1 Thursday, 9 December 2004

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, continue with your cross-examination.

7 MR. NICE: May the witness have, please, in the B/C/S text, and

8 I'd like to forecast that the Chamber may have brought their own copies

9 with them. But if the usher could display on the overhead projector from

10 the English text.

11 If the usher could display from the English text first page 57,

12 which is page 42 in the B/C/S for the witness.

13 WITNESS: SLAVENKO TERZIC [Resumed]

14 [Witness answered through interpreter]

15 Cross-examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]

16 Q. And this is a passage dealing with the memorandum we've discussed

17 with earlier witnesses, but Ms. Budding's report, at the top of the page,

18 is as follows in a conclusion --

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

21 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

22 JUDGE KWON: I don't think we are getting English translations.

23 THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear the English?

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Start again, Mr. Milosevic.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm trying to find the passage

1 Mr. Nice indicated in the English version, but page 57 simply doesn't

2 exist, and he refers to 57. The last page in the text I have is 53 of the

3 English text. Audrey Budding, that report; is that right?

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, it goes beyond that. Would the usher please

5 check to ensure that Mr. Milosevic has the right text.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The other pages that I have begin

7 with page 1 and go on to 29, page 29.

8 MR. NICE: He's looking at the B/C/S version, I understand. He

9 can have an English version if we've got a spare, but it's going on the

10 overhead projector, and can the accused please look at page 42, which is

11 in the B/C/S.

12 Q. And the expert conclusion, as we can see, is in part to this

13 effect: "My own opinion is that the Memorandum is most important as an

14 indicator: As evidence that by 1986 the assertions it set out were

15 accepted by influential figures within Serbia's intellectual elite. To

16 put it as clearly as possible, it was the existence of the belief system

17 set out in the Memorandum, far more than the Memorandum itself, that

18 influenced the process of Yugoslavia's dissolution."

19 Now, Mr. Terzic, it is --

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice. Mr. Terzic, is there a problem?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, there's a problem

22 here. I do have page 42, but I can't find that passage. Could you assist

23 me, please. Where does that passage begin?

24 MR. NICE: In a paragraph beginning --

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Not having B/C/S, I can't.

1 MR. NICE:

2 Q. We've marked the beginning of the paragraph. Yes. That's it

3 there.

4 Now, my only question --

5 A. But that's not what Mr. Nice is reading. Ah, yes, I found it. I

6 found it. Thank you.

7 Q. And I seek your assistance to track the important landmarks of the

8 belief system. Do you follow what I'm doing? She says there's a belief

9 system reflected in the memorandum, and it's that belief system that I

10 want to track. All right? And with that in mind, can we then come back

11 to page 5 in the English and page 4 in the B/C/S. And I'm going to deal

12 with certain entries in her report sequentially, not necessarily

13 absolutely chronologically.

14 On the screen we can see this passage: "Into this situation of

15 growing conflict came the first of Kosovo's twentieth-century episodes of

16 status-reversal: Its passage from Ottoman to Serbian rule in the Balkan

17 Wars." And then this sentence: "Contemporary observers of the Balkan

18 wars noted numerous atrocities committed by Serbian and Montenegrin

19 soldiers. Some saw evidence that the Serbian soldiers were engaged in a

20 systematic attempt to alter the demographic balance of the region in order

21 to justify its incorporation into the Serbian state."

22 Do you have any challenge to what Audrey Budding writes there?

23 MR. NICE: Your Honours, for my part I am keeping my finger in the

24 end notes to see the authorities that Audrey Budding refers to, and this

25 is at page 74.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: You're asking him to comment on both passages.

2 MR. NICE: Yes, on the passage we've just looked at.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: What about the passage on page 57?

4 MR. NICE: No. 57 was an introduction. I'm exploring the belief

5 system through various parts of this document.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well.

7 MR. NICE:

8 Q. "Serbian soldiers engaged in a systematic attempt to alter the

9 demographic balance." Yes or no.

10 A. Mr. Nice has asked two questions. I don't know what order to take

11 them in. Shall I start from the beginning?

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, has put one question.

13 MR. NICE: Yes.

14 Q. The question I'm dealing with is the question on your page 4 which

15 is: Were the Serbian soldiers engaged in a systematic attempt to alter

16 the demographic balance? Yes or no.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I assume you'll agree

18 that I cannot give a yes or no question to such a complicated question.

19 However, if I might be allowed to state something briefly, then I can say

20 no, and I can explain that by backing it up with a few sentences, with the

21 Court's permission.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm not challenging, I'm not

24 disputing the fact that, like in any other war conflict, and this was a

25 conflict not between the Serbs and the Albanians, this was the first

1 Balkan war, a conflict between the Balkan Christian states, that is to say

2 Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece on the one hand against the

3 Ottoman Empire on the other. And this position taken by Ms. Budding is

4 based on the Carnegie Foundation Institute report dating back to 1914.

5 However, many more sources from the ground, from the terrain, have

6 registered and recorded incidents that occur in every war, and I'm not

7 challenging that. However, there was no plan on the part of the Serbian

8 government to ethnically cleanse that territory, because had such a plan

9 existed, had there been such a plan, it could have been implemented, it

10 would have been implemented. And as proof of that I offer Adolf Fischer's

11 book, a Swiss physician, he was a Swiss physician, and the book was

12 published in German. He was up at the front, and in German it is titled

13 At The Balkan Front. It was published in 1914 and he medically treated

14 the wounded Albanian soldiers in the Serbian military hospital in Skopje.

15 MR. NICE:

16 Q. Page 10 in the English, page 8 in the B/C/S. The foot of page 10,

17 right at the bottom.

18 A. What page did you say of the Serbian text, please?

19 Q. Page 8. The paragraph has been marked, and it's the end of the

20 marked paragraph, and it says this: "Unlike their predecessors, the

21 Partisans from the beginning made serious efforts to --" No, I'm going up

22 the page a bit. "In 1944 to 1945 the Partisans put down major Albanian

23 risings with particularly --"

24 A. Just a moment, please. Ah, yes, I found it.

25 Q. "... particularly intense fighting in the Drenica region." Now, I

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1 want just to ask you a couple of questions about that. We touched the

2 Drenica fighting or attack yesterday -- on Tuesday. We also examined a

3 Cubrilovic document from 1937. You're aware, of course, that Cubrilovic

4 also published an even more virulent memorandum in 1944, aren't you, for

5 the Partisans?

6 A. No, I'm not aware of that.

7 Q. All right. We'll come back --

8 A. I think you're mistaken.

9 Q. If you think I'm mistaken, I'll give you an opportunity to look at

10 the text a little later.

11 At the foot of this page, it says: "Unlike their predecessors,

12 the Partisans from the beginning made serious efforts to win over the

13 Kosovar Albanian population, both by creating the Autonomous Region of

14 Kosovo and Metohija within the new Republic of Serbia, and by taking steps

15 to prevent many inter-war colonists from returning ..."

16 Do you accept that Audrey Budding is correct in that?

17 A. What assertion are you referring to? Because there are several

18 here.

19 Q. The assertion that I've just read out, that they created the

20 autonomous region and that they prevented inter-war colonists from

21 returning. Is she correct in that?

22 A. It's a fact, and I brought that up the other day.

23 Q. Page 11. Page 8 in the B/C/S. Statistics.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Just a moment. Mr. President, might

25 I be allowed to ask a question, please?

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, not usually. What is it you want to say?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have come here to testify on the

3 basis of my report, and the topic that I have dealt with.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm not allowing that. We will determine whether

5 the questions are relevant or not relevant. We are here to protect you,

6 and we will.

7 MR. NICE:

8 Q. Page 11 in the English, page 8 in the B/C/S. And in the end, or

9 towards the end of the paragraph marked, this sentence or couple of

10 sentences: "Allowing for varying assumptions about the rate of natural

11 population growth in this period, French social geographer Michael Roux

12 believes that the approximate upper limit for the number of Serb and

13 Montenegrin expellees is 36.000. (This figure is relatively close to the

14 April 1944 calculation of a senior German official in Belgrade that 40.000

15 Serbs and Montenegrins had been expelled since 1941.)"

16 The footnotes are given, and I think your estimate was a hundred

17 thousand. Could you explain, please, why Audrey Budding is wrong, or do

18 you accept that she may be right?

19 A. I cannot accept the fact that Audrey Budding is right. She just

20 relies on Michel Roux, and I quoted dozens of different sources which

21 arrive at a number of at least 100.000. And I also quoted the opinions of

22 the British historian Stevan Pavlovic who says that the figures of the

23 expelled Serbs range between 30 and 200.000. And he considers the top

24 figure of 200.000 not to be realistic. However, he also considers that

25 the figure of 100.000 is the most probable realistic figure, just as he

1 considers that the number of Albanians who have come in and settled from

2 200 to 300.000 might be somewhat exaggerated. So the mean value is about

3 100.000 Albanians coming in to take up residence in Kosovo and Metohija.

4 And I consider that this position by Ms. Budding is not founded on any

5 primary and important historical sources. She does not say which German

6 official she's referring to here, and I can tell you from other German

7 sources that I have facts and figures that I quote in my report according

8 to which, up until the spring of 1942, approximately 60.000 refugees found

9 themselves at the borders of occupied Serbia, and I state that in my

10 report.

11 Q. Now let's move on - having identified where you're at issue with

12 Audrey Budding on certain matters of fact, if they're important, the

13 Judges will resolve them - to your page 16 and the English page 21. I'm

14 having in mind, as I explained at the beginning, the thought processes or

15 the belief system, seeing how it developed. We've already looked a little

16 bit on Tuesday at the fall of Aleksandar Rankovic, and at the bottom of

17 this page, your page 16, this or these sentences: "The parties

18 post-Brioni attacks on police abuses and on centralism signalled the

19 beginnings of a (temporary) democratisation of political life and a

20 (permanent) decentralisation of the Yugoslavia party and state." Page 21

21 at the foot of that. I take it that you would, in general, agree with

22 that, that there was a permanent decentralisation of the Yugoslav party

23 and state?

24 A. Unfortunately, I cannot agree with that at all, and I have a

25 complete opposing view to Ms. Budding, because I consider that the events

1 that started in 1962 and 1963 and culminated in 1966 were the beginnings

2 of the disintegration of the Yugoslav state. And I'm very sorry that

3 Ms. Budding, who had previously written a very good doctoral thesis, sees

4 a process of a state's disintegration which led to the disbanding of the

5 state, and that she says this -- she calls this a process of

6 democratisation. So my position is quite the opposite of Ms. Budding. I

7 do apologise, but please allow me to finish. Yes.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I be allowed to conclude?

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Go ahead.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As I was saying, this impression

12 that Ms. Budding has gained is not based on archival research, and I

13 conducted research in the archives and reconstructed in detail when, in

14 what way, and with what political goals in mind the process of

15 decentralisation began or, rather, the destruction of the Yugoslav state,

16 and ultimately this is what was borne out by the 1990s. The start of the

17 country's decentralisation began in 1966.

18 MR. NICE:

19 Q. If we take away the word "democratisation" that upsets you, her

20 description of decentralisation is one you accept, because --

21 A. No, I apologise. No. No. Democratisation is something that is

22 very close to my heart, and I am an advocate of democratisation of society

23 and of states. But we're not dealing with the democratisation and

24 decentralisation of a country here, we're talking about the victory of

25 National Communist concept of Yugoslavia, which was catastrophic for the

1 fate of that country.

2 Q. We now read the next sentence: "The next five years were the most

3 tumultuous in communist Yugoslavia's political history until the late

4 '80s. Between 1967 and 1971, three sets of constitutional amendments

5 were passed. Taken together, they inaugurated a new and far more

6 decentralised constitutional order."

7 Before I ask you to comment on that sentence, or those two

8 sentences, and just for the sake of compactness, the constitutional

9 amendments were passed between '67 and '71 and so the constitution had

10 effectively been changed by '71. It was then formally set out in the '74

11 constitution, which is the constitution that people talk about and, so far

12 as Serbs are concerned, complain about, but the amendments had been done

13 in this four years.

14 Do you agree with Audrey Budding's account that these were

15 constitutional amendments that inaugurated a decentralised constitutional

16 order?

17 A. Of course, yes. They decentralised it but in the sense of

18 destruction, of destructing the state. The manner in which the

19 decentralisation was carried out led to the fact that the country couldn't

20 function as a uniform state. Therefore, it was not able to function

21 properly. I do apologise, but I have to complete what I've started to

22 say.

23 So this wasn't decentralisation in the usual customary political

24 constitutional sense. It was a process of breaking down all the vital

25 mechanisms of a state, and that is the essence of it.

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1 Q. I'm not arguing for or against the constitution, I'm just trying

2 to identify for the Court the landmark events established --

3 A. Yes, but --

4 Q. Thank you. Page 17 in the B/C/S, page 22 --

5 A. But just one moment, please.

6 MR. NICE: Mr. Nice, the witness wants to say something.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I should like to ask you,

8 Mr. President, to allow me to say a few words about this subject, because

9 they're very serious subjects. I can't just give yes or no answers. I

10 have to explain the position I'm taking.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, you're entitled to. Briefly.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As I was saying, the constitutional

13 amendments of 1967 and completed in 1971, which later came to be compiled

14 in the constitution of 1974, meant a definite end to the Yugoslav state.

15 It put paid to the Yugoslav state. That federal state became a

16 confederation, in fact, and Serbia was the sole area that was not a

17 republic like the other republics. The provinces in Serbia were republic

18 where Serbia was neither a republic nor a province and that was the

19 absurdity of the constitutional position of Serbia within the frameworks

20 of the Yugoslavia confederation.

21 MR. NICE:

22 Q. We go now to your page 17, our page 22. Observing in passing that

23 one of the things that offended the Serbs was that in 1968, the name was

24 changed from Kosovo-Metohija, Metohija being a Serb name, to Kosovo. And

25 then we see at the end of this paragraph on the screen at the moment this

1 sentence: "A province's borders could not be changed without the

2 concurrence of the provincial Assembly. The provincial Assembly could

3 make laws as opposed to issuing decrees based on federal or republican

4 laws and the province would have its own Supreme Court."

5 Now, Mr. Terzic, we're going to hear from other experts, including

6 legal experts, and this is only part of the things that upset the Serbs,

7 you will tell us, but is Ms. Budding correct in her emphasis that she

8 places here on these aspects of the constitutional reforms?

9 A. I would appreciate it if the Trial Chamber would truly understand

10 the problem. We're not talking about an emotional understanding of the

11 problem. This is a serious political constitutional definition of this

12 problem.

13 Kosovo originally means only the field of Kosovo, which is a small

14 area. Kosovo and Metohija are two separate regions. They were always two

15 separate regions. Mr. Nice, you proceed from the completely wrong premise

16 that Kosovo is a separate historical or ethnic entity that Serbia

17 incorporated. It's a different story. Kosovo and Metohija --

18 Q. Mr. Terzic, the point I've made -- forgive me for interrupting

19 you, but I'm aware of your desire to get away, and I'm just seeing if the

20 report of Ms. Budding, in focusing first on the change of the name but

21 then on this point of the changes in the constitution is properly

22 reflecting some of the Serbs' concerns. Yes or no?

23 A. Yes, from that point of view, yes. She objectively -- yes.

24 Q. Let's go now to our page 29 in the English, page 22 in the B/C/S.

25 This is a paragraph headed Albanians, and the first sentence really is all

1 I want or -- no, the second sentence. We go back to 1956. As I said, I

2 can't be entirely chronological in going through the report sequentially.

3 "Rankovic's ouster followed by dramatic revelations of police

4 abuses in the province led to fundamental changes in its government ..."

5 Is it right, as Ms. Budding says, that there had indeed, before Rankovic's

6 ouster, been abuses in the province against Kosovo Albanians?

7 A. Basically that is not correct. There were repressive measures

8 taken by the police, as Ms. Budding says in a different section, both

9 towards the Albanians and towards the Serbs. But what Ms. Budding loses

10 sight of here is a substantial matter, and that is that the security

11 service discovered a ramified Albanian terrorist organisation with illegal

12 weapons and so on. That is a substantial problem that she completely

13 overlooked.

14 Then you asked me about the provincial government, too. Yes. I

15 want to say something, and I have brought some exhibits here and perhaps I

16 can have them distributed to the Trial Chamber. From 1943 onwards -- no,

17 sorry.

