Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 39487

1 Tuesday, 17 May 2005

2 [Open session]

3 [The witness entered court]

4 [The accused entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the witness is scheduled to be

7 here for a long time in chief, so let us proceed as quickly as possible.

8 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for Mr. Milosevic.

9 Microphone. Microphone, please. The microphone is not switched on.

10 Could the microphone be turned towards Mr. Milosevic, please.

11 It's facing right the other way. Thank you.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, proceed now, Mr. Milosevic.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope you have received a proper

14 translation of tab 10, which we dealt with last week. I'll just dwell on

15 that for a while.


17 [Witness answered through interpreter]

18 Examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

19 Q. Good morning, General. I hope you have tab 10 in front of you.

20 It is the decision to establish a ministerial staff for the suppression of

21 terrorism.

22 What is the date of the decision? When was it passed?

23 A. The decision was passed on the 16th of June, 1998.

24 Q. We have here the staff members appointed by the minister, and

25 apart from that, it says here after listing all the individuals one by one

Page 39488

1 that the expanded Staff shall also include chiefs of the Secretariats for

2 Internal Affairs centres and branches of the RDB, Department of State

3 Security, in the AP, autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija.

4 A. Yes, that's right.

5 Q. Does that mean that the expanded staff incorporates all these

6 individuals as well as the chiefs of secretariats in the Kosovo and

7 Metohija area, all of them?

8 A. Yes, that's right.

9 Q. Now, what is defined here as the staff's assignment?

10 A. Last time, I said that under II the task of the staff was defined,

11 and it was defined in such a way as being tasked with planning, organising

12 and managing the activities and use of the organisational units of the

13 ministry, both the sent and attached units, to suppress terrorism in the

14 area of the AP of Kosovo and Metohija. And then para 2, also the staff is

15 tasked with planning, organising, directing, and coordinating the

16 activities of the organisational units of the ministry in Kosovo and

17 Metohija in carrying out complex security operations, special security

18 operations.

19 Q. In the documents here we have a number of these decisions on the

20 staff for suppressing terrorism. Now, what is the difference between

21 them?

22 A. The difference between these various decisions basically is in the

23 personnel composition of the staff. Of course, the difference between

24 this decision and the previous decision, if I remember that correctly, is

25 negligible with respect to the mandates of the staff. This decision is

Page 39489

1 focused more on the suppression of terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija and,

2 therefore, the title of the staff, the name of the staff has been changed.

3 Q. Thank you, General.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, you said that we shall

5 be tendering exhibits into evidence at the end of a tab. Is that how

6 we're going to proceed?


8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Let us now continue with your testimony where you left off at the

11 end of our last working session. I asked you whether there were any --

12 was there any overlapping in what the police and the army did.

13 A. I said that the overlapping of competencies in the negative sense

14 did not exist but that the army carried out, pursuant to the rules

15 governing the ministry of the interior just as the police did in

16 conformity with the rules of resubordination, did tasks that came under

17 the duties of the army and vice versa.

18 Q. Could you explain that to us more closely, please, bearing in mind

19 several excerpts contained in tab 4 taken from the law on the army and the

20 other relevant provisions, the law on defence, and other law in point.

21 A. Yes, I can do that. In tab 4, on page 2, Article 30, para 1 of

22 the law on the army of Yugoslavia says: "The rights and duties of

23 authorised personnel of the organs of the interior in the army is

24 performed by authorised personnel of the organs of security and the

25 military police."

Page 39490

1 Then Article 31, para 2, once again the law on the army of

2 Yugoslavia, states the following: "Authorised persons in the service of

3 the organs of security and military police may in performing their duties

4 in the field of security or military police use firearms and other means

5 as prescribed by separate provisions in conformity with the rules

6 governing the organs of the interior."

7 So this article deals with what military officials can use and

8 others. Of course, these duties carried out by the organs of the military

9 police and public security refers to military personnel.

10 Now, Article 17 of the law on defence of Yugoslavia prescribes the

11 means of resubordination of police units to the units of the army of

12 Yugoslavia, how they are resubordinated and attached to them. But I think

13 that we'll discuss this article at greater length in due course most

14 probably.

15 Q. Thank you, General. Now, the army and the police, did they engage

16 in joint operations; and if so, how did they engage in them? How did they

17 carry them out?

18 A. The army and police in Kosovo and Metohija in the course of 1998

19 and 1999 had joint operations to suppress terrorism. Those operations

20 were conducted according to a uniform, united plan for the suppression of

21 terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija, and according to individual plans or,

22 rather, orders for each specific operation and action.

23 Q. General, would you please take a look now at tabs -- you mentioned

24 orders just now.

25 A. Yes, that's right.

Page 39491

1 Q. So -- now, please take a look at tab 145 onwards, and then I shall

2 be asking you some questions pertaining to some of the material there,

3 some of these documents.

4 Tab 145 contains one such order. Have you found it?

5 A. Yes, I have.

6 Q. I'd like us to look at tabs 146, 145, 7, 8, and 9, now, please.

7 This is a document --

8 MR. NICE: No translation for any of these, unless the Chamber's

9 been provided with more material than I have.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, any explanation?

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, my information tells

12 me that this has been translated. However -- well, anyway, I hope that

13 the general will briefly be able to explain this. We can place it on the

14 ELMO. And I will check during the break what material has already

15 arrived.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. It's relatively short, so it may be placed

17 on the ELMO.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Let's take the portions that have been translated. Tab 148 has

20 been translated.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: If it has been translated, why is it we don't

22 have the translation? That's right. We don't have the original either.

23 We don't have the original.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll investigate during the break

25 and see what all that is about, Mr. Robinson, check it out. But let's go

Page 39492

1 back to tab 145, since it's a brief document.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, in your index, beside tab 148 is

3 the following: "Requested document not yet received from the authorities

4 in Belgrade." How does that tie in with the explanation that you give?

