or pension off JNA officers?

2 A. Well, that's what I said to General Simovic, "What did you say to

3 President Milosevic about this?" And he said, "I said I understand." I

4 said, "How could you say that when you're not competent to do this?" And

5 he replied, "But he's my president."

6 Q. Very well. How could Simovic have pensioned off any JNA general?

7 How could anyone give someone a task for which he is not competent?

8 A. He wasn't competent and he didn't pension anyone off.

9 Q. Very well. Isn't there a clear criterion for people to be

10 pensioned off; their age, their years of service, their rank?

11 A. I know this, Comrade President, but he kept telling me that you

12 were asking him to pension off the incompetent generals.

13 Q. Mrs. Gajic-Glisic, I really cannot go into what somebody told

14 you, but do you have any knowledge of the fact that the vast majority of

15 generals or colonels or captains or whatever rank were pensioned off, that

16 they were pensioned off exclusively according to the criteria for

17 retirement, which has to do with years of service and their age and also

18 their rank? The higher the rank, the higher the age. But this is all

19 within a range of a few years, not more. And that this is how they

20 retired.

21 A. Comrade President, I'm not saying that this is not correct, but I

22 still abide by the statement --

23 Q. Very well. Let's proceed. Let's move on. Then you go on to say

24 that I told Simovic to form lists of volunteers and to establish a

25 battalion of volunteers. That was what you say.

Page 27970

1 A. That's what he told me.

2 Q. He told you that?

3 A. Yes. And I have a notebook in which I wrote this down with the

4 date.

5 Q. All right. But don't you know that the volunteers came under the

6 competence of either the JNA or the Territorial Defence?

7 A. And Comrade President, you must know that those volunteers went

8 to report to the centre for reconnaissance and notification.

9 Q. Yes. That was according to the decrees that we looked through.

10 We can't go back to that. Everybody reports to the territorial body that

11 then registers them, has them written down in their lists, and then it is

12 the commanders of the military units of the ranks of brigade and higher

13 ones to okay this. That's what it says in the rules.

14 A. Yes. This is what it looked like. They would report to the

15 notification centres, and they would give their particulars. Then through

16 the notification centres all the data and information would go to the

17 republican centre for notification, and then the republican centre for

18 notification would go down the horizontal chain and vertical chain and

19 inform others. And the centre for notification would every day receive

20 reports from the notification centres as to how many volunteers had signed

21 up in which place, in which locality. Then those volunteers were further

22 sent on to the training centres, which came under the authority of the

23 Territorial Defence.

24 Q. Well, everything that you say is what is contained in the

25 instructions and provisions that we looked through a moment ago.

Page 27971

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. So this was all done -- this procedure was all in conformity with

3 those provisions. Is that right?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. In paragraph 69, you go on to talk about the owner of

6 Jugoskandik, who came to the ministry and said that he would help. Who

7 sent him in the first place?

8 A. I invited him to come.

9 Q. I see, you invited him to come. Now, as far as I understood it,

10 I asked you who that man was?

11 A. That was later, when he wanted to have a meeting with you. You

12 said, "Who is the man?"

13 Q. So he asked for something through you. He asked me to receive

14 him through you, and I asked who the man was.

15 A. Through General Simovic. You asked General Simovic who the man

16 was.

17 Q. Very well. Then you go on to say that in October I told Simovic

18 to ask Babic - and Babic, I assume, was the commander of the Territorial

19 Defence in Montenegro or what? What is he, defence minister?

20 A. Defence minister in Montenegro.

21 Q. Right. So he asked his colleague why Dubrovnik was under siege?

22 A. That's what General Simovic asked Babic, yes.

23 Our President Milosevic would like to know why they are moving

24 towards a siege of Dubrovnik, for God's sake.

25 Q. And what did Babic answer? I wasn't able to establish that.

Page 27972

1 A. Because the Montenegrins didn't want to go to other battlefronts

2 and there were a lot of soldiers who were shut up in the barracks in

3 Croatia. And the Croats did not want to release those young soldiers who

4 were being captured there and held in the prisons, and that Prevlaka was

5 the problem and that Montenegro had a large number of volunteers and that

6 they had started out in the direction of Dubrovnik to instil fear in

7 Croatia, to prevail upon them to free those soldiers.

8 Q. You mean Babic gave the explanation that pressure was being

9 brought to bear on Croatia, to release the soldiers; is that right?

