Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 31062

1 Tuesday, 20 January 2004

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Page 31063












12 Pages 31063 to 31115 redacted, closed session














Page 31116

1 [Open session]

2 JUDGE MAY: And we'll ask the registrar to produce the various

3 documents.

4 If you would like to announce that.

5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, in order, the additional photograph

6 used with picture number 3 on the registry page number 02115539 will

7 be 636, tab 1. Tab 2 would be the additional graph similar to the graph

8 on registry page number 02115536 of the expert report. Tab 3, Your

9 Honours, would be the new graph titled relief of direction of flight.

10 Tab 4 will be graph that identifies the distribution of the fragments.

11 And tab 5 will be the photocopy of the X-ray of the projectile. Tab 5

12 will be the photocopy of the X-ray of the projectile. And tab 6, Your

13 Honours, will be the picture of the mortar.

14 Defence exhibit -- the diagram of the vehicle will be Defence

15 Exhibit 230, and the sketch showing the damage on the asphalt will be

16 Defence Exhibit 231, Your Honours. Excuse me. Yes, Your Honours. The

17 diagram of the vehicle will be Defence Exhibit 232, and the sketch showing

18 damage on the asphalt will be Defence Exhibit 233.

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Call the next witness. Yes. Can you deal with

20 any matters we have to cover, first.

21 MR. KHAN: There are no protective measures for this particular

22 witness, Your Honour. No, there are not.

23 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

24 MR. KHAN: So the Prosecution would call Kerim Mesanovic.

25 [The witness entered court]

Page 31117

1 JUDGE MAY: Yes. When the witness is ready, let him make the

2 objection in the usual way.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

4 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

5 JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.


8 [Witness answered through interpreter]

9 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Khan.

10 MR. KHAN: Your Honour, this witness has already given evidence in

11 the Brdjanin and the Kvocka trials. So his transcripts have already been

12 admitted by 92 bis (D). So I kindly ask the witness.

13 Examined by Mr. Khan:

14 Q. Witness, did you give evidence in the Brdjanin and the Kvocka

15 trials before this Tribunal?

16 A. Yes, I did.

17 Q. Could I kindly ask Your Honours that these transcripts be

18 exhibited? They have already been admitted.

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

20 THE REGISTRAR: 638, Your Honours.

21 MR. KHAN: The witness's evidence concerns the municipality of

22 Prijedor, and I shall read a brief summary to the Court of that evidence.

23 The witness grew up in Prijedor with his family and remained there

24 until 1992. Although he is a Muslim, his wife is a Serb. Prior to the

25 conflict, he worked in the Mobilisation Department of the secretariat for

Page 31118

1 the People's Defence which was in the same building as the police.

2 Prior to 1991, the mobilisation orders used to come from Sarajevo

3 via Banja Luka. However, after 1991, they came from Knin in Croatia.

4 Around the same time, the organisation of the old Territorial Defence was

5 changed with the creation of a new federal organ referred to as a VTO,

6 which had control over all military matters in Prijedor. This new TO

7 structure was headed by Serbs.

8 The Mobilisation Department became a part of the VTO, but the

9 witness believes that he was excluded because he was a Muslim.

10 In September and October of 1991, the witness was instructed by

11 the chief of the VTO to provide him with lists for mobilisation containing

12 the names of Serbs only. The units mobilised included the Banja Luka

13 rocket unit and the 5th Kozara Brigade and the 43rd Motorised Brigade.

14 In early 1992, weapons were secretly distributed to Serb

15 civilians, and in February 1992, the commander of the Prijedor War Brigade

16 was JNA Major Radmilo Zeljaja who said that he was going to level Kozarac.

17 The Serbs established their own separate Assembly in March and took over

18 power in Prijedor on 30th of April, 1992. Gradually the Muslims were

19 sacked from their jobs and replaced by Serbs. On the 23rd of May, the

20 village of Hambarine was shelled and attacked by Serb forces and shortly

21 thereafter Serb forces attacked Kozarac.

22 The witness was told by a colleague that the Stari Grad part of

23 Prijedor, which is almost entirely inhabited by Muslims, was attacked and

24 destroyed by Serbs using tanks, and they started by destroying the mosque.

25 At that time, Simo Drljaca was head of the Prijedor police who gave the

Page 31119

1 witness a freedom of movement pass. On the 24th of June, the witness was

2 arrested by the police and placed in the cell at SUP, and whilst being

3 removed to the Omarska camp was beaten and had four teeth knocked out. At

4 that time, Dr. Stakic was president of the Crisis Staff, and the Omarska

5 camp had been set up by Simo Drljaca on the orders of the Serbian Republic

6 of Bosnia Ministry of Interior.

7 The witness was detained in Omarska for about 3 months from June

8 1992 to August 1992. He was never charged with any offence and was never

9 told why he was taken there. Approximately 3.000 people were detained at

10 Omarska at any one time. Initially he was placed in the white house for

11 the first three days of his detention, with 45 others. Those others had

12 been badly beaten, and it was difficult to recognise them because they had

13 blood all over them. The walls were splattered in blood.

14 The witness helped carry a dead man out who had been beaten to

15 death.

16 Zeljko Meakic was in charge of the camp whilst Ranko Mijic was in

17 charge of interrogators. According to the witness, Mijic was the most

18 responsible for the killings and beatings which occurred at Omarska since

19 he made the categorisation lists which were given to Meakic for

20 implementing the beatings and killings. The actual killings and beatings

21 were carried out by the guards on Meakic's orders.

22 The witness, since his family was related to Meakic, only spent

23 three days in the white house, after which Meakic ordered him to be taken

24 to the glass house where, according to Meakic, he could guarantee his

25 safety.

Page 31120

1 Whilst in Omarska, the sleeping and sanitation conditions were

2 inadequate. The detainees did not have enough to eat. They were often

3 beaten on their way to meals and many were afraid even to risk leaving

4 their cells to go and eat. They were afraid of being beaten.

5 Whilst the witness was in Omarska, he was permanently scared of

6 being beaten or killed.

7 After interrogation the detainees were placed in three categories.

8 According to the witness category 1 was the worst category to be in, since

9 these people were to be iced. The second category would be imprisoned and

10 the third category were meant to be released.

11 Category 1 generally consisted of the intellectual or wealthy

12 segment of the Muslim society in Prijedor at that time. Category 2 were

13 people who had supported the SDA, and those in category 3 were Muslims who

14 hadn't been involved in anything.

15 A number of those in category 1 disappeared and were never seen

16 again. They were taken to the Red House where the witness assumes they

17 were killed.

18 On one particular occasion, a hundred people who had been brought

19 to Omarska after the cleansing of the Brdo area of Prijedor were placed in

20 the white house and were shot during the night. In the morning, the

21 witness saw lorries being loaded from piles of dead bodies. The Brdo area

22 encompasses the villages of Hambarine, Biscani, and Jugovci. The witness

23 heard, after his release, that on or around the same day about 150 men

24 were also killed at the Keraterm camp.

25 Whilst he was at Omarska, the witness remembers on one occasion a

Page 31121

1 delegation of important people visiting. These people included Brdjanin,

2 Zupljanin, Drljaca and Stakic who had police and other bodies guards. The

3 witness on his release was taken to Trnopolje camp where he was detained

4 for only one day. He then returned to Meakic's village where he lived,

5 but again left there because of threats made against him.

6 Now, that is a very brief summary of the witness's evidence, and

7 with the permission of the Court, I'd like to ask the witness one or two

8 oral questions.


10 MR. KHAN:

11 Q. Witness, you say that the Serb authority came into power on

12 Prijedor on the 30th of April. Before 30th of April, how many armed

13 attacks had the Muslims carried out against Prijedor?

14 A. Not one. Not one armed attack on the 30th of April.

15 Q. You also mention this word that people in category 1 were supposed

16 to be "iced"? What do you mean by this word "iced"?

17 A. What I mean is I myself was on that same list on the 2nd of April

18 to be put on ice. I just know what the driver told me. I know his

19 nickname. What he said was, "You're lucky, because you were supposed to

20 be iced yourself." So I suppose that means dead, icy cold dead.

21 Q. Now, before the takeover on 30th of April, you say you'd been

22 living in Prijedor. Did you know a person called Darko Mrdja?

23 A. Yes, but not well, just by sight.

24 Q. Did you see him at all whilst you were in Omarska camp?

25 A. Yes, I did see him on the last day, which was the 6th of August

Page 31122

1 when they escorted the buses to Manjaca. Him and another young guy whose

2 nickname was Baki. He was in Prijedor. I knew him as a sportsman.

3 Q. And were they -- was Mr. Mrdja working and Mr. Baki working for

4 any particular organisation or body?

5 A. I don't understand what you mean by that. You mean before the war

6 or what?

7 Q. Well, when you saw him at Omarska, was he a civilian? Was he in

8 the military?

9 A. Oh, I see. Well, he was in the military, a special unit or an

10 Intervention Platoon. That's what they said. Although Baki wasn't a

11 military-able man. He didn't do his military service. He was one of the

12 once people in command on that APC which arrived on the 6th of August,

13 arrived in Omarska.

14 MR. KHAN: I have no further questions, and that would complete

15 the examination-in-chief.

16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Aga, before we go on, let me clarify about the

17 content of the Exhibit 638. You are submitting only the transcript or you

18 are going to submit all the package with these exhibits? I cannot confirm

19 it.

20 MR. KHAN: We are wanting to submit all the package.

21 JUDGE KWON: But you haven't produced even an index of them. I

22 don't know what's included in that package.

23 MR. KHAN: I apologise, Your Honours. There is no index included

24 there, but we will make one --

25 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

Page 31123

1 MR. KHAN: -- for the package.

2 JUDGE MAY: Yes, do that so that we have it.

3 MR. KHAN: Yes, Your Honour.

4 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, we have one hour for you to

5 examine this.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May. I'll do my best

7 to ask a number of relevant questions.

