Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 28604

1 Wednesday, 5 November 2003

2 [Open session]

3 [The witness entered court]

4 [The accused entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

7 WITNESS: WITNESS B-1531 [Resumed]

8 [Witness answered through interpreter]

9 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

10 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. 1531, independently of the fact that you say

11 that you know nothing about Cengic's interview, the one that I quoted,

12 tell me, please, what was the first knowledge you had about the arming of

13 Muslim forces in Foca? Since what he says here, that from the 1st of

14 August there were forces which possessed automatic rifles, machine-guns,

15 mortars, and so on, the 1st of August, 1990, in fact he quotes, six months

16 prior to the formation of the Patriotic League itself. So please tell me

17 what you know about arming.

18 A. I answered that question yesterday, and all I can say is that I

19 really knew nothing about arming at that time, nothing at all.

20 Q. And when did you learn about it?

21 A. Yesterday when you told me that you had read the interview.

22 Q. Well, when did you learn of any Muslim arming at all? When was

23 the first time you learnt about that at all?

24 A. I never learnt anything in concrete terms in view of the fact of

25 what I said yesterday in private session when I explained the specific

Page 28605

1 features of my role.

2 Q. All right. Now, do you know that after these events that took

3 place in Foca, the ones you're testifying about, Halid Cengic went to

4 Visoko where he was one of the main initiators of the exodus of the Serb

5 population in that area?

6 A. What you have just said I was not aware of it, but I did learn

7 through the information media, the writings in the press, that he assumed

8 an important position in the Bosnia-Herzegovina army in that small town.

9 Q. Now, do you know precisely what kind of ethnic cleansing was

10 conducted in that small town as you call it?

11 A. No, I don't.

12 (redacted)

13 (redacted)

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

16 MS. PACK: Your Honour, might I remind the accused that we're

17 presently in open session.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Don't worry, Ms. Pack. I won't say

19 anything that would point to this witness's identity.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. In your statements, Witness, you depict the following picture, if

22 I understand it correctly: You say that the Serbs were arming themselves

23 and preparing for war, whereas the Muslims were not arming themselves or,

24 rather, that you knew nothing about any kind of preparation for arming,

25 even after the large rally that took place, rallying over 100.000 people

Page 28606

1 as you yourself said, in Foca, and the SDA activities along those lines.

2 Is that right, Mr. 1531?

3 A. Yes, that is right. I told you what I knew, and I can't tell you

4 what I don't know about and haven't got any arguments to put forward on

5 something that I have not been kept abreast of.

6 Q. Well, of course I'm not going to go into the details of your

7 statement because I really don't know what all the things that could have

8 been going on there, but I would like to focus on certain portions where

9 you say some things which quite simply I'm just not able to understand,

10 and I would even say they sound rather ridiculous and even grotesque.

11 For example, in the last paragraph on page 2 of your statement of

12 the 25th of June, 1996, (redacted)

13 (redacted)

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

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17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted); then we have Petko Cancar and Miro Stanic. So the

20 president of the Serbian Democratic Party in Foca who, by the by -- who,

21 by the way, were being seen together. They came to Foca together from

22 Sarajevo. And generally speaking, they were public personages,

23 representatives of the Serbian Democratic Party, in fact.

24 Now, they were having a meeting, as you say, in a church in Foca.

25 Tell me now, please, Mr. 1531, isn't this - how shall I put this?

Page 28607

1 - a ridiculous assertion that personages of that rank could meet anywhere

2 they like, and they were seen publicly around town, they all had public

3 offices, now suddenly they have to organise some clandestine meetings in a

4 church in Cerezluk, and just the two of them who would usually be seen

5 around town in public. Isn't that nonsense?

6 JUDGE MAY: If, 1531, you wish to go into private session to

7 answer that question, you may.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I would, please.

9 [Private session]

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Page 28616

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22 [Open session]

23 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

24 Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:

25 Q. [Interpretation] Witness, could you please look at paragraph 5 of

Page 28617

1 your statement. It is marked with the number 5. It is page 3 of the

2 B/C/S version. The first paragraph. Page 3, first paragraph of the

3 B/C/S, paragraph 5. It's at the top of that page. Page 3.

4 MS. PACK: This is, I assume, the --

5 JUDGE MAY: Which statement? Which statement?

6 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Tab 3.

7 JUDGE MAY: Which date, please, so we can get it.

8 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] 25th of June, tab 3, received

9 from the OTP. Tab 3.

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted)

12 (redacted)

13 A. In order to give a more detailed answer to this question, I would

14 ask Their Honours to allow for a private session.

15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I will not ask

16 anything that could reveal his identity.

17 JUDGE MAY: If he's worried about it, though, he can go into

18 private session. Yes.

19 [Private session]

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Page 28618












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Page 28619

1 [Open session]

2 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] In that same statement --

3 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. In that same statement, look at paragraph 15, please, in which you

6 talk about the armed attack on Foca. And you say that a Serb woman was

7 wounded. Would you explain to Their Honours, please, who carried out that

8 attack and how that Serb woman was wounded on the 8th of April, 1992.

9 A. I said that fire from Serbian paramilitary forces were opened on

10 the 8th of April, and that is when that woman was wounded close to the KP

11 Dom, the prison. And this place is known as the Ivanovici houses, that

12 is, the houses of the Ivanovic family, and sniper fire was opened from

13 there. The telephone lines were working, and it was reported by people

14 who have houses nearby, as well as companies, that the woman had been hit.

15 They knew the woman, and I was called up by the president. I think -- I

16 think we have to go back into private session if I have to elaborate on

17 this.

18 JUDGE MAY: No need to do that unless you want particularly,

19 Mr. Tapuskovic, any more detail about this.

20 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] No. Since I have to economise

21 with the time.

22 Q. Paragraph 29 again, please. You say -- you talk first about Serb

23 paramilitary units that were directing artillery and machine-gun fire. I

24 think this is in the fourth sentence. And then later on you say: "There

25 was some resistance in those parts of town, but it was sporadic and of a

Page 28620

1 limited nature."

2 Could you explain what the resistance was like and who was putting

3 up that resistance.

4 A. I said what I could hear from where I was, that is, sporadic

5 shooting with infantry weapons as opposed to artillery fire towards those

6 areas.

7 Q. Then you went on to say: "The Muslims who lived there had very

8 little weapons, and later on all ethnically mixed parts of town were

9 exposed to sniper fire."

10 How do you explain that that fire lasted simultaneously towards

11 the parts of town in -- with mixed populations, where both Serbs, Croats

12 and Muslims lived? Was this some sort of a conflict that was going on

13 there and then those involved in the conflict didn't pay any attention to

14 where which civilians were living?

15 A. No. There were sniper nests held by Serb paramilitary units, and

16 in mixed environments, the situation was under control.

17 (redacted)

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24 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

25 [Private session]

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Page 28622

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2 [Open session]

3 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I must apologise first. I must

4 ask you, did you say that the area in which you lived, did Radivoj -- did

5 Radovan Karadzic come there? Did you say that yesterday? I just want to

6 check.

7 A. No, I didn't mention Karadzic in that context.

8 Q. So he was never there?

9 A. I don't know.

10 Q. Yes, but here in paragraph 35 you said --

11 A. Could we go into private session, please?

12 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. What is the question?

13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, in this paragraph,

14 there is a description of the situation in Foca and that the orders came

15 directly from Radovan Karadzic.

16 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Go into private --

17 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] He told me --

18 JUDGE MAY: Go into private session to answer that.

19 [Private session]

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23 [Open session]

24 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

25 JUDGE MAY: Witness B-1531, that concludes your evidence. Thank

Page 28626












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Page 28627

1 you for coming to the Tribunal to give it. You are now free to go. If

2 you would just wait for the blinds to be lowered.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, too, Your Honours.

4 [The witness withdrew]

5 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

6 MR. NICE: The next witness is Mr. Harland who is to be recalled.

7 He is, I gather, ready to come in.

8 JUDGE MAY: Very well. While we're waiting for him, I've been

9 asked to clarify the position of about an exhibit. It's the Pale speech

10 which was marked for identification. I think it was Exhibit 569, tab 9.

11 I will be told if I'm wrong. In any event, it's some days ago, and the

12 registry want it clarified. I don't remember myself why it was marked for

13 identification.

14 MR. NICE: I think this is the one that was produced in two parts.

15 Mr. Groome can deal with it, and I think I mentioned it yesterday, it's

16 now in a comprehensive format.

17 JUDGE MAY: All right.

18 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, if you recall the testimony of

19 Mr. Donia, the Prosecution marked for identification the entire Assembly

20 minutes but just introduced excerpts. During the course of the

21 cross-examination, the Chamber indicated that it would be helpful to have

22 the entire -- entirety of this session translated and introduced into

23 evidence, and that is what we provided the Chamber on Monday.

24 JUDGE MAY: Very well. So this is -- the exhibit is no longer

25 marked for identification, Exhibit 538 tab 9; it becomes an exhibit.

Page 28628

1 Thank you.

2 MR. NICE: I assume the usher is collecting the witness. When

3 she's brought him in, I'll get her to put the Sarajevo map back in the

4 position it was if it's thought helpful.

5 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Harland, if you'd like to take a seat. You, of

6 course, remain under the declaration which you took on the last occasion.


8 THE WITNESS: Will I have a set of the documents that were

9 submitted?

10 JUDGE MAY: Yes, you should have the documents.

11 Yes, Mr. Milosevic. You've got just over two and a half hours

12 left.

13 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

14 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Harland, since your testimony was

15 interrupted, I have to say in advance or, rather, I would like to make a

16 reservation in advance. I'm not quite sure that the notes that I took

17 during the examination-in-chief always referred to what you yourself were

18 saying. Perhaps they refer to another witness. So please, would you tell

19 me if I make some mistakes, because it's very difficult when testimony is

20 heard in two parts for me to find my way in my notes and documents. So

21 please would you bear that in mind, because I won't intentionally be

22 asking you questions which you didn't refer to and didn't testify about.

23 Quite simply, it might just be a mistake on my part because of the

24 interruption that has occurred, the two-part testimony.

25 We started by looking at the map and the comments made with regard

Page 28629

1 to this Sarajevo map, and most of your testimony referred to Sarajevo, in

2 fact. So it would be a good idea, since you spent a long time in Sarajevo

3 yourself, you had many contacts with people, you knew everything about the

4 Serb positions and the Muslim positions, so it would be a good idea if you

5 were to compare that map and what you knew about the deployment of forces

6 in Sarajevo with this map that I have here. It is a map of Sarajevo

7 showing -- and it says, it's in English, "Ethnic map of Sarajevo on the

8 basis of the population census of the Socialist Federal Republic of

9 Yugoslavia of the 31st of March, 1981." That's the title of the map

10 itself. And you can see on it what the ethnic make-up of Sarajevo looked

11 like at that time.

12 And my question is very short one. It is this: Roughly, or to

13 what extent, to the best of your knowledge, does the deployment of Serb

14 and Muslim positions coincide with this map? I assume the question is

15 clear. Please go ahead. And all the explanations are given in English on

16 the map, the text isn't long, so I'm sure you'll be able to find your way

17 around it.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have the map placed on the

19 overhead projector, please.

20 THE WITNESS: Right. The map of ethnic distribution only very

21 partially reflects the final confrontation lines. In general, certainly

22 the Serbs secured the areas around Sarajevo, the less densely inhabited

23 areas in which they had been a majority. Many of the mixed areas, mixed,

24 predominantly Muslim and Serb but also with some Croat areas, in the urban

25 part of Sarajevo were secured by the -- by the Serbs at the beginning of

Page 28630

1 the war. So, for example, though of course it's ten years ago so you will

2 excuse me if I don't have the exact figures, I recall that Ilidza, in the

3 urban area, the large part in the west, the urban area of Sarajevo --

4 JUDGE KWON: If you would point out on the ELMO.

5 THE WITNESS: The area here. The Serb -- Serb forces secured that

6 area and removed the Muslim population or it fled despite the fact that

7 that area had a similar number of Muslims and Serbs immediately prior to

8 the war, and in fact, I think, even a slight -- slightly larger number of

9 Muslims.

10 The same, I think, is true of some of the areas immediately north

11 of the city. Vogosca and Ilijas, these areas were --

12 JUDGE KWON: If you could point on the ELMO so we can see on

13 the --

14 THE WITNESS: Uh-huh.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. If you can't see what the regions indicate, you have a number on

17 each municipality, to designate each municipality, and then you have the

18 names of those municipalities. The Serb territories are blue; the lighter

19 blue areas where the -- where the relative majority is, the darker regions

20 the absolute majority, and the Muslim areas are green and yellow.

21 A. Yes. First of all, this map -- and it doesn't mark who controlled

22 which territory, it marks which population was the greater in 1981. It

23 also doesn't have the names, it just has a series of numbers for most of

24 the areas. Just a second.

25 It's actually much easier for me to work off the big map, if

Page 28631

1 nobody objects.

2 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Do that. It will be much easier for everybody.

3 THE WITNESS: So prior to the war, the Muslims were a large

4 majority in the municipality of Stari Grad, and that was held by the

5 Muslims during the war. Almost all of the other downtown municipalities,

6 that is Centar, Novo Sarajevo, Novi Grad, and Ilidza were -- were heavily

7 mixed, roughly equal in terms of their Muslim and Serb populations. And

8 this area, of course, became divided by the confrontation line. The

9 confrontation line came around here, around the municipality of Stari

10 Grad, which was entirely held by the Muslims, and then the Grbavica

11 section of Novo Sarajevo was held by the Serbs more or less down to the

12 Miljacka river, cutting right through some of the buildings here on what I

13 think is Ljubljanska Street.

