1 Wednesday, 19 January 2005

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Before you resume your examination-in-chief,

7 Mr. Milosevic, may I say that we have received translations into English

8 tab 27A and tab 31, both of which had been marked for identification

9 pending translation. So they can now be admitted. 28? 28 as well? Yes,

10 28 as well. 28 as well, yes. So they can now be admitted.

11 Please continue, Mr. Milosevic.

12 WITNESS: RATKO MARKOVIC [Resumed]

13 [Witness answered through interpreter]

14 Examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

15 Q. [No interpretation]

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Would you repeat, Mr. Milosevic. Please repeat

17 the question.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Professor Markovic, yesterday we ended with the topic of the

21 delegation which you headed which was established on the 10th of March,

22 1998, and whose mandate it was to discuss all political issues. Do you

23 remember that a long time before that delegation, in fact, full two years

24 before that time, another delegation had been established to negotiate

25 about the educational system? Do you remember that?

1 A. Yes, I do. I even remember the composition of that delegation.

2 Minister Ratomir Vico was in it, Goran Perkovic and Dobroslav Bjelotic.

3 The negotiations were organised through before Sant'Egidio and Monsignor

4 Paglia.

5 Q. And how long did that go on for, as far as you can remember?

6 A. Well, these negotiations lasted for quite awhile. I didn't follow

7 them closely, but I think that they finished before we started going to

8 Pristina. Before the delegation established by the government of Serbia

9 started going to Pristina.

10 Q. Very well. Please tell me, what was the result of the

11 negotiations led by you, negotiations with the representatives of all

12 ethnic communities? When I say "representatives of all ethnic

13 communities," I'm referring to the ethnic communities which are generally

14 mentioned in the documents emanating from those negotiations, namely

15 Albanians, Gorani, Romas, the Turks, Muslims, the Serb and Montenegrin

16 ethnic community, and so on. What was the result of these discussions?

17 A. The result of these discussions was an agreement on building

18 certain solutions into the framework which would respect the individuality

19 of all ethnic communities, and these solutions were to be built into the

20 law on local self-government. In addition to that, we also achieved a

21 political agreement on self-government in Kosovo and Metohija.

22 Q. Very well, Professor Markovic. Now, please take a look at tab 43.

23 Tab 43 is the agreement published on the 25th of November, 1998. In order

24 to save time, I don't want to put this question to Mr. Markovic, because

25 we're dealing just with an information. This is a photocopy of the Borba

1 daily. You can see in the upper corner it says "Borba" in English,

2 because this daily also published some pages in English. So what was

3 published at the time was published in English as well on the 25th of

4 November, 1998.

5 Professor Markovic, now, let us please take a look at this

6 agreement. First of all, in order to have a proper approach, I would like

7 to quote what was taken here as a starting point. And in the very

8 beginning it says that the signatories to the agreement, in view of the

9 complex national structure in Kosovo and Metohija and the necessity to

10 protect the development and existence of each individual national

11 community, and then it goes on to say other things that I will cover

12 quickly.

13 "[In English] From their commitment to the position that all

14 national communities, regardless of their numbers, are mutually equal and

15 that, therefore, in relations among them there can be no discrimination;

16 "Considering that persons belonging to all national communities

17 in Kosovo and Metohija should be enabled to exercise fully their ethnic,

18 cultural, linguistic and religious identity, in accordance with the

19 highest international standards and basic documents of United Nations,

20 Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Council of Europe,"

21 and then within brackets, "(the Charter of the United Nations, Universal

22 Declaration on Human Rights, Helsinki Final Act, Paris Charter, European

23 Convention on Human Rights, Council of Europe, Framework Convention on the

24 Rights of the Persons belonging to National Minorities), et cetera;

25 "Considering that it is necessary to set up appropriate democratic

1 institutions in order to create --" all those things.

2 "Determined in their position that broad self-governance within

3 national communities and in territory of Kosovo and Metohija is a

4 precondition for overcoming inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts;

5 "Bearing in mind the most positive experience and legal solutions

6 developed through long-standing common life;

7 Have agreed as follows."

8 [Interpretation] And then they go on to list the principles.

9 Professor Markovic, please quote and explain these principles

10 briefly.

11 A. The main idea of this entire agreement, which represented a

12 comprehensive political solution for Kosovo and Metohija, is that Kosovo

13 is a multi-ethnic area and that in Kosovo and Metohija, the individuality

14 of all national communities had to be expressed, that when it came to

15 ethnic essentials, there could be no overpowering or outvoting.

16 In addition to that, constitutional provisions had to be taken

17 into account, namely that Kosovo and Metohija was an autonomous province

18 within the framework of Serbia. These principles deal with the rights of

19 citizens and rights of members of ethnic communities. In addition to

20 that, they also specify the organs of Kosovo and Metohija; the Assembly,

21 the Executive Council, the administration, the ombudsman and so on, and

22 also determining the local self-government system or, rather, the basic

23 territorial unit, which was a municipality.

24 In addition to that, this document also deals with the

25 representation of the citizens of Kosovo and Metohija in the federal

1 bodies in view of the fact that Kosovo was within the Republic of Serbia.

2 Moreover, their provisions about the courts of national communities and

3 local police, there are some provisions about funding, and

4 confidence-building measures as well as implementation of this agreement

5 and additions and changes of this agreement.

6 I wouldn't go into details because you have the agreement before

7 you. It would take me quite some time to cover the details, which are

8 important. What is more important, however, is that this agreement is a

9 comprehensive political, therefore political solution, using political and

10 democratic means to resolve the situation in Kosovo and Metohija.

11 This agreement was concluded on the 20th of November, 1998, as you

12 can see in the text itself. It was concluded between the representatives

13 of the government of Serbia and representatives of all national

14 communities in Kosovo and Metohija, and these representatives signed the

15 agreement, whereas on behalf of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia the

16 agreement was signed by the then Prime Minister Vladan Kutlesic. After

17 that, in Pristina, on the 25th of November, a declaration was adopted in

18 support of this agreement.

19 Q. Professor Markovic, we have that declaration in tab 44, but before

20 we turn to tab 44 --

21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, it is not that I doubt the

22 authenticity of this document. I wonder whether you are in a position to

23 explain me why the Roman paragraph IV follows paragraph I, while the

24 paragraph II and III appears on the next page.

25 I think maybe Mr. Kay can --

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1 MR. KAY: I'm sorry. It's a newspaper with columns and it's been

2 photocopied that particular way.

3 JUDGE KWON: I can understand that.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Kwon, if you put page 1 above

5 page 2, you will see the entire newspaper page, which has three columns.

6 So in the left column you have the principles, and then you have Roman II

7 and III, and then the middle column has Roman IV and V and so on.

8 JUDGE KWON: It's clear now. Thank you.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is what the agreement looked as

10 it was printed in the Borba daily.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Professor Markovic is now

12 showing you the original from which we made the photocopy. This is the

13 Borba daily published on the 25th of November, 1998.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Professor Markovic, was the essence of the solution adopted in

16 practical terms to have this principle of the equality of ethnic

17 communities complied with consistently, and is it reflected under Roman IV

18 where it says the organs of Kosovo and Metohija? I would like you to

19 explain this, because the Assembly, as the highest body, it is the

20 parliament of the province, is defined very specifically here.

21 Item 1: "The Assembly shall be elected directly. The Assembly

22 shall have two Chambers: [In English] Chamber of Citizens and Chamber of

23 National Communities.

24 "Members of the Chamber of Citizens shall be elected directly in

25 line with the principle one citizen - one vote.

1 "Members of Chamber of National Communities shall be elected

2 democratically, within each national community. Each national community

3 shall have a delegation with equal number of members in the Chamber."

4 [Interpretation] Was that the essence of this solution; on the one

5 hand to secure full expression of democratic principles within the Chamber

6 of citizens where they worked on the basis of one citizen, one vote

7 principle, and where the will of citizens was expressed directly, and to

8 have, on the other hand, the Chamber of national communities where they

9 had delegations --

10 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... and it seems to me

11 that the question, which is very long, is likely to attract a simple yes,

12 no, answer and it's not an interpretation by the witness of what the

13 agreement amounts to.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Reformulate the question in a shorter manner,

15 Mr. Milosevic.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Professor Markovic, please explain this principle to us, and

18 please give your comments concerning this solution. Why was this position

19 taken? Why was this solution adopted? Were there any other options?

20 A. The concept of this agreement, now that we're dealing with the

21 Assembly and the organisational structure of the autonomous province, to

22 have this done combining the principle of territorial self-governance and

23 national self-governance, or the principle of ethnic sovereignty. These

24 two principles combined express the will of the citizens of Kosovo and

25 Metohija. In Kosovo and Metohija, we didn't have just one nation, the

1 nation of Kosovo and Metohija. No. That was a multi-ethnic community

2 containing several, numerous ethnic communities. And the concept of this

3 agreement, of this document, was to take the approach whereby --

4 concerning the issues of vital interests. An ethnic community could not

5 have been outvoted. The issues that were of vital importance to each and

6 every ethnic community had to be dealt in such a way as to not outvote

7 that ethnic community. So that was the main concept.

8 Another principle that was used was to treat Kosovo as area where

9 the citizens had an equal right to vote, meaning to -- to avoid a

10 situation where the majority would dominate the other ethnic community,

11 where we would avoid the possibility of outvoting other ethnic

12 communities.

13 Q. In tab 44, we have a declaration on support to the agreement,

14 which was published just five days later, this document in support. Would

15 you comment on this briefly.

16 A. This declaration was signed in Pristina, and it represents an

17 excerpt of the main ideas from the previous agreement on political

18 framework of self-government in Kosovo and Metohija. And the signatories

19 to this declaration take it upon themselves to seek political solution to

20 Kosovo and Metohija based on those principles. On behalf of the Federal

21 Republic of Yugoslavia, this declaration was signed by Vladan Kutlesic as

22 the Deputy Prime Minister of the federal government. On behalf of the

23 Kosovo Democratic Initiative, it was signed by Faik Jashari. It was also

24 signed by Sokol Qusha, Ljuban Koka, Zejnelabidin Kurejs, Qerim Abazi,

25 Refik Senadovic, and myself as the head of the delegation of the Republic

1 of Serbia.

2 Briefly, this declaration is referred to as the Pristina

3 Declaration. This was, therefore, a solemn expression of support to the

4 political agreement concluded on the 20th of November, and an expression

5 of consent to seek a political solution in Kosovo and Metohija based on

6 the principles expressed in the agreement in very global terms.

7 Kosovo never established territorial autonomy on the basis of the

8 1990 constitution for the simple reason that the Albanians, starting from

9 that year, boycotted all elections in Kosovo and Metohija. They believed

10 that they had their own constitution, the Kacanik constitution, and that

11 all life in Kosovo and Metohija had to develop in accordance with their

12 constitution, not in accordance with the constitution of the Republic of

13 Serbia.

14 Q. We commented upon that Kacanik constitution yesterday. I think

15 that its main characteristic is that it treated Kosovo as a uni-ethnic or

16 a monoethnic environment. Is that right or would you like to add

17 something to that?

18 A. In the preamble of that constitution, we can see that that

19 document, that constitution, was adopted by Albanians. Nowhere does the

20 document refer to "the citizens of Kosovo" or "the people of Kosovo." No.

21 It is -- it simply refers to Albanians. And we have a copy of that

22 Kacanik constitution here and its preamble.

23 As I've said earlier, some Albanians equate Kosovo and Metohija

24 with the Albanian issue. They think that Kosovo and Metohija is an

25 Albanian issue.

1 Q. And what this declaration says and what the agreement says, both

2 documents, that is to say tabs 44 and 45, do -- does the law on local

3 self-government, which is in tab 13, contain more or less the same things

4 that tabs 44 and 45 do?

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Gentlemen, you have the translation

6 into English.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The government of Serbia --

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. You don't have to go into the history of it. I'm just asking you

10 whether this was the law of Serbia on local self-government and whether

11 these main principles are contained in it, those that pertain to

12 multi-ethnic communities, municipalities, and so on.

13 A. Yes. From Articles 104 to 119. And then in the subsequent

14 articles, local self-government in these municipalities is dealt with.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: I observe that 113 is not translated.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do have a translation here, and it

17 should be in the tab, and it's your translation too. Maybe the paper fell

18 out of your binder.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: I understand it's there, but it's not in mine.

20 JUDGE KWON: And you referred to tab 44 and 45. Is it not a

21 mistake? 43 and 44?

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 43 and 44, actually. And then 13.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Professor Markovic, can you clarify for me, what is

24 the Kosovo Democratic Initiative?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's a political party that

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1 existed in Kosovo and Metohija. I don't know whether it still exists, but

2 it is a minority party. It never became a parliamentary party in Kosovo

3 and Metohija. It was represented by Mr. Faik Jashari, who was an ethnic

4 Albanian, whereas the Albanian Reform and Democratic Party was also

5 represented by an Albanian, Mr. Sokol Qusha.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: And so far as the Kosovo Albanians in general are

7 concerned, were they not represented in the completion of the agreement or

8 in the declaration itself?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But they were. They were. The two

10 I mentioned took part in the elaboration of the agreement, and they signed

11 the declaration. I have their manuscript here. I have their signatures

12 here on this declaration.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Can they be said to be representing Kosovo

14 Albanians in general, or is it -- were they representing a limited number

15 of Kosovo Albanians?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think only the latter, that they

17 represented a limited number of Kosovo Albanians, because the majority had

18 a different opinion, a different political view, that is.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Professor.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Jashari is a fairly common name in Kosovo?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, just like my surname, Markovic,

22 among the Serbs, as you must have noticed. There are a lot of Markovics,

23 yes.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As for tabs 43 and 44 and tab 13,

25 can we have them admitted into evidence?

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes, yes.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Professor Markovic, are you aware of anything -- or, rather,

4 Mr. Bonomy mentioned a few moments ago the political parties of the

5 Albanians, those who speak for the majority of the Albanians. Are you

6 aware of any principled objections by those who disagreed with this

7 agreement? Did they actually place any such objections to this agreement?

8 A. A principled objection was that a political solution for Kosovo

9 and Metohija cannot be sought in negotiations between the government of

10 the Republic of Serbia and the representatives of Albanian political

11 parties. They simplified the ethnic pattern of Kosovo and Metohija, and

12 they reduced this ethnic multitude to a simple Albanian majority. And

13 they said that the international community had to participate in the quest

14 for a solution. So that was their objection of principle; that it was the

15 international community that had to mediate in seeking a solution for

16 Kosovo and Metohija for a simple reason, that they did not recognise the

17 state, the Republic of Serbia, as a state within which they were. They

18 could not reconcile themselves to the fact that they were within Serbia.

19 They thought that they were a corpus separatum, that they were something

20 separate from Serbia and that in negotiations between these two entities,

21 which is their idea of what was going on, the international community had

22 to mediate.

23 Q. You mentioned -- rather, you met at the headquarters of Rugova's

24 party, which is also where the headquarters of the Writers Association is,

25 you met with Rugova and his co-workers?

1 A. Yes, only once.

2 Q. As for the positions of the two parties, what was actually

3 discussed then and when did that happen?

4 A. The 22nd of May, 1998. It was a Friday. In the building of the

5 Association of Writers of Kosovo. A meeting was held between the

6 delegation of the government of Republic of Serbia, and this time the

7 representatives of the majority Albanian parties.

8 In this discussion, the need to seek a political solution was

9 referred to in very general terms, as well as the need to stop the armed

10 conflict. Nothing tangible was agreed upon at that meeting. Basically,

11 the meeting took place, but no conclusions were reached at it.

12 At the same time, this was the only meeting of its kind that was

13 held. And I think that it was held primarily thanks to the mediation of

14 Mr. Christopher Hill, who at that time was the US ambassador to the

15 Republic of Macedonia.

16 Q. No agreement was reached then?

17 A. No agreement. And the discussion itself was not concrete at all.

18 It was in very general terms. The need to find a political solution was

19 referred to, and the need to stop the armed conflict as well.