18 Q. I have your answer to the question --

19 A. Please. Albanians --

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: On this occasion, Mr. Nice will continue his

21 questioning.

22 MR. NICE:

23 Q. Go now, please, to page 23 in your version, Mr. Terzic, and to

24 page 30 in the English. Just again to try and get the sequence of events

25 in our minds, the things that are important. And she sets out here that

1 1968 demonstrations. In a paragraph, she says: "The beginnings of reform

2 appear to have fed rather than assuaged Albanian discontents. In November

3 of 1968, violent demonstrations broke out among students in Pristina and

4 spread to other Kosovo cities."

5 She goes into that in some detail. 1968 is an event in the

6 generation or creation of the belief system, isn't it, in Serbs? That's

7 what I want you to confirm, because we don't have endless time, you see.

8 A. I'm sorry, I didn't understand your question.

9 Q. The 1968 demonstrations are a significant part of the belief

10 system. They feed into the belief system of Serbs about Kosovo; correct?

11 A. I simply don't understand this term that you've been using,

12 "belief system." What does a belief system mean in your books? I don't

13 understand it, you see. We are talking about historical facts.

14 Of course I understand --

15 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... and more simply. The 1968

16 demonstrations are thought to be important by Serbs as they addressed what

17 they saw as the problem of Kosovo and Metohija, yes? That's all I want to

18 know.

19 A. That's your question?

20 Q. Yes.

21 A. Not only Serbs. I don't see why you are confronting only Serbs

22 and Albanians here. This has to do with the fate of the Yugoslav state.

23 Not only the Serbs but all of patriotic Yugoslavia believed that the

24 demonstrations in 1968 were the first evidence of the Albanian separatist

25 movement coming out into the open on the political scene. This

1 jeopardised the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Serbia and

2 Yugoslavia, because the slogans of the rioters were Kosovo to Albania,

3 annexing Kosovo to Albania. So there was this slogan of a Greater Albania

4 that was out in the open. This disturbed not only Serbia but all of the

5 Yugoslav public.

6 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... what you told us earlier, but

7 I must try and cut you short.

8 We go now to - still with 1968 - to English page 32. Really at

9 the very foot of 31 but let's go to 32, and in your text it will be on

10 page 24, to record --

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sorry. Could you please help

12 me? Could you please allow me, as Presiding Judge, to say a few words

13 about what Mr. Nice is asking me, and could you kindly ask him not to

14 interrupt me?

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: You will answer the question. And if you want to

16 offer an explanation, you can offer an explanation. We are now dealing

17 with page 32, and I have been, I think, fairly liberal in allowing you to

18 offer explanations, because I appreciate that not all questions are

19 amenable to a yes or no answer.

20 Now, what's the question, Mr. Nice?

21 MR. NICE: Certainly. And the Court will appreciate that although

22 the report of this witness did not address Ms. Budding's report in terms

23 that would make it easy to understand what was in issue, the exercise I'm

24 going through is in part to establish more clearly what is in issue and

25 what is accepted.

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1 Q. We see on your page 24, our page 32, that there was a four-year

2 period between 1968 and 1972 when some Liberals, notably Marko Nikezic

3 and Latinka Perovic held power, and she suggests, does Ms. Budding, that

4 they held power until Tito engineered their fall in October of 1972. She

5 goes on to say: "During their time in office, the Liberals mounted a

6 sustained effort to disentangle Serbia from Yugoslavia and Serbian from

7 Yugoslav identity."

8 Do you accept that analysis of that four-year period? And it's

9 obviously summarised very much, but do you accept it?

10 A. I do not accept that. I think that that is a very partial,

11 one-sided analysis that is not based on historical facts. It is based on

12 political assessments. The term "liberal" was given to them by Tito

13 himself. You must understand the political system of Yugoslavia. In

14 Tito's rhetoric, in the communist rhetoric, "liberal" meant something very

15 pejorative. So this is a very one-sided assessment of this period on the

16 part of Ms. Budding, in my opinion.

17 And there's one more thing I want to say: The largest number of

18 books in the Yugoslav society were banned during the time when the

19 so-called Liberals were in power.

20 Q. Of course Mrs. Perovic is still alive and active and writing and

21 would hold totally different views from yours, wouldn't she?

22 A. I know Mrs. Perovic very well. We worked together as colleagues.

23 She's an historian now. We met many times. We talked. She took part in

24 gatherings that I organised, but that does not mean that I cannot have a

25 completely different view of that period.

1 Q. Very well.

2 A. Not only I. Not only I, but a large part of Yugoslav

3 historiography.

4 Q. Now, one thing that I've got to put to you, Mr. Terzic, is this:

5 That there is indeed an existing body of intellectuals, including

6 Mrs. Perovic, who would take a totally different view of the analysis of

7 the last 50 years from that that you've given to this Court. You accept

8 that, wouldn't you? There are intellectuals holding a totally different

9 view from yours. It's not a unanimous view or anything like it.

10 A. Please. This is a hypothetical question. Quite simply I cannot

11 assume what they would say. You will allow for the fact that all of us

12 sitting here today will have completely different views of what is going

13 on right now, so you will allow for the possibility of different people

14 having different views. This is quite natural in the history of science

15 as it is in all other sciences. There is no uniform view here.

16 Q. We move on to -- still in 1968, to page 34 in the English and page

17 26 in your text, to a paragraph that begins with the phrase "Among the

18 figures ..." And then the third sentence says: "In a famous speech

19 delivered at the Serbian Central Committee's 14th Plenum --"

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: He's trying --

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sorry. I beg your pardon. I've

22 found it. Thank you, yes.

23 MR. NICE:

24 Q. "In a famous speech delivered at the Serbian Central Committee's

25 14th Plenum in May of 1968, Cosic, who had been a member of the committee

1 since 1965, challenged the foundations of the party's national policy with

2 an impassioned attack on Yugoslavia's growing decentralisation." Correct?

3 A. That's correct, yes.

4 Q. And since Cosic may appear with subsequent witnesses as a person

5 of importance in the developing ideas of Serbs, it's right, isn't it, that

6 Cosic conceived, as early as 1968, the notion of partitioning of Kosovo

7 between Serbia and Albania, or between Serbia and another state. He

8 conceived the notion of partitioning.

9 A. No, I'm not aware of any such thing, absolutely. In 1968, at the

10 mentioned session, Cosic only pointed out that the question of autonomy

11 and autonomous rights of the Albanian minority cannot be equated to the

12 question of state sovereignty over one part of Serbia or Yugoslavia.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, Mr. President, Your

14 Honour. I really cannot give proper answers if this is the way these

15 proceedings evolve. I need to say a few sentences because these are very

16 important questions.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... say two or

18 three sentences in explanation, then we move on.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So in 1968, Mr. Cosic did not talk

20 about any kind of division of Kosovo and Metohija at all. He pointed to

21 the problem of national bureaucratism and the fact that the question of

22 the rights of the Albanian minority is being projected as something

23 different, and he says that there cannot be two sovereignties; there is

24 either going to be Yugoslav sovereignty or Albanian sovereignty, and that

25 is Mr. Cosic's position.

1 MR. NICE:

2 Q. Have you read Cosic's latest book?

3 A. Some parts, not all of it. Not all of it.

4 Q. Is he still maintaining that partition is a real, if not the only

5 real, outcome that will work for Kosovo?

6 A. I don't understand your question. Are you advocating partition of

7 Kosovo and Metohija or are you asking me what I think about Cosic's

8 opinion?

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: The question is clear. He's asking you whether

10 Cosic is still maintaining that partition is a real if not the only real

11 outcome for Kosovo. You can either say yes or no or you don't know.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Cosic, in 1968, did not mention any

13 partition of Kosovo and Metohija. He mentions -- he has mentioned that

14 question over the past few years. I absolutely disagree with such a

15 position. Why would a part of the sovereign territory of Serbia be

16 partitioned? Why?

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let me stop you there. Mr. Nice was directing

18 you to Cosic's latest book. Are you aware of his latest book? You said

19 you had read some parts of it. Is that so?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I even gave some evidence here,

21 parts of that book. But if the --

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Okay. If you have the question -- no, no. No,

23 no. Listen to this, this is what Mr. Nice was asking you, on the basis

24 that you have read some parts of the book: Do you agree or can you

25 comment on the question whether, from that reading, Cosic is still

1 maintaining that partition is a real, if not the only real, outcome that

2 will work for Kosovo? What's your answer to that? It's a very specific

3 question relating to your understanding of what Cosic was saying in his

4 latest book.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This has to do with major political

6 questions. You are asking me to take a stand with regard to a major

7 political problem. I am telling --

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I think we have gone as far as we can

9 with this. Move on to another question.

10 MR. NICE: And --

11 JUDGE BONOMY: No, I find this --

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please, I insist. I insist that I

13 give an answer to this question, please.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Terzic, the question is very simple. The

15 question is what has been said in the most recent work. You must tell us

16 as a matter of fact. It has nothing to do with your opinion. The

17 question is a question a fact. Now, can you answer it or can you not

18 answer it?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Which facts? Which facts does the

20 question pertain to?

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Whether the author is now advocating partition as

22 the only solution for the Kosovo problem.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not read the entire book, but

24 I know from the newspapers that --

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Your answer is you don't know. Thank you.

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1 MR. NICE: And I --

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, that's not my answer, that I

3 don't know. I know of that position from what has become part of public

4 opinion, but not a single state can reject part of its sovereignty. Why

5 would Great Britain do something like that?

6 MR. NICE:

7 Q. And I want to move on with one more question about partition.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: We're moving on. We're moving on.

9 MR. NICE:

10 Q. Time, Mr. Terzic, will not permit me to put the questions through

11 you that I want to put because of the length of your answers, but I do

12 want you to deal with this question --

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President --

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let Mr. Nice ask his question.

15 MR. NICE:

16 Q. Please listen to the question carefully.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: You are not to interrupt.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would like to lodge a protest,

19 please.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. Mr. Nice, ask the question.

21 MR. NICE:

22 Q. If in due course the Chamber -- listen to the question. It's a

23 hypothetical question which I'm allowed to ask you. If in due course the

24 Chamber has a body of evidence showing that partition was considered by

25 leading Serbs over the years since 1968, how does the willingness of

1 leading Serbs to partition Kosovo fit with the suggestion raised by

2 people, including the accused, that Kosovo is so central to the life of

3 Serbia that it can never be let go?

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, Mr. Nice, that's -- that's -- I'm not going

5 to allow that.

6 MR. NICE: If Your Honour pleases.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's a very difficult question to follow.

8 MR. NICE: I hope it's not difficult to follow. The proposition

9 is, I think -- I may come back to it in another form, with Your Honour's

10 leave, later, but can we then -- I'll pass over the letter from Tito, I'll

11 pass over the blue book which is dealt with at our page 42, but they are

12 important matters to which we will return with other witnesses, and

13 references to the blue book at 45.

14 Q. And then we come to the next event of which you told us, which is

15 the 1981 demonstrations of Albanians. But what you haven't told the Court

16 about, Mr. Terzic, is the cockroaches. And would you now please explain

17 to the Judges the importance of the cockroaches in the 1981

18 demonstrations.

19 A. This is the first time I hear of the term "cockroaches" in

20 relation to the demonstrations. Otherwise, of course, I know what a

21 cockroach is. I wish you would explain the question to me.

22 Q. Very well. Are you saying you're completely unaware of a body of

23 material going to show that the first demonstration at the university was

24 apparently a student demonstration over the quality of food and famously

25 over cockroach in soup? Yes or no. Are you not aware of that?

1 A. I must admit that this is the first time I hear about these

2 cockroaches, but I do know that as a pretext for the beginning of the

3 demonstrations the quality of food was referred to, allegedly. However,

4 if one looks at the entire context, it becomes clear that the illegal

5 demonstrations, the preparation of the demonstrations, that all of this

6 was just a pretext. I must admit this is the first time I hear of

7 cockroaches. I know that allegedly it was the quality of food that was

8 taken as a pretext --

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: You have answered that. That's a sufficient

10 comment on the question.

11 Mr. Nice.

12 MR. NICE:

13 Q. And are you aware of a body of material that suggests that the

14 demonstrations that followed the initial student protest may have been

15 generated by the intelligence services of Serbia or of other bodies and

16 states in order to generate violence against which Serbs could react? Are

17 you aware of a body of material that sets that out? Because you don't

18 cover it at all in your report.

19 A. This is the first time I hear of it. I believe that these are

20 mere speculations, because if one views the entire historical context, one

21 can see the demonstrations of '71 and the demonstrations of '68 and the

22 illegal organisations for years before that were preparing for this kind

23 of thing, an uprising and demonstrations. So to claim that the Serbian

24 secret service organised the demonstrations is something that is not

25 serious.

1 Q. And you've never considered a book by Julie Mertus on how myths

2 and truths started a war in Kosovo, a book that contains interviews with

3 students? You've never considered that document?

4 A. I have seen the book, but I consider it to be a partial book, not

5 an objective one.

6 Q. You see, this is the problem, Mr. Terzic, I must suggest for you:

7 There is a body of material reported in various ways about the origins of

8 the 1981 student demonstrations and raising the suggestion that they were

9 stimulated in order to enable Serbs to act against them, and you haven't

10 referred to it in your expert report. You haven't dealt with it at all.

11 A. I'm astonished, if I can put that way, with this lack of

12 seriousness in interpreting what happened. The entire historical context

13 of these events points to the contrary. This is something that is a pure

14 invention. It has nothing to do with the actual evidence.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: May I ask you -- may I ask you, Mr. Terzic, even

16 if it is an invention, isn't it something that you would have commented on

17 in your report as part of the history? Even if you were to dismiss it as

18 being partial, why did you not refer to it, allude to it in your report?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the history of

20 science is something different from court proceedings. I took into

21 account tens and thousands of very important historical sources that

22 explain the process. I did not consider this assertion to be a relevant

23 one because it was totally in contradiction to so many historical sources

24 of primary importance. That is why I considered this to be irrelevant,

25 because it does not explain the events that took place at all.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: I hear your explanation.

2 MR. NICE: And, Your Honour, I should say, of course we don't have

3 time, but I have the chapters I've referred to in that book available. I

4 have the relevant extracts from Dobrica Cosic's book available, and I have

5 material going to show the existence in Dobrica Cosic's mind of the

6 partition concept in 1968 available.

7 Q. Can we turn to the last reference in Ms. Budding's report --

8 A. Please --

9 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... in the English and page 37

10 in --

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Terzic, I'm not going to allow you --

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. We need to get on with this

14 cross-examination.

15 MR. NICE:

16 Q. Page 50 in the English, page --

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I put a question, please?

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, no, no. That is abnormal. Witnesses don't

19 ask questions. It's the other way around.

20 Page 50?

21 MR. NICE: Page 50.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The question refers to where Dobrica

23 Cosic mentioned the division of Kosovo.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: I am cutting you off because I have already

25 allowed you to offer the explanation. You have offered it. I have heard

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1 it. We have to get on with the cross-examination.

2 MR. NICE:

3 Q. Page -- would you be good enough, please, Mr. Terzic, to go to

4 page 37 in the B/C/S, page 50 in the English. And we see a reference here

5 as follows: "The atmosphere after the demonstrations of 1981 proved just

6 as hostile to reasoned discussion. In the early 1980s --"

7 A. I'm sorry, I cannot find it. Oh, okay. Okay. I have found it.

8 It's all right.

9 Q. "By the early 1980s, they were pushing the boundaries of

10 allowable action in a one-party system with mass petitions and marches on

11 the Serbian and federal parliaments. The Serbian leadership reacted with

12 hostility, but many prominent intellectuals embraced the Kosovo Serbs'

13 grievances. To many Serbs in Belgrade and elsewhere, it became an article

14 of faith that their co-nationals were being driven from their homes in

15 Kosovo as part of a deliberate campaign of terror by Kosovo Albanians

16 determined to create an 'ethnically pure' Kosovo.

17 "The view was elaborated in a petition."

18 Now, the petition is one of the untranslated documents that you've

19 provided in your binders; correct?

20 A. Yes, but it's wrong here because it says '68. It should state

21 '86.

22 Q. Very well. I think it does say '86 in the English, but still.

23 Your petition, which I'm not going to deal with, alleged --

24 because you signed it, alleged and used the word "genocide," didn't it?