14 And then up here again the Muslims controlled these settlements.

15 The Serbs controlled a part of Dobrinja. The Serbs controlled the airport

16 at the beginning the war, and then, by agreement, allowed UNPROFOR to use

17 it. And in the surrounding areas, which were mountainous areas, the Serbs

18 in general were much more numerous than Muslims prior to the war, and

19 those areas were held by the Serbs throughout the conflict.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. [No interpretation]

22 JUDGE MAY: No translation.

23 THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear the English?

24 JUDGE MAY: Can you try again.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will repeat.

Page 28632

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Mr. Harland, looking at this map which shows where the Serbs live

3 and the Muslims live, because this is just a map of Sarajevo, can we say

4 that mostly the forces deployed during the war were distributed in

5 conformity with the territories on which each of the parties lived, more

6 or less? Of course, it is impossible to have this coincide exactly, but

7 predominantly so, that each side held its territory?

8 A. No. No, that would not be true, because particularly in Sarajevo,

9 particularly in the urban area, the populations were entirely mixed. And

10 in a way, the larger ethnic map only gives you a sense of who is in which

11 area, but of course the overwhelming bulk of the people actually lived in

12 the urban area of Sarajevo, and that area was almost randomly mixed. Not

13 entirely randomly; Stari Grad had a much larger Muslim population, some of

14 the Stup settlement had a larger Croat population, but in general the

15 urban population was mixed. And where -- where Serb forces took control

16 of that, parts of that territory during the war, they did remove or kill

17 or force to flee almost the entire non-Muslim population.

18 Q. All right. On this map, could you point out what the Serbs had

19 occupied, what territory they had occupied where they did not live? The

20 one on the overhead projector, what is it that they took control of and

21 where they didn't themselves live, the areas not populated by them?

22 A. Yes. I must say I don't like working from this map, because first

23 of all it doesn't show the city of Sarajevo, it only shows ethnic groups,

24 and it largely only has -- it has only numbers representing the

25 geographical locations. But --

Page 28633

1 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Harland, let's deal with it this way: Since

2 you're a witness in a court --


4 JUDGE MAY: -- and of course you must be accurate, if you feel

5 that you cannot do justice on that map, then you should say so. If you

6 can, of course, if you can answer, well, so much the better, but if you

7 feel that it really isn't possible properly to answer, then I think you

8 should revert to your other map. It's up to you how you feel about it.

9 JUDGE KWON: My understanding is that the names of the cities

10 appear on the -- over the page. Rear side.

11 THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. That makes it particularly difficult to

12 deal with it when it's on an overhead projector. Why don't I just refer

13 to the large map.

14 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Whatever you feel more comfortable with. If you

15 can mention particular areas by name, then it might be easier,

16 particularly any areas which the Serbs took over where they weren't a

17 majority or something of that sort before, the areas you were referring

18 to.


20 The built-up areas of Ilidza, of Novo Sarajevo, Grbavica

21 settlement, of Vogosca, and just off the map, Ilijas, would have been

22 areas where the population would have been mixed prior to the war, that is

23 that no one population of the three ethnic groups, main ethnic groups of

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina, would have had more than a third of the population, or

25 would have had more than half of the population, anyway. And in those

Page 28634

1 areas which were taken over by the Serbs which did not previously have a

2 Serb majority, the -- the Serbs would have removed or caused to flee the

3 non-Serb population.

4 So I would mention Ilidza, Novo Sarajevo, Vogosca, and Ilijas in

5 that category.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Very well. Now, if we were to place this map over Sarajevo and

8 the distribution of force if it were in the right ratio, do you have an

9 idea of what percentage would not coincide with respect to the territory

10 that belonged to them, and would there be a percentage that would be

11 different regardless of movements up and down?

12 A. Yes. In geographical size, I couldn't tell you very exactly, but

13 approximately -- approximately 100.000 non-Serbs, Muslims, Croats. Mainly

14 Muslim but also Croats and people of mixed marriage found -- Sarajevans,

15 found themselves in territories that by May of 1992 were controlled by

16 Serb forces, and those people, some were killed but a larger number either

17 fled to the Muslim-controlled part of Sarajevo or, in some cases, were

18 able to flee the country altogether.

19 So I would say the area of overlap, as you call it, would be an

20 area affecting about 100.000 people of the total Sarajevo population of

21 400.000 or 500.000 people.

22 So there was some overlap, yes. You are correct when you say

23 there was some overlap between the Serb-held areas and the areas

24 previously inhabited by Serbs. And similarly between Muslim-held

25 territory and the territories previously inhabited by Muslims. But

Page 28635

1 territory on which lived about a hundred thousand people would not be in

2 that general statement.

3 Q. And what about the 150 Serbs from Sarajevo? 150.000 Serbs, I'm

4 sorry? What about the 150.000 Serbs from Sarajevo? What happened to

5 them?

6 A. First, as you point out, many of them -- the great -- a majority

7 of them were in territory which was immediately taken by Serb forces. So

8 they were, as it were, within their -- the territory controlled by armed

9 forces friendly to them.

10 For the -- for the remaining Serb population, by the time I

11 arrived in Sarajevo, which was in late May of 1993, we estimated that

12 approximately 40.000 Serbs remained within the confrontation line, that is

13 within the area controlled by the Muslim forces. Many of those people

14 reported that their relatives had either fled at the beginning of the

15 fighting or -- and many of those who remained did wish to leave the city

16 but were not able to.

17 Q. But they weren't able to. They weren't allowed to leave town; is

18 that right?

19 A. That is correct.

20 Q. So the Serbs did allow the Muslims to leave part of town which

21 they held under their control, whereas the Muslims did not allow this to

22 take place with respect to these 40.000 Serbs. They didn't allow them to

23 leave the part of town they were in. Isn't that right, Mr. Harland?

24 A. I think the first part of your statement I wouldn't characterise

25 like that, when you say the Serbs did allow the Muslims to leave. In

Page 28636

1 fact, in most cases, they initially forced them to leave. But the second

2 half of your statement I would have to acknowledge is correct, that many

3 of the Serbs who were caught in the fighting and caught on the Muslim side

4 of the confrontation line wished to leave and were not allowed to do so by

5 the Muslim authorities.

6 Q. As you were an international official, I assume you know that it

7 is the -- that the authorities must -- it is their duty to allow the

8 population to leave a territory where a conflict is being conducted, and

9 that that is a serious violation of the law if they keep the population

10 back, the civilian population back in areas where conflicts are going on,

11 this is a serious violation of the law, isn't it?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. From the positions you held, the United Nations in Sarajevo, did

14 you take any steps to enable the population to take refuge and leave the

15 area of conflict, to allow them to leave the area, those of them who

16 wished to leave, and to go to where they wished to go?

17 A. Yes. And I should say that from our perspective, it was not that

18 we wanted freedom of movement for Serbs or for Muslims, but just we wanted

19 -- we believed that freedom of movement for the civilian population at

20 large was something which we should advocate for.

21 And when I say that many of the Serbs, because we were talking

22 about Serbs, in Sarajevo wished to leave, the Serb civilian population

23 living in the Muslim-controlled area, I should also say that many of the

24 Muslims and Croats and people of mixed nationality also wished to leave

25 but were unable to. That doesn't change the general correctness of your

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Page 28638

1 statement, but it's worth clarifying.

2 Now, we did take a number of measures. First, we -- we sought to

3 tell all sides about their obligations under international law towards the

4 civilian population, and we also sought to negotiate what we called Blue

5 Routes, that is routes from Sarajevo to the outside world where both

6 parties, both the government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the

7 Muslims, and the Serbs would agree to allow certain numbers of civilians,

8 usually, unfortunately, on a basis of a sort of ethnic equation they would

9 make up between them, to allow them to leave the -- leave the city. And

10 these so-called Blue Routes were open at various times.

11 We also made provision so that people who were what we called

12 humanitarian cases, people who were either very sick or who had been

13 wounded, could in some cases be evacuated by us from the airport which we

14 controlled.

15 Q. Tell me, please, Mr. Harland, do you know why the conflict broke

16 out between Muslims and Croats at the beginning of your term in Bosnia and

17 Herzegovina?

18 A. I certainly heard the views at great length of the leaders of both

19 the Muslim and the Croat communities, because that -- that conflict was

20 just beginning on my arrival and was very much on the minds of both our

21 Muslim interlocutors and our Croat interlocutors, yes.

22 Q. You were there virtually throughout the time of the conflict

23 between Muslims and Croats. It started when you arrived, and it went on

24 for quite some time.

25 A. Yes.

Page 28639

1 Q. Do you know that it was precisely during those conflicts that the

2 Serbs made it possible to save many thousand Croats where they were

3 threatened with destruction by the Muslim forces?

4 A. That -- that was not true in my experience, except in some limited

5 cases. It is true that we saw that the Serbs provided weapons to the

6 Croat enclave of Kiseljak. The Serbs had a small access to the Croat

7 enclave of Kiseljak I think at a village called Kobiljaca. And they

8 provided weapons, including tanks, we were able to observe moving there.

9 Also, after the Muslim forces took, captured the Croat enclave of

10 Vares, it is true that the Serbs provided access through their territory

11 to Croats fleeing by bus from that area.

12 So, yes, I was aware of some assistance provided by the -- by the

13 Serbs to the Croats during that period.

14 Q. For example, you mentioned only Vares. Let me not mention the

15 others, but you could mention them. How many thousand Croats did the

16 Serbs evacuate so that they wouldn't be the victims of the Mujahedin in

17 those days? They made it possible for them to leave across their

18 territories, to go where they wanted, to avoid certain destruction and

19 extermination in those enclaves of theirs.

20 Well, let's look at Vares alone. How many thousand Croats?

21 A. I no longer recall the exact number of Croats evacuated from

22 Vares. I -- to Kiseljak. I would believe it was probably in the region

23 of 5.000.

24 I should -- I should add, though, that the people -- the people

25 who stayed -- and we had a lot of opportunity to observe this. The Croats

Page 28640

1 who stayed in territory controlled by the -- by the Muslims, their

2 treatment varied a lot. There were some, as in Tuzla, for example, who

3 did not seem to experience negative treatment. When you said, you know,

4 were they victims -- you know, that they were victims of the Muslims,

5 that's -- there certainly were areas where Croats were expelled from their

6 homes and their homes were burnt and some Croats were killed, and I myself

7 saw some of that in -- after the fall of Kakanj with the activities of the

8 7th Muslim Brigade, but in most places that I visited where there were

9 Croat communities living on Muslim-held territory, they were -- they were

10 probably the object of discrimination, but they were not, in my

11 experience, in physical danger except in a few cases.

12 So it's actually not good to make a direct comparison between

13 their condition, for example, and the condition of non-Serbs in Serb

14 territory. In most of the places I visited in Serb-held territory, those

15 who remained, the non-Serbs who remained, would have been in serious

16 physical danger except in a few places, perhaps Banja Luka and Bijeljina.

17 Q. Very well, Mr. Harland. So as not to waste any time, you're

18 saying that only in a few places where Serbs were in control, the

19 non-Serbs lived normally. Only in a few places, is that what you're

20 saying?

21 A. Correct.

22 Q. And also, you're claiming that during the Muslim-Croat conflicts,

23 the Croats lived normally in places held by the Muslims?

24 A. It was a mixed picture, but in some places they were able to

25 continue with normal life and to some extent, like in Sarajevo and in

Page 28641

1 Tuzla, as normal as the conditions of the war allowed. But in some

2 places, particularly the smaller communities of Central Bosnia, there was

3 ethnic cleansing by the Mujahedin or the 7th Muslim Brigade. I was able

4 to see that.

5 Q. And according to the information available to you, how many Croats

6 were killed in Central Bosnia and how many were ethnically cleansed by the

7 Muslims from areas in which they had lived?

8 A. The numbers killed we believed to be relatively low compared to

9 the casualties of the other communities in the war. Perhaps a couple of

10 thousand.

11 The numbers ethnically cleansed or fleeing in front of Muslim

12 advances was -- was much higher, certainly in the tens of thousands.

13 Q. Very well. Let's not waste time about the figures. There are

14 figures available about this, and there will be occasion to ascertain

15 them.

16 When making your statement, as I can see, you spoke to the

17 investigators, Todd Cleaver and Stephen Upton, and as far as I can see

18 from paragraph 15 of your statement -- let me just find it for a moment.

19 Actually, that is the first paragraph of your chronology, the beginning of

20 your chronology.

21 So tell me, please, within the framework of that chronology, are

22 you providing your comments to documents presented to you by these

23 gentlemen that you were interviewed by?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Very well. So these are your comments on documents presented to

Page 28642

1 you by them.

2 Is it true that this chronology is not exhaustive and that it

3 doesn't cover all events?

4 A. Certainly.

5 Q. And, Mr. Harland, is it true that particularly lacking are reports

6 on incidents provoked by the Muslim side, that is Muslim violations of

7 cease-fires agreed on the Sarajevo battlefront, as well as reports on

8 crimes committed by the Muslim side against the Serb civilians and the

9 army of Republika Srpska? Am I right in saying that?

10 A. No. That is not correct. On the contrary, in fact. We had -- we

11 suffered, as perhaps all onlookers suffer, from only being able to report

12 what you saw, and we were overwhelmingly able to see what happened on

13 Muslim-controlled territory. So in fact, when -- when there was a

14 violation of the cease-fire by the Muslims, we were much more likely to

15 see it than when there was a violation of the cease-fire by the Serbs.