20 Q. Now let's move on to your efforts within the delegation in

21 Rambouillet. Just tell me, please, in which capacity were you in

22 Rambouillet, and when were you in Rambouillet?

23 A. I was in Rambouillet in the capacity of leader of the state

24 delegation. The so-called alleged negotiations in Rambouillet were

25 supposed to take place from the 6th of February onwards, and then the

1 deadlines were extended all the time, and formally they went on until the

2 23rd of February, until 3.00 p.m.

3 Q. All right, Professor Markovic. Who was on the state delegation

4 that you headed? I wish to draw your attention to tab 7. That's a

5 photocopy of the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, a very brief

6 decision. It's the decision on the appointment of the government

7 delegation for the talks in France, adopted by the government of the

8 Republic of Serbia, and it was published in the Official Gazette. The

9 leader of the delegation was Professor Dr. Ratko Markovic and the members

10 of the delegation were Professor Dr. Vladan Kutlesic, Professor Dr.

11 Vladimir Stambuk, Gruljbehar Sabovic, Refik Senadovic, Zejnelabidin

12 Kurejs, Ibro Vait, Faik Jashari, Sokol Qusha, Ljuan Koka, and Qerim Abazi.

13 Please, is that the full composition of the state delegation?

14 A. That was the full composition of the state delegation. In

15 addition to the political establishment that was represented on the

16 delegation, that is to say officeholders in the federal government and in

17 the Serbian government, all the ethnic communities were supposed to be

18 represented, too, and indeed the ethnic Albanians were represented, and

19 the Turks. That is to say Zejnelabidin Kurejs and Bruljbehar Sabovic,

20 Refik Senadovic was a representative of the Muslims, the Roma were

21 represented, too. Ljuan Koka was a representative of the Roma. And also

22 the Ashkali, namely the Egyptians, were represented. Qerim Abazi was a

23 representative of the Egyptians community, and of course the Serbs and

24 Montenegrins, represented by Vojislav Zivkovic.

25 It was believed that if a true discussion were to take place in

1 respect of Kosovo and Metohija, then the representatives of all ethnic

2 communities would have to take part in them, all of those who are vitally

3 interested in finding a solution to Kosovo and Metohija, not only

4 representatives of the top political establishment in Serbia and in

5 Yugoslavia. That was the underlying idea, which obviously did not meet

6 with much understanding, because what was referred to all the time was the

7 general low level of the delegation. However, that was the right level.

8 And had real negotiations had taken place in Rambouillet, then the

9 representatives of all these ethnic communities would have been invaluable

10 interlocutors, because these are people who had an authentic knowledge of

11 all the problems in Kosovo and Metohija, having spent their entire lives

12 there.

13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Markovic, your position at that time was

14 vice-premier; is that right?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. I've already said at

16 that time I was one of the five Deputy Prime Ministers of the Republic of

17 Serbia, as I was in charge of legislation and the legal system.

18 JUDGE KWON: What position did Mr. Nikola Sainovic hold at that

19 time, who was apparently one of the members.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Nikola Sainovic at that time was

21 the Deputy Prime Minister of the federal government, just like Mr. Vladan

22 Kutlesic. He was also a Deputy Prime Minister in the federal government.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. I want to be very specific on this point, as Mr. Kwon was a few

25 moments ago. So the delegation was headed by the Deputy Prime Minister of

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1 the Republic of Serbia, and then there were two Deputy Prime Ministers on

2 the delegation itself. Then the representatives of these parties of the

3 ethnic communities, that is to say the most prominent people in these

4 ethnic communities at that point in time.

5 As far as the Albanian community is concerned, these people were

6 leaders of Albanian parties but not of the leading Albanian parties. How

7 is it possible, then, that someone can qualify that as a low-level

8 delegation? How come you mentioned that? Whose assessment was that?

9 A. Well, that was the assessment that could be found in the media and

10 that was even bandied about in our own public opinion. I think that this

11 was an elitist approach to the matter, and it came from people who declare

12 themselves as supporters of a European orientation. They were actually

13 putting down the people on this delegation and saying that they were not

14 very prominent political personalities, but they were ordinary people who

15 were not public personalities.

16 Q. Wait a minute, Professor Markovic. Let me express my disagreement

17 with this explanation of yours by putting a question to you. What does

18 this mean? These people who represent the Roma or the Gorani or whoever,

19 are these people who do figure prominently in their own ethnic communities

20 as political leaders or did you just pick them off the street?

21 A. These were people who figured very prominently within their own

22 ethnic communities, but obviously people thought that only the top

23 echelons of government should be sent to negotiate.

24 MR. NICE: Before we pass through this part of the transcript, and

25 I don't want to come back and be nitpicking about details, the formulation

1 of the accused's question suggested it was going to be improper because he

2 said, "Let me express disagreement with this explanation of yours." And

3 we then see that the witness has appeared to do an about face from saying

4 that they weren't prominent political personalities, they were ordinary

5 people who were not public personalities, to following the accused's

6 leading question lead and saying these were people who figured prominently

7 within their own ethnic communities. Yes. So that I mean not only was

8 the question improper, and the accused must have known it as he tried to

9 drive the witness to give the answer he wanted, but we see exactly why

10 this kind of leading question in examination-in-chief is valueless,

11 because it produces material that the Chamber can hardly weigh. The

12 witness seems to have given two entirely contrary answers, the second

13 because he was encouraged to do so by the accused.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Nice, was the first answer not expressing the

15 opinions the witness was aware of having heard from the media and indeed

16 from people in Serbia rather than his own view?

17 MR. NICE: Well, the first answer that I take it is that these

18 people represent the Roma or Gorani or whoever -- I beg your pardon, above

19 that. "They were not very prominent political persons, they were ordinary

20 people who were not public personalities." And the accused then starts a

21 question, "Let me express disagreement with this explanation of yours by

22 putting a question to you," and then we get a different answer.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I think the accused has to have some

24 understanding. I mean, he's not a trained lawyer, and the niceties of

25 leading questions apparently escape him from time to time.

1 I allowed this question, because I think it is -- it's fair. What

2 I didn't like about it was that he appeared to be commenting on the

3 evidence. It appeared to be more a comment than a question.

4 MR. NICE: As Your Honour pleases.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you must avoid asking leading

6 questions. Leading questions come when you -- when you have -- let me

7 finish. Leading questions come when you -- you have an introduction to

8 the question which is combative in nature. "Let me express my

9 disagreement," or, "Isn't it clear that so-and-so." So you must try and

10 avoid leading questions, because when you ask a leading question, it

11 really means you have put the answer in the mouth of the witness, and the

12 evidence is coming from you and you're not a witness. So continue.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, the explanation that

14 you did not understand and that I did understand, the one provided by

15 Professor Markovic about the criticism of this delegation, that it was not

16 at a sufficiently high level is - how shall I put this? - relative in

17 terms of the most prominent people in Yugoslavia. He did not talk about

18 the members of the delegation as people who were unknown in their own

19 communities. Since this relative relationship was not clear, I wanted to

20 have it clarified. It is easy to establish this even without Professor

21 Markovic, that these people were not selected just at random. These were

22 people who held appropriate positions in their own ethnic communities.

23 These were the most respected people in their own ethnic communities, and

24 that was one of the advantages of this delegation.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: I understand the distinction, yes. Proceed.

1 JUDGE KWON: It is -- may I add this to that: It is the way or

2 manner you put it to Mr. Markovic. You can clarify those parts which is

3 not clear, but it is not proper for you to express your disagreement with

4 what the witness had said. Please go on.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Kwon.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I be allowed to say something,

7 Your Honours, and explain? May I?

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Is it on this point?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very briefly. Very briefly.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I put forward the positions taken by

12 the information media, not my own views. And it is the information media

13 that commented on the delegation in that way. They said it was a

14 low-level delegation. But that wasn't my own opinion. I wasn't

15 presenting my own views.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. And who made up the Albanian delegation? Let's establish that

19 first and see the balance of forces. We have in tab 8 a technical review,

20 actually, to see who was on what floor and in what room and office, but we

21 can see all the names. They're all there. So who made up the Albanian

22 delegation, then?

23 A. We never actually received a list of the state -- of the members

24 of the delegation of the Kosmet Albanians. And you can see the list from

25 where whom was put up at the Rambouillet Chateau, and we can see that on

1 the 3rd floor, for example, the 3rd floor was where the Albanian

2 delegation was accommodated, and they numbered 17 members, you can see

3 from this list. It begins with Rexhep Qosja and ends with Ibrahim Rugova.

4 And from this list you can see that all 17 members were in fact Albanians.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I assume that you can admit into

6 evidence tabs 7 and 8 as exhibits; is that right?

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: What was the total membership of the delegation?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In our delegation, you mean the

9 delegation from the government of Serbia?

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the delegation of the Republic of

12 Serbia, we had 13 members; I as the head of the delegation and 12

13 delegation members.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: And then 19 from Kosovo, Albanians?

15 JUDGE BONOMY: There's no number 13 so it looks like 18.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right. There's no number 13.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Triskaidekaphobia.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Eighteen members, yes, I'm sorry, it

19 is in fact 18 members.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: I said Triskaidekaphobia, a fear of the number

21 13.

22 Continue, Mr. Milosevic. Yes, we admit that document. Did we

23 admit 43 and 44? Registrar? Yes.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I assume, Mr. Robinson, that you

25 have admitted tab 13 as well, which is the translation.

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1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. And then we have 7 and 8

3 here. Thank you.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. How did you -- well, and others too, the other participants in

6 Rambouillet, view the fact that the delegation was monoethnic or

7 uni-ethnic? What did this look like? What was this like? You had state

8 delegations on one hand, Albanians, Montenegrins, Roma, Muslims, et

9 cetera, all of them, Turks, on the one side, and on the other you had a

10 delegation which was monoethnic. So how did you look upon this and how

11 did others view this, for that matter?

12 A. Well, I know how we viewed the matter. That fact disclosed

13 intention, in actual fact, the intentions of the Kosovo Albanians, because

14 a make-up of that kind, a delegation made up Kosmet Albanians preempted

15 the solution. We knew which solution they would strive for, having

16 brought a delegation of that composition to Rambouillet to represent

17 Kosovo and Metohija; that is to say exclusively monoethnic.

18 Q. Otherwise, when we're talking about the arrivals in Rambouillet,

19 in tab 50 we have an annex. It is the statement by the Contact Group

20 issued in London on the 29th of January, 1999, in actual fact. I'm not

21 going to quote the whole document, you have it in the files. So this is

22 the annex. Did the Contact Group later on assume a position with respect

23 to the representatives of other communities? And I am going to quote

24 something here. "[In English]... Contact Group: Insisted that the

25 parties accept that the basis for a fair settlement must include the

1 principles set out by the Contact Group." [Interpretation] That's in

2 3(a).

3 "[In English] Consider that the proposals drafted by the

4 negotiators contained the elements for a substantial autonomy for Kosovo

5 and asked the negotiators to refine them further to serve as the framework

6 for agreement between the parties.

7 "Recognised that the work done by the negotiators had identified

8 a limited number of points that required final negotiation between the

9 parties.

10 "Agreed to summon representatives from the Federal Yugoslav and

11 Serbian governments and representatives of the Kosovo Albanians to

12 Rambouillet by 6th of February, under the co-chairmanship of Hubert

13 Vedrine and Robin Cook, to begin negotiations with the direct involvement

14 of the Contact Group. Contact Group recognised the legitimate rights of

15 other communities within Kosovo. In the context of these negotiations, it

16 will work to ensure that their interests are fully reflected in a

17 settlement."

18 [Interpretation] Therefore this is the position taken by the

19 Contact Group on the basis of which Rambouillet was convened formally in

20 the first place. Is that correct, Professor?

21 A. Yes, it was on the basis of that appeal launched by the Contact

22 Group on the 29th of January, 1999. The national Assembly held a session

23 at which it supported the position that the Republic of Serbia should be

24 one of the participants at the negotiations at Rambouillet and where it

25 determined the conclusions binding the delegation of the Republic of

1 Serbia.

2 Q. Well, in that context and the approach to Rambouillet, we see a

3 topic that we discussed a moment ago, and you testified about it a moment

4 ago. The Contact Group - let me repeat this part of the quotation -

5 recognises the legitimate right of other communities within Kosovo.

6 A. Well, that is a declaration, a statement made by the Contact

7 Group, and that's what it says, that in the context of the negotiations,

8 the interests of all national communities will be assured. However, I

9 don't know how they could have been assured without the presence of the

10 representatives of the national communities themselves within the

11 delegation that was supposed to represent Kosovo, so that we in fact, that

12 is to say the delegation that signed the agreement as the Kosovo

13 delegation, we will see we actually had a delegation of the Kosmet

14 Albanians, not a delegation of Kosovo but a delegation of the Kosovo

15 Albanians. And when the delegation signed the agreement in Rambouillet,

16 it signed it for Kosovo and not as the Kosmet Albanians, which they were.

17 So these different ethnic communities were represented only in the

18 state delegation, that is to say the delegation of the government of

19 Serbia.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Professor, that seems to be the way in which the

21 Contact Group envisaged the discussions would take place, because they

22 refer to summoning representatives from the federal Yugoslav and Serbian

23 governments, on the one hand, and representatives of the Kosovo Albanians

24 on the other hand.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is correct. However, it says

1 that the Contact Group -- this is the sentence which was read out a moment

2 ago: "... recognised the legitimate rights of other communities within

3 Kosovo." And that is under (d). So it is point 3, paragraph (d), the

4 second sentence there. "The Contact Group recognised the legitimate

5 rights of other communities within Kosovo," which means that the Contact

6 Group is fully conscious of the fact that you don't have only the Serbs

7 and Albanians living in Kosovo but other national communities there too.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Professor Markovic, were there any members of the terrorist

10 organisation the KLA within the Albanian delegation?

11 A. Yes, there were. And moreover, the head of the Albanian

12 delegation was a member of the KLA, and his name was Hasim Thaci.

13 Q. And you in the state delegation, how did you feel that the head of

14 the -- that the KLA member was head of the delegation in view of the state

15 -- Security Council Resolution on terrorism and its condemnation of

16 terrorism? How did you view that? How did you experience that?

17 A. We experienced this as a provocation because the Albanian

18 delegation did have political figures. They were Mr. Ibrahim Rugova, men

19 like that, Mr. Rexhep Qosja, for example, and many others. So if

20 political talks were supposed to be held, then the talks should have been

21 conducted between politicians, people of politics, and not to have at the

22 head of a delegation - and that's the internal affair of that delegation -

23 to have a member of an organisation which has been assessed as a terrorist

24 organisation.

25 However, so that it didn't appear that we had left the

1 negotiations and made it impossible for the negotiations to go ahead, we

2 agreed, despite the fact that the delegation of Kosmet Albanians was led

3 by Hasim Thaci himself as the head of the KLA, we did agree to go ahead

4 and participate, all despite the protests we voiced to the negotiators

5 through the mediators.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Who had made the assessment that the KLA was a

7 terrorist organisation? This in reference to your statement that that was

8 the internal affair of that delegation, to have a member of an

9 organisation which has been assessed as a terrorist organisation?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't quote the document exactly

11 just now and the people who did that. However, I think it is common

12 knowledge, or sufficiently common knowledge that the KLA used the method

13 of terror, of intimidation against the population in Kosovo and Metohija,

14 and that we were indeed dealing with an organisation which had all the

15 elements of a terrorist organisation.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Professor.

17 Mr. Milosevic.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. How were the negotiations in Rambouillet envisaged to take place?

20 A. The negotiations in Rambouillet had no plan to guide them. We

21 insisted that an agenda be set up for the work and the rules of procedure

22 for the Rambouillet negotiations. However, that was not accepted, so it

23 went in a chaotic fashion. Everybody did what they wanted to. We didn't

24 know when meetings would be held, who would negotiate with whom.

25 Everything was improvised. And the most important thing was that the

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1 negotiations never actually took place.

2 Q. Tell me, please, Mr. Markovic, did you have direct meetings with

3 members of the Albanian delegation? And everybody assumed that those were

4 the people you were supposed to negotiate with.

5 A. Never. Never. We never had direct contacts between the

6 representatives of the state delegation and representatives of the Kosovo

7 Albanians. Just sporadic meetings in the corridors but no official,

8 formal meeting ever took place. So that this was a sort of

9 self-negotiation process. That is to say the mediators, Mr. Hill,

10 Petritsch, and Mayorski, would bring in parts of the agreement and hand

11 them round to the delegation to consider and deliberate. There was never

12 any talks or negotiations with the other side, with the opposite side that

13 we were supposed to be negotiating with. There was always talks just with

14 the mediators.