25 A. Yes, that is correct. The word "genocide" is used.

1 Q. If we go over to 51 in the English, and I don't have time to go

2 into this in any further detail, there is this paragraph where Ms. Budding

3 says: "The petition is cited at length because it is representative of

4 mid 1980s --"

5 A. I'm sorry, what page is this?

6 Q. It will be either 30 -- a couple of paragraphs on, and it begins:

7 "This petition is cited at length because it is representative of

8 mid-1980s Serbian beliefs about the reasons for Slavic emigration from

9 Kosovo. These were the grievances that set Serbian response to the

10 Yugoslav crisis into a national pattern. It is therefore important to

11 consider how far they were rooted in reality." And Ms. Budding says: "A

12 full treatment of that subject would require a monograph in itself, and

13 would need far more empirical data than has ever been collected."

14 Do you agree with her that there is simply insufficient empirical

15 data available at the time of the preparation of this report to decide one

16 way or another on the facts underlying your petition?

17 A. No, I absolutely do not agree. It is regrettable that Ms. Budding

18 is not informed. There were thousands and thousands of documents based on

19 which these assertions are based. Thousands and thousands of documents.

20 Also video records, audio records, correspondence. And I pointed to

21 thousands of letters by Bishop Pavle. And there is a vast amount of

22 documents on which these assertions are based. There was tremendous

23 suffering on the part of these people, and this was clear.

24 For me, it was not clear why Europe was being silent before the

25 ethnic cleansing of one people by another people in the middle of Europe.

1 In any other part of Europe, we would have had to react had these things

2 taken place. This was happening in our own house, and Europe remained

3 silent.

4 Q. [Previous translation continues]... been identifying important

5 events and matters in issue between you and Ms. Budding, and the Chamber

6 can see her sources if it wishes to in the footnotes or end notes.

7 I point to something entirely different. You were given the

8 opportunity the last day to read in B/C/S a document prepared by the

9 International Crisis Group on Pan-Albanianism. I trust the Chamber had an

10 opportunity possibly to consider the document. I don't know whether it

11 did.

12 You know, do you not, that this document, the principal researcher

13 for this document was Miranda Vickers, somebody you referred to yourself

14 as a colleague; correct?

15 A. Yes, but the name of Miranda Vickers is not mentioned anywhere in

16 the document.

17 Q. Do you know that she works for the ICG and she was the principal

18 author of this document, or the principal researcher?

19 A. No, I didn't know that, and this whole document seems like a

20 phantom document to me, because no single name is mentioned here of the

21 persons who did the research. The only thing it says is the International

22 Crisis Group spoke an Albanian journalist. The International Crisis Group

23 spoke with such-and-such a person. They do not mention the first and last

24 name of the person, where, and when this conversation took place, and so

25 on. I assume that it was not Mr. Atasari or Wesley Clark who came to

1 speak with these people. This document does not provide one single name

2 as the author of this document.

3 Q. Of course you can go to the website and you'll find that her

4 association with this is established.

5 Please look at the executive summary. That's all I have probably

6 time for, and one other passage. And if the executive --

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. I just have one

8 request regarding Mr. Nice's question. I have a document which I would

9 like to have copied and which I would like the Trial Chamber to see. Is

10 this possible? This is in relation to this document.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's in relation to -- does it -- let us -- let

12 us hear the questions that Mr. Nice --

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In relation to the document of the

14 International Crisis Group.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us hear the questions that are asked of you

16 about the document, and --

17 MR. NICE: If the usher would be good enough, if we've got an

18 English version, to lay it on the overhead projector. Page 1. The first

19 page with text on it. Thank you.

20 Q. On the left-hand side, on the second paragraph: "It is

21 instructive --" We can see: "It is instructive that both the KLA and the

22 NLA started to gain popular support in Kosovo and Macedonia respectively

23 at precisely the time when they moved away from their initial Pan-Albanian

24 nationalist goals and concentrated on more rights for their own people.

25 The Albanian national army, which overtly advocated a Greater Albania

1 agenda, never managed to gain popular credibility."

2 Next paragraph: "In Albania since the arrival of multi-party

3 politics, poverty and international political conflict --"

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Internal political conflict.

5 MR. NICE:

6 Q. I'm so sorry: "... internal political conflict have eclipsed any

7 aspirations towards expanding the state's boundaries. Albania is more

8 interested in developing cultural and economic ties with Kosovo whilst

9 maintaining separate statehood; and successive Albanian governments have

10 opted for a strategic partnership with Macedonia."

11 And then over the page and I'll ask you a question, please.

12 Over the page, Usher, if you'll be so good.

13 "In the long-term, Albanian nationalism will be tamed by full

14 implementation of internationally-brokered agreements and respect for

15 Albanians's place in Macedonian, Serbian and Montenegrin society, together

16 with consistent pressure on Albanian extremists and politicians who appeal

17 to them." And missing the next sentence. "Decentralising power in

18 Macedonia and giving Kosovo conditional independence in return for an

19 assurance that all Albanian entities in the Balkans, that the present

20 borders of South-eastern Europe will remain unchanged, could also help

21 stabilise the situation."

22 Now, that's part of the summary. It's counter to the, if I may

23 suggest to you, extreme position you advanced throughout your

24 evidence-in-chief that this is the reality. Pan-Albanianism is a

25 minority, not a majority position.

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1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] With sincere regret, I must state to

2 the Trial Chamber in response to Mr. Nice's question that I feel that this

3 document, the presentation of this document is a provocation. This

4 document urges the establishment of Greater Albania. This is the platform

5 of Greater Albania. The other name for it is Pan-Albanianism. Historians

6 and linguists will tell you what Pan-Albanianism or Greater Albania means.

7 We will look at another document, the Front -- The Albanian National Front

8 for Unification denies this document and states that --

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just address this specific question that Mr. Nice

10 put in summary of the passages that he quoted, and it is that

11 Pan-Albanianism is a minority, not a majority position. Can you just give

12 a brief answer to that.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I absolutely stand by the position

14 that Pan-Albanianism is another name for Greater Albania. Number two,

15 regarding independent Kosovo, the question of an independent Kosovo, or

16 the question of the autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija was resolved by

17 Resolution 1244. A clerk from this Tribunal, such as Mr. Nice, has no

18 right to change Resolution 1244.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Terzic. Mr. Terzic, the specific question is

20 that Pan-Albanianism is a minority, not a majority position. That's the

21 specific question. Can you give a specific answer to that?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My position is that Pan-Albanianism

23 has mass support amongst the Albanian people in Albania and that it is a

24 projection of Greater Albania which radically threatens the stability of

25 the Balkans.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's the answer.

2 MR. NICE:

3 Q. Have you attended and listened to the evidence of the witnesses

4 Rugova, Veton Surroi, or Bakalli in this court? Have you?

5 A. Only partially that of Mr. Bakalli, and the testimony of

6 Mr. Rugova, also just a part of it.

7 Q. Do you recognise that they deal in a very specific way with the

8 options, the choices and what they wanted and what they want? And you

9 recognise that it's contrary to their evidence that you've heard, even to

10 the limited extent you've had, is contrary to your thesis, isn't it?

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, Mr. Nice, he has said that.

12 MR. NICE: Very well.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: He only listened to it partially, so ...

14 MR. NICE:

15 Q. Can we look at two more passages of this report. Footnote 70,

16 please, which I'm not sure of the page. It's page 17 in the English

17 version, but it's -- if you could find footnote 70, Mr. Terzic.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Terzic. Yes.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Chairman, I have a question.

20 May I, in response to Mr. Nice's questions, provide a CD about the

21 burnings of Serbian churches in Kosovo and Metohija, dated the 17th of

22 March of this year? May I show this in response to the question by

23 Mr. Nice?

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: What question does this respond to?

25 [Trial Chamber confers]

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Terzic, we'll not allow it. It's not

2 relevant to the question in terms of the period that we are considering.

3 MR. NICE:

4 Q. Footnote 70, page --

5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for Mr. Nice.

6 MR. NICE:

7 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Mr. Terzic. Footnote 70.

8 Aleksandar Rankovic was --

9 A. Which document? This document?

10 Q. In the ICG document, your page 17, footnote 70, bottom of the

11 page, please.

12 "Aleksandar Rankovic was vice-president of Yugoslavia and

13 regarded in some quarters as heir apparent to Tito. He headed the

14 Yugoslav security police. The UDBA, as it was then known, was responsible

15 for serious abuses of the Albanian population. On the pretext of

16 suppressing Albanian irredentism, UDBA put pressure on Albanians to

17 emigrate. Between 1954 and 1957, some 195.000 Albanians left Yugoslavia,

18 and by the time of Rankovic's dismissal, the figure had reached 235.000."

19 Now, you will have to discover later whether your colleague

20 Vickers was involved in preparation of this work. Do you accept the

21 accuracy of that footnote?

22 A. The information in the footnote is not correct, and I offer an

23 answer -- in answer to your question Exhibit 36 -- or tab 36 from my

24 material, page 417, in which Jovo Sotra informs President Tito and all the

25 leaderships of Yugoslavia and Serbia, and says that between 1953 and 1960,

1 precisely the period that is mentioned here, only 16.000 Albanians moved

2 out to Turkey. This is tab 36, page 417. This footnote that you refer to

3 does not cite any sources. It's arbitrary.

4 Q. My final question on this document, which you've had a chance to

5 read, is that given the quite pronounced if not extreme position that you

6 were arguing, speaking about in evidence, do you not accept that this

7 recent document is a document you should have considered before coming to

8 give evidence?

9 A. I did not consider this document to be relevant in order to

10 objectively present the events in Kosovo and Metohija. As far as I'm

11 concerned, this document is the platform for Greater Albania and a

12 platform for an independent Kosovo. It is an extremely political point of

13 view of one group within international relations, and for me it's not a

14 relevant historical source. It's a political opinion which is counter to

15 Resolution 1244. I believe that it is an obstruction of the efforts of

16 international community to achieve a high degree of autonomy of Kosovo and

17 Metohija instead of independence, and this is provided under the

18 Resolution. Urging or striving for independence of Kosovo would lead

19 towards a very profound crisis in South-eastern Europe, so I believe this

20 is a very dangerous document.

21 Q. Since you seek to accuse this group of bias -- and I'm going to

22 ask for the document in due course to be exhibited and considered by the

23 Tribunal. Since you accuse it of bias -- please let me finish the

24 question, Mr. Terzic. Would you explain what bias it is supposed to have.

25 Is it part of an American conspiracy? Is it part of an Albanian

1 conspiracy? We see the countries it works in and for which it has

2 prepared reports. Tell us, please, where does its bias find its root?

3 A. If the Presiding Judge would permit me, I would gladly do that.

4 Number one: In the Crisis Group, we have Wesley Clark, who was the

5 commander during the aggression on Yugoslavia. Morton Abramovitz is also

6 part of the Crisis Group, who was an advisor of the Albanian terrorists at

7 the Rambouillet negotiations. There are some other figures also which

8 have not proved an objective stand in relation to all of these events.

9 I will quote two positions from this document which clearly speak

10 about the nature of the document itself.

11 "An independent Kosovo --" This is on page 1: "An independent

12 Kosovo is something that is quite different from Greater Albania. The

13 plan by the international community is how to deal with the process of the

14 final status of Kosovo without destabilising its neighbours in the

15 process."

16 Number two. This is on page two. I quote: "However, as far as

17 the Albanians are concerned, this territory, meaning the territories in

18 Kosovo, Macedonia, and Greece, for Albanians these territories are not

19 separate, they are all Albania. They are all Albania, although divided

20 amongst different political units with the borders from 1913, 1921, and

21 with the later dissolution of Yugoslavia."

22 I consider this text to be written by those political forces that

23 wished to achieve an independent Kosovo and counter to the Resolution

24 1244, to take a part of Serbian territory out of Serbia. And I find that

25 this is counter-productive. I find it to be a very dangerous step which

1 would bring into question the stability of the whole of South-eastern

2 Europe.

3 Gentlemen, please. This entire document -- please, I would just

4 like to say two words. This entire document does not mention a single --

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: You have dealt with it sufficiently. You have

6 dealt with it sufficiently.

7 Mr. Nice, yes.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There is not a single word about

9 Serbs or ethnic cleansing.

10 MR. NICE:

11 Q. Your report, Mr. Terzic, and your evidence is aimed at arguing the

12 same position that the accused wants and is nothing like a balanced and

13 fair representation of either history or the present realities. That's my

14 suggestion to you. You've demonstrated that in every answer that you've

15 given. You understand, you've come here to argue a cause, not to give

16 evidence?

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is not Mr. Nice's job to draw

20 conclusions and judge about the testimony of the expert witness. That is

21 not his job, and he's not qualified to do so.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. That's -- that's a very ordinary question

23 that is usually put at the end of a cross-examination, Mr. Milosevic. The

24 witness will no doubt deny it and that's the end of it. It's for us to

25 assess eventually.

1 What do you say to the question that was put by Mr. Nice?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that Mr. Nice's question

3 is not well-intentioned. I believe that it is not proper. I tried, on

4 the basis of all available sources - foreign sources; British, German,

5 French sources for the most part - to draw and present objectively the

6 processes in Kosovo and Metohija, and with this presentation I wanted to

7 help in the determination of truth about the fate in this part of the

8 Balkans. I tried to be objective and to speak without any traces of rage

9 or partiality, as they say.

10 MR. NICE:

11 Q. Just please confirm --

12 A. In irem estudia [phoen].

13 Q. Please confirm, when you got your appointment at the Historical

14 Institute, you didn't have a Ph.D., I think, at the time. You'd only

15 published one book; is that correct?

16 A. Yes. When I got the position at the Historical Institute, I was

17 very young. I was 25 years old.

18 Q. You were assisted in getting that position by influential people,

19 such as Ekmecic, was it? Did he help you get the job?

20 A. Professor Ekmecic lived in Sarajevo, and at the time I didn't know

21 Professor Ekmecic at all.

22 Q. Is it right that you --

23 A. I must say -- I apologise. I must say that Academician Radovan

24 Samardzic helped me, whom I recall with gratitude. Professor Ekmecic was

25 a professor at the University of Sarajevo and at that time I didn't have

1 any connections with him of that sort. And I regret that you are not well

2 informed.

3 Q. Did you also assist in a publication on the genealogy of Vojislav

4 Seselj, even if you don't put it in your own bibliography?

5 A. No, that's not correct. That's an intrigue. I can explain what

6 it's all about, if necessary. The people's Assembly, the national

7 Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, upon a proposal of the group of

8 deputies of Mr. Vuk Draskovic, who is now the minister of foreign affairs,

9 wanted to investigate the ethnic origin of Mr. Seselj, and that is

10 something ridiculous. And they wanted us to provide our opinion on that.

11 So the Historical Institute responded to that request and explained that

12 the Historical Institute does not -- did not and will not be involved or

13 work on the establishment of the ethnic origin of any person. Vojislav

14 Seselj was not explicitly mentioned. We just said what there existed in

15 documents on the origins of the Seselj clan, and that is all.

16 So I regret that you are not very well-informed, and it would be

17 good if you had more complete information at your disposal about the

18 things you're asking me about.

19 MR. NICE: Your Honours, the time taken by the witness in

20 answering the comparatively simple questions, as I hope they were, on

21 Ms. Budding's report means that I was not able to deploy the material I

22 would like to have done.

23 May the Pan-Albanian report become an exhibit because he has

24 considered it and presents a contrary view available at the time of his

25 report and we have heard his answers on why he says it's unacceptable.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it may be exhibited.

2 THE REGISTRAR: That will be --

3 MR. NICE: I would have asked him to have dealt in detail with the

4 chapter from the book on Kosovo, How Myths and Truths Started a War,

5 dealing with the 1981 demonstrations which includes the interviews of

6 students at the time and so is indeed both raw material and proper

7 research, properly footnoted and so on, and I don't know if the Chamber

8 would, in light of the way the evidence has been given, find it helpful to

9 read that, because it constitutes a contrary view.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: We think not.

11 MR. NICE: The only other points that may be of value to the

12 Chamber, they may be able to come in through other witnesses, are the

13 witness denied the existence of the 1944 memorandum by Cubrilovic and

14 denied knowing of Dobrica Cosic's earlier views on partition, all of which

15 are covered by documents I can make available but, again because of lack

16 of time, I wasn't able to do so.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: If you have them, then you should make them

18 available.