16 And similarly, when there was a human rights abuse by the Muslims,

17 we would often see it very directly. We all lived in Sarajevo, which is a

18 rather small geographical area. There were many thousands of us on

19 Muslim-controlled territory. There were very, very few of us on

20 Serb-controlled territory. So in general, we were only able to record the

21 abuses on Serb-held territory when we encountered people who were

22 ethnically cleansed from Serb-held territory who were arriving in the

23 Muslim-controlled areas where we were stationed.

24 In fact, it was a particular source of grievance with the Muslim

25 authorities, that they felt that we were constantly holding them to a

Page 28643

1 higher standard in terms of abuses of human rights and cease-fire

2 violations than that to which we were holding the Serbs. In fact, I think

3 we were not prejudiced against the Muslims, but it probably is true that

4 we saw more of their wrongdoing, of their misdeeds, both in terms of

5 cease-fires and in terms of human rights than we saw of the Serbs. So our

6 reporting measured against an objective recording of the events somewhat

7 later would probably show more attention focused on Muslim cease-fire

8 violations and other actions than would be statistically merited.

9 And we did undertake a little study of this -- of this nature

10 which broadly confirmed it.

11 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, I'm going to interrupt now. It's time

12 -- past the time for the break.

13 We will adjourn now. Twenty minutes.

14 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

15 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Mr. Harland, could you please continue giving me as concise

18 answers as possible, because I don't have too much time.

19 From what you're saying, it follows that in view of the fact that

20 you were in the centre of town held by the Muslim forces that you were

21 able to note every cease-fire violation by the Muslim side. Does that

22 mean that you did actually report on each of those violations?

23 A. My particular role was political reporting, but yes, UNPROFOR

24 certainly had a deployment of UNMOs, military observers, whose principal

25 job was to count the shells and to note what type they were and where they

Page 28644

1 were coming from and going to, and, yes, that was part of UNPROFOR's daily

2 work.

3 Q. Very well. In paragraph 16, you mention the weekly political

4 assessment for Bosnia-Herzegovina number 24, dated the 16th of July,

5 referring to a meeting of the newly-appointed commander, General

6 Briquemont, Viktor Andreev, and yourself with Radovan Karadzic; is that

7 right?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And in the report you mention that, "Karadzic noted that even

10 though Republika Srpska had supported exchanges of population, the Serbs

11 recognise the right of people of different ethnic origin to remain or

12 return to their homes if they so wish." Was that his position, the one

13 that he advocated?

14 A. That's what he said.

15 Q. You also say that you raised the issue of ethnic cleansing,

16 particularly in Bijeljina, and that Radovan Karadzic would seek

17 justification for ethnic cleansing. Is that your comment? He would seek

18 to justify it.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Since you talk about Bijeljina, are you familiar with Radovan

21 Karadzic's order dated the 1st of January, 1994, relating precisely to

22 Bijeljina? And since I have it here in the Serbian language, signed and

23 with a stamp, the 1st January 1994 number 01-0894, and it says, "To the

24 Ministry of Defence of Republika Srpska and President of the Supreme

25 Military Court. According to information about the work of the military

Page 28645

1 prosecutor's office in Bijeljina --" I am mentioning this order because it

2 refers to Bijeljina that you referred to -- "indicates many missions being

3 made, particularly the release of persons who are suspected of serious

4 crimes. Such an attitude has worsened the security and political

5 situation in Brcko and Bijeljina. The situation requires that the

6 military prosecutor office's work be examined and any errors and omissions

7 be established made by the prosecutor. It is your duty to act according

8 to this order and to report me about your findings."

9 This was written by Dr. Radovan Karadzic and signed by him.

10 Are you familiar with this document?

11 A. No.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this into

13 evidence, please, Mr. May.

14 JUDGE MAY: Let us see the document.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] From what I have read out, and I

16 read it accurately, I hope that is not at issue, it should be beyond doubt

17 that Radovan Karadzic advocated the more efficient work of the military

18 prosecutor's office in Bijeljina.

19 JUDGE MAY: We'll mark this for identification next Defence

20 number.

21 [Trial Chamber confers]

22 JUDGE MAY: The document will get the next number. The map, which

23 I see the registrar still has, can be returned to the accused.

24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the document is Defence Exhibit 212,

25 marked for identification.

Page 28646

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. So he's advocating that persons who have committed criminal

3 offences should not be released from detention, and he says that this

4 worsens the general security situation in Bijeljina. And he's instructing

5 urgent intervention and inspection of the work of the military

6 prosecutor's office specifically in Bijeljina.

7 Do you know what the status of Muslims was in the area of

8 Bijeljina at the time when you were there?

9 A. During the -- during the war, there were some Muslim communities,

10 some Muslims in the town of Bijeljina and some small Muslim communities

11 around Bijeljina which had remained there until -- at least until 1995.

12 Q. Very well. So they remained there under normal living conditions.

13 They were treated in a non-discriminatory fashion. Is that -- does that

14 correspond to your knowledge?

15 A. No. They -- first of all, there were -- there was a constant

16 stream of people from Bijeljina and the Bijeljina area who were being

17 ethnically cleansed. There were some communities -- I remember in

18 particular representatives of one village came to us and said that they

19 were obliged to pay large amounts of money, or at least large by their

20 standards, as a sort of protection racket. If they paid off the local

21 authorities, military and civilian, then they could expect some degree of

22 protection. So there was a residual Muslim minority there, which made it

23 different from other places, you know, such as Visegrad or Rogatica, other

24 places in Eastern Bosnia.

25 But it would be wrong to describe their lives as normal.

Page 28647

1 I should also -- I know you want me to be brief and that's right,

2 but we had a particular problem with Dr. Karadzic's utterances, both in

3 writing and spoken, that there was, in general, a very large variance

4 between what he would say to us and even what he would write and say that

5 he had issued as orders and what actually happened. He would constantly,

6 when we complained about, for example, a cease-fire violation, say, "It's

7 okay. I have given written orders." And he would sometimes even show us

8 the written orders. And then we would see one of the military commanders

9 affected by those orders, and they would say, "Oh, no, we didn't really

10 get them," or, "They certainly weren't carried out and it wasn't

11 Karadzic's real intention that they were carried out." So I would view

12 with some caution his written order, and I wouldn't take it as evidence

13 that whatever he suggested in that letter actually happened.

14 I don't know this particular case and I don't know what the

15 military court was doing, but I would be careful.

16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Harland, if you could tell us who specifically he

17 was who said that -- who didn't get the order from Karadzic or they didn't

18 carry out what was ordered by Karadzic.

19 THE WITNESS: Yes. First of all, I should say that there are a

20 lot of such cases, but one which stays in my mind is during the siege of

21 Gorazde in the spring of 1994 - I suppose it's April 1994 - when we were

22 with Dr. Karadzic in Pale while Serb forces in the field were operating a

23 few dozen kilometres to the east of us. And Dr. Karadzic assured us that

24 he had ordered a halt to the advance of Serb forces and that he had

25 ordered a cease-fire. And when it was reported to General Rose, I

Page 28648












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 28649

1 remember, at one of these meetings in Pale by his people on the ground

2 that the Serbs were in fact continuing to fire, Dr. Karadzic went and said

3 he was sending -- he repeated the order, and he was sending also a written

4 order.

5 Then later, at the next meeting, we saw General Mladic, and we had

6 already seen him on television in Gorazde, and when we asked him about

7 that, even in the presence of Dr. Karadzic, he laughed about it and said

8 that he was -- he had not received orders that he should not continue to

9 prosecute his attack and that he should do so. And then Dr. Karadzic

10 didn't even say that he hadn't lied, he just came up with a different

11 story. He said, "Well, actually, Lord Owen promised us up to the river in

12 Gorazde." Another fact which he just made up. "And so all we're doing is

13 taking that part of Gorazde which is rightfully ours."

14 And it was so appalling all this business with Karadzic making up

15 facts as convenient, that I was with -- at this time with Vitaly Churkin,

16 who was a representative of the Russian Federation, and he came outside

17 and said, "I give up. I can't negotiate with him any more. I've never

18 heard more lies than I have heard here in the last 48 hours."

19 I could give many such examples.

20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. In paragraph 18, you refer to a meeting held on the 5th of August

23 at Pale with Briquemont, Hayes and Andreev, and that meeting was held at

24 Karadzic's initiative. Isn't that right, Mr. Harland?

25 A. Yes.

Page 28650

1 Q. As this doesn't correspond to your statement that he keeps doing

2 something other than he says, is it true that Karadzic made proposals for

3 the withdrawal of forces of the army of Republika Srpska from Mount Igman

4 and establishing secure routes in and out of Sarajevo and cooperation for

5 the restoration of public utilities? Isn't that right?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Did that indeed happen? Is it true that the army of Republika

8 Srpska withdrew from Igman, et cetera, in accordance with this agreement?

9 Isn't that right?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. He wasn't forced to withdraw, but he did withdraw in agreement

12 with you, that is your commanders, and this area was taken over by the

13 UNPROFOR forces. Isn't that right?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Is it true that on the 14th of August, 1993, upon Karadzic's

16 initiative that I now mentioned, a safe area was established in the

17 territory of Igman and Bjelasnica?

18 A. It was a demilitarised zone, not a safe area, yes. I don't

19 believe it was the initiative of Karadzic.

20 Q. Yes, yes. Demilitarised. It was his initiative, a demilitarised

21 zone. Was a component part of that agreement that the Serbs withdraw from

22 13 checkpoints which were to have been taken over by UNPROFOR and that the

23 Muslim forces could not take over that area? Wasn't that the agreement?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. However, is it true that the Muslims only a month later, without

Page 28651

1 being prevented by UNPROFOR at all, did capture those points though they

2 had been ceded to UNPROFOR? And on that occasion, that is during this

3 offensive and the takeover of points, they killed 37 and wounded 34

4 soldiers of the army of Republika Srpska? Surely you're aware of that.

5 A. I don't know the exact numbers, but it is true that Muslim forces

6 were consistently and over a long period of time and on a substantial

7 scale in violation of the Mount Igman agreement.

8 Q. And in this chronology which you have produced, is there any

9 reference to this event and the cheating by the Muslim side and the

10 passiveness of the UNPROFOR command which did not react to that at all?

11 A. First of all, yes, there are references, principally in the

12 section on 1994, as you will see.

13 I must also object to the idea that UNPROFOR was passive. In

14 fact, you have -- you've illuminated an important point, which is that in

15 general, the Muslims did not want the status quo. They did not want a

16 cease-fire with the lines that existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the

17 time. They opposed a general cease-fire, and when they made a cease-fire,

18 they did often break that cease-fire. And the commander of UNPROFOR

19 forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time, General Rose, did argue very

20 vigorously with the Bosnian Muslim leadership, particularly with Dr.

21 Ganic, who he felt was the principal advocate of this policy of violating

22 cease-fire agreements, and he -- he even sought to threaten them with the

23 use of air attacks by NATO forces on occasions if they would not comply.

24 No such airstrikes ever took place and would not have been agreed to by

25 NATO, it was felt, but UNPROFOR was certainly trying to stabilise the

Page 28652

1 situation, and General Rose was very aware of and very concerned by

2 violations from the Muslim side, particularly with respect to this

3 agreement which we're discussing now.

4 Q. And did the UNPROFOR command indirectly enable the Muslims to take

5 control of these points which the Serbs had voluntarily abandoned in the

6 interest of bringing the Muslims back to the negotiating table, that is,

7 in the interest of shifting the events from war to peace negotiations?

8 A. No. UNPROFOR certainly didn't enable them to it -- to do it, and

9 in fact, the Muslim forces made considerable efforts to try and avoid

10 detection by us. I recall sitting with the commander of the French

11 battalion which was responsible for that area and going over with him the

12 night vision photographs taken by intelligence officers, showing some

13 degree of infiltration into the zone by -- by Muslim fighters who were

14 trying to -- trying to avoid detection by us.

15 Q. So you are refuting the statement that you enabled them to do

16 that. But the second part of my question had to do with the reasons for

17 which the Serbs left Igman or ceded Igman. Will you confirm that at

18 least? The aim was to bring the Muslims back to the negotiating table,

19 that they should switch from the tracks of war to the tracks of peace

20 negotiations. Is that part correct at least?

21 A. That is correct, yes.

22 Q. That is the point. In paragraph 22 you referred to the 15th of

23 October and a meeting between Andreev, Briquemont, De Mello, with Karadzic

24 and Krajisnik at Pale. Is it true that at that meeting Karadzic said that

25 he had issued orders to shop the shelling and sniping, but at the same

Page 28653

1 time, he said that artillery and sniper fire from the Muslim side was a

2 major problem? Isn't that right?

3 A. Yes, he said that.

4 Q. Tell me, please, do you have any knowledge that Karadzic did

5 indeed order units of the army of Republika Srpska to stop shelling or

6 sniping or at least to use it only proportionately?

7 A. I see here in paragraph 22 that General Briquemont said that he

8 had seen no evidence of Muslim preparations for an attack on the Serb

9 areas but that the Serb shelling of civilian areas was increasing. And in

10 general, I would say that one of the complications of UNPROFOR's work was

11 that the -- the Muslim authorities did have -- see themselves as having an

12 interest in breaking the cease-fires, if necessary, in order not to allow

13 the confrontation lines to stabilise when they, who were about half of the

14 population of Bosnia, were then only living on 18 per cent of the

15 territory.

16 So they -- that created a problem for us. And a sort of opposite

17 problem for us was that the Serbs had an interest in keeping as much

18 military pressure on the Muslims as possible without actually attracting

19 any negative attention.

20 So in a way, both sides were deceiving us though for rather

21 different reasons.

22 Q. Very well. But if the Serbs favoured a cease-fire, the

23 cease-fire, and I think you'll agree, Mr. Harland, isn't a political

24 solution. A cease-fire enables the sides to seek a settlement through

25 negotiation and not through loss of life. I assume that is what you

Page 28654

1 advocated for, to have the peace fire -- cease-fire observed.