15 Q. All right. And who were the co-presidents of the conference and

16 what was their role and importance?

17 A. The vice -- or rather, co-presidents were the foreign ministers of

18 France and Great Britain, Mr. Vedrine and Cook, Mr. Cook. Ah, what was

19 their role? Well, I'm not aware of that, I really don't know. Their

20 presence could not be felt in any way at Rambouillet except for us having

21 read their press statements, statements for the press.

22 Q. How were they able to make those statements for the press if they

23 had no meetings with you, as co-presidents of the conference? As

24 co-presidents did they convene the conference in the first place?

25 A. Well, the conference was convened under the auspices of the

1 Contact Group as the organisers, and the co-chairmen were the foreign

2 ministers, as I've already said, of those two countries, of Britain and

3 France. There were no rules as to the proceedings of the conference in

4 Rambouillet. So we didn't even have stipulated the role of the

5 co-presiding people as head of the delegation. I don't know what their

6 role was. I can only judge by what the term "co-president" meant, or

7 "co-chairman" meant. Now, what their duties were, what their rights

8 were, what their authority and power encompassed, I really don't know.

9 Q. Did they convene a meeting at -- which they co-chaired?

10 A. We didn't attend a meeting like that except at the very beginning

11 of the conference. That is to say on the 6th of February, in the evening,

12 when there was a ceremonial opening of the conference, an official

13 opening, and the co-chairmen were there and the president of the Republic

14 of France held a brief speech, and the co-chairmen delivered brief

15 speeches, we had no further meetings after that.

16 Q. So this ceremony, the official opening ceremony and Chirac's

17 speech and the speeches of the co-chairmen was the end of all the

18 meetings? None after that?

19 A. After that there were alleged negotiations between the three

20 mediators and the delegation, and probably the same was followed up with

21 the Kosmet Albanian delegation. I don't know about that, I don't know how

22 they worked with them, but I can say quite definitely that there was never

23 a direct contact between the two delegations themselves which were

24 supposed to negotiate.

25 Q. And who made up the negotiating three-party team? What was their

1 role?

2 A. The negotiating trio was made up of Mr. Christopher Hill, Wolfgang

3 Petritsch, and Boris Mayorski, and their role was what the name says, to

4 mediate, to be mediators and not to be a party to the negotiations. And

5 it turned out that they were a party in the negotiations, because the two

6 other parties that were supposed to negotiate never met, never sat down to

7 the negotiating table. And they negotiated themselves independently with

8 one side and with the other side.

9 Q. Tell me now, please, and at the conference, what position did

10 Madeleine Albright occupy? In what capacity was she there as?

11 A. Madeleine Albright was present there as the US Secretary of State.

12 Q. And what was her role?

13 A. I believe that she was the grey eminence at the conference in

14 Rambouillet. She was the architect of the agreement. She wrote the

15 screenplay, she directed the whole conference. So everything went as

16 directed by Madeleine Albright. She was the central figure at

17 Rambouillet.

18 Q. What about your delegation, the delegation that you headed, the

19 delegation that was under your authority? Did your delegation meet with

20 Madeleine Albright?

21 A. We had one meeting with Madeleine Albright, on the 14th of

22 February, 1999, and that meeting was a mixture of, if I may call it,

23 sentimental pathos and despotic attitude. Mrs. Albright first spoke about

24 her childhood, which she had spent in Serbia at the time when Serbia was a

25 kingdom. Then she spoke about the fact that her father loved the Serbs

1 and that he lulled her to sleep when she was a child by singing Serbian

2 lullabies, and that her father always used to say that had he not been

3 what he was, he would have preferred to be a Serb. And then she would

4 change the tone suddenly and say that if we failed to sign the Rambouillet

5 agreement, we would be deprived of Kosovo, that NATO forces would bomb

6 Serbia, that the territory of the Republic of Serbia would be reduced; and

7 then on the other hand, if we were to sign the agreement, then Kosovo

8 would remain within the composition of Serbia, that the KLA would be

9 disarmed, that the Serbian economy would be integrated into the world

10 economy, that there would be an economic initiative within Serbia. And

11 then she used a typically female phrase, saying that the Serb spirit would

12 flourish.

13 I took notes during that meeting, therefore I'm authentically

14 bringing you the words that she uttered there.

15 Q. And what was the role of the Contact Group?

16 A. The Contact Group was an organiser, and if I can say so, the

17 Contact Group guided the whole enterprise. Parts of the agreement that

18 were given to the delegations had gone through the hands of the Contact

19 Group and were verified by the Contact Group. So if I can call the

20 Contact Group that way, it was actually spiritus novus of the negotiations

21 in Rambouillet.

22 Q. What was the starting point for the negotiations? What material

23 was used as a foundation for negotiations, and who authored it?

24 A. We received that material in bits and pieces. We never received

25 it all at the same time.

1 Q. No. I'm now referring to Contact Group, since the Contact Group

2 had a very important role. I'm now not discussing the course of the

3 conference itself. I'm referring to the role of the Contact Group, and

4 you said that the Contact Group was the initiator.

5 A. Yes, that's right. On the 29th of January, at a meeting in

6 London, the Contact Group demanded that the two delegations meet, and it

7 established the principle based upon which a political solution had to be

8 sought.

9 Q. Very well. So these were the principles established by the

10 Contact Group, and these principles were used as a basis for the

11 Rambouillet agreement; is that right?

12 A. Yes. These principles precisely were defined as non-negotiable

13 terms. They were the axioms that we had to start from.

14 Q. Yes, the starting point and the principles that could not be

15 changed. Now, please take a look at tab 47.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, just a second.

17 Professor, under whose auspices was Rambouillet held, the

18 Rambouillet conference?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Under the auspices of the Contact

20 Group. The Contact Group ordered, in a meeting on the 29th of January in

21 London, that a conference be held, and precisely at the request of the

22 Contact Group we in Serbia or, rather, the Assembly held a session,

23 accepted the invitation and established the principles that were to guide

24 the delegation of Serbia at the conference.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Earlier in answer to Mr. Milosevic, you said that

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1 there were no negotiations. What do you mean by that?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You see, negotiations necessarily

3 mean two sides which are negotiating. In this case there was no other

4 side. We never in fact negotiated with the other side with which we were

5 supposed to conclude an agreement. We only talked to the mediators,

6 Mr. Hill, Mr. Petritsch and Mr. Mayorski. We never talked to the other

7 side, because "negotiating" implies that there must be two sides.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Why was that? Is it that it wasn't organised in

9 a way that you could talk with the other side?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The mediators explained to us that

11 the Albanian side refused to negotiate. It even refused to negotiate at

12 the level of the meeting of experts. Because there were two types of

13 meetings, at the political level and expert level, and the Albanian

14 delegation refused to meet at the level of experts with the Republic of

15 Serbia. On several occasions, even in writing, I tried to secure a

16 meeting with the Albanian side, and Mr. Petritsch and Mr. Mayorski

17 explained to us that the delegation of Albania did not wish to have direct

18 contact with the delegation of the Republic of Serbia.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Therefore, you went to Rambouillet to negotiate about Kosovo.

22 There were never, in fact, any negotiations. Is that what you're saying?

23 A. Precisely so. There were, in fact, never any negotiations.

24 Q. And you never negotiated about anything with the other side?

25 A. Absolutely never. Not in Rambouillet, and not even in Paris.

1 Q. And every initiative that you showed to negotiate with the other

2 side was refused by the other side?

3 A. Yes, that's right. There's even written evidence to that effect.

4 As I told you, I asked on several occasions to be granted an occasion to

5 meet with them and was always denied that.

6 Q. Very well, Professor Markovic. Let us take a look at tab 47,

7 which are the Contact Group Non-negotiable Principles Basic Elements,

8 dated 29th of January, 1999.

9 The document goes on to list general elements, and then it says

10 that General Elements contained the necessity of immediate end to violence

11 in respect to a cease-fire; peaceful solution through dialogue; interim

12 agreement: a mechanism for a final settlement after an interim period of

13 three years; no unilateral change of interim status; territorial integrity

14 of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its neighbours. Therefore, that

15 was non-negotiable as well. Protection of the rights of members of all

16 national communities (preservation of identity, language and education,

17 special protection for the religious institutions); free and fair

18 elections in Kosovo (municipal and Kosovo-wide) under the supervision of

19 the OSCE; neither party shall prosecute anyone for crimes related to the

20 Kosovo conflict (with the exception of crimes against humanity, war

21 crimes, and other serious violations of international law); amnesty and

22 release of political prisoners; international involvement and full

23 cooperation by the parties concerning implementation.

24 These are the general elements established by the Contact Group.

25 And then the document goes on to discuss the governance in Kosovo,

1 governance in Kosmet, and it says there people in Kosovo are to be

2 self-governed by democratically accountable Kosovo institutions; high

3 degree of self-governance ought to be realised through own legislative,

4 executive and judiciary bodies. And then it goes on to list the authority

5 over various elements and fields, and then it says, "subject to the rights

6 of the members of national communities."

7 Then it goes on to mention the Assembly, the judiciary, definition

8 of competencies at communal level, municipal level. It says very

9 specifically "Members of all national communities to be fairly represented

10 at all levels of administration and elected government."

11 Therefore, as far as I can understand it and in order to be as

12 brief as possible, Professor Markovic, is this the only document produced

13 by the Contact Group with relation to the Rambouillet negotiations? Is

14 this the only document? I'm referring now to the Contact Group.

15 A. Yes, precisely. That was the sole document that we had when we

16 went to Rambouillet.

17 Q. Professor Markovic, please listen to my question very carefully.

18 Did the Contact Group provide any other document in addition to this one?

19 A. Parts of the agreement --

20 Q. No, no. I'm now referring to the Contact Group. Let us not mix

21 the negotiators that you met with in Rambouillet and the Contact Group.

22 I'm referring now only to the Contact Group.

23 A. This was the sole document they produced.

24 Q. Did you accept this document?

25 A. We did. We signed these principles, and we requested that the

1 Albanian delegation do the same.

2 Q. So you accepted and signed these principles.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. What about the Albanian delegation?

5 A. They did not accept them and neither did they sign to them.

6 Q. Why do you think is that? Why do you think the Albanian

7 delegation refused to sign these principles?

8 A. I think that one particular principle was objectionable to the

9 Kosovo Albanians, which is the principle of territorial integrity of the

10 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its neighbours. Back then, they did

11 not want to leave the request that they had to achieve an independent

12 status for Kosovo. Therefore, this principle, which was determined by the

13 contact group to be non-negotiable, this principle on the territorial

14 integrity, was unacceptable to them and I believe that that was their

15 reason.

16 Q. The refusal of the Albanian delegation to sign these principles,

17 did it block, did it stall the negotiating process?

18 A. Yes, it did. Our delegation did not want to proceed with the

19 agreement until these basic principles established by the Contact Group

20 were accepted. Since the Albanian delegation refused to do that, the

21 negotiations were stalled. For several days we had a complete halt up

22 until Madeleine Albright arrived. Even later on, even though parts of the

23 Rambouillet agreement kept coming in, the delegation of the Kosovo

24 Albanians kept refusing to accept these basic principles. Then they came

25 up with a solution, namely to express in the preamble of this interim

1 agreement for self-governance in Kosovo and to express also in the Kosovo

2 constitution a loyalty to the principles of the Contact Group without

3 mentioning individual principles. And if you can see in this framework

4 agreement for peace and self-government in Kosovo, if you take a look at

5 that agreement and if you take a look at the constitution, chapter 1, you

6 will see that there is a declaration proclaiming loyalty to the Contact

7 Group principles without enumerating the actual principles.

8 In the constitution, in the preamble, the last paragraph says:

9 "Mindful of and supporting the principles and basic elements agreed upon

10 by the Contact Group at a ministerial meeting in London on the 29th of

11 January, 1999."

12 Q. Thank you. Thank you, Professor Markovic.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I would like tab 47 to

14 be tendered into evidence. These are the principles of the Contact Group.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, they will be tendered.

16 JUDGE KWON: Let me clarify one thing. Professor Markovic, when

17 you had a talk with Mrs. Madeleine Albright, were the delegates from

18 Kosovo Albanians present?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. That was a meeting between

20 Madam Albright and the delegation of the government of the Republic of

21 Serbia. Naturally, within that delegation we had two Albanian

22 representatives that I mentioned in the beginning, Faik Jashari and Sokol

23 Qusha.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. But those were members of your delegation.

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1 A. Yes, that's right, they were members of our delegation.

2 JUDGE KWON: Because I remember Dr. Rugova once said that he had

3 met Mrs. Albright together with the Serbian delegates. I'll check it

4 later. Thank you.

5 Go on, Mr. Milosevic.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was one such meeting with

7 Madam Albright, but not with entire delegations, not with complete, full

8 delegations. That was, in fact, a monologue by Madam Albright. Nothing

9 concretely was discussed at that meeting. She simply appealed to those

10 present to try to achieve a political solution and conclude an agreement.

11 Mr. Thaci spoke there, as did Mr. Milan Milutinovic, president of the

12 Republic of Serbia, but that was not a meeting between two delegations,

13 no, that was a meeting where only top echelons of the delegation of the

14 Kosovo Albanians were present and some other leaders. There were no

15 direct talks at that meeting either. There was just a monologue.

16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Very well. I believe that we cleared this. You, as head of the

19 delegation, claim that there were no negotiations between the two

20 delegations. In a meeting with Mrs. Albright, as far as I could

21 understand, she said to you that she was quite sentimental with respect to

22 Serbs, and the second was that Serbia would be bombed if you failed to

23 sign the agreement. This is what she talked to you about.

24 A. Yes, that's right.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, it's time for the break. We will

1 adjourn for 20 minutes.

2 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

3 --- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Please continue, Mr. Milosevic.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Professor Markovic, please look at tab 51, where more light is

7 being shed on this problem of not accepting these axioms, these basic

8 principles of the Contact Group. "Axioms" is the word you used.

9 In tab 51 -- I hope we all have tab 51 -- we have "Reeker briefs

10 on day 2 of Kosovo peace talks." The 8th of February is the date. Then

11 there is the explanation "[In English] Philip Reeker, spokesman for the

12 negotiators at the Kosovo peace talks ..."

13 [Interpretation] And then paragraph 2: "[In English] When the

14 Contact Group at the ministerial level made their statement in London on

15 January 29, they invited two delegations (Serbs and Kosovar Albanians) to

16 attend talks at Rambouillet in order to come to a peaceful solution for

17 the Kosovo crisis. With those invitations was a set of basic principles,

18 non-negotiable elements ... by which the talks and negotiation process

19 would be conducted. By accepting these invitations, the members of both

20 delegations fully understood and accepted those elements.

21 "He added, 'The two delegations are working very hard on the text

22 of the agreement - a process which is taking place on the basis of a set

23 of principles and elements.'"

24 [Interpretation] So this is quite clear. On the 29th of January

25 in London, these principles contained in this document of the Contact

1 Group. And now I would like to draw your attention to the bottom of the

2 page, where there is a question. This is the question. "[In English]

3 CNN: Phil, can you clear up for us the confusion over, I think, it's

4 principles and something else? The delegates - the delegations - by

5 coming here committed themselves to, let's say, principles. Do those

6 principles include the territorial integrity of Serbia and Yugoslavia? I

7 ask this partly because there's been a communique -- there's been a

8 communique from the KLA third of Albanian delegation saying they hadn't

9 signed up to any such thing and they're never going to concede anything on

10 the independence issue. They insist on a clear, unambiguous wording on

11 independence in the final document."

12 [Interpretation] Then again recurs repetition of the same. The

13 journalist repeats his question. That's the next paragraph. "[In English]

14 I'd like to come back to this question of interpretation: Who agreed to

15 what? Is it like this - You think that by coming here to Rambouillet they

16 agreed already, but that the delegation doesn't think like this and says,

17 'We came, but we didn't agree'?"

18 [Interpretation] So the delegation of the Kosovo Albanians did not

19 accept this only document that the Contact Group provided as a platform

20 for Rambouillet. That was clear even to the journalists at that session.