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What I have here is it says tab 148,

6 in English, the 24th of May, 1999. Probably in the meantime what

7 happened, that document came in. I don't know.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. General, do you have that document, document tab 148? Do you have

10 it in the Serbian?

11 A. Only in the Serbian version, yes.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: How long is the document, how many pages?

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The document, I have it here in

14 English, is four pages long.

15 THE INTERPRETER: Could the English version be placed on the ELMO,

16 please.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we're going to lose time because

18 of the maladministration of your case, but let the English version be

19 placed on the ELMO.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. It's tab 148, General. You can follow it in the Serbian, the copy

22 in front of you. Have you found tab 148?

23 A. Yes, I have. Do you want me to say something?

24 Q. Just quote the characteristic points, what you think should be

25 highlighted. All the documents we find in 146, 7, 8, and 9.

Page 39493

1 A. In all these tabs, what we have are orders, the ones that I

2 mentioned in responding to your previous question, and those orders relate

3 to disbanding --

4 JUDGE KWON: Sorry to interrupt, but can we see the title of this

5 document. It looks like the ones already exhibited. "Order." Thank you.

6 Yes. Proceed, Mr. Stevanovic.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Judge.

8 In tab 148, just like in the other tabs, we have a series of

9 orders of the command of the Pristina Corps to disband and destroy, or

10 break up and destroy the Siptar operations in different operations and

11 different geographical regions. This tab 148 specifically is an order.

12 It is an order to break up and destroy the Siptar terrorist forces in the

13 Lipovica sector. The date is the 24th of May, 1999, and of course its

14 contents or, rather, the contents of this order have been standardised.

15 It is the customary way in which these orders are written for things of

16 this kind.

17 From this particular order we can see that in the anti-terrorist

18 operations, specifically this particular operation, was one in which the

19 joint forces of the army and police took part. And of course this can be

20 seen straight away on point 2 of page 1 where the main tasks of the units

21 are specified, and in line 1, if I can read it out, it says: "The 15th

22 Armoured Brigade, together with parts of the 124th MUP Intervention

23 Brigade (3 companies), the 36th Detachment of the special police units (3

24 companies) --" and then the next portion is not easy to read but quite

25 obviously it refers to tasks for units of the police and army in that same

Page 39494

1 anti-terrorist operation.

2 Of course, in continuation, once again it is a standardised form,

3 we have the tasks that are specified in the usual manner.

4 All the other tabs that you mentioned are very similar, with the

5 proviso that they refer, of course, to other operations and are usually

6 titled "Zapovest," "Order," rather than the word "Naredjenje," as is the

7 case in tab 148.

8 Q. General, these orders in tabs 145, 6, 7, 8, and 9 all pertain to

9 anti-terrorist activities where the army and police operated in concert?

10 A. Yes, that's right. It all has to do with anti-terrorist

11 operations. But they are carried out at different points in time and in

12 different areas. Different military and police units take part in them.

13 Q. The order in tab 145 bears which date?

14 A. The order in tab 145 is dated the 25th of May, 1999.

15 Q. What about the next tab?

16 A. That was the 27th of May, 1999.

17 Q. Tab 147?

18 A. The 24th of April, 1999.

19 Q. Oh, the 24th of April, 1999.

20 A. Yes, that's right.

21 Q. And what about 149?

22 A. 149 is the 22nd of May, 1999.

23 Q. During the NATO aggression against the Federal Republic of

24 Yugoslavia, was there any resubordination of the police units to the army

25 of Yugoslavia?

Page 39495

1 A. Yes, there was resubordination of the police to the army of the

2 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but this response requires a detailed

3 explanation.

4 Q. Through questions we'll try to get to that. First of all, the

5 resubordination of the police to the army, is that something that

6 regulations envisage at all, and was it limited in terms of its tasks and

7 the area involved?

8 A. Yes, precisely. In the law on the defence of the FRY, and that is

9 Article 17 that we mentioned a few minutes ago, in accordance with that

10 article, an order was passed on the resubordination of the forces and

11 organs of the interior to the army of Yugoslavia. However, as I already

12 said, that resubordination was limited in terms of its tasks because it

13 pertained only to carrying out combat operations or, rather,

14 anti-terrorist operations. Also, it was limited in terms of the police

15 units involved because it pertained to specific police units only. In

16 accordance with the orders that we have just seen, those were the police

17 units that were involved in individual operations.

18 In addition to that, resubordination was limited in terms of the

19 area and time involved. That is to say that the resubordination of police

20 units to the army can be reduced to the adoption of a plan for carrying

21 out anti-terrorist operations and also issuing orders that we quoted in

22 response to the previous question.

23 Q. General, I asked you about the regulations and you mentioned

24 Article 17 of the law on the defence of Yugoslavia. That is contained in

25 tab 4. I'm going to quote it very briefly. All of it has been

Page 39496

1 translated.

2 THE INTERPRETER: Could the interpreters please have a reference.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the interpreters just asked for a

4 reference so that they can follow you.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Tab 4, page 2, Article 17 of the law

6 on defence of Yugoslavia, the one that the witness mentioned in response

7 to my question whether there were any regulations pertaining to

8 resubordination, and he indicated that particular article of the law on

9 defence.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Before you proceed, I wanted to ask the witness,

11 and perhaps you but more the witness, is there any special significance in

12 the word "resubordination"? Why not just "subordination"? "Re" in

13 English has a specific connotation; subordinating again.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, of course these are

15 synonyms. They have the same meaning but that is quite simply the wording

16 in the law.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, the MUP units are

18 subordinated to their commands, but in case of a threat of war, the law

19 envisages that they should be resubordinated to the army in terms of

20 possible combat operations within the zones of command of the army.

21 I don't know whether "resubordination" is the best solution

22 possible, but anyway, that is the word that is used. The wording of the

23 law is rather clear, so I think that will make it clearer for you.