10 A. Yes. That's what I heard. That's what I noted down on that

11 occasion.

12 Q. Yes, I understand. I just want to hear your explanation. That's

13 what I wanted to hear, and thank you for giving it.

14 Now, in paragraph 97, you say that Simovic on the occasion told

15 Babic that the JNA in 1991, in addition to its proper relationship, even

16 when it was proclaimed an occupation army in Croatia, that it was doing

17 everything to prevent internationality conflict. Is that right?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And was that indeed the endeavours made by the JNA and was that

20 General Simovic's conviction based on everything he knew, although he

21 wasn't in the JNA structure any more but was the defence minister of

22 Serbia?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And is that what he told Babic?

25 A. Yes.

Page 27973

1 Q. Very well. Was there a joint meeting of any kind between them

2 and that the general assessment was made that a further transformation of

3 the JNA could not be done without the political agreement of all the

4 republics who wished to remain within the composition of Yugoslavia, to

5 remain within Yugoslavia?

6 A. Yes, that's what they discussed, and they also discussed how they

7 could negotiate with Bosnia-Herzegovina, to have Bosnia-Herzegovina remain

8 within Yugoslavia too. And then Colonel Kovacevic, I think he was, said,

9 "Well, the defence minister in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a Croat. How are

10 we going to negotiate with them?" And then Babic said, "But Montenegro

11 quite certainly is going to remain with Serbia."

12 Q. Yes. And that's what happened; Serbia and Montenegro formed the

13 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in April 1992.

14 A. As far as I recall, Macedonia was to be a part of that. And as

15 far as I recall, you went to negotiations there to see the possibility of

16 Macedonia remaining within that entity.

17 Q. Yes. There was a meeting of all the presidents of the republics,

18 and I did advocate the preservation of Yugoslavia. There's no doubt

19 there.

20 Now, in your article published in Nin magazine, you say in

21 paragraph 115 that "Milosevic didn't place the veto on the first article

22 that appeared in Nin or any other articles in the series." Now, I'm

23 asking you why would I place my veto on those articles?

24 A. Well, if the articles happened to be contrary to Serbia's

25 policies and the policy you pursued. You had the right -- you had the

Page 27974

1 discretionary right to use your power of veto to stop the article being

2 published. You did not do that, and once again I would like to say thank

3 you to you for that.

4 Q. Do you have any example where I banned any articles that were

5 supposed to appear in any newspapers?

6 A. I didn't deal with that at all. I don't know.

7 Q. Now, I'd like to tie this up to what we started off with, because

8 we made a clear delineation and distinction, and I think we can say black

9 and white, we put it in black-and-white terms, and distinguished between

10 the paramilitaries and the volunteers. You spoke about that yesterday and

11 we cleared up that issue today. So you devote a significant portion of

12 your statement to volunteers. And in paragraph 146, you state -- yes,

13 paragraph 146, you state that, "All the chaos at the battlefield was

14 caused by armed groups which were under the control of the parties." Is

15 that right?

16 A. Yes, based on my knowledge.

17 Q. All right. And let me just check paragraph 146. I have the

18 sentence here, the one I quoted. "I know that Vuk Draskovic set up the

19 Serb guards. Seselj organised his Chetniks, and those paramilitaries were

20 located in the territory of Croatia populated by a Serb majority. And

21 these volunteers --" I apologise to the interpreters for going so fast.

22 "Those volunteers, at the outset, were outside the command of the JNA.

23 Later on I heard that the volunteers had seized vehicles, money, and

24 property, houses from the Croats." And then we come to this critical

25 sentence, which I would like to emphasise: "All this chaos was created by

Page 27975

1 the armed groups, which were under the control of the parties. That is my

2 personal opinion and what I know." Is that right?

3 A. Yes. And if you want me to --

4 Mr. NICE: For context, the next sentence ought to be read as

5 well.

6 JUDGE MAY: Perhaps you would read it.

7 Just a moment, let him finish.

8 MR. NICE: The next sentence reads: "It was obvious that it was

9 not possible to set up armed units in a Communist or a post-Communist

10 country with a strong army without the prior approval of the competent

11 authority organs."

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, you now have -- just a moment.