21 Isn't that the way it was?

22 A. That's the way it was. I talked about it before the break, that

23 both offers for signing the basic principles of the Contact Group were

24 rejected by the delegation of the Kosmet Albanians.

25 Q. All right. Now I would like to show you tab 22, and I will just

1 briefly quote page 2. That is Cook's and Vedrine's conference.

2 Mr. Vedrine, on page 2, the third answer --

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Tab 22. Before you begin, Mr. Milosevic, you

4 must ensure that the Chamber has the document in front of it, as well as

5 the Prosecutor, of course.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is tab 52, 52.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: You had said 22.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I said 22, then I simply

9 misspoke, but it is 52.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we have it.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. You can see page 2 of 5. Vedrine, the first time, the second

13 time, the third time, and then the second part: "[In English] As for the

14 issues under discussion, over the course of the past several weeks the

15 Contact Group worked out a number of basic principles which formed the

16 core of the possible solution. The discussions around these central

17 principles should make it possible to complete and make clear what still

18 hasn't been settled."

19 [Interpretation] So the co-chairman of the Rambouillet conference

20 points out these principles. Is there any doubt here that they were not

21 accepted by the Albanian delegation?

22 A. What was pointed out here was the nature of these principles. As

23 I explained them, the principles are not subject to any kind of

24 negotiations. They are non-negotiable. They are supposed to be taken the

25 way they have been put forth.

1 Q. All right. And now on page 3, the journalists are seeking

2 clarification yet again. A question at the very beginning of the page:

3 "[In English] Can you give us some details about the famous basic

4 principles you mentioned, the main line set out by the Contact Group? ...

5 "Vedrine: I can't exactly go into the detail about the principles

6 because I'm keeping all possibilities open for the talks to move forward

7 and conclude successfully. But I would remind you that we propose

8 substantial autonomy which already says a great deal. It means autonomy

9 that goes very far in the framework of respect for existing and recognised

10 international borders."

11 [Interpretation] So is that this basic principle that the

12 co-chairman is highlighting now, too, and which is basically the stumbling

13 block for the Albanian delegation? They can't accept it because it has to

14 do with the territorial integrity of Serbia and Yugoslavia?

15 A. Yes, that was basically the stumbling-block, as you put it. And

16 obviously for the delegation of the Kosovo Albanians it was unacceptable.

17 Q. All right. Tell me now, please, how was this text worded, the one

18 that was put forth as the agreement?

19 A. It was done in parts, in sections. We came to Rambouillet on the

20 6th of February. In the evening there was an inauguration of the

21 conference, and already the next day we got from the negotiators annexes.

22 Later on, they turned into chapters, 1, 3 and 6, that is. 1 is the

23 constitution of Kosovo, 3 was elections, and in chapter 6, the Ombudsman.

24 Our suggestion was the following: That it is much better if we

25 get the agreement in its entirety and then embark upon negotiations on the

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1 agreement. We do not have an overview of the entire agreement. We do not

2 see the underlying idea of the entire agreement.

3 Then on the 13th of February, six days later, we got section 4,

4 or, rather, chapter 4 - annex 4, as it was called then - which was

5 dedicated to economic development, then humanitarian issues, and

6 reconstruction.

7 Then on the 15th of February, the delegation was given annex 4A --

8 I'm sorry. Chapter 4 was economic development, and 4A was humanitarian

9 issues, reconstruction and development.

10 Since we were wondering how long these different sections of the

11 agreement would be coming in, our delegation insisted to get an answer to

12 the following question: Does the agreement have some other parts, too, or

13 are these all the parts of the agreement? That was the 15th of February,

14 1999. The negotiating troika told us explicitly that this was the entire

15 agreement.

16 Immediately on the following day, that is to say on the 16th, we

17 gave the negotiators our objections to the portions that we had received;

18 annex 1, annex 3, annex 6, annex 4 devoted to economic issues, and 4A

19 devoted to humanitarian issues, reconstruction, and economic development.

20 Then again there was a standstill in the negotiations, and on the

21 22nd of February we were given an annex or, rather, chapters 2, 5, and 7.

22 These were the chapters that had to do with implementation and that had to

23 do with the police and public security, civilian security. We then

24 mentioned the information we were given by the troika on the 15th of

25 February, namely that we had received the agreement in its entirety. Now

1 we got more than a half of the agreement. We received a total of 56 extra

2 pages, and we said that we did not want to receive these chapters 2, 5,

3 and 7.

4 And then on the 23rd, that is to say when the second extension of

5 the Rambouillet conference was about to expire, in the morning, at 9.30,

6 the negotiating troika sent us the entire agreement with all annexes, all

7 chapters, including now for the first time chapters 2, 5, and 7. We were

8 given a deadline too. I have the letter here of the negotiating troika.

9 Q. We all have it. I would like us all to have a look at it.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could you please place it on this

11 projector. Could you please put tab 45 on the overhead projector. Tab

12 45.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. You have got tab 45, haven't you? We can have a look at it. Yes.

15 A. Well, you can see it now.

16 Q. Let me just put a few questions to you.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the usher please include the

18 top of the page so that the date and the time can be seen. Here it is.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation].

20 Q. So look at what it says here, Rambouillet, the 23rd of February,

21 1999, 9.30 a.m. Is that the letter that you were talking about, Professor

22 Markovic?

23 A. Precisely. That's the letter.

24 Q. The last sentence. We can read it together since it is on the

25 overhead projector. "[In English] The co-chairmen and the negotiators are

1 ready to receive your response no later than 1 p.m. ..."

2 So the first time you received the entire text of the agreement,

3 including these new tens of pages, at 9.30 a.m. on the 23rd of February,

4 and you had a deadline of three and a half hours to give an answer. Is

5 that what can be seen from this text?

6 A. Precisely. That was the first time we received it. That is to

7 say on the day when the second extension of the conference was about to

8 expire, then we received the integral text of the Rambouillet agreement,

9 including chapters 2, 5, and 7, which we had never been given until then

10 or, rather, they were given at 7.00 p.m. on the 22nd. And then I said why

11 we refused to receive them then.

12 And then within three and a half hours time, we were supposed to

13 study 56 pages of the text of chapters 2, 5, and 7. That was the length

14 of those texts. These were the vital pages of the agreement, if I can put

15 it that way, the vital portions of the agreement, because chapters 2, 5,

16 and 7 have to do with implementation. Chapter 2, rather, is police,

17 public security, and civilian security.

18 This letter also shows that Russia does not associate itself with

19 chapters 2 and 7. We were given an explanation why. The member of the

20 troika, Mr. Mayorski, explained that chapters 2 and 7 were not discussed

21 at all, nor were they agreed upon by the Contact Group itself. The entire

22 document was handed over to us by the negotiators on behalf of the Contact

23 Group, as the first paragraph says.

24 He mentioned that chapter 5 had been looked at but it was not

25 adopted, as opposed to chapters 2 and 7 that were not reviewed at all and

1 that were not discussed, let alone adopted. And that could be seen from

2 the signatures.

3 Q. All right. Could you please move the page a bit up so that we can

4 see the signatures. The signature of Christopher Hill, and Boris Mayorski

5 signed it, and he said: "[In English] Russia does not associate itself

6 with chapters 2 and 7."

7 A. 2 and 7.

8 Q. [Interpretation] And the third was Wolfgang Petritsch. So is it

9 clear that the complete agreement in Rambouillet on what you have said and

10 the explanations given by the Russian representative was not a proposal

11 put forward by the Contact Group and that the Contact Group didn't

12 consider it at all?

13 A. Yes, absolutely correct. And that is not being challenged. You

14 can't challenge that or dispute it. It was the explanation given by

15 Mr. Mayorski himself, why he was -- didn't want to sign the paper as a

16 whole. And we were told at the very beginning that the agreement could

17 not be accepted in part, only in whole, as a packet, packet of measures

18 with all the eight chapters taken together, which is the number of

19 chapters the final version of agreement had, or the so-called agreement

20 from Rambouillet had.

21 Q. Very well. Tell me this again, please, and let's go back to the

22 Contact Group again. So the only text that was adopted in fact by the

23 Contact Group at its ministerial meeting in London was the text of the

24 principles that you signed and the Albanians refused to sign. The

25 Rambouillet text, as it would emerge from this letter and the explanations

1 given by Mayorski was something that the Contact Group did not adopt; is

2 that right?

3 A. Yes, absolutely correct.

4 Q. Tell me this now, please: Did they allow for the possibility of

5 working on the text to fine tune it in the continuation of the

6 negotiations?

7 A. When we came to Paris to continue the negotiations, we brought

8 with us two acts, two documents which represented our vision of

9 self-government, self-governance in Kosovo and Metohija, and incorporating

10 that vision into all the chapters of that agreement except the agreement

11 on the implementation of it, which was not the subject of adoption at the

12 contact -- or by the Contact Group. And I attach here those documents.

13 The negotiators themselves, the negotiating trio responded and said that

14 no essential changes in the political part of the agreement could be

15 accepted, that the political part had been adopted in Rambouillet, and

16 that the process had been completed, and that in Paris what was to be

17 discussed was the implementation of it. So just chapters 5 and 7 and not

18 even discussions on chapter 2 were to be allowed. And we were asked to

19 move on straight away to negotiating with the negotiators on chapter 5.

20 Once again, there was never a meeting either in Paris during the

21 five days that we were there between the delegations of the government of

22 the Republic of Serbia and the delegation of the Kosmet Albanians.

23 According to the same principle and pattern, the negotiations followed the

24 previous pattern, but the difference was in the negotiations this

25 time. In our delegation we had the president of the Republic of Serbia,

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1 Mr. Milan Milutinovic.

2 Q. Let me go back to a question that was raised earlier on by

3 Mr. Robinson when he asked you under whose auspices the meeting was held,

4 and you said that the meeting was -- the negotiations in Rambouillet was

5 held on the auspices of the Contact Group, but you also mentioned the

6 speech delivered by President Chirac, and France was the host country and

7 at the same time the patron was it, or was it just the Contact Group that

8 was the patron and under their auspices?

9 A. I understood that France was the host and that the main organiser,

10 the principal organiser, which can be seen from these conclusions made by

11 the Contact Group and dated the 29th of January, 1999, that the main

12 organiser was the Contact Group itself. France, of course, was the host

13 country.

14 Q. Yes, you clarified the point. I had the feeling that we might not

15 have rounded off that question and clarified it fully. Tell me this now,

16 please --

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And Mr. Robinson, I would like to

18 have this letter signed by Hill, Mayorski, and Petritsch, that is to say

19 tab 45, tendered into evidence, please.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it may be exhibited. And also 51 and 52.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Tell me this now, please, Professor Markovic, my next question:

23 Why did the state delegation not sign this text?

24 A. The delegation didn't sign, didn't put its signature to the text

25 for the reasons that I have already mentioned. First of all, as to the

1 political section, there were no negotiations that were held, and we

2 didn't know whether the comments we made and objections we made had been

3 adopted or not, especially with respect to the constitution of Kosovo,

4 that portion of the text.

5 And secondly, more than half the -- we were not able to become

6 acquainted with more than half of the agreement, because when the

7 conference ended, on that very day we received chapters 2, 5, and 7, at

8 that late hour. And there was the decisive statement made by Mr. Mayorski

9 as well to the effect that those sections had never been decided upon in

10 the Contact Group itself, with the proviso that the -- that chapter 5 was

11 discussed but that no stand or decision was made, and there was no mention

12 at all of chapters 2 and 7.

13 Q. All right. Can I simplify this? What you actually did was you

14 refused to sign an agreement which was not the subject of discussion by

15 the Contact Group.

16 A. Yes. It was not an agreement at all. It was no agreement. It

17 was quite simply a one-sided dictate, and all they required was our

18 signature. No participation in its formulation, just a signature, nothing

19 more than that.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor, in deciding not to sign the agreement,

21 did the delegation act on its own or did it receive instructions from

22 Belgrade?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We didn't receive any instructions

24 from Belgrade. And in the delegation itself we had the president of the

25 Republic of Serbia, who, according to the constitution, is the organ

1 representing the republic or representing the state abroad. And the

2 position taken by the delegation was unanimous. It was unanimously

3 decided that that alleged agreement should not be signed.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Thank you. Professor Markovic, a moment ago we established that

7 the agreement was not an act of the Contact Group. Now, what about the

8 members of the troika, the negotiating troika? Did they sign the

9 agreement? And would you please look at tab 48 now in that regard. And

10 we just provide the last page with the signatures themselves. It's a

11 photocopy of the final page of the agreement, with the signatures

12 themselves. And if I can see this, what it says here properly, of the --

13 the three negotiators didn't sign either. The only people that signed, if

14 you compare the signatures to the text a moment ago, was Petritsch and

15 Hill. Mayorski never signed the agreement.

16 A. Well, from this piece of paper we can see that for the Federal

17 Republic of Yugoslavia, nobody actually signed. For the Federal Republic

18 of Serbia, once again you mean the Republic of Serbia.

19 Q. Yes, that's right. Nobody signed for the Republic of Serbia.

20 A. For Kosovo, as far as I can make the signature out here, this was

21 signed by Rexhep Qosja and Ibrahim Rugova. I think the first might be

22 Mr. Thaci. I'm not quite sure whose signature that is, whose handwriting.

23 But you can see that it says Kosovo here, and not the Kosmet Albanians,

24 but the entire area of Kosovo, the whole of Kosovo as represented just by

25 the Kosmet Albanians. And witness -- this was witnessed by -- the signing

1 was witnessed by, of the negotiators here we can just see Mr. Wolfgang

2 Petritsch. He's the first signatory, and Mr. Christopher Hill coming

3 next. Mr. Mayorski didn't sign this. He was in the hall where the

4 signing of the agreement, the signing ceremony was organised in Paris, and

5 when asked why he didn't sign, he said that it takes two to tango and that

6 he can't sign something that does not represent an actual agreement but

7 was the agreement of just one side, that is to say one side decided to

8 agree with itself.

9 Q. Tell me this now, please. What kind of text did our state

10 delegation sign then?

11 A. Our state delegation signed a text which it brought with it as its

12 offer to the negotiations, and the structure of the text was the same

13 structure to be found in parts of the political agreement in Rambouillet,

14 and that's where we were able to incorporate our delegation's views. Of

15 course, we didn't consider this to be final. It was just our offer, our

16 proposal on the table as to what we felt should be incorporated into the

17 agreement. And it relates to self-governance in Kosovo, which

18 incorporates the basic elements of real self-governance for Kosovo.

19 Q. Just a moment, please, Mr. Markovic. We're now talking about tab

20 9; right?

21 A. Yes, tab 9.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just before we do that,

23 Mr. Robinson, let me check whether tab 48, that is to say the last page

24 with the signatures, showing the signatures of the Albanians and where you

25 can't see any signatures of Yugoslavia or Serbia or Russia's signature,

1 just Petritsch and Hill's signatures, has it been admitted into evidence,

2 tab 48?

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we can admit it. We admit it, yes.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Now to go back, Professor, to my question about the text, the kind

7 of text that was signed by the state delegation. And we have before us

8 tab 9. It says Agreement for Self-government in Kosmet. In Kosmet, as I

9 say.

10 A. That was our proposal, the proposal of our delegation, which we

11 brought with us on the 15th of March and handed it over to the negotiators

12 as our proposal for discussion. However, the negotiators responded -- as

13 I say, we introduced our interventions in the political part of the

14 agreement, not the implementation of it. Because as I explained, the

15 implementation of any of this was not adopted. But the gentlemen

16 negotiators responded and said that a political agreement from Rambouillet

17 is considered as having been adopted, that there can be no further

18 discussion about it, no further amendments or changes can be introduced

19 into it, that it is a final text, and that we now had to move on to

20 implementation.

21 Now, we signed this agreement on the same day, the text of the

22 agreement the same day that the Kosovo Albanians signed the other text,

23 the text of the alleged agreement in Rambouillet, which was shown a moment

24 ago. And here you can see the signatures. For the Republic of Serbia I

25 signed it myself, Ratko Markovic. For the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

1 it was Professor Dr. Vladan Kutlesic. For the National Community of

2 Albanians it was Sokol Qusha.

3 Q. He was president the Democratic Reform Party of Albanians, wasn't

4 he?