8 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

9 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Mesanovic, you've just said that the Serbs

10 took over on the 30th of April, took over power in Prijedor; is that

11 right?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Is it true that they took over power without a single bullet being

14 shot?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So there was no violence, nobody was injured, or anything like

17 that?

18 A. Not that night, no.

19 Q. Is it true that the area with majority Muslim population was

20 placed under the control of the militia made up of Muslims and some

21 Croats, and also under the control of the Patriotic League of

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?

23 A. No.

24 Q. For example, Kozarac, which is where there was a large armed

25 Muslim formation in place, and then Hambarine, Biscani, et cetera, all

Page 31124

1 that remained under Muslim control, did it not?

2 A. Yes, until the 23rd.

3 Q. All right. Now, was the immediate cause for the takeover a

4 telegram which the head of the public security station whose name was I

5 think Hashim Talundzic --

6 A. Talundzic, yes.

7 Q. He was the chief of police in Prijedor, and this telegram was sent

8 by Alija Delimustafic, the Minister asking for action to be taken to block

9 the barracks, seize the weapons from the JNA and similar acts, and that by

10 mistake it came into the hands of the Serbs in Prijedor too. Do you know

11 about all that?

12 A. No. I worked in the Secretariat for National Defence and not in

13 the SUP.

14 Q. Well, that dispatch was sent on the 30th -- or, rather on the 29th

15 of April, and on the 30th they took over the main institutions. Do you

16 know about that?

17 A. Yes. The Serbs took control on the 30th in the morning at around

18 5.00 a.m.

19 Q. Yes, that's right.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this telegram being tendered?

21 The date is the 29th of April, and it is signed by the Ministry of the

22 Interior, Alija Delimustafic, and it states the following, that a blockade

23 should be effected of military facilities, et cetera, and that the columns

24 of the former JNA should be prevented from leaving the barracks and

25 communicating on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that combat

Page 31125

1 action should be organised and affected throughout the territory of the

2 BiH and that this action should be coordinated by the headquarters of

3 Territorial Defence, the region, the Bosnia-Herzegovina territory within

4 the frameworks of planning combat action to plan protective measures for

5 the population, its property and so on, material goods, et cetera.

6 Massive obstruction on all roads in Bosnia-Herzegovina on which the units

7 of the former JNA would start to withdraw their equipment and materiel, et

8 cetera, et cetera.

9 So in Prijedor, everything was quiet. This telegram was sent on

10 the 29th, ordering combat action and attacks on the army, that the

11 barracks be blocked, et cetera, and then the Serbian Territorial Defence

12 assumes control of Prijedor; is that right? Are the dates correct?

13 A. The dates are, yes.

14 Q. All right. Fine.

15 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Let the witness see this document.

16 If the witness would care to look at that and make any comment

17 about it.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can see some dates here, the 11th

19 of May, 1992, and that's been written in hand.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. I'm talking about the date of the telegram itself, which is dated

22 the 29th of April.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. You can see that in the upper left-hand corner?

25 A. It says the 29th of the fourth month.

Page 31126

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we proceed?

2 JUDGE MAY: No. Give the witness the opportunity if he wants to

3 make any comment, do so, but if not, just hand them in.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't think I heard this part

5 where it says: "Pursuant to a decision of the Presidency of the Republic

6 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, number so-and-so, of the 27th of April, 1992, with

7 respect to the withdrawal of the JNA units from the territory of the

8 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and because of the violations of this

9 order of the Presidency and the expropriation and looting of property

10 belonging to Bosnia-Herzegovina by the former JNA, I hereby order the

11 following." I think that paragraph is essential. That goes before the

12 order itself, why this order was actually issued in the first place.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Well, how do you mean that the JNA pulling out its equipment is

15 looting Bosnia-Herzegovinan property?

16 A. I was a member of the JNA too, so it was my property too.

17 Q. All right, if that's the explanation, we needn't belabour that

18 point any more.

19 JUDGE MAY: Let the document be handed in to us to mark it for

20 identification.

21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, to make a clarification for the

22 record, please.

23 JUDGE MAY: No, just give the number, please.

24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the Defence diagram of the vehicle

25 will be Defence Exhibit 231. The Defence sketch showing damage on the

Page 31127

1 asphalt will be Defence Exhibit 232, and this document, Your Honour, the

2 telegram dated the 29th of April, 1992, will be Defence Exhibit 233 for

3 the record.

4 MR. KHAN: Your Honour, may the Prosecution be provided with a

5 copy of that document to be marked for identification?

6 JUDGE MAY: It's only been marked in the usual way for

7 identification, and you will have a copy of it and indeed, can comment on

8 it in due course.

9 JUDGE KWON: And if the registrar can later check the number of

10 statement of Stakic and the letter or dispatch which was shown to the same

11 witness. Let's go on.

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. We noted a moment ago that areas with a majority Muslim population

15 remained under the control of the police consisting of Muslims, and we

16 mentioned Kozarac, Hambarine, Biscani, Carakovo. Is it true that at

17 Hambarine several members of the then-already existing Army of

18 Republika Srpska were killed on the 19th of May? No, the 22nd of May, at

19 a checkpoint manned by the Muslims? These were soldiers who were going by

20 unarmed, they were on their way home to Ljubija. Do you remember that?

21 A. Yes. On the basis of Radio Prijedor, these soldiers were armed,

22 and they provoked the incident at the checkpoint, and it was under the

23 control of policeman Aziz Aliskovic. That is what the shooting started.

24 Q. And that is when four of them were killed?

25 A. Not four, one of them.

Page 31128

1 Q. That is what you are saying.

2 A. That is what I know from Prijedor. That was the first shot fired

3 on the 22nd of May in the afternoon.

4 Q. And the killer is also known; right?

5 A. No.

6 Q. But this Aziz that you mentioned --

7 A. No, Aziz was the command of the checkpoint, Aziz Aliskovic.

8 Q. So he was in command of the people who killed this soldier?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. As you say, according to my information, four were killed. But

11 let us go back to you and your testimony in writing.

12 You were working in the mobilisation department of the municipal

13 Secretariat for National Defence in Prijedor; is that right?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And you stayed in that position until the 22nd of June, 1992; is

16 that right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. So you remained in that position even after the Serbs took over

19 power on the 30th of April?

20 A. With a break since mid-May when we were all dismissed, and then I

21 was called back to work in June. Just before I left to Omarska, because

22 they couldn't find an adequate replacement for me.

23 Q. And is it true that six out of seven Muslims from your service

24 remained in the job after the takeover?

25 A. Until mid-May. Only Becir Medunjanin didn't come to work.

Page 31129

1 Q. So only Becir Medunjanin was replaced.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And do you know why he was replaced?

4 A. He was a member of the SDA, and he was a Muslim.

5 Q. A moment ago, we found that out of seven Muslims, six remained on

6 duty and that one was Medunjanin. Do you know that in the military

7 Tribunal in Banja Luka there were proceedings against him and he was

8 accused of having organised and participated with some others like Muhamed

9 Cehajic, Mujadzic Mirsad, Hasan Talundzic, that he had participated in the

10 procurement of weapons, the formation of paramilitary units and prevented

11 weapons being returned to the legal authorities?

12 A. I don't know of that.

13 Q. Here is the indictment. He was not replaced because he was a

14 Muslim. He is the only one who was replaced out of you -- seven of you,

15 and here is the indictment against him and the others relating to these

16 acts that I mentioned a moment ago.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I would like to tender this

18 into evidence. Not because he was a Muslim but because he committed a

19 criminal act.

20 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness see it.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is the 5th of September, 1992,

22 an indictment after he was killed.

23 JUDGE MAY: Let --

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know that he was killed.

25 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness follow it.

Page 31130

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Crnkic, my former teacher, was

2 killed. Aliskovic Aziz was killed. Cehajic Muhamed was killed,

3 Medunjanin Becir was killed. That is as far as I know. And the

4 indictment was issued on the 5th of the September, whereas we were killed

5 in the month of June. So this is an indictment against dead people.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Thank you. If you'd hand that in, please.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. And do you know that prior to an indictment certain acts have to

9 be done regarding the crime for which the indictment is issued?

10 A. But Becir Medunjanin's top of the head was cut off, and his chest

11 was wounded. So I don't know that such acts need to precede an

12 indictment.

13 Q. But I couldn't have committed those acts as a dead person?

14 A. My opinion was he was killed first and then indicted because the

15 indictment is dated September and he was killed in June.

16 Q. I think one needs to read the whole document. It isn't a lengthy

17 one. I wouldn't dwell on it. Their Honours will be able to read it.

18 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. We'll mark the next document for

19 identification. We will then decide if it has any relevance.

20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Defence Exhibit 235, marked for

21 identification.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Mr. Mesanovic, is it true that no one forced you during that time

24 to sign any kind of loyalty oath?

25 A. It was offered.

Page 31131

1 Q. You say on page 2 of your statement, it is a statement the 4th of

2 February, 1999, that no one forced you to sign an oath of allegiance.

3 A. That is true. I said it was offered, but I didn't sign it.

4 Q. Is it true that your colleague in the department was

5 Stjepan Maric, a Bosnian Croat, Maric was sent to Manjaca in 1991 because

6 he didn't carry out the order on mobilisation? This is also in your

7 statement.

8 A. Stjepan Maric worked for the defence as -- department as a

9 computer expert. He went to Manjaca as a head of a regiment.

10 Q. Well, is the following true in your statement which may -- that he

11 had produced some false software programmes? He wasn't sent to prison

12 because he was a Croat but because he had committed some crimes?

13 A. Yes. He received a hundred thousand marks personally from

14 Mr. Franjo Tudjman.

15 Q. But that sounds rather unbelievable, doesn't it?

16 A. Yes, of course it does.

17 Q. You also say on page 2, paragraph 3, that people in Prijedor were

18 against the order on mobilisation taken at the federal level?

