Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 30476

1 Tuesday, 16 December 2003

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

7 MR. NICE: With Your Honours' leave, thirty seconds in private

8 session.

9 [Private session]

10 (Redacted)

11 (Redacted)

12 (Redacted)

13 (Redacted)

14 (Redacted)

15 (Redacted)

16 (Redacted)

17 (Redacted)

18 (Redacted)

19 (Redacted)

20 (Redacted)

21 [Open session]

22 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

23 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm asked to put on the record that so far

24 as yesterday's hearing is concerned, there were no redactions sought or

25 made at the application of any Rule 70 provider. Thank you.

Page 30477

1 JUDGE MAY: We'll just consider the position.

2 [Trial Chamber confers]

3 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I made one important error in the passage

4 in private session, but I don't need to go back into private session.

5 Where there was a reference to examination-in-chief, I should have said

6 the whole day's evidence.

7 JUDGE MAY: As far as the Trial Chamber is concerned, there is no

8 objection to the release of the record.

9 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, how much time do I have?

11 JUDGE MAY: An hour and a half.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not quite sure that that will be

13 enough, Mr. May, but I'll do my best.


15 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

16 Q. [Interpretation] I received the latest statement yesterday, I

17 looked at it, and in relation to the one I had, it is shorter and it has

18 been abbreviated to a total of 45 paragraphs. The previous one had 131

19 paragraphs. So obviously the narrowing down of the scope of the questions

20 has led not only to the exclusion of the war and the book from the

21 testimony of the witness, but you have reduced them to only a few topics.

22 But nevertheless, they merit full attention, so I'll go in order.

23 Paragraph 2. [No interpretation]

24 JUDGE KWON: We don't get any English translation. Could you try

25 again, please.

Page 30478

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. I was saying, General Clark, that in paragraph 2, there is

3 something that I do not understand, and I'd like to ask you to explain it

4 for me. And let me point out, I'm not quite sure that the meeting was on

5 the 17th of August. I think it was on an earlier date. But it is easy to

6 establish that because after that meeting you went to Sarajevo, and it was

7 after that meeting that members of the delegation were killed, but that is

8 a factual matter and it can easily be verified. I cannot assert that it

9 was so, but it seems to me that it was a little earlier.

10 Now, will you please tell me, as I allegedly said "with me," which

11 is not true because I later introduced you with Karadzic and Mladic, you

12 said that he would deliver the Serbs. What kind of delivery are you

13 referring to? What Serbs was I supposed to deliver to you?

14 A. Your Honour, the answer to the accused's question is that this is

15 a form of English language writing which explains that the accused was

16 advocating that we deal with him because he could produce an agreement of

17 the Bosnian Serbs to the terms of the peace that were being negotiated.

18 Q. So my advocacy for peace and my endeavours to achieve that peace -

19 which it was thanks to me, let me add, that bore fruit in Dayton - it is

20 your opinion that this was some sort of a delivery or what?

21 A. Your Honour, it's my opinion that Slobodan -- that the accused was

22 essentially the motivating force and the guiding force in most if not all

23 of the issues and activities in former Yugoslavia during this period, both

24 in war and in peace. And in this particular meeting, he chose to -- to

25 accept or admit his leadership and his power over the Bosnian Serbs, and I

Page 30479

1 simply included this to indicate that he was not the leader of a

2 neighbouring state alone but the leader of a neighbouring state who had

3 influence, power, if not control over the Bosnian Serbs. And that is the

4 -- that's the essence of what I'm stating here.

5 Q. Well, the essence is wrong, General, because what we're talking

6 about here is exclusively my commitment, my persistent insistence on

7 questions of peace and no others. Questions of peace, General. And that

8 was in the interest of the whole people, and I enjoyed the support of the

9 whole people with that respect. And we're talking of questions of peace

10 here and nothing else.

11 And now, tell me, please: "Milosevic told us that it was a key

12 that we give him the peace terms and he would hold an election or

13 referendum."

14 General Clark, then you go on to say that I said that they would

15 not turn a deaf ear to the will of the Serbian people. You know very well

16 that they didn't turn a deaf ear to the will of the people, and they

17 accepted peace. Isn't that so, General?

18 A. Your Honour, I'm -- I am simply recounting my recollection of the

19 conversation on my first meeting with Slobodan Milosevic, and it's simply

20 given to the Court to establish the fact that he put himself in a position

21 of leadership as the man in charge in this endeavour. It was a leadership

22 that wouldn't seem to be normal in view of international law in the sense

23 that these were two separate countries, former Yugoslavia versus

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yet he was claiming leadership if not control over a

25 faction, a war fighting faction inside Bosnia-Herzegovina. That's the way

Page 30480

1 it appeared to us when he said he would take -- he would deliver the

2 Bosnian Serbs, in other words.

3 JUDGE MAY: I say we can clarify it. So the expression "deliver

4 the Bosnian Serbs" to which the accused referred, that expression is your

5 summary, as I understand it, General, of the position, putting -- using an

6 English phrase.

7 THE WITNESS: Correct. I'm not talking about physical delivery,

8 I'm talking the support of the Bosnian Serbs.

9 JUDGE MAY: It's not an expression he used but it was the summary

10 of the position.

11 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. General Clark, my leading role in achieving peace is not in

14 dispute, but now this role and the result achieved is being placed in

15 quite a different context by you. Do you realise that?

16 JUDGE MAY: I don't know what that question means. What the

17 General has been reporting is what you said and reporting your conduct.

18 Now, do you have a concrete question?

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Explain, please, General: You go on to say that one member of the

22 delegation asked Milosevic why elections in Serbia would be binding for

23 people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is a different country. And then

24 I say to that they will not turn a deaf ear to the will of the Serbian

25 people, and they didn't, but that is said in quite a different context.

Page 30481












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Page 30482

1 Look at the previous text I had in paragraph 101 in that version,

2 page 22 of the previous statement. "Milosevic said that he wanted

3 elections to be held in Bosnia, and Holbrooke interpreted this that what

4 Milosevic really wanted was a referendum on the draft peace agreement."

5 That is what you wrote in your previous statement. And in this

6 statement, you say that a member of the delegation asked me how the

7 elections in Serbia would be binding for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

8 So General, isn't it quite clear that you're not telling the

9 truth? Please compare paragraph 101 of your previous statement with what

10 you're saying here. Am I right or not?

11 A. Your Honour, I think what we have here is a problem between

12 languages and translations and intent. The substance of both -- I don't

13 have paragraph 101 in front of me but the substance would seem to be the

14 same as Milosevic let it out, and I recall the conversation being

15 precisely this: This is, again, more than eight years ago, but it's my

16 recollection that President Milosevic said, "Give me your terms and we

17 will hold an election." And in a subsequent explanation of what this

18 meant, it turned out to be that what he meant was the English term a

19 referendum. We weren't to be -- he apparently did not mean to be electing

20 a person but, rather, to approve a position.

21 The reason that this is significant is that his leadership role,

22 I'm asserting, wasn't only about peace, it was leadership, and it was a

23 combination of -- of strategies using force, using intimidation, bullying,

24 and then going to the international community and pursuing peace. It was

25 this combination that marked his conduct during the entire period in

Page 30483

1 question, and it was with knowledge of this combination of his skills and

2 influence that we entered the discussions with the accused. We knew that

3 his influence was not limited to seeking peace but that he had influence,

4 period, over the Bosnian Serbs. No one knew and could say precisely how

5 much influence. We knew that there were discussions. We knew that there

6 were considerations, and we knew that he could see the gains that the

7 Serbs had made being erased by the countervailing military action of the

8 Croats and the Bosnian Muslims and that therefore it was logical that he

9 would attempt to hold on to what he had by trying to follow through on a

10 settlement of fighting that preserved as much of the territory for the

11 Serbs as possible.

12 That's the motivation that we entered assuming him to have, and

13 this discussion simply puts the frame of reference that we went to him and

14 we asked him should we deal with him or should we deal with the Bosnian

15 Serbs directly, and he said with him.

16 MR. NICE: Your Honour, may I make one point before the accused

17 asks further questions. Paragraph 101 of what's ascribed to as the

18 earlier statement is paragraph 101 of the annex to the application which

19 was drawn from notes made with the witness but was not in any way a

20 statement reviewed for him as to its language. And since I refer to that

21 annex, it's perhaps appropriate that I should make clear our position on

22 the scope of cross-examination, because the accused has, I think,

23 misstated it this morning.

24 Your order granting the particular protections of Rule 70 sought

25 for this witness limited cross-examination to that annex and not to the

Page 30484

1 narrower statement that was subsequently produced having been reviewed

2 with the witness and served in two effectively identical forms last week

3 and this week.

4 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Clearly the witness, if it's going to be

5 referred to, should have a copy of this document so that if there are

6 questions about it, he can deal with it.

7 MR. NICE: Certainly.

8 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Very well. General Clark, since I allegedly told you, "Just give

11 me the terms and I will take care that they be accepted," tell me, how

12 long did the negotiations in Dayton go on for? Did they last three weeks?

13 A. The -- I want to clarify the implication of the discussion with

14 the accused on or about the 17th of August, Your Honour.

15 It was never our impression that he could himself deliver an

16 agreement between the conflicting parties on the terms but, rather, that

17 he had accepted for himself or claimed for himself the ability to deliver

18 the agreement of the Bosnian Serb faction.

19 Q. But, General, when there are intensive negotiations in Dayton

20 among three parties and it was only at the end that an agreement was

21 reached which all three sides agreed to. So we negotiated in Dayton.

22 There were three delegations negotiating there. Isn't that right,

23 General?

24 A. Your Honour, this is correct.

25 Q. Do you remember, General, the first meeting of the delegations?

Page 30485

1 This was on the first working day. We all arrived in the evening, and on

2 the first working day we were sitting around a large round table, all the

3 delegations, including you and representatives of the Contact Group, as

4 far as I can remember. Do you remember that first day? That is how the

5 talks started.

6 A. I do remember the opening session around a large table at Dayton.

7 Q. And that first working day, the Muslim delegation proposed that

8 Republika Srpska consist of 30 something per cent, 34, 35 per cent of the

9 territory. Do you recollect that?

10 A. Your Honour, I have no specific recollection of that particular

11 matter. The reason is that I may or may not have been in for the entire

12 duration of the meeting. At the time, I was involved in not only

13 participating in much of what Ambassador Holbrooke was doing but also

14 trying to finish the negotiation of military annex with other NATO member

15 countries who would have to enforce it. So I just don't have any specific

16 recollection of that fact. I would have to consult other sources, but

17 it's not something that I remember. And it's not in my witness statement.

18 I'm not testifying about it or whatever; I just don't remember it.

19 Q. What I am saying is that from this initial position presented by

20 the Muslims at this first opening session, which was in plenary form, all

21 delegations were present, up until what was finally achieved, that is

22 51/49. In the meantime, there was a very strenuous and lengthy debate

23 which went on for three weeks so as to finally establish some sort of a

24 balance which resulted in the Dayton Accords. Isn't that right, General?

25 A. Your Honour, I certainly agree that there was strenuous and

Page 30486

1 lengthy debate at Dayton. I think that's a matter of historical fact. I

2 think it's a matter of fact that the negotiations went on for a certain

3 period of days, approximately three weeks. I think that's all clear, and

4 I think that the eventual territorial division between the Federation and

5 the Republika Srpska was approximately 51/49.

6 Q. Yes. So it wasn't easy to provide agreement to the 51/49 division

7 in relation to the initial position of the Muslim delegation which

8 provided for some 34, 35 per cent for Republika Srpska. So am I right,

9 General?

10 A. Well, I think a number of people worked very hard to bring about

11 an agreement at Dayton.

12 Q. Very well, General. I don't wish to dwell on the matter any

13 further, but in Dayton, in this process from the initial proposition of

14 the Muslims to the final solution of 51/49, endless maps were drawn. I

15 don't know what this map of Sarajevo means to you with a line drawn there.

16 There were any number of maps. You could have brought hundreds of maps

17 and more or less -- with more or less details. What does this particular

18 map mean for you with these two parallel lines on it?

19 A. Your Honour, the significance of this map again goes to the

20 leading role of the accused in matters affecting former Yugoslavia. He

21 was able by himself to come in and complete the negotiations with the

22 Federation party, and he drew the line by himself. He wasn't consulting,

23 he simply had the authority himself to draw these lines. And the reason I

24 submit this map is because it indicates in its own -- this is his own

25 marking in part of that red line on that map, that he knew what he was

Page 30487












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Page 30488

1 doing, he drew the line himself, and it's an indication of his authority.

2 It's that simple.

3 Q. And which of those two lines, General Clark, did I actually draw?

4 Surely I didn't draw both of them. And they are parallel, one to the

5 other.

6 A. I remember your picking up a pen and marking on it. I think you

7 drew this round circle on the side, I can't remember. But I do remember

8 that you did draw on the map. You did complete the negotiation yourself

9 with Prime Minister Silajdzic, and you marked it. You and he stood in

10 front of that map and you marked it.

11 Q. I see, General Clark. And how do you know I did not consult

12 anyone? For instance, I remember well my talks with Krajisnik regarding

13 that corridor around Gorazde, because I am not familiar with the area

14 there. So I did have to have long and lengthy and difficult talks about

15 these things. How can you say that he didn't ask anyone, consult anyone?

16 How do you know that?

17 A. I say in the time in which I witnessed you draw that line, the

18 accused did not consult anyone during the period he was drawing the line

19 and during these negotiations with Silajdzic. I have no idea who he may

20 have talked to previously or what degree of familiarity he had. I'm not

21 capable of knowing those and -- those details. I can only testify to what

22 I saw, which is that he was able to negotiate the lines.

23 Q. In the end, the result was 51/49, which I assume is not in

24 dispute. But let us move on as my time is limited.

25 Let us go on to paragraph 3. You say that several members of the

Page 30489

1 delegation left the room during the break, leaving only Kruzel, Clark, and

2 Milosevic.

3 First of all, that is not true. Your delegation was a large one,

4 and there were several of my associates. You numbered some ten or so

5 members, and with me there were also a couple of men. And if Holbrooke

6 left, that is another matter. He may have gone to the toilet. But never

7 were there just me and Kruzel and you. Why would I stay with you and

8 Kruzel during the break? That is not true simply.

9 JUDGE MAY: Wait. Now, let there be an answer to this allegation.

10 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, there was a break. Ambassador

11 Holbrooke did get up to go to the toilet. I can't account for every

12 single member of the accused's delegation in the room. The accused was

13 seated in a -- in an armchair at the head of the table, and he stayed in

14 the room at least momentarily. And as he got up from the armchair and

15 moved to the side, I went over and approached him. And I was accompanied

16 by Assistant Secretary Joseph Kruzel. And it was a break that was taken

17 right after the period in which he had announced that he could hold a

18 referendum that would ensure that the Pale Serbs agreed with whatever

19 peace terms were being proposed. And I simply continued the discussion

20 with him and asked him, "You say you've had so much influence on these

21 people. If you had so much influence, how did you permit General Mladic

22 to kill all those people at Srebrenica?" He looked at me and said, "Well,

23 General Clark, I told him not to do it, but he didn't listen to me."

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. General Clark, this is a blatant lie. First and foremost because

Page 30490

1 we did not talk about Srebrenica at all, and secondly because I,

2 throughout this time, through all of those years, I never issued a single

3 order to General Mladic or was I in a position to issue him an order.