13 You have ten minutes more, so that you know that. That will give

14 Mr. Tapuskovic 15 minutes, the Prosecution 10 minutes.

15 Now, we'll go back to the statement. Yes, the witness was going

16 to say something.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I learnt about all these

18 things, not only while I was the chef de cabinet but also while I was a

19 journalist, when I had no fixed job, before I became the chef de cabinet,

20 about the party armies that went to the territories in order to protect

21 the Serb population there. I also learnt about this and I describe that

22 in detail in my book. According to what Milan Paroski told us, he said

23 that he was taking his army to those areas, regions. And I also learnt

24 from Pejicic, who was in our cabinet - and this is again described in my

25 book - that they, too, transported some of their army outside the system.

Page 27976

1 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Do you mean the SPO, the Vuk Draskovic resistance movement?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Now, this intervention of Mr. Nice was a very good idea to have

5 this read in context because it shows that armed units could not have been

6 formed without the acquiescence and approval from the organs of authority,

7 the ones that created this chaos in the first place. Now, can you explain

8 to those who do not find this quite clear that, as far as I'm concerned at

9 least, and the authorities that I would wield influence on, that is, the

10 Serbian government and its organs, the organs of that institution, the

11 organs of that government, armies of that kind could not gain support, Vuk

12 Draskovic's army or Jovic's army or any of the others. And we have

13 already noted that these armies were outside the system, that they were

14 party armies, and that they were armies of oppositional political parties.

15 A. Well, Giska, Beli, Lainovic, all these were said to be members of

16 the state security. That's what they said in my cabinet. Now, I haven't

17 proof and evidence of that, but that is what I heard in the cabinet.

18 Q. That is quite unbelievable that the state security here, which as

19 a whole, everything it does is being ascribed to me, that it should

20 suddenly help armies that were working to overthrow me.

21 A. They assisted the protection of the Serb populace in the areas in

22 which they were under threat.

23 Q. In paragraph 147, you mentioned Jovic's volunteers, the White

24 Eagles, and also you say that the government opened up training centres to

25 place the volunteers under their control or, rather, to make this kind of

Page 27977

1 organisation of volunteers impossible.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Therefore, the government measures were to make these political

4 party armies impossible and to prevent this kind of chaos. And I quote

5 you when you said that all this chaos was created by the armed groups who

6 were -- which were under party control. So the Serb government took

7 measures to eliminate groups of this kind, and the volunteers who wished

8 to defend their people, the people and the state, had to join up pursuant

9 to the laws and regulations and come under the organisation of either the

10 JNA or the Territorial Defence. That was the purpose of this Serbian

11 government measure.

12 A. We're talking about the time up to this provision and after the

13 provision. Up to the provision, the government and you were in favour of

14 legalising all the volunteers, of having them registered, and having their

15 status being made equal to the reservists of the Yugoslav People's Army.

16 Q. Yes, that's what it says.

17 A. But before the provision, there were party armies which went to

18 the war-threatened territories without any consultations or any knowledge

19 on the part of the competent authorities.

20 Q. All right. So that's quite clear. Without any consultations or

21 knowledge of the competent authorities.

22 A. Yes. That's what I learnt there.

23 Q. Very well. Fine. Now, is it clear that the government of Serbia

24 - and we have seen the provisions and decrees and all the endeavours made

25 - that they did all this, in fact, in order to prevent these party armies

Page 27978

1 from running wild, running amok in the regions engulfed by war?

2 A. Yes. And my first agreement with the Prosecution was, yes, I

3 worked on the basis of legal provisions and regulations which I was

4 acquainted with as soon as I arrived at the ministry.

5 Q. Tell me now, please, you devote 14 paragraphs of your statement,

6 from 155 to 169 - and as you've just heard, I don't have the time to go

7 through all this - but you devote those paragraphs to Vuk Draskovic's

8 Serbian Guards, that is to say, the main oppositional party. And you say

9 that he was responsible for disseminating, looting, hatred, and the

10 looting and the victims of war in Croatia, the casualties of that war.

11 A. That's what was talked about in the ministry while I was there.

12 Q. You also claim that he called up the JNA reservists not to

13 respond to the mobilisation call and to use their weapons and equipment

14 and move -- and to join up with the Serb Guards.

15 A. Yes, that's true. And I publish all my letters and

16 correspondence with Vuk Draskovic, my conversation with Pejicic, and on

17 the basis of everything it says in the book you can learn a lot, a lot

18 more than I am able to present before this court of law. I maintain that

19 what is in the book is meritorious and, therefore, an answer to your

20 question.