5 A. Yes, but at the same time he was the president of the National

6 Community of Albanians.

7 Q. And then we also see the signature of Faik Jashari who was the

8 president of the Kosovo Democratic Initiative. For the National Community

9 of Serbs and Montenegrins Vojislav Zivkovic signed. For the National

10 Community of Turks Zejnelabidin Kurejs and Guljbehar Sabovic signed. For

11 the National Community of the Goranis, it was Ibro Vait. For the National

12 Community of Muslims we see Refik Senadovic. For the National Community

13 of the Roma we see Ljuban Koka. And for the National Community of the

14 Egyptians, or rather, the Ashkalis, we see Qerim Abazi.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor, but this agreement that was signed, it

16 is really signed by your delegation alone.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right, just our

18 delegation, just as the other agreement had been signed by the others.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: So it was really then just a political match of

20 what you call the so-called agreement which was signed by Rugova on behalf

21 of Kosovo. It was a counterpoise to that?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, this can be called an

23 agreement, too, with just the same legitimacy as you can call the other

24 paper an agreement, the one signed by Mr. Rugova, by the same token. So

25 that was signed by just one side, and this was signed by just one side.

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. And let's make ourselves understood, Professor Markovic. Is there

3 any difference there? That is to say, my question is a very specific and

4 precise one. What was signed by the delegation of the Kosovo Albanians

5 was signed by the Albanians.

6 A. Right.

7 Q. And this was signed by both the Serbs, Montenegrins, Turks,

8 Muslims, Goranis, Roma, and the representatives of the government of

9 Serbia and Yugoslavia; is that right? So in that sense, do you see at

10 least some difference between just having one national community sign and

11 the signatures of the representatives of all the national communities,

12 even if the representatives of the National Community of Albanians did not

13 represent the majority of the Albanians or, rather, their political

14 parties?

15 A. Of course. That difference is the result of the concept about the

16 composition of a delegation, and the delegation of the government of

17 Serbia was multi-ethnic in composition, whereas the composition and the

18 members of the delegation of Kosmet Albanians was monoethnic, just a

19 single ethnicity. So this is necessarily a result and consequence of the

20 different concept. That became visible if you look at the membership of

21 the delegations themselves.

22 Q. All right. Now, let's skip the representatives of the Albanians

23 and Serbs in this delegation because you've already explained that they

24 did not represent the most important Albanian parties, and the Serbian

25 delegation is quite clear. Now, what about Zejnelabidin Kurejs, Guljbehar

1 Sabovic? Were they the prominent representatives of the Turkish

2 community, for example? Were they the most prominent representatives?

3 A. Yes, indeed Mr. Zejnelabidin Kurejs was the head -- or rather, the

4 president of the party of Turks. I don't know the full name and title of

5 that party, but he was the president of the main Turkish political party

6 in Kosovo and Metohija.

7 Q. So he was the leading personage in the Turkish community. Is that

8 clear?

9 A. Yes, that's quite clear and that's how he took part.

10 Q. Now, what about Ibro Vait? He signed for the for National

11 Community of the Goranis? Was he a leading personage of the Gorani

12 community?

13 A. Yes, he was. And the national communities themselves represented

14 their best representatives. They put their best men forward, if I can put

15 it that way.

16 Q. And can we say the same for Raif Senadovic, Ljuban Koka, and Qerim

17 Abazi and their standing in their own national communities? Would that

18 hold true for them too?

19 A. Yes, absolutely so.

20 Q. I'm not going into what the papers wrote about them but their own

21 positions, how their own national communities viewed them in their

22 communities in Kosovo and Metohija.

23 A. Yes, in their national communities, they were the foremost

24 political representatives and that's why they were given the mandate,

25 whereas the papers considered that the representatives of the national

1 communities should not be members of a national delegation. Of course,

2 not all the newspapers but a part of the press.

3 Q. What part of the press?

4 A. You can find such statements to this day in various books written

5 about Rambouillet. I was shocked to see how many books were written about

6 Rambouillet, books numbering over hundreds of pages, as though written by

7 Jules Verne, because imagination was used to quite an extent there, as

8 nothing in fact happened in Rambouillet. So I don't see what gave rise to

9 such voluminous material being written about Rambouillet. This was

10 mentioned by certain media in the Republic of Serbia, and also authors of

11 various books about Rambouillet inserted this objection to the composition

12 of the delegation of the Republic of Serbia.

13 I have to state that I did not read the book by Mr. Wolfgang

14 Petritsch. I don't speak German so I couldn't read it, but those books

15 that I read in English and in Serbian all contain this objection to the

16 composition of our delegation.

17 Q. I saw that as an advantage of our delegation, the fact that it

18 contained representatives of various ethnic communities. So how can you

19 explain this objection? Where does it actually originate from?

20 A. Well, the dominant belief is that Kosovo ought to be discussed by

21 the representatives of Serbs and the representatives of the Albanians. So

22 the very complex ethnic picture of Kosovo and Metohija is being simplified

23 in this view and reduced to just two national communities which were

24 confronted here, the Serbs and the Albanians. And you can see, based on

25 the signatures of these leaders of various ethnic communities, that the

1 ethnic picture was not a simple one in Kosovo. Our delegation believed

2 that all of them, as residents of Kosovo, should take part in seeking a

3 political solution to the situation in Kosovo and Metohija.

4 Q. Are you aware of the fact that members of the Turkish ethnic

5 community in Kosovo attended school in Turkish, that they had their

6 newspaper that was published?

7 A. The institute for textbooks of Serbia published textbooks in

8 Turkish as well for children who attended Turkish schools, schools in

9 Turkish. I'm aware of that.

10 Q. All right. Let us not digress any more. Let us return to the

11 issue of this so-called agreement in Rambouillet that was signed just by

12 the Albanian delegation. You said that this agreement was not a proposal

13 of the Contact Group and the fact that it was not a proposal of Contact

14 Group was the reason why the Russian representative refused to sign it.

15 Now, please tell me this: If the agreement was not a proposal of the

16 Contact Group, if this text was not proposed by the Contact Group, then

17 who proposed it?

18 A. Well, I'm convinced, based on the role played by Madeleine

19 Albright, that it was her personal proposal, proposal of her and her team.

20 Q. So what she promised to you when she said that you will have a

21 brilliant future, if I can call it that, was actually something that was

22 boiled down to this agreement; is that right?

23 A. Yes, precisely so. That threat of bombing was directly linked to

24 the adoption or refusal to adopt the agreement. This is something that

25 was stated by Mrs. Albright to our delegation when we met on the 14th of

1 February, 1999, in Rambouillet.

2 Q. You just told us a minute ago that all members of the delegation,

3 representing all ethnic communities in Kosovo, were unanimous in your firm

4 stance not to sign the text.

5 A. Yes. We were unanimous in that position for the simple reason

6 that this text meant that the Albanian majority in Kosovo has its own

7 state, whereas other ethnic communities could perhaps enjoy some

8 protection as national minorities. Therefore, they were denied any

9 participation in the government as we wanted it. And all of these ethnic

10 communities make up a certain percentage in the entire population of

11 Kosovo.

12 The principle that Albanians favoured meant outvoting of other

13 communities, institutionalisation of the Albanian community in Kosovo and

14 ensured their dominant role.

15 Another aspect of this agreement, this agreement that only

16 contained declaratory statement on the respect for territorial integrity

17 of Serbia meant that Kosovo just officially speaking was part of Serbia

18 but there was no Serbia present in Kosovo, because Serbia had no power in

19 Kosovo which was nominally its territory. That was another reason we

20 refused to sign this agreement. Therefore, in the constitution of Kosovo,

21 the state of Serbia was completely expelled from its territory with all of

22 the instruments and attributes of its statehood.

23 Q. Professor Markovic, I believe that it would be interesting, in

24 view of certain reactions that were present in the media concerning

25 Rambouillet in those days, to see this leaflet in German that the

1 newspaper Borba received from its reader from Bonn. You can find this in

2 tab 12.

3 THE ACUSED: [Interpretation] It has been translated from German to

4 English, Mr. Robinson. This is the entire pamphlet.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. According to Borba this was circulated in Germany, and in this,

7 would you please confirm to us that this pamphlet quotes authentically

8 certain portions of that agreement that was offered for signature.

9 A. Well, this pamphlet contains excerpts from chapter 7, annex B.

10 These are just excerpts.

11 Q. Very well. Under 1, it says: "The parties recognise the need for

12 expeditious departure and entry procedures for NATO personnel," stationing

13 of NATO personnel. Was that taken from the text? Is this the verbatim

14 text taken out from the agreement?

15 A. Yes. All of these paragraphs were taken out of annex B.

16 Q. Very well. Item 2 states: "NATO military personnel shall

17 normally wear uniforms, and NATO personnel may possess and carry arms if

18 authorised..."

19 Then 3a: "NATO shall be immune from all legal process, whether

20 civil, administrative, or criminal.

21 "3b: NATO personnel, under all circumstances at all times, shall

22 be immune from the parties' jurisdiction in respect of any civil,

23 administrative, criminal or disciplinary offences which may be committed

24 by them in the FRY.

25 "4: NATO personnel shall be immune from any form of arrest,

1 investigation, or detention by the authorities in the FRY.

2 "Item 5: NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their

3 vehicles, vessels, aircraft and equipment, free and unrestricted passage

4 and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and

5 territorial waters." And so on.

6 Then they go on to recognise the use of communication channels for

7 NATO purposes upon simple request that it was needed for the operation.

8 "The parties shall, upon simple request, grant all telecommunications

9 services, including broadcast services, needed for the operation." And

10 then they go on to speak about public roads and so on.

11 So pursuant to the text of this agreement that was offered for

12 your signature there, the entire territory of Yugoslavia, its airspace,

13 its waters, telecommunication channels, radio, television, all public

14 media, everything that exists under the heavens ought to be placed at

15 NATO's disposal.

16 A. Yes. That's precisely where this Hamlet dilemma that our

17 delegation faced lay. The dilemma was: Either you will be occupied or

18 you will be bombed. That was the choice we had, the "choice" under

19 quotation marks. That was the choice we had.

20 Q. And this pamphlet ends with a question in German, "Would you have

21 signed this?"

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic -- Mr. Nice, do we have the full

23 text of this agreement that was offered?

24 MR. NICE: I'm not sure. I was going to check that out.

25 JUDGE KWON: Exhibit 128.

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that this has been

2 tendered already.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: I see. Exhibit 128, yes.

4 MR. NICE: In fact, yes, Exhibit 128, Your Honour is quite right,

5 and we prepared it in advance against the possibility of its being used.

6 While I'm on my feet, I notice the time. I've been informed that

7 you're going to be informed in due course that this witness can't come

8 back beyond tomorrow, something to that effect. He's already been in

9 examination-in-chief somewhere between nine and ten hours. The amount of

10 time left between now and the end of tomorrow is a fraction of that.

11 In any case, Exhibit 128.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, when will you conclude your

13 examination-in-chief? It has been fairly lengthy.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I've already told you that I

15 initially envisaged this would last less. However, it has been going

16 quite slowly, and I need just an additional few minutes.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: I could say, as a housekeeping matter, that the

18 Chamber will periodically issue a record of the time that is being used by

19 the parties, and we'll shortly issue the first one.

20 [Trial Chamber confers]

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor, I take it that if cross-examination is

22 not concluded by tomorrow, you would be available to come -- to return at

23 some other time convenient to all the parties? The earliest opportunity

24 would be better.

25 Mr. Milosevic, I'm sorry to interrupt with this but it's an

1 important matter.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've been here for two weeks now. I

3 had exams scheduled for these three days, the day before yesterday,

4 yesterday and today. It is very difficult for me to reschedule these

5 exams because some students come to the exams who reside outside of

6 Belgrade. I believed that I would conclude my testimony tomorrow at the

7 end of business. I could not continue to delay the exams for another

8 week, because the exam period is between the 15th of January to the 15th

9 of February, and I have other engagements for the month of February.

10 Therefore, I have taken upon myself quite a risk, and I have mistreated my

11 students quite substantially by prolonging my stay here.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think they will probably show some

13 understanding, Professor. But, Mr. Milosevic, then you should have

14 tailored your examination-in-chief to take account of that, because if the

15 Prosecutor can't complete his cross-examination by tomorrow, for my part

16 I'd find that entirely understandable. So let us continue, but bear in

17 mind that as far as the Chamber is concerned, we would require the

18 professor to be here to complete his testimony at some time, at some other

19 time, if it's not concluded tomorrow.

20 And with that in mind, Mr. Milosevic, then obviously the quicker

21 you conclude, the better.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I do not doubt the

23 fact that neither the professor nor the students would mind if the

24 professor had to come back for a day later on for Mr. Nice to complete his

25 cross-examination. The other trip would be just for a few days, not a

1 prolonged one such as this one. And I believe that the professor would be

2 able to schedule to return for a day. However, I am not allowed to have

3 any contact with the witness while he's testifying, so I hope that he will

4 bear this in mind.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Professor Markovic, very briefly, can we speak of negotiations in

7 Rambouillet and the Rambouillet agreement at all?

8 A. I do not believe that we can. There were no negotiations

9 whatsoever. There was simply some talks between the delegations and the

10 mediators. The two delegations never met and talked directly.

11 As for the agreement, I believe that there is no agreement at all

12 either, because each agreement implies the consent of two parties, two

13 wills. Here we have the consent of just one party, the expression of the

14 will of just one side.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: There is no need, Mr. Milosevic, to belabour that

16 point. We have that point. It has been made --

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Tab 35 is a text by Kissinger which

18 speaks about the position taken by the country that had the leading role.

19 Yes, that's right, 53. Page 2, third paragraph. Kissinger says: "Several

20 fateful decisions were taken in those now seemingly far-off days in

21 February [In English] when other options were still open. The first was

22 the demand that 30.000 NATO troops entered Yugoslavia, a country with

23 which NATO was not at war, an administrative province that had emotional

24 significance as the origin of Serbia's independence. The second was to

25 use the foreseeable Serb refusal as a justification for starting the

1 bombing.

2 "Rambouillet was not a negotiation - as is often claimed - but an

3 ultimatum."

4 Is that roughly your conclusion as well, Professor?

5 A. Absolutely. Rambouillet was a one-sided dictate --

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. That's a sufficient answer.

7 Please move on, Mr. Milosevic.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Professor, I will put just one more question to you. In view of

10 the passage of time, do you believe that it was a mistake to refuse to

11 sign the agreement on the part of our side?

12 A. No, I don't believe that that was an error. First of all, the

13 country was not occupied. Unfortunately, a lot of people have lost their

14 lives, but we have kept our honour. Our country maintained its dignity,

15 and the Serbs have history. They have, because they always cared about

16 their honour and saving their face more than anything else. These are the

17 principles that our delegation adhered to when it signed almost more than

18 six years ago to sign this agreement which was a one-sided dictate.

19 Q. Thank you, Professor. I have concluded my examination. I have no

20 further questions.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic. Mr. Nice.

22 Cross-examined by Mr. Nice:

23 Q. Just before I turn to deal with the substance of my

24 cross-examination and picking up on your last observation about loss of

25 life being better than loss of dignity, which nationality was it in the

1 Kosovo conflict that suffered most? Was it the Kosovo Albanians that

2 suffered for Serb dignity?

3 A. I think that the Serb nationality suffered the most, because the

4 persecution of Serbs has been going on for decades.

5 Q. Forgive me, Professor. I'm sure you understood the question. In

6 terms of loss of life or in terms of being forcibly moved from their

7 properties, which nationality suffered most; Kosovo Albanians? Simple

8 question.

9 A. I'm giving you a simple answer, but you don't like the answer. It

10 is the Serb nationality, which chronologically speaking suffered for a

11 much longer time because the slogan of the Albanians was that Kosovo could

12 no longer be part of Serbia if there were no Serbs in Kosovo. That was

13 the capital demand of the Albanians in Kosovo. They wanted a state of

14 their own because there would be no Serbs left in Kosovo.

15 Q. It may be, Professor, that we're going to have a difficulty with

16 my use of language. I'll try to make it simple. In the Kosovo conflict,

17 did more Kosovo Albanians lose their lives than Serbs?