19 MR. NICE: Very well. Thank you. I'll prepare that.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Terzic, yes. Yes, Mr. Terzic.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would like the statement by the

22 Albanian National Front for Unification to be adopted as an exhibit, about

23 how they are in favour of an independent Albania, thereby going counter to

24 the document by the International Crisis Group. I would like that to be

25 tendered as an exhibit, please.

1 [Trial Chamber confers]

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Terzic, the first document, the document that

3 you wanted to have tendered, you say it is a response to the document that

4 Mr. Nice just exhibited. What is it headed, and who is it from? Can you

5 tell us?

6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the witness, please.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a memorandum of the Albanian

8 National Front for Unification, of the 11th of April, 2004, and it's in

9 direct response to a statement by the International Crisis Group. It's

10 from the site of the Albanian National Unification Front, and I can

11 provide it for you so you can make copies.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Okay. Yes. We'll admit that.

13 JUDGE KWON: Next tab number.

14 THE REGISTRAR: That will be the --

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16 [Trial Chamber confers]

17 MR. NICE: I don't know if there is any clarification on who the

18 National Albanian Unification Front is. If that would help us.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Terzic, tell us who is the National Albanian

20 Front.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is a very serious political

22 organisation of Albanians which is striving for the unification of all

23 Albanians and the creation of a Greater Albania within the ethnic borders

24 as they consider them to be.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Okay. We have admitted it.

1 THE REGISTRAR: This memorandum will be D260.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Normally, it's the accused who would have

3 documents tendered as exhibits. Exceptionally, we have admitted it.

4 Mr. Milosevic, re-examination.

5 Oh, it's time to adjourn. It's time to adjourn. We have passed

6 the time. We will adjourn now for 20 minutes.

7 --- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.

8 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Before Mr. Milosevic commences with his

10 re-examination, the Court Registrar would like to give the number again

11 for the Prosecution Exhibit.

12 THE REGISTRAR: I would like to give number 801 to the report

13 dated 25th of February, 2004.

14 MR. NICE: Thank you very much. Your Honours also indicated that

15 the material dealing with Cosic's position might be exhibited. I have

16 that material available. I must identify what it is.

17 There are three documents altogether. The first is a document

18 from the Christian Science Monitor on the 17th of May, 1999. The second

19 an a Central Europe Review of the 28th of June, 1999, dealing with Dobrica

20 Cosic's earlier views on partitioning of Kosovo. And the third is the

21 extract from his latest book, already available in both -- at least in

22 this institution, in English and in Serbian.

23 [Trial Chamber confers]

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: We will admit the third, third one.

25 MR. NICE: I'm grateful. I'll make that available, and can it be

1 given a number.

2 THE REGISTRAR: That will be 802.

3 MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, lest you think we have forgotten

5 your exhibits, let me say we will be dealing with them at the end of your

6 re-examination. There are 51 documents that we have to consider. Yes.

7 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

8 Re-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

9 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Terzic, unlike Mr. Nice, I have to be highly

10 economical with my time, so I'm just going to ask you a few additional

11 questions, and please do your best to answer as briefly as possible.

12 Mr. Nice commenced his cross-examination with the question of what

13 was -- what did you have positive to say or write in your report about the

14 Albanians. So my question to you first is this: Does your work, your

15 report and other reports covering the subject matter of your own report

16 clearly distinguish between the Albanian national community and Albanian

17 extremists and terrorists, Nazi formations, terrorist formations towards

18 the end of the century? Nazi, of course, in World War II and terrorists

19 at the end of the century. So does it make a distinction between the

20 members of the Albanian national community on the one hand and these other

21 formations - extremists, terrorists, Nazis, and so on - on the other?

22 A. I will be very brief in my answer. From start to finish I always

23 distinguished between the Albanian national minority, or ethnic minority,

24 in Serbia and Yugoslavia and the illegal terrorist organisations and

25 groups fighting against Serbia and Yugoslavia. So I made a clear

1 distinction between the two and emphasised in several places that the

2 Albanians were also the victims of those latter groups. So that exists in

3 my report. I didn't make the division into Serbs and Albanians, but the

4 Albanians who respected the laws of the country and those who did not

5 respect them.

6 Q. Thank you. Now, your paper is entitled, Kosovo and Metohija in

7 the 20th Century, The Political, Ideological, Demographic and

8 Civilisational Coordinates of Ethnic Cleansing of Serbs from the Southern

9 Reaches of Serbia. Therefore, it incorporates all those coordinates of

10 the ethnic cleansing of Serbs from this area of Serbia.

11 Now, you as an historian reviewing that topic, can you find a

12 positive element in all this which you could attribute along with the

13 conduct of these extremist, terrorist, or Nazi organisations? Can you

14 find one?

15 A. I spoke here about a phenomenon, and that was -- actually, I spoke

16 about the history of Kosovo and Metohija in the 20th century. But within

17 that topic one of the basic determinants that I mention is the problem of

18 the ethnic cleansing of Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija. And I consider

19 this not to be only the problem of the Yugoslav and Serbian society, I

20 considered it to be the problem of European culture and European

21 civilisation as a whole. Because if in any part of Europe a nation or

22 ethnic group because of their ethnic affiliation or religious affiliation

23 is being ethnically cleansed, that should sound the alarm for the whole of

24 Europe. And I was only speaking about the violent expulsion and different

25 forms of violent expulsion of Serbs from their lands in Kosovo and

1 Metohija by the Albanian terrorist groups and individuals. That's what I

2 was talking about.

3 Q. Judging by your answer, then, I assume that the objection made is

4 highly unfounded. The objection according to which you are approaching

5 the matter in a subjective manner.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, well, that's not for you to

7 comment on. That's a comment which is not warranted.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Now, Mr. Terzic, I hope you won't find it difficult, although it's

11 difficult to find one's way in this pile of documents, but may we put on

12 the overhead projector the English piece of evidence dating back to 1906.

13 It is the English report of 1906 that we have in our documents, and could

14 you place it on the ELMO.

15 It's at the bottom of the page, as far as I remember, and it was

16 underlined.

17 A. This is the title page of the book. This is the title page, and

18 as far as I remember, that was the portion you're referring to is on page

19 89, if I'm not mistaken. 88, page 88.

20 Q. Very well. Put that on the overhead projector, please, so we can

21 see what it says.

22 A. Do you wish me to read it?

23 Q. Well, may it be placed on the ELMO so I can read it too.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Raise it up a bit, please,

25 Mr. Usher. You've just covered the portion I'm interested in. And could

1 we have it zoomed in, please.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. As far as I can see here, it says Old Serbia and the Albanian

4 border and then it goes on to say "[In English] Old Serbia is still an

5 area -- Old Serbia is still an area of disturbances owing to the

6 lawlessness and bitter and racial jealousies of the Albanians."

7 [Interpreted] Yes, the racial hatred or, as it says here,

8 jealousies of the Albanians.

9 Now, do you consider this to lack balance this general position,

10 because it doesn't say that the Serbs are responsible for that? It speaks

11 about the racial hatred on the part of the Albanians and thus about

12 chauvinism.

13 A. In my report, in several places, I quote an author called

14 Mr. Brailsford in his book entitled Macedonia, and other authors who, at

15 the end of the 19th century, speak about the racial hatred of Albanians

16 towards the Slavs. And this was written by foreign authors, and there are

17 a lot -- there is a lot of written material about that and I only used a

18 portion of it.

19 Q. Now, with respect to that, I'd like to draw your attention to

20 another text offered to us by Mr. Nice. It is Audrey Budding's text. I

21 don't have the time to go through the whole document in detail, but, for

22 example, a quotation that he extracted from page 4 of the Serbian version

23 of that text.

24 And this is what he says. He quotes the beginning of the third

25 paragraph on page 4, where it says: "Along with ever more frequent

1 conflicts in Kosovo --" and this is what Budding writes -- "we see the

2 first changes in the 20th century with the Balkan wars from the Ottoman

3 hands it came under Serbian control. Modern observers in the Balkan wars

4 registered normal a number of brutal instances on -- by Serbs and

5 Montenegrins." That's what Budding writes. "Some people see that the

6 soldiers took part in a systematic attempt to change the democratic

7 balance of the area to justify its attachment into a Serbian state."

8 Now, my question to you with respect to that quotation is can we

9 speak about the inclusion or attachment into the Serb state of Kosovo and

10 Metohija in the Balkan wars? Would that be correct?

11 A. First of all, there was no change in status, because Kosovo didn't

12 enjoy any special status in the Ottoman Empire. That's the first point.

13 The second point is this: It was a question of the liberation of Old

14 Serbia from Ottoman rule together with the other Balkan states;

15 Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece, countries in point. It was the first

16 Balkan wars when the whole Balkan Peninsula was liberated and freed from

17 Ottoman control. So it was -- that's what it referred to, the liberation

18 of those countries from Ottoman control.

19 Q. Now, these regions, when and for how long were they a part of the

20 Serbian state, these regions being freed from Ottoman rule in the Balkan

21 wars?

22 A. The Serbs arrived in that territory in the 6th and 7th centuries.

23 As a component part of the Serbian state, they had been there since the

24 end of the 12th century. They were within the frameworks of a Serb state

25 up until the end of the 15th century. From the 15th century onwards until

1 1912, in actual fact, they were under the Osmanli rule, Ottoman rule, but

2 always foreign sources refer to these regions as parts of Serbia under

3 Ottoman rule.

4 Q. I'm now going to ask you a question with respect to the sentence I

5 read out to you: "Modern observers in the Balkans wars registered the

6 numerous bestialities perpetrated by Serb and Montenegrin soldiers." Full

7 stop. That's where the sentence ends. And then at the end of that

8 sentence or the beginning of the follow sentence, which goes on to explain

9 what I quoted a moment ago, it says note 21, refer to note 21, and in note

10 21 or the footnote, whichever you like to call it, footnote 21 which you

11 will find on page 3 of this attachment with the notes --

12 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note they do not have the

13 document. Thank you.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. It says the international commission to investigate -- and it is

16 second part of footnote 21: "The International Commission to Investigate

17 the Source of the Balkan Wars and Procedures in Them, Balkan Wars." It is

18 Washington, the Carnegie Endowment, 1993. "For this assertion to be

19 placed into the proper context, one must bear in mind the fact that the

20 commission did not consider that the bestialities were conducted

21 exclusively by the Serbs. It highlighted many bestialities perpetrated by

22 Bulgarian and Greek soldiers as well and viewed that problem too as a

23 regional problem," and only then does it go on to quote the passage from

24 the Carnegie Foundation: "Those armed conflicts, open or covert, whether

25 they were conceived in proper form always had the same goal, the complete

1 annihilation of the alien foreign population."

2 Now, what is stated in that footnote and the Carnegie Foundation,

3 does it give a basis for Budding to say that Serbian and Montenegrin

4 soldiers committed bestialities against the Albanian population

5 systematically or was it the war effects in the Balkan wars in which

6 Turkey took part on one side, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia, et cetera,

7 this general conflict and war, was it the consequence of that? So from a

8 historical viewpoint and from the viewpoint of wielding scientific

9 apparatus, would that be a proper and correct assessment and observation

10 to make by your colleague Mrs. Audrey Budding?

11 A. The Carnegie Foundation shows this problem as a regional problem,

12 as being a regional problem, but it was a large-scale war in fact between

13 the Balkan Christians, all the Balkan Christians on the one side and the

14 Ottoman Empire on the other. The war which finally liberated Europe from

15 Ottoman rule. And in that war, just like in any other war, there were

16 always crimes. Crimes were committed on all sides, and the Albanians took

17 part in this war within the composition of regular Turkish troops, and

18 irregular Turkish troops as well. So as I say, both sides committed

19 crimes. But the problem was a regional one. However, the substance of

20 the question, the crux of the matter, is something else. A report on the

21 part of the Carnegie Foundation -- endowment cannot be the only valid

22 source for what happened in this area. We have Russian, British, French

23 sources, German sources of the day, archival material, archive sources of

24 the day, and they are the number one sources, the primary sources

25 testifying to this, of course, Turkish and Serbian as well.

1 Q. I'd now like to draw your attention to page 22, quoted by

2 Mr. Nice, of the Budding report. The title is Albania, and then it says

3 "The replacement of Rankovic was followed by dramatic --" I've been asked

4 to read more slowly. I'll do my best. "The replacement of Rankovic was

5 followed by a dramatic uncovery of abuse by the police in the province and

6 led to fundamental changes in the provincial government, the most

7 important being mass recruitment and promotion of cadres from the ranks of

8 the Albanian majority."

9 Now, to you as an historian, I'm sure you know the dramatic

10 discoveries made of abuse by the police in the province after Rankovic's

11 replacement, which Budding refers to in this all-embracing manner,

12 generalised manner.

13 A. There are two problems there. First of all, my colleague

14 Ms. Budding did not mention a single abuse. She did not specify. Second,

15 in the reports by the organs from Kosovo and Metohija themselves, that is

16 to say the Executive Council of Kosovo and Metohija and the Provincial

17 Committee of Kosovo and Metohija, they spoke about certain types of

18 abuses, but the main abuses were the amassment of weapons, for example,

19 and the Prizren trial. In my opinion, all this was about the fact that

20 the police had uncovered and prevented the activities of a large-scale

21 Albanian organisation and, that was the key to the police's relationship

22 towards the situation. But in the portion you read out, it said that it

23 led to radical changes in the provincial government. Now, I have here a

24 piece of information denying that position, that position taken.

25 In a book published in Pristina itself, and I have here this piece

1 of information, this document that I can hand round to all of you, it says

2 Kosovo and Metohija in 1943, from 1943 to 1963, published in Pristina

3 1963, and there is a text written by Fadil Hoxha there. But I'm just

4 going to look at some statistical data which refute Budding's position.

5 It says: "A review of the composition of the regional National Liberation

6 Movement, the provincial National Liberation Movement, and the Assembly of

7 the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija from 1943 to 1963," and

8 here we have the statistic composition which shows that the Albanians,

9 Albanian representatives were in all the organs of power and authority and

10 they were the majority in those organs, they represented a majority. For

11 example, the provincial national board from '43 to '45, the Siptars, as

12 they were called, there were 44. Serbs and Montenegrins just 7. Now, the

13 -- in 1945 to 1947, there were 110 Siptars and 41 Serbs and Montenegrins.

14 The president or, rather, the Prime Minister was Fadil Hoxha. Mehmed

15 Hoxha [phoen] the first time, then Fadil Hoxha, then the Prime Minister in

16 '47, Fadil Hoxha once again. Deputies: Siptars 132, Serbs 66,

17 Montenegrins, et cetera, et cetera.

18 If we look at the period from 1951 to 1963, the Prime Minister

19 once again Fadil Hoxha; the deputies, Siptars numbering 142, Serbs

20 numbering 42. Then we look at the '53 to '58 period: The Prime Minister

21 Fadil Hoxha; the number of Siptars was 46, the number of Serbs was 20.

22 Then we go into the fifth composition of the government, '56 to

23 '66 or '63, the Prime Minister of the Assembly, Pavle Jovicevic; the

24 first Serbian Prime Minister, Fadil Hoxha; Siptars 54, Serbs 28, and so on

25 and so forth. Until we come to 1963 where the president of the Assembly

1 was a Serb, the Prime Minister was Ali Shukrija. There were 158 Siptars

2 and 66 Serbs, which proves that in all the organs of power and authority,

3 the Siptars enjoyed the absolute majority. And I can hand this round as

4 evidence. I have sufficient copies.

5 Q. I think this is sufficient to draw the right conclusions, because

6 this shows that Budding's report is quite arbitrary. Please, tell me

7 now --

8 MR. NICE: That's not an appropriate comment. I hesitate but it's

9 not an appropriate comment.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. All right. All right.

12 Is it appropriate to admit this report into evidence, Kosovo and Metohija,

13 '43, '63, 1943, 1963?

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let's get the number for that.

17 THE REGISTRAR: That will be D261.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Very briefly, please, Mr. Terzic, let us speak about the Drenica

20 events and the parallels drawn to 1998. Budding says on page 8 of the

21 Serbian version of her report, it's somewhere around mid-page, it will be

22 easy for you to find it. Mr. Nice quoted some of it, and I'm only dealing

23 with the passages that he quoted. "In the period from '44 to '45, the

24 Partisans quelled large-scale rebellions of the Albanians, and there was

25 fierce fighting particularly in the area of Drenica."