24 It says: "In the event of imminent threat of war, a state of war,

25 a state of emergency, internal affairs units and organs may be used to

Page 39497

1 carry out combat tasks, provide support for combat or offer armed

2 resistance. In carrying out their combat tasks, these units and

3 organisations shall be subordinated to the Yugoslav army officer who is in

4 command of combat operations." Subordination. Subordination to the

5 officer of the army of Yugoslavia who is in command of combat operations.

6 That is the wording of this provision.

7 As far as regulations are concerned, that is the legal basis for

8 resubordination.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Now, in relation to the resubordination of the police to the army,

11 was there any problem involved, General?

12 A. Well, it can be said that there were certain problems which

13 primarily boiled down to a different interpretation of documents on

14 subordination and resubordination, especially at lower levels, both in the

15 army and in the police. However, after certain consultations were carried

16 out in terms of these different interpretations of the mentioned documents

17 were overcome. And as I said, subordination or resubordination was

18 reduced to planning anti-terrorist operations by the military commands and

19 issuing orders in order to carry out joint operations by the military and

20 police units.

21 Q. All right. Did resubordination pertain to all forms of police

22 work and all police units or police units that take part in combat

23 operations or, rather, in this combat against terrorism in the zone of

24 responsibility of the commander of the unit to which they were

25 subordinated?

Page 39498












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 39499

1 A. Of course resubordination pertained only to specific tasks,

2 specific units and only while these tasks were still under way in a given

3 area. Apart from that, both the military and the police carried out their

4 own tasks or, rather, those belonging to their own province of work. They

5 had horizontal coordination throughout, though. That is to say exchange

6 of information, et cetera.

7 Q. All right, General. We saw what this was like in the regulations

8 as we saw this brief paragraph in tab 4. Could we please see what this

9 looked like in practical terms. We have tabs 45, 46, 7, 8, 9, 50, and 51.

10 So could you please take a look at tab 45 now. It's just one page.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Have you found it?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. This is the -- this is an order of the commander of the Pristina

15 Corps --

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. -- dated the 20th of April, 1999.

18 A. That's right.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, again this is not translated.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We can put it on the overhead

21 projector. I believe it was translated, though. Perhaps it wasn't

22 grouped properly, but I'm quite sure that all these documents were

23 translated.

24 JUDGE KWON: Tab 46 is translated.

25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the speaker, please.

Page 39500

1 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

2 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters cannot hear anything. The

3 microphone has not been switched on.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please have the microphone switched on. Who

5 switches it on; Mr. Milosevic or the control room?

6 Yes. Will the control room please have the microphone of

7 Mr. Milosevic switched on.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's on now. I see that it's on

9 now. I see that the light is on.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I?

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Please go ahead, General.

13 A. This is an order of the commander of the Pristina Corps that has

14 to do with the subordination of the units and the organs of the MUP of

15 Serbia in the zones of responsibility of the brigades. It is dated the

16 20th of April, 1999. And it also invokes, in the preamble, the order of

17 the staff of the Supreme Command, and it issues an order which we

18 explained a bit earlier on.

19 Point 1 says: "Units and organs of the interior of the MUP of

20 Serbia in the zones of responsibility of the brigades shall be

21 resubordinated to commands of brigades for carrying out combat tasks."

22 That was point 1.

23 Point 2: "In accordance with the organisation of the organs and

24 units of the MUP and the deployment in the territory of the zone of

25 responsibility of the brigades, plans of use should regulate concrete

Page 39501

1 obligation in carrying out combat operations according to levels of

2 command."

3 Is it necessary for me to read on?

4 Q. I would just like to draw your attention to the second paragraph

5 of paragraph 4: "At the time when combat operations are not carried out,

6 the forces of the MUP shall be engaged in carrying out other specific

7 tasks according to the plans and orders of the staff of the MUP of -- for

8 Kosovo and Metohija."

9 A. Yes, that's right.

10 Q. General, can we conclude that all these orders from tabs 41

11 through 51 are quite a precise concretisation of this resubordination?

12 A. All these tabs from tab 45 onwards, including 1950 -- including

13 51, actually pertain to this order of -- on resubordination and spell it

14 out in more concrete terms, if I can put it that way.

15 Q. The resubordination of the police in the area of operations of a

16 certain brigade, that means that the unit of police within the zone of

17 operations of a particular brigade is resubordinated to the commander of

18 the brigade?

19 A. Only in terms of carrying out the tasks we mentioned.

20 Q. Only in terms of the specific tasks mentioned?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. They respect their own chain of command with regard to all other

23 tasks and they act independently of the army in all other respects?

24 A. Yes. I can just add one thing; that policework was not

25 resubordinated to the army in any way. There were certain interpretations

Page 39502

1 when we discussed problems, that it was necessary to resubordinate the

2 entire police jurisdiction to the army, which was not logical at all and

3 that was not the underlying idea of this order. So in wartime,

4 practically the police carried out all its work as in peacetime.

5 Q. I hope that this was sufficiently explained now.

6 General, now we're going to move on to a different subject, a new

7 subject. It has to do with the joint command in Kosovo and Metohija. I'm

8 going to put a very specific question to you. Please listen to it

9 carefully.

10 Do you know that during 1998 and 1999 a command organ called the

11 Joint Command was operating in Kosovo?

12 A. Precisely speaking and briefly speaking, there was not that kind

13 of organ called the Joint Command in Kosovo and Metohija in 1998 and in

14 1999.

15 Q. All right. So there wasn't a command organ.

16 A. That's right.

17 Q. And had you heard this word "Joint Command" in relation to this

18 period in Kosovo and Metohija?

19 A. Yes, I have heard of that, but of course it did not pertain to any

20 kind of command organ. It represented something completely different.