4 JUDGE MAY: Now, wait a moment. The witness doesn't know what

5 orders you addressed to Mladic, and his evidence is what you said at the

6 meeting. Now, you can ask him about that, of course, but he can't answer

7 questions about what you may or may not have ordered.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] First and foremost, Mr. May, I did

9 not have any kind of position in order to be able to give orders to

10 Mladic.

11 JUDGE MAY: You can give evidence about that in due course, if you

12 wish, but meanwhile just deal with the matters which the witness can

13 actually deal with. He can't deal with your relations with Mladic.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. General Clark, I, for example, believe firmly until the present

16 day that General Mladic did not order any execution of people in

17 Srebrenica. I believe that this was done by a group of mercenaries. Do

18 you have --

19 JUDGE MAY: Look, we're wasting time. You're simply trying to

20 give evidence. It doesn't matter at this stage what you may or may not

21 have believed. There's simply one issue, which was the conversation which

22 the general's given evidence about. Now, just concentrate on that.

23 Now, you've challenged it; it's not true. If you've got something

24 else to say, of course you can, but repeating it is not going to, I

25 suggest, assist us.

Page 30491

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. All right. I'm not going to repeat, but General Clark does

3 remember, at least when we discussed Kosovo, that I said to him and to

4 others who were coming a particular truth, that it is in the military

5 tradition of the Serb people -- that the greatest shame in the military

6 tradition of the Serb people is to kill a prisoner of war or an unarmed

7 man and that no honourable member of the Serb army would ever do any such

8 thing. I assume that you remember that much at least, General.

9 A. Your Honour, I recall the discussions about Kosovo on or about the

10 -- I think it was the 20th of January, 19th of January of 1999. I've got

11 to consult a record to find out the exact date, and we can do that now or

12 I can continue the testimony. It's the one meeting that I had in 1999

13 with the accused.

14 I don't recall any discussion like this specifically. I do recall

15 the accused saying that the special police at Racak could not have

16 massacred the Albanians because they would not do such a thing. He also

17 told me that he was having an investigation done but that he already knew

18 the results of the investigation because he knew that they would not do

19 such a thing. And it may be this incident or this conversation that the

20 accused is referring to. This is the only recollection I have of such --

21 of anything related to such a conversation.

22 Q. All right. All right, General. Since you do not remember, never

23 mind. But let's go back to Srebrenica now.

24 Paragraph 97 of the previous statement that I quoted, and I'm

25 going to read it out in its entirety: "Clark, however, could not indicate

Page 30492

1 any specific grounds --" "Clark, however, could not indicate any specific

2 grounds for believing that Milosevic knew that this was a massacre, not a

3 military operation."

4 Well, no one was talking about any kind of massacre then, General.

5 Don't you know that much?

6 Secondly --

7 JUDGE MAY: No. Let's deal with one thing at a time.

8 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I did not use the word "massacre" to

9 Milosevic, but I do recall saying or asking him in this sideline

10 conversation, "How did you allow General Mladic to kill all those people?"

11 At the time in the media, the accusation of a massacre was well known. It

12 was public discussion all around the world and at the United Nations and

13 certainly in Europe. And when I looked at the accused's face, and the

14 accused speaks very effective English, he knew precisely what I was

15 asking, his answer indicated to me that he knew it was about innocent

16 people, because, as he said, General Mladic -- "I warned General Mladic

17 not to do this, but he didn't listen to me." He would not have warned him

18 not to engage in a military operation necessarily. And then when he said,

19 "He didn't listen to me," and I watched his face, and it was clear to me

20 that he understood exactly the context in which I was asking this. This

21 was not about a warning not to conduct a military operation, it was about

22 a warning not to dispose of civilians in the course of such actions. That

23 was the strong impression I took from that conversation.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. General Clark, it's exactly the other way around. The position of

Page 30493












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Page 30494

1 Serbia and my own position all this time was the following: I mean, we

2 supported the Contact Group plan from 1994, and we insisted that it be

3 accepted, so our position was that no military operations should be taken

4 because that would aggravate the peace process. So our position was

5 generally a negative one vis-a-vis any kind of military operation.

6 JUDGE MAY: I'm not going to allow you to go on. You're simply

7 putting generalities. It may or may not have been your position, but here

8 we have a conversation at a meeting in terms. Assist us with this,

9 Mr. Milosevic: Did you speak to the general at all about Srebrenica? Is

10 it your case that you spoke to him at all about it?

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Not at all. There was no mention

12 whatsoever of Srebrenica. And I'm talking about our general position that

13 there should not be any military operations whatsoever. Heaven forbid

14 discussing any kind of killing of civilians or something like that. Our

15 categorical position was that there should be no military operations

16 whatsoever because in that case, there could be no peace process going on.

17 JUDGE KWON: General Clark, were you able to locate the paragraph

18 97 that the accused referred to just now? According to it that you could

19 not indicate any specific grounds for believing that Milosevic knew that

20 this was a massacre, not a military operation. This passage is drafted by

21 the Prosecution in preparation of -- for your evidence, but could you

22 confirm this?

23 THE WITNESS: Well, all I can confirm, Your Honour, is the

24 discussion that I had. I went to Milosevic and I asked him. I said, "If

25 you have so much influence over these Serbs, how could you have allowed

Page 30495

1 General Mladic to have killed all those people at Srebrenica?" And he

2 looked to me -- at me. His expression was very grave. He paused before

3 he answered, and he said, "Well, General Clark, I warned him not to do

4 this, but he didn't listen to me." And it was in the context of all of

5 the publicity at the time about the Srebrenica massacre.

6 Now, I did not use the word "massacre," and I did not specifically

7 use the word "civilian," but the context of the conversation was extremely

8 clear and timely at that point.

9 JUDGE KWON: So that passage is not done by you. It's not yours.

10 THE WITNESS: On 97?


12 THE WITNESS: I think that in that conversation maybe the

13 Prosecutor asked me to further elaborate on it. I made my point with

14 President Milosevic, and his admission to me was so stunning at that point

15 that I then recall telling the delegation later about this, because I

16 viewed that as an admission that he had foreknowledge of Srebrenica. And

17 what I could not tell was whether or not he was telling the truth when he

18 said he told him not to do it and he didn't listen. But I did take it as

19 an acknowledgement of foreknowledge of what was going to happen at

20 Srebrenica.

21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please go on, Mr. Milosevic.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. General Clark, at the time when this conversation was allegedly

24 taking place, everybody knew, and it was written all over the papers that

25 the army of Republika Srpska had taken Srebrenica. So it was no secret.

Page 30496

1 Everybody knew that they had taken Srebrenica.

2 My answer in response to any question that had to do with that -

3 and you did not put any such question to me - did not pertain to any

4 military operations. No military operations whatsoever, because we were

5 categorically opposed to any kind of military operations precisely because

6 military operations prevent the peace process from evolving, and that is

7 what we had advocated, the peace process. So the context is completely

8 different, and that is why I was saying that you were twisting the truth.

9 And you're doing it on purpose, that is quite obvious.

10 JUDGE MAY: Well, have you any reason, General, not to recollect

11 that conversation?

12 THE WITNESS: I remember the conversation very clearly because it

13 was the first time that I had ever spoken one-on-one to Milosevic. This

14 was our first meeting. The initial portion of the meeting may have gone

15 on for 30 minutes or an hour, it was a get-acquainted session. And then

16 Ambassador Holbrooke took a break. It was my first time to see the

17 accused, and I did take advantage of the break of the formal session to

18 have this conversation with him. Because the massacre at Srebrenica was

19 fresh on my mind, I was trying to form an impression of the character of

20 the accused, of his degree of influence and control, and that's why I

21 asked that question of him.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: General, the reply from Mr. Milosevic as given by

23 you, "Well, General Clark, I warned him not to do it but he did not listen

24 to me," you say that it shows foreknowledge, but wouldn't it also show

25 that Mr. Milosevic was dissociating himself from action of that kind?

Page 30497

1 THE WITNESS: Yes. It was the kind of reply that I came to expect

2 from the accused. He indicated foreknowledge and then he attempted to

3 dissociate himself from the responsibility for it.

4 But what lies behind my recollection is simply this: The

5 Republika Srpska military was formed from the Yugoslav military, it was

6 resourced from the Yugoslav military, its officers were, to the best of my

7 knowledge, paid by the Yugoslav military. General Mladic --


9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There is testimony about that.

10 Well, look, we haven't got time for this.

11 JUDGE MAY: Don't interrupt. You'll get a little more time if you

12 want it. Yes.

13 THE WITNESS: General Mladic had been an officer in the Yugoslav

14 military. So the fact was that in this case, the accused was

15 acknowledging his foreknowledge of the operation. He wasn't -- I couldn't

16 tell if he was telling the truth that he warned him not to do it or not.

17 I wasn't in a position to know that. But the -- all of the circumstances

18 around it indicated that he was aware that this was a military operation

19 combined with a massacre, and what he admitted to me was foreknowledge of

20 it. I didn't know whether he was telling the truth that he told him not

21 to do it or not, but he did admit the foreknowledge. And that's the

22 reason I wrote it in the book -- excuse me. That's the reason it's

23 relevant today. It's the clear piece of conversation that made the

24 greatest impression on me at the time. That's its importance. It was a

25 signal piece of evidence to me as I tried to understand the situation in

Page 30498

1 the Balkans and the accused's role in it.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Continue, Mr. Milosevic.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

5 General Clark, do you know that no one in Serbia, at least no one

6 I know, knew before the Srebrenica operation of the possibility of that

7 operation, particularly because this was a UN safe area?

8 JUDGE MAY: What the people in Serbia knew is irrelevant. All

9 we're dealing with is the conversation, what you said to him. That's all.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am saying, Mr. May, not only I but

11 no one else from the leadership, for example, could not have assumed that

12 there could be an operation launched against the UN safe area.

13 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Our position --

15 JUDGE MAY: You can give your in evidence due course. You can

16 call your evidence, and you can tell us what your case about it is, but

17 all we're dealing with is this conversation and what it is that you said.

18 Now, unless you have any fresh questions about that, you're to

19 move on to something else, because as you rightly point out, your time is

20 limited and there are very important matters.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think there are some very

22 important matters, although all of you have excluded the most important

23 questions, Mr. May, from the scope of this examination.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. You mentioned, General Clark, the KLA in several sections, in

Page 30499












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Page 30500

1 several paragraphs, even in this latest statement of yours. You talk

2 about their regrouping, you talk about operations against the KLA, you

3 talk about the existence of the KLA, and so on.

4 You mentioned in your statement that I had said to you that these

5 were murderers, rapists, plunderers, arsonists, that these people were

6 terrorists. Do you remember that?

7 JUDGE MAY: Is this the reference now - let's make sure we have

8 the reference right - to the conversation in October 1998? It's

9 paragraphs --

10 JUDGE KWON: 28.

11 JUDGE MAY: 28. That's the conversation, is it?

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That paragraph and other paragraphs.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. So I believe it is not in dispute that I said to you, General

15 Clark, that these were terrorists, murderers, rapists, killers of their

16 own kind. Is that right or is that not right? Was that clear or was that

17 not clear?

18 A. You did say that to me in October of 1998, and that is the phrase

19 you used. I remember you using it in English, "murderers, rapists, and

20 killers of their own kind."

21 Q. And terrorists; right? Terrorists first and foremost.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, please put this picture on the

23 ELMO. These are men in KLA uniforms, and I hope that you will recognise

24 the patch on the sleeve, the KLA patch. It can be seen on the left arm.

25 So there is no doubt that this is the KLA. We see this too.

Page 30501

1 JUDGE MAY: That is unnecessary. Remove that picture, please.

2 This is nothing to do with the evidence. Return the picture, please, to

3 the accused.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, these men in KLA uniforms,

5 I mean, this man is holding two Serb heads that had been cut off. Is that

6 confirmation? I mean, are these allies of General Clark's infantry in

7 Kosovo?

8 JUDGE MAY: Now, let us deal with this in a way which is relevant.

9 The picture is not relevant. You can give evidence in due course about

10 it. You can call the witness, and you can produce these photographs if

11 there is relevance of them, providing you establish that, but we have to

12 deal with the general's evidence.

13 Now, there hasn't been any dispute that you made these comments to

14 him.

15 MR. NICE: Your Honour, if the Chamber's concerned about the

16 production of that photograph and the effect it may have unsupported by

17 any relevance, it could give consideration to redacting that part of the

18 transcript. It's a matter entirely for the Chamber. We don't press you

19 one way or the other.

20 [Trial Chamber confers]

21 JUDGE MAY: We'll consider that.

22 Yes, Mr. Milosevic. What is the point that you're trying to

23 establish as far as the witness's evidence is concerned? You can ask

24 other witnesses, you can call other evidence about the behaviour of the

25 KLA, and indeed you've done so. I seem to remember a very great deal of

Page 30502

1 cross-examination about it already. If you wish, you can call some

2 evidence, relevant evidence during the case, but I don't think we're going

3 to take it any further with this witness.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the KLA was a terrorist group.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Isn't that right, General Clark? Is that in dispute or is that

7 not in dispute?

8 JUDGE MAY: It may be a matter for us, but it's not a matter that

9 arises from the witness's evidence.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness is talking about

11 measures of repression against the KLA, and you see what kind of killers

12 they are. I have yet another photograph here, a group of 15 of them, with

13 severed heads. This is also not relevant for you; is that right, Mr. May?

14 JUDGE MAY: That is quite right. Quite right. You can call all

15 this evidence in due course. We are just dealing with a part of the

16 evidence which is given by the general. The generalised evidence about

17 the behaviour of the KLA, if it's relevant, you can give it in due course.

18 Now, time is limited. If you want to ask him about the

19 conversations, of course you can.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The general -- well, I mean the

21 general is speaking in general terms about the KLA, and you did not allow

22 me to show a picture yesterday of the three Musketeers where he is like

23 D'Artagnan with the leaders of these terrorists.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. General, you actually commanded these formations, these units that

Page 30503

1 cut off Serb heads.

2 JUDGE MAY: Now, time is very limited. You're plainly not

3 following instructions you've been given. Your cross-examination is

4 limited to what the witness has given in evidence. The behaviour of the

5 KLA is not relevant to that. What you said about the KLA most certainly

6 is relevant. You've asked questions about it and what other things you've

7 said about it, you've said to the general, that is relevant, and you can

8 ask and indeed you should. If you challenge it, you should deal with it,

9 as you did with the general, General Naumann.

10 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, may I just have -- ask the permission

11 of the Court to clarify that I did not command the KLA. We never gave

12 assistance to the KLA. We did not direct the KLA. We did not assist its

13 formation. And I met with the leaders of the Kosovar Albanians at

14 Rambouillet as part of a normal diplomatic effort in the same way in which

15 I met with Serbs at the discussions at Dayton, that's all.

16 Thank you for allowing me to insert that for the record.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. All right, General. Since this has to do with your statement,

19 among other things -- I mean, you are really mocking the truth and logic

20 here. You say in paragraph 28: "We know how to handle these Albanians,

21 these murderers, these rapists, these killers of their own kind. We have

22 taken care of them before." And you talk about 1946.

23 General, obviously you do not know history, the history of the

24 Second World War. Do you know that in this context I did not speak to you

25 about this at all? I'm going to remind you. I was saying that many

Page 30504

1 members of Hitler's army who were Albanians and who had been crushed spent

2 all of two years after the war in the mountains of Kosovo, notably in

3 Drenica, and they were killing people, and that the Yugoslav army spent

4 all of two years with them in Kosovo finishing off the Second World War.

5 They were members of Hitler's units that remained in the hills up there,

6 and the war went on for two more years over there in Kosovo. Truth to

7 tell, it was a low-intensity conflict.

8 So it is completely false that we surrounded them in 1946 and

9 killed all of them. This went on for two years.

10 JUDGE MAY: One thing at a time. What is it you're suggesting you

11 said to the general, so that we can understand it?