19 A. Which mobilisation? Which year and which month?

20 Q. On page 2, paragraph 3 you speak about it.

21 MR. KHAN: Your Honour, may the witness kindly be provided with a

22 copy of his statement?

23 JUDGE MAY: Why? Why?

24 MR. KHAN: So that he can see the parts which he's actually

25 alleged to have said and comment upon them. It's more easy for him to do

Page 31132

1 it that way.

2 JUDGE MAY: Yes, let him.

3 MR. KHAN: Thank you, Your Honour.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Tell me, please, in those days, and we're talking about 1991

6 still, didn't Yugoslavia still exist as a unified state and that decisions

7 by the federal authorities were legal?

8 A. Yes, but the hierarchy applied differed. It went Belgrade,

9 Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Prijedor. That is why we were opposed, because the

10 orders were coming from Knin, written in Cyrillic from Knin, which did not

11 correspond to any system of the country we had before the war. We were

12 under the military district of Banja Luka, and above Banja Luka was

13 Sarajevo, and above Sarajevo, Belgrade, and that is why we opposed it.

14 Q. Very well. You say that in the spring of 1991, the last regular

15 mobilisation of territorial units was carried out?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And you say when they distributed weapons they gave Serbs

18 automatic rifles and Muslims, M48-rifles.

19 A. That was true. That applied to the TO detachment mobilised at

20 Urije. Serbs received automatic rifles. Members of the Muslim ethnicity

21 received M-48s.

22 Q. Very well. Did you actually see that and you were mobilised?

23 A. No, I wasn't mobilised. I was at the airport.

24 Q. So you were not mobilised and you did not receive a rifle.

25 A. No, I worked in the national defence secretariat. I carried out

Page 31133

1 the mobilisation. I apologise, Your Honour, for speaking so fast.

2 Q. You say things started to change drastically after 1992; is that

3 right?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Tell us why?

6 A. Because drunken soldiers were coming back from the Croatian

7 battlefront with insignia which were insulting and provocative of the

8 non-Serbs. They were wearing cockades, White Eagles patches, patches with

9 the four Ss. I don't know whom they belonged to. They did what they

10 wanted around town. They drank and ate without paying for it. They broke

11 cafes up, and that is what happened.

12 Q. As you were working in the national defence, was there a JNA unit

13 there?

14 A. No. Prijedor, as such, did not have any active military forces.

15 Q. Is it true that the situation deteriorated after the proclamation

16 on the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

17 A. And even before. In November 1991, there was some shooting.

18 There was a carpet of bullets in the streets when they returned from the

19 Croatian front. Things worsened around the 4th of November, 1991.

20 Q. Well, what about the well-known statements by Alija Izetbegovic on

21 the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina? When were they made? Was it

22 before the 4th of November or after that?

23 A. Statements, yes. But these were just statements. There were

24 statements by Karadzic that one people would disappear from the face of

25 the earth too.

Page 31134












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 31135

1 Q. Very well. You know that the formation of an independent

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina was the aspiration of the Muslim population.

3 A. Of the non-Serb population.

4 Q. You are familiar with the Izetbegovic's statement that peace would

5 be sacrificed for an independent Bosnia?

6 A. I don't remember that.

7 Q. Reactions to all this started in November; is that right?

8 A. We had a mobilisation before that of the reserve forces and

9 sending them to Croatia. Strange things were happening. The Muslims

10 didn't go to the Croatian front either.

11 Q. Very well, Mr. Mesanovic. Now, tell me, please, what do you know

12 about the organisation of paramilitary units in those days by the

13 Patriotic League and other paramilitary formations of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

14 A. I'm unable to answer that question because I don't know.

15 Q. But you do know, for instance, that at the time of the events you

16 are testifying about, there were several thousand armed members of Muslim

17 forces in Kozarac, for instance?

18 A. I wouldn't say that they were that many. There was a TO unit of

19 Kozarac, but they didn't number several thousand.

20 Q. Well, there was information about this.

21 A. Simply I don't know that, because those were the Territorial

22 Defence. I was in the civilian Secretariat for National Defence.

23 Q. Do you know anything at all about the formation of paramilitary

24 units?

25 A. No, because I wasn't involved for a moment, and I had no knowledge

Page 31136

1 of it.

2 Q. You don't know anything about the collection of weapons?

3 A. Yes, I do know about the collection of weapons as announced by

4 Radio Prijedor. I'm aware of the proclamations to hand in side weapons,

5 personal weapons, including pistols. Everything needed to be handed in.

6 I do know that.

7 Q. I am asking you about the arming, not the disarming.

8 A. Yes, I do know about the arming of Serbs in Prijedor.

9 Q. But you don't know anything about the arming of Muslims?

10 A. I lived in Prijedor, and I didn't live in the surrounding

11 villages, so I don't know that. And I know that weapons were distributed

12 publicly even to children in Prijedor in the spring of 1992. And I also

13 think that there is a figure as to how many weapons were seized from the

14 Muslims. I think this was a hundred or so. I saw the data in this

15 Tribunal.

16 Q. Very well. When you're talking about the arming of Serbs, were

17 they arming themselves for the purpose of self-defence or for some other

18 reasons?

19 A. It was -- it proved to be for some other reasons because they had

20 no need for self-defence.

21 Q. And you saw this dispatch from Alija Delimustafic. How can you

22 say that they had no need to defend themselves?

23 A. I think the area in which I lived there was that no need for an

24 indication of a need for self-defence.

25 Q. But it was peaceful until the dispatch arrived ordering attacks on

Page 31137

1 the military. Tell me, now can this function, as you just explained, that

2 you started receiving orders via Knin?

3 A. Yes. I can't explain that. Maybe you can explain it because you

4 were in the top leadership at the time.

5 Q. I believe that that is not true. That is why I'm asking you.

6 A. I don't know what I could say to that.

7 Q. Well, you say that by order of the federal government all the

8 weapons were taken from the local offices of the TO and placed under JNA

9 control.

10 A. You know that the TO staffs were abolished and the weapons were

11 taken over by military territorial bodies.

12 Q. Very well. And do you know that on the 29th of May, 1990, so this

13 was prior to any kind of conflict, the 29th of May, of 1990, a decision

14 was taken by the Presidency of Yugoslavia on the takeover of weapons and

15 military equipment of the TO and their storage in JNA warehouses,

16 precisely to avoid uncontrolled use of such weapons and this applied to

17 the whole of Yugoslavia, that all the republics of Yugoslavia had to do

18 this, and they did?

19 A. Yes. And after that Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia happened. Once

20 the weapons were taken from TO units.

21 Q. They were not taken, they were placed under JNA control, and this

22 happened in Serbia as well.

23 A. You call it what you like. I didn't even have an official pistol.

24 It was taken away from me in 1992. It was a 7.62 millimetre pistol.

25 Q. Is it true that the -- working in the Zarko Zgonjanin barracks was

Page 31138












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Page 31139

1 not delivered a part of the weapons that should have been delivered to it?

2 A. We didn't have an active military in Prijedor, only the reserve

3 force.

4 Q. But there was a barracks?

5 A. Yes, but there were no conscripts there, only the officers.

6 Q. And these officers didn't engage in any kind of wartime

7 activities. It was a commission that should have taken over the weapons

8 following orders of the Presidency of the SFRY. Isn't that right?

9 A. It was not a commission. The barracks always had a certain number

10 of active-duty officers who made up the staff of the unit that was being

11 established for a certain purpose. So it wasn't a commission of any kind.

12 They were just people there who were there parallelly. They had the same

13 function, organisationally speaking, as I did in the civilian section.

14 The regiment commander was the barracks commander at that time, and all

15 the other administrative employees, finance and so on, that was something

16 else. But there were no soldiers. When I say "soldiers," I mean the

17 young men doing their military service in the JNA.

18 Q. All right. Is it true that the Party of Democratic Action and

19 Izetbegovic himself at the beginning of 1991 made the decision that

20 Muslims should not go to the JNA and that he called all the soldiers and

21 officers born in Bosnia-Herzegovina, appealed to them to leave the JNA and

22 also prevented further recruitment of the JNA; is that right?

23 A. I know about an order not to respond to the reserve force and not

24 to respond to mobilisation so that they shouldn't be sent to the front in

25 Croatia. I know about that.

Page 31140

1 Now, we regularly enrolled in the JNA up to a certain month but

2 not afterwards. I can't remember the exact time. After what went on in

3 Croatia, they were no longer sent to the JNA and Croatia and Bosnia and

4 Slovenia, I think, too.

5 Q. Is it true that the Party of Democratic Action, the SDA party,

6 through its representatives appealed to the Muslims of Prijedor not to

7 respond to the appeal launched by the JNA?

8 A. Let me repeat. I wasn't a member of the Party of Democratic

9 Action at all, the SDA.

10 Q. But you know about their appeal?

11 A. I can't tell you about that either. I know there were rumours to

12 that effect. Now, whether it was the party's official position, I can't

13 say because I wasn't a member of that party.

14 Q. All right. Do you know that on the 12th of April, 1992, Alija

15 Izetbegovic ordered an all-out attack on JNA barracks?

16 A. No.

17 Q. All right. While you were working in Prijedor, you say on page 3

18 of your statement, the last paragraph, up until the 22nd of May, nothing

19 was going on in Prijedor.

20 A. Except for what happened on the 4th of May, I think, and that was

21 the killing -- the killing that took place in Dubica when three Muslims

22 were taken out of a regular bus line and this man was killed, and after

23 that a curfew was enforced.

24 Q. Yes. That is borne out by my information too. It was linked to

25 the killing of a soldier on the previous day, and then somebody out of

Page 31141

1 retaliation killed those three Muslims, and in order to prevent further

2 violence, a curfew was introduced which applied to everyone. Isn't that

3 right?

4 A. Yes. As far as I was concerned, I didn't go out. I don't know

5 whether it applied to everybody, though, because you could hear shooting

6 after 10.00 p.m., and songs were sung, cafes were open, and underneath my

7 own window there was an all-night cafe.

