1 Friday, 16 January 2004
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.
7 MR. NICE: In one minute before the witness takes the solemn
8 declaration, administrative matters necessary to make the best use of our
9 time. It's obvious that at the present rate of progress we aren't going
10 to be able even to take all the witnesses I think on the schedule. I'm
11 having to make preliminary decisions about which witnesses we may drop,
12 and I will of course be assisted by knowing in due course what prospective
13 cross-examination the accused would want and would be granted in respect
14 of candidates for abbreviation.
15 It may help if I tell the Chamber the following: The witness
16 listed for next Wednesday, Sarinic, is on the list for four hours but that
17 was before the 89(F) ruling was made. We will seek for him to be dealt
18 with in a period of time less than that in toto. And then there are two
19 witnesses -- I don't ask for any indications at the moment. There are two
20 witnesses, General Vegh on the 5th of February, and Mr. Brunborg on the
21 4th of February, each of whom is experts and against whom substantial
22 periods of time are currently marked. In each case we will be asking for
23 them, if they are taken at all, to be taken more shortly. And were it
24 possible at some stage for the accused and/or the amici to accept, or the
25 Court to rule, that cross-examination need not be too extensive, that
1 would help us.
2 But I hope that these indications of where we are will assist the
3 Court because it would be preferable to plan rather than simply to run out
4 of time, and I want to be able to plan which witnesses properly should be
5 dropped and which should be taken.
6 JUDGE MAY: Which are the two witnesses again?
7 MR. NICE: Apart from Sarinic next week, it's General Vegh on the
8 5th of February and the expert Brunborg on the 4th of February.
9 JUDGE KWON: Did you say 4th of February?
10 MR. NICE: 4th of February I think, yes.
11 JUDGE KWON: Not 28th of January.
12 MR. NICE: He was the 28th and I think he's been moved. Maybe
13 there's a later version, but in any case, he's the expert, Brunborg.
14 That's all, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Yes. If the witness would take the
16 declaration, please.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak
18 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
19 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. If you'd take a seat.
20 WITNESS: BERKO ZECEVIC
21 [Witness answered through interpreter]
22 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
23 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, if we could begin. The Prosecution will
24 be tendering two exhibits; one is the expert report of this witness
25 Dr. Zecevic, and the other is a binder of 30 exhibits. If we could ask
1 that numbers be assigned.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the expert report will be marked
3 Exhibit 636 and the binder of exhibits will be 637.
4 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, in the interests of saving time, the
5 Prosecution wishes to withdraw three exhibits from the binder which is
6 now 637. Those are exhibits -- or tabs 6, 16, and 28. I apologise that
7 the curriculum vitae in tab 1 is also included in the expert report, so
8 the Prosecution will be withdrawing the second copy of that that was
9 included in tab 1.
10 Examined by Mr. Groome:
11 Q. Sir, can I ask you to begin your testimony by telling us your full
13 A. Berko Zecevic.
14 Q. And the Chamber has a full record of your education and
15 professional background before it now. Could I ask you to summarise in a
16 sentence or two what your field of expertise is.
17 A. I specialised in two fields. Education; that is to say, teaching
18 at the faculty of mechanical engineering, and also my expert work in the
19 field of designing ammunition.
20 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, at this time, if it's acceptable to the
21 Court, I will read a summary of what it is that is contained in the expert
22 report and then proceed with my questions regarding some other matters of
23 fact that the witness has information regarding.
24 JUDGE MAY: Have you a copy of that document or is it your own
25 personal summary that you're going to read?
1 MR. GROOME: Just a summary that I have some speaking notes of
2 that. It's not an official document.
3 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
4 MR. GROOME: This witness, a mechanical engineer, is a highly
5 qualified expert in heavy weapons technology of the former Yugoslavia, and
6 prior to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he was involved in the design
7 of heavy weapons, including the 120-millimetre mortar for the JNA.
8 During the war, he assisted the Bosnian and Herzegovina government
9 with a weapons production industry. His full statement as an expert
10 pursuant to Rule 94 bis reports on the operation and effect of the
11 120-millimetre mortar round and the shelling of Markale market in Sarajevo
12 on the 5th of February, 1994. At that time, he had volunteered to
13 participate in the investigation of the shelling of the market and was
14 appointed by the local investigating judge as part of a team of engineers
15 who analysed the physical evidence and prepared a study on the shelling.
16 His analysis concluded, in part, the following: One, that the
17 120-millimetre mortar round exploded upon impact with the surface of the
18 ground in the market and that the tail stabiliser fin of that mortar was
19 found lodged in the centre of the crater created by the mortar; that his
20 analysis determined that it came from the north north-east direction in an
21 azimuth of 18 degrees plus or minus two degrees.
22 Third, that there were six possible locations from which the shell
23 could have been fired from.
24 Fourth, that of those six locations, only the closest one of those
25 sites was under the control of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina
1 army at the time. The other five possible locations were in territory
2 controlled by the army of Republika Srpska.
3 Fifth, that UNPROFOR personnel interviewed -- stated that they had
4 not observed a single projectile fired from the area of controlled -- the
5 area controlled by the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina at a time relevant
6 and that it would be impossible to hide the sound of the firing of a
7 120-millimetre mortar in that area or in that controlled area; therefore
8 concluding that the round must have been fired from one of the other five
10 Six, that it is scientifically possible that one 120-millimetre
11 mortar shell was able to kill the large number of people that it did kill
12 on that day.
13 And finally, that the lack of colour on the tail stabiliser fin as
14 recovered indicates most probably that it was manufactured in the Pretis
15 arms manufacturing plant in Vogosca or Marko Oreskovic in Licki Osik in
16 Croatia, both of which were under the control of the army of Republika
17 Srpska at the relevant time.
18 This expert also reports upon and explains scientific research
19 that indicates that the tail stabiliser fin of the Yugoslav 120-millimetre
20 mortar round would not begin to lodge into the ground if fired on charges
21 1 and 2 and that it would be unlikely to lodge if fired with three charges
22 and would begin to lodge if fired with four, five, or six charges.
23 On the basis of this research, it can be concluded, or he has
24 concluded, that the round was fired from Bosnian Serb-controlled
1 Your Honour, I will now ask the witness regarding matters relevant
2 to his time working in the Pretis factory.
3 Q. Sir, could I ask you to summarise the number of years that you
4 worked in the Pretis factory.
5 A. I worked there for 17 years.
6 Q. And during the time that you were there, did you become familiar
7 with the paperwork of the Pretis factory as well as correspondence that
8 regularly transpired between Pretis, other munitions factories, and the
10 A. I was in the department for research and development of the Pretis
11 factory. That is actually the nucleus in terms of the operation of that
12 factory. That is to say manufacturing ammunition.
13 There were 30 to 50 of us employed in that department, depending
14 on the year, and of course we all had the opportunity of seeing how our
15 colleagues developed. The most responsible people for designing, testing,
16 and introducing ammunition in the Yugoslav People's Army were us, and of
17 course we were present in the manufacturing phase, in the testing and
18 experimental stage, and since this was our very own country at the time,
19 we were all pleased if we could help the Yugoslav People's Army as much as
21 Q. Sir, can I ask you specifically regarding the paperwork that was
22 generated typically by the Pretis factory as well as written
23 correspondence between it and the Yugoslav People's Army and other
24 munitions factories. During the course of your employment there, did you
25 become familiar with such documents?
1 A. Since I was one of the constructors of the 128-millimetre rocket
2 M87, I went through all stages of its design and its introduction in the
3 Yugoslav People's Army, so it was only logical that I had to be --
4 Q. Just in the interest of time, if you're able to answer yes or no,
5 I would appreciate that. Were you familiar with the documents?
6 A. Yes, yes, yes, yes, fully. Fully.
7 Q. Over the course of the last several days were you asked to look at
8 some documents from the Pretis factory?
9 A. Certainly, yes.
10 MR. GROOME: Could I ask at this time, if it pleases the Court,
11 that the binder, 637, be placed before the witness so that he can tab
12 through the large number of documents I will ask him to comment on during
13 the course of his testimony.
14 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll get a number for that.
15 THE REGISTRAR: 637, Your Honour.
16 MR. GROOME:
17 Q. Sir, can I ask you -- can I ask you to turn to tab 2 of that
18 binder, and my question to you: Is that a summary of your observations
19 regarding the documents that you were asked to look at while here in The
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Before I ask you about any specific document, can I ask you in a
23 few sentences to describe for the Chamber what was the pre-war structure
24 of the munitions and weapons industry in Yugoslavia?
25 A. The military industry of the Socialist Federal Republic of
1 Yugoslavia was very well organised with clear competences of all the
2 participants involved. In the process of designing, there were two
3 possibilities; it was done either by the Military Technological Institute
4 in Belgrade or by individual factories. Ammunitions factories were mostly
5 located in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. Ammunition was tested in
6 Nikinci in Serbia. Decisions on whether anything should be developed in
7 the field of ammunition was passed by the Military Technical Council of
8 the Yugoslav People's Army, the -- such a decision would be adopted by the
9 council too, and the technical division of the Federal Secretariat for
10 National Defence passed the further relevant decisions, and therefore, all
11 the competences were clearly outlined.
12 I have to point out one more thing: For a long time, the rule was
13 that there would be a clear division in terms of what each factory should
14 do. For a long time, there had been no parallelism in production. It
15 appeared only towards the very end, towards the 1980s. Before that, the
16 entire organisation was at a very high level.
17 Foreign trade was conducted by the SDPR. The factories themselves
18 did not have the right to sell their products on their own.
19 Q. Can I ask you to describe for us, what was the significance of the
20 Pretis factory itself? How large a factory and what quantity of munitions
21 did it produce?
22 A. The backbone of any army are the artillery units in addition to
23 infantry units, but the main strikes are carried out by the artillery
25 The Pretis factory produced artillery ammunition from 76
1 millimetres to 155 millimetres, rocket ammunition of 128 millimetres, air
2 bombs of 250 millimetres. So this was a highly respectable factory,
3 perhaps among the largest such factories in Europe for the manufacturing
4 of ammunition.
5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness kindly be
6 asked to speak slower.
7 MR. GROOME:
8 Q. Sir -- Doctor, the interpreters are asking if you could speak
9 little bit slower.
10 Doctor, the Chamber has heard evidence about the withdrawal --
11 A. Sorry.
12 Q. -- of the Yugoslav People's Army from Bosnia-Herzegovina on the
13 19th of May, 1992. Did you discover a document dated after that time
14 which indicated to you an ongoing relationship between the Yugoslav army,
15 as it was then called, and the Pretis factory? And I'd ask you to turn to
16 tab 3.
17 MR. GROOME: And if I could ask that the first page of that
18 document be placed on the overhead projector.
19 Q. Sir, do you recognise the document that's contained in 637, tab 3?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Was that a document that you yourself located or found?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Can you summarise for the Chamber what is it is that is stated in
24 that document.
25 A. In this document, the president of the Community of Military
1 Industries of Yugoslavia, Mr. Jovan Jovicic, proposes that directors be
2 appointed for various factories, namely Rudi Cajavec, Pretis, and Famos,
3 special vehicles. All of these factories at that time were under the
4 control of the army of Republika Srpska.
5 Q. And what does this document purport to do?
6 A. It was customary in the former Yugoslavia that the appointment of
7 directors would be carried out or, rather, agreement would be sought from
8 the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, although it was the workers'
9 council that actually carried out the appointment. However, not a single
10 case was registered of appointing a director within the military industry
11 without having consulted the Federal Secretariat for National Defence
12 beforehand and without receiving their agreement.
13 In this particular case, objectively speaking, Bosnia-Herzegovina
14 had attained independence, so it would have been illogical to have this
15 done by the then-Federal Secretariat for National Defence. At that point
16 in time, this was proposed by an organisation that still operated, and
17 that was the Community of the Military Industries of Yugoslavia, and it
18 was headed by its president, Jovan Jovicic.
19 Q. Sir, does this document, through the mechanism you've just
20 described, propose a candidate to be the manager of the Pretis factory?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And who does it propose should be the manager of the Pretis
23 factory now located -- or located in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
24 A. Mr. Milorad Motika, with a degree in engineering, was proposed to
25 be director of the Pretis factory.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. I now ask that you look at tab 4 of 637 and ask that page 1 of the
2 English copy of that document be placed on the overhead projector.
3 Sir, this is a document dated the 18th of June, 1992. Can I ask
4 you to summarise what this document is and can I ask you also to read the
5 conclusion or finding under Roman numeral I.
6 A. Under Roman numeral I problems are spelled out because -- those
7 problems were due to the fact that there was a conflict in the territory
8 of Bosnia-Herzegovina and also --
9 Q. Sorry to interrupt you. Are you sure that you're looking at tab
10 number 4? I believe you're referring to tab number 5 at the moment.
11 A. I'm sorry. I am sorry. Tab 4. This refers to the appointment of
12 the manager of the Vogosca Pretis holding. Jovo Vucic, the previous
13 manager, was dismissed and Milorad Motika, with a degree in engineering,
14 was appointed manager of the Vogosca Pretis holding, and this was signed
15 by Prime Minister, Professor Dr. Branko Djeric.
16 Q. Does this indicate that the recommendation for general manager of
17 Pretis, made through the mechanism of the Federal Secretariat, was adopted
18 by the management or by the Pretis -- or was it enacted for the Pretis
20 A. Yes.
21 JUDGE MAY: What is it?
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the question put by Mr. Groome
23 is unfair because he said the proposal was made through the Federal
24 Secretariat, and this is no proposal of the Federal Secretariat. This is
25 a proposal of a business association that is called the Community of
1 Military Industries and the Manufacturers of Military Equipment. This had
2 existed for years in Yugoslavia. It consisted of the managers of military
3 industry factories. So it has nothing to do with the government, and
4 therefore Mr. Groome is putting a question that is quite wrong.
5 JUDGE MAY: Let us have it clarified.
6 MR. GROOME:
7 Q. Sir, can I ask you to clarify, what was the relationship between
8 the organisation that authored this document that's in tab 3 and the
9 federal organs having to do with the military in Yugoslavia?
10 A. The fact that the Military Industries Community for Yugoslavia
11 existed several years and that it had been established with a view to
12 resolving some of the common problems in the functioning of the military
13 industry, and it served the following purpose: When exports were made,
14 then joint positions were taken. However, it was not customary for this
15 business community to propose its head. It was always the Federal
16 Secretariat for National Defence that gave its approval. Also the
17 appointment of this director could not have been made on the basis of an
18 independent decision. It wasn't that the managers would meet and appoint
19 another manager. This had to go through the Federal Secretariat for
20 National Defence.
21 My opinion is, if I can put it that way, that at this point in
22 time, it was illogical for the Federal Secretariat for National Defence to
23 put forth a proposal again. So use was made of this community which still
24 existed, and they proposed Mr. Motika to be the general manager. My
25 opinion is there was no synchronisation in this process as there had been
2 Q. Now, I want to draw your attention to April 1992. During that
3 month did you cease to work at the Pretis factory?
4 A. Yes, on the 17th of April I stopped working there.
5 Q. Can I ask you to briefly describe why it was you stopped working
6 on the 17th of April in 1992?
7 A. In the days before, there was great tension and shooting in the
8 area of Sarajevo. That week, factories resumed their work, and on that
9 day I came to the factory with a very small number of other colleagues
10 because I thought it impossible for a conflict to break out in Bosnia and
11 Herzegovina, so I came to work in the morning, to the factory. It was
12 around noon or 1.00 p.m., and all of a sudden there was complete silence.
13 This big complex, this factory, employed every day several
14 thousand people, and there was always hum and noise and you could feel it
15 working. However, this was complete silence. And looking through the
16 window of my office, I saw people leaving the factory en masse. I
17 remained there for another couple of hours, and at a certain point I left
18 my office because nobody, none of my colleagues arrived to work that day,
19 although the R&D department was the most important one in the whole
20 factory. There was no director, no senior staff. Nobody was there.
21 Then I left the factory and a couple of days later it was
22 impossible to go in the factory anywhere -- anyway because the JNA had
23 entered the complex.
24 Q. If I can now draw your attention to after the conflict did in fact
25 begin. Can I ask you to summarise for the Chamber the situation with
1 respect to munitions that would have been faced by the early army of
2 Republika Srpska?
3 A. The Pretis factory had in its production programme a continuous
4 process. At all times it was producing a significant amount of
5 ammunition. It is a huge complex and part of its storage facilities were
6 used for storing the reserves of the Yugoslav People's Army. It contained
7 a lot of semi-finished products, not ready-made weapons but parts of
8 assemblies that can easily be put together.