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I said to the general that

13 particularly in Drenica, the former members of Hitler's units were focused

14 there and that the war went on for another two years with these ballists.

15 They were even part of the SS units, Hitler's SS units. And these

16 bandits --

17 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Let's deal with this. General,

18 perhaps you could deal with that, if you would. The accused is suggesting

19 that what he said was that the war went on for another two years

20 apparently with these units, members of Hitler's units, part of the SS, in

21 Drenica, I understand. Perhaps you could help us. Did he say anything

22 like that?

23 THE WITNESS: Well, let me put this in context and then go to the

24 specifics, if I might, Your Honour.

25 What he said was -- this was in the moments after the agreement on

Page 30505












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Page 30506

1 the 25th of October had been completed but it had not been signed. It was

2 a moment of relaxation of tension in the agreement. And he turned to me

3 and he explained to me. He said, in essence, that -- he said, "The Serbs

4 know how to handle people like this," equating the Kosovar Albanians with

5 this problem after World War II. And he said, as I remember his words,

6 "We have done it before." And I said, "When?" And he said, "In 1946 in

7 Drenica." And I said, "What did you do?" He said, "We killed them. We

8 killed them all." And General Naumann and I looked at him because it was

9 -- there was such a striking display of emotion on his face. It was a

10 fierce emotional outburst. And we simply continued to look at him, and

11 then he qualified it and said, "Of course, we did not do this all at once,

12 it took several years." But the message that I took from it was that he

13 was equating the resistance inside Kosovo in 1998 to the situation after

14 World War II and that he intended to finish the problem the same way it

15 was done before, despite the statement that he had just prepared that I

16 was going to carry back to NATO.

17 I took it as a real indicator, a warning of his state of mind.

18 And I looked at the body language of the other officials who saw the

19 outburst, and what they saw was a kind of fierce irrationality on the part

20 of the accused which would brook no discussion and no argumentation. They

21 sort of jumped back as he spoke this way, toward General Naumann and me,

22 as though they had seen it before and that this was what they were dealing

23 with in the person of their leader at the time.

24 That's why I've offered this in testimony, because I think it's a

25 significant indication of the mind-set that was animating actions in

Page 30507

1 Yugoslavia toward the Kosovars in the fall of 1998. This was the period

2 when between 300 and 400.000 had already been driven from their homes.

3 It's the period when General Djordjevic had explained to me that they only

4 had two more weeks to go to kill them all. And then after I heard

5 Milosevic say this, then I felt like I had insight as to the motivating

6 force behind Serb actions.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. General Clark, isn't it clear that the reference here is not to

9 Albanians but to terrorists who that year had killed more Albanians than

10 Serbs, as a matter of fact? These were terrorists and killers towards

11 which every country, every nation is entitled to take measures when

12 dealing with terrorists, killers, rapists, torturists, slaughterers. That

13 was the reference, and not to Albanians. I never used the name of a

14 people to link it to killers. Killers are killers. Terrorists are

15 terrorists, regardless of what nation they may belong to.

16 In this case, we were talking about terrorists and killers, and in

17 1946 --

18 JUDGE MAY: We must stop there and let the witness answer.

19 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, if I may. It was very clear to me in

20 the context of the discussions -- and these were discussions all held in

21 English with the accused, who is fluent in English and understands exactly

22 what he is saying -- that after we had completed the statement, he, by

23 implication, didn't put much weight in the promises he was about to send

24 to NATO because, as he indicated to me, he said, "We have handled these

25 problems before. We know how to do it." So there was equating the

Page 30508

1 problems in 1998 with the problems in 1946, and there was a strong

2 suggestion that they would be dealt with the same way, by attempting to

3 kill them all over a period of years, and that was in fact what was

4 already going on and that's what NATO was attempting to have handled

5 through diplomatic means to resolve this issue.

6 And I might say that it was clear that the context of this

7 fighting had emerged not as in 1998, the context of the fighting had

8 emerged not in the aftermath of a war but in the aftermath of a decade of

9 significant repression of a culture and that this was a desperate means of

10 resistance.

11 So the motives, the nature of the problem in 1998 was, to my view,

12 entirely different than the problem in 1946, and what was striking to me

13 was the suggestion on the part of the accused that he would handle the

14 problem in exactly the same way, that he knew how to deal with it.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. That, General, is simply not true. And secondly, when you made

17 that comparison with reference to what was done before, in 1946 I was five

18 years old. I couldn't have spoken in the first person plural.

19 And secondly, General, you certainly must know that it was the

20 German intelligence service, in fact, that worked on the formation of

21 terrorist groups and the equipping of the KLA. As NATO commander, you

22 must have had such intelligence information.

23 JUDGE MAY: This is totally irrelevant. Whether you were five

24 years old or not is not the point. The point is that this is exactly what

25 is alleged that you said. Now, what we make of it will be a matter for

Page 30509

1 the Trial Chamber, and whether we accept the evidence is a matter for the

2 Trial Chamber, but you must confine your examination to that conversation.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I was talking about the traditional

4 commitment of certain groups over there in that area in favour of

5 terrorism, looting --

6 JUDGE MAY: No, we're not going to go into this. You know that

7 your examination is limited. Now, have you any other questions? You've

8 got 20 minutes on the current count, or less. Have you got any more,

9 anything else you want to ask the general about?

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You told me you would give me some

11 extra time, Mr. May. You said you would give me some additional time so

12 please don't say I've only got another 20 minutes.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. General, as you referred to this October agreement which we, as I

15 claim, did comply with because what you're saying about that conversation

16 is distorting logic. We made an agreement and then I say to you we're not

17 going to comply with that agreement. That is ridiculing elementary

18 logic. That is a pure fabrication on your part. You just put into a

19 context my explanation about the history of events in Kosovo and Metohija,

20 especially in Drenica, within a completely different context. And you're

21 saying that it is a different situation. Of course it is. You put it

22 within the context of a completely different situation. Isn't that clear

23 to you, General?

24 JUDGE MAY: If you follow the question, General, by all means

25 respond.

Page 30510

1 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, if I might first say that I do not

2 believe that the German intelligence service worked on the formation of

3 the KLA. I certainly had no knowledge of it, and I doubt deeply that that

4 is possible in any way. And I want to make that very clear for the

5 record. NATO had no relationship with the KLA, period.

6 But I do want to answer this question again and try to clarify

7 exactly this context. It was in the period after the tension of the

8 negotiation, while the typing was going on, while the pear brandy was

9 being served, on a Sunday midday as the accused was relaxing and having

10 idle chatter. And suddenly he came forward with this statement, and what

11 I found so striking about it was the fierce emotion that animated him.

12 This was a passion. And as I hear his voice today, I remember how

13 chilling it was to recognise that what lay underneath the signature of the

14 agreement seemed to be a clear determination to eliminate the problem of

15 the resistance by killing them all, regardless of what the statement said.

16 He said, "We know how to handle these people. We've done it before." And

17 that's the message I took, and I watched and worried greatly about the

18 future course of events in Kosovo because of the attitude that I saw in

19 the accused.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Did you say anything to him, General, in response

21 to that?

22 THE WITNESS: I don't recall what I said, whether I said something

23 or not at that point. I just don't remember. All I remember is being

24 stunned by the outburst.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 30511












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Page 30512

1 Q. Very well, General. We knew each other for some time by then.

2 You say you were stunned by my outburst, and I am prone to outbursts

3 anyway, apparently. I don't remember that I ever had an outburst. At

4 least you cannot refer to it. And you had no response to that. And we

5 had just drawn up this agreement.

6 General, are you making fun of logic or what? You're taking part

7 in this Tribunal which is being used as an instrument of war.

8 JUDGE MAY: No. We'll stop this. This is all totally irrelevant,

9 totally your comment, and it's likely to be taken off your time if you're

10 going for comments of that sort.

11 JUDGE KWON: Let me clarify this matter once again. You said this

12 earlier: The entire conversation was done in English.

13 THE WITNESS: It was.

14 JUDGE KWON: Yes. And given that the accused is not a native

15 speaker of English, could you allow the possibility that he could -- might

16 have spoken -- misspoken something, omitted something, or you

17 misunderstood his words?

18 THE WITNESS: No, I can't, because his English is, or at least it

19 was then, and I don't know how much he is speaking now, but it was so

20 fluent. He was so artful in the use of English. Though he has an accent,

21 his command of the grammar, the vocabulary was excellent in formal

22 English, and it was conversational and it was clear exactly what he meant.

23 And as best I recall this period, at about the time that he made these

24 comments, they brought back in the sheet of paper for us to sign, and so

25 the discussion stopped, the sheet of paper being this exhibit that was

Page 30513

1 shown yesterday with his signature on it despite the fact his name block

2 wasn't put in. And that was pretty much the day, and we left. But I was

3 left with a chilling insight into his temperament and his intent inside

4 Kosovo.

5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. General Clark, a moment ago you said that the others present - and

8 these were actually generals from the police and the army - sort of stood

9 back when I said this, and now you're saying that I was speaking in

10 English, and none of them speak English. How could they have been shocked

11 if they hadn't understood a word of what I had said? And there was no

12 interpreter around to interpret for them what I was saying to you. Why,

13 General, are you making this whole story up when it's rather kitsch, I

14 must tell you?

15 A. I remember Milutinovic being there, Your Honour, and he did speak

16 English --

17 Q. Yes. Milutinovic does speak English. That is true.

18 A. And I think that the emotion in his voice must have startled

19 people even if they didn't speak English. I can't remember who exactly

20 was there. There were three or four of us standing together when he

21 recounted this.

22 Q. Very well, General. Are you aware of the fact that after that,

23 after that October agreement, there were 470 terrorist attacks and 22

24 violations of the border between October and December? This is contained

25 in a letter addressed by our Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic to Kofi

Page 30514

1 Annan in December 1998, in which he says that 1.854 terrorist attacks took

2 place, that 244 persons were killed, 566 wounded, and after the signing of

3 the agreement, 470 terrorist attacks from the end of October up until

4 December. Are you aware of that?

5 A. I don't have any specific knowledge of that. I can't confirm it

6 or deny it. Whether in fact there was such a letter and/or whether in

7 fact there were that many attacks and incidents in Kosovo. Certainly the

8 information that I'd received from reliable sources did not indicate that.

9 What my information indicated was that there was continuing action between

10 Serb military and police and some members of the Kosovar Albanian

11 community and that these Serb military and police units were still

12 engaged, even in areas in which they had previously indicated they would

13 pull back.

14 Q. General Clark, what you're referring to as certain members of the

15 Kosovo Albanian community, these are the men who did this beheading. Are

16 they members of the Albanian Kosovar community or are they terrorists?

17 JUDGE MAY: This is not going to assist. The witness is not

18 dealing with these matters. I allowed the last question because it may

19 have had some relevance in your -- whether you complied or not. There

20 seems to be no relevance in that question.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Very well. Now, tell me, please, General, in your opinion, these

23 KLA members from the photographs and others, how many civilians did they

24 need to kill and soldiers and policemen for the state to be legitimately

25 struggling against it, to take measures against it?

Page 30515

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: General, let us go back to that conversation.

2 You testified that Mr. Milosevic said, "You know, General Clark, that we

3 know how to handle these Albanians, these murderers, these rapists."

4 Mr. Milosevic is saying that he's referring to a situation in the Second

5 World War, and he was speaking about people who were clearly committing

6 illegal acts.

7 Is it possible that in the conversation you might not have heard a

8 reference to "these Albanians," which to my mind would mean civilians, but

9 that the reference was solely confined to "murderers, rapists, and killers

10 of their own kind"? So what I'm asking is whether it is possible that you

11 might have heard a statement minus the reference to "these Albanians."

12 THE WITNESS: No. I think that the intent of the statement was

13 very clear. It was that Milosevic was equating the resistance in 1998 to

14 Serb repression to the activities in 1946, and the implication was that he

15 would handle them the same way, at least that that was what was in his

16 mind to handle them. That's why he was saying, "We know how to handle

17 these people." And that's the clear message I took from it.

18 I didn't have a tape recorder. I remember the phrase "murderers,

19 rapists, and killers of their own kind." That's exactly what he said to

20 General Naumann and me in English at that point. And it was clear to me

21 that he wasn't just giving us an historical fact but that he was saying

22 that that historical fact related to the current situation, and that's the

23 message I took from it. That's why I had such a foreboding that the

24 agreement, when I took it back to NATO, might not mean much.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: So in your view it would not have made a

Page 30516

1 significance difference --


3 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- whether he referred to Albanians.

4 THE WITNESS: That's correct, Your Honour. That's exactly right.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. You didn't answer my question. How many civilians, soldiers and

9 policemen did the KLA have to kill for the state to be allowed to respond

10 to such terrorism? Because obviously that was what was happening.

11 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, if I -- when I answer this question,

12 I'm going to be going into some very high-level matters here, so I want to

13 put the whole situation in context in an effort to answer this question.

14 JUDGE MAY: Before you do, General, perhaps you might like to

15 think of the various parameters which we have set in relation to it. I've

16 only allowed that question on the basis of the suggestion that these

17 agreements were not being kept, and the response, as I understand it, that

18 they were involved in terrorist fighting.

19 If you could deal with it within those parameters, perhaps you

20 can.

21 THE WITNESS: We had -- we had observers, and we were receiving

22 information from observers, men like Shaun Byrnes, that indicated that

23 there had only been partial compliance by the Serb side with the agreement

24 and that there was some scattered exchange of gunfire and other matters

25 still going on in the areas, including areas around Malisevo and others

Page 30517












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Page 30518

1 that were specifically discussed between me and the Serb generals and were

2 part of a phased pull-back plan.

3 There was nothing from the information I received to indicate that

4 there was any fighting of the intensity that the statistics that the

5 accused has presented did in fact take place. We had no verification of

6 that kind of intensity in the fighting. What we did have indication of

7 was that the Serb side had not fully complied and that there was still an

8 exchange of fighting.

9 Now, in that agreement which was an annex to the agreement given

10 at another point, there was also to be a cessation of fighting by the

11 Kosovar Albanian side, and it was, as I recall, the judgement of the

12 observers that both sides had incompletely complied. Nevertheless, there

13 was -- the intensity that the accused is describing wasn't there in any of

14 the reports that I received.

15 Instead, what was happening at the time was an effort to resume

16 some diplomatic settlements, and US ambassador to Macedonia, Chris Hill,

17 had been empowered to meet with the respective parties and try to broker

18 some kind of a solution that would see a division of territorial

19 responsibilities or division of power or some other means that would stop

20 the conflict, and that was what was happening there in the November

21 period. I don't recall the details of those negotiations right now, and I

22 don't have access to the facts, but it was a period in which the violence

23 had diminished and there was a window of opportunity for diplomacy to

24 enter and solve the problem if in fact it was the intent of the Serb side

25 to use diplomacy to solve the problem.

Page 30519

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. By "diplomacy," General, you are implying Rambouillet, aren't you

3 General? That's what you're implying by "diplomacy"?

4 A. Your Honour, by "diplomacy" I'm implying right here is the

5 meetings that US Ambassador Chris Hill had. And I can't recall exactly,

6 there were some other meetings during that period October, November,

7 December of 1998. This was pre-Rambouillet.

8 Q. Well, that's the point, General, that in that period of time,

9 apart from the terrorist attacks, there was absolutely no repression

10 except against the terrorists. Surely you have information about that.