2 A. It is. And the problem we had with the Presidency of Bosnia and

3 Herzegovina was that they felt that if there was a general cease-fire in

4 which the population under their control, about half of the total

5 population of 4 million of the country, if that -- if they were left on 18

6 per cent of the territory of the country and the cease-fire stabilised but

7 there was no successful outcome to the talks, then they would be left in a

8 very difficult position. So we felt that they were publicly saying that

9 they wanted a cease-fire because it's a hard thing to say you don't want,

10 but in fact were often working to undermine those cease-fires.

11 On the other side, the Serbs genuinely did want the situation to

12 stabilise because they had so much territory, but they also wanted to make

13 life as miserable as possible, through shelling and sniping, of the Serb

14 positions -- of Muslim positions, and Dr. Karadzic even told us that

15 directly, that the sniping and the cutting off of the water serves a

16 purpose.

17 So UNPROFOR was in a particularly difficult position between those

18 two parties.

19 Q. Well, when I ask you whether you know if Karadzic ordered the

20 units of the army of Republika Srpska to reduce or stop their operations,

21 I have in mind a document to the Main Staff of the army of Republika

22 Srpska, the command of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and the commanders of

23 the brigades. That's who it is addressed to, of the Sarajevo-Romanija

24 Corps, which means from the Main Staff down to the corps command and the

25 brigade commands. The date is the 7th of February, 1994, where it states:

Page 28655

1 "There is proof and evidence that on Muslim artillery provocations, the

2 Serb side is responding inadequately, sometimes even 20 to 30 and even 70

3 times more. The international community does not criticise us for

4 responding, but that too much force is being used, and the Muslims are

5 provoking us to use our ammunition without effect. The Muslim side is

6 very skillful in ascribing its artillery shelling in town to us, which

7 causes great damage to us and threatens us the loss of our state."

8 And then it says: "I order strict control in responding to

9 provocations and to respond only when we are under threat ourselves and

10 when there is full military justification for doing so. Respond by

11 targeting only military facilities and respond exclusively pursuant to the

12 commander's orders, and respond in the ratio of one to one with the

13 strength of the provocation used." And then it says in figures, "1-1."

14 "Second, exclude any shelling out of control. Control conduct

15 and sanction misdemeanors urgently and on the basis of the law. For corps

16 artilleries, the corps commander shall be responsible to me directly, and

17 the brigade commander for the brigades. Please inform me immediately of

18 any incidents. The Supreme Commander, Dr. Radovan Karadzic." And the

19 signature is his, the stamp says Republika Srpska, the header is Republika

20 Srpska, the president of the Republic in Sarajevo, and so on.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]

22 So, Mr. May, I'd like to tender this into evidence.

23 JUDGE MAY: Before you do, the witness can answer or give a

24 comment about it.

25 Have you ever heard of this document, Mr. Harland?

Page 28656

1 THE WITNESS: No, I haven't heard of this document, but -- and I

2 should say Mr. Milosevic has jumped forward a few months in time. We're

3 now at the beginning of 1994, after the Markale shelling. And I should

4 say that the document is almost certainly a true copy, because at that

5 time, the Serbs were very concerned that as a result of the marketplace

6 massacre, NATO might intervene against them, and they did call us to say

7 that they had passed orders of this type. So I think it is almost

8 certainly correct.

9 JUDGE MAY: Yes, if it could be handed in. Marked for

10 identification.

11 THE REGISTRAR: D213, MFI, Your Honour.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Just a comment on this. It is precisely Karadzic which is

14 indicating this response which isn't in kind and to the same ratio, and he

15 draws the attention of the parties that it should be on a one-to-one ratio

16 and that he is seeking strict control in responding to the provocations,

17 strict supervision of that response. Isn't that right?

18 Now, Mr. Harland, does this coincide and compare with what

19 Karadzic said at the 15th of October meeting, 1993? May we hear your

20 comments on that, please.

21 A. The commitments that the Serbs gave us to a cease-fire in October

22 of 1993 were not observed. They continued their military activity. And

23 we kept a daily record, as I said before, of the shooting which largely

24 confirmed this. They may have passed the order, but the order was not

25 significantly obeyed if it was passed at all.

Page 28657

1 The situation which you have just referred to, however, was very

2 different. By February of 1994, the Serbs did seem genuinely to want a

3 stabilisation of the situation around Sarajevo, and they did stop

4 shooting. And in fact, they did so -- they reduced the amount of fire

5 coming from their side of the confrontation line from February of 1994

6 right through till the autumn of 1994 to a very low level.

7 Q. Practically from the beginning of 1994, in fact, until the end of

8 the autumn of 1994; isn't that right?

9 A. Yes, beginning almost immediately after the so-called Markale

10 incident.

11 Q. We'll come to the Markale incident. But in paragraph 26, you say

12 that in your weekly political assessment of the 3rd of November of 1993,

13 mention that in the forward command post, forward headquarters, there were

14 two Muslim snipers who were active and who even shot at UN staff members

15 and the passersby, and that the 1st Corps, the one holding Sarajevo,

16 claimed that it was individuals that had -- belonging to a man called

17 Caco, this gang of individuals under the command of Caco; is that right?

18 A. Yes, that's what they said.

19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, may I assist you?

20 It is tab 4.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Just to compare facts, Mr. Harland, this man Caco, was that a

23 nickname for Musan Topalovic who had under his control the left bank of

24 the Miljacka river on the territory of Stari Grad municipality in

25 Sarajevo? Was that who he was?

Page 28658

1 A. Yes, though he was dead by the time of this claim, of course.

2 Q. And do you know that this man Caco, for which the ABiH 1st Command

3 claimed was a renegade, that he was a commander of a Mountain Brigade of

4 the BH army and so at no event could he have been a renegade, in actual

5 fact? Is that correct, Mr. Harland?

6 A. I believe what it -- what it says is that is that the snipers who

7 were acting at this time were -- they reported to us that these were

8 renegade supports of Caco. In other words, the period which is being

9 reported here is the period immediately or some weeks after the death of

10 Caco. Caco was killed by Muslim forces in Sarajevo. And when we were

11 complaining about the activity of Muslim snipers in Sarajevo who appeared

12 to be firing at targets within Sarajevo itself, other Muslims, they -- BH

13 1st Corps, they recognised that these incidents had happened, but they

14 said that this was not part of their policy, this was the act of these

15 so-called renegade supporters of Caco.

16 Q. Yes, supporters of Caco, who was commander of the Mountain Brigade

17 the BH army. So he couldn't have about a renegade at all.

18 And now, do you know that these formations perpetrated mass

19 killings of Serbs in Bisipoto [phoen], Popodija and Kazani on the slopes

20 of Mount Trbevic in Sarajevo? Do you have an awareness of that?

21 A. Yes, and we made some efforts to establish the events surrounding

22 those -- those events.

23 Q. Well, did you establish it?

24 A. Yes. There certainly had been Serbs from Sarajevo killed and

25 their bodies put in the pits of -- of Kazani above Bistrik barracks, and

Page 28659

1 that the people who did it were certainly associated with -- with Caco.

2 Q. And do you know that in a television programme --

3 THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear the English?

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. -- Alija Izetbegovic referred to Caco as his son? He called him

6 "My son."

7 A. I don't recall that.

8 Q. Well, wasn't it Karadzic at a meeting of the 15th of October who

9 indicated the danger from Muslim sniper fire?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And is it true that General Rose, at a meeting with Ganic, for the

12 umpteenth time indicated the mortar fire that was coming from the Muslim

13 side from a mortar installed on trucks, mortars on trucks, and sniper fire

14 opened by the Muslims at their own people? Isn't that right, Mr. Harland?

15 A. Yes, General Rose did make that protest, and it was our concern

16 that certainly some elements and probably including the leadership of the

17 Bosnian Muslims did not wish to stabilise the situation around Sarajevo,

18 and that was very frustrating for General Rose.

19 Can I just add, though, that concerning the killings of the people

20 at Kazani and Caco's actions, Caco was the commander of -- of a brigade

21 and was very ruthless in the way he dealt with Muslims. He was certainly

22 also a murderer in the way he dealt with Serbs. My sense, however -- I

23 met him, and I met the authorities who dealt with him. My sense was that

24 whatever President Izetbegovic may have said, the Muslim leadership

25 generally considered him dangerous, and ultimately they did kill him on, I

Page 28660












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13 English transcripts.













Page 28661

1 think, towards the end of October 1993. So I would not make a line of

2 questioning that suggests that there was a general policy to kill Serbs in

3 Sarajevo. And although the numbers, perhaps several dozen, were shocking,

4 it was really in no way comparable to the crimes that were being committed

5 by the Serbs. And I don't know if it was the intention to make an

6 equation, but that would be a wrong conclusion to draw.

7 Q. So it wasn't the general option. How come so many Serbs were

8 killed in Sarajevo then?

9 A. I think that most Serbs who -- most of the Serbs who were killed

10 within the confrontation lines of Sarajevo were killed by Serb fire coming

11 from outside the confrontation line, either by snipers or by shelling.

12 We kept a rough tally of the number of people killed in Sarajevo

13 by visits to the morgue, by taking reports from family and by our own

14 observations, and our impressions were that although the crimes of Caco

15 were very horrible, they were relatively limited in scope and that most of

16 the Serb casualties in Sarajevo were not caused by actions from the --

17 from the Muslim authorities.

18 Q. All right, Mr. Harland. The killing of Serbs in Sarajevo, do you

19 exclusively link that up to this group of men around Caco or do you allow

20 for the possibility that that was done by many more groups, units, members

21 of the army, the so-called army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, et cetera?

22 A. It was not exclusively done by Caco, though I would -- from the

23 figures that came to us, I would guess that perhaps most of the Serbs

24 killed in Sarajevo by Muslim groups were killed by groups associated with

25 Caco. But there were certainly -- you're correct. There were certainly

Page 28662

1 other Serb victims too, though I hope during this whole line of

2 questioning we are again clear that there is no equation in numbers or

3 even in order of magnitude between what was happening in Sarajevo and what

4 was happening in Serb-controlled territory around it.

5 Q. I don't know why it can't be compared. Perhaps there were a

6 thousand of you there in Sarajevo. But we don't have time for that.

7 Anyway, in your weekly political assessment of the 9th of

8 February, in paragraph 26, you speak about the tragedy that took place at

9 the Markale marketplace, the 5th of February, 1994; is that right? That

10 report.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Well, through force of circumstance that your testimony was

13 interrupted, in fact, and in my material, the documents that I received,

14 along with Lord Owen's testimony, who completed his testimony here

15 yesterday, in those CD-ROM materials there is part of a BBC programme

16 which was attached to Lord Owen's book, and the title is "Jankovi the 30th

17 of October, 1995, BBC Panorama, Peace Without Honour, The Propaganda War,"

18 and it quoted a UN document. So I'm asking you here and now whether you

19 remember that. It was quoted in the document that I was disclosed: "Most

20 immediate code restricted 8th of February, 1994 [In

21 English] From UN Command Sarajevo to UN New York. Judging from the

22 trajectory, experts thought -- experts thought that range is more likely

23 -- that the range is more likely to be under 2.000 metres than 2 to

24 4.000 metres, putting it in Muslim territory rather than Serb."

25 [Interpretation] Tell me now, please, in view of the position you

Page 28663

1 held and this report which I assume you know about, would it be true that

2 there was a lot of information pointing to the fact that that was fired

3 from the Muslim side, in fact?

4 A. Yes, I am familiar with that document, but I am not familiar with

5 the BBC broadcast you refer to.

6 With respect to the first Markale massacre, and I should say that

7 there is controversy surrounding who fired the shell in both the first

8 Markale massacre and the second Markale massacre, but in respect of the

9 first one, which we are discussing now, the UNPROFOR conclusion was that

10 it could not be determined beyond reasonable doubt who had fired the first

11 -- the shell for the first Markale massacre.

12 The report that you have just quoted was a very preliminary report

13 which is, in the normal course of events, followed up by a full ballistic

14 analysis.

15 Now, the more comprehensive report, which followed a couple of

16 days after the one which you have in your hand, concluded in fact that the

17 range from which the mortar was fired, the possible ranges from which the

18 mortar is fired crossed the confrontation line to the north-east of the

19 Markale marketplace. In other words, it was fired from close to the

20 confrontation line, but it was not possible for us to determine whether it

21 was fired from the Muslim side or the Serb side.

22 And in fact, there is -- there is a factual error in the

23 calculations made for the first report which was noted in the fuller

24 report that followed a few days later.

25 Q. So the finale of it was, the conclusion was that nothing can be

Page 28664

1 said with absolute certainty. The first indications showed that it was

2 from the Muslim side, and then the finale of it was that one couldn't make

3 an absolutely correct assertion. Isn't that right, Mr. Harland?

4 A. That is correct, and I should say that that was often the case.

5 For any given shell, it was very difficult for us to say where it came

6 from. Only some shells could it be confirmed with great accuracy where

7 they came from.

8 When we were able to determine, then in almost a hundred per cent

9 of cases we were able to determine that shells landing on the Muslim side

10 of the confrontation line came from the Serb side of the confrontation

11 line. We had mortar detecting radars, which the Serbs tried to destroy.

12 We had military observers who --

13 Q. Mr. Harland, I'm just asking you about this specific instance. So

14 you needn't tell me that there were shells fired from the Serb side. What

15 we're talking about is the Markale marketplace. The first report was that

16 it came from the Muslim side; the final conclusion that nothing definite

17 could be established; and third, that there was a general anti-Serb

18 hysteria that it was the Serbs who actually perpetrated this crime.