21 Q. So it was not a command organ. What was it? You say that it was

22 something completely different. What was it in actual fact?

23 A. The term "Joint Command" in Kosovo and Metohija during 1998 until

24 the Verification Mission was established in Kosovo and Metohija, the term

25 was used for horizontal coordination and cooperation among military police

Page 39503

1 organs and state organs at all levels. In a practical sense, this joint

2 command represented a series of meetings that were attended by

3 representatives of the military, the police, and the state organs. At

4 these meetings they exchanged information and data that were of relevance

5 to all the participants. And after these meetings, everybody went back to

6 their own line of work.

7 Q. General, this form of cooperation, you explained just now that

8 this term was used. It was used regularly, that's my understanding on the

9 basis of what you've said just now, in 1998, until the Verification

10 Mission arrived, and that was the method of work actually.

11 A. It can be put that way.

12 Q. So horizontal cooperation among organs, was that your explanation?

13 A. Yes, that's right. That's what the term denoted. It could also

14 be explained if we say horizontal coordination in every way, but there is

15 certainly no subordination or resubordination involved.

16 Q. All right. Did you attend any of those meetings of this

17 coordination that was called the Joint Command?

18 A. Yes, about ten or so, approximately.

19 Q. All right. This form of cooperation under that term, did it go

20 beyond the chain of command in any way, either in the police or in the

21 military, or did it in any way infringe upon the regular chain of command

22 either in the army or in the police?

23 A. No, it didn't. This horizontal cooperation or coordination did

24 not infringe upon the chain of command either in the army or in the police

25 in any way. Everybody consistently observed their own vertical chain of

Page 39504

1 command.

2 Q. General, I'm asking you these questions because an allegation was

3 made here that this term "Joint Command" represented some sort of command

4 body that was outside the vertical chain of command in the army and in the

5 police. Do you have any information to the effect that this coordination

6 between the police, the army, and state organs in Kosovo went in any way

7 beyond or outside the regular chain of command as envisaged by the law?

8 A. All chains of command at the time in Kosovo and Metohija were in

9 conformity with legal provisions. This method of work, therefore, this

10 type of coordination, did not affect in any way of normal chain of command

11 either in the police or in the army, it only contributed to the better

12 functioning of both forces because of frequent exchange of information

13 about the situation on the ground.

14 Q. For this occasion, just to clarify this allegation that this form

15 of work was somehow outside the normal of -- normal chain of command, I

16 would like you to look at tab 144. That is -- actually, those are minutes

17 of a meeting in my office that took place on the 2nd of November, 1998.

18 Have you found it?

19 A. Give me just a second. I found it.

20 Q. We will come back later to this document when discussing some

21 other issues. For the moment, I only want to use this document to

22 establish whether it shows clearly that all the bodies involved are within

23 the chain of command, not outside of it. So I will ask you a couple of

24 questions.

25 It says here at the very beginning -- and these are minutes drawn

Page 39505

1 up by the chef de cabinet. At the very beginning we see the order of

2 contributions by various speakers who make proposals that will eventually

3 become proposals of the Joint Command. So does it say proposals of the

4 Joint Command?

5 I opened this meeting, and after me spoke the commander of the

6 Pristina Corps.

7 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues]... translation.

8 JUDGE KWON: We haven't got it translated.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's not translated, and I see it runs to 15

10 pages.

11 MR. NICE: So that if it's going to be referred to, with the

12 Court's leave, at all, it should be on the overhead projector so we know

13 what we're looking at.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we'll allow you to refer to it.

15 You can refer to short passages, but it has to be on the ELMO.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Place page 1 on the

17 ELMO. At the bottom of the page, we see an entry. Could you scroll it

18 down a little. Now we can see the whole page. Please leave it that way.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. It says: "The commander of the Pristina Corps, Lieutenant General

21 Nebojsa Pavkovic, gave a summary report on the implementation of the plan

22 for combatting terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija and suggested a draft

23 conclusion," et cetera, et cetera.

24 This passage mentions this term "Joint Command," because it says

25 in the second paragraph, "Speaking on behalf of the Joint Command for

Page 39506

1 Kosovo and Metohija."

2 Please, do not lose this upper part on the ELMO where the

3 participants in the meeting are enumerated.

4 General, at the time when he is making this report, General

5 Pavkovic is a member of the Pristina Corps?

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. I just want to show the chain of command. Is he subordinated to

8 the commander of the 3rd Army?

9 A. Of course he is.

10 Q. And what about the commander of the 3rd Army? Is he subordinated

11 to the commander of the General Staff?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. So in this passage where General Pavkovic is reporting on these

14 matters, is the commander of the 3rd Army present?

15 A. Yes. That's Lieutenant General Dusan Samardzic.

16 Q. Sixth line from the top, Lieutenant General Dusan Samardzic,

17 commander of the 3rd Army. And above him is the Chief of the General

18 Staff?

19 A. Yes. At the time it was Momcilo Perisic, Colonel General.

20 Q. And so it is stated in the first paragraph.

21 In the military chain of command, all the links above Pavkovic are

22 present, such as the commander of the 3rd Army, to whom he reports

23 personally; the Chief of the General Staff is present as well; and of

24 course the president of the republic to whom the Chief of the General

25 Staff reports. Is the chain of -- is this the complete chain of command?

Page 39507

1 A. Correct. All the links in the chain of command are present, in

2 the military chain of command.

3 Q. Very well. Let me just see where the next passage is, on which

4 page. Page 7.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stevanovic, were you at this meeting?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I was, Your Honour. We can see

7 that from this introductory part, line 3 from the top. Line 3 from the

8 bottom of paragraph 1.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. We saw who was present on behalf of the entire military chain of

11 command from the commander of the Pristina Corps to the president of the

12 republic.

13 Now, let us see on page 7. We see there was a contribution by

14 Major General Sreten Lukic, who was a general of the police force. As we

15 saw in that decision in tab 10, he was commander of the MUP staff.