11 Isn't that right, General, or not?

12 A. Your Honour, the information that I have indicates that the Serb

13 military and police did not fully comply with the agreement, that the

14 Albanian resistance, therefore, continued and that the diplomacy was

15 ineffective and that plans were being made to resolve the problem not

16 through diplomacy -- plans by the Serbs to resolve the matter not through

17 diplomacy but through the use of force. And this was the period in which

18 the diplomacy failed, it led to the massacre at Racak, and subsequently to

19 Rambouillet.

20 Q. General, the activities of the police were exclusively limited to

21 the fight against terrorism. You mentioned General Djordjevic, and you

22 have in paragraph 21 that, according to Djordjevic's information, they had

23 intended to destroy the whole province, and you were trying to capture 410

24 people. And Djordjevic responded, "We needed only another two weeks to

25 kill them all, and you prevented us. Why did you stop us?" Djordjevic

Page 30520

1 could never have said any such thing to you, General. You say, "Don't you

2 understand that you can't stop anything such thing by using force,

3 especially against civilians?" And Djordjevic did not respond.

4 But Djordjevic, who is an honourable man and a police general,

5 always reported that the police were strictly abiding by the order not to

6 open fire, even against the KLA, if there is any danger of civilians

7 getting hurt. He personally made sure that the police, by issuing

8 appropriate orders --

9 JUDGE MAY: You know you're here to ask questions. You can ask

10 one question arising from that before we adjourn. What is it you want to

11 put?

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Please compare what you said in paragraph 21 that I quoted from

14 with paragraph 28 in the lengthier statement where it says Perisic

15 informed about army deployment. These are the technical talks that you

16 engaged in because you were actually engaged in those technical military

17 talks. The political talks were led by Holbrooke and not you.

18 And then you say, "Djordjevic did the same with regard to MUP.

19 Both referred to maps during the meetings. Clark remembers that on the

20 map used by Djordjevic, the positions of the KLA had been marked." They

21 were marked, the positions of the KLA. "And Clark, on the basis of the

22 map, made notes and believes that they were true," which means that the

23 police general was showing you a map with the positions of the KLA

24 indicated on it, and it is your judgement that the map was correct.

25 The KLA is a terrorist organisation, and this is something that

Page 30521

1 was confirmed here by Ashdown, Gelbard, your envoy, that these were

2 terrorists. Djordjevic shows you the positions of the KLA, you believe

3 the map to be correct, but at the same time you believe that the police

4 must not intervene against these who cut off heads. So you believe that

5 the police must not intervene.

6 JUDGE MAY: I find it quite incomprehensible to follow this sort

7 of question.

8 I think it's been suggested, General, that the conversation in 21,

9 the suggestion that they were about, apparently, "two weeks of killing

10 them all when you stopped us," I think that is being challenged. Perhaps

11 you could deal with that specifically, how you recollect Djordjevic making

12 that comment.

13 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, thank you. First of all, if I might, I

14 don't accept the definition of the KLA as a terrorist organisation. I

15 want to state that for the record.

16 Secondly, Djordjevic did make those comments precisely as I've

17 described orally and in previous testimony, and the issue, in my view, is

18 the proportionate use of force and the conduct and character of the Serb

19 activities in Kosovo.

20 Over a period of a decade, the Serb control of Kosovo had been

21 tightened. It was a repression of the majority population. It was

22 enforced by the police. It was accompanied by selective eliminations.

23 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

24 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Let the witness finish. No. You

25 began this with a very lengthy explanation or question, so let the witness

Page 30522

1 finish and then we'll adjourn.

2 THE WITNESS: It was accompanied by selective eliminations of

3 leaders of the Kosovo Albanian community. I had many explain to me how

4 they couldn't be schooled in their own language, they couldn't hold

5 positions in various government organisations, et cetera.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's a lie.

7 THE WITNESS: So there was a systematic cultural repression --

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's a lie.

9 THE WITNESS: -- which ended up sparking a resistance movement.

10 The appropriate way to have dealt with this would have been not through

11 the use of force, as I was trying to explain to General Djordjevic, but

12 through the use of dialogue and restraint, because it's simply a matter of

13 military history that when you use force in an effort to restrain

14 movements like this that have broad popular support, it's not going to

15 work. Not only is it illegal, but it's also ineffective. And Djordjevic

16 had no answer. He was obviously operating under instructions.

17 It was clear to me, Your Honour, at the time, that Djordjevic was

18 in the good graces of the accused. The accused thought very highly of

19 him. Djordjevic seemed to be an efficient officer. He had facts at his

20 command. He pointed out to me the locations. But he was obviously

21 operating under instructions, and it was a policy designed by the accused.

22 The accused was there. He came in during these military technical talks

23 on the night of the 20th of October. Watched us as we discussed around

24 the map the locations of the KLA. So he wasn't an isolated, distant

25 political leader. He was very closely engaged in the character of the

Page 30523












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Page 30524

1 activities there.

2 And I think the character of the activities could only be

3 described as illegal and causing a humanitarian catastrophe. Some 350 to

4 400.000 people had been forced out of their homes in the late summer and

5 early autumn of 1998, according to observers' figures. Now, NATO wasn't

6 there, I didn't have direct access to my own chain of command

7 intelligence, so this is taken from other sources. But there was clearly

8 a major problem in the summer and fall of 1998 caused by the activities of

9 the Serb military and police.

10 One of the Albanians came to me and he told me that from the

11 mountains overlooking Kosovo, they could see the Serb military firing

12 artillery against the villages in the Drenica area, and this was as early

13 as April of 1998. And so those don't fall into the character of normal

14 police activities.

15 And that's what the basis of this seemed to me to be all about.

16 You had a disproportionate use of force, an illegal use of force, it was

17 predicated toward replicating the 1946 --

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's not correct.

19 THE WITNESS: -- solution, at least as I watched it all unfold,

20 and this is what led to the crisis in 1999.

21 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. We're going to adjourn now. We take it

22 into account the fact that we've gone past the adjournment and you've had

23 some extra time, but nonetheless, we said we would give you some extra.

24 You've got another 20 minutes more questioning.

25 We will adjourn now. Twenty minutes.

Page 30525

1 --- Recess taken at 10.38 a.m.

2 --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.

3 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] How much more time are you going to

5 give me, Mr. May?

6 JUDGE MAY: Twenty minutes.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's not sufficient for me, but

8 I'll try to clarify certain matters.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. So yesterday, or at least in paragraph 28 of this longer

11 statement, you said that Djordjevic told you the KLA positions, which were

12 accurate to a large extent, and then you also said --

13 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter could not hear the rest of the

14 statement.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. General Clark, do you know that the police and the military are

17 not engaged in dialogue? They're not supposed to be. It is for

18 politicians to engage in dialogue. At meetings with Rugova and other

19 Albanian politicians, there was Milutinovic who was then president of

20 Serbia, and Sainovic, the Deputy Prime Minister of the federal government,

21 and members of government of the Republic of Serbia. So they were the

22 ones that were engaged in dialogue. I assume that you know that, General

23 Clark.

24 A. Your Honour, I do know that. I know that there was discussion,

25 but the cause, the motive force behind the conflict was, in fact, the

Page 30526

1 repressive actions of the military. The police first, and then

2 increasingly the military engagement that was there, coupled with the

3 policies of the civilian Serb leadership. This was a policy of

4 incremental ethnic cleansing which came to be implemented in this province

5 at the expense of the majority of the inhabitants.

6 Q. Ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was carried out against the Serbs,

7 General Clark. I assume that you know that.

8 As for the police and its activities, I assume that you will agree

9 that the police, when it learns of certain things, as Djordjevic explained

10 to you where the KLA positions were, that in a house there is a group of

11 terrorists, then it is the task of the police to surround them and arrest

12 them. And if they shoot at the police, then the police shoots at them.

13 Is that what the police does in your country?

14 JUDGE MAY: Only what happens in Kosovo is of any relevance to

15 this trial. What is it that you want to put?

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. So the question is: Is it clear that if the police acts in

18 accordance with the law, and the police can only act in accordance with

19 the law, when it is faced with a group of terrorists, killers, then they

20 try to arrest them? Isn't that right? Isn't that right, General Clark?

21 A. I think there are two relevant facts in response to your question.

22 First, Your Honour, I think it's clear that over a period of a decade

23 there was systematic repression of the majority population in Kosovo,

24 repression that was enforced by the police and by the system of laws that

25 were imposed on the population.

Page 30527

1 And secondly, I think it's clear that there was excessive use of

2 force by both the police and the army and that this increased the

3 motivation of the population to resist.

4 I remember the specific incident as recounted to me by the

5 president of the neighbouring country of Macedonia, and this was the

6 massacre of the Jashari family, in which the police did in fact reinforce

7 with heavy weapons surround the family compound. They reduced it. The

8 reports were some 60 members of the family were inside and were killed.

9 This made news. And President Gligorov, who understood the Albanian

10 community well, warned me that this is the kind of incident that these

11 people, these Albanians, will simply not tolerate. It was murder for

12 these people in this family compound. Most of them were unarmed, they

13 were not resisting, they were simply killed. And that's what incited the

14 population.

15 Q. That was discussed here. This group of Jasharis was a group of

16 killers, and the police called everyone to come out, and they called on

17 him and his accomplices to surrender. He, on his part, shot at the

18 police, and his accomplices shot at the police. The police could not have

19 known, since a group of civilians had already walked out of the house,

20 whether another group of civilians had remained in the house. There is a

21 number of survivors, so it is quite clear that the police had no intention

22 whatsoever of putting civilians in harm's way.

23 So I'm asking you once again whether you know whether General

24 Djordjevic said to this to you and the others, that he was precisely the

25 person who was trying to make sure that this order was being carried out

Page 30528

1 and that even KLA members should not be targeted when civilians could be

2 harmed. Do you know that, General Clark?

3 A. Your Honour, I never heard this order. General Djordjevic never

4 referred to this order. And based on the information that I had from

5 reliable sources, this order was in fact not carried out. There was

6 indiscriminate shooting in this province by the police and the military.

7 Q. You're talking about 1998. There were no attacks against the

8 civilians conducted by the army and the police. Are you aware of that,

9 General Clark? Especially that summer that you've been referring to. And

10 also in Malisevo that you favour to such an extent, that is where KLA

11 headquarters were; right?

12 A. Your Honour, I don't know where KLA headquarters were. I do know

13 that, according to General Djordjevic, Malisevo was a centre of KLA. I

14 don't have any independent corroboration of that. But I do know from the

15 record that I recall that there were actions by the police and army

16 against the civilian population in the summer of 1998. That's why some

17 300 to 400.000 people had fled their homes. And I do recall very clearly

18 the Albanians telling me that they could look over from the mountains of

19 Albania and see the artillery fire falling on villages in the western part

20 of the province.

21 Q. All right. Let's leave that aside, what the Albanians told you.

22 These stories of theirs are well known.

23 You said a short while ago that you wanted to have something

24 struck from the record. You wanted to say, as a matter of fact, for the

25 record that the KLA was not a terrorist organisation. Isn't that right,

Page 30529












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Page 30530

1 General Clark?

2 A. Your Honour, I do not consider the KLA a terrorist organisation.

3 Q. All right. Tell me, then, who was it then in 1998 that carried

4 out these 1.854 terrorist attacks, having killed hundreds of people,

5 having wounded hundreds of people, civilians, policemen, soldiers? Who

6 did that then in 1998 if not terrorists? Who could have done it?

7 JUDGE MAY: I'm going to stop these rhetorical questions. What is

8 the question?

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Well, who carried out these acts of terrorism, General Clark, if

11 they are not terrorists?

12 A. Your Honour, I have no independent confirmation of the number or

13 significance of the violence in Kosovo that's being cited, but based on

14 the discussions that I have had, the information that I recall at the

15 time, what we had was a pattern of violence and intimidation that began

16 with the police and military in 1998, and it was a pattern of intimidation

17 and violence that put the civilian population at risk. And the civilian

18 population had no recourse. They had no representation on the police.

19 They had no means of communicating with the police. They had no means of

20 trust of the police because all of this was part of the instrumentality of

21 repression.

22 So it's understandable that they wanted to defend themselves

23 and protect themselves. Most did this by simply fleeing their homes.

24 Some may have tried to resist by force of arms. That's the tragedy in

25 this case. But it's a tragedy whose causes lie with the policy of

Page 30531

1 repression and excessive use of force that the accused was responsible

2 for.

3 Q. General Clark, since you claim that these individuals who carried

4 out these acts of terrorism are not terrorists, although several

5 resolutions of the Security Council refer to terrorism in Kosovo, you

6 nevertheless claim that they are not terrorists.

7 Please answer a question: Is your election campaign financed by

8 Albanian circles including the KLA?

9 JUDGE MAY: That's a totally improper question, totally improper

10 and irrelevant.

11 General, you do not have to answer this sort of thing.

12 THE WITNESS: I think it's important that I do answer it, and the

13 answer is no.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. All right. All right. Tell me, please, General, this is The New

16 Yorker, the issue of the 17th of November. It carried an interview with

17 you as well, and it says here in the interview: [In English] "Shelton,

18 the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was Clark's boss in 1999

19 when Clark was unceremoniously told that he was being removed from his

20 position as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe."

21 [Interpretation] Then Shelton is quoted: [In English] "'I've known

22 Wes for a long time,' Shelton said. 'I will tell you the reason he came

23 out of Europe early had to do with integrity and character issues ... Wes

24 won't get my vote.'"

25 [Interpretation] So your former superior talks about your

Page 30532

1 character. Isn't that right, General Clark?

2 A. Well, Your Honour, I'm -- let me explain a couple of things.

3 First of all, Shelton was not my superior. He was the chairman of the

4 Joint Chiefs of Staff. I reported to the Secretary of Defence through

5 General Shelton. I also reported to Secretary-General Solana through

6 military committee and North Atlantic Council.

7 I would like to offer the following: First, here are the remarks

8 made about me by Secretary Cohen, my superior, after the Kosovo campaign

9 on the 1st of December, 1999. He made these remarks at the Marshall

10 Centre for Studies in Germany. He said: I want to "pay tribute to a

11 gentleman who is sitting in the audience ... and that is General Clark.

12 ... One of the great strengths ... is the genius, the competence and the

13 professionalism of General Wesley Clark." Secretary Cohen continued: "I

14 don't know of anyone who had a greater challenge than to hold 19

15 democracies together while conducting some 34.000 sorties and holding and

16 managing all of that together during a very stressful time. I would like

17 to pay tribute to his professionalism and the outstanding job that he has

18 done serving as our Supreme Allied Commander..."

19 That was Secretary Cohen's commendation when I was serving. When

20 I changed command and left command, here is what Secretary Cohen had to

21 say: "To help preserve freedom at the end of the century, America turned

22 to the leader that we honour today. In General Wes Clark --"

23 Q. Wait a minute, General Clark, please. I'm asking him about

24 Shelton.

25 JUDGE MAY: Of course you are, but the witness is entitled to

Page 30533

1 reply, and he's doing so.

2 THE WITNESS: "In General Wes Clark, America found a scholar, a

3 soldier, and a statesman: a scholar who understands the forces of history

4 on our time; a soldier of unquestioned courage - a Bronze and Silver Star

5 hero - who, despite grievous wounds, inspired his unit to survival in the

6 jungles of Vietnam, and as soldier of insight who returned home to train

7 those who prevailed in Desert Storm. He is a statesman, whose influence

8 has been felt from the Americas, where he helped guide the fight against

9 drug barons, to Dayton, where --"

10 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please be asked to read

11 slower. The interpreters do not have the text. Thank you.

12 THE WITNESS: Okay. I understand. "... where his counsel helped

13 end the bloodletting of Bosnia."

14 Secretary Cohen continues: "Now, it has been said that, 'without

15 passion man is a mere latent force and possibility, like the flint which

16 awaits the shock of the iron before it can give forth its spark.'"

17 Secretary Cohen continued: "Future historians will recount how the

18 passionate leadership of Wes Clark and the dedicated men and women of this

19 command combined to spark new possibilities across this continent, forging

20 new bonds in a great Partnership for Peace and serving alongside soldiers

21 from some 38 nations to bring peace to Bosnia and Kosovo."