21 Q. You were asked by Mr. Nice, as you say you learnt about the

22 volunteers from the different irregulars -- you've learnt about the

23 irregularities, the looting, the crimes that were being committed, and

24 whether he informed me of that, and your answer was - and I jotted it down

25 - you hope that Simovic conveyed that information to me. That was your

Page 27979

1 answer. But you don't know whether he actually did so, whether he

2 informed me of everything he heard from the volunteers. You said you

3 hoped he conveyed it to me.

4 A. Well, I couldn't hear what you were talking about tete-a-tete, so

5 I couldn't say that I heard him tell you that. I said I hoped that he

6 conveyed it all to you.

7 Q. Very well. Thank you. Now, as my time is almost up, is it true

8 and correct that in the armed forces of Yugoslavia, that means -- this

9 refers to the JNA, the Yugoslav People's Army, and the Territorial

10 Defence, that there were strict rules and regulations with respect to the

11 application of international war law in our -- with respect to the armed

12 forces of the SFRY and that they also related to the Yugoslav People's

13 Army and the Territorial Defence and that they insisted upon that; that is

14 to say, that all higher military instances in Yugoslavia insisted upon

15 having that prevail?

16 A. You expect me to say yes, but you know very well that this was

17 not within my competence.

18 Q. It doesn't matter what I expect. I am simply putting questions,

19 and you can respond according to your conscience.

20 A. According to my conscience, Colonel Djokovic would say that when

21 the reservists went to the battlefield, even the most respectable of them

22 came back with a car full of goods, even the most honest of them did that.

23 He would wait for them with his unit to stop them and to take records of

24 all this, but they would fire shots from their cars, so he couldn't do

25 that.

Page 27980

1 Q. Well, precisely this was part of the chaos that the leadership of

2 Serbia was trying to prevent with these measures of discipline and with

3 these attempts to introduce order into the situation with these units. Is

4 that correct?

5 A. I hope so. Did they say anything to the contrary?

6 Q. No, you didn't.

7 JUDGE MAY: This must be your last question.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. If it's the last

9 question, I have one more question.

10 Mr. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Yesterday you said Simovic, how long was he minister of defence,

12 how many months?

13 A. Officially two and a half. Unofficially, three months.

14 Q. Very well. You say that during that time he published 200

15 interviews given to local journalists and about 100 more given to foreign

16 journalists, 170.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. So this is three interviews a day during his term of office.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Thank you, Mrs. Gajic.

21 A. I have these interviews. I can give them to you if you want.

22 Q. Well, how could he do anything else if he spent all his time

23 giving interviews?

24 A. I was very expeditious there.

25 Mr. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

Page 27981

1 Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:

2 Q. [Interpretation] Mrs. Glisic, there are many topics that you deal

3 with in your book, but there is only one thing I would like you to confirm

4 or not confirm, as the case may be, and that is in the chapter entitled

5 "Arkan's Sniper." In English, it's page 39. And in that passage, it's

6 the paragraph before the last, "Shooting a rabbit with Arkan's sniper."

7 There was a TV event broadcast via Studio B. And you said that Arkan,

8 when asked, said, "We do not recognise anyone. We do everything on our

9 own."

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Thank you. There is another topic I would like to go into before

12 this Bench, and it concerns primarily the functioning of the Territorial

13 Defence during decades, starting from 1984, and of course the

14 establishment of armies after 1990. Please look at paragraph 129 of your

15 statement. I have to read it to avoid misunderstanding. It isn't long.

16 "The TO units did not leave their territory. They carried out

17 their wartime assignments only on the territory of their village, town,

18 municipality, or republic, while the JNA units were mobile all over the

19 territory of the SFRY and their purpose was to protect the country from

20 foreign aggressors. During times of peace, plans were drawn up relating

21 to the movements of the reservists of the JNA."

22 My question is as follows: Does this mean that the Territorial

23 Defence was envisaged as a defence system in case the borders were

24 attacked or, rather, if there was an attack, the borders would be

25 protected by the army and the people would defend the entire territory?

Page 27982

1 A. Yes, the Territorial Defence was to protect the territory on

2 which they were based.