8 Q. All right. Now since you're talking about the stay in Omarska and

9 you say that the white house was reserved for people from Kozarac, all

10 those who had taken part in the attack on Prijedor; is that right?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. So there was an attack on Prijedor.

13 A. That's what they said. Because the question was why was I in

14 Omarska.

15 Q. Well, we'll come to that too. Didn't you confirm a moment ago

16 that on the 22nd of May there was a killing that took place at the -- at a

17 checkpoint by Muslim forces?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And you say that one man was killed, but my information tells me

20 that four soldiers were killed, and of those four, two were Croats and two

21 were Serbs.

22 A. The on-site investigation was conducted by the Serbs, so the

23 reports are drafted as befits that side.

24 Q. Now, we're not talking about an on-site investigation. That's not

25 the point. But the point is the document that I have in my possession,

Page 31142

1 perhaps you're going to say that somebody was accused and charged after he

2 was killed. And this is an official report that said that Amer Ceric was

3 apprehended. The 10th of June, 1992, is the date. And then it goes on to

4 say that in the village of Hambarine, two uniformed Serbs were killed who

5 were passing by in a car together with two Croats who were wounded. And

6 then it goes on to say,"Dado told me that the man was killed by someone

7 called Siki and that his real surname was Sikiric because he stopped a

8 soldiers' patrol in Hambarine."

9 And there's a lengthy statement to follow which speaks about the

10 whole event, and I think that it can be tendered into evidence as an

11 exhibit.

12 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness see it first. Yes. If the witness

13 would take a brief look at that and whether he can assist us or not.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Amer Ceric was killed. His father

15 is Jusuf and works in the Nafta gas company. And the name rang a bell

16 but, yes, he was killed after the statement. Mesic Halil, killed in

17 Omarska, and he was going to make a film about the attack on Prijedor. He

18 was killed after that.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Who killed one man and who killed the other? Do you have any

21 information about that?

22 A. Who killed them all. But Amir and Halim and Muhamed and all the

23 rest of them. Who killed them?

24 Q. Well, during the Muslim attack on Prijedor, according to what a

25 witness said here before you, 17 Serb policemen were killed. So who

Page 31143

1 killed them?

2 A. I couldn't tell you who killed them.

3 Q. But I assume you know that they were killed, because they were

4 buried.

5 A. They were policemen mostly from Bosanski Novi. Do you know that?

6 That most of the policemen were from Bosanski Novi? Now, what were they

7 doing in Prijedor on that morning and where were they killed? Were they

8 killed in Prijedor or somewhere else.

9 Q. Well, Mr. Mesanovic, as far as my information tells me, they were

10 killed during the Muslim attack on Prijedor, and you say you lived in

11 Prijedor throughout and that you knew about the attack?

12 A. Yes, I did hear shooting that morning, and it went on until noon.

13 And amongst them was my uncle with two of his sons. One of them is in

14 Australia and the other is in Switzerland. The house was razed to the

15 ground. It is across the road from Radio Prijedor on the pretext that the

16 attack came from this house and that it was launched by my uncle and two

17 sons, and he doesn't know about the whereabouts of his first son because

18 it was a son from a first marriage, but it is true that the house no

19 longer exists and it used to be across the road from Radio Prijedor.

20 Q. When was the house destroyed?

21 A. It was destroyed during the attack on Prijedor.

22 Q. And the attack on Prijedor was conducted by Muslim forces, was it

23 not?

24 A. I don't know that. And my uncle was not in Prijedor at the time,

25 and the Tribunal can check that out. When my uncle and his son left for

Page 31144

1 Switzerland and when the first son disappeared and is probably living in

2 Australia but he haven't heard from him for 30 years. So official police

3 reports say that my uncle and the two sons worked in Prijedor, which is

4 not true, and the house was razed to the ground, and there were two shops

5 underneath it.

6 Q. I don't know about that.

7 A. Well, I'm telling you.

8 Q. When those soldiers were killed at the checkpoint, do you know

9 that in fact, Aziz Aliskovic and Crljenkovic, Sikiric, Ferid, and the

10 others were there and Mujadzic, Mirsad and Esef Crnkic joined them later,

11 as well as Husein Crkic, Jasmin Beharolic [phoen], Husa Pasic, Emir Paltak

12 and others.

13 A. I can't answer that. I don't know who came. I just heard that

14 Aziz Aliskovic was there but I don't know about the others. I think he

15 was from Biscani or Jugovci or somewhere like that.

16 JUDGE MAY: Yes. It's time now for an adjournment. Before we do,

17 do you want the witness to produce this document or other that you

18 referred to? Do you want it produced? Do you want it, Mr. Milosevic?

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

20 JUDGE MAY: Yes, produced it. Very well. We'll give it the next

21 number for identification.

22 THE REGISTRAR: D236, Your Honours, marked for identification.

23 JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now for 20 minutes. We will remind

24 the witness, Mr. Mesanovic, not to speak to anybody about your evidence

25 until it's over, please.

Page 31145

1 We will adjourn now. Twenty minutes.

2 --- Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.

3 --- On resuming at 12.39 p.m.

4 JUDGE MAY: Fifteen minutes left, Mr. Milosevic. Yes.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'll do my best to use them

6 rationally.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Is it true that after the killing at the checkpoint that the

9 Muslim forces did not want to hand over the killers and that an appeal was

10 made for them to hand over the perpetrators of the crime? The appeal was

11 made over the radio.

12 A. I don't know that that happened. All I know was that they asked

13 weapons to be surrendered.

14 Q. Is it true that the army took action only afterwards because they

15 wanted to block off that checkpoint, not to prevent any repetitions?

16 A. Well, two tanks of the Intervention Platoon from the Zarko

17 Zrenjanin barracks passed by that night.

18 Q. You mean after the killing at the checkpoint?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Is it true that two days after this event, that is to say on the

21 24th of May, in Jakupovici from a military checkpoint the army was sent

22 off and that the military column was shot at?

23 A. The same as in Hambarine, the cause for action.

24 Q. You mentioned a certain Zeljaja who threatened to raze Kozarac to

25 the ground. Is that a man from your local area?

Page 31146












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Page 31147

1 A. No.

2 Q. Where is he from?

3 A. From the surrounds of Sarajevo. And he came to replace Bosko

4 Divljak [phoen] to organise mobilisation and organisation with the

5 platoon. I think he was captain first class and later received the rank

6 of major.

7 Q. Is it true that the main road from Banja Luka to Prijedor was

8 blocked for a length of 15 kilometres?

9 A. No.

10 Q. And the checkpoint was set up by members of the Patriotic League

11 and the TO and the 3rd of May, 1992, as early as that; is that right?

12 A. The checkpoint was in Kozarac. I don't know where else it could

13 have been. After Kozarac, you have Serb villages, Lamovita, Omarska, and

14 so on.

15 Q. Yes. And all that was blocked; is that right?

16 A. Yes, that's right, but the -- that's what the Serb authorities

17 said.

18 Q. You don't know about that?

19 A. Well, I wasn't there.

20 Q. Now, do you know that Sead Cirkin organised an attack on the

21 military column and he was the commander of the Green Berets in Kozarac?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Is it true that in Jakupovici the Muslims killed a soldier named

24 Zgonjanin with a sniper and set fire to a tank?

25 A. I heard about that.

Page 31148

1 Q. Is it true that the fighting went on for two days?

2 A. No.

3 Q. What is true then?

4 A. What is true is that they used multiple barrel rocket launchers

5 for two days to fire and if you respond with a shell when a bullet is

6 fired, then that's not a proper fight.

7 Q. All right. But the Muslims attacked on the 30th of May; is that

8 right?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Do you know that at Kurevo and Carakovo, Captain Muhic, Suad

11 Halilovic, Kemo Alagic, and Slavko Acimovic prepared and trained men and

12 devised a tactical attack for Prijedor?

13 A. All I know is that Acimovic was killed in Omarska.

14 Q. And do you remember that the group of Alagic, Kemo, and Suadic

15 nicknamed Suhi had the task of attacking from the bridge and attacking the

16 motel.

17 A. No.

18 Q. And do you know that Slavko Acimovic's group under the command of

19 Captain Muhic attacked the building and assumed control of the town?

20 A. No. I wasn't in the group for me to be able no know what

21 assignments who had, nor did I take part in the perpetration of any plan.

22 Q. Do you remember that from the direction of Puharska, for example,

23 where the 4th group started out to take over the bypass that a young man

24 was killed there?

25 A. No.

Page 31149

1 Q. Do you know the commander of the group whose name was Kemo Alagic

2 and his nickname was Divljak?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Did you hear that the 3rd group was commanded by man called

5 Rizvanovic and the fourth by Izet Mesic, Hadzija?

6 A. I knew Hadzija by sight but I don't know which group he commanded.

7 Q. According to you, how many Serb policemen were killed on the

8 occasion?

9 A. I think it was the number you mentioned.

10 Q. All right. Fine. Now, do you know that a group of -- a group

11 escaped towards Sredici [phoen], Biscani, Kalajevo, and Donja Ljubija?

12 A. No, I don't know that.

13 Q. Do you know that that group, the one that secretly dispersed, were

14 given the task of resting up and three days later on the 2nd of June too

15 have a meeting in Studenac near Sisin Hrast [phoen] or Kurevo in order to

16 ascertain the plans of attack on Ljubija and the police station there?

17 A. No.

18 Q. You yourself were arrested on the 24th of June; is that right?

19 A. Yes, but I didn't leave my house until the 15th or 16th of June.

20 I didn't dare leave my house.

21 Q. You were apprehended by a policeman what's surname was Kovacevic

22 whom you knew from Prijedor?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Did he tell you he was arresting you because somebody who had been

25 arrested mentioned you in one of their statements and this was to be

Page 31150

1 checked out?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. You were first of all put up at that so-called white house and

4 then were you were transferred to the staklenik [phoen], the glass house;

5 is that right?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Did Zeljko Meakic transfer you?