22 Secretary Cohen continued, "And I would add," he said, "that the

23 service of General Clark ... has actually come full circle. He was there

24 on that muddy mountain road five summers ago when three of America's best

25 gave their lives trying to end that war. And he has been there so many

Page 30534

1 times since, turning the plan he helped to craft at Dayton into what we

2 hope will be a durable peace."

3 Secretary Cohen continues: "General Shelton has reminded us of the

4 historic accomplishments further to the south," implying meaning Kosovo.

5 "Indeed," Secretary Cohen continues, "while it may be tempting to view

6 darkly the challenges of the moment in Kosovo, I would say to all who are

7 here today that no one, no one should ever doubt either your service or

8 your success. Faced with an adversary who manufactured a vicious

9 humanitarian nightmare, you responded with compassion and speed to relieve

10 human suffering. Faced with an adversary who tried to maximise civilian

11 death and misery, you responded by minimising the suffering of the

12 innocent."

13 "Just a year ago today," Secretary Cohen continues, "Serbian

14 forces were on a rampage and nearly a million Kosovar Albanians had fled,

15 threatening to overwhelm their neighbours. But you responded, and today,

16 Milosevic's thugs are out of Kosovo --"

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Are we going to listen to all of

18 Cohen's speech now?

19 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Perhaps, General, you could come to a

20 conclusion fairly rapidly.

21 THE WITNESS: I want to, Your Honour, thoroughly disabuse the

22 accused of the idea that there was any reflection on my character and

23 integrity, and I want to assure this Court that there is no merit

24 whatsoever in the statement made by a military colleague during the course

25 of a political campaign, and that's the reason I'm asking to submit this

Page 30535












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Page 30536

1 statement to the record. And I would beg the forbearance of the Court to

2 continue, because I think it's important to lay to rest this charge. And

3 Secretary Cohen --

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: How much longer is it, General?

5 THE WITNESS: About another 30 seconds, if I may read at a normal

6 pace, Your Honour. I'm sorry to read slowly here. And Secretary Cohen

7 continues: "So, General Clark, men and women of EUCOM, we thank you again

8 for your outstanding leadership..."

9 So then I want to just add to the record the remarks that

10 President Clinton made when I was awarded the Presidential Medal of

11 Freedom. And I will read these just in summary, very quickly, to be

12 finished. "Wes Clark understood the perils of the Balkans. He already

13 play a vital role. He summoned every ounce of his experience and

14 expertise as a strategist, soldier and statesman to wage our campaign in

15 Kosovo. He prevailed, miraculously, without the loss of a single combat

16 casualty. At the apex of a long and distinguished military career that

17 goes back to his outstanding performance as a cadet, he was assigned a

18 challenge many experts --"

19 JUDGE MAY: Could you slow it down.

20 THE WITNESS: "... instead, General Clark -- thanks to General

21 Clark, we now can declare it mission accomplished."

22 Your Honours, I would like to submit these for the record in

23 refutation of the charge of the accused against my character.

24 JUDGE MAY: Very well, we will certainly consider that.

25 THE WITNESS: I will also, I believe, have additional material

Page 30537

1 that will be submitted for the record from others in the United States who

2 may have been referred to here.

3 JUDGE MAY: You can have another five minutes, Mr. Milosevic.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, he took up all my time,

5 General Clark did, by having read these speeches that are a matter of

6 protocol.

7 JUDGE MAY: You are getting time in lieu.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. So, General Clark, since you say that what Shelton said here is

10 not correct, that it's totally wrong, then why were you removed from your

11 post in Europe prematurely?

12 A. Your Honour, I would like to answer this question, because in all

13 candor, there was a policy difference between General Shelton and myself.

14 I believed that the United States and NATO could not prevent, could not --

15 sorry, could not permit another round of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans

16 led by the accused, and I worked hard to warn the United States government

17 of what was going to happen, and I provided policy recommendations, and my

18 recommendations were accepted. The United States acted, and it acted to

19 halt in progress a round of ethnic cleansing.

20 Some people in Washington may not have agreed with that, but

21 that's what we did. I'm very proud of what was accomplished, and we saved

22 a million and a half Kosovar Albanians from ethnic cleansing.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. You caused a humanitarian catastrophe, General Clark. You didn't

25 save anyone. And since you were the NATO commander, I assume that you

Page 30538

1 know that the Helsinki final act explicitly authorises states to fight

2 against terrorism in their own territory and that no other state has the

3 right to stop it or prevent it from doing that. You interfered in this

4 conflict and you took the side of the terrorists, General Clark. Is that

5 right or is that not right?

6 A. Your Honour, NATO acted to try to prevent a fourth war in the

7 Balkans. We did this with the concept of diplomacy, but it was a

8 diplomacy that Mr. Milosevic refused to consider until it was backed by

9 the threat of force. As I recounted to the Court, I delivered that threat

10 of force. It produced a pause during which diplomacy could have taken

11 action, but it's my belief that the accused had already settled on a

12 course of action that did not include diplomacy. Instead, he intended to

13 pursue the solution that he had warned me in the meeting that he would

14 pursue. It was the effort to kill them all, and it unfolded beginning in

15 January of 1999 with the massacre at Racak. He fought off the efforts of

16 the Western community to seek a diplomatic solution to the problem in

17 Kosovo.

18 And finally when there was no recourse, NATO did take military

19 action in an effort to prevent an unfolding campaign of ethnic cleansing,

20 and we went through a 78-day air campaign in an effort to turn around the

21 ethnic cleansing that the accused and his government perpetrated against

22 the Kosovo Albanians. And in fact we did turn it around.

23 JUDGE MAY: Your last question.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. I have many questions for General Clark. But since you're talking

Page 30539

1 about Racak, General, do you know that there was a KLA unit in Racak

2 consisting of tens of men? Its commander testified here, stating that

3 they were the first to open fire against the police that entered the

4 village, and that the police that was entering the village had reported

5 this to the verifiers. We also saw two orange vehicles of the verifiers

6 when the police was entering Racak. We saw that on video footage here.

7 Do you know all of that? Do you know that this was a clash between the

8 police and an organised group of terrorists of the KLA? Do you know that?

9 These are things that were presented here quite clearly.

10 JUDGE MAY: That's not a total representation of the evidence

11 which we've heard here, and the witness should not be misled about that,

12 but we -- you can certainly ask the question as far as the general was

13 concerned.

14 The question is, to the general, did you know it was a clash

15 between the police and an organised group of terrorists at Racak? Did you

16 know that or anything like that as far as your information was concerned?

17 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, my initial information came from

18 Ambassador Walker who informed me he'd seen the site, he'd looked at the

19 people, and that it was a massacre, and that these people were farmers,

20 they were shot at close range in a ditch. They'd been herded there out of

21 the village and murdered. That's the information that he provided.

22 That's the information that could have been investigated by the

23 International Criminal Tribunal, and that's in fact what NATO had

24 recommended. That's the message that General Naumann and I carried down

25 to the accused, and he refused to permit the investigation, instead

Page 30540

1 telling us that it couldn't have happened that way, he was certain of

2 that, before there was any investigation whatsoever.

3 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kay.

4 Questioned by Mr. Kay:

5 Q. General --

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, in connection with data

7 presented by General Clark regarding refugees, let me just try and confirm

8 one point.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. In your book, you say --

11 JUDGE MAY: No. You know, we gave you a certain amount of time.

12 You've had it. We'll consider later whether we'll consider any question

13 from you. What page of the book do you want to ask about? Which page is

14 it?

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 268th page of the Serbian

16 translation when General Clark claims, and it is -- the reference is to

17 the tenth day of the war, the 3rd of April, and he says: "Our information

18 indicated that there were about 100.000 refugees in Albania and 50.000 in

19 Macedonia, which makes a total of 150.000 on the tenth day of the war."

20 Isn't that the best confirmation --

21 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We're going to -- we're going to stop this

22 -- I'm going to stop you. The Prosecution can find the passage and we can

23 return to it after Mr. Kay's cross-examination and see whether it's one of

24 the passages to which you referred earlier, and we'll consider whether to

25 allow a question about it.

Page 30541












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Page 30542

1 Yes, Mr. Kay.

2 MR. KAY:

3 Q. General, just taking up the last series of issues the accused was

4 asking you about before the question concerning Racak. It would be right

5 to say, would it not, that the UN Security Council did not pass a

6 Resolution affirming your bombing of Yugoslavia?

7 A. Your Honour, that's correct.

8 Q. The Resolutions that were passed which we've referred to were

9 Resolution 1160, 1199, and 1239, and 1203. And in those Resolutions --

10 JUDGE MAY: How does this arise from the examination-in-chief?

11 MR. KAY: It doesn't arise precisely from the examination-in-chief

12 but it's been an issue that has emerged and it would be an issue that

13 perhaps is relevant to the issue of self-defence as pleaded by the

14 accused.

15 JUDGE MAY: Yes, but you know, we have been through this a lot,

16 and it may or may not become a legal argument.

17 MR. KAY: I was going to deal with the document of the 25th of

18 October which has the statement with it. Perhaps if I go to that it might

19 assist the Court to look at the matter.

20 Q. General, if we look at the document which is Exhibit 94, tab 3,

21 that's the record of the meeting in Belgrade of the 25th of October, 1998.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. As the front page of the record makes clear, your meeting with the

24 government of Serbia was on the basis of the Resolutions that had been

25 passed by the UN Security Council, and in particular 1199; is that right?

Page 30543

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. Could you just confirm for the record --

3 A. Confirm for the record.

4 Q. Yes, please. And as we know, there has been evidence in this

5 Court that the Resolutions passed - 1160, 1199 - expressed concern about

6 events that were happening in 1998 in Kosovo. If you could confirm.

7 A. This is correct.

8 Q. Thank you. As part of the international effort to deal with those

9 events, you had, with General Naumann, visited on behalf of NATO the

10 Serbian government to discuss those affairs with which the Security

11 Council was concerned.

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. At this stage in 1998, you were aware of the history of the

14 matter, that there was a -- a group described by the accused here as a

15 terrorist group. You don't accept that definition, but if I can just use

16 the phrase because it's one that has been used regularly here, that there

17 was the KLA which had been operating within Kosovo over the previous 18

18 months?

19 A. That's correct. I'd heard of that organisation.

20 Q. You were aware of the concerns of the Serbian government as to the

21 activities of the KLA within a part of their territory and in respect of

22 which they wished to take steps to prevent casualties, harm, and

23 destruction.

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. You were aware as well that the United Nations was concerned about

Page 30544

1 the issue of proportionality, was concerned about the issues of the

2 treatment of the indigenous population, the Albanian Kosovars, and were

3 concerned to ensure that there was as peaceful a situation within that

4 province of Kosovo as possible?

5 A. That's correct, but I want to return just for a moment to the

6 previous question about the concerns of the Serbian government, because I

7 wouldn't want it to be taken that I agreed that the concerns of the

8 Serbian government were limited to taking steps to prevent casualties,

9 harm, and destruction. I did not feel that that was the limitation of the

10 concerns of the Serbian government. I was aware they might have described

11 them that way, but I did not agree, based on their actions that I was

12 observing, that their concerns were limited to those matters.

13 Q. Very well. You had reservations about their position, but it

14 would be right to say that you have to acknowledge there was this

15 political problem within Kosovo that that government had to deal with.

16 A. I would say that they had created a political problem that they

17 were dealing with by the use of force rather than attempting to deal with

18 it through political means. This was the very heart of the issue of the

19 matter.

20 Q. If we look now to the statement that was also issued on that day -

21 and I'm turning to the second page of tab 3 of Exhibit 94, Your Honours-

22 paragraph 1 of that document, recognising the Security Council Resolution

23 of 1199 and proceeding from the fact that organised terrorism has been

24 defeated in Kosmet and that all actions against terrorists have ceased as

25 of September the 29th, 1998, the authorities of the Federal Republic of

Page 30545

1 Yugoslavia have decided, amongst other measures, to undertake a series of

2 actions. And essentially those series of actions can be summarised as

3 attempting to put a normal, peaceful position within that province over

4 which that government had control, authority. Do you agree?

5 A. I do.

6 Q. In the second paragraph of the document, it states: "In order to

7 further encourage the return to peace and normality, the state authorities

8 of the FRY will bring down the level of presence and the equipment of

9 security forces throughout Kosmet to normal levels ... preceding the

10 outbreak of terrorist activities." Is that right?

11 A. That's right. And in a previous question also I'm taking at face

12 value the content of the document. I'm not including in the answer the

13 intent of the accused as it was expressed to me, or the underlying intent

14 of the accused as it was expressed to me, I'm simply affirming the face

15 value of the document.

16 Q. Let's look at the goals then within the document, if I can put it

17 in that way, as to what was stated was needed to be achieved. And we can

18 see through the document that it essentially concerns the withdrawing of

19 forces to peacetime levels, heavy weapons. I'm looking at the next page

20 now: The police down to normal peacetime activities, additional units

21 before February 1998 to be withdrawn. Because it was seen as from

22 February 1998 that the intensification had occurred, that that is when the

23 materials were brought into Kosovo; is that right?

24 A. As far -- yes. That the intensification occurred at the time of

25 the -- on or about the time of the attack on the Jashari family.

Page 30546

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. But I don't have the specifics as to whether that was -- that

3 precipitated the build-up or that was a result of the build-up. I just

4 don't know.

5 Q. The idea being a de-escalation and what has been called on a

6 number of occasions within this court an October cease-fire in 1998.

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. If we just get to the end of the document, there was also the

9 provision in Roman numeral paragraph III: "The FRY intends to comply

10 unconditionally with the UN Security Council Resolution 1199 and the

11 actions described above. It calls on all other parties to also comply

12 unconditionally with this Resolution."

13 And that, in effect, would have been the KLA or the terrorist

14 groups that were otherwise operating; is that right?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. "The FRY remains committed to seek solutions to all outstanding

17 issues and problems peacefully and in consultation with the OSCE.

18 However, as a last resort and consistent with the right of self-defence,

19 the state authorities retain the right to respond adequately and

20 proportionately to any form of terrorist activity or violation of law

21 which could jeopardise the lives and safety of citizens and

22 representatives of state authorities."

23 At this time in October 1998, it was still appreciated that there

24 was a right of the state of Serbia to be able to protect itself in

25 self-defence as well as to proportionately respond to terrorist activity

Page 30547












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 30548

1 or violation of law. That's right, isn't it?

2 A. That's correct. And let me, if I could, explain, because this was

3 a very carefully considered statement on the part of NATO which I had --

4 before this statement was carried forward, we had considered this. Unless

5 we wanted to put a NATO peacekeeping force in, into the conflict, we could

6 not deny the right of self-defence to the Serbian authorities. But the

7 important language here is the language of "proportionately." In other

8 words, the idea was to return, just as you suggested, the province to the

9 normal rule of law and normal police activities and pull the heavy weapons

10 out and stop the use of heavy weapons against the population. And so

11 that's why the phrase, or the word "proportionately" was in there.

12 Q. At this stage, of course, this statement was being viewed as goals

13 that were attempted to be achieved and that a cease-fire would take place.

14 Yes?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. However, during the cease-fire, it became apparent, did it not,

17 that the KLA took that as an opportunity to revive itself and rearm?

18 A. I think that's a question of fact in which both parties, the KLA

19 and the government, bear some responsibility, because in fact, neither the

20 Serbs nor the KLA fully complied with the intent of this period.

21 Q. But that was the problem, wasn't it, that the -- as viewed from

22 the Serbian side, that during this period when they were to be

23 withdrawing, that the opponent they had on the other side, which at that

24 stage was very much an opponent that was to a very great extent quite

25 defeated. It was not an opponent that was a vigorous and strong opponent

Page 30549

1 at that stage in October of 1998.