3 Q. From a foreign aggressor?

4 A. Yes, from a foreign aggressor.

5 Q. Would you now look at paragraph 137 of your statement. "Should

6 the country be attacked from outside, members of the TO units had their

7 uniforms at home," and this was the same all over the territory of

8 Yugoslavia; is this correct?

9 A. Yes, as far as I know. But that's how things were in Cacak where

10 I saw this; I knew about it.

11 Q. But you know that that's what the law prescribed.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. The weapons were stored in TO depots at the municipal level.

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. Now, look at paragraph 38. I have to draw your attention to

16 these paragraphs because I would like to put this in a certain order for

17 the Court to understand better. I'm not trying to confuse you.

18 In paragraph 38, you say that you met General Simovic for the

19 first time in 1984, when he was the commander of the Territorial Defence

20 of Serbia, and that he then told you that if there was a war, this would

21 be a war between the JNA and the TO, which was being established along

22 ethnic lines. Is this correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Did he then explain something to you about the reorganisation of

25 the JNA and the TO when the constitution was enacted and that this was

Page 27983

1 based on the regulations of 1974, when the constitution was promulgated?

2 A. Yes. Do you want me to explain this to you in a broader context?

3 Q. No. Sorry, there's no time. But is this based on the

4 constitution of 1974?

5 A. Yes. But let me explain to you who were the members of the TO

6 and who were the members of the reserve forces of the JNA.

7 Q. No, no, believe me, there's no time. Let me move on, Witness.

8 A. Would the Judge give us time?

9 Q. Well, if His Honour will allow, I do not object.

10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the witness is

11 asking for time to explain this.

12 JUDGE MAY: We are very short, I'm afraid, because we've got to

13 leave this courtroom to allow another case to come in. So I think if we'd

14 keep it short, please.

15 Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic, please.

16 Mr. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Now, look at paragraph 20. Have you found it?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Here you say that as early as 1986 -- you say Simovic in 1984 and

20 already in 1986 you're say that the territorial defences of the republics

21 were growing stronger and becoming separate and independent armies more

22 and more. Is this correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Now, look at paragraph 189.

25 Mr. NICE: Your Honour, we haven't burdened you with this

Page 27984

1 statement, of course. It's a very long statement and 50-odd pages would

2 be available should you want it.


4 Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic. We can follow.

5 Mr. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Look -- now, what did I say? What paragraph? Sorry. 179, where

7 you say that in 1991, when it seemed that conflicts could not be avoided,

8 Slovenia and Croatia created their own republican armies out of the TO.

9 Is this correct?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. I apologise for having to take you back to paragraph 139 now.

12 You say here in your last sentence, "In Croatia in 1991, most of the

13 materiel was confiscated by the Croats and that's why the Serbs in Croatia

14 were left without weapons." Is this correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And finally, paragraph 269: "The Croatian TO became a parallel

17 army, parallel with the JNA. The JNA was soon isolated and its

18 communications were cut off. The Serbian populace could not efficaciously

19 oppose the ZNG." Is this correct?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And then soldiers were imprisoned in the barracks.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Did the Territorial Defence of Serbia ever gain the status of an

24 army? Did it at any moment have the status?

25 A. No, never.

Page 27985

1 Q. In Bosnia-Herzegovina?

2 A. It did.

3 Q. And now paragraph 49, if there's time.

4 THE INTERPRETER: 40. The interpreter apologises.

5 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. You spoke about the creation of a Serbian army here and in the

7 last sentence. I won't take you back to what you've already said, but in

8 paragraph 121, you said, in the middle here, "This did not succeed because

9 at that time Slobodan Milosevic could not confront the leadership of the

10 JNA directly." Is this in fact what you said in your book, that the

11 minister of defence had no authority over the JNA and also that the

12 president of the republic had no authority over the JNA?

13 A. Yes. And what mistake did I make here?

14 Q. No, no, I'm just asking for your response.

15 And to round off this topic, I did have a few other questions,

16 but I've come to the end now. You started working in the Ministry of

17 Defence of Serbia only in October.

18 A. On the 25th of September, 1991 I received my -- the decision, the

19 official document on the 1st of October. But I was physically present

20 there from the 25th of September, 1991.