18 A. Mr. Nice, I did not count the victims. I cannot give you an

19 answer to that question.

20 Q. Okay. So I'll come back to that tomorrow with the evidence to

21 show the answer to the question. And I'm going to suggest that your

22 answer to this Court right now was entirely less than frank. You know

23 perfectly well whether more Kosovo Albanians or more Serbs died in this

24 part of the conflict and you are declining to give straight answers.

25 Now, let's go back to the beginning. You've been described by --

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, just let him -- since you have put that

2 to him --

3 MR. NICE: Certainly.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- I think he should answer.

5 MR. NICE:

6 Q. The proposition, Professor, is that you're not giving a straight

7 answer.

8 A. I'm saying that frankness is an interior feeling, and I don't see

9 how Mr. Nice could have looked into my inside and seen what I thought

10 inside, deep inside. Whenever I give an answer that does not suit

11 Mr. Nice, he says that I'm not frank. He accuses me of not being frank.

12 I'm giving him my opinion and everybody's entitled to his own opinion, and

13 if there is a difference in opinion, that does not mean that I'm being

14 less than frank.

15 Q. All right. Let's go back to the beginning. The accused described

16 you in these terms in the course of the examination, that you are "without

17 doubt the best constitutional expert on the territory of the former

18 Yugoslavia. This is generally recognised. We can never question or

19 challenge that. The answers are transparent."

20 There you are. "Without doubt the best constitutional expert on

21 the territory of the former Yugoslavia." Is that how you regard yourself?

22 A. I don't know whether he said in the territory of the former

23 Yugoslavia. It is not in my nature at all to compete. My own judgement

24 of my own value is irrelevant. What counts is what others think and what

25 also counts is the objective state of affairs. I do not regard myself

1 that way at all.

2 Q. Because you've been extensively criticised by fellow academics for

3 various other things that you've done in the last 15 years, have you not?

4 Let's give you a couple of examples. Pavle Nikolic, for example, on your

5 attempts to extend this accused's tenure of office. Do you remember his

6 criticisms?

7 A. The term of the president is not ten years, it is five years,

8 according to the constitution of the Republic of Serbia.

9 Q. What I'm saying is you've been criticised by academic lawyers for

10 your performance as a lawyer. One of them, for example, is a Pavle

11 Nikolic. Correct?

12 A. I don't know what you mean. I don't know which criticism you

13 mean. In science and scholarly affairs, it is quite common to have

14 disagreement and criticism. Very often we do not agree with each other.

15 That is why science advances. If there was no disagreement, then science

16 would not be advancing.

17 Q. I'll give you one other example by way of forecast of criticisms

18 I'll lay before you in due course. Slobodan Samardzic of the Institute of

19 European Affairs in Belgrade has attacked you publicly and extensively for

20 the misuse of the constitutions that you've drafted, hasn't he?

21 A. This is the first time I've ever heard of it.

22 Q. Very well.

23 A. I never heard of it before. Could you please be so kind as to say

24 where he said that and what was this abuse of the constitution that I

25 carried out?

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, Mr. Nice is referring

2 to an author and to a text by a particular author. Therefore, it would be

3 his duty to place this text before the witness if he wishes to put

4 questions in relation to that text.

5 MR. NICE: And I most certainly well.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

7 MR. NICE: I most certainly will. I will do it in due time

8 because I want to deal with things chronologically. I'm just at the

9 moment exploring the accused's description of this witness as effectively

10 unchallengeable as an expert. But I can just tell the witness this if he

11 wants to research the matter overnight, and we can even probably provide

12 him with a copy, but he will find the criticism of him and of his

13 constitutions in a paper of the Institute of European Studies of Belgrade,

14 headed Constitutional System of FR Yugoslavia, Principles and

15 Contradictions. The date of the paper is not entirely clear, but we can

16 provide him with a copy of it and he can read it.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: You should let him have a copy of it, Mr. Nice.

18 MR. NICE: I will, and I will come to it in its appropriate place

19 in my questioning.

20 Q. For reading later, Professor.

21 Now, you told us a little bit about your history. We'll pick it

22 up pretty nearly at the beginning of my questioning, but before we do,

23 let's deal with things chronologically and look, first of all, at a little

24 bit of the 1974 constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

25 While that's being prepared for me and for the overhead projector,

1 this: The Serbs regarded the 1974 constitution as something that damaged

2 their interests; is that correct?

3 A. That's not what the Serbs thought. That is what scholars thought.

4 There was unanimity practically among scholars that the 1974 constitution

5 was the reason for all the crises that befell the Yugoslav federation.

6 Q. And -- very well.

7 A. Croats and Slovenes and Macedonians had equally poor opinions of

8 that constitution. I can refer to several meetings where it was exposed

9 to criticism from all quarters.

10 Q. Professor, I would be only too delighted to conclude your

11 cross-examination by the end of tomorrow morning. To some degree, it's in

12 your hands. If I ask questions that are susceptible to short answers and

13 you give compact answers, we'll make more progress.

14 I have your answer on the 1974 constitution. But Tito -- sorry.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: But, Mr. Nice, excuse me for interrupting just now,

16 but this cross-examination has started off in a fairly antagonistic

17 fashion, for reasons which I think I understand.

18 MR. NICE: Yes.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: But that can be counter-productive, I think, and

20 the way the question was framed, in fairness to the professor, inevitably

21 brought the answer it did because you couched it as Serbs, and his answer

22 as well is much more widespread than that. So I think I can understand

23 that, and therefore while I'm not criticising you, I think it's only fair

24 for the Court to intervene if it feels the witness is unfairly criticised.

25 MR. NICE: Certainly. I actually thought my question was neutral,

1 but if it wasn't or if it didn't seem to be --

2 JUDGE BONOMY: It was not.

3 MR. NICE: I'll come back to that because it features in the -- in

4 the next exhibit beyond the constitutions to which I'll turn.

5 Q. But, Professor, help me with this, please: So far as Serbs were

6 concerned, and I am asking you to look at this from the point of view of

7 the Serbs, Tito and his fellow leaders were regarded, were they not, as

8 wishing to keep Serbia down, the famous phrase, "Weak Serbia, strong

9 Yugoslavia"; is that right?

10 A. Well, that thesis was first disclosed by Lazar Kolisevski, one of

11 Macedonia's political leaders.

12 Q. One of Tito's -- one of Tito's closest colleagues - Tito the Croat

13 - was the Slovene Kardelj; correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And he's also generally regarded as somebody who wasn't promoting

16 the interests and the cause of the Serbs, particularly, for example, at

17 the time of the 1974 constitution.

18 A. I would not put it that way. I have a different opinion. Edvard

19 Kardelj was not a trained lawyer. In many of his views, he believed in

20 utopia, and it was such solutions that were the main shortcoming of the

21 1974 constitution, and he was most directly involved in the writing of

22 that constitution.

23 Q. You see, I'm going to be exploring the events that relate to the

24 criminality, if any, as alleged of this accused, but I'm also going to be

25 exploring your own part in it and therefore we must look at you as a man.

1 Your first book, I think, was dedicated to the man Kardelj; is that right?

2 A. No. I never dedicated any book to Kardelj. Edvard Kardelj --

3 Q. Very well. If I'm wrong, and I can't show you the document to the

4 contrary, I'll withdraw it, but I'll come back to it if necessary.

5 A. Mr. Nice, you cannot show it to me because no such thing exists.

6 But you have already broadcast that. That's already been heard. Please,

7 no such thing exists. I never dedicated a book to Edvard Kardelj. I did

8 quote Edvard Kardelj very often, because he was the main

9 constitution-maker of Yugoslavia, starting from 1946 or, rather, the Foca

10 annals and all the way up to his death. So that includes the constitution

11 of 1974. He always provided the basic concept, he was the main author of

12 the constitution, and he was behind the concepts of all the constitutions

13 of the former Yugoslavia, but I never ever dedicated a book to him.

14 Q. Thank you. Let me just look because I think it's helpful if we

15 take all the constitutions in their date order, just Articles 3, 4 and 5

16 of the 1974 constitution. It's on the overhead projector now.

17 A. Very well.

18 Q. Are you happy to follow this in English, Professor?

19 A. I can, but I do have the text in Serbian here.

20 Q. You've got the text in front of you. So the structure that may be

21 helpful for the Chamber to have in mind is Article 3: "The socialist

22 republics are states based on the sovereignty of the people and the power

23 of the self-management by the working class and all working people, and

24 are socialist, self-managing democratic communities of the working people

25 and citizens, and of nations and nationalities having equal rights."

1 And then Article 4: "The Socialist Autonomous Provinces are

2 autonomous socialist self-managing democratic socio-political communities

3 based on the power of and self-management by the working class and all

4 working people in which the working people, nations and nationalities

5 realise their sovereign rights, and when so specified by the Constitution

6 of the Socialist Republic of Serbia in the common interests of the working

7 people, nations and nationalities of that Republic as a whole, they do so

8 also within the Republic."

9 And then the last section that it may be helpful for the Court to

10 have in mind as it considers the arguments that you've been covering,

11 Article 5: "The territory of the Socialist Federal Republic --"

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson. What's the question?

13 I don't understand. Is Mr. Nice giving you instructions as to what you're

14 supposed to take as argument or is he putting a question to the witness?

15 What is the question after this quotation?

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: He's coming to the question. I don't think you

17 have been fair. You have employed the same methodology of reading

18 passages and then formulating the question after that, but it's now a

19 quarter past twelve, and we'll hear the question when we resume in 20

20 minutes.

21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, I just noted Exhibit 128 contains only

22 chapter 6 of the agreement. Could you look into the matter.

23 MR. NICE: Yes. The version of Exhibit 128 that I had - and I was

24 able to check it - certainly has the passage set out in the German

25 newspaper article. You can find it at page 588 in the page numbering of

1 the document, so that unless I've been provided -- and I've been provided

2 with a copy of the exhibit as stamped, and unless for some reason less

3 than the full document went in - and Ms. Dicklich shakes her head, this is

4 the document that went in - you will be able to find the defendant's

5 exhibit at page 588.

6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

7 --- Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.

8 --- On resuming at 12.43 p.m.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please continue, Mr. Nice.

10 MR. NICE: And, Your Honours, to complete the position on Exhibit

11 128, Ms. Graham has been good enough to remind me or inform me that

12 Exhibit 128 is a copy of the whole text of the Rambouillet agreement as

13 found in a book of documents, The Kosovo Conflicts, A Diplomatic History

14 Through Documents. It's not just chapter 6, even if each page says that

15 at the top of it. We hope that this is a satisfactory version of the

16 agreement, and we can investigate further through the UN website if you

17 would prefer, but we believe this to be satisfactory.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice.

19 MR. NICE:

20 Q. Back then, please, to the 1974 constitution, and I'm hoping

21 really, Professor, to provide the Chamber with just an adequate frame of

22 the various statutes in sequential order as we go through your evidence

23 for me to make the points that I wish to.

24 But if the usher would be good enough, please, to come back to the

25 page he was to the previous page so we can look at article 2 as well.

1 Previous page, article 2. No. Previous page. It's on the previous page,

2 at the foot of the page, article 2. And that reads: "The Socialist

3 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consists of the Socialist Republic of

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Socialist Republic of Croatia, the Socialist

5 Republic of Macedonia, the Socialist Republic of Montenegro, the Socialist

6 Republic of Serbia, the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, and

7 the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, which are constituent parts

8 of the Socialist Republic of Serbia and the Socialist Republic of

9 Slovenia."

10 So we've looked at that. This constitution -- we'll look at

11 another section in a second, but just in a sentence so that we can

12 understand your concerns, how does this truly disadvantage Serbia when the

13 decision was made to compose it in this way? How did it actually

14 disadvantage Serbia, so that the Judges can understand?

15 A. It is disadvantageous to Serbia in the following way: The

16 autonomous provinces are represented in all the federal organs, apart from

17 Serbia, as separate entities. In that way, Serbia was broken into three

18 parts. They would not represented through the delegation of the Republic

19 of Serbia but as independent delegations at federal level.

20 Q. Very well. The last section I want to look at, we may have looked

21 at it already, is Article 5. If the usher would be so good. Article 5

22 shows us at the foot of the page on the left: "The territory of the

23 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a single unified whole and

24 consists of the territories of the socialist republics.

25 "The territory of a republic may not be altered without the

1 consent of that republic, and the territory of an autonomous province

2 without the consent of that autonomous province.

3 "The frontiers of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

4 may not be altered without the consent of that autonomous province.

5 "The provinces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

6 may not be altered without the consent of the republics and autonomous

7 provinces."

8 So that the lawmakers in 1974 decided that the autonomous

9 provinces should have these very considerable powers; correct?

10 A. Well, they do have very considerable powers. They have all the

11 attributes of a state. They have legislative, judicial, executive powers,

12 they have their own constitutional court.

13 Q. That was the decision of the lawmakers in 1974. And so that the

14 Court can have the picture very rapidly but in a sense comprehensively, if

15 we then look at the matching constitution of 1974 for Serbia. If that

16 could go on the overhead projector. It's Exhibit 526, tab 1. We'll just

17 have a look at a little bit of that.

18 We can see, if the usher would just take the English version,

19 that these constitutions have preambles which at some stage it may be

20 interesting to look at, so that, for example, on the second page, I think

21 you'll see, of the preamble, second page, Usher, you'll see something that

22 says paragraph 7 - thank you - paragraph 7, this is in the Serbian

23 constitution: "The provinces are autonomous, socialist, self-managing,

24 democratic, socio-political communities with a special ethnic composition

25 and other specificities ..."

1 And then under paragraph 8, third line: "... according to the

2 principles of the agreement among the republics and autonomous provinces,

3 solidarity and reciprocity, equal participation by the republics and

4 autonomous provinces in federal agencies consistent with the

5 Constitution ..."

6 And this is the sort of -- would this be right, Professor? It's

7 this sort of power was disturbing to Serbs and Serbia?

8 A. I don't know which powers you mean.

9 Q. Well, under -- just looking at the preamble, under paragraph 8,

10 I'll read it again: "The working people, nations and nationalities of the

11 Socialist Republic of Serbia shall make decisions on the federal level

12 according to the principles of agreement among the Republics and

13 Autonomous Provinces, solidarity and reciprocity, equal participation by

14 the Republics and Autonomous Provinces in federal agencies consistent with

15 the Constitution ..."

16 So that there was a requirement for the making of decisions on --

17 according to the principles of agreement with an equal participation by

18 the autonomous provinces. This was one of the things that Serbs in Serbia

19 didn't like.

20 A. That precisely meant that the Republic of Serbia was reduced to

21 the area outside the provinces. Serbia was where the provinces were not,

22 because the provinces were independent entities in the federation. In

23 that way, Serbia was not equal to the other republics, because it was not

24 represented in the federation as a whole.

25 Q. If the usher would just turn on, to have a look at one other

1 article of this Serbian constitution, in case we return to it. It's

2 Article 146, 147.

3 And while that's being found -- there it is. Article 146 of the

4 Serbian constitution said this: "The languages of nations and

5 nationalities and their alphabets shall be equal.

6 "Members of nationalities --" and you've explained for us the

7 difference between nations and nationalities -- "Members of nationalities

8 shall, in conformity with the Constitution and Statute, have the right to

9 use their language and alphabet in the exercise of their rights and duties

10 and in proceedings before state agencies and organisations exercising

11 public powers."

12 And then under 147: "Members of other nations and nationalities

13 shall have the right to instruction in their language in schools and other

14 institutions of learning in conformity with the law and municipal

15 statute."

16 So those were enshrined rights within the Serbian constitution for

17 the use of language in education; correct?

18 A. Yes, precisely.

19 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... take you through the

20 development of these constitutions, those rights in education were later

21 restricted so far as Kosovo Albanians were concerned. Would you accept

22 that?

23 A. Until you prove that to me, I cannot accept it.

24 MR. NICE: The third constitution of this trio of constitutions

25 that I want to look at, Your Honours, is not available to us at the moment

1 in the same format as the ones we've got at the moment, but it is

2 available in a document that I'd ask you at the moment to look at and, at

3 the most for the moment, mark for identification.

4 Q. Professor, there's a publication called Kosovo Law and Politics,

5 published by the Helsinki Committee For Human Rights in Serbia. Are you

6 aware of that document?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Very well.