2 A. Well, I think there may be a misperception here in that you are

3 assuming, I think, a certain parallelism. There wasn't that parallelism.

4 The effort was not to have a cease-fire in which the parties would

5 maintain their respective military relationships. It was to set a pause

6 in a cease-fire in which diplomacy could work to find a political solution

7 to the problem. It really had nothing to do with the presence or absence

8 of the KLA, because had there been a political solution to the problem,

9 the KLA would have been irrelevant, and it would have lost support of the

10 population.

11 The KLA was drawing support from the population precisely because

12 of the actions of the Serb military and police. It was their only means

13 of defence against the excessive use of force. And in fact, what happened

14 was that the Serbs continued the excessive use of force. They did not

15 follow this statement to use force proportionately.

16 Q. It may be a matter of evidence, and the Judges have heard a lot of

17 evidence about this, as to what actually happened during this period and

18 as to whether the KLA were in fact arming and then caused the Serbs to

19 react. That may be a matter of evidence. But you don't disagree with the

20 proposition that in fact the KLA did restore itself, rearm, and equip

21 during this breathing space?

22 A. To the best of my knowledge, and again, Your Honour, I'm not

23 familiar with all the evidence that was presented to the Court or how the

24 Court may have this information, but the information I recall at the time

25 was, yes, there were casualties in the KLA, and they did evacuate

Page 30550

1 casualties, they replenished, and they took some limited actions within

2 their means.

3 Q. The Security Council Resolutions, of course, were concerned with

4 the generality of the problem and on both sides they expressed

5 condemnation of the Serbian state but they expressed condemnation of the

6 other side as well, the KLA, the terrorists. You're aware of that?

7 A. I don't have the specific language in front of me but I do recall

8 in general that.

9 Q. I've got copies of the Security Council Resolutions here with me.

10 MR. KAY: And it may be that we put them in at this stage, Your

11 Honours.

12 Q. Dealing then also with the whole of the context of this issue

13 after October of 1998, meanwhile you were building up forces around the

14 state of Serbia.

15 JUDGE MAY: You know, we stopped this in relation to the accused,

16 and the fact is that the witness has come here to deal with very specific

17 issues and not with generalities. As you rightly say, we've heard much

18 other evidence about it.

19 MR. KAY: Your Honour, why I was dealing with this issue is this:

20 I'm not dealing with events after the 24th of March, 1999, but I'm trying

21 to put the context for the state of Serbia -- well, the picture into a

22 context for the state of Serbia. There are foreign forces building up

23 around that state, obviously equipping and arming. There is also the

24 build-up of the KLA that we've heard about in evidence. So there are

25 clear issues of government that that state has to take. When it's

Page 30551

1 criticised for not withdrawing or for reentering into the province, there

2 are issues here relating to the government of the state that the state may

3 be entitled to take certain decisions to protect its territorial

4 integrity.

5 [Trial Chamber confers]

6 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Very well.

7 MR. KAY:

8 Q. Isn't that right, General, that that is the picture that we should

9 be looking at within this snapshot of history from the October to -- 1998

10 to March of 1999, that there were build-up of foreign forces around the

11 Republic of Serbia over which you had command?

12 A. No. I think that's a very incomplete picture. That's a

13 one-colour snapshot of a multicoloured situation. Let's put it in

14 context, Your Honours, if I might.

15 First of all, there had been an effort for several years to

16 constrain the Serb repression of the Kosovars, going back to the first

17 Bush administration, which in December of 1992 had issued the so-called

18 Christmas warning, implying that there was a certain threat of force that

19 could be levied against Serb forces were they to provoke a humanitarian

20 catastrophe in Kosovo. I don't have the exact wording of that warning,

21 but it could be provided for the record.

22 And accompanying that, for years there had been an effort to bring

23 about a diplomatic resolution, to ameliorate the harsh policies of ethnic

24 repression that the Serb government had promoted in Kosovo that were

25 fuelling the resistance there, a resistance in -- that had arisen in

Page 30552

1 self-defence inside that province and for no other motives, and that

2 evening during this period of 1998, what was being attempted was a

3 diplomatic resolution, an effort to bring the parties of the struggle

4 together and somehow to peacefully manage a restoration of civic harmony

5 in which two different populations could co-exist and live together

6 without the intimidation of the majority by the instruments of repression

7 controlled by the minority.

8 This is what was being sought.

9 As far as the military instruments are concerned, the military

10 instrument after October of 1998, the airpower, was actually being

11 redeployed back to its normal bases. It didn't remain there. And the

12 forces instead were involved in a cooperative verification mission in

13 which aircraft overflew the province of the Kosovo. They reported

14 information that was correlated with the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer

15 Mission on the ground in order to provide confidence building that could

16 prevent a re-escalation of violence, that the Serb side themselves had

17 liaison officers located at the headquarters of the air operation, so it

18 was cooperative and there was a mutual exchange of information.

19 And then insofar as there was a build-up of ground forces, those

20 ground forces were there for an in extremis permissive extraction of the

21 KDOM, which was -- would have been politically neutral. It would have

22 only happened if the Serb side had permitted the entry of the reaction

23 force but had simultaneously been unable to provide assistance to a

24 beleaguered force of observers. It was a notion that we had attempted on

25 several occasions to coordinate with the Serb side themselves, and there

Page 30553

1 had been some discussions, as I recall, between either Ambassador Walker

2 and Shaun Byrnes or others with Serb representatives inside Kosovo about

3 how this action might have taken place.

4 In no way should that force have been perceived as a force that

5 could fight its way into Kosovo or Serbia or in any other way threaten the

6 sovereignty of Serbia. It was strictly a permissive action force and that

7 was well explained and fully understood by any military officer who looked

8 at it because the force had no capacity to force its way inside Serbia.

9 Q. We've all read your book, you see, and the Judges have read it --

10 JUDGE MAY: Now, look. We must keep control of this matter.

11 Mr. Kay, I remind you of your role in this trial.

12 MR. KAY: I was hoping to be helpful, Your Honour, to the Judges

13 in relation to points that are properly able to be made by the accused.

14 JUDGE MAY: He's had three and a half hours to four hours

15 cross-examination.

16 MR. KAY: But hasn't made this point and I've taken loads of

17 points off that he's made, and I'm attempting to fulfil my role to the

18 Court as zealously as possible but with a degree of fairness to look at

19 this issue in the context it should be raised.

20 [Trial Chamber confers]

21 JUDGE MAY: There's so far been no reference to this book apart

22 from what the accused has said, and you've heard our ruling that we do not

23 wish it to be part of the evidence because of its very wide-ranging

24 nature.

25 MR. KAY: Your Honour, I wasn't going to introduce the book, but I

Page 30554

1 was going to tell the witness who had mentioned what was happening at that

2 time that we've read the book and we're aware of what he has written about

3 it, and I was then going to put a summary of that picture to him because

4 it's an obvious feature from his own writings about the military activity

5 that was taking place.

6 JUDGE MAY: Is this part of the evidence which was highlighted by

7 the Prosecution?

8 MR. KAY: Yes. It's the --

9 JUDGE MAY: It's part of one of their passages; is that right?

10 MR. KAY: It's the NATO deployment. It's his role within the

11 planning --

12 JUDGE MAY: Very well, you can refer to that.

13 MR. KAY: Your Honour, I'm not in a position to do that, just like

14 that. Forgive me, because --

15 JUDGE MAY: You can put the question, of course.

16 MR. KAY: If I put the question and the Court doesn't like it,

17 they can ignore it.

18 Q. What I was going to say, General, was this: That you have written

19 about the deployment of those forces in that area over this period from

20 the October to the March until the bombing campaign actually started.

21 That's right, isn't it?

22 A. Absolutely, but as I'm trying to clarify, that it wasn't a period

23 that was only about the deployment of force. And as I read what your --

24 the significance of your line of analysis, I'm trying to provide the Court

25 with a full picture of the complete array of what was happening; that

Page 30555

1 there was a wholehearted effort on the part of NATO and its Member States

2 to seek a peaceful and diplomatic resolution to this matter.

3 Q. I don't disagree with that and I don't think that anyone here

4 should misread how I am questioning you about this. What I am putting to

5 you is the context of what was happening in the Balkans at that time and

6 the issues that the Republic of Serbia had to face, what it was seeing

7 over its borders. Do you understand?

8 A. And what I've tried to explain is that the military force on the

9 ground was not capable and that any professional military officer would

10 have recognised that force as being incapable of threatening Serbia, that

11 the airpower that flew over was unarmed and monitored and fully in

12 cooperation with the Serbs themselves, and that what was going on around

13 Serbia and what the Republic of Serbia had to face over its borders was

14 the concern of its neighbours to seek a diplomatic solution.

15 Q. I don't want to dwell too much more on this issue because I'm

16 limited in my time, so I'm going to turn now at this stage to 1995. Do

17 you understand me? And your involvement then from the first meeting on

18 the 17th of August, 1995. So we're now leaving Kosovo and going to

19 Bosnia.

20 You described that as being your first meeting, on the 17th of

21 August 1995. Would it be right to say that before that meeting you had

22 had no significant role to play within the political process?

23 A. Your Honour, I'm not sure what the line of questioning is directed

24 at. I was the officer on the joint staff in charge of Balkans policy. I

25 did the coordination between the joint staff and the Department of Defence

Page 30556

1 staff and the White House and State Department on Balkans policy. I had

2 made several trips to the Balkans before that. I had been in Sarajevo, I

3 had met Izetbegovic, Silajdzic, General Delic and General Mladic. In

4 August of 1994 I made another trip or two back into the region and worked

5 with European allies on it. So I'm not sure what the line of questioning

6 is supposed to play. I did not met Milosevic. As I said, that was my

7 first meeting with Milosevic.

8 Q. I'll get straight to the point for you. It concerns the

9 conversation that you've given evidence about concerning Srebrenica, and

10 you say that indicated to you that Mr. Milosevic had foreknowledge of what

11 was going to happen, as you have put it, committed by General Mladic.

12 That's what I'm asking about, because I didn't know whether you were

13 aware, in fact, that many politicians - and Lord Owen has expressed this

14 in this court - were very concerned about the safe havens policy from

15 1993. Were you aware of that?

16 A. Yes, I was aware of that.

17 Q. Were you aware that those politicians were concerned about the

18 enclave in Srebrenica and the potentials for chaos that those -- that

19 particular safe haven posed to the region?

20 A. What I was aware of at the time was that to the best of my

21 knowledge, Lord Owen no longer had any official role in Balkans policy,

22 Your Honour, and that there was a long-standing concern on the part of the

23 United Nations personnel to end the suffering in these enclaves and that

24 it was a source of continuing dispute. People were concerned about it,

25 that there had been a previous attack on an enclave - I think it was

Page 30557

1 called Zepa - that had occurred a few days before Srebrenica and that had

2 also aroused concern, and that there was no question in the minds of the

3 international community that the Serb side was unjustified, wrong, and

4 unauthorised to conduct military attacks against these humanitarian

5 positions.

6 Q. If we could just look at this issue then because it's important

7 and the Courts are plainly interested in it: Were you aware that under

8 Lord Owen's concerns, President Milosevic had warned Dr. Karadzic in 1993

9 about not to attack Srebrenica?

10 A. No, I was not aware of that specific point.

11 Q. Were you aware that Milosevic, as stated publicly, was in fact

12 very exasperated and concerned about that particular safe haven,

13 Srebrenica --

14 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment.

15 [Trial Chamber confers]

16 JUDGE MAY: It seems to me it's a matter of argument. No doubt

17 the accused will raise this point about what he said to Karadzic as

18 alleged. No doubt he can.

19 MR. KAY: We've heard evidence anyway, but the point here is that

20 this is being presented now as a confession, if you like, that --

21 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

22 MR. KAY: -- the accused had foreknowledge of what was going to

23 happen when the fact of the matter is that there is evidence that he had

24 warned. You have allowed in the impression of what the accused was saying

25 to this witness, and what I am questioning now is what this witness's own

Page 30558

1 state of knowledge was of the whole circumstance. Was he aware that there

2 was concern for Srebrenica and the safe havens and indeed warnings to

3 Karadzic - it doesn't mean any warnings to Mladic - concerning not to

4 attack the safe havens?

5 JUDGE MAY: It will be a matter for us, first of all whether the

6 statement was made and, secondly, what we make of it and what the

7 significance of the statement was. That surely is the crucial factor.

8 MR. KAY: Forgive me if I'm wrong, but I thought the Court was

9 very concerned about this evidence today and --

10 JUDGE MAY: Indeed. Indeed. But what somebody said to somebody

11 else doesn't seem to me to have any relevance on it.

12 MR. KAY: Well, if there's been a warning given by someone of

13 importance in the issue to someone else, that surely indicates that there

14 is a background to this that is entirely different from the impression

15 that the witness was able to put before this Court based on his impression

16 when having mentioned it in 1995.

17 JUDGE MAY: It may be that both things were said. It's a matter

18 for evidence which we will have to determine. Both things have been put

19 before us and it will be a matter for us what significance we give to the

20 evidence. That's the important fact.

21 MR. KAY: I appreciate that and I appreciate now I think the Court

22 has understood my point in asking these particular questions, and I think,

23 in my submission to the Court, they are consistent with the role of the

24 amicus on this issue. It's a very --

25 JUDGE MAY: I think you've got five minutes left.

Page 30559

1 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, might I have a chance just to reply to

2 this specific point?

3 It had been my experience in monitoring the situation in the

4 Balkans and watching the warnings that were given by the respective Serb

5 parties one to another that in case after case they covered themselves by

6 warnings that in fact they knew would not be abided by and by giving

7 instructions that they knew were not being upheld.

8 MR. KAY:

9 Q. Were you aware and did you hear that Mr. Milosevic viewed the

10 matter as being a great mistake for the Bosnian Serbs to attack

11 Srebrenica?

12 A. I heard the statement that you made. I have no independent

13 verification of it, but having observed the accused for more than a

14 hundred hours and studied his conduct over a period of years at very close

15 range, that -- I've learned that the accused is capable of saying many,

16 many things, that he was an adroit and skilful manoeuvrer on the

17 boundaries between politics, diplomacy, and war; that he went from the

18 role of peacemaker to warmaker effortlessly, and that he was able to

19 provide a different face to different visitors at different times. And so

20 I don't know -- it is up to the Court to decide how much weight to give to

21 the information that I'm providing. That's not my role. I can only give

22 you the information that I'm providing, Your Honour. I did so. It was,

23 to my view, as it was given to me. It was a direct response, not to a

24 previous warning three years ago but a direct response that he had warned

25 Mladic about what was about to happen at Srebrenica and that Mladic didn't

Page 30560

1 listen. And the clear implication behind my question - and the accused

2 speaks fluent English though not idiomatic English - the clear implication

3 was not just a military attack but it was the killing of the civilians

4 that were there. Milosevic didn't say to me that he was shocked. He said,

5 "I told him not to do it, but he didn't listen." That's what he said.

6 MR. KAY: That can be interpreted by the Court. I have to end

7 here, Your Honour, because of the timing. There is one matter I couldn't

8 deal with in cross-examination because it's a document that's only in

9 B/C/S, there isn't an English translation. Mr. Tapuskovic is able to deal

10 with it and has been able to put the matter into a context that will only

11 take about three minutes. It's a matter to do with the authority of

12 Mr. Milosevic in 1995 to deal with the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs.

13 If the Court would permit the other amicus to deal with it. I can't deal

14 with it.