8 A. Yes, correct.

9 Q. Zeljko Meakic told you that the statement you gave during your

10 interrogations was not a good one and that you ought to amended it?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Is it true that Meakic wanted to help you?

13 A. Yes, correct.

14 Q. You say that Meakic was the commander of the Omarska camp.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. However, you know that that is not correct.

17 A. No, no, that is correct. That is correct, sir. And you forgot to

18 say something. Zeljko Meakic had family ties with me. We were family; my

19 brother married his sister. So Zeljko was the commander throughout the

20 whole time.

21 Q. According to my information, he couldn't have been commander

22 because there were people who were senior to him. He might have been in

23 command of the group providing security, but he wasn't the camp commander.

24 A. He was the captain, the commander of the guards who beat people,

25 killed people and took people off for interrogation.

Page 31151

1 Q. All right. Now is it true that Meakic did not kill anyone or beat

2 anyone or take anyone off for interrogation?

3 A. I didn't see anything like that, but if he was the main person in

4 command, then I see no reason why he should do that, why that would be his

5 duty.

6 Q. That's what I'm saying. I'm saying that he wasn't the main person

7 in command and that is a wrong piece of information.

8 A. I know two men who were there: Ranko Mijic, the head of the

9 inspectors, and Zeljko Meakic, who was the chief. Now you can call him

10 what you like, whether of security for the camp or the detainees, I

11 wouldn't know, I can't say. I don't know what happened round about,

12 whether there was any third formation there, military, civilian or

13 whatever. Police or whatever.

14 Q. All right. According to my information, the War Presidency of the

15 Prijedor municipality made a decision according to which the members of

16 the reserve police force was to be decreased to provide security for

17 Keraterm, Trnopolje, Omarska to be taken over by the army but the army

18 refused to take on the obligation of providing security for those camps.

19 Do you know about that?

20 A. No.

21 Q. All of these people, ones that you mention in any capacity

22 whatsoever, whether being in the police force or in those camps were

23 people from your local area; is that right?

24 A. Well, from the Prijedor municipality. I don't know all the

25 people, but I know the people that I mentioned and Prijedor municipality,

Page 31152

1 when I came to Omarska and I heard from the inmates who came before me

2 because I came later on 24 hour -- days later in fact, and I heard from

3 them there were groups there and the army was Banja Luka Banija or

4 wherever. I really can't say.

5 Q. All right, you were released from Omarska on the 6th of August and

6 sent to Trnopolje from which you were released on the 7th of August?

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. And then you went home to Prijedor; is that right?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Is it also true that after 24 hours in Prijedor, you went to

11 Petrov Gaj precisely to the house of the Zeljko Meakic family?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And you spent the next two and a half months there; is that right?

14 A. Until the 16th or 17th of September.

15 Q. You were there together with Zeljko Meakic's family, his wife and

16 child; is that right?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Who were you with then?

19 A. With the parents of my sister-in-law, and that is Zeljko's cousin

20 from the house across the road.

21 Q. So Meakic protected you; is that right?

22 A. I don't know from what.

23 Q. Is it true that Meakic got a forged identity card for you?

24 A. No. It is my sister-in-law from Novi Sad who obtained that ID for

25 me.

Page 31153

1 Q. Meakic is a relative of yours.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. But this emanates from page 3, paragraph 5 of your statement. A

4 moment ago you said that you never saw Meakic hitting anyone or engaging

5 in any kind of violence.

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. The same applies to Kvocka?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. So neither Meakic nor Kvocka never hit anyone nor abused anyone or

10 engaged in any kind of violence?

11 A. That is what I saw and that's what I said at the trial of Kvocka

12 and others.

13 Q. And you were wife is a Serb?

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. And after all this suffering, you found shelter and safety in

16 Serbia; is that right?

17 A. With a Serbian identity card that was the only way.

18 Q. Now, tell me, if you had wanted to, couldn't you have gone to the

19 territory under the control of the BH army?

20 A. Along which route?

21 Q. Any route going through the far west of Bosnia-Herzegovina to

22 Serbia.

23 A. Everything was under Serb control. You know that well. The only

24 route was through Serb-held territory with a false ID in Zdravko Lukic's

25 name.

Page 31154

1 Q. Perhaps you didn't go to territory under Muslim control so as not

2 to come under the mobilisation order.

3 A. No. I never gave that a thought, because I had escaped from hell,

4 and I was thinking of how to save my family and pull them out.

5 Q. And you did, didn't you? You went to Serbia, and you stayed in

6 Serbia for how long?

7 A. Four days.

8 Q. And after that you went to Germany?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Did you have any problems in Serbia?

11 A. As a Serb, no.

12 Q. Do you know any Muslim who had problems in Serbia?

13 A. No.

14 Q. In your statement, you mentioned a certain Zoran Zigic.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Is it true that he was a local criminal?

17 A. I wouldn't describe him in those terms. Zoran Zigic grew up with

18 me in the same part of town. We were even together for our tonsils to be

19 operated. He had his life. I have mine. Now, whether he was a criminal,

20 I wouldn't really tell you.

21 Q. I have here a document dated the 1st of July, 1992, and it says:

22 "Instructions for the apprehension of Zoran Zigic to the prison

23 administration in Banja Luka, public security service in Prijedor, the 1st

24 of July, 1992, Zigic Zoran," et cetera, "from Prijedor," his address, "to

25 be arrested because of reasonable grounds to believe that he received

Page 31155

1 money, and it is in this connection that the order is issued for him to be

2 arrested.

3 The Secretariat of the Internal Affairs in Prijedor, public

4 prosecutor informs under this number that he had started -- that he issued

5 a request for investigating procedures against Zoran Zigic for the

6 criminal act of receiving bribes.

7 So this is a person who did engage in criminal activity.

8 A. You read that out. Zoran Zigic was a taxi driver. Why could he

9 have received a bribe as a taxi driver?

10 Q. I don't know anything about that, but I have this document. You

11 can have a look at it.

12 A. I don't think it's necessary. This was on July 1st. I was in

13 Omarska.

14 Q. But you mentioned him in your statement?

15 A. Yes, I know him.

16 Q. And my question was whether he was a local criminal, and you said

17 no.

18 A. There was a killing that he was charged with, but he was

19 acquitted. So I can't say that he was a criminal if the court acquitted

20 him.

21 Q. And is it true that you received a special pass from Simo Drljaca

22 on the basis of which you were able to move around after the curfew?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Tell me, since a moment ago that you said you were not able to

25 move around, did you move about or did you not? That is one question.

Page 31156












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Page 31157

1 And my second question, why did you receive that special pass? What were

2 you doing? What were the activities you were engaged in?

3 JUDGE MAY: These must be the last questions. Yes.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did move about from my house to my

5 work in the presence of the driver of the Secretariat of National Defence,

6 Branko Milosevic. I needed this permission because I said I lived and

7 grew up in that town, and everyone knew who I was, and I just had confirm

8 that with a letter signed by Simo Drljaca, who was the big boss in

9 Prijedor. I never moved around alone without this driver who was armed

10 and with the presence of the head of the military territorial body,

11 Cedomir Zitovac, who was also armed, because the computer wasn't working

12 and we had to go to Zitopromet. And there were checkpoints all over town

13 at which we would be stopped. If one of the local Serbs recognised me, it

14 was necessary for me to show them this pass signed by Simo Drljaca and

15 that I wasn't driving around for the fun of it.

16 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.

17 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I just have a few

18 questions.

19 Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:

20 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Mesanovic, you said a moment ago that via

21 Serbia you went to Germany, and you stayed there until when?

22 A. Until I went to a third country.

23 Q. Very well, but you also said during the examination-in-chief that

24 your uncle went to Australia and his children.

25 A. One son to Australia, and my son [as interpreted] and uncle went

Page 31158

1 to Switzerland in 1991. His son may have gone in 1990, but my uncle in

2 1991.

3 Q. They went there directly from Bosnia?

4 A. They went to work there as medical technicians.

5 Q. But I would like to know how many Muslims left Bosnia in the same

6 way as you did via Serbia and went abroad.

7 A. I couldn't tell you. I know that Emir Puskar used the same kind

8 of ID card under the same name and left, because that ID card was sent

9 back to Prijedor.

10 Q. About the events you testified about in the camp, you said that

11 you heard shots one night.

12 A. Correct.

13 Q. You said that that night that the fog was very thick and it lasted

14 all night.

15 A. Until morning.

16 Q. Until what time?

17 A. Until about 5.00 or 4.30.

18 Q. And how far was the white house from where the shots were heard?

19 A. Maybe some 50 metres.

20 Q. Could you explain to the Judges, since you mentioned that that

21 night 150 men were killed, on what basis did you come to that number?

22 A. That was the number that entered the white house as we counted

23 them when they came off the buses.

24 Q. Who counted them?

25 A. Not just me but those of us who were in the glass house.

Page 31159

1 Q. And why did you count those men?

2 A. Simply to know how many of us were there and how many had arrived.

3 Q. Yes, but you said in your statement that, "Later when I was in

4 Trnopolje, I learned that that night 150 men had been killed."

5 A. But I'm talking about Omarska, not Keraterm.

6 Q. And 150 were killed in Keraterm as well?

7 A. I heard that. Even Radio Prijedor announced that this was an

8 escape attempt in all those camps.

9 Q. And that that night in each of those camps that many people were

10 killed. So you're just assuming it?

11 A. Yes. Well, there were more than a hundred.

12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Does the Prosecution have any questions?

14 MR. KHAN: I'd just like to ask the witness a couple of questions.

15 Re-examined by Mr. Khan:

16 Q. Now, according to the accused, this dispatch was received on the

17 29th of April and then by 5 a.m. the next morning, the Serbian authority

18 had assumed power. Did you observe or notice anything to indicate that

19 the Serb community were getting ready to take over power before 29th of

20 April?

21 A. No.

22 Q. And finally, can you confirm just for clarity whether there were

23 one or two killing incidents at camps? Were they separate instances that

24 you mentioned at Omarska and Keraterm, or only one?