19 That's right, isn't it?

20 A. No, that's not right. I must say I have sometimes accused General

21 Rose of things, but I've never accused him of anti-Serb hysteria. On the

22 contrary. I think that --

23 Q. No, that's not what --

24 JUDGE MAY: Let him finish.

25 THE WITNESS: I think that there was -- there was, in a way, in

Page 28665

1 fact, in certain parts of UNPROFOR a certain sympathy with the Serb

2 military, because I think because the Serb military more closely

3 represented a military like that from which they came. So it was

4 certainly not my experience with UNPROFOR that the reporting of UNPROFOR

5 reflected any anti-Serb hysteria. On the contrary; my experience with

6 that reporting was that it went out of the way to give the benefit of the

7 doubt to the Serb side.

8 And in this case, it was determined by engineers who, as far as I

9 remember, had no obvious political views at all, that it could not be

10 determined who fired that shell, and that remains the UNPROFOR position,

11 though I feel it is also fair to put in the context that that was often

12 true, we could not confirm, and in almost a hundred per cent of the cases

13 where we could confirm where a shell came from, landing on the Muslim

14 side, it came from the Serb side.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Mr. Harland, you have made an inversion of theses. I never

17 intimated that General Rose launched an anti-Serb hysteria. I wasn't

18 watching, maybe the translation wasn't quite accurate. On the one hand

19 you had reports that it had come from the Muslim side and then the final

20 conclusion that it was not possible to determine where it had come from.

21 Whereas on the other hand there was a worldwide media propaganda along

22 anti-Serb lines that the crime had been committed by the Serbs. I'm not

23 saying that the source was General Rose. On the contrary; I think that he

24 was quite objective.

25 A. I lost translation. First it got very small and then I lost

Page 28666

1 translation. Okay. Let me try.

2 First of all, I -- I don't believe that the reporting from

3 UNPROFOR was anything other than objective. And from your own reporting,

4 from your own comment from the BBC, they are willing to present a

5 preliminary report which is really very favourable to the Serb view of

6 that event, but they do not, at least as you've described the show, appear

7 to discuss the conclusive report. So I don't think that this media

8 hysteria went as far as the BBC.

9 In fact, I remember quite by coincidence several years later

10 listening to a BBC correspondent, Nick Gowing, who is still a

11 correspondent, a presenter, talking about that incident and saying how it

12 was actually the Muslims who had done that. In fact, he was thereby

13 perpetrating as a fact something which really wasn't known by any of the

14 people who had investigated the incident on the ground.

15 We could -- we wished as much as everybody else that there was a

16 clear answer to the question, but the fact was there was no clear answer

17 to the question. It is still not able to be determined on the basis of

18 the ballistic evidence who fired that shell.

19 Q. Mr. Harland, well, that is the whole point. I'm not saying that

20 you were a source of information, and especially not General Rose. But

21 what I am saying are -- I'm referring to certain coincidences. On the one

22 hand, you were not a source of the information that the Serbs had fired

23 the shell, whereas there was an anti-Serb media hysteria that the crime

24 had been committed by the Serbs. And this programme, which is on a CD

25 together with Lord Owen's book, was broadcast on the 30th of October,

Page 28667

1 1995, so it's much later. And I read out to you from that programme a

2 document that you said you were familiar with and which says that the

3 range was within 2.000 metres and not between 2 and 4.000 metres, which

4 seems to point to the Muslim side.

5 But before that telegram of the 8th of February that I quoted

6 from, there's another telegram that is quoted dated the 6th of February,

7 and it is quoted in the same documents that were attached to Lord Owen's

8 testimony. It is also --

9 JUDGE MAY: I don't know if the witness can follow all this

10 detail. I really don't think we're going to get much further with this.

11 The witness has given you what sounds to be an objective account, that

12 nobody is certain, he says, as they understood it, where the shell came

13 from.

14 Now, going over and over this again with a witness who can't

15 himself say, of course, where the shell came from seems to me -- just a

16 moment -- seems to me to be a waste of time, and we need to move on to

17 some other point.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am moving on to something else,

19 namely the witness said that he was familiar with this dispatch that I

20 quoted from, and now I am asking him about another dispatch that doesn't

21 relate to Markale but was sent on the same time -- at the same time from

22 Zagreb to New York, on the 6th of February, and it refers to a matter of

23 principle.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. And it says: "Care is particularly important -- [In English] Care

Page 28668

1 is particularly important given the fact that UNPROFOR is almost hundred

2 per cent sure that the Bosniaks on at least two occasions during the past

3 18 months have been the origin of shelling that caused casualties in

4 Sarajevo."

5 [Interpretation] Are you familiar with that report? You probably

6 remember it too.

7 A. I believe that was sent from Zagreb, but I am familiar with the

8 assertion and the evidence on which it's based, which came from Sarajevo.

9 Q. And are you familiar that the assertion regarding the massacre in

10 the bread line in Vase Miskina Street on the 27th of May, 1992, that that

11 too was provoked by the Muslims, and for propaganda purposes, and it was

12 successful, because three days later the Security Council adopted

13 Resolution 757 enforcing sanctions against Serbia. Are you aware of that,

14 Mr. Harland?

15 JUDGE MAY: Wait a minute. Let the witness answer these

16 questions. If it's 1992, it sounds as though it may have been before your

17 time, Mr. Harland.

18 THE WITNESS: It was before my time. I'm familiar with the place

19 and with the incident and with the claim by both sides that the other side

20 fired it. But Mr. Milosevic has raised the -- the question of who fired

21 which shell, so if I can just add, to clarify, that about a half a million

22 shells were fired at Sarajevo during the course of the war. Sometimes we

23 were able to determine very exactly where they came from and sometimes we

24 weren't. In nearly a hundred per cent of the cases, that is with the

25 exception of two or three, when we could confirm, we confirmed that they

Page 28669

1 came from the Serb side. And I think that all of our discussion is

2 basically going around that point. Are there some particular shells which

3 are in the grey zone? Yes. Is this one of them? Yes.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Mr. Harland, Mr. Harland, Mr. Harland, regarding this bread line

6 about which there is evidence that the shot was fired by the Muslims, and

7 relating to Markale for which there is evidence that the Muslim side fired

8 it, this provoked the worst possible consequences for the Serb side. So

9 it is very difficult --

10 JUDGE MAY: We've been over this point. It's pointless going on.

11 Let's move on to something else. The time is limited. Your time is

12 limited, and the Court's time is limited, and to go over the same argument

13 trying to make the same points and trying to argue the witness into some

14 position or other is a waste of time. Let's move on to something else.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Mr. Harland, do you know that, for example, the London Independent

18 in August, the 22nd of August, a Saturday, published an article entitled

19 "Muslims Slaughter Their Own People"? Are you familiar with that

20 article?

21 JUDGE MAY: It doesn't matter what the London Independent said.

22 It's not a matter for the witness.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But mention is made here of various

24 incidents.

25 JUDGE MAY: Yes, there may be, and you can give evidence about it

Page 28670

1 and you can try and put it before the Court, if you want, that the Muslims

2 were killing their own people. You can make your case. But it's

3 pointless going on asking the witness about matters which he's dealt with

4 in evidence as best he can. He's given you the best answer which he can.

5 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I hesitate to interrupt, but of course on

6 these particular issues, the Court will have evidence before it different

7 from the material before the witness and to the extent necessary and

8 possible will be invited to make its conclusions in due course, and that

9 does make this exercise by the accused really unfortunately wasteful.

10 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Harland, you were going to say something?

12 THE WITNESS: I was going to say, I mean, I can't talk about the

13 Independent, first because I didn't read that article, and second because

14 it referred to a time when I was not there. But I was in Sarajevo for

15 most of the war and was familiar with a large number of cases, and in

16 every case where the firing point could be confirmed for a shell that

17 landed in Sarajevo, in almost every case, it was confirmed as having come

18 from the Serb side. And --

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Yes, we've heard that.

21 JUDGE MAY: No. Let him finish. Yes.

22 THE WITNESS: In all cases which I could speak about - I mean we

23 could go through them one by one at great length - are either certainly

24 fired from the Serb side or it's unclear.

25 This one which we happen to be discussing now is one which is

Page 28671












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13 English transcripts.













Page 28672

1 unclear. When we come to Markale 2, I think the case is less unclear.

2 But I think I have nothing to add on this one. It was -- it was unclear.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Particularly in connection with what you are now saying, what was

5 clear and what was unclear, General Rose, in his book, and I will quote

6 very briefly from the book, you were there at the same time: "The Serbs

7 whom we could clearly see in their trenches on the slopes behind us

8 covered with fir trees completely halted a Muslim attack. That is when

9 they used their artillery and mortars to respond to the Muslim fire, whose

10 mortars were distributed all over town and one of them within the Kosevo

11 Hospital compound. The Muslims opened fire at the Serbs, hoping that they

12 would respond with blows on built-up areas which would be another cause

13 for the international community to condemn the Serbs and take their side.

14 The history will be the best judge of the Muslim leaders for resorting for

15 such inhumane tactics."

16 This was written in his book by General Rose. Do you consider him

17 to be telling the truth or are you constantly repeating that the Serbs

18 were shelling Sarajevo? We know that the Serbs were shelling Sarajevo.

19 We condemned the Serb shelling of Sarajevo.

20 JUDGE MAY: You're not here to argue. You're merely here to ask

21 some questions. The accused -- I'm sorry, the witness of course can

22 answer and comment on that passage.

23 THE WITNESS: I think -- I think that is both an accurate

24 statement of General Rose's position at the time as I recall it, and it is

25 certainly also an accurate statement of what was going on, yes.

Page 28673

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Very well. Is it true that on the 9th of February, 1994, at a

3 meeting between General Divjak on behalf of the BH army and General

4 Milovanovic on behalf of the army of Republika Srpska, an agreement was

5 reached, a cease-fire, in the territory of Sarajevo?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Is it true that in your weekly report of the 17th of February,

8 number 54, you stated that the Serbs had agreed to withdraw their weaponry

9 from around Sarajevo, that the process of withdrawal would be supervised

10 by the UN, that UNPROFOR exchanged liaison officers with the Serbs, that

11 they speed up the procedure for granting approval for humanitarian

12 convoys, that UNPROFOR appoint its men on key border crossings, that more

13 Muslims leave Sarajevo than ever before, that they allow humanitarian aid

14 to be brought in in a greater measure than before? Is all that correct,

15 Mr. Harland?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. What did the Muslims agree to, Mr. Harland? I've enumerated all

18 the arrangements agreed to by the Serbs. What did the Muslims agree to?

19 A. First of --

20 Q. Please go ahead, Mr. Harland.

21 A. First of all, we use in this courtroom, for convenience, the terms

22 Muslims, Serbs, and Croats, but of course the actual general who was

23 making the agreement on behalf of the army of Republic of Bosnia and

24 Herzegovina was General Divjak who is, of course, not a Muslim, he's a

25 Serb, but I will continue for simplicity's sake to refer, as you do, to

Page 28674

1 Muslims, Serbs, and Croats.

2 The Muslims were bound by the same --

3 Q. Mr. Harland, I was quoting you, to make myself quite clear. I was

4 quoting from your statement.

5 A. It would be a mistake to refer to General Divjak as a Muslim. I

6 hope that my report doesn't do it, and I'm sure it doesn't.

7 Q. No.

8 JUDGE MAY: One at a time. Now, let -- let the witness finish

9 what he was going to say.

10 THE WITNESS: Now, the Muslim side, that is - to avoid confusion

11 because it is General Divjak - the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

12 agreed to the same four points, which was a cease-fire that was meant to

13 start on the 10th of February, the interposition between the two forces of

14 UNPROFOR, the withdrawal of heavy weapons or their -- or for the Muslims

15 their cantonment in certain sites in Sarajevo and the creation of a joint

16 commission to investigate problems. Both sides were bound by the same

17 four points.

18 The difference was that the Serbs were required to withdraw

19 weapons whereas the Muslims had nowhere to withdraw weapons to. So they

20 were required to put them into cantonment facilities in Sarajevo under our

21 control, which they would not have access to.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Mr. Harland, are you familiar with the fact that the Muslim side,

24 in the period from the 28th of March until the 1st of July -- I don't know

25 what's happening with your headphones.

Page 28675

1 A. It's fading away.

2 Q. I see the transcript is working. Maybe it's your headset.

3 So I was saying, do you know that the Muslim side in the period

4 from the 28th of March until the 1st of July, that is over a period of

5 only three months in 1993, violated the cease-fire 196 times, and from the

6 10th of February to the 27th of April, 1994, 318 times they violated the

7 cease-fire?

8 A. I don't recall the exact figures, but that sounds about right.

9 Q. Very well. Are these figures of violations of the cease-fire by

10 the Muslims frightening? 196 times in three months and then later on 318

11 times; doesn't that sound frightening?

12 A. It was certainly very frustrating for our commander, General Rose,

13 who was trying to stabilise the situation. And the Muslims certainly

14 understood that when they fired out, whether they -- of the city, that

15 would provoke a large Serb coming -- incoming fire, which would make

16 normal life in the city impossible. So, yes, it was very -- it was very

17 disturbing for us.

18 Q. Did you have the figures how many soldiers of the army of

19 Republika Srpska were killed as a result of that fire or wounded seriously

20 or lightly? Did you have any such figures and did you review them, take

21 them into consideration?

22 A. In general, we had almost no independent source of information on

23 what was happening in Republika Srpska. The Serbs very often complained

24 to us that they were not treated fairly in the media, and we proposed to

25 them that they just allow journalists to move freely on their territories

Page 28676

1 and that they allow us to move freely on their territories so we could see

2 these incidents, these alleged incidents in which bad things happened.