21 Q. And up to then you were in Cacak?

22 A. I was -- and lived in Cacak up to the 25th of September.

23 Q. The first refugees that turned up came from Croatia?

24 A. Much earlier, before I arrived in the ministry.

25 Q. Yes, I know. I know. But these were the first refugees that

Page 27986

1 started moving on the territory of the former Yugoslavia?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And my last question is: Did you ever hear of the existence of

4 any plan, at that time, planning the persecution of anyone? For example,

5 that plans were drawn up in your ministry to persecute non-Serbs?

6 A. No. On the contrary; I worked in the same office with a Croat in

7 the 13th of May. Not a single Croat was persecuted or dismissed from his

8 job. No one was persecuted. They all kept their jobs, even those who

9 came from the territories of other republics got jobs in Serbia.

10 Q. Thank you. Thank you very much.

11 A. Did I contradict myself?

12 Q. It's up to Their Honours to judge that.

13 Mr. NICE: Your Honours, I've only got one question, I think, on

14 the book. But at some stage the Chamber may want to decide what it should

15 do about the book.

16 JUDGE MAY: Well, I think we'll probably have to admit it.

17 Mr. NICE: That would be our submission. It's a book as to the

18 accuracy of which the witness has attested and the accused seems to have

19 accepted that it's her accurate recollection, even if he challenges some

20 of her underlying conclusions.

21 Re-examined by Mr. Nice:

22 Q. On page 41 in the English - and that will match page 60 in the

23 original - there was a line that the accused put to the witness coming

24 from Arkan saying, "We do not acknowledge any authority. We do everything

25 on our own." And it may be that the Chamber would want to see the context

Page 27987

1 for that. Because, Ms. Gajic-Glisic, isn't this the case that as your

2 book reveals, Arkan's arrival -- I beg your pardon, "Arkan being spoken to

3 by the moderator --"

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.

5 JUDGE MAY: Just let counsel finish, and then you can object.

6 Yes.

7 Mr. NICE: "-- asked Arkan in public who was his

8 commander-in-chief." Silence in the office as you were watching the

9 broadcast, expecting him to say Simovic. He said, "Patriarch Pavle."

10 "Everybody laughed. It was not serious. It was just his way." You then

11 go on, then saying: "We do not acknowledge any authority. We do

12 everything on our own." And follow that by saying, "A few days later Kum

13 brought us a videotape shot by Studio B showing the volunteers sending

14 their greetings to General Simovic, proclaiming him to be their

15 commander-in-chief. Some of the officials resented that. Simovic was not

16 one of them."

17 You told us --

18 JUDGE MAY: [Microphone not activated]

19 Mr. NICE: Yes, certainly.

20 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Yes.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just wanted to correct a minor

22 point, his not acknowledging anyone. This was not a question put by me

23 but by Mr. Tapuskovic.

24 JUDGE MAY: Yes. My recollection is page 41 was put by you, but

25 I may be wrong.

Page 27988

1 Yes.

2 Mr. NICE: [Microphone not activated]

3 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

4 Mr. NICE: If it was put by Mr. Tapuskovic, I accept that

5 correction.

6 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

7 Mr. NICE:

8 Q. Please tell us this, please, Ms. Gajic-Glisic: You gave an

9 account of who Arkan answered to right at the beginning. Namely, to who?

10 A. To whom Arkan answered at the beginning? Is that your question?

11 Q. You told us at the beginning of your evidence who he answered to,

12 which body he answered to.

13 A. As Comrade Zoran Sokolovic told us, they answered to the SUP of

14 Serbia.

15 Q. In that broadcast, given that he had his funny ways, was there

16 anything to throw doubt on your understanding?

17 A. Well, we expected him to say, "Our commander-in-chief is

18 General Simovic," because General Simovic had declared that the volunteers

19 were the backbone of the future Serbian army, which would transcend

20 political parties and would defend Serb national interests, and the Serb

21 Volunteer Guard was part of that at the time.

22 Q. Very well. You spoke of a viso orders. You described how the

23 accused made such orders, you spoke of them being appropriate at the time

24 of an imminent threat of war. Was what the accused was doing consistent

25 with what a man in his position should be doing with an imminent threat of

Page 27989

1 war?

2 A. I said that a viso orders was something that was quite usual in

3 the organs of state administration, and I said sometimes I gave a viso

4 orders to my collaborators and this was quite usual for a viso orders to

5 be given directly tete-a-tete for a superior to give his subordinate such

6 an order. Of course, I was not present when Mr. Milosevic spoke to

7 people. I was not present, I did not hear him directly give a viso orders

8 to anyone. I just heard General Simovic say, "President Milosevic told me

9 this, this, and this," and I would note it down. I have my diaries here

10 which I can show you, Your Honours.