9 The stockpile was enough for about five or six months of
11 Q. Can I ask you perhaps to simply list what, if any, problems the
12 munitions industry at that time in the Republika Srpska would have faced.
13 A. I can say what problems -- what were the potential problems in
14 Pretis in Republika Srpska, because it was the main factory in that area.
15 First of all, there was the problem of supply with energy, power,
16 supply of steam and coal, because that was necessary for the production.
17 And since the military industry was a unified body, no single factory
18 could work alone so that the factory of rockets and rocket fuels in Vitez
19 was under the control of HVO at the moment. The factory of igniting
20 devices in Bugojno was under the control of HVO, and that created
21 significant problems in putting together the production. And then also
22 there occurred problems in providing inputs for the production of
24 Q. Sir, could I ask you now to turn to tab 5 of 637. This is a
25 document entitled -- it's from the Republika Srpska Ministry of Industry
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 and Energetics, and it's titled information on current problems of
2 military industry of the Republika Srpska, and it's dated the 26th of
3 November, 1992. Have you had an opportunity to review this document, and
4 does it fairly and accurately represent some of the problems that would
5 have been faced by the military and munitions suppliers in the
6 Republika Srpska during this early part of the war?
7 A. I have seen this document, and I agree completely that this is a
8 realistic assessment.
9 Q. I'm now going to ask you to turn to tab 7 of 637. You made some
10 mention of raw materials. Can I ask you to describe in a little greater
11 detail what types of materials did the Pretis factory depend on that would
12 become -- or did become unavailable in the latter part of 1992 and
13 continuing on into 1993?
14 A. In the production of ammunition, there is a series of raw
15 materials that are necessary. One of the important components is steel
16 that was supplied from Slovenia, Croatia, or from Niksic and Zenica, which
17 means Bosnia-Herzegovina. Furthermore, rocket fuels for rocket artillery
18 systems are very important as well. Such fuels could be supplied from the
19 Vitez factory, which was then under the control of HVO, or from the Lucani
20 factory in Serbia. I have to emphasise that fuels from the Vitez and
21 Lucani factories were not compatible but were used for only certain types
22 of ammunition.
23 A special problem were fuses and capsules for the production of
24 cartridges. One needs brass. Copper is needed from Serbia. And bearing
25 in mind the overall situation, production in Pretis was made very
1 difficult unless we could complete the supply of all the inputs.
2 Q. Now --
3 A. Explosives were a special problem. They were also supplied from
5 Q. Now, I asking you to draw your attention to the tab 7 of 637.
6 This is a document dated the 20th of September, 1994, and it's signed by
7 Mr. Motika, the director of the Pretis company. Does this document
8 describe the types of munitions that are being produced in 1994, and does
9 it summarise the situation in 1994 with respect to the supply of the raw
10 materials necessary for their production?
11 A. Yes. This enumerates practically the entire span of Pretis's
12 production before and during the war, and this overview specifies the
13 factories which supplied raw materials to our factory, indicating the
14 current problems.
15 Q. And according to this document, have some or many of the problems
16 that existed in 1992 been resolved at this stage in November 1994?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. If I could now draw your attention to tab 8 of 637 and ask that
19 the first page of the English translation be placed on the overhead
21 This is a document dated the 6th of November, 1992, signed once
22 again by Mr. Motika. Can I ask you to summarise in a sentence or two what
23 it is that this document is referring to.
24 A. This is a communication between two factories, one being Pretis
25 from Vogosca, Sarajevo, and the factory of Lucani. And the subject of
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 this letter is production of projectiles for a 125-millimetre tank, M84.
2 The factory in Blagovici produces ammunition for this weapon and produces
3 fuel for this weapon.
4 Q. Could I ask you to now look at tab 9 of 637 and once again ask
5 that the first page be placed on the overhead projector.
6 This is a document dated the 11th of August, 1995. Can I ask you
7 to describe what is contained in this document.
8 A. In this document, Mr. Milorad Motika requests from the Ministry of
9 Defence of Republika Srpska to secure the transport into Republika Srpska
10 from Republika Srpska -- from the Republic of Serbia TNT in the amount of
11 12.000 kilos and copper tubing in the amount of 8.000 kilos.
12 Q. Now, during this time period were there agreements or barter
13 agreements where raw materials and partially finished products were traded
14 between the factories that now existed in the Republika Srpska and
15 factories that existed in the Republic of Serbia itself?
16 A. I think it would have been a natural effort, because they would
17 not have been able to function one without the other, just as today
18 factories that belong to the military industry in various territories are
19 trying to establish cooperation. It is a natural way out.
20 Q. Can I ask you to look at tab 10 of 637. That's a contract dated
21 the 24th of July, 1995. Is that one such example of a barter agreement?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Then if you would please look at tab 11. It's a document dated
24 the 10th of November, 1992, once again signed by Mr. Motika. Is this --
25 does this document also indicate the existence of an agreement to barter
2 A. I could not say that this document speaks of -- speaks to barter
3 agreements. This document reflects the request of Mr. Motika, addressed
4 to the Institute for Technical Repairs, which is an organisation of the
5 Yugoslav army, to supply a certain amount of elements needed for the
6 production of ammunition -- or, rather, I'm sorry, I'm sorry. I didn't
7 notice at first the second page. It does reflect exactly what you said.
8 Both these documents reflect barter deals. I did not pay attention at
9 first to the heading.
10 Q. And finally, could I ask you to look at 637, tab 12, and ask you
11 to comment on this document and what it says.
12 A. In this document the Krusik factory from Valjevo, Serbia, sells
13 fuses TK-M71 and AU-18 as well as ammunition M74 to the Pretis factory
14 with the price being fixed by one of the departments of the Secretariat
15 for National Defence. These are the most important elements of this
16 communication, this document, I would say. And that ties in with what I
17 said before, namely that the Federal Secretariat, even before the war,
18 would make estimates of the value of an hour of work, an hour of labour,
19 or the price of a certain type of ammunition on the market.
20 Q. If I could now draw your attention to tab 13 of 637. Is this one
21 of the documents that you were asked to review here in The Hague?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And my question to you with respect to this document is: Does
24 this document indicate that the Republika Srpska Ministry of Defence was
25 directly involved itself in some of these barter agreements?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Now, if I could ask you to please turn to 14 of Exhibit 637 and
3 ask that the first page be placed on the overhead projector.
4 Have you had an opportunity to review this document; and if so,
5 can you please describe what this document indicates? And this is a
6 document dated the 29th of January, 1994.
7 A. I did have occasion to review it. In this document, the Main
8 Staff of the army of Republika Srpska, the logistics sector, informs via
9 the Ministry of Defence of Republika Srpska, informs the Pretis factory
10 that it is unable to provide 2.000 tons of steel from the Niksic steel
11 works, needed for normal operation, due to lack of funds. And at the same
12 time, they emphasise that in the process of securing 100 tons of
13 explosives in exchange for 125-millimetre ammunition for M84 tanks, it was
14 approved, and that we see in item 3, that the Krusik enterprise would
15 provide mines for the Pretis factory, mortar shells in fact.
16 Q. Can I draw your attention to the first sentence under the CC where
17 it says: "Notification on the allocation of technical equipment and
18 material by the Yugoslav army." Do you see that portion?
19 A. Just a minute, please. I can't see that.
20 Q. Can I ask you to check the tab at the front of the document. It's
21 the number at the front of the document.
22 A. Tab 14 you say?
23 Q. Yes. Okay. I'll move on and perhaps look at your binder during
24 the break.
25 I want to now ask you to turn your attention to tab number 15.
1 Could I ask that the original -- a copy of the original be given to the
2 witness so he can check that it is the same one that's in his binder, and
3 could I please ask that the English be placed on the ELMO.
4 Sir, to ensure that there's been no confusion or mix-up in your
5 binder, could I ask you to just compare what you have in your binder as
6 tab 15 with the three -- with the pages that are to you right now? Are
7 they the same?
8 A. Okay.
9 Q. Can I ask you to describe what this document is.
10 A. In this document, director Milorad Motika is addressing a request
11 to General Mladic at the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska,
12 asking him to urge the chief of General Staff of the army of Yugoslav,
13 General Perisic, to make sure that 1.000 pieces of rocket engines of
14 122-millimetre rocket engines be forwarded to Krusik Holding in Valjevo to
15 meet the needs of Pretis Holding, and to do this through the assistant
16 Defence Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, in the interests of time, the
19 Prosecution is withdrawing tab 16 of this exhibit.
20 Q. Sir, you've been discussing Pretis and its manufacturing capacity
21 during the period of 1992 to 1995. In the documents that you were asked
22 to examine here in The Hague, did you find indications of where a large
23 number of the munitions that were produced were eventually sent from the
24 Pretis factory?
25 A. You mean during the war?
1 Q. Yes.
2 A. The largest part of that ammunition was used in the theatre of
3 operations around Sarajevo by the army of Republika Srpska, namely the
4 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.
5 Q. During the war, because of your expertise, were you called upon to
6 sometimes visit the scenes of where shells had landed in the city of
8 A. I was involved twice, the first time when there was an explosion
9 in the Markale market, and the second time when a rocket projectile was
10 fired on the Sarajevo television.
11 Q. Did you ever come to know from your personal knowledge that shells
12 bearing a manufacturing date of 1993 had been discovered in Sarajevo?
13 A. At that time, I was still head of the research and development
14 sector attached to the Main Staff, and one of my responsibilities was to
15 find an alternative way of supply, and among the detected unexploded
16 shells was a shell with a manufacturing date of 1993. It was produced in
17 the Krusik factory in Valjevo.
18 Q. And where are those two factories located, in what republic?
19 A. That factory is located in Serbia.
20 Q. So within the city of Sarajevo, you found an unexploded shell that
21 had been manufactured in 1993 in Serbia; is that correct?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. I'm going to now ask you to look at the document in 637, tab 7.
24 MR. GROOME: I'm going to ask that page number 7 of that -- of the
25 English version of that be placed on the overhead projector.
1 JUDGE KWON: 7 or 17?
2 MR. GROOME: My apologies; tab 17, page 7.
3 Q. My question to you is: This document dated 11th of February,
4 1993, does it include an accounting of where some of the munitions
5 produced at Pretis were sent, to what units of the army of Republika
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. I know that you do read some English. Can I ask you to take the
9 pointer and point to the column on the English version of that document on
10 the overhead projector to your left. Can I ask you to point to the
11 columns that refer to munitions. And you need to do it on the original at
12 your left hand.
13 A. [In English] Uh-huh, okay.
14 Q. Can you point to the columns that indicate the munitions that were
15 sent to units involved in the Sarajevo area.
16 A. [Interpretation] Column 4, column 5, column 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
17 15, 18, 19, 20.
18 Q. Thank you. Can I now turn your attention to tab 18 of 637. This
19 is a report dated 5th of December, 1993. My question to you is: Does it
20 indicate the amounts of ammunition supplied between the 1st of January,
21 1993 and the 30th of November, 1993?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. If you would now please turn to tab 19 of 637. This is a document
24 dated the 6th of July, 1995. Can I ask you to summarise what is contained
25 in this document.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. In this document, the logistical sector of the technological
2 department of the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska addresses a
3 request to the Pretis factory, to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps command, and
4 to the forward command post of SRK to deliver certain ammunition including
5 100-millimetre, 105-millimetre, 122-millimetre mortar shells, the previous
6 two rounds, and in the fourth position 122-millimetre rounds.
7 Q. If you would now turn to tab 20 of 637. If I could ask you to
8 describe what is contained in that document.
9 A. In this document, which is certified by the seal of the Pretis
10 factory, we see a list of certain amounts of ammunition that was delivered
11 to various brigades active in the area of Sarajevo.
12 MR. GROOME: I will withdraw, in the interests of time, tab 21.
13 If I could ask you to turn to tab 22 of 637. And I ask that the
14 first page of the English be placed on the overhead projector.
15 Q. Sir, does this document, entitled a "Review of the ammunition,
16 explosive ordnance and other armament and military equipment delivered for
17 the period of the 1st of January to the 31st of September, 1993," does it
18 indicate the total quantity in percentage of the output of the Pretis
19 factory that was forwarded to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?
20 A. Yes. Out of the total quantity, 67.3 per cent was delivered to
21 the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.
22 Q. Now, based upon your experience, were you -- were there some types
23 of armaments that could only be produced in the Republic of Serbia itself?
24 A. All guided means were produced in Republic of Serbia; mortar
25 shells, 120, 122, and 60-millimetre; ammunition for anti-air guns;
1 ammunition for infantry weapons. That is what I know. And probably some
2 more complicated systems that may have started to be developed during the
4 Q. I'm going to now turn your attention to tab 23 of 637. And I ask
5 you what is indicated by this document, the document dated the 30th of
6 March, 1993.
7 A. In this document, the technical testing centre in Nikinci, this
8 document, which is addressed by the director of the control of the Pretis
9 enterprise, request is made to test five 125-millimetre projectiles for
10 the -- for two tanks, T72 and M82. This is a standard process. When a
11 certain number of ammunition has been manufactured, a certain number of
12 samples be selected to be tested in the technical testing centre, and if
13 the ammunition corresponds to the standards set, then that ammunition is
14 delivered to the units.
15 Q. And where is this testing centre located?
16 A. The testing centre is in Nikinci, which is close to Sabac, the
17 town of Sabac in Serbia.
18 Q. Would you now please turn your attention to tab 24 of 637, and I
19 ask that the first page of the English be placed on the overhead
21 This is document dated the 21st of May, 1994, also signed by
22 Mr. Motika. Does this document also indicate that some munitions were
23 sent to Nikinci for testing?
24 A. Yes. It says here that two modified 128-millimetre M63 rockets
25 are being sent to the technical testing centre in Nikinci. In this case
1 signed by the Pretis Holding manager, Milorad Motika.
2 Q. Thank you. I'm finished with that document.
3 Sir, I'm now going to ask that you turn your attention to the
4 topic of fuel air explosives. Are you familiar with what that munition
5 is; and if so, briefly describe what it is for the Chamber.
6 A. Air explosives, or thermobaric, or full air explosives are
7 explosives that we used in the Vietnam War, in Chechnya, and these are
8 devices for massive destruction of a certain region. They don't affect
9 the individual targets but they affect the whole surface, and by their
10 effects they have greater consequences regarding manpower and light
11 armoured vehicles than when using solid explosives. Their effect is
12 particularly dangerous in closed areas and urban centres when there are --
13 when there is a considerable increase in the effect of the explosives.
14 These explosives were developed for the air force in the 1980s.
15 And in the Pretis factory before the war, we were about to complete the
16 development of a 250-millimetre bomb filled with this explosive.
17 Q. Sir, did you recently obtain a photograph of such bombs that were
18 deployed by the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?
19 A. Yes.
20 MR. GROOME: Can I ask that tab 30 of 637 be placed on the
21 overhead projector.
22 Q. Can I ask you to describe what it is we're looking at and just
23 generally about this type of bomb.
24 A. This couldn't really be called a bomb. It's a rocket projectile
25 which contains a warhead equivalent to a 250-kilogramme bomb. This
1 projectile consists of three rocket engines, a warhead, which is the body
2 of the air bomb, 250, and a stabilising fin attached to the back part of
3 the rocket engine. This is a relatively simple manufacture of a Russian
4 system which consisted of four racket engines used close to Sarajevo in
6 This rocket system is not precise, but what I did have occasion to
7 analyse during the use of one such system against TV Sarajevo building, it
8 has a very considerable destructive effect.
9 Within the warhead there is liquid explosive, propylene oxide, and
10 the solid explosive is inside and its task is to destroy the body. The
11 fuse at the tip, upon impact, it penetrates the obstacle and with a delay
12 of four, seven, or 15 seconds, it activates the cover, the cartridge, the
13 liquid evaporates, mixes with air, and an explosion occurs, and the whole
14 system has a blast effect on the surroundings.