25 A. I don't understand the question. In Omarska, as I said, that was

Page 31160

1 the first time that we heard shots. And I saw the killing of Crnalic. I

2 don't know his first name. He was killed in front of the white house.

3 That is the only shooting that I saw and heard, but in the night between

4 the 25th and the 26th, between Thursday and Friday, with Esad Sadikovic

5 and another two guys, I took out Mehmedalija Sarajlic, his body, and we

6 left him near the fence next to the red house. That is where they were

7 killed, beaten up to death. And they would be left there for days

8 sometimes, and then a yellow truck would take them away in the morning.

9 We used to call it Zuco. Because if someone were to see a killing, he

10 would just see it and that would be it.

11 MR. KHAN: No further questions.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. The Prosecutor's

13 question as to whether it was known, it wasn't known except that a new

14 parallel authority was established. That is the Serb Assembly was formed

15 in March, before the takeover. And all the administrative bodies of the

16 municipality existed in parallel. All the secretariats. They were --

17 there were all the directors who would replace the Muslims. And this was

18 even announced on Prijedor radio, the Serbian Assembly of Prijedor.

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let us thank the witness for coming here to give

20 his evidence. We're grateful. It's now concluded. Mr. Mesanovic, if you

21 would like to leave now. Thank you.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you too.

23 [The witness withdrew]

24 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

25 MR. NICE: Your Honour, the next witness is Dr. Ton Zwaan whose

Page 31161

1 report of November 2003 has been served. He's actually just outside the

2 door, so he can be brought in immediately. The Chamber has seen his

3 report already.

4 [The witness entered court]

5 JUDGE MAY: We have in mind, so it should be plain that we will

6 hear some brief questions by the Prosecution. We allow one hearing as far

7 as the accused is concerned. If he wishes to ask that length of question

8 of this witness.

9 MR. NICE: Thank you very much. Ms. Aptel, who the Chamber hasn't

10 seen before, and Mrs. Tromp, who the Chamber has seen before, will be in

11 court, they having been involved in the preparation of this evidence. And

12 the Chamber should also have the curriculum vitae of Dr. Zwaan, where it

13 was served a couple of days after the report.

14 JUDGE MAY: Yes. If the witness would please take his usual

15 statement.

16 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

17 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

18 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. If you'd like to take a seat.


20 Examined by Mr. Nice:

21 Q. Full name, please sir?

22 A. Anthony Zwaan.

23 Q. And Dr. Zwaan we will come to your curriculum vitae in a minute,

24 but you're a social scientist, and is the position as follows, that you

25 were asked by the Office of the Prosecutor to prepare a report on research

Page 31162

1 into genocides and other mass crimes which target specific groups?

2 A. Yes, that's correct.

3 Q. Such crimes or such events, if we use a neutral term, have only

4 been capable of being described as genocide since that word was coined in

5 the mid-twentieth century?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. But in fact have such events been the subject of academic study

8 before that word was coined?

9 A. Yes, certainly, but then other words were used like atrocities or

10 massacres or barbarous acts.

11 Q. Since the Second World War, has there been developing interest in

12 and research upon such events conducted by a wide range of social science

13 and other disciplines?

14 A. Yeah, that's correct, especially since the 1980s. The field,

15 so-called field of genocide studies has developed in which historians and

16 social scientist are active.

17 Q. If you could keep your voice up a little bit although, of course,

18 it's all amplified so we can hear you. You are now based at the recently

19 opened centre for Holocaust studies in Amsterdam?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And that centre is not unique. It's one of several or many

22 similar centres around the world researching into these events.

23 A. That's correct, yes.

24 Q. With that in mind, then, very briefly your curriculum vitae which

25 has been made available to the Court, the accused, and the amici, you set

Page 31163

1 out your history since 1970 as an academic, your qualifications most

2 recently being your doctorate in the year 2001 at Amsterdam, doctorate

3 being in civilisation and decivilisation, studies on state formation and

4 violence, nationalism and persecution.

5 A. That's correct, yes.

6 Q. You set out the other publications under your name. In the report

7 for this Chamber, were you asked specifically to omit all reference or any

8 reference to the former Yugoslavia?

9 A. Yes, I was asked that.

10 Q. And to draw the report on the basis of other research, and

11 focusing in particular on four events known as genocides in the 20th

12 century, the Armenian, the Nazi, Rwanda, and Cambodia?

13 A. Yes, that's correct.

14 Q. The underlying or one of the underlying interests and problems

15 that academics in your field are concerned with is how it comes about that

16 neighbour can land up killing neighbour, colleague, colleague, apparently

17 in pursuit of some other objective.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And to do so on a large scale?

20 A. Yes, that's correct.

21 Q. Your study is focused by reference to earlier and other events on

22 whether there are common characteristics that can be discerned, whether

23 there are conclusions that can be drawn from such characteristics when

24 they occur?

25 A. Yes, I would agree to that.

Page 31164

1 Q. Your report, and I look now at the index, is in eight sections of

2 which the eighth is a summary of conclusions.

3 MR. NICE: Your Honour, it's always helpful for those viewing to

4 have as good an understanding as they can of material dealt with in

5 writing. With the Court's leave, might page 38 and 39 as appropriate, the

6 summary, be laid on the overhead projector? And I have about one or two

7 questions to ask per sector, and I'll link the questions to the

8 conclusions that are to be found. If that's an acceptable course, I'd ask

9 the usher to do that.

10 Q. The first part of your report is by way of introduction, and if

11 goes from pages 3 to 7. Nothing I need cover with you in that.

12 Starting at page 7 and under, as it were, chapter 1 of your

13 report, you deal with the definitions and discussions of the term genocide

14 that has both a legal meaning, ultimately the only meaning of significance

15 here, but has a broader use and connotation; correct?

16 A. Yes, that's correct. I focused on historical and social scientist

17 discussions.

18 Q. Very well. At your conclusion in relation to this part, we can

19 see on the passage on the overhead projector that you make the point

20 that genocide and other en masse crimes targeting specific groups should

21 be distinguished from war and civil war, although we should recognise that

22 war or civil war may contribute to the development of genocidal processes.

23 At page 11 of your report, and within this section, you draw to

24 our attention the problem, if it is a problem, of the Holocaust of being

25 the standard model. Could you just amplify that in a sentence for so for

Page 31165












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 31166

1 us?

2 A. Well, the murder of the Jews was the basis for drawing up the

3 United Nations Convention, and I think because it's the case of genocide

4 about which most people know quite something. It has become, so to speak,

5 the model against which people measure other or new cases of genocide, and

6 that has some advantages but also some disadvantages.

7 Q. The disadvantage being related to the scale of events?

8 A. Among other thing being related to the scales, yes, but I think

9 people tend to measure, unwittingly or wittingly, new cases or other cases

10 of genocide against the standard model, and then might easily conclude

11 that these new cases are not really cases or are not so very serious

12 cases.

13 Q. Although they may in fact demonstrate to the social scientist the

14 same constellation of events and circumstances that can be found in

15 genocides of the larger type?

16 A. Yeah, I would prefer here the term similar.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: On the scale, what are some of the other factors

18 that make the 1945 phenomenon not necessarily a good example, Witness.

19 THE WITNESS: I think that depends on what you want to argue. I

20 think it is a very important case to study over and over again, the murder

21 of the Jews but it is also, like every other case, a unique case with

22 certain unique features and then there are also some similarities, and

23 what I'm after in this report is looking for similar conditions and

24 similar causative mechanisms.

25 MR. NICE: It may be -- if I can add to His Honour's question. I

Page 31167

1 don't know if you wanted to -- am I cutting across Your Honour?

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Not at all, no.


4 Q. It may be in amplification of that answer and to assist His Honour

5 you could, if it's helpful or appropriate, identify some of the

6 characteristics of the 1945 event that are not to be found generally and

7 are unique?

8 A. Well, a very important fact to my mind is that the Nazis went for

9 the complete genocide of every Jew within the reach of the German

10 authorities, and in other cases that does not have to be the case or is

11 not happened -- has not happened in that way. So it was -- it was an

12 effort at the really complete genocide, and that's one of the exceptional

13 characteristics.

14 Q. Within this same section of your report at paragraph 12, you set

15 out a list of conditions identified by a fellow academic, Helen Fein, and

16 it may be that the usher, as well as leaving the final page on the

17 overhead projector, can lay on other pages from time to time,

18 paragraph 12, coming your way.

19 This academic identified continuity of attacks by perpetrators,

20 collective organisation of perpetrators, victims selected by membership of

21 a group and being defenseless in circumstances where murder is favourably

22 sanctioned by the perpetrators as some of the identifying characteristics.

23 A. Yes, you can use these characteristics or these criteria to look

24 at specific cases and see whether they fit, yes or no.

25 Q. Having identified her standard or unexceptional list, you in fact

Page 31168

1 set out your report in slightly different headings, but let -- can you

2 help us with this: Your approach, as far as you can judge it, is it

3 within the main body of present research into these events or would it in

4 any way be eccentric or extreme?

5 A. No. I've done my best to formulate, let's say, the general

6 consensus within the field with regard to conditions and processes. So I

7 wouldn't judge it eccentric at all.

8 Q. Let's turn, then, to part 2 of your report which starts at page 13

9 and goes only to page 15, headed war, civil war, and genocidal crimes. It

10 finds its expression in your summary. Sorry. I already dealt with that

11 summary, I think.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. There's one point of -- I think you think great importance to be

14 found at paragraph 23 on page -- footnote 23 on page 14, and this is the

15 concept of monopoly of violence and its relationship to the monopoly of

16 taxation. Expand on that in a sentence or so, its significance for

17 potential perpetrators and victims and then we'll look at a modern

18 demonstrative example?