1 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note that they do not have the

2 text.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Then you said that the Partisans were actually already the

5 Yugoslav army and that there were 30.000 soldiers deployed. So -- 39.000

6 soldiers deployed. So what you say and what she said matches in that

7 respect.

8 Here it says an Albanian uprising. Mr. Terzic, is this an

9 uprising of the Albanians or is this fighting on the part of Ballista

10 forces of Hitler's SS division in the area of Drenica in 1945 or, rather,

11 a continuation of the war in the territory of Serbia, which was freeing

12 itself from German occupation, that is to say Germans and Ballistas who

13 were part of the German formations?

14 A. Ms. Budding's methodology is very strange. She has Albanians on

15 one side and Partisans on the other side. I must say that the commander

16 of the Main Staff of the Partisan forces in Kosovo was an Albanian, Fadil

17 Hoxha.

18 After the military administration was introduced --

19 Q. That will suffice, thank you. I wanted us to clarify this. We

20 cannot simply make a distinction between Albanians and Partisans. These

21 are Partisans that included Albanians, Montenegrins, Slovenians, Serbs,

22 for the most part, of course, but also Croats and others. And on the

23 other hand, the quisling formations, that is to say members of the regular

24 troops of the Hitler coalition.

25 A. Briefly, this is a struggle between the anti-fascist forces that

1 included Albanians, and on the other side the Hitler coalition and its

2 remnants from the Second World War.

3 Q. So the word "uprising of the Albanians" cannot be used as

4 appropriate there.

5 A. Well, it can if it is a rebellion on the part of Nazi Albanian

6 forces that rebelled.

7 Q. That's quite logical. So in 1998, again this was an armed

8 terrorist activity in the territory of Drenica. You have information

9 about that? Yes or no.

10 A. Yes, absolutely.

11 Q. So can you establish what -- what these two have in common, the

12 Hitler coalition troops in 1945 and the terrorist groups in 1998 in

13 Drenica.

14 A. What they have in common is resorting to violence in order to have

15 a violent secession of a part of Serbia so that it could be annexed to

16 Albania.

17 Q. Mr. Terzic, for a moment I'm going to refer to your own report,

18 page 109. You say at the end of the first paragraph that from January

19 1998 until the 10th of July, 1999, the Albanian terrorists in Kosovo and

20 Metohija killed 1.835 persons. That is what you refer to in your own

21 paper. This is correct, or it is just about accurate, because it turned

22 out that they had killed even more people.

23 Do you know that in that year, in 1998, the Albanian terrorists

24 or, rather, the Albanian terrorist organisation that called itself the

25 KLA, in 1998 killed more Albanians than Serbs? Do you know that?

1 A. Yes, I know about that. And this has been published too.

2 Q. So in both cases, in 1945 and in 1998, it has to do with the

3 fighting of armed formations against citizens and government; is that

4 right?

5 A. Absolutely.

6 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... if not absolutely

7 leading.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, leading questions are not allowed.

9 We've been through that before. You're putting in the mouth of the

10 witness the evidence that you want him to give.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't know what's leading about

12 the fact that I'm drawing a conclusion and I'm asking the witness to say

13 something on the basis of what he said. That is to say whether both

14 cases, namely 1945 and 1998, were clashes with armed formations that used

15 weapons to attack the government and civilians, citizens. That is always

16 illegal, although an effort is being made here to strike a balance between

17 the legal organs of a state and a terrorist organisation.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ask another question.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. This will do. This is

20 sufficiently clear.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Mr. Terzic, tell me, as an historian you have to rely -- as you

23 said yourself, history is an interdisciplinary science, so you have to

24 rely on demography, inter alia; isn't that right?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. From the point of view of this science, is it possible to

2 establish what is being attempted here, that the fact that Albanians were

3 leaving Kosovo en masse and that that coincided with the demographic boom

4 of the Albanians in the area? Is that possible from the point of view of

5 science?

6 A. Of course it's not possible. This is an assertion that was made

7 in the platform of the Albanian Academy Of Sciences, and it says,

8 approximately, the more the Serbs expelled them, the more their numbers

9 went up, which is an absurdity. The percentage of the Albanian population

10 in Kosovo registered the largest increase registered anywhere in Europe in

11 the post-Second World War period.

12 Q. All right. You now presented this memorandum of this front.

13 A. For the national unification of Albanians.

14 Q. Yes. When you look at the website of that front, can you

15 establish that they have their branches in Macedonia and in Montenegro and

16 Greece; is that correct?

17 A. That can be seen on the memorandum itself, that they have such

18 branches in Skopje, Pristina, Tirana and Ulcinj, if I remember correctly.

19 Q. Yes. And in their memorandum they say that the International

20 Crisis Group is lying when it says that it is not a majority position to

21 espouse this Pan-Albanianism or this Greater Albania. And they give their

22 own information and the results of their own research, so I would like to

23 ask you for your comment. This is from the text that the Trial Chamber

24 admitted into evidence.

25 "Pro-national unification. [In English] [Previous translation

1 continues]... per cent [Interpretation] 82.5 per cent. It is 82.5 per

2 cent, [In English] against 6 per cent [Interpretation] Against [In

3 English] 11 per cent. With what right ICG is ignoring that much more than

4 80 per cent of Albanians from all Albanian slants are pro-national

5 unification."

6 [Interpretation] This is self-explanatory, isn't it? So my

7 question is whether this paper of the International Crisis Group is, in

8 your opinion as an historian, of any scientific significance or is this

9 merely a political document?

10 A. For me, it is a political pamphlet.

11 Q. Have you read who was on the board of the ICG?

12 A. Yes. I read that several times.

13 Q. You've mentioned Wesley Clark, who committed a series of war

14 crimes in Yugoslavia. He's a member of that group.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, Mr. Milosevic, inappropriate. Inappropriate.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. On the board, in addition to the persons you mentioned, is also

19 George Soros. Have you seen his name?

20 A. Yes, I have seen his name, inter alia.

21 Q. You said that this was a political pamphlet not a document that

22 can be used for any scientific purposes unless people look at the

23 substance of pamphlets in order to carry out scientific research.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: If he says it's a political pamphlet and not a

25 scientific document, let him say why.

1 Why is that so, Mr. Terzic? Why do you say it's a political

2 document and not of any scientific value?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, because its authors

4 are anonymous. There is not a single name of any author who wrote this

5 document. The only thing quoted in the text is the following: "The

6 International Crisis Group interviewed or spoke to --" Who is the Crisis

7 Group? The entire Crisis Group? That is impossible. That is one thing.

8 Secondly, sources are unreliable. Sources are not documents.

9 They are basically interviews with certain individuals.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Isn't that the way documents of this kind are

11 prepared? They don't always identify the authors. You have the board,

12 the board members identified.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is customary, Mr. President, for

14 the author of the document to be identified. I don't know whether the

15 members of the board are the authors of this document.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well. I take that point, yes. What are the

17 other reasons?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The other reasons are very important

19 too. This document advocates an independent Kosovo, and not a single word

20 in it refers to ethnic cleansing of Serbs, crimes against Serbs. There is

21 no reference whatsoever to Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija. This document is

22 in contravention of Resolution 1244 adopted by the Security Council. That

23 is one thing. It advocates the secession of part of a sovereign state,

24 that is to say Kosovo, from Serbia. That is one thing.

25 Secondly, it advocates a Greater Albania. Although it does not

1 use the word Greater Albania, but it does speak about Pan-Albanianism, and

2 under the term it means economic, cultural, transportation related, and

3 every other kind of integration of all Albanian areas. What is that but a

4 Greater Albania? If on the other hand one speaks of integration between

5 the Serbs of -- from Republika Srpska and the Serbs from the Republic of

6 Serbia, then this turns into the spectre of a Greater Serbia, so isn't

7 that only logical?

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Mr. Terzic, where did you work, say, in 1990 up to 1995?

10 A. I worked at the Historical Institute of the Serbian Academy of

11 Sciences and Arts.

12 Q. In the book by Ivan Stambolic which was admitted into evidence

13 here, it is stated that some academicians at the time were toiling over

14 maps. That's the word that was used, I believe. Please. You are in the

15 same building. What is done at the academy is very transparent; everybody

16 communicates with everybody else. Who were these academicians who were

17 toiling over the maps in order to see how the Serbian lands can be linked

18 up even along a goat path, as it was said?

19 A. I am not aware of any source.

20 Q. He quotes a conversation with Vasa Cubrilovic; that's his source.

21 A. I was never present at any meeting nor did I ever see any meeting

22 where these kind of maps was being looked into. Never, absolutely.

23 Q. So you have no knowledge about this?

24 A. I have no knowledge about this whatsoever.

25 Q. Now I'm going to take you back to this other very interesting

1 issue that Mr. Nice --

2 A. I beg your pardon. There are research papers, there are

3 scientific conferences that were public conferences. There were

4 international meetings where maps were discussed, too, but from this point

5 of view, from the point of view of building some kind of a Greater Serbia,

6 I have no information about that.

7 Q. Well, I assumed you would have to have information had such

8 activities been carried out at the time.

9 A. I was the director of the Historical Institute, I'm not a member

10 of the academy. But I don't know about any activities of that kind in the

11 academy in any shape or form.

12 Q. Very well. Let's go back to the infamous demonstrations. On page

13 23, Mr. Nice cited from that page, from the Budding report. I will quote

14 just one or two sentences at the most.

15 In the first passage on page 23, it states: "Some demonstrators

16 demanded that Kosovo be given the status of a republic. That is the idea

17 that the Albanians, including some officials, expressed earlier that year

18 during the talks about forthcoming constitutional amendments. Some went

19 even further, requesting that Kosovo and other regions in Yugoslavia

20 populated by Albanians link up with Albania." Even Audrey Budding speaks

21 about the demands for regions inhabited by Albanians be linked up with

22 Albania, inhabited by Albanians in Yugoslavia.

23 Now, could you please answer the following question: This

24 unification with Albania of regions inhabited by Albanians be effected

25 from -- as a result of finding cockroaches in the food?

1 A. Any serious researcher is aware that we are talking about a

2 long-term, well-conceived and well-planned project of several decades'

3 duration, because these demonstrations are just an external expression of

4 this project which was worked on by illegal organisations, which I spoke

5 about, for decades. For this mention of cockroaches can be something that

6 is humourous but it cannot be any kind of proof or --

7 Q. So this reaction by students to the food they had in their

8 dormitories, could that have been the cause of the events which ensued?

9 A. I was not in Pristina, you know, but if it was a problem with

10 food, then you would be requesting better food. You would not be asking

11 for unification with Albania, which at the time was much poorer than

12 Kosovo and Metohija. This is logical in itself.

13 Q. Very well, Mr. Terzic. It's logical to you, and perhaps to every

14 other well-meaning person, but it's not clear to everybody.

15 Could you please tell me, it was stated here that the Serbian

16 service -- secret service incited these Albanian demonstrations in 1981.

17 I am not asking you to say it did not, because this is something that

18 everybody in Yugoslavia knows. What I'm asking you is the following: Are

19 you aware that the Serbian service, as Mr. Nice calls it, had no access at

20 all to the region of Kosovo and Metohija at the time?

21 A. Yes, I am aware of that and I regret the extent to which Mr. Nice

22 is not well informed. Serbian services, Serbian police services had no

23 jurisdiction at all in Kosovo and Metohija following the constitutional

24 amendments in '68 and '71. Second, Serbia had no insight into Kosovo's

25 international cooperation with Albania. So the conclusion can be seen

1 based on that alone.

2 Q. Very well, Mr. Terzic. Could you please tell us how the Yugoslav

3 security service was organised up until the 1990s, until Yugoslavia

4 existed. Was it centralised or was each republic independent in respect

5 of these functions?

6 A. I must admit that I'm not an expert on the security services, but

7 knowing that all republics actually had -- were states within states, each

8 republic had its own security service. I don't know what their mutual

9 cooperation was, but I know that Kosovo had its own security service and

10 that cooperation between Kosovo and Metohija and Serbia was not very

11 strong in this respect. It was practically non-existent.

12 Q. And what about the security services and the police in Kosovo?

13 Were they subordinated to the Serbian Ministry for Internal Affairs or to

14 the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Yugoslavia?

15 A. As far as I know, and I don't know too much about it, as far as I

16 know, and I'm not an expert in that matter, it was under the jurisdiction

17 of the provincial Secretariat for Internal Affairs and probably under the

18 jurisdiction of the federal security services, because I know there was a

19 problem with the intervention of Serbian forces in Kosovo and Metohija.

20 Serbian forces waited for several days in order to be able to enter Kosovo

21 and Metohija in 1981. That is something that I do know.

22 Q. Very well. Do you know that then they only entered as part of the

23 joint Yugoslav security forces and not as Serbian forces?

24 A. Yes, because I think that the commander of that joint force was a

25 Slovenian.

1 Q. Do you know that all measures adopted regarding Kosovo up until

2 1991 were Yugoslav measures, that Serbia practically did not adopt any

3 measures about the imposition of any kind of measures in Kosovo and

4 Metohija following the demonstrations in '68 and later, after '81, and all

5 of -- and in light of all the subsequent events?

6 A. Well, that's logical, because under the constitution, Serbia had

7 no jurisdictions there based on the amendments and the constitution of

8 1974.

9 Q. Very well. Thank you, Mr. Terzic. I have no more questions for

10 you.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Terzic --

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, is it possible now to

13 deal with the list of exhibits?

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we're going to do that.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16 [Trial Chamber confers]

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, I -- as I indicated before, I take it

18 that if you have any questions to ask, you will bring that to our

19 attention.

20 MR. KAY: Absolutely.

21 [Trial Chamber confers]

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic - and this of course will concern

23 Mr. Nice - the Chamber overnight looked at the documents that

24 Mr. Milosevic referred to in his examination-in-chief, and we prepared a

25 list for ourselves for our internal use, and it numbered 51. The Chamber

1 will issue an order as to the admission of these documents, and I will

2 give a general outline as to the criteria which the Chamber will use.

3 Those which have been translated will be admitted. Those which have not

4 been translated will be marked for identification until they are

5 translated. And those which have not been -- those which have not been

6 dealt with will clearly not be admitted.

7 And I should say that in relation to translation, it is only those

8 sections that were referred to in court that will be translated.

9 We can give a number to the binder now.

10 THE REGISTRAR: D262 for two binders.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

12 MR. NICE: Does that give us the opportunity if we so decide, and

13 I don't know that we will, to seek additional exhibiting of other passages

14 from documents translated in part?

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We think that that would be --

16 MR. NICE: I'm very grateful. And while I'm -- unless you had

17 something further to announce by way of order, on the topic of exhibits,

18 may I respectfully make one other proposal?

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Exhibits generally or in relation to this?

20 MR. NICE: No. Exhibits generally and for this witness but not

21 the Prosecution.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us release the witness first.

23 Mr. Terzic, that concludes your evidence. Thank you for coming to

24 give it, and you may now leave.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Terzic, are you in a position to leave the

2 originals of the maps that were referred to?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course. I gave the maps to

4 Ms. Evelyn and she scanned them in colour, and I trust that they are in

5 her possession. But if this is not possible, I would be very happy to

6 leave them for you.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you very much, Mr. Terzic. You may leave.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you.

9 The CD?

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think we have that.

11 [The witness withdrew]

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, maybe you can start.

13 MR. NICE: Your Honours, the matter I wanted to raise is something

14 upon which you've already ruled. It's the potential exhibit that covers

15 the 1981 student demonstrations. You ruled against its admissibility and

16 I'm effectively inviting you to give some reconsideration of that, for two

17 reasons, really, but not -- first, it's been extensively re-examined on,

18 including with such questions of the accused as "It's logical to you --"

19 this was the witness's having answered something about the student

20 demonstrations, and he said, "It's logical to you and perhaps to every

21 other well-meaning person but it's not clear to everybody," and then he

22 goes on to ask another tendentious question about the history of the 1981

23 demonstrations.

24 The Court will recall that I'd explained that but for the time,

25 and the taking of time was by no means entirely my cause, but for the

1 taking of time I would have put to him an extract from a book, and I

2 should explain that it -- although it's a book, it's an extract that is

3 itself -- the chapter in the book is 30 pages and the footnotes run to a

4 160, is it, footnotes, so it's a researched document - 161 - and it's

5 followed by some interviews, although, having said that, the amount of

6 reading is pretty limited. And my concern is that if this is going to

7 feature as an important part now of the accused's case and if there's no

8 other witness to whom I'm able to put this particular piece of reading,

9 the issue will only be fully ventilated if I seek and am allowed to call

10 rebuttal evidence on a point like this, which of course one would be

11 extremely reluctant to do given that, on one argument, it's at least

12 historic and arguably peripheral.