15 Q. Sir, can I now ask you to look at tabs 25 -- look at 25 first and
16 just --
17 JUDGE KWON: Where was this picture taken, the picture of this
19 MR. GROOME:
20 Q. Dr. Zecevic, do you know where this picture was taken?
21 A. I couldn't really tell you, but I know who took the picture. This
22 photograph in this form -- or, rather, the appearance of this projectile I
23 didn't have occasion to see until this photograph was obtained, because on
24 the spot when it was used against the television building, I only found
25 the rocket engines with the stabiliser. The warhead had exploded, so I
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 couldn't find it in its original form but only parts of it.
2 A year and a half ago I had occasion to meet with a Dutch officer
3 who was in charge in Bosnia for -- of efforts to find unexploded
4 ammunitions, and during a conversation, I asked him whether he had
5 occasion to come across such a system. And he said that he did several
6 times, and then he sent me these photographs.
7 I'm afraid I don't know his name, but I do have his visiting card,
8 and I can provide it for you. He also has photographs of Russian systems
9 that -- on which this system was modelled. So such examples were found in
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina in unexploded form.
11 Q. Can I ask you to turn your attention to tab 25 of 637, and if you
12 would just in a sentence or two describe what it is that is indicated by
13 this document dated the 16th of June, 1995.
14 A. In this document, the logistics sector of the technical department
15 of the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska is addressing to the
16 command of the 35th logistics base and of the 27th logistic base and the
17 Pretis factory an announcement that the 35th base will transport to Pretis
18 aerial bombs, FAB100 kilogrammes, 15 pieces of 250 kilogrammes, I think it
19 says here 14 or 11 pieces, and rocket engines of 128-millimetres, 57
20 pieces, which will be completed, 500 with one engine each --
21 Q. Can I ask you just in the interest of time, can I ask you to look
22 at tab 26 of 637. Is that also some correspondence with respect to Pretis
23 and these fuel or explosives?
24 A. Very similar. Very similar.
25 Q. And once again, to tab number 27?
1 A. Yes, very similar.
2 Q. The motors for some of these bombs, where did they come from in
3 your opinion?
4 A. In view of the fact that Pretis was unable to get hold of rocket
5 fuel, it could no longer manufacture 128-millimetre rockets that were
6 standard, nor could it obtain fuel for 122-millimetre rockets which it
7 started to develop just before the war. These had to be imported, which
8 means purchased abroad and then transported to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
9 Q. And based on your experience, what avenues would have been used
10 for the purchase of such necessary components?
11 A. Normally they could be purchased in Romania, Bulgaria, Russia,
12 Belarussia. In June 1993, a platoon started acting on the urban part of
13 Sarajevo, and I was close to the point of impact. I went there and found
14 parts of rocket motors with inscriptions indicating repair institute --
15 technical repair institute Kragujevac, and the year was 1991. Later on
16 when TV Sarajevo was shelled, I also saw engines with inscriptions
17 indicating that those 122-millimetre rockets were prepared in the
18 technical repair institute in Kragujevac in Serbia. And in my report, you
19 can find photographs of this.
20 Q. After Serb forces left Vogosca in the Sarajevo area in February
21 1996, did you find drawings related to the launching of such bombs or such
23 A. Yes, there were some designs for the launching devices for such
25 Q. Sir --
1 A. I just had a chance to look at them.
2 Q. Without going into the technical details of these launching
3 systems, were you able to determine where these drawings were created and
4 at what time they were created?
5 A. It said VTI on them, Military Technical Institute of the ground
7 Q. And that would have been from what republic?
8 A. In Bosnia and Herzegovina. You mean the Military Technical
10 Q. The drawings that you discovered that had to do with launching,
11 methods on how to launch these rockets, what are you able to tell us about
12 who authored them and at what time they were authored?
13 A. They were authored by the Military Technical Institute in
14 Belgrade. When, I don't know.
15 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, in the interests of time I will not play
16 an intercept, which is now Exhibit 613, intercept number 244, but I would
17 draw the Chamber's attention to it in relation to the next question that
18 I'll ask the witness.
19 Q. Sir, can you -- how were these bombs commonly referred to during
20 this time period?
21 A. They were known as FAB 100 or FAB 250. The first weighed 100
22 kilogrammes and FAB 250 indicated 250 kilogrammes, so the code number
23 indicates the weight of the air bomb.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 MR. GROOME: I have no further questions, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE MAY: How long -- I don't think you've said anything so far,
2 have you, as to how long you were going to be.
3 MR. GROOME: I'm sorry, Your Honour, about this examination?
4 JUDGE MAY: Yes, your examination. I don't think we had any
5 discussion about it.
6 MR. GROOME: Not with myself, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE MAY: No, and I don't think as far as anybody's concerned,
8 but obviously we must recognise the time which is available, and at the
9 same time, of course, it must be a fair examination. Have you any other
10 matters you have to deal with today, the Prosecution, for instance?
11 MR. GROOME: I know that Mr. Tieger is anxious to resume the
12 cross-examination and, if possible, complete that today.
13 JUDGE MAY: Well, thank you.
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We've considered coming to a fair decision as
16 far as the ability which the accused must have to be able to present his
17 case in cross-examination, at the same time, having regard to all parties.
18 What we will do is this; that we will allow the rest of the day for
19 cross-examination by the accused but leaving some minutes, if there is
20 time, to allow the amicus to ask some questions if that's going to be
22 So, Mr. Milosevic, start, make a start.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. May.
24 I really do wish, first of all, to thank Mr. Groome for bringing
25 such a witness here, and especially for producing so many documents. And
1 now, after two years, we can see in this courtroom the enormous quantity
2 of ammunition that was manufactured in the territory of the former Bosnia
3 and Herzegovina, including Republika Srpska, and it can even be seen that
4 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or, rather, the army of Yugoslavia
5 purchased certain devices and ammunition there. Until here, it was -- the
6 prevalent view was that everything came from the Federal Republic of
8 JUDGE MAY: It's not time for speeches, it is for examination.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I received a voluminous
10 amount of documents for this witness. He was first announced as an expert
11 for the Markale explosion, but I see now that many other elements have
12 been produced, and I shall do my best to focus on them, leaving time, of
13 course, for his expert report regarding the Markale shelling.
14 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:
15 Q. [Interpretation] I would like to cover quickly some of these tabs
16 that Mr. Groome produced. First of all, we saw a report on the
17 possibility of manufacturing in special-purpose factories.
18 Mr. Zecevic, this Community of the Industry of Ammunition and
19 Military Equipment is a business association, is it not, and it has an
20 economic nature?
21 A. Not just of an economic nature. It couldn't function, as all
22 military factories were under the direct control of the Federal
23 Secretariat for National Defence, in view of the fact that the prices of
24 products were set by the Federal Secretariat. Therefore, they were not
25 independent economic entities. Therefore, the Community of the Military
1 Industry could not be an economic entity only. It was up to a part.
2 Q. Mr. Zecevic, as you worked in a company and I worked for many
3 years in a company, the nature of the product certainly requires a certain
4 measure of control when we are talking about military equipment - control
5 of the military authorities - but when talking about enterprises as such,
6 they functioned with their own account. They had their own expenses and
7 balance sheets, they had their own profit, they made contributions to
8 various funds, they paid out incomes from their own earnings, they paid
9 for their manufacturing components; therefore, they functioned on the
10 basis of an economic account such -- like any other company in a market
11 economy; is that right?
12 A. No. Every military factory in Yugoslavia constituted part of a
13 system. It couldn't operate independently. There was the so-called
14 principle of a common product, a joint product, which meant that within a
15 product, the price of which was fixed by the Federal Secretariat for
16 National Defence, every factory had a percentage share in this. This was
17 as regards manufacturing for the needs of the Yugoslav People's Army.
18 As for exports, not a single factory could act on its own in
19 exports. Sales were again done by one of the institutions of the Federal
20 Secretariat for National Defence. The distribution of funds in those
21 factories was also controlled. So these military factories cannot be
22 viewed as fully independent entities because they didn't decide on many
23 things. It's rather complicated for those who don't understand it.
24 Q. Yes, for those who don't understand the process. But as you have
25 just explained that not a single factory produced a complete product, let
1 me ask you, do you know how many factories took part in the production of
2 an ordinary passenger car? Who produced the measuring instruments, the
3 plastic parts? Who manufactured the tyres and bumpers? And it was very
4 hard to find a factory in Yugoslavia that produced the whole -- the fixed
5 -- the finished product on its own.
6 A. Yes, but the difference is that the prices of military products
7 was fixed and not for Crvena Zastava products. Who fixed the prices? The
9 Q. You worked in Pretis, didn't you? When you have a loss, when you
10 work with a loss, who covered those losses?
11 A. We couldn't have a loss for one simple reason that Pretis always
12 had billings up to 50 to 70 million dollars and exports accounted for 60
13 per cent. These were high-profit companies.
14 Q. So Pretis was a high-profit firm, and it acted like any other firm
15 on the market.
16 A. A high-profit firm but under direct control, which means that
17 incomes, the salaries, were fixed. Personal incomes could not be
18 increased with the increase of profits.
19 Q. So they never got the surpluses within Pretis?
20 A. Rarely.
21 Q. I'm surprised by that, because I think in most companies in
22 Yugoslavia, people did receive bonuses if they worked with a profit.
23 So this report by the Community of the Military Industry, like any
24 kind of business association, of course this is military production, no
25 one is denying it, but let me just read the first paragraph. "Under
1 conditions of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is still a possibility
2 through organised cooperation with facilities in the Federal Republic of
3 Yugoslavia to organise production in Rudi Cajavec..." which manufactured
4 electronic components; isn't that right?
5 A. Yes. They also manufactured TV sets and radio sets and all kinds
6 of things, Rudi Cajavec, Pretis, Famos.
7 Q. Famos produced engines, isn't that right, motors?
8 A. Yes. This is a reference to special vehicles.
9 Q. Yes, but engines from Famos were also used for the Priboj factory
10 of trucks in Serbia. Then there was an association called Famos. They
11 cooperated with Mercedes. Don't you remember that?
12 A. Yes, you're quite right as far as automobiles are concerned.
13 Q. Then Pobjeda. Pobjeda is in Gorazde, isn't it? So with other
14 enterprises in Bosnia-Herzegovina cooperation is possible upon prior
15 stabilisation of political circumstances, should that occur. So we have
16 here an opinion, I would say an expert opinion of business people, and I
17 emphasise under certain conditions, as it says, upon prior stabilisation
18 of political circumstances should they occur. And that is all.
19 And then there is an indication of the need for business people
20 working in the area to focus on economic issues, and after that you were
21 given a document on the appointment of the manager of Pretis Holding,
22 Vogosca, and he was appointed by the government of Republika Srpska or,
23 rather, by the Prime Minister, Professor Dr. Branko Djeric, which is also
24 quite logical as the Republika Srpska has already been formed and Pretis
25 was within Republika Srpska. Isn't that right, Mr. Zecevic?
1 A. No. Republika Srpska hadn't been formed then.
2 Q. Well, how come the Prime Minister, Professor Dr. Branko Djeric --
3 as far as I know he was Prime Minister of the Republika Srpska. He was
4 never -- It says up there the government of the Serbian Republic of
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina is issuing this decision.
6 A. We can discuss this at length, but I would like to draw your
7 attention to something else. If the president of the Community of the
8 Military Industry of Yugoslavia is proposing the establishment of
9 relations, why doesn't he mention the factory in Bugojno?
10 Q. But it mentions Pobjeda, which is in Gorazde.
11 A. It was thought that Pobjeda would be under the control of the Serb
12 forces, but unfortunately, it was not possible at the time.
13 I would like to draw your attention to the fact, could the
14 president of an economic association such as this one, should he say the
15 appointment with the corresponding military authorities? It is in short
16 to coordinate security conditions and to coordinate ammunitions
17 production, et cetera. If we're trying to say that he was just the
18 president of an economic association, then why should he suggest that
19 military authorities should be engaged to ensure security conditions in a
20 factory? He should have dealt with professional matters and not military
21 security matters.
22 JUDGE MAY: In fact, I'm going to adjourn this for a moment
23 because the time is now up. We're going to adjourn for 20 minutes, and
24 Mr. Zecevic, would you be, please, since you're giving evidence, to bear
25 in mind not to speak to anybody about the evidence until it's over. Thank
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
2 Twenty minutes. We'll continue then.
3 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
4 --- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.
5 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. I will try to move on as fast as possible because we haven't got
8 much time, Mr. Zecevic, so I'm going to ask you to give me the shortest
9 possible answers. Of course, not to the detriment of what you're trying
10 to say, but let's keep things within sensible proportions.
11 So as far as I can see, a series of documents indicates that the
12 Republika Srpska was being formed and thus regulated its own economy,
13 including the military industrial complex. This shows this document
14 related to the appointment of the director of Pretis Holding, where it can
15 be seen that the government of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
16 adopts this decision on the appointment of the manager of Pretis Holding
17 and then this is signed by the Prime Minister. I assume that this is not
18 in dispute.
19 A. Absolutely; it is not in dispute.
20 Q. Along with a comment of what was going on there, Mr. Groome asked
21 you what Pretis had to obtain from elsewhere and then you said it was
22 electricity, coal, steam, explosives manufactured in Vitez, and that was
23 under HVO control, then fuses in Gorazde. That was a factory that was
24 also under the control of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the rest.
25 So this was a dispersed production of elements that you spoke of. That is
1 not in dispute either; right?
2 A. It is not in dispute.
3 Q. All right. Further on, you were shown a longish document from the
4 26th of November, 1992 about the current problems of the special purposes
5 production Republika Srpska.
6 A. Could you please give me the tab number so that I can follow you
7 easily, more easily?
8 JUDGE KWON: Tab 5.
9 THE WITNESS: Okay.
10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. And then what is discussed here are primarily economic and
12 financial issues.
13 A. I have to intervene at this point, I'm sorry.
14 Q. It's all right.
15 A. It's not only economic issues. For example, on page 5 of this
16 particular tab, it says that the overall claims of the special purposes
17 factories of Republika Srpska vis-a-vis the SDPR are a certain number of
18 dollars. $100 million. So this includes factories that at that point are
19 under the control of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
20 Q. Mr. Zecevic, I'm not going into the actual correctness of the
21 information. However, the SDPR is a company that dealt with exporting the
22 product of the specialised industry from all of Yugoslavia. Isn't that
24 A. Precisely. But it did not have any authority at the time.
25 Q. No, but the outstanding dues remain as such; isn't that right?
1 A. Absolutely. But until things were legally regulated in
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina the SDPR or anybody else, the community of the military
3 industry, did not have the right to interfere in the internal affairs of
4 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina which legally did exist at that time.
5 Q. All of that is well and fine, but the SDPR is not interfering in
6 any way here. This is information about current problems of the special
7 purposes industry of Republika Srpska and presented to the Government of
8 Republika Srpska.
9 A. Yes, precisely. But it seems as if nothing had changed in the
10 sphere of influence. That's the difference.
11 Q. But I am going to tell you that they do show what was different.
12 Towards the end of page 7, they say: "As we are geared towards them,
13 inevitably they are in a position to blackmail us." So obviously this
14 refers to the economic relations among different enterprises.
15 A. That's right.
16 Q. And they are asking for settled -- claims to be settled, for old
17 debts to be paid. So they are talking about companies and the SDPR, about
18 companies in the territory of Yugoslavia. They say they are a position to
19 blackmail us, and they are asking for the payment of old debts, and in
20 parentheses it says: "At the same time the Federal state does not wish to
21 pay them." That is to say, the outstanding dues to our enterprises, our
22 companies, but they are trying to put this into the general balance that
23 will have to be struck between the federal republic of Yugoslavia and
24 Republika Srpska and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and so on and so forth, because
25 there has to be a division of assets. And they ask for cash advance
1 payments for new orders.
2 So this is a reality that is referred to in this particular
4 A. That is exactly what is written here.
5 Q. Further on, there is information about the production capacity of
6 Pretis, and then the development of Pretis is geared in eight directions,
7 and then it is explained that it's a special purposes and for military
8 purposes, tool production, overhaul, machinery, dishes, then for the train
9 car industry, transportation services, and other market-oriented
10 programmes. This also includes some information --
11 A. Could you please give me the tab number. I simply cannot follow
12 you, and therefore, I cannot answer your questions.
13 JUDGE KWON: Tab 7 and the following.
14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. I just quoting all of this, yes. Then, of course, the main
16 cooperation partners, the Vitez, Duk [phoen], Nepsavic [phoen], Vlasenica,
17 Bistrica, et cetera. All of that pertains to - how shall I put this? -
18 the economic aspect of the manufacturing facilities of Pretis.