19 A. Well, I think the monopoly of violence is the most central

20 characteristic of any state and the monopoly of violence does several

21 things. It reserves the right to use violence to the state and usually

22 forbids it to groups of citizens. That's one aspect. Another aspect is

23 the formal basis of public order in the sense that the forces of monopoly

24 of violence, usually the police or military or judiciary, will take action

25 when groups of citizens or individual citizens will take recourse to

Page 31169

1 violence so the monopoly of violence is the guarantee of public order. I

2 think I should leave --

3 Q. Its relationship with the monopoly of taxation is probably obvious

4 but a sentence on that?

5 A. Well, they're both closely intertwined. If you do not have a

6 monopoly on violence you will not be able to levy taxes. And the other

7 way around. If you don't have taxes, you are not able to pay for a

8 monopoly of violence.

9 Q. Once the monopoly of violence is broken, penetrated by other

10 forces, disintegrates or whatever, what is the consequence for the sense

11 of impunity in wrongdoers? What is the consequence in vulnerability for

12 potential victims?

13 A. Well, if the monopoly of violence is not functioning any more or

14 when certain groups are deliberately excluded from the protection of

15 monopoly of violence, that will mean that some groups in society or some

16 organisations might take recourse to violence for their own private ends.

17 Maybe I could give as an example the functioning of the Mafia in Italy and

18 other countries. Mafia functions there where they can take recourse to

19 private uses of violence which a state is not able to repress or contain,

20 and similarly, in genocidal situations, the state will not try any more to

21 contain violence for certain political ends.

22 Q. Countries may like to think of themselves as absolutely civilised,

23 and the notion that they are dependent on something called or something

24 characterised as a monopoly of violence may be unappealing, but was there

25 example in a country that are proud of its civilisation, Canada, recently

Page 31170

1 that demonstrates exactly what you're saying?

2 A. Yes. When the police decided to go on strike there, you saw in a

3 very short period of time a fast increase in the uses of violence and in

4 crime. There are other another example, for instance, when the central

5 lighting broke down in New York, as you may remember a few years ago.

6 Looting, plundering and other criminal activities certainly increased.

7 So I could -- if I -- if I may, I could say the civilisation of a

8 society and also the civilised behaviour between people depends very much

9 on the guarantee of security, and security is guaranteed by an monopoly of

10 violence.

11 Q. I think the Canadian example again, lawlessness broke out within

12 hours, not days. Literally within hours?

13 A. Within hours, yes.

14 Q. Part 3 of your report from pages 15 to 17, headed crisis and

15 genocidal crimes, finds reflection in your second conclusion in the

16 summary to the effect that such crimes can only develop and take place

17 under conditions of serious and enduring crisis, destabilisation -- third

18 sentence the state concerned, polarisation processes, depacification and

19 increasing use of violence at the heart of such crises.

20 You address at paragraph 18 on page 15 the possibility that

21 genocides or crimes of mass targeting of groups can erupt spontaneously

22 from the bottom up as a normal aspect of society, and if so, what's your

23 conclusion according to all the research?

24 A. I think that just never happens. Genocide or genocidal crime is

25 a very exceptional thing in a society, and it never develops from the

Page 31171

1 bottom up nor out of the blue, so to speak, and that's why I've tried to

2 argue that to understand genocidal crimes or genocidal processes you have

3 to look at the crisis the whole society gets into before you can

4 understand what's happening.

5 Q. We turn now to part 4 of your report, which is between pages 17

6 and 21, finding expression in your conclusions in the third conclusion,

7 which is a long and central conclusion.

8 I'd like you to help us a little bit by expansion, perhaps, of

9 paragraph 29, and it may be this is a paragraph the usher could just lay

10 over the top of the conclusion for the time being, paragraph 29 on page

11 19. Can you link for us your conclusions about the monopoly of violence,

12 about factual dictatorships and impunity?

13 A. Yes. I will try to do that. Normally, the monopoly of violence

14 is under the command of central political authorities of a society so when

15 we have to do with situations in which genocidal crimes are developing, we

16 must conclude that the central authorities do no longer maintain the

17 monopoly of violence in a impersonal and lawful way, but that, in one way

18 or another, and this make take different forms, they have given

19 permission, directly or indirectly, to groups of perpetrators to go on

20 with certain forms of mass crime.

21 So there is a direct relation between the level of specification

22 of a society and the decisions central authorities make. I don't know if

23 I answered your question enough this way.

24 Q. Factual dictatorships?

25 A. It's very important for central authorities, for certain extreme

Page 31172

1 decisions, that they can dispose of enough power to make such decisions.

2 So that will mean two things. It will mean that they will try to -- to

3 withhold restraints from their own society and also that they will also

4 try to withhold restraints from other societies or other state

5 governments. So they will strive after a lot of power to put it simply to

6 be --

7 Q. Looking --

8 A. -- to be able --

9 Q. Looking at the particular events that you have considered, is

10 there any pattern of factual or de facto dictatorships being dressed up or

11 continuing to wear the clothing of democratic process?

12 A. One example I could think of is the sort of referenda Hitler used

13 to organise after he got power in 1933, in which he tried to get majority

14 votes from the German electorate for his policies and for certain

15 decisions. So I would say that there he tried, for instance, or the

16 National Socialist leadership tried, to show some democratic trappings to

17 what was already in fact already a dictatorship from the half -- halfway

18 through 1933. That would be an example.

19 Q. If we now focus, and this is the only time that I shall focus on a

20 paragraph in your report in detail, on paragraph 29 on the overhead

21 projector. Picking it up at the end of paragraph 28, you say how

22 sometimes under certain conditions - this is paragraph 28 - incidental

23 atrocities and massacres may result, or pogroms, but normally the state

24 and its law enforcement agencies, the police and the judiciary, and if

25 necessary the military, will contain, repress and sanction such forms of

Page 31173

1 violence.

2 You go on to say: "When the state authorities fail to do so, or

3 are not willing to do so, they are encouraging and contributing to the

4 development of a genocidal process. Such processes involve large numbers

5 of people as victims, and considerable numbers as perpetrators. That

6 shows again the crucial importance of the central political leadership in

7 committing genocidal crimes. Genocidal crimes are top-down affairs."

8 From the research into the events you considered and from the

9 learning of those and other such events, how clear are you on this

10 top-down conclusion?

11 A. I think I should state that we know of no case of genocide or a

12 genocidal process in which it had grown from bottom up. I think in all

13 cases I know of and other experts do too, you can draw the conclusion that

14 decisions of the central political and military authorities are of

15 decisive importance, whether a genocidal process developments, yes or no.

16 Yes.

17 Q. And this conclusion -- we're using the word genocide but of course

18 the report relates to crimes, mass crimes, targeting individual groups or

19 groups that are picked on?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And that's your conclusion for that type of event?

22 A. Yes, certainly.

23 Q. If we look at the last part of this paragraph, you say as follows:

24 "From the researched cases of genocidal crimes in the 20th century,

25 structural and systematic series of forceful uprooting and violent events,

Page 31174

1 deportations and massacres over an extended area during an extended period

2 of time, the conclusion can be drawn that such crimes happen with

3 knowledge, approval, and involvement of the state authorities."

4 Is that an amplification of the conclusion you've just given me?

5 A. Yes, it is, it is.

6 Q. Does that in any way reflect the availability of information in

7 this part of the development of our world in contrast perhaps to analyses

8 that might have to be made of medieval, late medieval, or whatever you

9 like periods of our histories?

10 A. If you turn to earlier periods of history, you should recognise

11 that the structure of society was quite different from what it is now, so

12 you should specify then the conditions of the state and the monopoly of

13 violence at that time to understand the type of atrocities and massacres

14 which took place, for instance, at the end of the Middle Ages or in early

15 modern times, and they are partially different but also in these cases, I

16 think, the decision of the highest authorities in any society are of

17 crucial importance to understand large-scale violent crimes.

18 MR. NICE: If the usher would be good enough to remove that sheet

19 so we can see the conclusion of the summary paragraph, again the only one

20 I'm going to look at in detail.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Can I ask when you speak of the bottom up and the

22 top down phenomena, are you speaking principally about the genesis, the

23 start of the -- the beginning of the phenomenon? Because isn't there a

24 stage at which the two would coincide, would merge?

25 THE WITNESS: You're partly correct, I think. Once the decision

Page 31175

1 has been made that large-scale violence will not be stopped, it might be

2 so that certain groups from bottom down see opportunities or get impunity

3 to go on with their own mass crimes, violent crimes. Maybe I can offer

4 you an example. When the Germans occupied the eastern part of Poland, at

5 several locations, about 30 in all, local Polish leaders decided to

6 organise pogroms against the Jews, but that to my mind was only possible

7 because the German authorities, who had already initiated anti-Jewish

8 policies, gave them the opportunity to do so, but there you would have a

9 case in which you see a certain merging of large-scale violence from

10 bottom down with top -- top-down decisions or bottom-up and top-down

11 decisions.

12 Did I answer your question?

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

14 MR. NICE:

15 Q. And I think you, in a sense, address this a little bit later, in

16 the next section or the next section but one, where we look at how these

17 processes develop. The summary of the passage you've just been dealing

18 with, the third conclusion, says that: "In the course of the crisis, a

19 radical and ruthless political elite may succeed in taking over the state

20 organisation. Political behaviours and decisions of this leadership may

21 be considered of decisive importance for the emergence of genocide. It

22 has been argued that a genocidal process does not develop from bottom up

23 but is typically top down although the precise involvement of the state

24 may take different forms. One corollary is that the highest state

25 authorities are always responsible for what happens during the genocidal

Page 31176

1 process."