16 A. Correct. So he is speaking at this meeting.

17 Q. Very well. Now, let us go back to page 1. Is it the case that

18 this meeting was attended by Colonel General Vlastimir Djordjevic, who is

19 directly above Sreten Lukic?

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. He was head of the public security sector?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And his direct superior, Minister of the Interior Vlajko

24 Stojiljkovic is also present?

25 A. Yes, he is, but I can't find him.

Page 39508

1 Q. The fifth line from the top of the paragraph. Minister of the

2 Interior of the Republic of Serbia Vlajko Stojiljkovic.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Is the president of the Republic of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic,

5 also present?

6 A. Yes, he is.

7 Q. Of course the meeting was attended by you as well and other

8 participants on behalf of public and military security -- civilian and

9 military security, that is. Let us look at the chain of command, however.

10 Are all the links in the chain above Lukic present, from himself to the

11 president of the republic?

12 A. Yes. Not a single link in the chain was omitted.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I hope this is enough by

14 way of response to the allegation that there was something outside of the

15 chain of command, particularly this type of coordination.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. I will now move on to a different subject, General. It concerns

18 local security or, rather, local police and confidence-building measures

19 in Kosovo and Metohija.

20 Could you tell us, please, what is understood by the term of

21 "local security" in Kosovo and Metohija, and what was the purpose and the

22 intent of establishing local security in this area?

23 A. Local security in Kosovo and Metohija implied a specially

24 organised system of engagement of local Albanians for the purpose of

25 maintaining public law and order and some other affairs within their local

Page 39509

1 communities. The establishment of such a system of local security was

2 geared at building up the confidence between local Albanian communities

3 and members of the police force, the MUP, of the Republic of Serbia.

4 Q. General, who were the members of this local police force or local

5 security?

6 A. Members of the local security were Albanians who accepted to work

7 in the local police on the terms and conditions stipulated by a contract

8 that they signed with organs of local self-management.

9 Q. Please look at tab 26. This document provides us with a very

10 specific list of a local police such as in the municipality of Djakovica.

11 A. Correct. That is a list of the local police force in the

12 municipality of Djakovica at a certain point in time. I would like to ask

13 that names of individuals not be mentioned here for their own safety.

14 Q. Well, those names were well known at the time, but it is entirely

15 appropriate that you should ask for this protective measure, and I hope

16 Mr. Robinson will grant it.

17 A. So we have two lists. One is horizontal, the other is vertical.

18 The names are the same but they are arranged slightly differently. From

19 this first list we can see their names, the village they were in charge

20 of, their registration number, the type of uniform they had, and the

21 weapon they had.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I understand that you have

23 requested that the names not be mentioned. You have to provide a reason,

24 because this is a public trial, as you know.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] General Stevanovic indicated that

Page 39510












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Page 39511

1 individuals -- that those who survived, although I believe most of these

2 people have been killed, could experience problems because they used to be

3 local policemen, and as such they were targets of the KLA during the

4 entire time of terrorist activities and after 2000, after 1999 as well. I

5 suppose that is the reason why the general is suggesting that their names

6 not be placed on the ELMO.

7 [Trial Chamber confers]

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, do you --

9 MR. NICE: I am afraid I'm at a loss to understand the reasoning.

10 It seems to me these men were well known at the time and I can't see any

11 reason for them not to be named now. I can't see what the risk is in

12 their being identified as to what they were doing at the time, which must

13 have been well known at the time. There it is.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: It's surely for the accused, though, to decide how

15 he presents this, and if he wants to do it by using the numbers, what can

16 anyone do about it?

17 MR. NICE: If he wants to do it by using the numbers and if he

18 persuades the Chamber not to lay the document on the overhead projector,

19 and if I don't raise the question of the names specifically in

20 cross-examination, then Your Honour is quite right, but is that an

21 appropriate way to get around the requirement that the material should

22 basically be public unless good reason is shown for it to be dealt with

23 otherwise?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if you allow me, I

25 could try to --

Page 39512

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, go ahead.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I did not

3 suppose that this was going to be complicated, but bearing in mind the

4 fact that these people were well known in their areas, wore the uniforms

5 of the police, we can make their names public. My only intention, my only

6 thought was to protect individuals from possible problems.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well. Well, we'll proceed in the normal

8 way.

9 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We will continue in the normal way,

11 but out of consideration for these people, I will skip their names, which

12 of course imposes no obligation on Mr. Nice to do the same, but I'm going

13 to make sure that I not the cause of any problems for them.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. General, here we see, village by village, the names of these

16 policemen. There are mainly two per village. So in the first list there

17 is a total of 30 villages in that municipality alone, the municipality of

18 Djakovica, where the local police functioned.

19 A. Correct. The big numbers denote villages, and the smaller number

20 next to it in the next column is the number of the member of the local

21 security.

22 Q. Yes. That is self-explanatory. We also see the registration

23 number of every member of the local police and information whether his

24 uniform was drawn from supplies and the type of pistol also drawn from

25 supplies. In this case that is the 7.65 millimetre pistol. So this is a

Page 39513

1 list for the municipality of Djakovica.

2 Now, tell me, General, in those places where local security was

3 established as we see in the list under tab 26, was there any need for

4 members of the MUP to be present?

5 A. Well, that need was considerably reduced once the local security

6 was established. The police, of course, continued to do their regular

7 work but with considerably smaller presence in those areas where the local

8 police maintained public law and order.

9 Q. So in those villages where there was no special reason for them to

10 go in, the police did not enter?

11 A. I said at the beginning that the basic object of this whole system

12 was precisely that the local Albanians should come to understand that the

13 police had no goal of being present in the village itself but that their

14 goal was to provide law and order in the village. Now, if they accepted

15 keeping law and order, then the police accepted to go there only when the

16 need arose or, rather, in cases where members of the local forces were not

17 able to or did not have the authority to get a job done with respect to a

18 given event.