3 However, they did not do that. Presumably they had their own other

4 reasons for not wanting us to see what was going on, and so we were simply

5 left in the position of having to report information which they gave us,

6 which, when we could verify it, often turned out to be false.

7 I don't say that the other sides did not also produce false

8 information, but the advantage of working on the Muslim side is we could

9 basically go wherever we wanted to, right up to the trench lines. So we

10 were able to double-check what the Muslims claimed was happening, and we

11 did so very aggressively, to their frustration. We were not able to do

12 that on the Serb side. So I can't tell you much about how many Serbs,

13 military or civilian, might have been killed by these cease-fire

14 violations, but obviously, yes, there would have been some.

15 Q. You say that you were not able to establish how many Serbs were

16 killed, but you were present at the spot from which the fire was fired.

17 So you know, for instance, how many shells were fired by the Muslims from

18 their positions and artillery at Dobrinja, Lukavica, Rajlovac, Vogosca,

19 Ilidza, Nedzarica, Mrkovici, Ilijas, Hadzici. So all these places and

20 settlements and small towns which were held by the Serbs, you were able to

21 establish that as you were in the location from which the fire was coming.

22 So you must have very clear records of that. Did you have such records?

23 A. Yes. I think we had a record probably of every shell fired.

24 Q. How, then, is it possible that there is nothing about that in your

25 report? I have listed ten parts or areas around Sarajevo - Grbavica,

Page 28677

1 Dobrinja, Lukavica, Vojkovice, Rajlovac, Ilidza, Nedzarici, Mrkovici,

2 Ilijas and Hadzici. How is it possible that there is no reference to any

3 of that in your report and statement? And it wasn't one shell that was

4 fired at each of these places or these parts of the town where the Serbs

5 were. How would you explain that, Mr. Harland?

6 A. Well, as you can see, the documents which you are quoting from are

7 weekly political assessments. There were also what we called Daily

8 SitReps, sort for situation reports, and there was a military observer

9 called "Shoot Reports," that is, they were counts of how many weapons were

10 fired and of what sort and by which side. There was rather full

11 reporting. And our general conclusions were that there were casualties

12 from these violations of the cease-fire that you're talking about. In the

13 global sense, about 90 per cent of -- we estimated about 90 per cent of

14 the civilians killed around the Sarajevo area were killed within the

15 confrontation line, that is, they were killed on the Muslim side of the

16 line. That might have included Muslims and Serbs and Croats, but about 90

17 per cent of the casualties were inside the confrontation line.

18 But I would certainly accept that firing out of the city,

19 including these violations you've mentioned, could have killed up to about

20 10 per cent of the total casualties from the conflict around Sarajevo from

21 the evidence given to us by Serb hospitals, from the Ministry of Health

22 and so on.

23 Q. Very well. You say you were issuing weekly assessments. Are you

24 familiar with Radovan Karadzic's order of the 2nd of July, 1994, that

25 Yasushi Akashi should be daily briefed about the violations of the

Page 28678

1 cease-fire because the disturbing figures of those violations were

2 absolutely unacceptable. And it says here, "I order that Akashi should be

3 briefed directly on a daily basis on all Muslim violations of the

4 cease-fire and occasionally make public statements." So not regularly

5 make it public but inform Akashi on a daily basis. And when Akashi is

6 mentioned, it is because he is at the top of the UN pyramid. So the

7 reference is to your entire structure. So you had daily reports on

8 cease-fire violations, didn't you, Mr. Harland?

9 A. Not every day, but most days, they did. It was part of a Serb

10 effort to -- to get what they felt would be greater balance in the media.

11 But it was all rather undone by the fact that they would not allow us

12 access to what was actually going on or allow access to the journalists.

13 Their press person who did the briefing was very able, Dr. Zametica, a

14 very clever man, but even he recognised that they were not likely to get

15 more positive coverage until the journalists could go and see for

16 themselves, otherwise, people would tend to discount it, because

17 unfortunately, all three sides were rather given to -- to lying.

18 JUDGE MAY: That's a convenient moment. We will adjourn now.

19 Twenty minutes.

20 --- Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.

21 --- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.

22 JUDGE MAY: You have 40 minutes left, Mr. Milosevic, which will

23 give about ten minutes each to the amicus and the Prosecution should they

24 want it.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'll try and be as short as

Page 28679

1 possible to enable Mr. Tapuskovic to have some time for his questions.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. But I should like to ask you, Mr. Harland, also to be as concise

4 as possible. Your answers tend to be quite lengthy.

5 Is it true that on the 9th of April a meeting was held between

6 General Rose, Andreev, Victor Jakovich, US ambassador to the BH, and

7 American envoy Charles Redman and then Rasim Delic and Vahid Karavelic on

8 behalf of the BH army and Mladic, Gvero, Tolimir on behalf of the army of

9 Republika Srpska? And you refer to that in paragraph 36 of your

10 statement.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Is also true that on the occasion Mladic tabled a draft agreement

13 which was very similar to that tabled by the UN?

14 A. It may well have been, yes.

15 Q. And is it true that Delic agreed to sign just a part of the

16 agreement, whereas Mladic came out in support of a cessation to

17 hostilities, a complete cessation to hostilities on all fronts? And that

18 was the only difference, in fact, between the proposals?

19 A. Yes, I believe that's correct.

20 Q. Is it also true that there was a lull during which Redman, the US

21 envoy, left the meeting, that there was a break for him to consult with

22 Izetbegovic?

23 A. I don't recall.

24 Q. In his book, General Rose says about this that, "Redman went to

25 see Izetbegovic and said Izetbegovic's office, that information trickled

Page 28680

1 that Redman secretly advises Izetbegovic to change his mind because if the

2 war were to be stopped when the Serbs held 70 per cent of the territory,

3 it would be impossible to establish peace." Was that the explanation?

4 A. That was one of the main Muslim objections to the cease-fire, and

5 it was the main motivation, presumably, for violating the cease-fires when

6 they were made, yes.

7 Q. Well, wouldn't a cease-fire enable matters to be resolved without

8 bloodshed, through negotiation, rather than having a loss of lives?

9 A. Yes. That was one view. There was also a view, not just held by

10 the Muslims, that it would be very difficult to secure a Serb withdrawal

11 from large amounts of territory which they held, and that for there to be

12 an agreement, they would have to first be pushed off the land, and that's,

13 of course, what ultimately happened. The Dayton Agreement agreed on a

14 51/49 per cent division of the country, but they didn't begin negotiating

15 until the battlefield had already produced a result that was roughly 51

16 per cent to 49. So there was a view that the cease-fire would not lead to

17 peace if there was a gross imbalance in the territories held by either

18 side.

19 Q. On the contrary. It was part of the peace plans, and many Serbs

20 accepted that, and it could be seen that the territory was far smaller

21 than that 70 per cent in several of the plans, in fact, accepted by the

22 Serbs before the war, up to the European Union plan which spoke about a

23 completely different demarcation, delineation. Do you remember that?

24 A. Yes, I think that's right. Though I think there was a large

25 question in the minds of many as to whether or not those agreements could

Page 28681

1 be implemented if the Serbs were actually sitting on those large

2 territories with their armed forces. And Dr. Karadzic, in fact, did make

3 statements to that effect, that we would have trouble - and Mr. Krajisnik

4 - we would find it impossible to evacuate territories, as they put it,

5 that had to be ceded to the other side in case of these agreements even if

6 we signed them. That's what they told us.

7 Q. Well, they offered having the territories -- territories for

8 peace. It was the subject of all negotiations conducted in Geneva between

9 the three parties led by Karadzic, Boban, and Izetbegovic. I assume you

10 remember that.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. In paragraph 37, you mention your assessment of the 16th of April,

13 weekly political assessment, and you say that, "At about 1500 hours

14 yesterday, Bosnian lines to the north of Gorazde suddenly collapsed." Is

15 that right?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. So Gorazde was not in fact a demilitarised zone and in that sense

18 where armed installations were prohibited within a circumference of three

19 kilometres, radius of three kilometres.

20 A. No.

21 Q. Therefore, they did have the right within that protected area to

22 have all the weapons they wanted to. Isn't that right, Mr. Harland? Is

23 that your explanation of it?

24 A. Under Security Council Resolution 824, I believe that it called

25 upon all parties other than those of the government of the Republic of

Page 28682












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Page 28683

1 Bosnia and Herzegovina to withdraw to a distance from which they ceased to

2 be a threat to the safe areas. So we considered that the forces held by

3 the army of Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Gorazde were there

4 legitimately, though we did try to enter into demilitarisation agreements.

5 Q. So you just attempted an agreement on demilitarisation, but it was

6 never actually reached or drawn up; right?

7 A. For Gorazde, not until after the Serb offensive in the spring of

8 1994; that's correct.

9 Q. And is it contested that the refusal to sign the peace agreement

10 of the 9th of April and the attack of Muslim forces on Gorazde at Serb

11 positions represented a synchronised activity which should set the war

12 machinery into operation.

13 A. That was the Serb position. I'm not sure now whether we were in a

14 position to confirm that.

15 Q. Very well. If you cannot confirm that, let's move on. And tell

16 me this, please: Is it true that on the 14th of August, 1994, at Sarajevo

17 airport an anti-sniper agreement was signed?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And when we're talking about sniping, look at paragraph 105 of

20 your statement and tell me is it true that Muslim snipers targeted

21 civilians more than the Serbs did?

22 A. As I said before, the Serbs did not allow us direct access to

23 their side for most of the conflict, so -- or for much of the conflict, so

24 sometimes we were having to take their word for it. But for the conflict

25 as a whole, over 90 per cent of the sniper casualties were on the Muslim

Page 28684

1 side.

2 If we're talking specifically about this period in the late summer

3 of 1994, sniping was at a low -- generally a low level, and I believe that

4 the agreement here was -- was violated by the Muslim side on a number of

5 occasions.

6 Q. You say in paragraph 105: "Both sides targeted civilians, and

7 when we could monitor sniper activity in Grbavica, it would appear that

8 the Muslims were sniping more civilians than the Serbs." That's what you

9 say in your own statement.

10 A. Yes. I think that is referring to this period in the late summer

11 of 1994. Yes.

12 Q. All right. Now, do you know about, or if not did the investigator

13 Todd Cleaver indicate a document that is in his possession or, rather, Mr.

14 Nice's side, and it is an order to the 3rd Motorised Brigade of the BH

15 army with respect to more effective use of snipers, and it is date the 5th

16 of March, 1993, the number is 23/1-82, signed by Esad Paldum, and it says

17 that "The use of snipers should be planned and organised and under the

18 control and supervision of battalion commanders." And it is attachment 5

19 in 2560308. The document number is 166. Are you familiar with that?

20 A. No.

21 Q. In paragraph 41, you say that the anti-sniper agreement functioned

22 quite well for a time but there was some difficulty with command and

23 control that the warring parties had over their snipers; is that right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Now, this document that I've just quoted to you and which I was

Page 28685

1 disclosed here on -- in CD-ROM form, I assume we can see that from the

2 document of the 3rd Motorised Brigade there was suspicions and doubts as

3 to who was being -- who was in control and there was no control and

4 monitoring over the use of snipers, in fact.

5 A. Yes. That would be consistent with what we knew. In general, we

6 felt that command and control was better on the Serb side than on the

7 Muslim side, in general.

8 Q. Well, I'm indicating quite the opposite document that that other

9 side has over there, which speaks about control on the Muslim side with

10 respect to the Motorised Brigade of BH.

11 A. Yes. I haven't seen that document, but I'm -- it sounds a very

12 plausible document.

13 Q. In paragraph 52, you speak of General Rose's meeting with Karadzic

14 on the 1st of December, 1994, at Pale, and that was linked to the

15 deterioration of relations between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian Serbs with

16 respect to the captivity of UN members; is that right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Well, do you know that it was precisely Serbia and I myself who

19 intervened to effect the urgent freeing of those men and to have them

20 returned? Do you know about that, Mr. Harland?

21 A. I don't recall, but there were several occasions on which the

22 UNPROFOR leadership, particularly Mr. Akashi, would try to use the

23 influence that you exercised over the Bosnian Serb party to bring about a

24 result, and on a number of occasions from Gorazde right through to the

25 fall of Zepa, anyway, and the Dayton Agreement, that was something, it

Page 28686

1 seems, that you were able to do.

2 Q. Well, we're not challenging the fact that I used all my influence

3 to stop the war. I don't think that can be disputed at all. However, let

4 me just find this next portion.

5 General Rose, in his book, writes the following to the Assistant

6 State Secretary Richard Holbrooke on the fourth visit of Bosnia to see the

7 progress that was being made by the United Nations. He said to Andrew

8 Ridgway that he didn't like meetings and that he would raise the question

9 with respect to Central Bosnia and the consequence of the sanctions on

10 importing weapons, et cetera, et cetera. Andrew explained to him --

11 "Andrew explained to him that the Muslim army was responsible for the

12 largest number of violations of the cease-fire in Western Bosnia and that

13 lifting the bans on arms import would fan the flames of war and split the

14 federation once again." Do you know about that?

15 A. Yes. That was a view also strongly held by General Rose.

16 Q. I assume that you don't doubt General Rose's objectivity.

17 A. I believe that he -- he was very honestly committed to a -- to an

18 approach to the war, and he was very frustrated when events conspired to

19 make it difficult for him to pursue that result. I think that in general

20 in pursuit of that strategy, he was very objective and very -- very

21 effective commander, but there were -- there were some points, as I guess

22 there always are, of disagreement between him and those around him.

23 Q. But for the most part, based on the fact that he tried to be -- he

24 tried to be objective and stop the war, would that be your impression, the

25 general impression, because you were one of the people around him?