15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would need to

16 explain to you first that this is in closed session, if possible, please.

17 Yes.

18 MR. NICE: This is a document we provided on the basis that as a

19 result of the terms of its provision we would ask that it be taken in

20 private session.

21 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

22 [Private session]

23 (Redacted)

24 (Redacted)

25 (Redacted)

Page 30561












12 Page 30561 redacted private session.














Page 30562












12 Page 30562 redacted private session.














Page 30563












12 Page 30563 redacted private session.














Page 30564

1 (Redacted)

2 (Redacted)

3 (Redacted)

4 (Redacted)

5 (Redacted)

6 (Redacted)

7 (Redacted)

8 [Open session]

9 JUDGE MAY: We are. Very well.

10 Mr. Nice, first of all the one question which the accused was

11 trying to raise. The book, page 234, and it was a reference to the

12 figures which appeared there.

13 MR. NICE: Yes.

14 JUDGE MAY: What was it? What did you want to ask about the

15 figures? We'll consider a question about that.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. May, yesterday you denied

17 me the right to question the witness about his predominant role in the

18 war, about the book that he wrote about modern warfare.

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. That's absolutely right. So we'll leave the

20 matter there. You can have one question about the figures, if you want to

21 ask, since it's part of the book which was marked by the Prosecution.

22 Further cross-examination by Mr. Milosevic:

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the figure that is mentioned

24 on this page, this is ten days into the war, the tenth day of the war,

25 100.000 refugees in Albania and 50.000 in Macedonia, and now that refutes

Page 30565

1 what the witness said, that in 1998 there were I don't know how many

2 refugees.

3 JUDGE MAY: We will let the witness deal with that if he wishes to

4 respond to that particular point, but that is all.

5 Yes, General Clark.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. My question is whether this makes it clear that these refugees

8 were the result of their bombs, and at the same time of their coordination

9 with the KLA that --

10 JUDGE MAY: No. You know those questions have been disallowed.

11 But, General Clark, the accused having raised it, if you want to

12 deal with either question in any way you wish, of course it's open to you

13 do to do so.

14 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. The figures that are cited

15 in the book on that particular day are interim figures. The complete

16 sentence shows 540.000 displaced or refugees, including the figures of

17 100.000, 50.000. The figures later rose to, if my memory is correct,

18 something like 900.000 external or refugees and 500.000 plus internally

19 displaced people living outside their homes and hiding in the forest and

20 so forth. At least, this is the figures that we were using at the time.

21 There was no coordination with the KLA to move these people out in any

22 way. This was an exodus of people that was planned and orchestrated by

23 the Serbs themselves, either through deliberately putting them on trains

24 and shipping them south toward Macedonia or by surrounding villages and

25 threatening them and putting them in fear of their lives so that they

Page 30566

1 fled.

2 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice.

3 Re-examined by Mr. Nice:

4 Q. First dealing with the material that the witness read from in

5 relation to the suggestion made by the accused about General Shelton. I

6 do have copies of that material.

7 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll admit that.

8 MR. NICE: Perhaps that could be exhibited.

9 JUDGE MAY: The simplest thing is to exhibit them together and

10 we'll give them the next exhibit number.

11 MR. NICE: On the same topic --

12 JUDGE MAY: Just one moment. Let's give them a number.

13 THE REGISTRAR: 618, Your Honours.

14 MR. NICE: Your Honour, on the same topic, the witness observed

15 that there was additional material on the same general topic that he would

16 like to be available to the Chamber. As the Chamber knows, we've had the

17 advantages of being able to discuss documents with his lawyer, who has

18 been here in The Hague assisting him, and I understand that arrangements

19 are in train for another document to be forthcoming. I don't know if the

20 general can tell us anything about that or if we will await developments.

21 THE WITNESS: I don't have any additional information at this

22 time.

23 MR. NICE: Some of this may be known to the Chamber already.

24 Perhaps I'll return to it right at the end of my re-examination, the

25 substance of which I'll turn to now.

Page 30567

1 Q. General, first of all, so far as the so-called patriarch agreement

2 is concerned, which we've seen not in its original form but as set out in

3 the minutes a meeting of all the prominent Serbs in August of 1995, the

4 position is that the unified Serb delegation was to be made up of three

5 members of the RS and three from the FRY with the accused as the

6 tie-breaking voter; correct?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. Your observations at Dayton and how that agreement worked, tell us

9 this, please: Did you ever become aware of the accused acting without the

10 knowledge or outside the knowledge of the RS representatives? Did they

11 ever come and talk to you about that?

12 A. Yes. There were -- there was a general series of complaints from

13 the RS delegation that they weren't being consulted, and there was the

14 specific incident which was relayed to me of the accused saying that --

15 explaining that they would not sign the agreement at Dayton or initial the

16 agreement and specifically that Mr. Krajisnik would not because, until

17 that moment, he had not seen the agreement, the map that, quote, gave away

18 his farm near Sarajevo, unquote.

19 Q. And the map that apparently and to his surprise gave Krajisnik's

20 farm away, is that this map or --

21 A. It is.

22 Q. That's the map in court.

23 A. It's the lines that were drawn around this map.

24 Q. And you've probably seen this point manifest already, but confirm

25 it: The crossed-out line is to the west of the added vertical red line

Page 30568

1 which has the semicircle drawn in it. That more easterly line, would that

2 have the effect of having given Serb-held territory away from the previous

3 position?

4 A. Yes, it would have.

5 Q. And your evidence is that it was the accused who drew at least

6 that line?

7 A. That's my recollection.

8 Q. Without reference to anybody, Krajisnik, his farm or otherwise.

9 A. That's my understanding.

10 Q. You've been challenged on your account of some matters, in

11 particular your account of things that you say the accused said. In

12 general, can you explain, please, how if at all you noted matters and how

13 they then came to be in your book and how they came to be given to this

14 Court. Did you make notes at this time?

15 A. I did take notes. I, throughout most of the meetings with the

16 accused, I sat in the number 2 position of the delegation. I was not at

17 every meeting, but I did sit in the number 2 position on most of these

18 meetings and I did take notes as the accused and the head of the

19 delegation discussed.

20 Q. Was it to those notes that you referred when, amongst other

21 things, you wrote your book "Waging Modern War"?

22 A. Yes, I did have access to those notes.

23 Q. Insofar as matters built on your notes are recorded in "Waging

24 Modern War," has anybody ever - I think it's a repeat question but I want

25 it again in any event - has anybody ever said that your account of things

Page 30569

1 as set out in "Waging Modern War" is incorrect in detail?

2 A. No, they have not.

3 Q. In dealing in particular with the exchange that you set out at

4 paragraph 4 of the latest more abbreviated version of your potential

5 evidence, do we find at page 325 of your book a forecast of what was to

6 come in that you say this, speaking of the former Prosecutor, Louise

7 Arbour, fourth line -- or sixth line: "I told her I would be happy to

8 testify eventually, recounting how Milosevic had admitted advanced

9 knowledge of some of General Mladic's plans for Srebrenica." And was it

10 to the material set out in paragraph 4 that you were referring then?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. You've given the account for paragraph 4, first in the longer

13 version of potential evidence described as the annex and then by meeting

14 lawyers from the Office of the Prosecutor, Mr. Groome and Mr. Shin,

15 reducing that to the version that we have. Was that done before --

16 reaching this slimmer version, was that done before you came to The Hague?

17 A. Yes, it was.

18 Q. At The Hague, were you shown and asked to review a document coming

19 from Croatia and being the record of meetings between yourself, Holbrooke,

20 and the late President Tudjman?

21 A. Yes. I was shown that document, and I did review it.

22 MR. NICE: Your Honours, the Court will remember right at the

23 beginning of the evidence that I said there had been a document provided

24 initially in part under 68 withdrawn and then reprovided, and the Court

25 will remember that I recommended to the accused considering it, and it's

Page 30570

1 to that document that I'm now going to turn. It's a document provided to

2 the Prosecution in answer to a request for assistance to the government of

3 Croatia arriving with us at about the 17th of July of last year. I'd ask,

4 please, for the witness to have a copy in front of him.

5 Q. Before we look at any part of it, General, on reviewing it, did it

6 accord or not with your recollection of the meeting concerned?

7 A. Yes, it did in general.

8 Q. Did you find anything in it that you thought to be inaccurate or

9 is it just a question that you, at this remove of time, wouldn't have a

10 detailed recollection for all events?

11 A. I just wouldn't have remembered every detail of the meeting.

12 Q. Very well.

13 MR. NICE: Your Honours will see various passages, and perhaps in

14 order to be -- to give something of the flavour of the --

15 JUDGE MAY: Before you do, this arises, I take it, from

16 cross-examination.

17 MR. NICE: Absolutely. It arises in several ways, but the

18 simplest way would be to remind yourselves that the accused's question

19 included an assertion. There was no mention of Srebrenica, heaven forbid

20 any reference to killing at Srebrenica.

21 Now, under the most restrictive of traditional common law rules,

22 that would allow in a prior consistent statement of the witness, which is

23 what we're going to find here, to the effect of the evidence he'd given.

24 So it's admissible on that ground. The document has, I think, all sorts

25 of other admissibilities given, as Your Honours will see, that the

Page 30571

1 conversation occurred on the day after the day of the conversation spoken

2 of by the witness.

3 Perhaps I can take you straight away to the immediately relevant

4 passage, and if you'd be good enough, please, to go to page 9 in the

5 bottom right-hand corner where we see a long passage. If you'd track back

6 from page 7, you'll see that it's Ambassador Holbrooke speaking in the

7 presence of this witness.

8 Q. Do you have page 9 open, General?

9 A. Yes, I do.

10 Q. And we can see five lines down: "The second issue that we focused

11 on with Milosevic, outside of his problem related to recognition, and the

12 most difficult issue for us is 'Who speaks on behalf of the Bosnian

13 Serbs?' He talked a lot about Mladic and Karadzic and all those other

14 people, and you know what he said for Karadzic? And I quote, 'The man is

15 a damned crack-brained maniac.' You know I never even met Karadzic and

16 whether he is --" and then there is break in the recording, it would

17 appear.

18 "However, with regard to Srebrenica and Zepa, he told us, I don't

19 know whether that's true or not, Mr. President, but we are only informing

20 you now, he told us that he attempted to prevent that from happening. He

21 thought it to be a disgrace. When we told him that war crimes were

22 committed in Srebrenica, he actually agreed. He said, 'I know.' By the

23 way, that is not at issue at all. We just spoke with the US embassy

24 officials ..."

25 General Clark, does this part of the conversation accord with your

Page 30572

1 recollection of what happened in Tudjman's palace?

2 A. Yes, it does.

3 Q. Had you --

4 A. In general.

5 Q. Had you drawn to the attention of other members of your delegation

6 what you had been told by the accused in the presence of the one other

7 person now, sadly, dead?

8 A. To the best of my knowledge, I did.

9 Q. And if we go over the page, we see at the bottom -- sorry, we see

10 at the foot of page 9 when asked about the relationship with Karadzic and

11 Mladic, you said you could say something about that, and the paragraph at

12 the top of page 10, Ambassador Holbrooke picks it up again and he says:

13 "We'll discuss Perisic in a minute. That's very unclear. I asked him to

14 whom is Mladic subordinated, who commands him, and he answered I don't

15 know whether that's true or not. Sometimes I influence him in limited

16 affairs and sometimes I can't influence him. In Srebrenica, he claims

17 that he didn't have anything to do with that, that he attempted to stop

18 it. However, that happened and I'm not relieving him of responsibility."

19 Now, do you remember -- we've looked at the conversations of the

20 accused relating to Srebrenica and foreknowledge. Do you know what the

21 position was with Perisic? Does this record revive your memory?

22 A. With respect, your specific issue, did Perisic know about

23 Srebrenica?

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. I never discussed it with Perisic.

Page 30573

1 Q. So this is Holbrooke speaking on his own.

2 A. This is Holbrooke speaking on his own, but I think he's still

3 speaking about -- yes, he says we'll discuss Perisic in a minute. I read

4 this as still continuing about -- about Milosevic himself, not about

5 Perisic.

6 Q. Thank you very much.

7 MR. NICE: For completeness for the Chamber, the document doesn't

8 take very long to read but the Chamber has an enormous amount to read.

9 Q. If we go on to page 12, we can see that you're invited in the

10 middle of the page to -- or you're not invited, you're offered to say

11 something about Mladic. "You asked me to speak there with Perisic. And I

12 did that." You never go further in explaining anything that Perisic said

13 about Srebrenica so all we have in this record is an account of what the

14 accused says about Srebrenica. Is that your understanding of the record,

15 General Clark?

16 A. Yes, it is.

17 Q. Yes.

18 MR. NICE: Your Honour, there are a number of other things in this

19 document. I may come back to it but I can see the time and I know that

20 there are pressures on us.

21 May this document be exhibited? It is, in our respectful

22 submission, a clear example of a valuable prior consistent statement.

23 JUDGE MAY: I take it that it's also the document to which

24 Mr. Tapuskovic was referring.

25 MR. NICE: No, it's a different one.

Page 30574

1 JUDGE MAY: It's a different one.

2 MR. NICE: This one -- and we don't, unfortunately, have

3 Mr. Tapuskovic's in English. No fault of his. This is the 18th of

4 August. Mr. Tapuskovic's was much later, I think.

5 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Yes. We'll admit this and give it the

6 next number. Yes, Prosecution.

7 THE REGISTRAR: 619, Your Honours.

8 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I beg your pardon.

9 JUDGE MAY: Yes, could you give the number.

10 THE REGISTRAR: 619, Your Honours.

11 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.

12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] The document that I quoted is

13 dated the 31st of August, 1995.

14 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Thank you.

15 MR. NICE:

16 Q. General, there was a passing reference in the accused's complaints

17 or assertions against you about one thing and another. There was a

18 passing reference to the Mladic cap incident. Is there anything you want

19 to say about that, to put on the record now, or shall we leave it where it

20 is?

21 A. Well, I met with Mladic to have an understanding of their

22 positions. I'd been advised to do so by one of my military colleagues who

23 had been Ambassador Redman's advisor. He said be sure and see both sides

24 so you can get their position. I got both sides' position from meeting

25 Mladic.

Page 30575

1 Q. And behaving in --

2 A. I thought it was in an appropriate way. I wasn't trying to

3 provoke an incident, and it would have been helpful if Mladic had agreed

4 to support and sign the Contact Group peace plan, which did he not agree.

5 Q. You made an observation, General, about how the accused was likely

6 to follow through on a settlement of the fighting that preserved as much

7 as possible of the territory that the Serbs had already obtained. You

8 made other observations on a couple of occasions about his ability to

9 conduct negotiations for peace, and to conduct war, and to switch between

10 one and another.

11 Viewing the accused over the hundred hours that you did and having

12 all the other background information, was there a continuing inconsistency

13 in his behaviour, war and peace, or could you perceive a continuing

14 consistent thread in what he was attempting to achieve?

15 A. I believe that there was a consistent thread in the accused's

16 behaviour which was consistent with the aims of this -- what was known

17 colloquially as a Greater Serbia. Whether it was a political entity or

18 not, there was still the idea that he was the protector of the Serb people

19 and would speak for them, whether in war or in peace, and clearly at the

20 point we entered the negotiations, that entity was collapsing, and so it

21 would have been in his interest in 1995 to have sought to end the fighting

22 before the terms of settlement became more adverse.

23 Q. Were negotiations, when conducted, and conducted sometimes

24 publicly for peace, integrated, in your judgement, with whatever support

25 he was giving for or whatever leadership he was giving for war?