13 So my invitation to the Chamber is at any event to consider

14 reviewing my application for that exhibit, perhaps marking it only for

15 identification. That's all.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Nice, can you remind me of the title of this?

17 MR. NICE: It comes from a book called Kosovo, How Myths and

18 Truths Started a War. The chapter is headed The 1981 Student

19 Demonstrations, and it reviews the various possible topics that I was able

20 to raise but only very briefly with the witness.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Who is the author of this?

22 MR. NICE: It's Julie Mertus. As I say, it's not just a book

23 without authority, it's footnoted.

24 MR. KAY: Can I raise something? Because it is important and I

25 can't help but remark on it.

1 We seem to be getting a lot of exhibits coming in from the

2 Prosecutor which are unattributable that should be part of their rebuttal

3 case if there is a rebuttal case. And vast tracts of evidence are coming

4 in which are barely referred to, glanced upon, which can be later said to

5 form some sort of foundation for their evidential propositions in this

6 case. And it's of great concern that it may well unbalance the evidence

7 in this trial.

8 The accused, in my submission, is trying a technique that the

9 Prosecution tried during their case, which was referring to a catalogue of

10 tabs within an exhibit in a tangential way quite often and then seeking to

11 have the whole of the documents admitted into evidence.

12 We are getting into a dangerous area of trial by book and trial by

13 chapters, unattributed people that -- the Trial Chamber has no idea the

14 bona fides of these people, how they stand as witnesses, and we end up

15 perhaps looking at secondary sources, tertiary sources, and not primary

16 sources for evidence.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Kay, can I explain how I see this: The expert

18 quite rightly quotes or identifies his sources. It would not be uncommon,

19 following his evidence, to look at the parts of his sources he identifies.

20 I for my part would not confine my reading to precisely the lines that

21 were identified but I would look at it in context. And I hope that the

22 order that we will issue and which Judge Robinson outlined will make it

23 clear that that is the approach that the Chamber intends to take to the

24 productions, to take them in context, have the bits that were referred to

25 translated, not to admit the documents that weren't actually referred to

1 by the witness. And I think that probably -- or I hope reassures you that

2 we're conscious of the problem. And I think speaking for myself, I would

3 be unhappy about admitting the document that Mr. Nice has just asked us to

4 reconsider, certainly at this stage.

5 MR. KAY: Yes. I think the Trial Chamber, if a document isn't

6 referred to, is entirely right in not admitting it.

7 One of the problems for the accused in dealing with an expert on a

8 historical basis such as this is vast sources have been looked at in the

9 compilation of a report. And in the evidence-giving process, it is

10 impossible within a trial to go through all the sources, all the

11 references, but merely slide across them as they support his report,

12 which, in our submission, the binders that were produced sought to do, to

13 back up the propositions he had in his report.

14 I appreciate the Trial Chamber is producing guidance which would

15 be welcomed for all parties on it, but I do ask them to bear in mind the

16 process that we had to experience during the Prosecution phase of the

17 trial where we were admitting vast amounts of documents only at times

18 tangentially referred to, but in the cause of the greater good because

19 everyone was concerned for time and resources. And what we submit is that

20 when the accused tries that process, that he should be given the same

21 indulgence that the Prosecutor was. There's a danger now in looking at

22 this second phase of the case that we forget the procedures that were

23 adopted in the cause of economy and resources during the Prosecution phase

24 of the case.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Kay. I think your remarks are

1 timely, and we're always endeavouring to ensure that the accused is

2 treated fairly.

3 Mr. Nice, we'll not admit the document.

4 MR. NICE: As Your Honour pleases.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Your next witness now, Mr. Milosevic.

6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My next witness is Cedomir Popov.

8 [The witness entered court]

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

11 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

12 WITNESS: CEDOMIR POPOV

13 [Witness answered through interpreter]

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may begin, Mr. Milosevic.

15 Examined by Mr. Milosevic:

16 Q. [Interpretation] Could you please give us your full name and

17 surname.

18 A. Cedomir Popov.

19 Q. Professor Popov, would you please briefly tell us the main points

20 of your curriculum vitae.

21 A. I'm a university professor at the University of Novi Sad. I

22 lectured on European history of the modern age, that is to say from the

23 end of the 18th century to the mid-20th century. I retired after 40 years

24 of having a university career, and I retired in the year 2000.

25 In the meantime, I have gone through all the instances of

1 university learning. In 1981, I was elected member of the Vojvodina

2 Academy of Arts and Sciences. In 1981, I was elected as member of the

3 Serbian Academy of Science -- 1989, I'm sorry. And when the two academies

4 conjoined, the Serbian and Vojvodina Academy, I became a member of the

5 Working Council of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, of which I'm

6 a regular full member.

7 Throughout my life I have given priority to two aspects of work;

8 that is to say tuition and scientific research. My books for the most

9 part and the work I have written refer to the history of Europe and the

10 Serb people within the frameworks of Europe, of European history, in fact.

11 I was socially active by taking part in various cultural and

12 scientific manifestations, scientific first of all in the province in the

13 Republic of Serbia, and in the second Yugoslavia as well.

14 I have nothing of particular interest to add, having said that.

15 Q. Thank you, Professor Popov. And now something in your

16 bibliography states that -- actually, we have a list of books published by

17 you in the biographical extract. Not scientific works but books. And

18 there are 13 books of yours published and four books which you edited

19 written by individuals who dealt in areas of your expertise.

20 A. Yes.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I should like to tell you that the

22 bibliographical notes and the curriculum vitae have been attached to

23 Professor Popov's report.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Professor Popov, which are the decisive factors, factors which had

1 a decisive influence on the development of the national consciousness and

2 awareness of the Serb people and the process of national integration? How

3 did that evolve?

4 A. There were two basic factors. One was a Balkan factor, a

5 patriarchal factor, and an Orthodox factor in one - I would put that under

6 number one - to which the Serb people belonged; and the second was the

7 European component. So these two components came together and permeated

8 each other, interacted in a fruitful way with each other during the 18th

9 century at -- during the days of the rationalist philosophy and its

10 supremacy and scientific thought in Europe. There was a meeting of the

11 Balkan traditions which the Serbs brought with them to the Panonian

12 valley with them, Podunavlje, which is the area of present day Vojvodina

13 and Hungary, right up to Vienna and Trieste, and in today's Romania up

14 until Terusvar, Arad, and so on. They stretched in these two areas. So

15 these two traditions, these two cultural trends permeated each other and

16 were very fruitful. They had a fruitful effect on each other.

17 On the one hand we had the enlightenment, the baroque, the

18 romantic movement which enriched the Balkan patriarchal culture on the one

19 side and Orthodox traditions of St. Sava and the rallying of the Serbs

20 which was brought from the Balkans during the period of the long

21 resettlements that took place. They did not only take place in 1690, in

22 the great movement under Arsenije Carnojevic but throughout the time of

23 Turkish rule, that is to say from the 15th century onwards up until the

24 end of the Second World War, and now, during current events after 1991,

25 they were speeded up and multiplied even more.

1 Q. Thank you, Professor Popov. Now, tell me, what was the

2 relationship between the Serbian nationalist idea and similar ideas and

3 ideologies and the policies waged by other European peoples, especially in

4 neighbours of Serbia and surrounding Serbia?

5 A. Serbian nationalist thought was very prompt in following what was

6 happening in -- on the European scene in the broadest possible way, but

7 particularly focusing on Central Europe, which is where we saw the

8 development of a national ideology and social thinking based upon two key

9 assumptions, premises, and they are the following: That they were all the

10 members of one human group speaking one language, a single nation, a

11 single language; and secondly, that this language, this common language,

12 enabled them to have common -- a common cultural heritage and a joint

13 endeavour to continue living in that fashion in the future. And the

14 historical tradition here was very important in order to have the national

15 consciousness of all these nations developed. And all the nations of the

16 Balkans, Central and South-eastern Europe and even, if you will, Western

17 Europe as well, enjoyed this process of enlightenment that the Serbs went

18 through and formed their own nations on the basis of a common language, a

19 common history, and common cultural traditions.

20 Q. What --

21 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please repeat his question.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Concept of Greater Serbia.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: You're asked to repeat your question. The

24 interpreters were asking you.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

1 Q. Yes, the question wasn't interpreted and I'll repeat it. Let me

2 repeat.

3 I'd like to ask you to bear in mind that since we're both speaking

4 the same language, Serbian, and everything has to be interpreted, what you

5 and I say has to be interpreted, please make pauses between my questions

6 and your answer to facilitate interpretation and avoid overlapping, and

7 we'll save time in that way too.

8 Now, my question was this: What does the concept of a Greater

9 Serbia mean within the context of history and the national question in

10 Europe of the 19th and 20th centuries?

11 A. All the nations of Europe, including the neighbouring nations,

12 nations neighbouring to the Serbs, had their national programmes with

13 minimum requirements and maximum requirements, and they all had maximum

14 requirements which transcended the requirements made by the Serbian

15 national programme. A Greater Serbia is -- Greater Serbia is a concept

16 which was introduced in usage very late in the second half of the 19th

17 century. Up until then, the term used was "unification," first of all

18 spiritual unity and cultural unity of the Serbian people; and after that,

19 in the second half of the 19th century, we saw the birth of the concept of

20 political unification of what was termed the Serb lands, that is to say

21 the lands where the Serb people were in the majority.

22 Neighbouring nations and nations belonging to other European

23 countries who were also struggling for unification and for the creation of

24 uniform national states, united national states, had similar programmes or

25 identical programmes, but I have to say this, I have to make this proviso

1 which might appear to be subjective on the Serb side: All those

2 programmes were far more ambitious, if I might say so, far more

3 expansionist and far more aggressive than the Serb national programme

4 which limited itself exclusively to Serb lands or, rather, the lands and

5 the area in which the Serbs were the majority population and in which they

6 did not have any intentions of denationalising the members of other

7 nations or other ethnic groups.

8 Q. Tell me, please, Professor, what were the foundations upon which

9 the accusations made against the Greater Serbia, what were they founded

10 upon?

11 A. They were usually founded on two ambitions: On the one hand you

12 had the ambitions of the Central European powers, that is to say Austria,

13 from 1867 Austro-Hungary, a dual monarchy that came into being; and on the

14 other hand we had Germany, to permeate the Balkans, to break through into

15 the Balkans, this is the Drang nach Osten which Germany designed after

16 1881 as an expansion, although these tendencies existed earlier on as

17 well. But in this plan Austria or, rather, Austro-Hungary was supposed to

18 play the role of the vanguard which was to open up the road to the German

19 breakthrough to the east. That is one factor which led to the

20 mystification of the question of the Serb nation and its aspirations to

21 unite and to prevent this.

22 The second aspiration which led to this was the aspiration on the

23 part of the neighbouring nations to create their large states to the

24 disadvantage of Serb territory, Hungary, Greater Croatia, which was under

25 project from the middle of the 19th century, from Ante Starcevic onwards

1 to the end of the 20th century with Franjo Tudjman.

2 So these programmes were programmes that the Bulgarians had in

3 their quest to take over Macedonia and the entire southern regions of

4 Serbia, and even Greece too. The Greeks had these programmes too but they

5 gave them up. They had them from the end of the 18th century and it was

6 their great state and national programme which implied and envisaged the

7 revival of the Byzantine Empire.

8 So we see these two factors which collided or very often drew

9 together in building up the myth about the fact that it was the Serbs who

10 wanted a Greater Serbia to make it impossible for other nations to achieve

11 their goals, and Austro-Hungary and Germany to implement their Imperialist

12 plans to break through and reach the Mediterranean and Turkey.

13 Q. Professor, could you be a little more precise and specific,

14 please, and tell us who the creator of the charges against the Serb state

15 and Serb nation was because of their alleged aspirations towards an

16 aggressive policy in the creation of Greater Serbia and by subjugating

17 other nations?

18 A. This idea against Serb unity and unification appeared during the

19 first Serbian uprising. This was a social and national revolution which

20 corresponded very well to the revolutionary events that were taking place

21 in Europe and the events that took place from 1779 to 1815. And it was

22 from 1804, in fact, until 1813, to be continued in 1815, that we see this

23 first stage of the Serbian national and social revolution which had a dual

24 task; on the one hand to liquidate and destroy the Ottoman feudal system,

25 which was very specific compared to the European social system but was

1 identical to the Bourgeois European revolution, and on the other side to

2 have the integration of the Serb people, which was the goal of Bourgeois

3 revolutions in Europe.

4 At that time, during that period, we saw the emergence of the

5 great power, the big power factor, and they had their interests to promote

6 in the Balkans and in the south-eastern reaches of Europe which were

7 against this idea of the revival, renaissance of a Serbian state. We had

8 Napoleon Bonaparte who, with his troops in 1806 reached Dalmatia, and he

9 reached Bar and Ulcinj, and here he came up against the Turks. That was

10 the border with the Turks. Then you had the Habsburg monarchy in Austria

11 which did not wish to see a strong South Slav state on its southern

12 borders. And ultimately, we Russia who, in material terms and diplomatic

13 terms, helped the Serbian insurgents but did not agree to the creation of

14 an independent Serbian state but, rather, was ready to assist it to gain

15 autonomy over which it would have power and influence. So we have big

16 power rivalry.

17 And when this ended and when Serbia moved along the roads of

18 building up its autonomy, for the first time in history we have Austria

19 taking an express stand, or the Austrian monarchy and Metonic, who in 1816

20 already, that is to say after the first steps made in Serbia to create and

21 reach autonomy, Metonic said that Austria did not see it as its interests

22 in having a unified Serbia and a free Serbia along its southern borders.

23 After that, we had the awakening of the interests of other

24 European nations, and once Serbia gained autonomy nonetheless, in formal

25 and official terms recognised in 1813, we saw that the big power -- in

1 1830 -- I apologise -- in 1830 we see that in this land had still not be

2 sufficiently developed but they sent their consular officers and consuls

3 and intelligence services, as did Britain, France, Russia and endeavoured

4 to influence its policy and get a footing there.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you very much.

6 Mr. Milosevic, after that broad sweep, could we be a little more

7 specific now.

8 It's time to adjourn. It's time to adjourn, Mr. Milosevic.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: We will adjourn for 20 minutes.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you.

12 --- Recess taken at 12.19 p.m.

13 --- On resuming at 12.47 p.m.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic, continue.

15 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now it's on.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Before I put my next question to you, we have been dealing with

19 the myth of a Greater Serbia, but I would like to ask you give me your

20 comment. I'm going to read out from your paper, page 38, and you say as

21 follows: "In order to eradicate this 'danger,' the Habsburg monarchy,

22 before and after it was set up in 1867, dealt with every type of awareness

23 of Serbian identity especially belonging to a national and cultural,

24 denoted it all as a Greater Serbia or a Greater Serbian conspiracy."

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: You should identify the relevant page in the

1 English text for us.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As a matter of fact, I haven't even

3 got the text in English. I have to tell you that, Mr. Robinson. I

4 thought that it was sufficient for me to look at the text in Serbian when

5 speaking to this witness.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, but we're following it in English. That

7 should be part of your preparation, Mr. Milosevic. Mr. Nice identified

8 the text in English and in Serbian.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Can I get the text in

10 English, because I haven't got it. I have it only in Serbian.

11 MR. KAY: Page 33.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Kay. Thirty-three.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. If you found it, then I

14 can quote it again.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. "In order to eradicate this 'threat' before and after its

17 reorganisation in 1867, the Habsburg monarchy labelled Greater Serbianism

18 or even Greater Serbian conspiracy every aspect of expressing the

19 awareness of the Serbian cultural and spiritual identity, particularly the

20 awareness of the affiliation to a single national and cultural entity. A

21 theoretician of Kalay's regime in Bosnia-Herzegovina described this in

22 1895 as follows: 'In essence, by its aspirations the Serbian spirit is

23 nothing but cherishing the Greater Serbian idea on the basis of state and

24 national unification of all Serbs.'

25 "Accordingly, the Austro-Hungarian regime persecuted everything

1 that could stir up the awareness of affiliation to the Serbian national

2 unity throughout its Empire."