19 A. No. Military cooperation. That is a significant difference.
20 This -- if the final product is aimed at killing people in Sarajevo, then
21 that cannot be a very good business.
22 Q. Please. This is provisional information by the Pretis Holding
23 Company to the Secretariat of the Economy of the Serb Municipality of
24 Vogosca; isn't that right? So that's the document involved. And it
25 explains what the capacities of Pretis are and this explanation is given
1 to the municipality of Vogosca?
2 A. I don't see why anything would be in dispute in terms of this
3 report except for the absolute substance.
4 Q. The substance involves the overall activity of Pretis, the one it
5 had before the war. And it says what can be used now from among all these
7 A. Everything is fine as far as this report is concerned.
8 Q. All right. Then there is the letter of the director of the
9 holding, Mr. Milorad Motika, to -- addressed to the factory in Lucani, and
10 then he says to them that they have provided them with casings and sets
11 and so on, and they are asking for deliveries. This has to do with the
12 relationship between two different companies, and it shows that,
13 inter alia, the Lucani factory is buying something from them and selling
14 something to them.
15 A. No. According to international law, when explosives are
16 concerned, there is a special procedure involved, and such things cannot
17 be exported from one country to another without abiding by these rules. So
18 this has nothing to do with business itself. They can reach an agreement,
19 but once they agree on this, they have to abide by the regulations
20 involved in such particular procedures.
21 At this moment, there was a war going on in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
22 If munitions were exported from Serbia or if parts of munitions or
23 ordnance or fuses or cartridges were sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina, since
24 there was an embargo, that means that that country was directly taking
25 part in the killing of people who were unarmed. This shows the two
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 companies agreed to provide components to one another. One firm -- one of
2 the two firms is eight kilometres away from Sarajevo, and they were
3 supposed to manufacture munitions which were supposed to be used against
4 the citizens of Sarajevo and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
5 Q. And what about the things that they sell to the firm in
6 Yugoslavia? This was there war in Yugoslavia, so what was done about
7 that? They were selling this to the Yugoslav company?
8 A. At that point, Yugoslavia could not produce T72 and M84
9 components, and of course it was the objective of the Yugoslav army to
10 have this kind of ammunition for these resources. These tanks, T72 and
11 M84, are tanks that the Serb army in Bosnia-Herzegovina had very few of in
12 comparison with the Yugoslav army.
13 Q. Thank you very much for explaining this. So the Yugoslav army was
14 obtaining the munitions it needed from Pretis; is that right?
15 A. That's right.
16 Q. So they purchased from Pretis the things that Pretis manufactured
17 and that Yugoslav companies could not manufacture.
18 A. And at the same time they sold to Pretis what Pretis could not
19 obtain in Bosnia.
20 Q. Well, that is the very nature of any business deal. I'll go
21 through this very quickly because I have to move on to your expert
23 You mentioned the Kragujevac overhaul factory. It also functions
24 as a proper enterprise, a proper company.
25 A. I beg your pardon. It is not a company. It has a military post
1 code. That is a unit within the Yugoslav army. So it is not an
2 independent economic entity.
3 Q. But it is most certain that they collect payments for the services
4 they render.
5 A. They collect payments.
6 Q. And this is done on a commercial basis.
7 A. Well, generals also have their services paid for by receiving
8 their salaries.
9 Q. Well, this is a bit different. Please look at tab 10, I think.
10 It says "barter deal." Precisely between the Kragujevac maintenance and
11 repairs depot and Holding Pretis, and the two are represented by their
12 general managers, and it is the exchange of goods between the parties that
13 is regulated in this contract, and that is what is said -- what is
14 provided here.
15 A. It is interesting if you look at Article 2, timber and iron and
16 Golf engines are supplied from Bosnia, and what is imported are mines,
17 ammunitions and fuel for 120-millimetre shells. So it's barter.
18 Q. Everybody is buying and selling what they have or what they do not
19 have; is that right?
20 A. There was an embargo on the import of weapons in
22 Q. There was an embargo on all of that and there were sanctions
23 against the entire Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
24 A. I'm talking about the killing of people. People were killed in
25 Bosnia. They were killed through this barter contract in part.
1 Q. As far as I know, all countries trade in weapons and military
2 equipment, all of those who have a military industry of their own, and you
3 know that full well since you were employed by such an industry.
4 A. However, there are special situations when there is a crisis.
5 Then there are special rules on the import or export of weapons.
6 Q. Mr. Groome asked you about this telex. I see that it was typed as
7 a telegram and it refers to 125-millimetre ammunition for the M84 tank and
8 so on and so forth. Isn't it clear that the Federal Republic of
9 Yugoslavia is buying this from Pretis?
10 A. Yes, it is clear on the basis of this they are buying munitions of
11 125 millimetres, and they are sending to Bosnia-Herzegovina what is
12 required to kill people.
13 Q. And before that, 2.000 tons of steel were sent from the Niksic
15 A. They cannot do it because they do not have the financial resources
17 Q. But that is what is being sought; right?
18 A. Yes. Again for the body of projectiles in order to kill people.
19 Q. Well, when somebody orders steel from a steel plant, then that is
20 the production of steel --
21 A. No.
22 Q. -- not projectile bodies.
23 A. I'm sorry, Mr. Milosevic; there are special types of steel used
24 for special purposes and made according to special standards with
25 appropriate mechanical and physical and chemical characteristics that are
1 used for projectiles. In this case the steel plant in Niksic is a
2 specialised factory that was built for producing this special kind of
3 steel, but it provides high-quality steel, very expensive, which is only
4 used for manufacturing ammunition and very sophisticated parts.
5 Q. It is true that, inter alia, the Niksic steel plant does
6 manufacture such steel, but it is a steel plant like any other steel
7 plant, and it makes steel. So in this tab 18, I believe, again you can
8 see, and I just wish to make this point here, I'm not interested in the
9 quantities at all, this is a report on issued ammunition from the Holding
10 Pretis according to instructions issued by the Main Staff of the army of
11 Republika Srpska, and then the information is that in the period from the
12 1st of January, 1993 until the 31st of November, 1993, according to
13 instructions issued by the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska, the
14 following resources were issues from Pretis. And then there is a list
15 several pages long showing how much was manufactured and what was sent to
16 various units.
17 A. It doesn't refer to the manufacture. It only refers to the
18 quantities received by the army of Republika Srpska.
19 Q. From Pretis.
20 A. Yes, from Pretis.
21 Q. So that's the difference. And then further on also, since there
22 are many tabs, you have tab 19 where again reference is made to the fact
23 that from Pretis for the needs of the army certain quantities of munitions
24 are being issued; is that right?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And then in tab 20, there is a survey of the munitions provided in
2 the period between the 1st of February and the 28th of February, 1993.
3 Then the name of each and every item, and then how much is received by
4 individual units.
5 You put on the ELMO the survey of Vogosca, Ilijas, Rajlovac,
6 Sokolac, Das [as interpreted] and so on, these Pale -- these are all the
7 different brigades that received these munitions. So what can be seen
8 here is - how should I put this? - a continuous regular activity of the
9 military industry of Republika Srpska, in this case Pretis, which is quite
10 logical in a state of war; is that right, Mr. Zecevic?
11 A. That is not being brought into question. This production could
12 not have functioned without support from Yugoslavia. That's the problem.
13 Q. Well, you see, Mr. Groome put a question to you. Certainly they
14 received supplies from Yugoslavia. That is not being contested. The
15 question that Mr. Groome put to you is where parts or components were
16 imported from, and you mentioned Romania, Bulgaria, Russia. You could
17 have mentioned all the countries of the Warsaw Pact that had similar types
18 of weapons and from where these purchases could be made. You mentioned
19 these countries.
20 A. I just have to correct you in one respect. This observation of
21 mine only had to do with the 122-millimetre rocket projectiles GLAD M21
22 [as interpreted]. That was the specific question in terms of the
23 markings, the cold markings on parts of projectiles that I found. They
24 were later overhauled by the technical depot from Kragujevac. That is
25 what I spoke of, because there are different ways of making these markings
1 with different colours or by carving this in metal. That's the only
2 reference I made. I did not mention any other munitions. 122 millimetres
3 could not be manufactured in Pretis or in Yugoslavia because there wasn't
4 any. It was imported. We even have photographs of this. We see the
5 markings, and it was repaired, overhauled in Kragujevac, and then Sarajevo
6 was targeted with these munitions. This is the whole truth. There is no
7 dilemma, and that is what my observation referred to.
8 Q. All right, Mr. Zecevic. Munitions or components from munitions,
9 or components for these rocket projectiles and so on and so forth, that
10 was purchased in the market wherever it could be purchased; isn't that
12 A. I don't know. I don't know. I was not abreast of that.
13 Q. All right. Since Mr. Groome asked you about some drawings,
14 schematics and so on that had remained in Pretis and that you had the
15 opportunity of seeing, and you say that this was designed at the Military
16 Technical Institute. There is a single Military Technical Institute in
17 the territory of the former Yugoslavia; isn't that right?
18 A. There are two. There is the air force Military Technical
19 Institute and the ground forces technical institute.
20 Q. All right. So let me correct myself. There is only one Military
21 Technical Institute of the ground force is in the territory of the former
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. It was in Belgrade
25 A. Yes.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. And in it all systems were designed for the special purposes
2 industry of Yugoslavia?
3 A. Until 1976. From 1976 onwards, in Bled, the military council
4 decided that factories also had the right to be involved in R and D.
5 Q. So factories had their own development sectors, and apart from
6 them was the military engineering institute?
7 A. Correct.
8 Q. Therefore, these drawings, designs for rocket projectiles were
9 made at the time when these rocket projectiles were designed, were
11 A. No. These 122-millimetre rocket projectiles were never designed
12 in the military engineering institute until 1992.
13 Q. What did these drawings that you saw refer to?
14 A. They referred to a launching ramp for rocketised bombs.
15 Q. That means that the engineers from the military institute did
16 their professional job and manufactured certain components for launching.
17 A. Yes, but for another country.
18 Q. So you think they were not doing it for their own country but for
19 another country?
20 A. According to the information I have, that system was not
21 introduced in the army of Serbia and Montenegro, nor has it ever been
22 publicly displayed within a unit of the Yugoslav army.
23 Q. But you know very well that many systems are manufactured, tested,
24 and later either introduced or not into the system of weaponry. But in
25 any case, the military institute had sufficient designing capacities and
1 designers to design various things, and it was then up to the competent
2 authorities to decide whether to introduce it or not.
3 A. The military engineering institute is a professional institution.
4 It does not have that in its purview.
5 Q. I will not ask you any more about the military complex in
6 Republika Srpska. I think this issue has been covered sufficiently here.
7 I would like to ask you to focus on issues of your expertise regarding the
8 Markale incident.
9 But before I begin with specific issues, specific questions, in
10 your statement of 1996, in paragraph 8 on page 2, you say that you
11 volunteered to work in the investigation regarding the shelling of the
12 Markale market; is that correct?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. That was on the 5th of February, 1994?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And you volunteered when you heard that General Smith of the
17 UNPROFOR said it was impossible to establish where the shell had been
18 fired from?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And until the moment when you heard this, as you say, you were not
21 involved in the investigation of this incident.
22 A. I was not.
23 Q. At the moment when you heard this statement of General Smith, you
24 were not aware of all the elements that were established or were not
25 established by UNPROFOR teams. Isn't that obvious?
1 A. I had no access to UNPROFOR investigation teams.
2 Q. Tell me first one tangential thing. Do you know at what time
3 General Smith was in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
4 A. I think I was mistaken about his name anyway. It doesn't matter.
5 Information was broadcast over the television that it was
6 established -- it was impossible to establish where the projectile came
7 from. I called a colleague of mine in a technical service. He invited me
8 to come the next day. I came on site. There was a judge there. I
9 introduced myself. I brought two of my colleagues who were ballistics
10 experts, and the two of us were appointed competent experts who were
11 supposed to give their report.
12 Q. Just let me go through the events as they went until your report.
13 The explosion happened on the 5th of February, 1994, around noon.
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Is it established that three UN teams came to the site of the
16 explosion immediately after it happened?
17 A. I don't know about that. I was in a different part of Sarajevo
18 when it happened. Only that evening I was able to hear on the radio and
19 television and see the footing of their reports.
20 Q. There were various teams, including Major Russell, Fairbud
21 [phoen]. Did you see various documents?
22 A. No. I didn't see these documents until then. At the time when I
23 joined, I was not in the army, I did not have an official position, I was
24 simply a person who was employed in the Unis Institute, according to
1 Q. But at that time did you know that these teams had established
2 that the shell had probably been fired from the Muslim side?
3 A. No.
4 Q. So it was only -- and I will acknowledge what you said about
5 making this mistake, because General Smith was not in Bosnia at the time.
6 Anyway, when you heard this on television, that it was impossible to
7 establish where the shell had come from, it's only then that you
9 A. It was my duty. I'm a professional.
10 Q. And then you reported to the security centre?
11 A. Not the security centre but the criminal investigation service
12 because I used to work with them in 1992, 1993.
13 Q. And you asked them for permission to get involved?
14 A. No. They were not in a position to give me permission. I did not
15 ask permission from the security centre. I addressed the judge.
16 Q. So it was the judge who appointed this team of experts, including
17 you and two of your colleagues.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And thus you and two of your colleagues received an official
21 A. Yes. We were entitled to gain access to the site and make certain
22 analyses that we thought we were able to do.
23 Q. And that's when you started your investigation which included
24 inspection of the site, the necessary measurements, filming, et cetera.
25 And then you reviewed television footage.
1 A. No. I reviewed part of the television footage when you see a
2 soldier of the UNPROFOR retrieving the stabilising fin from the ground.
3 Q. And then you made computer simulations and your own assessments,
4 plus/minus 2, 5 per cent. You calculated the azimuth or the bearing, and
5 you describe this on page 3 of your statement, and finally you make your
6 expert report.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Now, this report, this expert finding, is dated 7 February 1994.
9 A. Correct. It took me 30 hours to complete it. If you think it can
10 be done faster --
11 Q. No, I don't think anything of the kind. I think, on the contrary,
12 that you set out to investigate events of the 5th of February as a
13 volunteer expressly appointed by the investigating judge and then produced
14 a full report on the 7th of February. I find this almost impossible,
15 because UNPROFOR experts, which I suppose are as qualified as you, had a
16 much longer deadline to make and publish their own findings.
17 A. Will you please stop here, because you made several assertions
18 which are not quite appropriate.
19 First of all, UNPROFOR teams that came on site were composed of
20 officers who were already on the territory of Sarajevo. The technical
21 officer, an engineering officer, does not necessarily know the technology
22 of firing. He is only trained to use weapons and ammunition, whereas my
23 colleagues and I were professionals who have spent their entire lives
24 designing weapons and ammunition. We had behind us years of experimental
25 work, testing. We attended dozens of explosions of projectiles. We know
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 how munitions were produced and what they are capable of achieving. I
2 used to teach at the mechanical engineering faculty. I was aware of the
3 design of warheads.
4 Don't interrupt me, it's important.
5 The results of the technical team I was part of cannot be compared
6 to the results and findings of the UNPROFOR experts.
7 Also, I was aware that I had to produce a report within 24 hours.
8 That means I had to submit it the next day, within 30 hours. And that's
9 the difference. And if my memory serves me well, the town was under
10 siege. It had no electricity, no water. At that particular time there
11 was no shooting, but there was shooting the previous day when I was
12 working. So to turn on my computer in Sarajevo, I had to use a generator
13 to effect this computer simulation of the trajectory. Those were
14 impossible conditions for work.
15 Q. All right, Mr. Zecevic. What I'm asking you now has nothing to do
16 with the structure of explosives or - how shall I put it? - shells or any
17 of the things you enumerated.
18 Can you comment on this: Captain Verdi, who arrived on site much
19 earlier than you did, established a much greater bearing or azimuth and a
20 much greater angle at which the shell had to make its impact without
21 hitting the building nearby, and that's the basis on which he thought it
22 was fired from the Muslim side.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, can I make a very
24 brief presentation, a graphic presentation of this event which will
25 provide clear answers to these questions?
1 JUDGE MAY: Let's just go on a bit longer. We'll look at the
2 time, and if possible, you can do that.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. I will try to answer
4 your question now.