2 And then this: "Another corollary" - perhaps you'd just comment

3 on this last sentence and then we'll move on - "another corollary implies

4 that single acts of genocide should be considered against the background

5 of the prevalent power and authority structure within the state society

6 concerned." And it may be that that sentence can also connect to

7 His Honour's question. I'm not sure but could you amplify --

8 A. Yes, I certainly can. I'm convinced when you look at single

9 separate or isolated events during genocidal process that you will have

10 to -- if you want to understand these separate events, you will have to

11 connect them to a larger view of the power structure within the society

12 concerned, because many people on local and regional levels, for instance,

13 will only act in a violent way when they can be more or less sure that

14 they can get away with it and that they got some impunity. So that's

15 maybe --

16 Q. Thank you. Part 5 of your report between pages 21 and 26 is

17 headed, "The process of genocide, planning and the division of labour."

18 It's largely self-explanatory, and I don't need to ask you any questions

19 about it but one or couple -- save for two. At page 24, at the top of

20 page 24 - again this may, may a matter for you reflect back to His

21 Honour's question - line 3, you speak of genocides gathering speed like

22 flywheels, and that's a picturesque way of putting things. A sentence of

23 amplification.

24 A. Well, I -- I used that image to convey the message that if you

25 look at the genocidal process and you look at the first phase or the

Page 31177

1 initial phase, you will usually find all sorts of obstacles or barriers

2 before getting it launched. It might be a very general decision of

3 central political authority to do away with such or such a category of

4 people, but then still the whole planning still has been -- has to be

5 done. Practical and realistic particular plans have to be drawn up, and

6 that will mean that initially a genocidal process will take time, energy,

7 investments to get going, but once it is organised and once it is running,

8 it might gather speed like a flywheel in the sense that it will be running

9 smoothly after some time and become routinised and it will -- people will

10 learn by doing, perpetrators will learn by doing, and they will find ways

11 and means to go on with genocidal campaign.

12 Q. Then following from that, the first two lines of paragraph 39 and

13 remembering that you said that there's no suggestion that these events

14 occur naturally in societies, or civilised societies, well, any societies,

15 you say that once under way they seldom or never be stopped by the same

16 people who set them in motion. This is your flywheel?

17 A. Yes, it's partly my flywheel, but it's also what has been said

18 under paragraph 38, that when people become involved in genocidal crimes

19 or mass crimes targeting specific groups, they will become involved in a

20 criminal career, and it's not usual for people who get into such a career

21 to have any further recourse to the law or to formal authority. So it

22 will be very difficult once they get in to stop, because they have to

23 cover up all the time what they have been doing, and they're connected to

24 each other also.

25 Q. And your conclusion, the fourth conclusion, puts it in a slightly

Page 31178

1 different way. It says that these events are usually -- the conclusion of

2 such events are usually brought about by forceful external intervention.

3 In any of the large events that you've particularly focused on, has there

4 been a process of natural cessation or has there always been --

5 A. No. In the four cases I have used as examples in this report,

6 they were all stopped from the outside by military intervention in

7 different ways, but it was never stopped by the perpetrators themselves.

8 Q. And at page 25 of the same section, paragraph 40 and then a line

9 from 42, you make the point in paragraph 40 that within the division of

10 labour you've covered in this part of your report, leadership

11 characteristically does or does not make detailed decisions about the

12 genocidal or similar process?

13 A. The top leadership usually only makes very general decisions and

14 thereby gives other people the means and the organisation and sometimes

15 also the money and the armed force to organise the process in a more

16 detailed way, in a more realistic way. We know, for instance, that

17 Hitler, to give that example, never witnessed any genocidal acts himself,

18 nor did he ever write down an order "kill all Jews," but we can be very

19 certain especially in discussions with Himmler and others, that he must

20 have stated the order, that is "kill all the Jews."

21 Q. Is that -- that is famous example -- or very famous exam. Is

22 there a reflection of that in the other of the cases you've studied?

23 A. Certainly. The facts are often difficult to ascertain, but we

24 know, for instance, that three main leaders of the Ottoman Empire at the

25 beginning of the First World War have decided that the Turkish state would

Page 31179

1 do away with the Armenian minority and also with a large part of the Greek

2 minority in Anatolia. Very often the evidence is circumstantial. Maybe I

3 could add that.

4 Q. And then at paragraph 42 of your report, the foot of the page, 25

5 and over to page 26, you make the point that the leadership, unlike the

6 lower-level perpetrators, typically are unlikely to be caught red-handed

7 or apprehended at all.

8 A. Well, the top leadership, at least as far as I know, very often

9 are aware of the extremist character of their decisions, and so they don't

10 leave traces usually. We don't have written orders in these different

11 cases that such-and-such category of people should become the victim of a

12 genocidal process. That's one of the reasons. One of the other reasons

13 is that in several cases, as you all know in Cambodia, for instance, or in

14 Indonesia in 1965, no process ever followed the happening of a genocidal

15 campaign.

16 Q. Finally from the report and then one last question and I'm done,

17 but finally from the report, part 6 which is headed Genocidal Crimes and

18 Ideology, and which goes from page 26 to 31, nothing from the report

19 itself but drawing on that section of the report, what can you tell us,

20 please, about the significance of societies being divided in some way

21 before these crimes can be committed, about the use of propaganda, and

22 indeed about the perpetrating group casting itself as victim?

23 A. Well, a fundamental precondition for a genocidal process in a

24 society is that there are some divisions within the population. These

25 might be of an ethnic nature or a religious nature or a majority/minority,

Page 31180

1 but there should be some divisions.

2 Now, at a certain point in time, for instance by a radical elite,

3 these divisions might become a main point in an ideological stance which

4 might argue as follow -- as follows: We are threatened. We the national

5 majority, for instance, are threatened by certain minorities or other

6 groups. They do not belong to our nation. They should be excluded. And

7 in its most radical form, the conclusion might be they should be ousted of

8 our country or killed. And I think that's where ideology fulfils a very

9 important function and will also be actively used in propaganda to

10 convince part of the population, part of the perpetrators, to act with

11 violence against an innocent minority, for instance.

12 Q. Incidentally going back to His Honour Judge Robinson's question,

13 and paragraph 54 perhaps can pick up on this, although there can be this

14 consequence of a "top down" approach, others may, of course, be driven not

15 by those motives at all but might have entirely selfish objectives in the

16 crimes they commit. Isn't that right?

17 A. Yes, that's certainly correct. Research has shown that

18 participants in the perpetration of genocidal crimes harbour all sorts of

19 different motivations. Some might be devoted nationalists or devoted

20 national socialists, for instance in the German case. In other cases,

21 people might just be out for looting or plundering or money income. People

22 might want to make a career. But apart from these individual motivations,

23 I would emphasise, if I may, that the ideology gives a sort of overall

24 sense of direction to what should be done and imparts a sense of purpose

25 and intent to all the individual perpetrators apart from their personal

Page 31181

1 individual motivations which may be quite variated.

2 Q. Is the creation of a them and us culture characteristic,

3 essential, or what?

4 A. Yes, I think so. It's very important. It's very important that

5 the people of which the perpetrator wants to get rid are seen as "them"

6 and not "us." That's also connected in a dehumanising tendency to exclude

7 certain people from, let's say, the common universe of human obligation.

8 Q. And the need for dehumanisation or the incidence of dehumanisation

9 in all those cases you've studied?

10 A. They illustrate all the time the same mechanism between "them" and

11 "us," but it also makes clear, I think, that a certain degree of

12 dehumanisation is a precondition for large-scale killing. It's not so

13 very easy for people to kill on a large scale, so they have to be

14 convinced that those they are killing are evil and less than human, I

15 think.

16 Q. And then within the general heading of Propaganda, probably my

17 penultimate question: Is the collective historical memory of any part of

18 a them-and-us culture of any significance?

19 A. Yes. That depends on the case at which you're looking, but to

20 give a few examples, I think for the genocidal process against the Jews,

21 the very widespread antisemitism was a very important condition. Many

22 Germans already believed that Jews were evil and conspiring against the

23 German nation.

24 In cases of Hutus and Tutsis, perhaps I can give that example too

25 from Rwanda, Hutus saw themselves, and also with some ground, as victims

Page 31182

1 of Tutsi supremacy for a long time. So in 1994, the organising

2 perpetrators could make use of collective memories among Hutus, collective

3 memories as victims and might turn that experience into a perpetrator's

4 wish to end the victimised status.

5 Q. Literally two last questions. It may be typically the them-and-us

6 culture is a bipartite thing. Would your conclusions be any different if

7 you were dealing not with a bipartite but a three-party or a four-party

8 them-and-us culture?

9 A. It would complicate the research questions, but I think you would

10 find similar mechanisms but in a more complicated way.

11 Q. And then outside your report but something that I wish you to help

12 us with, incidents of people characterised as perpetrators doing some good

13 to those characterised as victims, is that a feature, a common feature or

14 an exception in the studies you've done?

15 A. If I understand you well, you will find such cases, and even in

16 nearly every case you study. And that also has some reasons.

17 Perpetrators might realise what they are doing and might, so to speak, try

18 to make some capital for later on by, for instance, protecting certain

19 families out of the victim category or certain groups. And in all the

20 cases I know of, there are examples of such behaviour. So perpetrators

21 might be large-scale killers or organisers of large-scale killings and at

22 the same time protect a handful of victims out of the same category.

23 MR. NICE: Nothing else. Thank you, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE MAY: One moment while we consider tomorrow.

25 [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 31183

1 JUDGE MAY: For time tomorrow we have in mind one hour and a half,

2 the first hearing, for this. If you have some point, a useful point, if

3 you're going to argue for more time, it is open to you, but at the moment

4 you have an hour and a half, and we do not at the moment intend to

5 increase that. But it's -- if you wish to argue, then you can do that.

6 That's tomorrow.

7 Mr. Zwaan, thank you very much for coming. Please don't speak to

8 anybody about your evidence until it's over. Could you be back again at

9 9.00 tomorrow.

10 THE WITNESS: Yes, I can, Your Honour.

11 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. We will adjourn now until tomorrow

12 morning.

13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m.,

14 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 21st day

15 of January, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.