Page 30576

1 A. Yes, they were.

2 Q. Behind this underlying single objective?

3 A. That is certainly the way it appeared to me, yes.

4 Q. You were promised at one stage an investigation into the incident

5 at Racak. Did you ever see the fruits of any investigation?

6 A. I never saw the fruits, but I have to confess that after the

7 accused told me he knew how the investigation would turn out, that they

8 couldn't possibly have done this anyway, it didn't seem that there was any

9 real point in seeing the results of that investigation. I do recall that

10 there was an independent investigation made, I believe by a Finnish group,

11 that -- whose findings seemed to be consistent with the initial

12 observations made by Ambassador Walker.

13 Q. But nothing coming from the accused?

14 A. I don't recall seeing anything from the accused.

15 Q. You were asked whether it was well known throughout Europe and the

16 world that there -- in the media that there had been a massacre. I think

17 this was by the amicus. Do you accept that it was indeed well known that

18 there was a massacre? I beg your pardon. This came from you, yeah.

19 A. At Racak.

20 Q. Yeah. In which case I'll withdraw that question and move on to

21 something else because I've probably made an incorrect note.

22 In answer to a question from the amicus, you spoke of the

23 disproportionate use of force by Serbs against the KLA. What were your

24 sources in general terms for that judgement?

25 A. These were reliable sources of US intelligence plus reporting on

Page 30577

1 the ground from the -- from the Observer Mission that was in there.

2 Q. Over what period of time were you receiving those reports?

3 A. Commencing in the spring of 1998 through the outbreak of more

4 intense operations in March of 1999.

5 Q. Did you find your judgement consistent or did you find that you

6 had to revisit your judgement from time to time because of the perhaps

7 increased use of force by the KLA? Just if you can recall, explain how

8 you were able to hold and ultimately to act upon that judgement.

9 A. I continued to seek detailed information on the KLA. I never got

10 much of any specific information. My Russian colleague there at my

11 headquarters told me that I should be very cautious of the KLA. He

12 reported that they were connected to various international organisations.

13 He tried to say that they were reinforced by Chechens and so forth. I

14 asked him to provide that information, but the information he provided me

15 didn't answer and didn't substantiate that charge, nor did it provide the

16 information of a force that was so substantial that it warranted the kind

17 of forces being deployed against it.

18 So I never had a clear idea of the strength of the KLA, but after

19 the initiation of actions on the 19th and 20th of March, it was clear that

20 the KLA had very little capabilities.

21 Q. Thank you very much. The amicus asked you a question about the

22 foreknowledge of risk at the safe havens, and that was the question I'd

23 intended to turn to earlier when I referred to an incorrect note. The

24 risk of which there was foreknowledge was a risk of what happening to whom

25 and by whom?

Page 30578

1 A. Well, this was a complicated series of discussions, and I wasn't

2 in on the creation of these safe havens. They were, frankly -- they were

3 an embarrassment across the board for the United Nations because the

4 United Nations wasn't capable of protecting them, didn't have a mandate to

5 do it or the authority really to deploy the weapons necessary to protect

6 them. And in the give and take of dialogue had at one point ordered the

7 personnel inside the safe havens to be disarmed but lacked both the will

8 and the means to enforce the disarmament, given the fact that the UN

9 itself couldn't protect the safe havens. So it was one of these artifices

10 of peacekeeping that lots of people said lots of things about, and

11 eventually they came to have a huge political symbolism in the sense that

12 they represented a continuing presence of the Bosnian Muslim population on

13 the territory in the eastern part of Srpska that the Serbs had begun

14 ethnic cleansing of in 1992 and had not finished cleansing in the summer

15 of 1995.

16 Q. Mr. Kay asked you something about what Lord Owen may have thought

17 or said. If in 1993 Lord Owen explained that the accused was aware of the

18 potential of great violence being done by the Serbs to the non-Serbs in

19 those areas, would that be the sort of risk that was in mind by those of

20 the international community?

21 A. Well, that would certainly have been the risk that was in mind.

22 Q. And on the basis of what Mr. Kay has raised with you and on the

23 basis of your own experience of the accused, is that something that would

24 have been available to him as general information, the risk that the Serbs

25 would do great violence to the non-Serbs in those areas?

Page 30579

1 A. Yes, I think so. There was also the atmosphere at the time that I

2 recall those suggesting that the Serbs would never dare to attack a UN

3 safe area. And in the summer of 1995, I recall as these attacks were

4 beginning on Zepa and later on Srebrenica, that there were still many in

5 the international community who were in denial that this could ever

6 happen.

7 MR. NICE: Very well. Your Honour, I think that's probably all I

8 want to ask by way of specific questions of the witness, apart from

9 returning to the question of the material about General Shelton, which we

10 should deal with before the witness leaves. I'm just checking with my

11 colleagues to see if there is anything they want to raise.

12 I think that's all by way of re-examination otherwise.

13 My understanding of the position, for the record, is that the

14 document is being sought. I know nothing more about it than that. I know

15 that the witness has to be away at 1.45, and I think the witness may have

16 something to say about that.

17 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, if I may request just a brief

18 five-minute recess for me to go check and see what the status of the

19 document is with my lawyers, I would be grateful.

20 JUDGE MAY: Well, there are, in fact, one or two administrative

21 matters which we need to deal with. We do need to adjourn and leave the

22 court anyway by 1.45. Would it be convenient, General, if you'd like to

23 leave now, while we deal with the administrative matters, and come back

24 when you're ready?

25 MR. NICE: Your Honour, except there's one administrative matter

Page 30580

1 that I must raise and I must raise it in the witness's presence, and then

2 there's another matter that I needn't trouble him with. It's to do with

3 publicity, and may I raise it now?


5 MR. NICE: Witnesses like General Clark, Klaus Naumann, and Lord

6 Ashdown are, of course, subject when they leave this place to enormous

7 press interest and quite inevitably they have to speak about what they've

8 been doing here. They can't, as public figures, be unrealistic about it.

9 In this case, unlike in the case of those other two witnesses, for

10 example, who both did indeed speak to the television, in this case the

11 material evidence is not going out contemporaneously. It's only going to

12 be broadcast subject to such redactions, if any, as may be required, later

13 this week. However, it's known to the witness and to those representing

14 him that there is no objection by anyone to the totality of yesterday's

15 evidence being eventually broadcast by transcript and by television

16 broadcast in full, and I know that they will be much assisted by knowing

17 whether it's going to be appropriate for the witness to speak about

18 yesterday's session in light of that position immediately or not.

19 It's not something upon which those of us in the Office of the

20 Prosecutor can do more than express tentative views because there are

21 court orders here and these are court orders of importance.

22 JUDGE MAY: Your tentative view?

23 MR. NICE: Our tentative view is that the court order as it stands

24 would restrict publication and discussion until after publication of the

25 material in full, but that's our view or our tentative view. The pressure

Page 30581

1 on the witness and on those with him is going to be very substantial that

2 he should say something about the material, and of course if it's known

3 now that what was said yesterday is going to be subject to no redaction,

4 one can understand the way their sympathies might lie.

5 JUDGE MAY: We'll consider that, and meanwhile you may have some

6 instructions.

7 [Trial Chamber confers]

8 JUDGE MAY: We take the view that it would be a more

9 straightforward and probably the correct view of the law that the matter

10 should not be discussed until such time as it is published. When that is

11 to be, I'm afraid I don't know, but on that matter, General, you can

12 certainly be advised by the Prosecutor, who should be aware of when this

13 matter is going to be published.

14 MR. NICE: The registry may be able to tell us. I don't want to

15 jump the gun but I might as well say what my understanding is. Thursday

16 is my understanding.

17 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

18 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, may I speak?

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

20 THE WITNESS: I'm going to request the permission of the Court to

21 be able to talk not about the specifics but about something more general,

22 about the atmosphere of the court, about the procedures, about the

23 demeanours and so forth and the general range of the issues, because

24 there's just no way I can walk out of there and not say anything. I said

25 it yesterday, I just can't get away with it today because I'm not the same

Page 30582

1 public figure that General Naumann was or Mr. Ashdown, with all due

2 respect to the Prosecutor's interpretation. I'm now a political candidate

3 for the highest office in the United States and we're at an incredible

4 historic juncture where Saddam Hussein has just been captured and there is

5 intense effort to understand what an International Criminal Tribunal might

6 consist of, how a head of state faces justice, and so forth. It's a

7 moment of peculiar and particular relevancy for this Court in the eyes of

8 world opinion and it's all come together at once here when I walk out of

9 this courtroom.

10 So I would ask your understanding if I may talk about some of the

11 general matters of the Court without going into the specifics of back and

12 forth exchanges, and so forth. Most of this material is in my book in any

13 event and is public knowledge.

14 [Trial Chamber confers]

15 JUDGE MAY: We are not able to give a definitive answer as to when

16 this is to be published outside the original order which has been given,

17 so, General, we shall grant, of course, permission for you to deal with

18 the generalities in the way which you have described.

19 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours. Thank you very much.

20 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Nice, please.

21 MR. NICE: The witness may like his five-minute adjournment. I

22 must assure him that there was no comparison of him with General Naumann

23 or Mr. Ashdown was in any sense diminishing. I was actually seeking to

24 ensure that he shouldn't be more limited than they were in the advantages

25 they assumed were their rights.

Page 30583

1 Perhaps he can have his five minutes now.

2 JUDGE MAY: Yes, General.

3 THE WITNESS: Thank you to the Prosecutor and to the justices,

4 thank you, sir.

5 [The witness stood down]

6 JUDGE MAY: One administrative matter which is that we've been

7 asked to consider exhibiting, Mr. Kay mentioned it, the UN Resolutions

8 1199, 1160, 1239 and 1203, and I believe that Mr. Kay has them and we'll

9 accept them.

10 MR. KAY: Yes, I've got them here.

11 JUDGE MAY: We'll give them the next C number, may be most

12 convenient.

13 THE REGISTRAR: C25, Your Honours.

14 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I did at one stage -- I remember at one

15 stage raising as a possibility that we should put in the resolutions as a

16 library, and I remember the word "library" drew an inhalation of breath

17 from the Bench and the rejection of the proposition, but I think there may

18 be some more to come at some stage.

19 JUDGE MAY: It may again be convenient at some stage to put them

20 together, not as a library but as a collection, but we'll come to that in

21 due course.

22 Now, there is one other matter, which is the registrar's order

23 which the accused raised. Is there anything that you want to raise?

24 MR. NICE: Independently of that, there is a very small matter I'd

25 like to raise through the Court with the accused. The accused produced

Page 30584

1 one photograph of KLA atrocities, as alleged, and obviously has possession

2 of others. He might like to consider making those documents available to

3 the Prosecution. He should know that the Prosecution pursues, as part of

4 -- and indeed the Prosecutor's here and the accused can see her. The

5 Prosecutor pursues people on all sides of these conflicts under her

6 mandate and is assisted by evidential material, not least of the kind that

7 the accused was seeking to put in evidence in this court. Whether or not

8 relevant here, if he will attend to this, it would be valuable to us to

9 have that material in the duties that the Prosecutor has in respect of KLA

10 alleged offenders.

11 JUDGE MAY: Well, the accused will have heard that.

12 MR. NICE: But nothing in relation to the registrar's order, Your

13 Honour.

14 JUDGE MAY: We have -- I have a note from the registry that the UN

15 Security Council Resolution binder is 547. It may be that somebody could

16 have a look at that and see if we can deal with it slightly more tidily

17 administratively but for the moment, we'll move on. Yes, well, the

18 accused will have heard what you've said, Mr. Nice, and note what the

19 Prosecutor suggests.

20 Yes. You wanted to raise a question about the registry order.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I should first like to refer to what

22 Mr. Nice has said, that apparently they're investigating all crimes. If

23 they are investigating all crimes, then you have first of all the

24 photograph of Clark, Hashim Thaci, Ceku and all the others who were in

25 command of those crimes. As for the other photographs that I showed, I

Page 30585

1 have the name of the person holding those heads and the names of the Serbs

2 who were beheaded. And the photographs that I wanted to show him, because

3 it was his allies that he is keeping company with who did this.

4 Unfortunately, you are not investigating all crimes.

5 JUDGE MAY: Well, you've heard what the Prosecutor has said, that

6 if you pass those documents over in due course, they will be investigated.

7 It's a matter for you whether you pass them over or not.

8 The time is very limited. Do you want to raise the question about

9 the Registry, or we can deal with it tomorrow.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. I raised that matter yesterday

11 already. I have nothing more to add. You have seen that order. I am not

12 allowed to have visits, I am not allowed to communicate by telephone.

13 Therefore, I asked you to rescind that order because I believe it is

14 absolutely in contradiction with elementary human rights I am entitled to.

15 JUDGE MAY: Yes. The Registry provide for a procedure in the case

16 of such a complaint that you communicate in writing, and it's a matter

17 which the President has to deal with. So there is a procedure to deal

18 with it which you can follow, so I'm instructed.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no intention, Mr. May, to

20 address anyone in written form. I have addressed the public in this

21 manner to draw attention to a very flagrant violation of my human rights,

22 and it is up to you to do what you will.

23 JUDGE MAY: You cannot abuse the procedure of the court by making

24 speeches.

25 Mr. Nice, time is short, the witness is not here.

Page 30586

1 MR. NICE: I'll send a runner. I think Mr. Shin probably is going

2 to qualify.

3 We do have a document that's come from the United States. I'm not

4 sure if it's the document that the witness is going to want to put in to

5 cover the passage of his evidence where he said there was more material he

6 wanted to come. So I'll just wait until he comes back in.

7 [The witness entered court]


9 Q. General Clark, I've got a single faxed document before me which is

10 possibly the document you want to go before the Judges. If it is, I'll

11 make it available to you to read and then ask it to become exhibited.

12 A. That's fine. I've not seen this document.

13 Q. You'd better have a look at it first then.

14 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, request permission to read this into

15 the record.

16 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

17 THE WITNESS: This is a statement from former President Bill

18 Clinton: "Contrary to Mr. Milosevic, General Wesley Clark carried out the

19 policy of the NATO alliance to stop massive ethnic cleansing in Kosovo

20 with great skill, integrity, and determination." And I ask that this be

21 submitted as an item for the record.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: What is the date of that?

23 THE WITNESS: It's dated December 16th, 2003.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: I see. Okay.

25 JUDGE MAY: We'll get the next number for the exhibit.

Page 30587

1 MR. NICE: Can it become part of the same clutch of documents that

2 have already been --

3 THE REGISTRAR: 617, tab 7, Your Honour.

4 MR. NICE: May leave for determination one other technical matter;

5 whether, in light of the cross-examination, the extracts or any of them

6 from "Waging Modern War" become exhibited or not. It seems to me that

7 everything has been covered in live testimony, but I'm in the Court's

8 hands.

9 [Trial Chamber confers]

10 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Now, Mr. Milosevic, it's beyond your time. What

11 is the point?

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to say since you have

13 not allowed me to ask the witness about his crimes, you are now admitting

14 a letter --

15 JUDGE MAY: We're certainly not going to listen to this. You know

16 quite well that that's an abuse of the process.

17 We decided earlier that we would not admit the book if the

18 evidence was given live, which it has been, so unless there is any change

19 in our view, which we will communicate overnight, the position will remain

20 the same.

21 Is there anything further that anybody wants to raise?

22 MR. NICE: No thank you.

23 JUDGE MAY: General, I'm sorry you've been kept waiting again, but

24 that does conclude your evidence, and thank you for coming to the

25 International Tribunal to give it. You are, of course, free to go. Thank

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1 you.

2 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. I am very pleased to have

3 been given the opportunity to present my information and my views here in

4 front of this august Tribunal.

5 JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn until 9.00 tomorrow morning.

6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,

7 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 17th day of

8 December, 2003, at 9.00 a.m.