5 I had not seen that report, but I will try to explain briefly in
6 which way I arrived at the direction from which the shell came and to
7 assess the angle at which the shell impacted the ground.
8 First of all, when the shell hits solid ground, activating the
9 fuse, in the course of explosion there is a natural fragmentation of
10 components. The splinters impact and damage the ground. In this case, we
11 had clear scrapes of the fragments of the projectile on the ground. These
12 scrapes are axially symmetrical. So the traces of these scrapes, the
13 shapes of the scrapes show the direction from which the projectile
14 arrived. On that basis, we were able to conclude that the direction was
15 18 degrees north north-east. That's one.
16 Second, the projectile fell into an area between two lines of
17 stalls, shopping stalls. The width of this corridor between stalls is on
18 the order of about a metre. I don't have the exact figure, I can look it
19 up later. And the height of the stalls is about two metres. And if we
20 use simple geometric arithmetic that we know from primary school - you
21 don't need high education - you can realise that the minimal impact degree
22 is 55 degrees. That is the lower -- lowest estimate, because if the angle
23 had been lower, the projectile would have hit the roof of the stall.
24 If we approach directly the place of the -- the spot of the
25 explosion and if we look at the recording, the video, we see an opening in
1 the ground where the stabiliser fin was sticking from. I asked for the
2 stabiliser fin to be brought, and without any effort I put it back in the
3 ground to the depth of 250 millimetres. I used a quadrant, which is an
4 instrument for measuring elevation, and I measured the angle of
5 inclination of this stabiliser fin. It was about 60 degrees. Since this
6 stabiliser fin had been retrieved from the ground before, I thought as a
7 professional that it would be unprofessional of me to determine the angle
8 at exactly 60 degrees. I took a margin of error of plus/minus 5 per cent,
9 and I thought it was fair to admit I could have made a small margin of
11 Those are purely technical discussions. Based on these findings,
12 I determined that the angle of impact was around 60 degrees, the direction
13 was from -- of the trajectory was 18 degrees north north-east, and I took
14 into account the structure of scrapes on the ground. On that basis, I saw
15 that the traces on the ground were not axially symmetrical, which shows
16 that the projectile hit the ground at a certain angle. As I said, around
17 60 degrees. The very finding that when the projectile hit the ground,
18 after the explosion the stabiliser fin was stuck into the ground means
19 that the projectile had a very high velocity.
20 Q. Very well, Mr. Zecevic.
21 A. Sorry. I have to finish.
22 On that basis, it was very easy to determine the location at six
23 possible points. If you take into account that the stabiliser fin is
24 stuck into the ground, that is only possible at velocities higher than 100
25 metres/second. And based on ballistic analysis, it could have been at
1 velocities of 4.900, 5.000 or 6.600 metres/second. So the nearest
2 distance between VRS and the Muslim side was 1.900 metres.
3 Q. Is it in dispute that Major Russell determined that the projectile
4 fell at a degree of 67 to 73 degrees?
5 A. I didn't see his report, so I can't say whether it was in dispute
6 or not.
7 Second, I don't know on what basis he determined that. All that I
8 presented in my then report and in my subsequent reports used during the
9 trial of General Galic is clear as to what basis it is founded on. You
10 can only tell me on what the findings of the major are based.
11 Q. In any case, Mr. Zecevic, it seems logical that you should look at
12 the reports of other teams and the team of the UNPROFOR who made all the
13 other measurements in addition to making your report, because you must
14 admit that you have a conflict of interest. You immediately volunteered
15 to be one of the investigators in this incident with a prejudice that it
16 must have been fired by Serbs, whereas the UN had several teams whose
17 findings differ from yours. How do you explain this discrepancy?
18 A. Mr. Milosevic, I volunteered because 68 of my co-citizens were
19 killed and 274 were wounded. My children, my sister, my brother and their
20 children could have been among them. My friends were there. And that is
21 why I volunteered to establish that. I didn't volunteer to give any
22 publicity to myself.
23 Let me finish, please. There's something else I wish to say.
24 Why would I look at reports of any of the UN officers if that
25 report was never shown to me? Secondly, my position in Sarajevo was not
1 such for me to be given a report or someone to call me to read the report.
2 If the Prosecutor asked me to provide an additional report, they never
3 felt it necessary to give me those reports, so I'm saying that I didn't
4 have a chance to look at them.
5 Thirdly, I think that it is better as an independent author
6 without looking at what others had written to write my own report. And
7 whoever reads it will find that there's absolutely not a single error in
8 it in terms of the physical description of the event. There are no
9 fabrications nor any subjective opinions but very exact and precise facts.
10 Q. Doesn't your subjective opinion -- isn't it reflected in the text
11 of the report when the army of Republika Srpska is referred to as Chetnik
12 forces, aggressor forces, et cetera? And yet you're an expert who is
13 called upon to establish professionally the trajectory of the shell.
14 A. Mr. Milosevic, TV Pale took pride in calling themselves Chetniks,
15 and I was just repeating that.
16 Q. If they thought that, you will agree that you didn't believe that?
17 A. Mr. Milosevic, I was a patriot who loved Yugoslavia during Tito's
18 era, let me tell you. And I couldn't believe that there could be a
19 trained armed unit that could be capable of killing women and children in
20 a Sarajevo under siege.
21 Q. That is not in dispute that that was tragic. We are talking here
22 about your expert report regarding a shell.
23 A. But Chetniks have nothing to do with it.
24 Q. But then there are reports of other teams. And my question was
25 why you didn't compare their results, and you said that was not necessary.
1 A. No, I didn't have access. That's the point. I didn't know about
3 Q. Very well. I'll go on to very concrete questions and please give
4 me brief answers because you are spending a lot of time, and I have been
5 very patiently listening to you.
6 The area of the Markale market, was it in the same condition as it
7 was immediately after the explosion, when you went there?
8 A. No, for one reason, because 24 hours had gone by. Sixty-eight
9 people had been killed. There was a lot of blood, and the area had been
11 Q. So the area had been cleaned, and only then did you start your
12 investigation. Do you believe as an expert that the main conditions for a
13 reliable finding did not exist because the area had been cleaned before
14 you started your expert investigation?
15 A. At the time, it had no substantive impact on the nature of my
16 report. It could affect the number of people killed, where they were
17 killed, et cetera, but the actual point of impact, no. If you go to
18 Sarajevo, you can have a look. You can see the imprints of fragments and
19 shells all over Sarajevo. In Markale, certainly not, because it's been
21 A. I must say unfortunately so. I don't know who did that.
22 Q. In addition to UNPROFOR, the police authorities in Sarajevo
23 carried out an investigation and took away the elements found, fragments
24 and pieces. So the area was cleaned, the pieces taken away, and then you
25 and your team start your investigation.
1 A. I didn't need any fragments. I only needed the stabiliser. The
2 opening that this stabiliser was lodged into was quite undamaged.
3 Q. So the basis for your expert opinion regarding this whole event
4 was the stabiliser which had been taken away and then given to you.
5 A. One of the bases. Not the only one.
6 Q. Well, what was the basis for your expert report if it was not just
7 the stabiliser?
8 A. Mr. Milosevic, I explained at the beginning. If necessary, I
9 shall repeat myself but that will take a lot of time. I told you. The
10 angle of descent is the basis, the appearance, et cetera, et cetera.
11 Q. I see. You've already explained that, so there's no need to
12 repeat it. And what was the condition of the actual point of explosion
13 when you arrived?
14 A. What do you mean?
15 Q. Well, as pieces had been taken out, the area cleaned, what was the
16 condition of the place? It wasn't dug over. Of course it was when you
17 can see on the video that knives were used to pick out the pieces and
18 fragments of the mine, of the shell.
19 A. I apologise. Digging in our language implies the use of a pickaxe
20 or a spade. But this is a fine tool, a knife that was used to delicately
21 pick out the stabiliser.
22 Q. Tell me, what was the damage on the ground, on the spot?
23 A. I can show you the photographs. I have them here for you to see
24 if you wish. I can't describe them to you.
25 Q. Mr. Zecevic, in your earlier testimony at General Galic's trial,
1 you said that on the spot you only found two pieces of the explosive
2 device, and that the stabiliser was given to you by the police which you,
3 after your study, returned to the police; is that right?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. So on the spot of the explosion, apart from damage on the ground,
6 you didn't have any material evidence of the explosive device on the spot
7 of the explosion itself when you arrived?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Very well.
10 A. Except for the video shots of the moment when the stabiliser was
11 taken out and the whole process, but that is quite unimportant for my
12 subsequent analyses.
13 Q. You wrote, on page 25505, that on the basis of the video recording
14 you said that, "The frontal surface of the stabiliser in our assessment
15 had an angle of 20 to 30 in relation to the surface of the ground," and
16 then there's picture 3 in brackets.
17 So tell me, please --
18 A. Just a moment. Let me find it.
19 Q. You wrote that on the basis of the video recording.
20 A. Let me find it, please. Having insight into the video recording
21 made immediately after the explosion, it can be noted -- it can be noted
22 that the stabiliser of the projectile penetrated 20 to -- 200 to 250
23 millimetres into the ground.
24 Q. I have a quotation here that, "The stabiliser formed an angle of
25 20 to 30 degrees in relation to the surface of the ground (figure 3)."
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. I see. The frontal surface, yes. And then by reconstructing the
2 position of the stabiliser, the angle of its frontal surface in relation
3 to the ground was about 30 degrees, and in relation to the mortar shell
4 about 60 degrees.
5 Q. Tell me, how is it possible on the basis of a picture given to you
6 by the police, without knowing the angle of filming and the position of
7 the camera, how can you determine the angle between the stabiliser fin and
8 the ground?
9 A. If you don't see the photograph, it's difficult for me to explain.
10 I am a technical expert, and angles for me are quite normal. I can easily
11 assess whether it's 20 or 30 degrees. It is easy to establish that. That
12 was what I was trained to do.
13 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, may I suggest, Dr. Zecevic does have a
14 very clear photograph of the scene as he saw it. It may be of assistance
15 to the Chamber if it's placed on his ELMO. He has it in his possession.
16 JUDGE MAY: Yes, let's do that.
17 JUDGE KWON: And since it's mentioned, I think the Chamber also
18 needs the original copy of the pictures which appear in his report. It's
19 very difficult to follow in this circumstance.
20 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour. I'll get better pictures.
21 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]
22 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. We're just going to look at the
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When I placed the stabiliser into
25 this opening - there's a difference of quality in the image - there's no
1 major difference.
2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Did you make those photographs? Who took these photographs?
4 A. I didn't make any of these, of course.
5 Q. Were they taken by the Sarajevo police?
6 A. Yes, yes, the Sarajevo police.
7 Q. I think this is a very important fact. You say, "Having insight
8 into the video recording made immediately after the explosion, it can be
9 noted that the stabiliser of the projectile entered the ground to a depth
10 of 200 to 250 millimetres." That's what you wrote, isn't it?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. So on this basis you were not able to exactly measure the depth of
13 the opening.
14 A. I didn't determine the depth on the basis of the photograph. I
15 just said that when I reconstructed the event and placed the stabiliser
16 into the opening, I was able to measure exactly the depth as we know what
17 the length of the stabiliser fin is.
18 Q. So you say 200 to 250 millimetres.
19 A. Yes. Logically so. That can be seen from this first photograph.
20 You can see the front of the stabiliser is almost on a level with the
21 asphalt. And in view of the length of the stabiliser being about 200
22 millimetres, then that is it.
23 Q. But you can see on both photographs that the angle is large,
24 because the shell fell almost vertically.
25 A. When I said an angle of 20 degrees, it's an angle between the
1 front of this stabiliser. The front. This front. And when you apply it
2 to the axis, that is 90 minus 20, which makes it 70 degrees, or 90 minus
3 30, making it 60. So technically you didn't read my report carefully.
4 Q. I did read your report very carefully, but you should know that,
5 for instance, Captain Verdi at 1500 hours on the 5th of February - which
6 means before you - determined that the minimum angle at which the mine --
7 the shell could have flown over the nearby building is about 80 degrees in
8 relation to the surface of the ground at the marketplace.
9 Major Russell, on the same day at 1630 hours, measured 1.200 to
10 1.300 degrees, that is, the angle was 48 to 73 degrees. So 80, 73
11 degrees, and the pitch itself that you have shown when you reconstructed
12 it, that the shell fell almost vertically, which is an indication that it
13 was fired from the Muslim side.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, can I show you some
15 new photographs to respond to this question?
16 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Yes.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is the site of the event, and
18 that is why I consider it to be very important. These stories that a
19 mortar shell should have hit a building are ridiculous for one simple
20 reason: The point of impact of the projectile was 4.16 metres from the
21 closest building, which is not higher than six metres, and the right hand
22 building, this building, this is this building, this is the angle of
23 descent, is 11.1 metres away.
24 If we proceed from the fact that the projectile arrived at an
25 angle of 45 degrees, which is absurd, then the height of the building
1 would need to be about 11 metres, and that building has three or four
2 stories. And in view that the angle of descent was about 60 degrees, this
3 is this angle, then there's no chance that the projectile could have hit
4 the building. And if you have forgotten, I said that the projectile fell
5 into a space between two stalls. This is an absolutely narrow, limited
6 area about one metre wide. So that is an angle of -- a minimum angle of
7 55 degrees. So that is why I said 60 degrees plus/minus 5 degrees. So
8 there's no question of a mortar shell hitting a building. The main
9 purpose of mortar shells is for them to act -- to be used behind
10 obstacles, behind buildings. They have a broad spectrum of action. It
11 was clearly shown that the -- that the angle of impact was 60 degrees.
12 There's no discussion over that. The fact that a major or captain said
13 something else, he doesn't tell us how he obtained that angle. My report
14 states clearly how I calculated that angle.
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Zecevic, is that picture or drawing included in
16 your expert report?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is in a somewhat different form.
18 It's the same picture, actually. These are very important -- this is a
19 very important photograph I would like to say.
20 JUDGE KWON: If you could tell -- if you could tell us what are
21 the same pictures as that. Picture 1 and picture 3?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a picture showing the area
23 immediately surrounding the point of impact.
24 JUDGE KWON: We have difficulty, because the picture does not
25 appear in the English translation. I've got it, thanks to the registrar.
1 Yes, please go on.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] [no translation].
3 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. You say that the tail fins -- between the tail fins and the ground
6 is 20 to 30 degrees, and then on the same page you say that the angle is
7 about 60 degrees, and you consider it more reliable than those measured by
8 UNPROFOR officials immediately after the explosion.
9 A. Mr. Milosevic, I'm talking about the angle of the front surface.
10 If we consider this to be the body of the stabiliser, I said -- and this
11 was dug into the ground. So I could only measure this angle. And let me
12 say that the angle is 20 to 30 degrees. Whereas this other angle is 90
13 minus this one. This is simple mathematics. This is something you learn
14 in secondary school.
15 Q. Surely you're not going to tell us, Mr. Zecevic, that these UN
16 experts did not have absolutely any qualifications to carry out any
17 measurements and investigations. I assume that the UN also sent trained
18 officers who are able to establish what happened. The point of impact of
19 a shell is no great science.
20 A. Mr. Milosevic, I have no idea who the UN sent, nor am I interested
21 in that. I am just commenting on the report -- nor should I comment on UN
22 reports. I can only comment on my own report.
23 Please don't attribute to me something that I didn't say. I'm
24 just not interested in that. If I need to explain something from my own
25 report, I will do so, but I didn't see those reports, nor can I comment on
1 them. And I don't want to comment on them.
2 Q. All right. Well, then don't. I see that you're all worked up.
3 A. No, I'm quite calm.
4 Q. It doesn't look that way. But I'm not going to ask you whether
5 you read the report. But in the UNPROFOR report, on the 5th of February,
6 1994, paragraph 6, it says there are reasons to believe that at that time,
7 the authorities dug through the crater in detail. Is that your opinion
8 too or do you think they did not?
9 A. No.
10 Q. So they did not dig through the crater?
11 A. It was not dug. What does it mean in detail or superficially? I
12 told you what it means to dig. I showed you here the actual place where
13 this happened, what I found on site. I put the stabiliser here. And if
14 you look at the damage, the damage shows that the mortar projectile was at
15 an angle between 55 or 65 degrees when it originally fell. And vertically
16 it was close to 90 degrees. Had it been vertical, then the damage would
17 have been on various sides. However, most of the asphalt damage is in the
18 area where the mortar shell came from, and that corroborates what the
19 expertise said.