3 Before I put a question to you, could you tell us, please, what

4 kind of Kalay regime are we talking about? I assume that you mean

5 Benjamin Kalay, but could you tell us briefly, what is the Kalay regime

6 that you speak of?

7 A. He was a member of the lesser nobility in Hungary and through the

8 then influential Count Gyula Andrassy, he came into politics. In 1868, he

9 was appointed to Belgrade as consul. He had learned Serbian very well

10 before that. He even started writing about Serbian history, and in 1880,

11 he was appointed Imperial Commissioner in Bosnia, and he remained there

12 until his death, until 1903. This regime developed an idea that had

13 already been in existence. It was not his own original idea, but it was

14 widespread then, of this Greater Serbian danger in the Balkans and that

15 this was a threat to Austro-Hungarian interests. If necessary, I can give

16 you a few facts in order to show how this idea developed sometime from the

17 middle of the 19th century.

18 Q. Very briefly, please.

19 A. In the time of the Crimean war, from 1853 until 1856, the then

20 foreign minister of Austria said that Serbia had to be eliminated or

21 somehow put under firm control so it wouldn't spread its influence to

22 neighbouring states, on the one hand, in order to prevent these states

23 from becoming a Russian stronghold in the future. After that, the same

24 idea but in more radical terms was expounded by Count Redburg [phoen] in

25 1862. He was the Austrian minister.

1 So once in 1867 the Austro-Hungarian Empire was reorganised, the

2 majority of the Serbs or, rather, the most active part of the Serbs

3 remained either within Croatia or southern Hungary, and Vojvodina is part

4 of it today. That is where many Serb cultural and spiritual initiatives

5 were taken. The Matica Srpska, the oldest cultural institution, was

6 there. Then the Serbian high school was there, the Serbian national

7 theatre, and so on.

8 The Hungarian authorities did not look upon this kindly. They

9 even wanted to return Matica Srpska to Budapest in order to keep it under

10 firmer control. Otherwise, it had been moved to Novi Sad, the centre of

11 Serbdom.

12 On the other hand, in Novi Sad a cultural, educational, and

13 political organisation was established, that is -- that was called the

14 United Serbian Youth. So this was a cultural society of ethnic Serbs from

15 all parts of the Habsburg Empire, from Serbia, Montenegro, and Turkey.

16 Various issues were debated there, cultural, ideological, literary, et

17 cetera, but the Austria regime proclaimed that to be a Greater Serbian

18 action and banned the organisation in 1871.

19 From then onwards, and especially after Bosnia-Herzegovinian

20 uprising in 1875, which was a major emancipation movement of the Serbs

21 against the Turks in Bosnia-Herzegovina and certainly affected the

22 attitude towards Turkey in Serbia and Montenegro too, the two Serbian

23 principalities. And there was this large-scale campaign against Greater

24 Serbian tendencies, and after the Berlin Congress, the Austro-Hungarian

25 Empire was allowed to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina and then ultimately to

1 annex it, which indeed it did in 1867.

2 So this campaign, speaking of fears from a Greater Serbia, was

3 intensified all the time. And this went on, especially in times of

4 crisis, in 1806, in 1811, and then in the period from 1908 until 1909, and

5 then in the First World War the major struggle against a Greater Serbia

6 was waged.

7 Q. Yes, but you speak about this same page. Gentlemen, for your

8 benefit, in English this is from the beginning of page 33, where it says

9 the concept of Greater Serbia -- century.

10 So this is what you say: "The concept of Greater Serbia was made

11 public in the mid-19th century and was nurtured and further developed

12 after the 1878 Berlin Congress, acquiring the character of a never-ending

13 political and religious campaign. The aim of this campaign and the

14 creation of the myth was threefold; to prevent the creation of a Serbian

15 state within its national borders, to conceal the fact that Austria

16 possessed some of the Serbian and Balkan territories and aspired to

17 others, and to open the routes to a Catholic missionary campaign among the

18 Orthodox population of South-eastern Europe. No effort was spared to

19 spread the myth about a Greater Serbian threat, and they were constantly

20 expanded. In the last decade of the 20th century, this myth promoted the

21 small Greater Serbia to a threat for the national security of the only

22 superpower in the world which was accepted and strongly supported by the

23 German Imperialist Drang nach Osten policy, Klau fascism [phoen], Nazism,

24 communism, and contemporary globalism.

25 A. Well, yes.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: What's the question on that? What's the question

2 that arises from that?

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. The question is: Who participated in all of this and with what

5 motives in the building of this historical myth of a Greater Serbia?

6 A. Different big powers. Great Britain took part in the following

7 way: It wanted to stop the expansion and strengthening of Serbia at all

8 costs, fearful that it might become a Russian stronghold in the Balkans.

9 It opposed this all the way until -- and then France, until its second

10 Empire fell in 1870, also opposed this because they had different feelings

11 about the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. And of course, the Austro-Hungarian

12 monarchy opposed it for obvious reasons that were already mentioned there.

13 And also the Catholic church was strongly opposed to this because, in

14 terms of its missionary activities, it had built it into the idea of

15 European national states through a few programmes and projects that were

16 elaborated in Italy. Precisely at the time when Serbia was working on its

17 national programme in 1844, Cesare Baldo wrote a book saying what Italy's

18 hopes were, and he says the hopes of Italy are to have Italy united as a

19 Catholic country, and also that Austria, as the proponent of the Catholic

20 mission, should be sent to the Balkans in order to spread Catholicism

21 there.

22 In order to pursue such a policy, and promote such a concept,

23 Cesare Baldo and all the other proponents of this policy enjoyed the full

24 support of the Pope and clerical circles in Croatia and elsewhere, and

25 both in the 19th and 20th centuries.

1 Q. Thank you, Professor. When answering one of the previous

2 questions, you mentioned the first Serbian uprising, but you referred to

3 it as the Serbian national and social revolution. My question is as

4 follows, because this needs to be elaborated: What was the role played by

5 this Serb national and social revolution from 1804 until 1815 in the

6 history of the Serbian people in terms of laying the foundations of the

7 Serbian national programme and in the national awakening of the Balkan

8 peoples?

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I'd like the questions to be

10 organised in such a way to facilitate short answers. The answers are far

11 too long.

12 So, Professor, we want shorter answers, and sometimes that can be

13 achieved by the way question is framed.

14 Yes. Please go ahead now.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Then I'm going to put three questions. What was the role played

18 in the Serbian national revolution in 18 -- from 1804 until 1815? What

19 was its role in the history of the Serbian people?

20 A. The heritage of bourgeois ideas which came through the Serbs in

21 the Habsburg monarchy can actually be carried out. May I be allowed a

22 comparison? The American revolution in the 1770s showed that the ideas of

23 John Locke and other theoreticians can actually be carried out. In the

24 same way, the Serbian revolution showed that the Balkans can espouse this

25 heritage and carry through the main demands of the bourgeois revolutions.

1 Perhaps I could repeat some of this.

2 Q. There is no need for you to repeat anything. That is the basic

3 role. And what about laying the foundations of the Serbian national

4 programme, this national awakening of the Balkan peoples?

5 A. This role is also very important, because at the time of the first

6 Serbian uprising, on Karadjordje's staff, Karadjordje was the leader of

7 the first Serbian uprising, also in his Sovjet, his supreme council, there

8 were two prelates of the Serbian church, Nikolaj Stratimirovic and Peter

9 I, the Bishop of Montenegro.

10 A programme of bringing together the Serb lands was elaborated.

11 Karadjordje was very pleased with this and he tried to carry this through.

12 So this was the first time that the unification of the Serbs was referred

13 to, and it was the first time that there was this unification of the

14 Serbian state. This is also important for other Balkan peoples, because

15 the Serbian revolution gave a strong impetus to the movement in Greece,

16 the Hetarus movement in Greece, Philike Hetairia, the Greek liberation

17 organisation which was founded in 1815. And also a strong impetus was

18 given to the liberation in Romania. Both movements actually came to the

19 fore in 1821.

20 So the Serbian movement gave an impetus to these other liberation

21 initiatives of the peoples of the Balkans.

22 Q. Very well. I'm not going to dwell on this much longer because it

23 is in chapter 3 of your report. In the Serbian language it's on page 8,

24 and in English it's on page 7, where it says that,"The Serbian people

25 began its revolutionary transformation at the beginning of the 19th

1 century at a time when Europe was vibrating from the powerful thunder of

2 the bourgeois revolutions following the French revolution in 1789." And

3 then you give these explanations that you've already referred to.

4 Tell me, Professor, what about the national programmes of other

5 European nations? What are their main characteristics at the same time,

6 the first half of the 19th century when the Serbian national programme was

7 being elaborated?

8 A. If you wish, I can give you just a few pieces of information in

9 terms of the German programme or the Hungarian programme or the Italian

10 national programme, and so on.

11 Hans Ulrich Weller, a German historian, analysed all these

12 movements and --

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, what are you seeking to

14 demonstrate here? Is it that other countries in Europe also had

15 programmes, similar programmes? I will consult my colleagues, but I'm not

16 sure this is very relevant. Let us concentrate on Serbia. It's not

17 really -- we are not in a university here.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's not academia.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, this idea and this

21 myth of a general Serb -- of a Greater Serbia is dealt with in a very

22 simplified manner here. Academician Popov is highly competent to explain

23 how these ideas were developed in the 19th century and what the historical

24 context was in view of developments in other European countries at the

25 time, in the neighbourhood of Serbia, in countries that were a bit further

1 away, and so on. There is no need for me to prove historical facts. We

2 have an historian here who is quite competent to explain all of this. But

3 I think that everybody needs to understand the historical context in which

4 this myth was developed, especially in view of the way in which this idea

5 was abused here in this indictment. So that is why I believe this is

6 relevant.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I must understand -- I must say that

8 that was my understanding too.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very briefly, Professor.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'll try to be as brief as possible.

11 Hans Ulrich Weller, you see, analysed three types of European movements

12 for national unification where nations were created by the state. For

13 example, France, Spain, the Scandinavian countries. Then where nations

14 fought for their unification, like Italy, Germany, the Balkan countries.

15 And finally, where they were created by seceding from big empires, and

16 that pertains to the Balkan countries too.

17 At the time when these ideas appeared, and when we refer to these

18 three types, I have to tell you that this national ideology was the most

19 highly developed in Germany, and of course I don't want to keep the Court

20 much longer, but Weller quotes at least 11 German theoreticians. If you

21 don't think it is necessary, I won't do this, but I just wish to say that

22 this was not something that was specific to Serbia, the idea of a national

23 state and national unification, and this creation of a strong country.

24 That is what a great Serbia would mean, a strong country in which all the

25 Serbs would live.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think you have identified the historical

2 context in which the concept arose. Thanks very much, Professor.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Professor Popov, what were the reactions by the major powers in

5 Europe? Now I'm talking about the European major powers vis-a-vis these

6 aspirations of the Serbs? In 1874 the rebellion began against the Turks.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And that is the Serbian national and social revolution, from 1804

9 to 1815. What were the reaction of the major European powers?

10 A. They were all negative. I think I said that a little earlier, and

11 I can add to these facts that all the major powers responded to this idea

12 of liberation and the independence of Serbia in a negative way right until

13 the Berlin Congress when finally the Serbs, Montenegrins and Romanians

14 were given the rights of a sovereign and independent state. These were

15 all the guarantor states which protected the Christian peoples as far as

16 they could within the composition of the Ottoman Empire.

17 Q. Thank you, Professor. We mentioned Garasanin's Nacertanije here.

18 That is in the domain of your interest, the period, the historical period

19 which is your speciality.

20 Could you please answer the question of how Garasanin's plan came

21 about? We had an expert witness report here provided by the other side,

22 and he interpreted this plan, how it came about. So this is my question:

23 How did Garasanin's plan come about?

24 A. This expert work that you're talking about is the one by

25 Ms. Audrey Budding which I came across by coincidence, and I think that

1 that question was treated with a lot of -- with a lack of understanding.

2 In fact, there is a definition there of Serbian national aspirations

3 there, but Serbs were not those who initiated that. It came from Polish

4 emigrants.

5 Prince Milos spoke with a couple of diplomats, a British one,

6 David Urquhart, and a French diplomat, Bois-le-Comte, and at about the

7 same time in 1832. He expressed ideas to the effect that Serbs had

8 aspirations to unite all of their lands into Serbia. Serbs not only in

9 Serbia but also outside Serbia. David Urquhart brought this up before his

10 government and published that in his magazine portfolio which he

11 published, and besides that - and this is the most important - informed

12 the head of the Polish immigration about that, Adam Chartoriski. When he

13 studied this idea, it seemed to him that it would be a favourable thing to

14 initiate in the Balkans with the assistance of the Serbs, a broad national

15 movement aimed against Austria and Russia, because these two powers had

16 divided Poland. And in the interest of liberating and freeing the Polish

17 people, they felt that it would be good to initiate an action which would

18 cause Russia and Austria to quarrel. He went on several missions. I

19 don't want to mention names, but the decisive mission was one by Frantisek

20 Zah, a Czech person who brought Chartoriski's instructions which the

21 Serbian policy was to follow. He brought that in May in 1844. He

22 submitted that to Ilija Garasanin, and then Ilija Garasanin worked that

23 through. He edited it in the sense, because he left out Croatia from that

24 plan, and he received a lot of criticism because of that for being

25 anti-Yugoslav, because he divided a Serbian programme, but because of his

1 own diplomatic caution in order not to irritate overly Austria, he also

2 left out the anti-Russian leanings from that original instruction. So he

3 formulated that in that way. I have it here. The programme was published

4 many times, but it was held secretly in the safes of the Serbian

5 government and the Serbian rulers until 1906, so for more than 60 years.

6 The first time it was published was in 1906, and that is when the

7 discussions began as well as contradictory assessments of that document

8 which was assessed as a Greater Serbia in Serbian and a Yugoslav document

9 today. I will not mention only Serbian historians, I will also mention an

10 American historian who wrote a biography of Garasanin. This is assessed

11 as a Serbian national programme, but that's the story of how it came

12 about.

13 Q. Did I understand you rightly, Professor, the question that is

14 being put quite frequently, whether the plan is Greater Serbia a Serbian

15 or a Yugoslav programme, I understood your answer to be that it is

16 actually a Serbian programme.

17 A. Yes, that is correct.

18 Q. Then why is it not a Greater Serbian document?

19 A. It is not because it provided for the unification around Serbia

20 only of those territories where the Serbian people are a majority, an

21 absolute or a relative majority. And this -- besides the actual Serbia

22 proper at the time, this would include Bosnia, which was Orthodox, where

23 only Orthodox part of the population comprised 40 per cent of the

24 population, but you also have Catholic and Serbs of other faiths. This is

25 based on information at the time, because there was no real census in

1 Bosnia at the time.

2 All the way until World War I, Bosnia considered itself to be the

3 most Serb-populated country of all the other countries. Besides that,

4 there was also Old Serbia, the region of Raska, Sandzak, Kosovo and

5 Metohija, because these were the -- this was the heritage of Serbian

6 national history. On the other hand, at the time when the plan was being

7 drafted, this supremacy of the Albanian or the Siptar population did not

8 exist. The balance between the non-Albanian and Albanian population was

9 disrupted only after 1878, when a very expansionist, and if you wish

10 aggressive, Albanian national movement began to develop. That is why this

11 document is not a Greater Serbian one.

12 Q. Very well. So that is the explanation why it is not a Greater

13 Serbian document. You said which territories Garasanin considered to be

14 Serb. What was his idea of this unification? How was it take place?

15 A. It was supposed to be carried out in the following way: Without

16 any revolutionary impact, without wars, by the gradual falling apart of

17 the Turkish Empire, which was gradually falling apart during the previous

18 two centuries, based on a particular type of law, not based on national

19 and natural law. We would be taking those territories and unifying those

20 territories which would break away from the Turkish Empire and in which

21 the Serbian population constituted a majority. We would govern people

22 from those countries who would be trained to conduct state functions and

23 administrative functions.

24 Q. Well, okay. So these were the views of Ilija Garasanin. In this

25 concept, he speaks exclusively about territories where Serbs constitute a

1 majority. Could you quite briefly, please, tell us in which way -- how

2 did it come about that the Serbs came into possession of those territories

3 which -- for which Garasanin said they were in a majority?