11 Q. I'm going to cut you short because of time. You did in your

12 answer make a linkage of this type of order to the imminent threat of war.

13 The question was whether what the accused was doing, on the basis of what

14 Simovic told you, was consistent with there being such an imminent threat

15 or his acting as if there was such an imminent threat. Can you answer

16 that, please?

17 A. It seems to me that in some borderline municipalities an imminent

18 threat of war was proclaimed. So one could say that he respected those

19 regulations in that case. But as for a viso orders, you have had so many

20 military people here who could tell you about this off the top of their

21 heads. They could talk about this.

22 Q. Let's move on. You were asked about shelling from one country to

23 another. Shelling from one country or one part of Yugoslavia to another.

24 Do you know of your own knowledge where Vukovar and East Slavonia was

25 shelled from? Was it always from within or was it ever from without its

Page 27990

1 own borders?

2 A. I can't answer this question. I don't know.

3 Q. There was a question raised by the accused as to whether Badza

4 was or was not a volunteer. And he asked you a question about it linked

5 with another question that drew a single answer. It's on page 38, line

6 15.

7 Just for clarification, was Badza a volunteer or not?

8 A. As Comrade Zoran Sokolovic told us, he had been sent from the

9 Ministry of Defence to help Arkan and to help the populace in those areas.

10 Whether he volunteered to go, I don't know.

11 Q. You were asked questions by the accused about actions of the air

12 force in Vukovar at the time when Arkan emerged from Vukovar. It was

13 suggested by him, the accused, that there were a lot of civilians present.

14 Was the air force put into action on account of civilians or on account of

15 Arkan's predicament?

16 A. In Vukovar, there were quite a few civilians, both Serb and Croat

17 civilians, of course, but the action there then was precisely because of

18 the situation Arkan found himself in. That's why General Simovic asked

19 the air force simply to fly over but not to fire any shots. And President

20 Milosevic asked General Simovic to --

21 Q. My next question relates to that. I think the word "entreating"

22 was used, the accused claiming that he was entreating Simovic, and Simovic

23 then did what he did. Did you ever hear of or see Simovic denying the

24 accused anything he asked of him?

25 A. I didn't understand your question.

Page 27991

1 Q. In their relationship, that is the accused and Simovic, did

2 Simovic ever deny the accused something that the accused asked of Simovic?

3 A. Did the accused deny? Did President Milosevic deny that Simovic

4 denied? Who denied?

5 Q. No. Did -- when the accused asked Simovic to do something, did

6 Simovic always do it or did he ever refuse to do it?

7 A. There were things he couldn't do. He didn't make lists of

8 incompetent generals, he didn't mobilise anyone, but he didn't tell the

9 president he wouldn't do it. Most often he did what President Milosevic

10 told him to do.

11 Q. Two last questions. The question of paramilitaries being

12 illegal, were you ever aware of any paramilitaries being pursued on the

13 grounds that they were unlawful?

14 A. Some proceedings were initiated before courts, and I know that

15 Vojislav Kostunica with his team put himself at the disposal of the

16 accused as their Defence counsel. However, most often when we received

17 information that war crimes had been committed by these illegal

18 paramilitary formations, we didn't know when or where or who or their

19 name, so we were unable to investigate to a large extent. And time was

20 short. All this happened within the space of two and a half months.

21 Q. The volunteers supported by or through the Ministry of Defence,

22 once they'd been trained, where did they go and serve? They were deployed

23 in units of the Territorial Defence of the place -- or rather, of places

24 that were at risk, where there was a threat of genocide over the Serbian

25 population, and they had the same treatment as the population of that

Page 27992

1 place, if I'm correct.

2 Q. And as you say in your summary, that's in Slavonia, Baranja, and

3 Western Srem and in the Krajina.

4 JUDGE MAY: The witness for tomorrow?

5 MR. NICE: C-062.

6 JUDGE MAY: C-062. Very well.

7 Mrs. Gajic-Glisic, that concludes your evidence. Thank you for

8 coming to the International Tribunal to give it. You are free to go.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10 JUDGE MAY: Could the legal officer come up, please.

11 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]

12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m.,

13 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 23rd day of

14 October, 2003, at 9.00 a.m.