20 Q. On page 002531, you -- "However, the fact that there are no
21 colours on the stabiliser shows that this was probably recent war
22 production." I'm going to omit some parts. Never mind. "And this
23 indicates that it was probably manufactured in one of the two factories
24 that made this kind of thing before, Marko Oreskovic, Licki Osik, or
25 Vogosca." Is that right?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Please try to answer my questions now without going into lengthy
4 Do you know that UNPROFOR officers, when they toured the 105th
5 Brigade of the 1st Corps - that is the 1st Corps of the army of
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina, is that right - on the 9th of February, 1994, at the
7 ammunition depot saw 120-millimetre mines that had not been coloured, and
8 they saw the same ones -- this is page 0303831, and this is an UNPROFOR
9 report of the 15th of February, 1994. Do you know that?
10 A. No. There's no reason for me to know that.
11 Q. Such shells that you claim were made in Vogosca or Licki Osik were
12 seen by UNPROFOR controllers on the positions of the 105th Brigade of the
13 Sarajevo Corps.
14 A. I don't know. I could not discuss the matter.
15 Q. All right. If you don't know that, I'm just indicating it to you.
16 But this part of your report is under a question mark then, because this
17 is absolutely the same thing that they saw in your case.
18 A. At this moment it does not affect the conclusions of this report
19 at all.
20 Q. All right. Can we move a bit faster then. What's the altitude of
21 the Markale market?
22 A. About 550 metres.
23 Q. About 600 metres? According to the information I have, it's about
24 600 metres. On the basis of which estimate did you conclude --
25 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please slow down; the
1 interpreters cannot follow at this pace. Thank you.
2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. On the basis of which estimate did you assess that 400 metres is
4 the distance between the point of impact and the point of firing?
5 A. Just a moment, please. This is the area above Sarajevo.
6 Q. Yes.
7 A. The point of impact.
8 Q. We're not talking about the altitude of the Markale market. It is
9 600 metres.
10 A. I've already said to you that we looked at 200 metres and 400
11 metres, and we worked with 400 metres because, of the six possible places
12 from which this projectile could have been fired, five were at an altitude
13 close to 400 metres above the Markale market.
14 Q. All right. Do you know that in this trajectory of 18 degrees
15 north-east plus/minus 5, as you established this, the highest altitudes
16 and elevations are up to 1.086 metres? That is 23496 or, or rather, in
17 the Serbian language, page 02115548.
18 So if what you are claiming were correct, somebody would have to
19 put this mortar on the top elevations in order to have this 400 metre
20 difference, which had to be there.
21 A. It did not have to be there. You misunderstand this difference.
22 This 400 or 200 or 300 or 500 metre difference is only a very small
23 segment in terms of determining the actual point more precisely. It could
24 have been 00. It has nothing to do with it. I did not know from which
25 position this projectile was fired. I only knew the direction, the
1 trajectory. And in order to carry out a ballistic analysis, it was
2 necessary for me to be able to estimate the point where it was potentially
3 launched in order to take into account the correction factors in terms of
4 the altitude between the point where it was launched and the point where
5 it impacted. It doesn't matter. Both of us can say that there is a
6 difference between the point of impact and all the five possible places
7 from which the projectile could have been launched.
8 I tell you once again, there are six possible points for a mortar.
9 Five points are directly under the control of the army of Republika
11 Q. Mr. Zecevic, don't you know that a 120-millimetre mortar, as you
12 know better than I do, is a bulky weapon? It is not put on the very top
13 of an elevation but at someplace to which one has access. And in this
14 direction that you are describing, there was no possibility for the army
15 of Republika Srpska to place a mortar at such a high altitude as you had
17 A. I don't understand.
18 Q. Physically this is impossible.
19 A. Somebody gave you the wrong kind of information, Mr. Milosevic.
20 There is no summit. There is no elevation. It is not mentioned at all.
21 It could have been a meadow. These are hillocks there.
22 Q. Oh, so you don't even know the distance. You cannot even
23 determine the distance from which it was fired. The only important thing
24 is that it came from Serb positions, then it had to be there. Six, five,
25 four, you can just go on guessing.
1 A. Mr. Milosevic, you need three square metres in order to position a
2 mortar. If you're trying to put it on top of a building, then people are
3 going to do that if they deem it necessary. But if you tell me that a
4 120-millimetre mortar cannot be put at any such point, then the advisors
5 who are giving you advice are not giving you the best type of counsel, are
6 not the best possible counsellors.
7 Q. All right. Tell me, is it of any significance to you that the
8 military observers of the UN reported that there was no report concerning
9 the opening of fire from the Kosevska Brigade on the 5th of February,
10 1994? "The explosion in the market was registered by military observers
11 on the Bosnian side as incoming fire but the point where it came from was
12 not registered." I quoted the UN report to you directly now.
13 A. Mr. Milosevic, the UN observers register the firing of audio
14 systems. So they either hear it through an audio system or with their
15 very own ears. As sound moves through space, it involves a very complex
16 process. Now, it depends on whether there are buildings, whether there
17 are forests, whether there is fog, whether there is humidity. So you can
18 place a mortar in a valley surrounded by woods. So people who are four
19 kilometres away will not be able to feel the difference in terms of the
20 firing of such a projectile. Or if you put it out in an open clearing,
21 then there is going to be an amazing difference in the noise levels.
22 So this is not in contrast with my report. The projectile came
23 from the direction that was 18 degrees north or north-east. I showed that
24 it had to have sufficient energy, at least at the impact moment, of 200
25 metres/second so that the stabiliser could be placed this way. That is
1 the key point, and that is how these first three points are eliminated
2 from where the firing could have taken place.
3 So it is possible, because the stabiliser was sticking into the
4 ground, that is sufficient proof that the projectile had to have a greater
5 velocity of impact and that it had been launched from the -- with the
6 fourth, fifth, or sixth charge, and that is a distance of 4.900, 5.000
7 something, and 6.400 metres. No one can establish through any kind of
8 expertise from which of these three points it happened.
9 Q. But why did you change the attitude [as interpreted] in respect of
10 the Markale altitude?
11 A. Well, look. Above the market are hills. So 30 metres above the
12 market there is a hill. Whoever looked at this place could see that. I
13 can show it to you here. This is it. This is it. In relation to this, I
14 looked at 200 metres to 400 metres. I can also make an analysis with
15 200 metres that will show you that the distance is not 4.900 metres but
16 4.800 metres. It doesn't mean a thing in terms of its precise
18 Q. It is important that we should get answers, your answers in this
19 respect, because of course I'm going to challenge this, given adequate
20 expert support.
21 And also tell me, if a mine stabiliser of 120 millimetres has a
22 fin and is to fall into ground, asphalt, and you give the figure of 200 to
23 250 millimetres in your report, there was asphalt there and then
24 underneath there was sand --
25 A. Please don't simplify matters.
1 Q. What should be the velocity of impact of that mine so that it
2 would remain the way you had put it?
3 A. I told you that the minimum had to be 200 metres/second.
4 Q. And what is the average radius of operation of such a mine?
5 A. According to available data, about 17 metres. That would be the
7 Q. All right. Tell me, what is more precise when the angles are
8 smaller when a mine is fired, as you say in paragraph 3 of your previous
9 report? It says that if the mortar crew has the possibility of choosing
10 the angle -- my question is actually does this angle imply greater
12 A. 45 -- 40 degrees and above.
13 Q. 40 degrees and above.
14 A. That means when they are on the same plane, the objective and the
15 point from where the mine is fired.
16 JUDGE MAY: The time has come to take the adjournment.
17 Mr. Milosevic, we will have to finish this at quarter to 2:00 in
18 order to finish with this witness. Perhaps, if you look at
19 Mr. Tapuskovic's position, if you can provide some time for him, I'm sure
20 he'd be grateful.
21 Yes. We'll adjourn now. Twenty minutes.
22 --- Recess taken at 12.15 p.m.
23 --- On resuming at 12.38 p.m.
24 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please take into account the time
1 needed for Mr. Tapuskovic. I will leave that much time for him so that we
2 are able to finish within this session.
3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Mr. Zecevic, what is the probability for one shell, one
5 120-millimetre shell to hit a target of --
6 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please slow down. Could we
7 have the question repeated.
8 JUDGE KWON: Sorry to interrupt you, but Mr. Milosevic, could you
9 repeat the question again.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will.
11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. I asked what is the probability of one 120-millimetre shell
13 hitting a pre-planned target sized 23 by 28 metres at a distance of 2.000
14 metres from the artillery position?
15 A. I cannot tell you without looking at the firing table, because I
16 have to point out certain dilemmas you have to face. If you are trying to
17 hit a target for the first time, and if you are just positioning the
18 mortar on the position for the first time, then the probability is lower.
19 It is less likely that you will hit the target. But if you have several
20 attempts and if you had the benefit of previously making adjustments as
21 was the case here because the war had been going on for some time, people
22 were familiar with their weapons, there are so-called standard and
23 accidental mistakes. Standard mistakes, standard errors are typical of
24 certain weapons, where accidental, occasional mistakes are due to the
25 weather, et cetera.
1 So if you take occasional mistakes, you have to take into account
2 whether the position is familiar to you, whether you are targeting a
3 target that is familiar to you, that you tried to hit before regardless of
4 whether it is Markale or some other target. In any case, I cannot give
5 you a precise answer without consulting the firing tables.
6 Q. All right. Artillery officers and UNPROFOR officers claimed that
7 the probability of hitting the Markale market with one shell without
8 adjusting fire is very small when firing from a great distance. Do you
9 agree that the probability of hitting the target is much higher from a
10 smaller distance?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Don't you think it was the case indeed that the market was hit
13 from a smaller distance?
14 A. It has nothing to do with it, Mr. Milosevic. You are forgetting
15 certain physical factors. We cannot change the nature, we can only try to
16 understand it. Nature is very clear here. The shell exploded. The angle
17 of impact is around 60 degrees. The stabiliser fin was buried in the
18 ground. It couldn't have been buried in the ground 200, 250 millimetres
19 unless the velocity of the impact was more than 200 metres/second.
20 Mr. Milosevic, I heard you out. Please hear me out too. You
21 asked me a question, and give me time to answer. I'm telling you again,
22 you cannot introduce arguments into science without any basis in fact.
23 These are exact facts that are not subject to discussion. We have
24 exact facts that point to the origin of fire. Mortars are among the most
25 precise artillery weapons. Both you and I know that the most dangerous
1 weapon in the Second World War for the partisan forces were mortars. In
2 the war in Sarajevo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, most victims were killed by
4 Q. All right. Tell me, what is the possible error, in metres,
5 regarding the target?
6 A. I am telling you again, Mr. Milosevic: Without knowing the
7 parameters, what kind of crew we have, what the corrections are, et
8 cetera, I cannot answer you. You can look up the textbook on the theory
9 of firing.
10 Q. All right. Answer one question for me regarding outside
11 observations. Is it possible from a distance of over 2.000 metres, based
12 on the possible sound, can you determine the point of origin of a shell?
13 And you -- if you as an expert cannot determine it, can a simple ordinary
14 citizen do that who doesn't have any familiarity with mortars?
15 A. Mr. Milosevic, the problem of spread of sound is very well
17 Q. I'm not asking you about the spread of sound. Is it possible to
18 determine the origin of fire if something was fired from a distance of
19 2.000 metres?
20 A. Look, modern systems for determining the origin of fire were --
21 are based on sound, audio equipment. You need three localisers of sound
22 in order to determine the origin of fire. These are well-known systems in
23 the world.
24 Q. I asked this because we had here a citizen, a witness who claimed
25 that he had heard a mortar shell being fired. Thank you very much for
1 providing this explanation about the three localisers of sound.
2 Now, tell me, how many shells need to be fired in order to make an
3 adjustment to the target?
4 A. I think you're talking to the wrong man if you want an answer to
5 this. I am not operating or running a battery of mortars to be able to
6 answer this. Without consulting firing tables or textbooks, I cannot give
7 you a precise answer.
8 Q. That is enough. Regarding the video where we see an UNPROFOR
9 soldier digging out the stabiliser fin, do you agree that it is clear in
10 this video that at the moment when the UNPROFOR soldier is beginning to
11 work the stabiliser is not visible? We can only see it after the soldier
12 has removed a layer of what looks like debris, using a knife.
13 A. I can't tell you now. You must have seen this video. It was a
14 long time since I saw it, maybe ten years.
15 Q. What was the composition of the ground on the market?
16 A. There was a layer of asphalt 1.5 to 2 centimetres thick, sand and
18 Q. All right. If the shell detonated upon impacting the ground upon
19 asphalt, in what direction does the impact wave act, in depth or in
21 A. Mr. Milosevic, may I show you this picture? It is an x-ray of a
22 detonation of a projectile very similar to the one we're talking about.
23 Q. Is it the same one?
24 A. It doesn't matter. The physical process is the same. This is a
25 122-millimetre projectile, so the calibre is very similar. The picture is
1 not upside down. It is sitting on the ELMO very well. You don't have to
2 read the text, it doesn't matter.
3 This is the moment when the projectile is hitting an obstacle or
4 when the fuse is activated, and this white spot you see is the beginning,
5 the activation of the detonation wave, and then a reaction and burst
6 begin. And on the following picture you can see that the projectile is
7 growing wider. It is now almost double the size. And the flow of the
8 products of detonation has begun towards the ground. The flow is at a
9 velocity of 10.000 millimetres/second. It is those products of detonation
10 that create the damage.
11 Q. My question was: What is the direction of the impact wave, in the
12 width or in the depth?
13 A. When the projectile bursts, the impact wave is directed on all
15 Q. From the detonation of the fuse, is the detonation, the impact,
16 determined by --
17 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't hear the question.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You cannot see this on the picture.
19 When the detonation happens, fragments start moving through space.
20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. So both up and laterally?
22 A. Yes, on all sides. All over the place. There are various
23 estimates, depending on the velocity of impact. Various deviations in the
24 distribution of fragments are possible, and we can arrive at certain
1 I'm showing you this example. Let us take this case. When the
2 greatest number of fragments are in this lateral part, the lowest speed of
3 fragments are in these two parts, and the lowest mass is also in these two
4 parts, although on the side you can still find a significant number.
5 Q. This impact wave rejects fragments all over; is that correct?
6 A. That's not what I said. I said the products of detonation during
7 explosion destroy the structure of the body of the projectile. Cracks
8 appear. And as a result of pressure inside, which is 250 to 300.000 bars,
9 and a very high temperature of about 3.000 degrees Celsius, these
10 detonations accelerate metallic fragments and they can move about 1.500 to
11 2.000 metres/second depending on their mass.
12 Q. All right. Is it possible for this material that is propelled by
13 explosion to be found again on the spot where it was propelled?
14 A. From which part of the projectile?
15 Q. Any part. The projectile hit the ground, exploded, propels
16 material all over. As you said, is it possible for this propelled
17 material to be found again on the spot?
18 A. Yes. Some parts can be found here, for instance fragments of the
19 fuse. And these scrapes, if you had occasion to see them on the asphalt,
20 they were propelled. They hit the asphalt. They had no energy to bounce
21 further, and they fell again on the asphalt or perhaps they hit somebody
22 who was nearby.
23 Q. All right. Tell me, is it then probable, precisely according to
24 this video where you see the stabiliser covered by pebbles and earth, and
25 it is not actually visible, doesn't it prove that the stabiliser fin did
1 not lodge in the ground? It was put there.
2 A. The process described is on the order of the 30 millionth part of
3 a second. There is no stabilisation there involved. Why don't you start
4 from the premise that after detonation, when this cylindric part of the
5 projectile fell apart, this part of the stabiliser continued to travel
6 through space and entered this area and penetrated 250 millimetres into
7 the ground.
8 Q. Wasn't it propelled?
9 A. No, it couldn't have been.
10 Q. It wasn't propelled? You're saying that it was buried? How come
11 it wasn't propelled by explosion?