19 Q. Now, tell us, please, in what way, under what conditions were the

20 members of the local security recruited and engaged?

21 A. Members of the local security were recruited and engaged under

22 this system according to the principle on voluntariness. That is to say

23 if they accepted the conditions stipulated in the agreement drawn up by

24 the organs of self-government, and those contracts or agreement specified

25 their rights and duties.

Page 39514

1 Q. All right. Let's take a look at one of those contracts or

2 agreements, tab 24. And the date of that one is the 1st of January, 1999.

3 So it is a contract between the individual that is becoming a local

4 policeman by entering into the contract.

5 A. Yes, that's right. This contract defines the person's rights and

6 duties, and it is the person entering into the contract with a

7 representative of local self-government. In this case, it was the

8 president of the Municipal Assembly of Djakovica.

9 Q. Right. Fine. Now, the locals of a village, the villagers in

10 which this local police force was established, did they have any influence

11 on the election of the members of that local police force or were those

12 names put forward from outside?

13 A. In principle, it was up to them to represent their own

14 representatives, people they trusted and people who would be able to

15 represent their interests vis-a-vis the police and local self-government

16 authorities. And we'll see this from one of the subsequent exhibits. I

17 can't remember which one it is just now.

18 Q. All right. Now, take a look at this particular contract. Let's

19 do that. We have the name and surname of the person entering into the

20 contract, and then it says, "Relates to security," and then 1, it says,

21 infrastructure; 2, health protection; 3, food supplies; 4 maintaining

22 public law and order. That is a classical task that the police does.

23 Control and registering people who are coming into the area or passing

24 through the area, and generally providing conditions for the normal life

25 and work of the citizens or villagers.

Page 39515

1 A. Yes. That was -- those were the basic duties for which they were

2 remunerated and engaged in the first place. Looking at it from the

3 security related issues, point 4 the most important one here.

4 Q. Yes, that's right. Now, point 3, or article 3, it says the

5 coordinator of local security - that applies to each one - has an ID in

6 order to present his ID to third persons.

7 A. That's right.

8 Q. So he has a sort of police card or a similar document?

9 A. Yes, that's right. And I think that we have attached a copy of

10 the type of ID they would carry.

11 Q. Yes. That is in tab 25, a photocopy of the kind of identification

12 papers that we mean.

13 Could the photocopy be placed on the overhead projector. The

14 first page need not be placed on the ELMO, but would you please read out

15 what it says. On the reverse as well as on the first side it says the

16 Republic of Serbia. It says that in Serbian and Albanian. Is that what

17 it says, the Republic of Serbia? Then it says in Albanian Republic of

18 Serbia, and then underneath it says the autonomous province of Kosovo and

19 Metohija, and then that same thing in Albanian, the autonomous province of

20 Kosovo and Metohija in Albanian, in the two languages, Serbian and

21 Albanian.

22 A. Yes, that's right.

23 Q. Then it says local security, both in Serbian and in Albanian once

24 again. Then it says municipality in Albanian and Serbian, the village in

25 Serbian and Albanian, the first and last name, and the number.

Page 39516

1 A. That's right.

2 Q. Now, what does it say on the reverse side of the ID for this local

3 security? Could you read it out, please, in Serbian. And the text is the

4 same in Albanian.

5 A. The reverse side of the ID says as follows -- it is written in

6 Serbian and Albanian. In Serbian, it reads as follow: "The bearer of

7 this identity card is authorised to work to secure the infrastructure, to

8 provide health care protection, food supply, law and order, maintenance,

9 and other conditions for the normal life of citizens, to issue warnings,

10 to check identity documents, to arrest persons, to use force and to carry

11 a firearm."

12 So those are the tasks and competencies which have been entered

13 into the ID card for the local security personnel and taken from the

14 contract.

15 Q. So he can take persons into custody, use force, and carry

16 firearms; is that right?

17 A. Yes, that's right.

18 Q. Tell us, please, General, the members of the local police, did

19 they wear a uniform?

20 A. Yes, they did. However, the uniforms were made in a continuous

21 period, or, rather, they didn't have uniforms to begin with until they

22 were supplied with a uniform. However, it was envisaged that each member

23 of the local security service should have and should wear uniforms, and

24 most of them did. And we can see that from the list we read out a moment

25 ago, looked at a moment ago.

Page 39517

1 Q. According to that list, all of them wore uniforms -- most of

2 them.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Did that uniform differ in any way from the police uniform?

5 A. Well, in slight details but I can't go into the details now.

6 Q. But it could be distinguished. You could distinguish a local

7 policeman from a policeman which was a policeman employed by the Ministry

8 of the Interior.

9 A. That's right.

10 Q. Just like this ID card differs in certain aspects to a police ID.

11 A. Yes, that's right.

12 Q. Very well. Thank you. And where was this idea on local security

13 first applied? Where did it start from?

14 A. It came from the municipality of Djakovica and that's where it

15 proved most successful. Of course, the activities -- activities along

16 those lines were organised in other municipalities as well or, rather, in

17 all the municipalities with an Albanian population.

18 Q. And what were the work results of the members of the local

19 security that we mentioned here and talked about?

20 A. In the police force, we were satisfied with their work. They

21 worked satisfactorily. First of all, because the police had to go to

22 those villages less frequently, on rarer occasions, and that was one of

23 the goals for which this whole system was established in the first place.

24 And there were very specific, concrete results that the members of the

25 local security force had to do with respect to reporting any violations,

Page 39518

1 uncovering the perpetrators of crimes, and so on and so forth.