Page 28687

1 A. Yes, certainly. He was very committed to stabilising the military

2 situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to allow humanitarian aid to flow, and to

3 allow time for peace negotiations to reach an effective conclusion. That

4 was his approach. I believe that it may have been mistaken, but I think

5 that was his objective pursuit.

6 Q. All right. And is it true that the fragile truce in Sarajevo was

7 upset once again by the Muslim side with a mortar attack on the 18th of

8 September, 1994, at -- targeting positions of Bosnian Serbs in Eastern

9 Sarajevo? And General Rose says, "Already on the 18th of September all

10 our efforts to establish trust and confidence to continue the peace

11 process were toppled. Along with support from mortars, the Muslim army

12 moved ahead in a large-scale artillery attack on Serb positions in Eastern

13 Sarajevo. I returned from Brussels two days earlier, and today with

14 Viktor spent the day in Pale."

15 A. Yes. I don't have the book in front of me, but that sounds right.

16 It accords with what I remember.

17 Q. And then he goes on to speak of other things after that, the fact

18 that they opened fire, the Muslims opened fire targeting the Serbs in the

19 hope that the latter would respond with attacks in built-up areas which

20 would be a cause for the international community to condemn and blame the

21 Serbs. I assume you remember that.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Is it true that NATO, on the 30th of August, 1995, once again

24 launched an air attack on the positions of Bosnian Serbs around Sarajevo?

25 A. Yes.

Page 28688

1 Q. I should like now to draw your attention to another document.

2 Mr. Akashi and myself - and I assume you're aware of that - endeavoured to

3 find or arrive at an initiative, rather, to have the conflict stopped, and

4 you say, "Finally Smith showed me a copy of the letter, and he emphasised

5 that this initiative was borne during talks between Akashi and President

6 Milosevic." And that was our joint initiative to do three things; to stop

7 the attack on the Bihac-Gorazde-Sarajevo and Tuzla safe areas, that the

8 Serbs withdraw all heavy weaponry within a radius of 20 kilometres, and

9 that an immediate cessation to hostility be implemented in keeping with

10 the 1994 agreement, September. The ERN number is the one I have received

11 from the opposite side. It's not a clear copy but it says from David

12 Harland, SPAO UNPROFOR, UNPROFOR headquarters Sarajevo, info Asushi

13 Akashi, General Smith, William Eagleton, et cetera. The 30th of August

14 1995 is the date.

15 Is that right, Mr. Harland?

16 A. I don't have it in front of me but it sounds right, yes.

17 Q. So this initiative, then, did it lead to quieting the situation?

18 A. We're now talking about the 30th of August, 1995?

19 Q. Yes.

20 A. I've tried to be brief, so let me now say something a little

21 longer. The approach of General Smith was quite different to that of

22 General Rose. General Smith had great doubts as to whether the UNPROFOR

23 mandate was implementable and as to whether or not it was useful to

24 stabilise the situation. Stabilising the situation would lead the Muslims

25 to try and get more land if the talks were not unsuccessful, and they

Page 28689

1 always were unsuccessful. So he came to the view that the mandate should

2 be much more aggressively implemented on exactly that time.

3 So when the -- after the Markale 2 attack, it was up to him to

4 decide how to -- how to approach the conflict, he changed direction

5 completely from his predecessors.

6 First he made a statement which was very unclear as to who fired

7 the shell. He deliberately wanted to create a degree of confusion so as

8 not to arouse the suspicions of General Mladic. He then used the time

9 following the attack to clear all soldiers, all UNPROFOR soldiers and

10 personnel off Serb territory. He then ordered -- turned the key, as it

11 was called. He ordered the beginning of NATO air attacks and not narrow

12 air attacks but much broader air attacks as part of an effort, he

13 believed, to bring about an end of the war by allowing the Serb positions

14 to be -- to be rolled back to about what they would get in the final peace

15 agreement. And I think the fact that it was then suddenly possible to

16 negotiate a peace agreement to some extent validates his -- his approach

17 to that conflict.

18 Q. On the contrary. It caused unnecessary casualties, and the

19 agreement was in the offing much before that. But I drew your attention

20 to this particular point, that the calming of the situation came at the

21 initiative of Mr. Akashi and myself to stop -- to stop the attacks in

22 these areas. And what it says in your letter, to have all heavy weapons

23 withdrawn to within 20 kilometres and to sign an agreement for a truce

24 straight away. And after that, the situation did calm down. Isn't that

25 right, Mr. Harland?

Page 28690

1 A. I believe that's correct, though we had received the conclusion by

2 that stage that calming the situation did not bring the war closer to a --

3 closer to a conclusion, and that the -- the advances that were made by the

4 Muslims and Croats after the NATO air attacks and after Operation Alulja

5 [phoen] in Croatia by the Croatians actually did create conditions on the

6 ground much more conducive to a final peace agreement than any number of

7 cease-fire, local cease-fires or withdrawal of weapons agreements on the

8 ground.

9 I think that General Rose was the most patient of all generals in

10 giving it a chance, seeing how we could calm the situation and then give

11 room for peace negotiations. But our experience was that those peace

12 negotiations would not be successful until there was a distribution of

13 territory roughly comparable to what each side could expect in the end,

14 and that is, unfortunately, the way in which the war had to -- had to end.

15 And the document that you are quoting from is a part of the

16 build-up of General Smith to his decision to launch major NATO air attacks

17 on Serb positions.

18 Q. Well, don't you think that the explanations you've just given just

19 represent justification for NATO's involvement in the civil war in Bosnia

20 against the Serbs?

21 A. I -- the decision in the end -- NATO had made it clear from an

22 earlier point that they were willing to carry out the air attacks. So the

23 question is not really whether it indicates anything about NATO's

24 position. It didn't change. What did change was the view of the UNPROFOR

25 command, that narrowly pursuing the mandate to monitor the situation, to

Page 28691

1 encourage a calming of the situation and to facilitate humanitarian aid

2 and to give space for negotiations was a project which had been attempted

3 with some success for a couple of years but in fact simply led to a

4 perpetuation of the status quo on the ground, which was very horrible for

5 most people in the country and particularly the people in the besieged

6 Muslim enclaves.

7 So this document you're referring to represents a -- the beginning

8 of a major departure from an earlier approach to the conflict. I wouldn't

9 say it represents a change in NATO position so much as in or the position

10 of the UN or at least of its commander General Smith.

11 Q. But since you are describing that this came about because there

12 was a lack of trust that the agreement would be respected and the

13 proposals which the Serbs were ready to sign regarding the division of

14 territory, wasn't it logical for NATO to use force if the agreement was

15 not complied with rather than using force to force the Serbs to agree to

16 the agreement? They could always have resorted to force if the agreement

17 was not respected, and that agreement was on the horizon. Is that in

18 dispute, Mr. Harland?

19 A. Yes, it's in dispute. Our view was that the most recent peace

20 agreement on the table was the Contact Group plan which had offered the

21 Serbs 49 per cent of Bosnia-Herzegovina and had been -- and it had been

22 rejected by the Serbs in the summer of 1994, and the Serbs had, after

23 that, become much more aggressive in the pursuit of a settlement to the

24 war outside of the context of the peace agreement such as by the attack on

25 Srebrenica and the massacre there. And that all of these peace

Page 28692

1 initiatives that you talked about were really just cover for a much more

2 aggressive policy on the ground that were leading nowhere, and that these

3 events on the ground had to be confronted militarily if the massacres like

4 happened after the fall of Srebrenica were not going to be repeated in

5 other areas. And General Smith came to the firm conclusion that he would

6 use all military force at his disposal after the fall of Srebrenica to

7 avoid any possible repetition and to accelerate the peace process.

8 Q. I hope that this question of Srebrenica will be finally cleared

9 up, because it was the ugliest thing that happened and which affected

10 certainly both sides very badly.

11 But you were saying in your examination-in-chief that Mladic often

12 went to Belgrade; is that right?

13 A. Yes, he said he did.

14 Q. Of course. Do you know that his family was living there?

15 A. Yes. He mentioned a daughter sometimes, and then a son would

16 sometimes appear with him at -- at meetings.

17 Q. But his family was living in Belgrade, so he went to see his

18 family. When you say he kept going to Belgrade, it is placed in a context

19 as if he went there for official reasons, but he went to visit his family.

20 His family was living there. Surely you know that.

21 A. Yes, I did know that. Sometimes he said, though, he went there

22 for official reasons, and sometimes members of the international community

23 such as Mr. Bildt would see him with you, such as during the Serb attack

24 on Srebrenica, just prior to the capture of Srebrenica and the massacres.

25 Mr. Bildt was visiting Belgrade to see you and came across General Mladic

Page 28693












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Page 28694

1 and the same day. On the 7th of July, I believe.

2 Q. The 7th of July is a state holiday in Serbia, so I don't believe

3 it could have been the 7th of July. On the 7th of July, a reception is

4 held if it isn't a weekend. However, I heard about the events in

5 Srebrenica from Mr. Bildt, in fact. And we saw Akashi's telegram here in

6 which he says -- and this was after those events in Srebrenica, and no one

7 knew anything about any massacre. He says that he was with me at a

8 meeting, Mr. Akashi says that, in a telegram that was produced here, and I

9 think he says he went together with Mr. Stoltenberg and Mr. Bildt, and

10 that General Smith was also with him, and that I, at Mr. Bildt's request,

11 allowed General Mladic to attend, who was having separate discussions with

12 Smith in order to smooth relations between General Mladic and General

13 Smith. Surely that is not challenged as this is stated in Mr. Akashi's

14 telegram. Are you aware of that, Mr. Harland?

15 A. I would just challenge one aspect of it, which is that General

16 Mladic certainly must have known that there was a massacre going on at

17 Srebrenica. He's on television in Srebrenica in the hours before the

18 massacre begins, and there are many people who I spoke to, or at least a

19 number of people who I spoke with on the Serb side who confirmed his role

20 in ordering the massacre. And all I point out is that you asked about his

21 visits to Belgrade, and he was in Belgrade during this period, and Mr.

22 Bildt and I believe one other member of the Contact Group did confirm they

23 saw him with you. So he did know about the massacre, and it seems

24 surprising to me that he would fail to mention the deaths of 7.000 people

25 to you, but it's possible. But anyway, I would challenge the fact that

Page 28695

1 nobody there knew about the massacres. It's true Mr. Akashi didn't know

2 but I believe General Mladic did.

3 Q. Everyone learnt about it later.

4 A. No. No.

5 Q. At the time Akashi came to see me with Bildt and Stoltenberg, when

6 they asked that Mladic come too, at the time, no one even mentioned it

7 because no one had any inkling of it, and this was after it had happened.

8 The fact that General Mladic was filmed in Srebrenica, that was during the

9 attack on Srebrenica. Of course, generally speaking, we never agreed with

10 any attack on any safe areas or any such operations, but at that time,

11 such a cardinal matter must have been the subject of discussion if anyone

12 had known anything about it. It was learnt about later, and there is an

13 indisputable fact.

14 JUDGE MAY: You've made this point. The witness has already

15 answered. Now, you've got about five minutes left, Mr. Milosevic.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will cede them to Mr. Tapuskovic,

17 but let me just make one observation.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Do you know, Mr. Harland, the only direct participant in that

20 crime who was put on trial was Erdemovic, who was arrested by the Serb

21 police --

22 JUDGE MAY: I'm going to stop this. This has nothing to do with

23 the witness at all.

24 Yes.

25 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, thank you.

Page 28696

1 Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:

2 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Harland, I would like to ask you only about

3 things that you have already spoken of or are contained in the report to

4 the Secretary-General pursuant to the General Assembly resolution that you

5 drafted. You're familiar with the number. And I wouldn't go back to any

6 of the things that you have already explained, but I would like to ask you

7 first to start with page 24 of the English version of your statement, and

8 the heading of that chapter is "Sniping."

9 I won't comment on the first paragraph. You've already been asked

10 about it by Mr. Milosevic.

11 Look at the third paragraph, which speaks about the strategy

12 linked to sniping. You say: "The Bosnian strategy seemed to be to

13 suppress sniping by the Serbs through anti-sniping teams and then to have

14 their own snipers to wear down the Serbs and make them less eager to

15 continue the fight. Also, for the Bosniaks it was a way for them to

16 strike back, and especially when they couldn't strike back. The Serbs

17 controlled the high ground, most of the heavy weapons, most of the gas,

18 electricity and water, so it was one of the only ways the Bosniaks could

19 strike back."

20 Is that right? Those are your words, your own conclusions

21 regarding the strategy; is that right?

22 A. Yes. Both sides sought to wage the war by terror. Obviously by

23 far the most victims were on the Muslim side because the Serbs had more of

24 the instruments of terror, but it was the tactic of both sides, all three

25 sides, yes.

Page 28697

1 Q. I won't be asking you to repeat anything you said. I heard it,

2 and that is why I'm asking you whether these were your conclusions.

3 The next sentence is that: "In meetings in Grbavica, the Serbs

4 would often complain that they were suffering from sniping from the

5 Serbs," it says in this text, but it is probably an error; it should be

6 "Bosniaks." Is that right?

7 A. That's right.

8 Q. Is the following correct too: You were with Mr. Andreev, as is

9 stated here at paragraph 110, at a meeting with Muratovic, who is a

10 Bosniak; isn't that right?

11 A. Correct. Correct.

12 Q. And then look at what you go on to say: "Muratovic said that

13 sniping was completely organised, that when they kill one we kill one and

14 that a balance is struck in that way. Both Indjic and Muratovic also said

15 that sniping was a science and that numbers were set for every day."

16 Is what is written in your statement here correct?

17 A. Yes, that's what they said.

18 Q. And now look at the last paragraph, please, of that chapter, where

19 you describe something you saw yourself. "I'm also aware of two instances

20 where the Bosniaks were shooting at Bosniaks. One involved an incident

21 near the Residency in late 1993. The other incident was in early 1994

22 when one of General Rose's bodyguards, whose name was Goose, said that he

23 had returned fire on a Bosniak shooting Bosniaks." Is that correct too?