9 MR. NICE: Your Honours, at the moment I simply invite you to look

10 at the parts of it that deal with the constitution and other decisions

11 that I don't have available at the moment elsewhere, and perhaps we can

12 then review the position at the end of this witness's evidence.

13 While they are being distributed, they are documents that contain

14 a limited amount of commentary but extracts, not the full versions,

15 extracts from a number of documents that may be of interest and value to

16 us. Most helpful of the document is this, that it is published

17 simultaneously in English and Serbian. So that if you look at the index

18 first of all, you will see the first part of the index between pages 8 and

19 74 is in Serbian. Then on the next page we have the English, then

20 Serbian, then English.

21 At the moment, just to look at the relevant constitution that I

22 don't have elsewhere, if the Chamber will be good enough to go to page 39,

23 and if the witness would be good enough to go to page 38, we'll see the

24 preamble for the 1974 constitution of Kosovo. I don't need to take us

25 through any part of that.

1 Q. If we then go, Professor, you, please, to page 40, the Chamber to

2 page 41, and the overhead projector to page 41, we see general provisions

3 applying in Kosovo. They can be read at leisure, but included at Article

4 4: "The nations and nationalities in the Socialist Autonomous Province of

5 Kosovo shall be equal in their rights and duties.

6 "To ensure the equality of the nations and nationalities, their

7 right to the free development and expression of national specificities,

8 language, culture, history and other attributes shall be guaranteed."

9 Then Article 5: "In the socialist autonomous province of Kosovo,

10 the equality of the Albanian, Serbo-Croatian and Turkish languages and

11 their alphabets shall be ensured.

12 "The implementation of this principle shall be regulated and

13 ensured by the present Constitution and by provincial statute."

14 So, Professor, we see in the constitutions of the Socialist

15 Federal Republic and in the constitution of Serbia generalised rights in

16 respect of language and education as an example. We see here in the

17 Kosovo constitution a specific identification of the equality of rights

18 for Albanian, Serbo-Croatian, and Turkish language and alphabets; is that

19 correct?

20 A. Yes, and that's quite natural because the greatest degree of

21 generalisation is the federal constitution, and lower down we come to the

22 republican constitution and provincial one because it is in force for the

23 province.

24 Q. Constitutional change in the laws left by the 1974 lawmakers, am I

25 right in this - correct me if I'm wrong - constitutional change should

1 start at the top. It should start with the federal government, and it

2 should make decisions on constitutional change; correct?

3 A. The federal state decides -- or, rather, as I said, the federal

4 state decides upon amendments to the federal constitution. And if the

5 federal constitution is amended, that entails amendments to the

6 constitutions of the republics and provinces down the line.

7 Q. And indeed there would be a general requirement for the

8 harmonisation of constitutions in line with any constitutional change by

9 the federal government. Would that be correct?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. I can now move rapidly through the history until we come to your

12 own personal involvement. We've looked at very briefly, and I don't need

13 to look at again, plava knjiga, the blue book, which was Defence Exhibit

14 at tab 6. This was published in about March 1977; is that correct?

15 A. Yes, you're quite right.

16 Q. I think its author was a relation of the accused's wife. Is that

17 correct? As a matter of history and fact.

18 A. First of all, the text was published at the time but not for

19 public consumption but as a working paper, and the author of that text was

20 not one single person, there were a number of them, and if you want, I can

21 tell you who they were. And none of them, as far as I know, is related to

22 the wife of Mr. Milosevic.

23 Q. Very well. No time going to be taken on that.

24 And you appreciate, Professor, that the Prosecution in this case

25 has no interest in the rights or wrongs of constitutional arguments or,

1 indeed, in the rights and wrongs in the parties. We are only concerned to

2 lay out the history. So that when we look at the blue book, would this be

3 a fair characterisation of the position as you understand it, having been

4 given the book, I think you told us, by Mihailo Markovic: As early as

5 1977, Serbs were expressing their discontent with what the 1974

6 legislatures had provided?

7 A. First of all, I have to correct you. I received the book from

8 Academician Kosta Mihajlovic and not Mihailo Markovic. And secondly, not

9 the Serbs. It was a working body of the Presidency, the then Presidency

10 of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, and in that working body, since

11 you're insisting upon the blue book, there was Professor Najda Pasic from

12 the political science faculty; Professor Slovatkovic [phoen], also from

13 that faculty; Veljko Markovic -- Veljko Markovic, slower, thank you -- who

14 was the secretary-general of the Assembly; then we had Milivoje Draskovic,

15 who was the secretary, or rather, the minister for justice; Nikola Stanic,

16 who was the chef de cabinet of the president of the Presidency of the

17 Republic of Serbia; Milan Radonjic, who was a member of the Presidency.

18 So that then was the commission which was set up in 1975 when Mr.

19 Milosevic wasn't on the political arena at all. He wasn't a public figure

20 at that time at all.

21 Q. I accept that and hadn't suggested otherwise, but help me with

22 this: Had Kosovo Albanians, who had been given powers and the

23 constitution that they had been given in 1974, were they expressing

24 discontent with this constitution or was the discontent only coming from

25 Serbia?

1 A. They, too, expressed their dissatisfaction, and in 1981, in fact,

2 they staged an armed rebellion because they were not satisfied with being

3 an autonomous province. What they wanted was to be a state. They were

4 not satisfied with the solutions pursuant to the 1974 constitution, and

5 that is why they held their uprising in 1981.

6 Q. Let's break that down into two parts, because I was coming to the

7 1981 incident or event. There was no question, was there, of Kosovo

8 Albanians expressing discontent with the powers they had on the basis that

9 they were inadequate. You're simply saying that they wanted even more.

10 Would that be right?

11 A. They wanted Kosovo Republic, and their basic slogan at the

12 demonstrations and rebellions was "Kosovo Republic." That was the slogan.

13 Q. And let's come to the 1981 demonstrations, or whatever it was.

14 First of all, were you involved yourself in any way at that stage?

15 A. I don't where you mean was I involved. In public life or what?

16 Q. First of all, were you at Pristina when the incident occurred?

17 A. No. No, I wasn't.

18 Q. Did you have any teaching role in Kosovo in general or in Pristina

19 in particular?

20 A. No, I did not, never. Only on one occasion, in 1999, on the 16th

21 of January, I was the member of a commission for a doctoral thesis

22 defence, and that was all I had to do in the educational sense at the

23 University of Pristina.

24 Q. So your knowledge of the 1981 event is really the knowledge that

25 anybody else had through reading newspapers, watching television,

1 listening to the radio?

2 A. Absolutely so. All my knowledge was the kind of knowledge that

3 was accessible to all the citizens. And since it's been more than 20

4 years since then, that knowledge is no longer reliable. They are only my

5 recollection of the events.

6 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... trigger a memory of the

7 events that's been before the Judges, this is the demonstration that was

8 alleged to have started with a complaint by the quality of the soup by the

9 students and developed into something else. Is that the one?

10 A. That's right. That's what the papers said. But as I say, I'm not

11 an authentic eyewitness of those events. I didn't see anything. I wasn't

12 there to see what happened. I learnt about it subsequently and not

13 directly; indirectly.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

16 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't know if I remember correctly

18 myself, but as far as I recall, Professor Markovic didn't testify about

19 the demonstrations in Kosovo at all.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: It falls within --

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All these years, 1971 and so on.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: In my view it falls within the area of his

23 testimony.

24 MR. NICE: I'm grateful and in fact he did mention them.

25 Q. But we'll move on, because in 1980 to 1985, you were passing from

1 being an extraordinary into becoming a full-time professor at the law

2 faculty in Belgrade. Would that be an accurate picture?

3 A. Yes, yes. As I said, I was an assistant lecturer, docent,

4 extraordinary professor, and then finally full professor.

5 Q. And then in 1986, as you explained to us, you became a member of

6 the Commission for Constitutional Issues in the Assembly of the Republic

7 of Serbia. In order to be a member of that commission, was it necessary

8 to be a member of the Communist Party?

9 A. That's what I became as a representative of my profession. And we

10 were invited to the Assembly of Serbia together by Branislav Ikonic, who

11 was the vice-president, that is to say Miodrag Jovicic and myself, the two

12 of us were asked to attend, and we were asked on that occasion to give

13 them the benefit of our professional knowledge, to help the work -- the

14 commission in its work. But Mr. Jovicic was disillusioned with the

15 commission very soon and he left. But as I was a younger colleague and

16 somebody with better nerves, he asked me to stay on and finish the job

17 that we had started.

18 Academician Jovicic himself was never a member of the League of

19 Communists of Yugoslavia.

20 Q. Were you?

21 A. I was, yes, I was a member of the League of Communists.

22 Q. Since when?

23 A. Since 1965.

24 Q. Had you been an active participant in Communist Party affairs

25 since 1965?

1 A. No. I never held any position, not even at the university level,

2 the level of the faculty of law. I was just a simple member.

3 Q. How, then, was it that you either got the flavour or the taste for

4 or were invited to get involved in active politics at this, turned out to

5 be critical, time, 1986?

6 A. Let me repeat: I did not become involved in politics in 1986. I

7 became involved in the professional work of the Constitutional Commission.

8 I became active in politics only in 1992, when I was elected as the

9 federal deputy, deputy in the federal parliament, and then I took an

10 active part in politics up until the year 2000 when, as I have already

11 explained, I withdrew from political life once and for all and am now

12 devoting myself to my professional work --

13 Q. Can we look --

14 A. -- in the academic realm.

15 Q. -- at an article you wrote, and I think the date is probably

16 September of 1988, headed The People's Constitution.

17 While it's being distributed and you're reminding yourself in

18 general terms of the article as you look at it, the Chamber will recall

19 that it's in 1986 that the famous -- famous memorandum was written.

20 When did you first become aware of the existence of the

21 memorandum, please?

22 A. Well, to be quite frank, I really can't pinpoint the time now, but

23 it was when that whole affair was set out in the press. Before that, I

24 never knew about it.

25 Q. And your involvement in or even near politics, is this what you're

1 telling us as I can understand it, was limited to your membership of this

2 Commission for Constitutional Issues; is that right?

3 A. Yes, you understood me correctly. I never held a public function

4 until 1992. I was just a member of the Commission for Constitutional

5 Issues, as I said.

6 Q. I want to look at a number of things that you said in this article

7 in 1998. On the first page, and it's about three lines down, there's this

8 passage: "Until recently, the say of those working in science and

9 politics in Serbia was not fit to make even a single essential change in,

10 as it seemed until recently, a conserved for all times constitutional

11 system of Serbia."

12 Sorry, have you found the place, Professor? It should be at the

13 first page.

14 A. No.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It begins on line 3, page 1. The

16 last word is "do nedavno," the word, and we just have the first syllable

17 of that word, "until recently."

18 MR. NICE:

19 Q. If you'd like to just pick it up from there and read it over to

20 yourself.

21 Then the next sentence begins: "Those working in politics and

22 experienced in the constitutional struggle lived the struggle as a

23 struggle for their personal prestige and position, and they exercised the

24 power which they possessed for the formal initiating of constitutional

25 changes, the maintenance of their political careers, instead of using it

1 for the struggle itself."

2 We've heard about something that goes by the name of the

3 Bureaucratic Revolution. Just help me in this passage that I've read to

4 you from your paper. Is that what you're describing?

5 A. I'm afraid I couldn't find the second part of your quotation.

6 However, what I want to say is this: It was the first time ever that the

7 amendments to the constitution included active representatives of the

8 profession and of science and scholars. Up until then, including the 1974

9 constitution, constitutional amendments and preparations for amendments

10 were done behind closed doors, always by politicians themselves, people

11 from the realm of politics, and the main politician which stood at the

12 held of constitutional change was Edvard Kardelj.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I assume there's been a mistake

16 towards the end of Mr. Nice's question, because he says "[In English]

17 something that goes by the name of the Bureaucratic Revolution."

18 [Interpretation] I assume what he meant to say was Anti-bureaucratic

19 Revolution.

20 MR. NICE: Absolutely correct, and I thank the accused.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice is indebted to you, Mr. Milosevic.

22 MR. NICE:

23 Q. And did that help, Professor? The passage that I've read, and

24 that even if you had difficulty finding it, was that describing the

25 Anti-bureaucratic Revolution?

1 A. Well, I don't know which paragraph you're referring to now because

2 I failed to find that.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I be of assistance, perhaps?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would be very grateful, yes.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The seventh line from the top, after

6 68, 70, after the year 68, 74, it says political workers, et cetera, et

7 cetera, viewed the -- line 7 from the top. From the beginning, line 7.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. The sentence does not give rise

9 to an assertion that this is a programme for the Anti-bureaucratic

10 Revolution. This is a pure statement of fact that the people working in

11 politics have included into such a serious business that the

12 constitutional changes were that they were including professionals from

13 the profession, and that was the reason why so many professionals were

14 activated and involved in this process at the time. I myself was almost

15 50 at the time when I became involved in public life, because that was the

16 only time that people wanted to hear the -- what the professionals and

17 scientists and scholars had to say. Otherwise you would go to prison if

18 you said anything against the constitution and constitutional provisions.

19 And as I said, in 1971, the journal was banned. Professor Mihailo Djuric

20 went to prison and five professors were expelled from the university.

21 MR. NICE:

22 Q. Let's look at the next passage in, I think your 1988 account of

23 then-recent history. "All those working in science, although science was

24 proclaimed a subjective factor in our system, had the knowledge and the

25 adequate understanding of the things, at least those who did not become

1 slaves of those working in politics, however, they did not have before as

2 well as now the real power to start constitutional changes. Nonetheless,

3 thanks to the change in the ratio of the political forces, when it comes

4 to political changes and generally new political climate, those working in

5 politics and science, each working in their own domain, from the moment

6 when the proposal for change of the constitution of Serbia was formally

7 submitted prepared the terrain for the say of the people on constitutional

8 changes."

9 Now, does that passage, written in 1988, reflect in part the role

10 that the Academy of Sciences' memorandum played in driving political

11 change?

12 A. I didn't have in mind the memorandum in the sentence at all. All

13 I had in mind was the fact that the debates on the constitution had become

14 transparent. That is to say that the citizens, broad sections of the

15 population, for the first time were able to hear what the dilemmas were

16 with respect to the constitution and what the options were, what solutions

17 could be chosen to tackle the constitutional crisis. And this means that

18 the public at large was kept abreast of what was going on. Otherwise,

19 beforehand, you could just read about it in some scholarly scientific

20 journal and you couldn't adopt a critical position towards any of this

21 before.

22 Q. Had you, by your participation on this commission, got to know a

23 lot more about politics and to understand the way the world of politics

24 was moving?

25 A. Well, I took part in politics as a professional, things that

1 related to my professional expertise. And throughout the time I was in

2 politics, as I say, I did professional work, that is to say law. I dealt

3 with law. I was in the government for the justice system, jurisdiction,

4 jurisprudence, legality, legislation and so on, constitutional matters.

5 So in politics I was always there as a professional. I didn't go beyond

6 my profession. So I can't say that I know much about the powers of

7 politics as such.

8 Q. Well, I may be going to challenge you on that in due course, but

9 when you wrote this article in 1988, the Kosovo Polje incident of the

10 accused's speech and its reporting in the media had occurred. Do you

11 remember that?

12 A. Well, I remember at that well-known sentence. I don't remember

13 the entire context. I wasn't there. I wasn't present, neither did the

14 media go into the details. Were you aware and were you indeed in this

15 article of yours writing about the development of direct action - I use a

16 neutral term - direct action for effecting political change?

17 A. No. This is quite simply the view of a professional of the

18 constitutional problem that loomed in the Republic of Serbia at the day.

19 It wasn't an address to the public at all, it was just the presentation of

20 a professional view by a professional.