2 Q. Very well. I'd like to draw your attention to tab 27 now, please,

3 where we can see a document dated December. It is a letter sent to the

4 staff of the Ministry of the Interior, and it says the chief of the

5 secretariat from Djakovica for purposes of local security, winter uniforms

6 must be issued as well as wind jackets, shirts, pants, and so on. And we

7 saw on the basis of a previous document that they had already received

8 weapons. So this entire equipment is listed here.

9 A. Yes, that's right. The local security force was established with

10 cooperation between the provisional Executive Council, the staff of the

11 MUP in Kosovo and Metohija, and the local self-government authorities.

12 And the police force gave them logistical support and professional

13 support, and here we can see that it was the police that supplied them

14 with uniforms. You can't actually see that but they did also supply

15 weapons for the local security force.

16 Q. So this document is important because it is dated 1998. There

17 are, of course, earlier documents in 1998 as well.

18 A. Yes, that's right.

19 Q. Now, as a confidence-boosting measure, did this have a positive

20 effect on the situation in the villages where the local security force was

21 established?

22 A. Yes, of course, because with the establishment of a local security

23 force, the imposed thoughts among the citizens that the police was

24 repressive was done away with, and that the force -- police force came

25 into villages just for repressive measures. We managed to show the local

Page 39519

1 Albanians that that was not the goal of the police force but that they

2 were bent on providing law and order in their villages.

3 Q. Law and order that they could keep themselves, enforce themselves

4 to the best of their ability. And did they -- were they able to do that?

5 A. Yes, they were.

6 Q. Can we see some examples of the results scored by the local

7 security force? And I draw your attention to tabs 28 to 35 in that

8 respect.

9 A. In these tabs we have several examples of the concrete work and

10 conduct of the local security force in keeping with the authorisations

11 specified in the contract we looked at a moment ago.

12 Q. In tab 28, we see a report by the SUP of Djakovica about the fact

13 that a member of the local security force was subject to serious threats

14 and that the perpetrator, in conformity with the law, was sanctioned with

15 a misdemeanour charge.

16 A. Yes, that's right.

17 Q. Now, what else do we see? We see that --

18 A. We see that a member of the local security force in the next

19 document reported to the duty service in Djakovica, that on the 1st of

20 May, 1999, at around 2200 hours, in the house of a villager, that three

21 unidentified persons entered the house of Vitor Docaj of Yugoslavia armed

22 with automatic rifles. So this is an example where members of the local

23 force call in members of the Yugoslav army. They report conducts on the

24 part of members of the Yugoslav army.

25 Q. In this case, the policeman was an Albanian?

Page 39520

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. This Albanian policeman, in fact on the 1st of May, 1999; is that

3 right?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Although the date is the 2nd of May. That was the time when,

6 according to what is presented here, the Albanians were allegedly expulsed

7 and terror being effected against them. So on the 1st of May, 1999, this

8 particular Albanian, a member of the local security force, was reporting

9 to the police the conduct of three -- inappropriate conduct of three

10 Yugoslav soldiers who tried to abuse the female family member of a given

11 family.

12 A. Yes. And we can see that pursuant to that report the organs of

13 the police were notified about that and that the police took steps to

14 apprehend the perpetrators of that particular offence.

15 Q. And all this is taking place on the 1st of May, 1999. That is to

16 say, the local security force is functioning properly; it is reporting the

17 misconduct of soldiers and the appropriate authorities are taking steps to

18 act upon his report. Is that right?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Now, take a look at tab 30, please. Here we can see that on the

21 13th of May, once again it is the Djakovica municipality area, where a

22 member of the local security force, once again an Albanian, took into

23 custody another Albanian whom he caught thieving.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. So once again the time is mid-May, the time of the aggression,

Page 39521

1 when it is assumed that Albanians were being expelled from Kosovo and

2 Metohija. Here we have an Albanian member of the local security force who

3 catches a thief, is taking him to the local police station. We can see

4 all that from this Official Note, which has its number, and the date is

5 the 13th of May, 1999.

6 Then we come to the next tab, tab 31, which is a receipt for items

7 confiscated.

8 A. Relating to the previous case.

9 Q. That's right, because he was caught red handed, and the items that

10 the person had stolen were confiscated, and this is a receipt for that,

11 and the date on the receipt is once again the 30th of May, 1999. So two

12 months after the aggression.

13 Now take a look at tab 32. The date there is the 15th of May.

14 What is important here is --

15 A. Well, once again a person was taken into custody by a member of

16 the local security force because they were found --

17 Q. Well, yes. He was engaged in an act and was apprehended by a

18 local Albanian police force, and that is mid-May that we're talking about.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. It is in fact the 15th of May, 1999; is that right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Take a look at tab 33 now, please. This is an Official Note. It

23 is dated the 16th of May, and once again a local Albanian policeman who

24 took into custody and brought into the police station a certain

25 individual, once again an Albanian.

Page 39522












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Page 39523

1 A. That's right. But this is important, because a member of the

2 local security force in actual fact took into custody an individual whom

3 it was supposed had taken part in the killing of several policemen in the

4 period gone by.

5 Q. Right. So that means that a member of the local security force,

6 on the 16th of May, 1999, that is to say two months -- almost two months

7 into the aggression and the alleged persecution of Albanians, here we have

8 an Albanian bringing in somebody who he had taken into custody, taking him

9 to the police force -- police station concerning a murder that had been

10 committed earlier.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Now, take a look at tab 34. The date there is the 19th of May.

13 A. This is the case where a weapon was confiscated from a citizen in

14 cooperation with members of the local security force in this particular

15 village.

16 Q. Very well. Thank you.

17 A. So we have a member of a local security team reporting and

18 confiscating somebody -- confiscating a rifle that had been hidden and dug

19 into the ground, and the person was found in illegal possession of that

20 weapon.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, what do you say this -- all this

22 evidence indicates? Just very briefly.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Quite clearly, Mr. Robinson, these

24 confidence-building measures and the appointment of Albanian policemen in

25 purely Albanian villages was operational, and it denies, by virtue of the

Page 39524

1 fact that it was there, that Albanians were persecuted. They were there.