24 A. Yes. In fact, this reference to the first one is the one that

25 Mr. Milosevic also raised in a different context. It's the one which led

Page 28698

1 us to complain to the Bosnian army 1st Corps and for them to claim that

2 they knew this was happening but that it was just the renegade supporters

3 of Caco. So you are correct.

4 Q. Let me go back just to one more point but not to waste any time.

5 There's another question that you addressed to the effect that the French

6 sometimes suspected that it was mostly Bosniaks that were firing at

7 Bosniaks from large distances. You said that also on page 11. Do you

8 remember?

9 A. No. It was not our view that most of the shooting -- in fact, I

10 should be clear about that: That of the shells that landed in Sarajevo in

11 1992 to 1995, about half a million of them, the overwhelming majority,

12 certainly well over 90 per cent and well over 99 per cent came from the

13 Serb side. So the people killed inside the confrontation line, about

14 12.000 or -- sorry.

15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the witness has

16 already explained that. I think he's already said that, and there's no

17 need for him to repeat it. You were already told this, Your Honours.

18 Q. I have to hurry to ask you a few more very important matters that

19 Their Honours need to know about.

20 Look at the next chapter. After Sniping comes Shelling, and this

21 is a chapter beginning on page 26, headed "Shelling." And in the first

22 paragraph you say the following: "Both sides used shelling against the

23 civilian population, each according to their own resources, although it

24 was far greater by the Serbs against the civilians of Sarajevo."

25 That is what you stated. Isn't that right?

Page 28699

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Then two paragraphs lower down, I quote: "The Serb strategy of

3 shelling was often in response. By launching an attack, the Bosniaks

4 precipitated responses that were not necessarily against those fighting

5 but also against the civilian population, in order to send a message."

6 Isn't that what you said?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And you even said, in the last sentence: "This seemed to be a

9 policy that they used around the country." Is that right?

10 A. Yes, but it was particularly common in Sarajevo we felt because

11 they were under media scrutiny, and we felt that they wanted the media to

12 see the Serbs attacking, and so they had to sometimes create the

13 conditions for that. In other parts of the country where the media was

14 not present, they had much less incentive to do that.

15 Q. Very well. Thank you. Then you have the next chapter, Control

16 and Command. Last paragraph, in which you say, and I won't read all of

17 it: "I saw how they were working in a systematically destructive manner

18 -" and you're referring to the Bosniaks - "because virtually every Serb

19 house had been burnt." Is that something you yourself saw?

20 A. Yes. That was ethnic cleansing of Western Bosnia by the Bosnian

21 army 5th Corps. I saw that myself, yes.

22 Q. Thank you. And the last chapter headed "Others." When you said

23 at a certain point in Hadzici 180 Muslims went missing; is that right?

24 A. Yes, at the very beginning of the war before I got there, in fact.

25 Q. And then, "Immediately afterwards the Bosniaks rounded up a

Page 28700

1 similar number of civilians in nearby Tarcin, including women, and placed

2 them in silos." You say that in the next sentence. Is that right?

3 A. Tarcin, yes.

4 Q. And as Karadzic said in an interview that those men were dead, and

5 yet one was found by the ICRC, you say, "... so the Bosniaks never wanted

6 to release those people from the silos because they would lose important

7 leverage. In the course of 1995, I learnt from a local official and from

8 some people in the Bosnian army that some of the people from the silos

9 were being used to clear mines and booby-traps and to dig trenches in the

10 area of Stup and Treskovica and that some had been killed. The Bosnian

11 army personnel who told us this were not happy about the use of people in

12 this way."

13 This is something that you learnt about specifically?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. I don't know how much I will manage to cover in the time available

16 to me, but let us go back to something on page 20, somewhere in the

17 middle. One but last paragraph of the English version, where you talk

18 about your meeting with Silajdzic at the airport, and you say the

19 following: "I was at a meeting at the airport on the day of the Markale

20 massacre and Silajdzic was also present. The interpreter told me when we

21 arrived that Silajdzic had told him, 'Today we're going to surprise them.'

22 I do not think he meant the marketplace bombing, rather, it was a

23 statement pumping himself up for the negotiations. However, that comment

24 has stuck in my mind."

25 Tell me, did Silajdzic do something useful in those negotiations

Page 28701

1 or was this after all perhaps linked to what happened at Markale?

2 A. The meeting was interrupted quite soon after it began because of

3 news that there had been this massacre. So we had not got very far before

4 we were all called away and needed to go and visit the massacre site, and

5 I think General Rose took Mr. Silajdzic there directly, directly from the

6 airport where we were having the negotiations, so I'm not able to give you

7 a clear answer to your question, sorry.

8 Q. Thank you. Could you now look at page 16, please, of the English

9 version, when you talk about a weekly assessment of the 24th of June,

10 1995, and the document number is given, and the Prosecution has it, and

11 you said here that you felt, that you believed that Serbs had about 500

12 heavy weapons within a 20-kilometre range of Sarajevo; is that right?

13 A. Yes. I think later we discovered they had somewhat more than

14 that, but yes, that's what we thought at the time.

15 Q. But you also said, in the next sentence, that, "The Bosnians are

16 believed to have had about 100 to 150 such weapons that could be described

17 as heavy weapons at that time"; is that right?

18 A. Yes. There was a qualitative difference, but yes, that's correct.

19 Q. And when you testified here the last time, you said that the

20 Muslims, in time, acquired sufficient weapons. Is that true, that as the

21 years passed, they acquired more and more weapons, including heavy

22 weapons?

23 A. They always had a problem with heavy weapons, and I think even at

24 the end, I don't know the exact -- the Serbs had somewhere in the region

25 of 400 tanks, and the Muslims had only a few dozen. So they never

Page 28702

1 completely addressed the imbalance of heavy weapons. But they had a

2 numerical advantage, and by the end of the war, they were reasonably well

3 equipped and organised and trained, yes, that is correct.

4 Q. Could you, for a moment, please, look at the report to the

5 Secretary-General that you drafted, page 49 (E), paragraph 210. To save

6 time, I have a copy of it.

7 A. Page 49 -- paragraph 49?

8 Q. Page 49 of your report, under (E), and the paragraph is 210, where

9 you say that, "During the first half of 1995, the army of the Republic of

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina had made significant changes in respect to its

11 structure." And then later on you say, or maybe straight away, that, "The

12 army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with about 200.000 men in uniform, for a

13 long time had an advantage over the Bosnian Serb army, especially in terms

14 of light weapons." Does that mean that the BH army had had about 200.000

15 men armed with light weapons for quite some time already at the time you

16 wrote it?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Is it true that already by the spring that the system of work as

19 stated - this was disclosed under Rule 68 - General Vagram [phoen] said

20 that in 1993, the activities of the Muslim army were concentrated in the

21 spring when Serbs could not operate because of their heavy weapons. Was

22 that true also in the year that you were there?

23 A. Yes, more or less.

24 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tapuskovic, I must ask you to wind up, if you

25 would, please, so the Prosecution can have some time.

Page 28703

1 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I have to wind up, though I have

2 some very important and very useful things to address, but let me try and

3 clear this last topic.

4 Q. On page 44 of that same report, under (A), paragraph 177, you say

5 that despite an improvement on the ground, there were areas in which the

6 situation was still unstable. Croatian forces -- now, please. You say

7 here Croatian forces. Do you mean the HVO or predominantly regular forces

8 of the Croatian army which was advancing through those areas towards

9 Krajina or not? Were they not predominantly Croatian army forces; Livno,

10 Kupres, Glamoc?

11 A. Yes, our military reported to us that there were units of the army

12 of the Republic of Croatia present, yes. And in fact, the Serbs also

13 referred to it, and the Serb leaders regretted that Mr. Milosevic was not

14 as directly willing to provide regular units of the army of Yugoslavia as

15 Dr. Tudjman was willing provide to the Bosnian Croats, yes.

16 JUDGE MAY: Just one more, please.

17 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I'll finish.

18 Q. I'm asking this for the following reason: A moment ago you spoke

19 about the strategy, the difference in strategy between General Rose and

20 General Smith, and in General Smith's testimony, I didn't have time to go

21 into it, at certain meetings he would even say to Mladic that Croatia was

22 entitled to advance through the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina to

23 protect its rights according to the principles enshrined in the UN Charter

24 and its right to self-defence.

25 Are you aware of that position, that Croatia was entitled to use a

Page 28704












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 28705

1 foreign country to protect its -- one of its natural rights? Are you

2 aware of that?

3 A. No, and it was certainly never a position voiced to me by General

4 Smith. On the contrary.

5 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.


7 Re-examined by Mr. Nice:

8 Q. It was made clear to you by, I think, Plavsic and Karadzic that

9 they had a clear objective of ethnic cleansing, a phrase you used on the

10 last occasion. Any suggestion that what was made clear to you was hidden

11 from the accused?

12 A. No. They did indicate that they had differences with

13 Mr. Milosevic. They felt that there should be a greater level of support,

14 and in fact it's when they talked about those differences that we became

15 most aware of the bedrock of regular ongoing support that Serbia provided

16 to -- to Karadzic and Mladic through fuel for tanks and payment to

17 soldiers, and so on.

18 Q. Thank you, yes. But as to whether he was being kept in the dark

19 about their objectives ...

20 A. They didn't indicate that.

21 Q. It's been suggested that there was emphatic opposition from the

22 government of Serbia to shelling Sarajevo. Just yes or no: Did you at

23 the time hear, see, or learn of that, or is that just something you're

24 accepting from the accused saying it today?

25 A. No, certainly no.

Page 28706

1 Q. You weren't aware of it at the time?

2 A. No only unaware of it but aware somewhat to the contrary. What

3 was going on in Sarajevo was rather well-known in Belgrade. We would come

4 across Serbian officers in Lukavica and they never expressed any concern

5 about it at all. On the contrary, they usually wanted to prosecute the

6 war more vigorously.

7 Q. It's suggested on that the last occasion that the accused did

8 everything he could to stop the conflict in Sarajevo. What else could he

9 do, he effectively said. What would happen if they'd withdrawn support

10 from the Bosnian Serb army that was shelling Sarajevo?

11 A. I think that the Serbs would have been in a dire position. They

12 were at a numerical disadvantage, and they relied almost entirely on the

13 support they got from Serbia, from the officer corps, from the

14 intelligence, from the pay, from the heavy weapons, from the anti-aircraft

15 arrangements. Had Belgrade chosen even to significantly limit that

16 support, I think that the siege of Sarajevo probably would have ended and

17 a peace would have been arrived at somewhat earlier rather than having to

18 force them militarily into that weaker position.

19 Q. With the consequent saving of lives of those who died in the

20 interim?

21 A. Almost certainly.

22 Q. You were asked questions about various places this morning;

23 Lukavica, Ilidza, Ilijas, Hadzici, as places from which Bosnian attacks

24 were made, Muslim attacks were made. As a matter of fact, what happened

25 to the ethnic composition of those areas?

Page 28707

1 A. All of those areas, which had been mixed prior to the war, were

2 already essentially 100 per cent Serb by the time I had got there. The

3 Muslims had -- and others had been either killed or expelled or had fled.

4 Q. So these areas referred to by the accused were areas of effective

5 ethnic cleansing by the Serbs?

6 A. Certainly.

7 Q. You were asked about the reasons for Mladic going to Belgrade. At

8 the moment I'm not in a position to put certain documents to you for

9 technical reasons. Were you aware of something called the Supreme Defence

10 Council that met in Belgrade at that time as a superior organ of

11 government?

12 A. Not closely.

13 Q. But you were aware of it?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Do you know one way or another about visits of Mladic and

16 attendance at the SDC in the summer of 1995?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Okay. So we'd have to learn of that from elsewhere.

19 The 7th of July meeting just with Bildt, do you know if that was a

20 long or a short meeting? The accused has suggested it's in error because

21 of its being the date of a holiday, but your efforts are what?

22 A. I don't recall. Mr. Bildt told me that, and I think it may also

23 be in his book.

24 Q. On the topic of what's in a book and just as a matter of flagging

25 up something, you speak about General Rose being at Sarajevo at the time

Page 28708

1 of the Markale massacre. Is that something you've checked against his

2 book recently?

3 A. Yes. Yes, you're right. I was with Silajdzic and Rose was --

4 Rose was absent that day and came back; correct.

5 MR. NICE: Your Honour, give me one minute.

6 [Prosecution counsel confer]

7 MR. NICE: Nothing else, thank you. The only question that may

8 arise is there has been several references to the witness's statement. It

9 wasn't produced and I suspect it may have been available to you as part of

10 a 92 bis package that was not accepted because his evidence was given

11 live. It's entirely a matter for the Court whether the number of

12 references make it appropriate for it to be given an exhibit number.

13 JUDGE MAY: We will consider it.

14 [Trial Chamber confers]

15 JUDGE MAY: Yes, we'll give it the next exhibit number, please.

16 THE REGISTRAR: 582, Your Honour.

17 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

18 MR. NICE: Your Honour, there may be just one question.

19 [Prosecution counsel confer]

20 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, is there anything else?

21 MR. NICE: Your Honour, no. I see the time and I know the Court

22 has to rise.

23 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Harland, that concludes your evidence. Thank you

24 for coming to the Tribunal and indeed thank you for coming back to it to

25 give it. You are now free to go.

Page 28709

1 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

2 [The witness withdrew]

3 JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn until Tuesday morning.

4 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,

5 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 11th day of

6 November, 2003, at 9.00 a.m.