21 Q. Let's look at the next bit, please. It reads as follows in the

22 English, and I'm starting at a sentence that in translation says: "And,

23 considering ..." and in your text you'll find it "i po svemu sudeci." On

24 the first page still of your text --

25 A. Yes, yes I've found it. Thank you.

1 Q. "And, considering everything, that which they did not manage to do

2 in regard to the constitutional changes, the people are now on the course

3 of doing in a spontaneous action. That is the best proof of the ripeness

4 for resolving of the constitutional issue. Is there a more ideal

5 execution of constitutional authority in a democracy than it being

6 spontaneously taken by the people? Today, in Serbia, the people

7 themselves are beginning to execute the constitutional authority. Its

8 formal executors are risking losing legitimacy if they do not translate in

9 writing this living constitution of the people. Today, the entire Serbia

10 is a legislature, a spontaneously convened constituent Assembly in a

11 continuous session. In it, the people, in an immediate fashion, without

12 intermediaries and interpreters of their desires, write their own

13 constitution as a work of self-determination."

14 Now, we see in that passage references to spontaneous action and

15 constitutional change. Were you there lending academic respectability to

16 what I've called in the most neutral terms direct action and the use of

17 force?

18 A. No. I note a fact here which no democrats can dispute, and that

19 is this: The constitutional power, constitution giving power should be in

20 the hands of the people, and the constitution should be an expression of

21 the will of the people, and the most democratic way of adopting a

22 constitution is to hold a referendum regarding the constitution. This was

23 an informal referendum, and there was a uniform idea of how the 1974

24 constitution should be amended.

25 Q. You see, in the -- if this article was written in September -- or

1 published in September 1998, it was in the following months that there was

2 the famous Yogurt Revolution. And you remember that?

3 A. I do, I remember that.

4 Q. It was called the Yogurt Revolution because all the demonstrators

5 in Vojvodina who brought the downfall of the Vojvodina authorities had the

6 same yogurt in their packed lunches, some of which they threw, suggesting

7 that they were an organised group. That's the reason it's called the

8 Yogurt Revolution, isn't it?

9 A. I truly don't know that detail. I have heard of the term Yogurt

10 Revolution, and you just gave me an explanation why it is called that way.

11 Q. And my suggestion to you is that you were already rather closely

12 involved in politics, whether through this commission or otherwise,

13 because you seemed to be writing here about the validity of direct action.

14 That's my suggestion to you. Would you accept that or not?

15 A. I would not accept it, not at all. My position is the result of

16 the freedom of thought and freedom of scholarly work. I am taking

17 advantage of my constitutional freedom.

18 Q. We look --

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Can I ask a question? The very first sentence,

20 Professor, that was quoted to you in this last passage, "And, considering

21 everything, that which they did not manage to do in regard to the

22 constitutional changes, the people are now on the course of doing in a

23 spontaneous action." What does that mean?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That meant that in many spontaneous

25 gatherings, this conviction was expressed, namely that the -- that Serbia

1 was split into three separate parts, that it had lost its authority over

2 its provinces, that it could not implement the self-organisation. The

3 entire thing became an absurdity. The provinces which were within Serbia

4 had turned against Serbia, so they represented Serbia in a different way

5 within the federal organs than did the state delegations of Serbia proper.

6 That constitution was already in force for 14 years, and therefore there

7 was enough time for people to realise just how unjust this constitutional

8 solution was.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, with the greatest of respect, that does not

10 seem to me to answer that question. Read it again: "And, considering

11 everything, that which they did not manage to do in regard to the

12 constitutional changes, the people are now on the course of doing in a

13 spontaneous action." This doesn't appear to be a reference to opinions or

14 views, it appears to be a reference to action and the failure in the past

15 to successfully take action.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the past, most likely because of

17 political opportunism, the solution contained in the 1974 constitution,

18 the federal constitution, was tolerated. And this solution was taken to

19 even greater absurdity in the Serbian constitution that came after that.

20 So in that sense, the political establishment that was in power at

21 the time did not succeed in changing that. Most likely, as I've said,

22 because of political opportunism.

23 After that, there came a spontaneous action of the people, of the

24 residents against. It was turned against such a constitutional solution.

25 There were gatherings. People were getting together in order to express

1 protest.

2 In addition to that, the scholars also believed unanimously that

3 the solution applied in the constitution of Serbia was non plus ultra,

4 that was a precedent that had not existed ever before and was expressed

5 for the first time in that constitution.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

7 MR. NICE:

8 Q. Next of the total of four passages I want to look at in this

9 article is on our page 4, but for you, Professor Markovic, it's page 1181

10 at the bottom, and it's the second line from the top. In the English

11 text, it's in the centre of the page, and if it's on display, it reads as

12 follows -- yes, about four lines down on the screen:

13 "There is no realisation of that what the people now seek without

14 a radical constitutional change, and only two such changes are necessary.

15 Firstly, that the regions be reduced to true autonomous units with

16 autonomous domains set in the Constitution of Serbia (thus, taking away

17 all the attributes of statehood from the regions). Secondly, that every

18 direct institutional connection of the regions with the federation be

19 severed, if the connection means granting equal vote to one Serbia and to

20 the two regions in the federation, in conditions of consensual federalism

21 (where thus Serbia has minus one vote)."

22 So you are here - it is your article - expressing the most, if I

23 may suggest so to you, the most extreme position for Kosovo, namely that

24 it has to lose all attributes of statehood.

25 A. I don't see. Where do you find me mentioning Kosovo at all in

1 this text? Please find the word Kosovo for me.

2 Q. Are you suggesting that you didn't have Kosovo and Vojvodina in

3 mind when you wrote this?

4 A. Interpreted in that way, yes. Including Vojvodina, not Kosovo

5 alone. The first and the second statement are true within the science of

6 the constitutional law; general, obvious statements. The competence of

7 the autonomous provinces I listed exhaustively, not in a general way, as

8 is done with respect to the federation. In -- the autonomous provinces do

9 not have the right to participate in the work of the federal organs in a

10 federal state, and this is where the difference lies between a federal

11 state and a state with a federal autonomy. This is an obvious conclusion

12 that you can find in constitutional law. This is mentioned by Professor

13 Patek [phoen] when he lists the qualities of federal states. One of those

14 principles is participation, which is typical only for the federal state

15 and no other form of state.

16 Q. Two questions: One an entire parenthesis I must deal with before

17 I forget it. I think you said yesterday in the course of evidence that

18 Vojvodina, like Kosovo, contained people seeking separatism in some way.

19 Did you say that yesterday?

20 A. Yes. I even said that the then-representatives of political

21 figures in Vojvodina were quite vociferous and aggressive in that respect,

22 which is another proof showing that the Serbs have majority in Vojvodina.

23 The absolute majority in Vojvodina is held by Serbs, and despite that,

24 Vojvodina expressed tendency for separatism just like Kosovo did.

25 Q. Pause there if you would be so good. Expressed a tendency. Can

1 you point me so I can just go and find it and confirm the accuracy of what

2 you say. Can you point me to any Vojvodina politician or political party

3 or event that was a move within Vojvodina for separatism? Can you help

4 me?

5 A. At the time, there were no political parties at the time. We did

6 not have a multi-party system then. However, those were the people who

7 held public offices at the time within the province. In various

8 professional journals and various dailies, in meetings of the

9 Constitutional Commission, I witnessed daily their speeches and positions

10 to that effect. Perhaps I could give you some names but I might err by

11 mentioning some names and omitting some others. After all, this took

12 place over 20 years ago.

13 Q. Well, if you think of something that can show that what you've

14 said is accurate I would be grateful.

15 I come back to my previous question. You, an academic, as you

16 explain you were, have taken a position adverse to the then constitutional

17 rights and powers of both provinces that could not be more extreme. Would

18 that be correct? Because you've sought to argue that they should lose all

19 the rights that the 1974 constitution gave them.

20 A. There are two substantive mistakes in your question. First of

21 all, I'm not an academician, nor have I ever stated that I was one. The

22 second is that I did not state that all autonomous rights should be

23 revoked but, rather, that the attributes of statehood. You can see in

24 parenthesis "the revocation of all attributes of statehood from the

25 provinces." Therefore, there were two substantive mistakes in your

1 question.

2 Q. Very well. I'm going to cut one passage and go to the last. On

3 our page 6, and on your page 1182 -- and in your version, Professor, it's

4 about seven lines up from the end of the paragraph that's in the middle of

5 that page. On the overhead projector, please, halfway down the page, the

6 words "In conditions ..." A bit higher. Fine. Thank you very much.

7 "In conditions of such constitutional isolation of a region from

8 the Republic of Serbia, it is natural that Albanians in Kosovo gave a

9 'request Kosovo Republic', that they request for themselves an Albanian

10 state in Kosovo as they are a majority from that self-sufficient area

11 provided with all the state functions, and Serbs and other non-Albanian

12 peoples are in a considerable minority. Albanians in Kosovo, the ones who

13 are requesting that, are inspired exactly by the existing constitutional

14 system of Serbia. It would have been hard to put such requests forward if

15 Serbia on its entire territory was established as a unitary state."

16 You recognise in this passage, don't you, Professor, that the

17 powers were lawfully given by the lawmakers, and you can hardly blame the

18 Kosovo Albanians for seeking that which they sought.

19 A. No. In this passage, I merely say that such constitutional

20 solutions inspire separatism, give rise to it. Therefore, there is a very

21 subtle difference between the province and republic which could turn

22 province into the republic, and that was precisely what the Kosovo

23 Albanians requested. They wanted to be a part of the federal state, a

24 unit, and not an autonomous unit within the Republic of Serbia.

25 MR. NICE: May this article be exhibited?

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

2 MR. NICE: And if the Chamber is sitting only to the normal time,

3 I have one other question to ask, but if it is sitting beyond, I'll take a

4 topic.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: One further question.

6 MR. NICE:

7 Q. You told us -- and, Professor, I'm exploring your closeness to

8 politics, and we're just reaching a period of particular materiality. You

9 told us last week that in addition to drafting constitutions for Serbia

10 and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, you drafted a constitution but are

11 somehow disabled from telling us what that constitution was by an Official

12 Secrets Act. We can take it in detail. For whichever this country is, is

13 there really an Official Secrets Act that says the drafter or draftsmen of

14 the constitution cannot be identified?

15 A. First of all, I didn't say that I wrote those constitutions.

16 Based on the questions you could see that I took part in the drafting of

17 these constitutions, so I was not the author.

18 Q. You told us on the day one, but indeed it was two, that you

19 drafted them with, amongst others, Borivoj Rasua. Now will you please

20 tell the Chamber what those constitutions were in each you lent a hand.

21 A. I don't know where you got the name of Borivoj Rasua. This is the

22 first I'm hearing of it. I never mentioned that name.

23 Q. In which case, tell us what the constitutions were, please.

24 A. I took part in the sense I was a member of the commission for

25 drafting the constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and

1 Republic of Serbia. I took part only in formulating revisionist

2 procedures of the constitution of Montenegro. So I gave the solution, the

3 proposal, and also the formulation for disbanding the Assembly of

4 Montenegro -- dissolving the Assembly.

5 Now, let me give you a more detailed explanation, if it is at all

6 relevant for this trial. The constitution is a very delicate issue. It

7 is adopted by the Assembly. I only provided my professional expertise in

8 the drafting of the constitution which was later on adopted by the

9 Assembly. Nobody can claim authorship over a constitution, because

10 constitution is passed by an Assembly. I simply took part in formulating

11 some of its provisions. The constitution is always adopted by an

12 Assembly.

13 Q. [Previous translation continues]... some involvement in

14 Montenegro, but help me. Did you take part in drafting constitutional

15 documents for the Republika Srpska?

16 A. No, never.

17 Q. The Republic of Serb Krajina?

18 A. The constitution of Republika Srpska or, rather, Bosnia and

19 Herzegovina, is an integral part of the Dayton Peace Accords. So it would

20 be pretentious of me to claim that I took part in drafting the Dayton

21 Peace Accords.

22 Q. Did you take part in drafting documents of a constitutional nature

23 either for the Serbs in Croatia or the Serb body in Bosnia way before

24 Dayton in 1992? Did you?

25 A. I don't know that a constitution was passed in Republika Srpska

1 Krajina and in Republika Srpska. I just heard it from you for the first

2 time.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: That --

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I wish you could show that

5 constitution to me. As Lord Palmerston said, I would reward you well for

6 showing me that constitution. I would like to see it myself.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, one more question or --

8 MR. NICE: Certainly.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- stop?

10 MR. NICE:

11 Q. Perhaps you could also look -- can we go back to the exhibit I

12 produced just now, and perhaps you could look just at the last -- the last

13 paragraphs of that for your comments as well, please. Do you have the

14 document before you?

15 THE REGISTRAR: And that's Exhibit 816.

16 MR. NICE: Yes. Thank you.

17 Q. It's on the last page, and I'd like your comment on it. It's the

18 last paragraph, that begins: "A question arises." So it will be on our

19 page 11, the last page of the article for you. It says: "A question

20 arises what will happen if the amendments of the constitution in Serbia

21 cannot be carried out according to the constitutional procedure as set in

22 its constitution?"

23 Have you found that?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. "That depends on the political consequences which could be

1 provoked by that fact. If such a dilemma is established, it should be

2 evaluated what will be given the priority - observing of the constitution

3 or survival of the state. In such a situation, we are of the opinion that

4 it should not be allowed by any means that the law should triumph even if

5 that means the fall of the state: Fiat iustitia pereat mundus. A

6 constitution is always a particularly political and not only a legal act,

7 differently from the law. Constitution is always an expression of the

8 ratio of political forces, and so it cannot be expected that the principle

9 of legality would be to that extent strictly observed, as is the case with

10 law. Disruptions of the constitutional continuity - the

11 non-constitutional amendments of the constitution - in the world are a

12 clear phenomenon --

13 A. Yes, frequent occurrence.

14 Q. "-- independent of the political culture of a country. In a

15 changed ratio of political forces, why would a regulation, which is

16 obviously a nonsense, be unalterable, and enjoy asylum, only because it is

17 set in the constitution which is practically made unalterable. The

18 criterion of constitutionality in democracies was always the will of the

19 people and its great majority. A people are anyhow more important than a

20 constitution."

21 This conclusion in specific terms says that the law will not

22 triumph but the will of the people will, doesn't it?

23 A. Mr. Nice, I wrote this article in my capacity as a scholar, and I

24 signed it in that capacity. Are you now accusing me or blaming me for my

25 scholarly ideas?

1 Q. My question to you was and is: By this article and this part of

2 the article, you are proposing - I didn't use that word but I do -

3 proposing arguing for the supremacy of the will of the people over the

4 rule of law, and nothing could be clearer.

5 A. The law can have supremacy only if it is an expression of the will

6 of the people. Otherwise, it has -- it is not grounded. It has no

7 foundation. And let me repeat once again that I wrote this as a scholar,

8 not a political office-holder. At the time in 1998, I held no public

9 office. These are my scholarly views and positions. And if you now take

10 me to account for that, that means that we are returning to the times of

11 inquisition.

12 Q. My suggestion to you is that it was your willingness to take,

13 shall we say, a liberal view of the law that made you extremely useful to

14 this accused over the decade that was to follow. You remained useful to

15 him in various ways, as we shall see, throughout that period of time,

16 turning the law not to the advantage of mankind but to the advantage of

17 this single individual, the accused. Do you accept that you turned the

18 law whenever you could to the advantage of this accused?

19 A. These are your qualifications, Mr. Nice. If that is your opinion,

20 so be it. I will not interfere with that. However, I did not really

21 expect you to state an opinion of that nature in a courtroom.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I think we'll have to take the break

23 now. We'll break until tomorrow morning, 9.00 a.m.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, if it's not too much

25 trouble, could you please establish whether Mr. Nice intends to conclude

1 his cross-examination tomorrow, because it is important for me to know

2 that for my next witness so I can adjust my schedule.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.

4 MR. NICE: I'm certainly not in a position to forecast that I will

5 conclude tomorrow. I will certainly do my best, if I can, to conclude

6 tomorrow, but there are a number of matters this witness has gone into of

7 some detail, and what I propose to do so far as matters of law properly

8 subject to legal expertise is concerned is to try and at least identify

9 such issues as may be relevant to the Chamber through the witness and then

10 we can discuss perhaps later whether further expert evidence is required.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, in that case, you should have a

12 witness in readiness.

13 MR. NICE: I'm pretty sure I will take all of tomorrow.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: It won't be necessary to have a witness in

15 readiness for tomorrow.

16 We are adjourned.

17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.56 p.m.,

18 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 20th day

19 of January, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.

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