12 A. Because the process of detonation was on the order of 170
13 plus/minus 20 metres/second. If the velocity was minimally 200
14 metres/second, in order for the stabiliser to lodge it should have a
15 residual kinetic energy of, let's say, 40 to 60 metres per second and then
16 it gets buried. In such cases, depending on velocity of the projectile at
17 the time of impact, we can have three possibilities. When it is launched
18 with the first, second, or third charge, or let's say just first and
19 second charge, then the speed of fall is lower than the speed of
20 propelling, and then it goes back in the direction from which it was
21 fired. However, if the speed of impact is around 170, 160, 150
22 metres/second, we will find the stabiliser fin lying somewhere in the
23 vicinity. If the speed of impact is 200 or more metres/second, then the
24 stabiliser fin will get buried in the ground. So these are three
1 Operating with these three possibilities, we can decide from which
2 possible area it was fired.
3 Q. Some ballistics experts, and I saw some among UN experts, claim
4 that it should been propelled, rejected. It wouldn't have been buried
5 under pebbles and sand. It must have been put there later.
6 A. Mr. Milosevic, the experts I knew at the military engineering
7 institute with whom I worked for 17 years had occasion together with me to
8 determine -- to determine whether stabilisers were involved in such cases
9 or not. There is no dilemma here, whatever some experts may say.
10 In my follow-up report, you have findings of an American
11 laboratory for ballistical analysis which give you precise data for
12 determining the velocity of this stabiliser.
13 Q. It was not rejected or propelled. It was buried, as we saw in
14 that video.
15 A. Mr. Milosevic, I didn't say that. You also have the velocity of
16 descent of at least 100 metres/second. If you take into account that
17 speed of descent, you have the residual kinetical energy with which it
18 lodged into the ground. I'll repeat this to make it clearer.
19 When the velocity is smaller than the speed of impact, then the
20 projectile lodges into the ground. When the speed of descent is equal to
21 the speed of impact, the stabiliser is found in the area. When the speed
22 of descent is higher, then it will be buried in the ground.
23 For instance, with 60 or 82-millimetre shells, you will almost
24 never find them buried in the ground because the speed of descent, the
25 speed of firing, is lower than the speed of impact on the ground.
1 Q. Can we now conclude that your expert report, as it is, and I don't
2 agree with it, did not remove a reasonable doubt that the shell was fired
3 onto Markale by Serbs, because you found also one possible origin of fire
4 in the Muslim territory as well. So that reasonable doubt was not removed
5 even by the findings of other experts?
6 A. In my report, it says explicitly that there are six possible
7 origins of fire for this mortar projectile that correspond to the
8 conditions of impact that we are faced with. But as I said earlier, for
9 the stabiliser to be lodged in the ground, it had to have a velocity
10 higher than 200 metres/second. That inevitably means that the projectile
11 was launched with fourth, fifth, or sixth trajectories higher than 4.900
12 metres. That means more elevated positions.
13 Q. So the higher velocity of firing, the greater the distance.
14 A. No. The angle of impact, the velocity of penetration of these
15 stabilisers are the parameters which point out to three possible origins
16 of fire; at 4.900 metres, around 5.000, and 6.300 metres.
17 Q. Your conclusions are clear, but let us look at this diagram. Is
18 it possible for the projectile to have been fired from this vehicle?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Will you place it on the ELMO,
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What are you telling me with this
22 vehicle? What has it got to do with this firing of the shell?
23 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Yes, go on.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is not clear to me. It's quite
25 unimportant whether it came from a vehicle or a mortar. The question is
1 where the mortar was.
2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Well, that's precisely it. The mortar could be on this vehicle,
4 and forces of the BH army had such a vehicle which they used to fire
5 shells, and it is possible that it was fired from this vehicle.
6 A. I'd rather not go into that discussion. My study clearly showed
7 that the direction was 18 degrees north north-east, six possible firing
8 positions. Later on, I indicated three firing position, fourth, fifth,
9 and sixth charge. If this vehicle could have been 4.900 metres away in
10 territory held by the army of Republika Srpska, then it's possible, if
11 they wanted to let this vehicle be placed in that position, but I won't go
12 into that.
13 Q. But that is what I'm claiming, and this coincides with the
14 findings of the UN experts, that it is possible that the shell was fired
15 from territory controlled by the BH army.
16 A. The farthest position held by the BH army was 1.900 metres away.
17 And I am telling you all three locations from which these effects could
18 have been produced is 4.900, 5.400, and 6.400 metres away.
19 Q. But I have another sketch here which shows the original damage on
20 the asphalt and the subsequent made, handmade, damage on the asphalt,
21 which are indicated by dotted line and the original ones in a straight
22 line. And this is what could be deduced from UN experts' reports. Would
23 you like to comment on these, please?
24 In your opinion, is it possible that these two directions, called
25 confusions because of subsequent damage that was hammered into the
1 ground --
2 A. Mr. Milosevic, this is a sketch made by hand and not a photograph.
3 Q. Of course it is a sketch. How can you on a photograph indicate an
5 A. But what you're talking about, mechanical intervention on the site
6 of the explosion? Here is the site of the explosion. Now, give me a
7 photograph like this - you have the video recording in the presence of the
8 UN officer - and tell me whether there's any difference.
9 Now, a drawing made like this could be that of an artist. As you
10 see, the dotted line indicates the damage hammered in subsequently --
11 you're showing us a sketch. There is no subsequent intervention on these
12 photographs. I'd like your experts to come to Sarajevo. No one will stop
13 them nowadays. They can have a look at the point of impact and see
14 whether there is any additional intervention done.
15 Q. But as you said yourself, the Markale marketplace has been
16 completely reconstructed.
17 A. Yes, but there are other places.
18 Q. But the traces have been destroyed once and for all now. But you
19 said generally that an elementary school is sufficient to understand this,
20 and I assume that the UN officers who made these reports had at least
21 elementary training.
22 A. I'm telling you again I never saw a single UN officer report.
23 Q. I should just like to draw your attention to one further point.
24 You testified in the Galic case as well, didn't you?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And in this document that has to do with General Galic, entitled
2 "Judgement and Opinion," in Chapter 7, separate and dissenting
3 opinion --
4 A. I can't follow because I don't have the document.
5 Q. The dissenting opinion of Judge Nieto-Navia --
6 JUDGE MAY: I'm not necessarily going to stop you saying what the
7 objection or any other other form of judgement may have been, but it's not
8 necessary -- it may or not be the case that it's necessary for a witness
9 to know anything about this. So he may well not be able to answer it, but
10 you can and you can put something provided you put it very briefly and
11 it's relevant.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, this dissenting opinion
13 consists of many pages and I will read out only a few lines from it, so I
14 will be extremely brief. Don't worry, please.
15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. So point 97. It says: "[In English] For the above reasons, I am
17 not satisfied that the Prosecution has established beyond a reasonable
18 doubt that the SRK fired the shell which exploded in Markale market on 5th
19 February, 1994. I do not reach this conclusion idly because the ABH as
20 well as SRK had access during the conflict to 120-millimetre mortars which
21 are weapons which can be transported with relative ease. Finally, I know
22 that my conclusion about the origin of fire also finds support in the
23 special UN team's official finding communicated to the UN Security Council
24 that there --" [Interpretation] then a quotation -- "[In English] is not
25 sufficient physical evidence to prove that one party or the other fired
1 the mortar bomb."
2 [Interpretation] That is all I wanted to quote from this
3 dissenting opinion.
4 JUDGE MAY: Very well. I haven't stopped you doing it, but
5 normally, of course, that is a view. It's a matter which we have to take
6 into account and it's not a matter for comment. Now, if you'd like to go
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May. I will continue
9 with my questions.
10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Mr. Zecevic, is it true that it was only six days later on the
12 11th of February that an investigation was started by the so-called
13 special UN team consisting of Captain Jose Grande, Commander John Hamill,
14 and Major Sajis Arkan [phoen]? Do you remember that?
15 A. Mr. Milosevic, I don't see how I could remember. I have
16 repeatedly said that I haven't seen a single report of the United Nations
17 regarding this incident. I did not take part in their work. I did my
18 work and completed it in two days' time during the war on the 6th and 7th,
19 and since then I was not consulted up until 1995 when there was an
20 explosion in TV Sarajevo building. And throughout that intervening
21 period, no one contacted me, so I don't know anything about it.
22 Q. Well, let me tell you then. Four days after they conducted an
23 investigation, they produced a report, and I'm asking you how do you
24 explain that this special UN team needed four days to compile their report
25 whereas you, in such a short time, having heard on television that the
1 point of firing cannot be established, you were appointed, completed your
2 study, and had a report ready already on the 7th. Are they that much less
3 capable than you or perhaps are there any other reasons to explain this?
4 A. Mr. Milosevic, if you read my report and what I wrote in it
5 together with my colleagues, and it was completed in two days, we just
6 estimated or indicated six possible locations, and we said that only one
7 of them was in the territory held by the BH army.
8 My subsequent studies over the past two years, at the request of
9 the Prosecution, I carried out more detailed analyses, and on the basis of
10 what I have repeatedly said today, I showed that out of those six
11 locations the fourth, fifth, and sixth are those that fulfil the necessary
12 requirements. I had an order from the investigating judge that I had to
13 complete my report within 24 hours, and in accordance with that order,
14 because he was the person who appointed me, I completed my work in a
15 professional manner within the time available and the facts given.
16 Through subsequent analyses, the results of which I have given to the
17 Prosecution, produced what I have testified about today. Therefore, I am
18 not calling in question at all the ability of UN officers. You have your
19 own opinion. I have my own technical opinion. It is up to Their Honours,
20 the Judges, to assess which documents they will rely on.
21 Q. If on the 15th of February they stated that it was impossible to
22 establish who fired the shell --
23 A. That is their right.
24 Q. But their first reports, initial reports indicate that it had been
25 done by the Muslim side.
1 A. I have no idea, Mr. Milosevic. I haven't read those reports. I
2 can only talk about what I did. I'm no official person in
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I'm an ordinary citizen, a university professor, and
4 that's all.
5 Q. And is it true that your engagement has nothing to do with the
6 statement of the UNPROFOR representative to the effect that it cannot be
7 established because they produced their final report on the 15th?
8 A. Surely there's no need for me to repeat what I said in my
9 statement. I heard on television and the radio that they had stated that
10 it cannot be established, et cetera.
11 Q. Very well. In your statement in 1996, in paragraphs four and
12 five, I quote: "As a member of the team of experts at the beginning of
13 the war, I organised in Sarajevo the production of weapons, the production
14 and development of weapons."
15 I will slow down for the interpreters. You said: "As a member of
16 a team of experts at the beginning the war, I organised in Sarajevo the
17 production and development of weapons. We worked in cooperation with the
18 staff of the BH army. I worked there until the 14th of December, 1993,
19 when the team was disbanded."
20 Is that right, Mr. Zecevic?
21 A. That's right. I was replaced.
22 Q. So you stopped working in that area one month and 20 days prior to
23 the explosion at Markale?
24 A. No. I was replaced in July 1993 when the head of the staff of the
25 BH army, General Sefer Halilovic, was replaced. Then the entire unit of
1 which I was a member was also dismissed. For six months, I was at their
2 disposal. They didn't know what to do with me. And then on the 14th of
3 December, they gave me the order to go to the UNIS Institute. I was under
4 military obligation, and I went there. Therefore, my engagement as head
5 of the department for research and development attached to the Main Staff
6 of the BH army lasted from June 1992 until July 1993. When my unit was
7 dismissed and disbanded I was put on hold, and I was at their disposal.
8 They didn't know what to do with me.
9 Q. In your CV, on page -- it says that from 1st of June until the
10 18th of December, 1993, you were employed in the General Staff of the BH
11 army and the mechanical engineering faculty in Sarajevo.
12 A. In the centre for special purpose industry, the department for
13 research and development, attached to the Main Staff.
14 Q. The Main Staff of the ABiH army?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. But that is the General Staff of the army.
17 A. No, no. It's a unit attached to the staff. I was not a member of
18 the General Staff.
19 Q. I'm not saying that you were a member of the General Staff, but
20 you were employed by them.
21 A. All soldiers are, in a sense, employed by the General Staff. So
22 please don't attribute what you're saying to me.
23 Q. I'm not doing that, I am just quoting what you said, that you were
24 employed in the General Staff of the ABiH army as head of the department
25 for research and development.
1 A. No. In the centre for special purpose production and research
2 department, working attached, not in the Main Staff.
3 Q. Okay, attached to the Main Staff. And you worked on the design of
5 A. Yes. Under conditions when there were no manufacturing components
6 and spare parts, I had to find ways of the BH army ensuring for itself
7 within Sarajevo the process of production of munitions, and this
8 engagement lasted one year.
9 Q. In paragraph 37 in your statement of July 2002, you described how
10 you used unexploded shells that you collected in the territory of Sarajevo
11 to make appropriate lethal devices.
12 A. Yes, because 60 per cent of our needs for explosives were solved
13 in that way. Every kilogramme of explosive in an unexploded shell would
14 be worth one bomb, and so people, at the risk of their lives, found these
15 unexploded ordnances, I had the explosives extracted for it to be
16 reprocessed for defence purposes.
17 Q. So I did perhaps -- one of the possible findings of the
18 investigation could have been that a device exploded in Markale that you
19 yourself may have participated in making.
20 A. In Pretis, yes, but before the war.
21 Q. And not out of what you described that you made out of unexploded
23 A. We made hand grenades and rifle grenades for personal defence, not
24 those that could be used by larger units. We were unable to produce
25 120-millimetre mortar shell.
1 Q. Is it quite clear that you have a direct interest in not
2 establishing that the BH army fired the shell?
3 A. I don't wish to comment.
4 Q. But you were working for the staff of that army.
5 A. I was working for the defence of the citizens of Sarajevo, my
6 friends and relatives. The unit I was in command of, 30 per cent were
7 Serbs, 21 per cent were Croats, the rest were Bosniaks.
8 Q. I'm not asking you that.
9 THE INTERPRETER: Could there be pauses, please. It is impossible
10 to follow at this speed.
11 JUDGE MAY: You're making it very hard for the interpreters, for
12 everybody. So would you both make a pause. Yes.
13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Very well. I did not ask about other members of your unit. I was
15 saying isn't it clear that it was more than evident that you had an
16 interest involved in order not to have it established that it was the BH
17 army who fired at Markale?
18 A. Mr. Milosevic, I worked in a professional manner. In my report
19 there is not a single thing that is partial in any way. You can send this
20 report to my colleagues from the Military Technical Institute and let them
21 try to find anything that would be false there.
22 Q. I am bringing this all into question because in your findings, you
23 allegedly established that the shell was fired by the Serb side, although
24 there were findings by UN experts that indicated that this came from the
25 Muslim side. And although on the 15th of February the special team
1 established that this was impossible.
2 A. Mr. Milosevic, if you want to read my conclusion, and I have to
3 say this to you, in my report it says quite clearly 18 degrees north
4 north-east. The direction is there too. And also the angle is between 50
5 and 60 degrees.
6 Q. Sir, please.
7 A. No, no. Listen. Please listen. I listened to you, and I want to
8 answer now.
9 I said that there are six areas from where the projectile might
10 have been fired, and this is on a military topographical map. And five of
11 them -- there is one area that is on ABiH-controlled territory and five in
12 Serb-controlled territory; nothing else. And that is my conclusion. So
13 please do not put words into my mouth, especially not things that are not
14 written in my report.
15 Q. Mr. Zecevic, is it possible that all the UN experts who took part
16 in the investigations, and none of them had any grounds for being partial,
17 as opposed to you, how come they established something that was completely
18 different? Because only your report established that it was fired from
19 the Serb side. And you were the only one who had a direct interest in the
20 results of the finding. You were the only one who was professional enough
21 to establish that the shell was fired by the Serb side.
22 A. I don't know what to say to you, Mr. Milosevic. I never said
23 anything derogatory about any UN report. I have never seen any one of
24 them. There is nothing good or bad I can say about them. I first have to
25 see these reports. I'm telling you for the umpteenth time that I have to
1 see the report first. I don't know how professional they are and whether
2 they are professional.
3 But let me tell you, Mr. Milosevic, you will hardly find a person
4 in -- anywhere in the world who worked on designing ammunition for 17
5 years and taught at university and was for three and a half years the
6 target of projectiles and who had the opportunity of feeling himself what
7 the combat effect of a projectile is. So I can tell you I have
8 considerable experience, positive and negative. I know a lot of
9 theoretical models that go into the phenomenon of fragmentation as far as
10 projectiles are concerned, and I follow the research of American experts
11 in this area.