4 A. Those territories were liberated by the Serbian state in the first

5 and second Balkan war, and of course during World War I by uniting with

6 them, with the exception of Macedonia, which was occupied militarily. So

7 unifying with the other countries based on their own free will.

8 Q. Did Serbs from those territories expel anyone from those

9 territories where they constituted a majority from the aspect of

10 Garasanin's ideas?

11 A. A part of the Albanian population in 1878 fled not before the Serb

12 army but before the Serb people who had organised an uprising in Southern

13 Serbia from Nis to Vranje. Nis is about 200 kilometres south of Belgrade,

14 then we have Leskovac, then Vranje. The Serbian people staged an uprising

15 there against the Turkish authorities, and the Turkish authorities were

16 most directly helped by the Albanian population which was armed, the

17 so-called Basibozluk. And then the Serbs began to retaliate. And this

18 Serb retaliation prompted fear amongst the Albanian population, and they

19 began to pull back. A large number of them went to Kosmet when the

20 Serbian troops came, commanded by the first Serbian general, Jovan

21 Belimarkovic. He stopped that immediately and even threatened that

22 Serbian troops would withdraw if this pressure and terror against the

23 Albanians did not stop who had been engaged on the side of Turkey.

24 So this is the only case where we could say that Serbs, through

25 pressure, removed a number of the population from the territories that

1 they were liberating.

2 Q. And what would the most frequent reasons for the condemnation of

3 the plan as a Greater Serbian programme and Serbs were condemned as

4 conquerors with pretensions for domination?

5 A. This was all done based on Habsburg policies of Austro-Hungary in

6 the most virulent form of the persecution of any kind of Serbian cultural

7 or spiritual initiatives.

8 There is a bizarre example for this: In Bosnia, sometime in 1906,

9 thereabouts, the Serb Organisation of the Red Cross was banned because it

10 had the name "Serb" in its name, Serb Organisation of the Red Cross. So

11 you can imagine the fate of other Serb initiatives.

12 On the other hand, the Austrian action met with the full support

13 of greater Croatian ideas, because the Croats also had a fairly well

14 developed national consciousness in the second half of the 19th century

15 and it was much more expansionist and much more aggressive than the

16 Serbian one, beginning from Ante Starcevic who negated the existence of

17 Serbs completely. He felt them to be a branch of the Croats and he

18 considered Nemanja and his state and his successors as Croats. So he

19 negated the existence of Serbhood.

20 And then on the other hand, Klaternik planned to expand from

21 Salzburg all the way to Macedonia. Of course, it's understandable that

22 such a policy and ideology which never ceased, it became a little bit more

23 moderate since World War I, slightly more moderate, it stopped at the

24 Drina River and the Sava and Danube Rivers, but that ideology was very

25 anti-Serbian and it constantly attacked Serbia for Greater Serbia ideas.

1 Q. And could you please tell me whether these accusations were

2 founded, charging Serbia of ideas -- of desiring to conquer other peoples?

3 A. Based on historical events and outcomes, today we can conclude or

4 establish very simply and even assert that there were no grounds for such

5 assertions. Here and there, there were incidents which were dramatised to

6 a large degree and turned into historical evidence. They were mystified

7 and so on. So the grounds for a policy of conquering non-Serb territories

8 was groundless.

9 Q. And these accusations were groundless also.

10 A. Yes, of course.

11 Q. Professor, could you please tell us if, and if so to what extent,

12 did the Serbian national and political thinking of the 19th century was

13 burdened with the Greater Serbian programme -- or not to say programme but

14 plans; programmes and plans.

15 A. The Serbian state programme and state policy, the official policy,

16 never contained any Greater Serbia plans. It was always more oriented

17 towards the preservation of what it had up until 1878, when its

18 sovereignty was recognised.

19 In Serbian society, there was some superficial or peripheral ideas

20 about Greater Serbia. There was Pantelja, Milojevic and Sreckovic,

21 historians who talked about the restoration of Dusan's Empire. The

22 Serbian youth also entertained such ideas. But it was more of a

23 feverishness rather than actual concrete plans. There was a magazine in

24 1888 which was launched by Ladislav Kacanski, a Vojvodina man who lived in

25 Belgrade, which simply had to be closed down because nobody read it.

1 There was no interest for literature like that.

2 The only true movement for Greater Serbia stemmed from the

3 annexation crisis in 1908, when the Serbian National Defence Organisation

4 was formed, but after the crisis subsided, when the problem was resolved,

5 this organisation turned into a cultural movement. But a group of

6 officers came out of that organisation, about 500 of them, who created a

7 secret organisation, Unification or Death, or the Black Hand as it was

8 popularly called, and which advocated Greater Serbia ideas. They

9 published a magazine, Piemont, which was an allusion to Piemont's

10 movement in Italy. And at the time, the radicals were in power under

11 Nikola Pasic in Serbia, and they managed to suppress that magazine in

12 1911. However, it was a little more difficult to suppress or break up the

13 Black Hand, because 500 organised officers is not a small thing. And the

14 Serbian regent Aleksandar and Nikola Pasic, the Prime Minister, managed to

15 break up this organisation only during World War I, and the leader of this

16 organisation, Dragutin Dimitrijevic, Apis, and two of his collaborators,

17 paid with their lives for these subversive ideas, if you like.

18 Q. This is a very brief question about what you have just spoken

19 about. What were the aspirations of the Serbian people in the 19th

20 century?

21 A. Always towards one thing; unification and equality with other

22 peoples. If we're talking about Serbs from Croatia, nobody was thinking

23 about including them in a Serbian state, but they themselves wanted

24 equality. You know, in the entire political Serbian vocabulary during the

25 19th, the 20th, and even now the 21st century, the most often used word is

1 equality, equality with other peoples, equality in sovereign functions of

2 their state, in the exercise of such functions, cultural, spiritual

3 equality, and so on. This aspiration was always the same: Freedom,

4 independence. A free independent state and an equal position in those

5 countries where Serbs were going to live outside of their homeland.

6 Q. Does that mean, in fact, that the Serbian people in the 19th

7 century aspired to what it obtained at the Berlin Congress; is that right?

8 A. Yes, for the most part, but understandably it was sensitive to the

9 movements, and not only sensitive to the moods but it suffered a great

10 pressure from Serbs in Bosnia and Southern Hungary or today's Vojvodina,

11 in Montenegro; pressure from them, let's unite, let's become free and

12 unite. And the Serb state avoided this because it knew of the -- it was

13 aware of the troubles that that could lead to.

14 Q. Tell me now, please, the Yugoslav state, the first Yugoslavia from

15 1918 until 1941 and also the second Yugoslavia, from 1945 to 1991, was it

16 the sort of -- a sort of product of a Greater Serbian policy or was it

17 founded upon some different foundations and interests?

18 A. It was established and founded on the interests that I spoke

19 about; to have all Serbs rallied in one state. But as that was not

20 possible, in the Serbian state, the state of Serbia, and the aspirations

21 became very intensive in the 20th century. They became very marked. And

22 the prominent circles of Croatian politics, for example, and Serb politics

23 in Croatia and public life -- the public life of Vojvodina province,

24 generally speaking, and in other parts of the Habsburg monarchy, Serbia

25 based its wartime programme, formulated in the so-called Nis declaration

1 dating back to December 1914, said that its war objectives were defence,

2 the defence of Serbia, and the liberation of the other South Slav

3 brethren, because those brothers had asked for that.

4 During the reign of the Serbo-Croatian coalition, for example, in

5 Croatia, there were loud calls, although not always public ones, for this,

6 because Austro-Hungary had some processes and trials. But there were

7 numerous emigres, Croatian emigres, and so on in the countries of the

8 entente exerting pressure on Serbia, saying liberate us, free us, unite

9 us. And finally that programme was first of all set out by the Corfu

10 declaration in 1917, it was put down on paper, and then later with the

11 proclamation of the unification of all South Slav nations on the 1st of

12 December, 1918.

13 Now, there were different concepts within that project from which

14 we see later on --

15 Q. Just a moment, Professor. Let's take it step-by-step, because

16 this deserves a more profound explanation. You mentioned the 1914 Nis

17 declaration, the Corfu declaration in 1917. Could you tell us what this

18 was or, rather, were the wartime goals in the Nis declaration of Serbia,

19 what were they? Were they Greater Serbia goals or Yugoslav goals,

20 Yugoslav oriented goals? Tell us more about those documents, the Nis

21 declaration, the Corfu declaration. Were they Greater Serbian in nature

22 or were they Yugoslav in character?

23 A. They were expressly Yugoslav war goals. The Nis declaration was

24 formulated by the Serbian national Assembly, or Skupstina, of the Kingdom

25 of Serbia of the day, whereas the Corfu declaration was signed by the

1 representatives of the Serbian government and the representatives of the

2 so-called Yugoslav board or council which was set up by the political

3 emigres from the South Slav countries in Britain, France, and elsewhere,

4 and in Switzerland in actual fact, in Italy as well. And they went along

5 the lines of the unification of Yugoslav lands.

6 So these two documents were expressly Yugoslav in character, a

7 Yugoslav programme.

8 Q. Now, in this connection, with regard to what you have just been

9 saying, we have amongst our exhibits several documents which speak about

10 some important moments in the creation of Yugoslavia and the expression of

11 basic ideas outside Serbia with respect to what was going on. For

12 example, Frano Supilo's letter and correspondence with the British foreign

13 minister, Sir Edward Grey, for example, and that is exhibit -- we have

14 tendered that in the form of an exhibit. Could you explain to us first

15 who this was, what this was all about. Who was Frano Supilo, and what

16 ideas existed in his concept and what initiatives were taken?

17 A. Frano Supilo was a prominent Croatian politician, a member of the

18 Croatian-Serbian coalition set up in 1905. He was adverse to the

19 Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

20 Q. Where was it set up?

21 A. It was set up by the Zadar and Rijeka resolution at two meetings

22 held in 1905.

23 Q. So it was a Serbian and Croatian coalition of Serbs and Croats

24 living in Austro-Hungary; is that right?

25 A. Yes, in the Croatian banovina, or province, and in Slavonia and

1 Dalmatia.

2 Frano Supilo was one of the movers and creators of the Yugoslav

3 board, or council, but in his political concept he included the idea of

4 Ante Starcevic by which a Greater Croatia had to be established, which

5 would incorporate and revolve around Croatia and Zagreb as its centre on

6 the basis of Croatian historical rights, as they referred to it, and to

7 create a Greater Croatia, which would encompass Croatia, Slavonia,

8 Dalmatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Srem, and the Bay of Kotor. And this would be

9 one unit, one entity of a future Yugoslavia. The other entity would be

10 made up of Serbia, Old Serbia and Macedonia, so that these two entities,

11 these two units, would enter into a dual confederation similar to the one

12 that was the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

13 The Serbian government and Serbian public opinion did not accept

14 this for the very simple reason that that would, in a great Croatian

15 state, would lead to an imbalance between the Serb and Croatian population

16 to the detriment of the Serbs. The Croats would make up 38 per cent of

17 the population, whereas in the Serb half, the Serbs would make up 70 per

18 cent of the population. So outside the Serb lands, what you would have

19 would be half the Serbs; All the Serbs from Bosnia, all the Serbs from

20 Hungary or Vojvodina, today's Vojvodina, Slavonia, et cetera. And the

21 Serbs could not agree to this kind of dual federation. What they wanted

22 to agree to was a joint state in which they would all have national

23 religious, cultural, spiritual rights, equal rights, and with their

24 historical symbolism, that they would be on a footing of equality, the

25 Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes.

1 Q. And what about Frano Supilo's correspondence to Edward Grey or,

2 rather, to the Yugoslav board?

3 THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry, interpreter's correction: Letter to

4 Nikola Pasic.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, this was a letter to Nikola

6 Pasic presenting these ideas, and he distances himself from the other

7 members of the Yugoslav board in that respect. The number one man, who

8 was Ante Trumbic, he was a Dalmatian, a Dalmatian lawyer, in actual fact,

9 and prominent politician, and it -- because he wanted to see Yugoslav on a

10 centralist basis without this division into two entities, two units, the

11 Croatian entity and the Serbian entity or unit.

12 Q. And what about the letter written by Stjepan Radic to the English

13 government, British government?

14 A. That was in 1922, once Yugoslavia had already been created. So

15 Supilo was to be the starting point of a future Greater Croatian programme

16 developed by Stjepan Radic in turn. He was, once again, a prominent

17 politician, led the Croatian Republican Party and asked that within the

18 frameworks of a united Yugoslavia there should be an independent and

19 neutral, as he liked to call it, Croatia, a neutral Croatian state, in the

20 Yugoslav monarchy, a Croatian republic. That was absurd, an absurd

21 request, and it would incorporate all the territories mentioned, even more

22 than proposed by Supilo, Backa, and Banat to boot. And that was a

23 complete absurdity because that's where I come from. I come from those

24 parts and I know it, I've lived through it, because you just have three

25 villages who were -- who are in Romania now. They were just three

1 Catholic villages, and by that token they were supposed to belong to

2 Croatia. So these ideas were presented by Supilo in a lengthy interview

3 to the daily news.

4 Q. You mean Stjepan Radic, don't you?

5 A. Yes, Stjepan Radic in 1923, in an extensive interview which was to

6 astound the Serbian public and I can say even a large portion of the

7 Croatian public.

8 Q. Well, we tendered that interview by Stjepan Radic.

9 A. Yes, and it's very important for understanding this whole issue.

10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, I think you're dealing with some

11 documents which are included in tab 5, but I must say, speaking for

12 myself, that that's not a proper way of dealing with exhibits. You have

13 to deal with it specifically, each -- if you are going to tender it, you

14 have to show it and put the question on that. General comment is not a

15 proper way of dealing with the exhibits.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Kwon.

17 JUDGE KWON: Moreover, we don't have translations of those letters

18 and interviews at all. And if I can say one thing more, that at least I

19 would expect you to produce the index in English.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that this index did exist

21 and that several of the documents mentioned have been translated, because

22 the Professor attaches a large number of exhibits to his report, but since

23 they haven't been translated, I asked that seven points be translated at

24 least, for you to be able to follow in English; and they are the letter of

25 Frano Supilo to Sir Edward Grey, the letter of Supilo to Pasic, Stjepan

1 Radic's letter to the English government, Radic's interview mentioned a

2 moment ago by Professor Popov. It is the interview to the London Daily

3 News, and later on to the Tribune. And King Aleksandar's 1928 map. I

4 don't think that has to be translated. The Macek party programme and the

5 Cvjetokovic-Macek agreement. I don't know whether any of that has been

6 translated but I did truly believe that at least those seven points would

7 have been translated. It's not such a big job.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: We don't have translations. I think very few are

9 translated. Very few. But the point being made, Mr. Milosevic, is that

10 in leading the witness in examination-in-chief, when you're referring to

11 information that is in one of the documents, you must bring that to our

12 attention. Otherwise, it comes across as a private dialogue between the

13 witness and yourself, because we are not in a position to assess the

14 evidence.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, may I say something?

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: What is it you want to say, Professor?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I assume my word is some kind

18 of evidence because you have 45 years of scientific research behind it.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Of course we respect that, but if he's referring

20 to documents, then we need to see the documents.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They can be translated, of course.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Professor, that is not your mistake. It is my mistake if the

24 documents haven't been translated, because I expected that the portions we

25 highlighted were going to be translated.

1 And in tab 5, we have the book Yugoslav Federalism, Idea and

2 Reality. Is it a collection of documents, in fact.

3 A. Yes, that's right.

4 Q. And in that set of documents, that set of documents includes the

5 documents that you highlight in your report that you mentioned a moment

6 ago; is that right?

7 A. Yes, and ones that I attached.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: You're now referring to tab 5, Yugoslav

9 Federalism?

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Ideas and Reality. It is a

11 selection of documents, or collection of documents.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's not translated. So we encounter the same

13 problem that we had with the last witness. This requires a lot of

14 patience, Mr. Milosevic, dealing with evidence of this kind. The strategy

15 that we have been using is to have you identify a small portion, and we

16 put it on the ELMO so that it can be translated for our benefit.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Professor --

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: We're coming up to the time for the adjournment.

21 It's a quarter to two. We're going to take the adjournment now.

22 [Trial Chamber confers]

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: We are adjourned until 9.00 a.m., Wednesday of

24 next week.

25 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,

1 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 15th day of

2 December, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.

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