12 So I really am a good expert in this field. And as for the UN
13 experts, I cannot say. I have told you very nicely, I've provided my
14 report, you have my CV, and now you're telling me about some kind of
15 experts that I never heard of, that I never read of. So I'm not
16 quarreling about them. I never said anything about them, positive or
18 Q. I'm not talking about them at all, sir. I'm talking about you.
19 Isn't it evident that there is a conflict of interest that disqualifies
20 you as an expert in this case because you were employed, attached to the
21 General Staff of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina? You have a direct
22 interest involved to have the Serbs blamed for this. Even in this
23 professional expert report, you use derogatory terms for the Serbs. And
24 for you, this -- this conflict of interest disqualifies you as an expert.
25 A. No, way. Mr. Milosevic, when I wrote this report, I was not
1 engaged by the military. That is one point.
2 Secondly, the term "Chetnik" is not a derogatory term.
3 Q. You said "the aggressor side."
4 A. Well, yes. If somebody is throwing projectiles at me --
5 Q. Did anybody -- did you target projectiles at them? There was the
6 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and there was the Bosnian Army Corps and there
7 were two corps that were clashing. So didn't they exchange projectiles?
8 A. Rifle grenades with 150-metre range.
9 Q. You say that you did not have artillery pieces.
10 A. I'm telling you what I did, Mr. Milosevic.
11 Q. All right, Mr. Zecevic. But you know that the Serb positions were
12 observed from other UN observation posts. And no firing of shells was
13 observed from there either. Do you know that?
14 A. How can I have that kind of information? I was an ordinary
15 citizen in Sarajevo.
16 Q. Wait a minute. There is an UNPROFOR statement that it was
17 impossible to establish who fired the shell, and you attach great
18 importance to that. You only know of that statement. You don't know of
19 any other statement of UNPROFOR, and you don't know about any other
20 information provided by UNPROFOR. The only thing you know is that you
21 don't know who fired the shell and that it is impossible to --
22 A. Mr. Milosevic, if you read my report, I said that it was an
23 announced over the radio, on the 6th, on the radio. It's not that I got a
24 report. It was broadcast over the radio. The UN spokesperson said that
25 from the positions of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina on that day - this
1 can be checked - not a singe projectile was fired, and that is what my
2 report says and nothing else. There is no special report that came to me
3 from the UN.
4 Q. All right. So you took from the UN only that which had to do with
5 this statement that it was impossible. I hope that you're aware of the
6 fact that the only report so far that claimed that the Serb side fired the
7 shell is your report.
8 A. I don't know that. I did not look at any other reports except for
9 my own.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I promised Mr.
11 Tapuskovic to leave him 15 minutes, so I thank you, Mr. May.
12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I would like to thank
13 Mr. Milosevic too.
14 Your Honours, I would like to put a few things to the witness,
15 things that he stated and documents that he alone used when providing his
17 Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:
18 Q. [Interpretation] So, Mr. Witness, I would like to start with the
19 statement that you gave on the 13th of December or, rather, in July of the
20 -- to the investigators of the Tribunal. It's a lengthy statement. I'm
21 interested in only one paragraph. It is paragraph 37 of that statement of
22 yours. Let me show you what you said there, please.
23 Mr. Zecevic, please look at paragraph 37. You say here, and I am
24 reading this now so that you wouldn't have to read it. "From April/May
25 1993, mortar shells and projectiles that were fired by the Serb side
1 against Sarajevo were manufactured in Serbia. I know that because from
2 August 1992, I had introduced the practice of collecting unexploded mines
3 and projectiles, and the -- so that the explosives taken out of them could
4 be used for the needs of the army of BH." Is that correct?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. "Furthermore, I was looking for volunteers --" so you were a
7 volunteer too; right? "-- to go around Sarajevo to collect these
8 unexploded explosive devices." Is that right?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. "That was practice which, in normal circumstances, would not be
11 carried out, but since the government forces had a critical lack of
12 weaponry, there was no alternative." And then you used "...each and every
13 kilogramme of explosives to make..." and so and so forth.
14 A. Ten rifle grenades.
15 Q. Ten rifle grenades. Never mind. But what I'm interested in is
16 that you collected these unexploded explosive devices; is that right?
17 A. Logically.
18 Q. And one sentence further down you say: "This was customary
19 practice in Yugoslavia, namely these explosive devices that were brought
20 to me by people had their manufacturer's name and the year of manufacture
21 marked"; is that right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. So you were collecting these bodies of the projectiles, and you
24 had them among your own weaponry.
25 A. No. We just used the explosives, because nobody would be crazy
1 enough to put into a mortar the body of a mortar shell that had already
2 been fired.
3 Q. All right. But in your statement of the 7th of September, I will
4 show you if necessary --
5 A. Please do show it to me.
6 Q. All right. Here it is. I'm have to show it to you again. Here
7 it is. Again, it was given to the investigators.
8 You say here in paragraph 7, the one but last paragraph, that you
9 and Sarajevo made shells at Alipasino Polje, the foundry there?
10 A. Not I.
11 Q. Was this done under your control?
12 A. No. Under my control it was only hand grenades and rifle grenades
13 that were made. This was done by the Pretis factory, but it did not fall
14 under me. I was a military unit and they were an economic entity.
15 Q. Now look at the statement that you received today and that was
16 presented to the Judges awhile ago. Mr. Milosevic showed it to you a few
17 minutes ago too. It has to do with what you said were the security
18 services centre. You said that you did not ask them for anything, but I
19 am reading your statement of the 26th and 27th of February 1996 to you.
20 On page 1 in the middle you say: "I decided to establish contact with the
21 security services centre and to ask them whether I could conduct an
22 investigation in this respects. They agreed."
23 So it was not expertise you sought?
24 A. No, no, wait a minute. I have to have a look at this. I cannot
25 say anything. Give me the page number, please.
1 Q. Here it is, and it was underlined as a matter of fact. It had
2 already been presented to the Judges. Here it is on page 1. Page 1,
3 paragraph 7. You said quite literally what I said to you. "I contacted
4 the security service centre and asked if it was possible for me to conduct
5 an investigation." So you were conducting an investigation. You were not
6 giving an expert opinion.
7 A. No, no. Wait a minute. It was a judge who engaged me. They just
8 made it possible for me to come to the site.
9 Q. Did you state what it says here in this statement or not?
10 A. Look, I cannot conduct an investigation within the centre when I'm
11 not a member of the security centre -- services.
12 Q. But that's what you said.
13 A. It's a mistranslation.
14 Q. All right. Look at what you said: "I did not agree with the
15 opinion of General Smith because there is a difference in shells used by
16 the Chetniks and by the ABiH. The shells produced in Sarajevo were not
17 made of wrought steel but from pieces of steel or cast steel." Is that
19 A. This is, again, a misinterpretation. I used a different word, a
20 different kind of iron.
21 Q. Wait a minute. You corrected it later in your September from --
22 in your September statement you say, on page 1 in paragraph 4 --
23 A. It's steel.
24 Q. This is what you said in 1996, that it wasn't made of -- now how
25 did you put it. That it wasn't made of wrought steel.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. But made of cast steel. That is what you said. Of pieces of
3 steel, not of wrought steel. Would you like to explain it to the Judges?
4 A. Yes. Because of technological differences, because there were no
5 presses, et cetera, a number of projectiles, not in my unit but at the
6 Pretis factory in Sarajevo, so I did not take part in this, I just know
7 about it, I have nothing to do with it, they would use a block of steel
8 and then they would mechanically cut this steel, and they would make mines
9 out of it. Afterwards, they managed to develop their own technology of
10 founding -- casting.
11 Q. So in September 2000, you corrected yourself.
12 A. No, no, I did not correct myself. It's the very same thing. For
13 a technical person, it's the very same thing.
14 Q. Please, look at what you said in paragraph 4 of your statement in
16 A. It is not contradictory.
17 Q. Please explain it to the Judges.
18 A. I'm asking you what to explain to the judges.
19 Q. Well, I've put the question to you. I always seem to be in a
20 hurry because the time, and I know I'm speaking too fast. So I'm reading
21 this: "In relation to this statement made previously, shells made in
22 Sarajevo were not made of wrought steel but from pieces of steel or cast
24 A. I've just tried to explain this to you.
25 Q. Well, please hear me out. Please hear me out so that you could
1 give the Judges the explanation that is necessary. And you say: "My
2 sentence was not interpreted properly. Shells of the BH army were made of
3 cast iron, rolled iron." So did you understand that you had made a
4 mistake and that you wanted to correct it when you saw what the shell had
5 been made from?
6 A. Distinguished colleague, have you seen my report? There is no
7 reference in it whatsoever what kind of steel it is, cast or rolled. The
8 question here had to do with external ballistics, determining the
9 locality. If you look at my report, no reference is made to pieces of
10 steel. What the Prosecution asked me about was whether I as an expert
11 could explain to them how the development of ammunition manufacturing went
12 in Sarajevo. That is what I said in my statement to them. But in my
13 expert report, there is no reference absolutely to any technologies that
14 were involved in this.
15 I did not call them -- I did not analyse these pieces. I analysed
16 the external ballistics of the projectile and the stabiliser. So for this
17 expert opinion, this is totally insignificant. Why would it be
18 significant whether the material was cast or rolled? And whether the
19 pieces will be in the shape of a blade or irregular shapes, if a
20 projectile is --
21 Q. Witness, we don't have time for this.
22 A. I don't know if you have time or not. Now because you do not have
23 time you are going to bring me in a position that would make it seem that
24 I stated something that I didn't state.
25 Q. You say that as opposed to what Smith found.
1 A. No. Well, his first statement was that the projectile did not
2 have a fuse.
3 Q. We will have to go back to the absolute core of the matter.
4 In item 2 of your conclusions --
5 A. Just a moment. Let me find the conclusions.
6 Q. You say: "There is no possibility of an explosion caused by a
7 stationary explosive device."
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And in the statement you have before you, the one given in
10 September, look at the penultimate paragraph. You said: Professor
11 Zecevic handed over to the team of investigators a photocopy of the report
12 of the Serb expert, Miroljub Vukasinovic, in which he speaks about the
13 mortar action in Markale in Sarajevo."
14 And look at the last sentence now: "Professor Zecevic said that
15 although these are two different incidents, the information from the
16 reports are relevant to the incident that occurred on the 5th of February,
18 From the Office of the Prosecutor, I got this -- these findings
19 that you handed over to the OTP. I believe that it is relevant, and I
20 would like to indicate something in it to you.
21 What is stated in para 2, does it mean that you are in fact
22 contesting the contents of this report you yourself submitted to the
24 A. Where are you exactly?
25 Q. And this is consistent with what you said about the angle: "The
1 analysis made of the position of the crater, the place of impact, the
2 angle of the stabiliser, and the numerical measurements of impact on the
3 target, it can be concluded on this basis that the shell fell under static
4 conditions under an angle of 55 to 60 degrees." That is precisely the
5 angle that you spoke about all the time. They seem to be identical. What
6 can you tell us about this finding? Is it relevant?
7 A. I hold Mr. Vukasinovic in high esteem. He is a good expert but he
8 has no practical experience. He is a good expert when it comes to
10 This whole theory is based on very good concepts. But in my whole
11 report, I never say that I accepted his conclusions. You cannot call
12 these conclusions identical. I said, however, that the methodology of
13 Mr. Vukasinovic is interesting. Is can be debated opinion. And we have
14 other pieces of information here. But generally speaking, it is an
15 interesting concept that can be usefully involved in analysis.
16 However, the report of Mr. Vukasinovic is useful because it
17 provides one possible concept: He tried to explain this phenomenon. He
18 did not explain it in fact, because he made several errors, but this is
19 not important for our case.
20 Q. So you accept it from that point of view?
21 A. No. You cannot have me say what I never meant to say. People
22 from the Prosecution asked me what can be done. I told them here is the
23 report of Mr. Vukasinovic, he is a good expert, a young man whom I
24 respect, his conclusions are not completely correct, but his theory is not
25 unfounded, and some concepts from his theory I used in my own analysis.
1 And it says in my expert opinion given to the Prosecution that I did not
2 accept his conclusions, I just said that his theory was interesting.
3 Q. What I'm interested in and what you have to explain to the Judges
4 concerns this angle. If it -- we are talking about a statical instrument,
5 the angle established is consistent with the one that you measured, not
6 the angle measured by the UN investigation team.
7 A. Look, the angle has nothing to do with it. When you fire a
8 projectile, depending on the distance, on the angle of elevation, you will
9 have completely different angles. To make this clearer, I will show you
10 this example.
11 Here is a mortar. It's important for understanding what angles
12 are all about. This 55 angle has nothing to do with Markale 1994.
13 Markale 1994 and 1995 are two different cases. This is the mortar from
14 which the projectile was fired. It can change elevation from 45 to 65
15 degrees. The shell has additional charges. The more charges inside, the
16 higher the velocity of firing.
17 Now, take two teams. Take two crews and give them the task of
18 firing from two different positions, two different shells --
19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Time is rather against us.
20 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Just one more question, please,
21 if I can complete my examination.
22 Q. Mr. Zecevic, what is interesting is that the radars operated by
23 the representatives of the international community did not record the
24 firing of any rockets, and there are no witnesses who seem to have seen
25 them. Radars did not register the -- any rockets flying over the area
1 where the projectile was supposed to have been fired over. How can you
2 explain this? Because you say in your report that a projectile can be
3 seen by the naked eye.
4 A. First of all, a mortar shell is not the same as projectile.
5 Second, the radars were positioned in the Sarajevo airport, and they were
6 not turned on. Therefore, the projectile that flew in was completely on
7 the opposite side in relation to the radars. So that doesn't mean
9 JUDGE MAY: We are going to finish now. Thank you very much.
10 Yes. I'm afraid that's going to include --
11 Questioned by the Court:
12 JUDGE KWON: Please wait a minute. It's not clear to me. It's
13 about the raw material of the shell. Is it true, as you suggested in your
14 statement in 1996, there is a difference in shells used by the Serbs and
15 by the Bosnian army?
16 A. The difference was in the quality of material used for the body of
17 the projectile. They had presses and could manufacture the body --
18 JUDGE KWON: That being the case, apart from the analysis of
19 ballistics of projectile, why did you not analyse the fragments found in
20 the Markale place at that time?
21 A. They were completely irrelevant to determining the position of the
22 origin of fire. Fragments are important if you want to establish how many
23 people could have been killed. One mortar shell had 3 to 5.000 fragments
24 that fly at a speed of 1.000 to 1.500 metres/second. They are important
25 to ballistic experts, not to somebody trying to find the origin of fire.
1 What mattered to me was the stabiliser fin and the point of firing. On
2 the basis of that, you could draw certain conclusions.
3 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Thank you.
4 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.
5 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, if there's no time for re-examine could
6 I at least ask that the photographs that we used in cross-examination be
8 JUDGE MAY: Yes, certainly.
9 MR. GROOME: Thank you.
10 JUDGE KWON: And they can be included. And we should exhibit the
11 Defence Exhibit also later.
12 JUDGE MAY: We will deal with that next week formally.
13 Yes, Mr. Nice, we've really got to end, I'm afraid.
14 MR. NICE: Your Honour, can I cut across the evidence simply to
15 say this. The project on showing relevance of the intercepts that we seek
16 to have admitted has been completed. Files are available for you now.
17 This deals with the Bosnian intercepts which have been reduced to what the
18 Prosecution has reduced to a minimum, every one being relevant but they've
19 been grouped two ways for your assistance. First chronologically with
20 themes identified. The themes are then set out, and then the intercepts
21 have been regrouped according to the themes so that you can see them in
22 that context. A list of dramatis personae is added at the end.
23 There are three more potential intercept collections all much
24 smaller than this, two of them depending on decisions about particular
25 witnesses, either identified or being identified by, amongst others, the
1 Prosecutor. At least one and probably two of those fall for collation in
2 a similar way. There's a final collection of intercepts which would be
3 admitted in an entirely different way and probably wouldn't merit this
4 particular form of collation. But the project has been completed by, as I
5 indicated, the in-house expert, together with others of the team who are
6 identified on the footer of the first page.
7 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Zecevic, that concludes your evidence. Thank you
8 for coming to the Tribunal to give it. We are grateful, and you are now
9 free to go.
10 [The witness withdrew]
11 JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now until next Tuesday.
12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m.,
13 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 20th day of
14 January, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.