2 They carried weapons. They wore uniforms.

3 So this is quite contrary to what the side opposite has been

4 saying, that the police were expelling Albanians and killing them. This

5 is a series of examples to the contrary.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you very much.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to draw your attention

8 to the dates that are very important on these documents. All of this

9 happened in mid-May, all the documents we provided here.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, please continue.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. So we have tab 35 to deal with as well. That was compiled around

13 the 19th of May too. It also has to do with the work of the local

14 security.

15 Do you think that there is anything characteristic that has to be

16 highlighted in this respect, General?

17 A. No. It's quite similar to the previous examples. Members of the

18 local security informed us that the following persons were caught stealing

19 in the said village. So the police was informed by the local security

20 that some persons in the mentioned village were involved in stealing.

21 Q. All right, General. What kind of effect did the NATO aggression

22 have on the operation of local security?

23 A. It certainly had a negative effect on this system of local

24 security, because many members of the local security suffered the

25 retaliation of terrorists, because the police were not in a position to

Page 39525

1 protect them any more as they were before when their safety was in

2 jeopardy.

3 Q. Please look at tab 84, General. What happened? What was written

4 here to the secretariat in Kosovo and Metohija by the head of the MUP

5 staff in Kosovo and Metohija?

6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Presiding Judge, please.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: No translation, Mr. Milosevic. If it's brief, it

8 may be put on the ELMO. Let's have it on the ELMO.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I proceed?

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Just give us some brief comments with regard to this. So the NATO

12 aggression was under way. What happened to Albanians then? How did they

13 react and how did the police react?

14 A. The 2nd of May, 1999, is the date of this document. It was

15 written by the staff of the Ministry of the Interior, and it was sent to

16 the Secretariats of the Interior in Kosovo and Metohija. It has to do

17 with the reporting of residence of citizens so that they can be taken care

18 of. This has to do with the regulation of the population that left their

19 places of residence. But one of the measures in paragraph 2 -- sorry.

20 No, not paragraph 2. It's paragraph 3, subparagraph 4. So point 3 reads

21 as follows: "Persons who reside in a particular area should be protected

22 from a security and safety point of view and they should be familiarised

23 with their obligations and ensure," and now under 4: "to appoint a

24 representative who will carry out the work of the local police and carry

25 out contacts with the authorities in order to resolve humanitarian issues

Page 39526

1 and issues related to their safety and security, the provision of food,

2 water, electricity, and other matters of relevance to the normalisation of

3 life and work in their places of residence."

4 This document practically issues an order to secretariats to

5 communicate with the local communities by affecting them in that way,

6 namely, that they should appoint their own representatives who would be

7 involved in this line of work.

8 Q. So that they should appoint their own local policemen?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Who would take care of law and order among them.

11 A. Yes, that's right.

12 Q. Are these internally displaced persons who moved from a particular

13 territory because of combat operations?

14 A. Precisely. These are persons who were staying outside their

15 places of permanent residence.

16 Q. And why were they outside their permanent places of residence,

17 General?

18 A. It is quite clear that that was because of the combat operations

19 in Kosovo and Metohija, that they had to move from the areas where they

20 lived, and also for other reasons that I could perhaps explain in greater

21 detail.

22 Q. What was the attitude of the KLA towards the representatives of

23 this local security and do you know what the fate was of the members of

24 the local security when the army, our army and police, withdrew from

25 Kosovo and Metohija?

Page 39527

1 A. Well, the members of the so-called KLA certainly had a negative

2 attitude towards the members of the local security because it did not suit

3 them to have any kind of confidence building between the local Albanians

4 and the police. Conflicts, hatred, intolerance were things that actually

5 suited them.

6 Q. Tell me, General, in addition to the establishment of this local

7 community -- local security, what other measures were taken at the time,

8 at the height of the crisis during the war? What other measures were

9 taken by the Ministry of the Interior vis-a-vis the Albanian population?

10 What other confidence-building measures?

11 A. Well, not only in times of war. As a matter of fact, from

12 mid-1998 onwards, the police of Serbia tried in Kosovo and Metohija in

13 many ways to convince the Albanians that there was no reason for them to

14 be afraid of regular, everyday police work. In that sense, members of the

15 police even refrained from using roads where there could be conflicts.

16 And they also refrained from entering villages, especially Albanian

17 villages where it was assumed that certain conflicts might break out.

18 After that, and also in relation to that, the police, whenever possible,

19 took a series of actions in order to return all internally displaced

20 persons to their places of permanent residence.

21 MR. NICE: Before we move on --

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, yes.

23 MR. NICE: Obviously with this number of documents I'm not going

24 to be able to return to all or even many of the documents in

25 cross-examination. This particular document, 84, has no English

Page 39528

1 translation, and it is on its face in need of some explanation. It's not

2 stamped, it's not signed, it's not a photocopy of a sent document and I

3 wonder if the Chamber, before allowing the accused to move on to the next

4 document, would wish to get a little more detail of what exactly we're

5 looking at.

6 JUDGE KWON: I note a recent arrival contains the translation of

7 84.

8 MR. NICE: Uh-huh. But again the original is different, I think,

9 from many other originals because it looks as much like a draft as

10 anything else, and I'm grateful to -- and pleased to know that there is

11 now a translation.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us have some information from the witness on

13 the provenance of this document. General?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President of the Trial Chamber,

15 I have indeed noticed that there aren't any signatures or stamps here, but

16 I do know with certainty that this document was adopted and was sent on to

17 the secretariats. At that time I was in Kosovo and Metohija and I know

18 that action was taken by all secretariats on the basis of this document.

19 I know that in the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia there is a document

20 that would bear a stamp and signature or some other proof that this

21 document was sent out in order to be carried out.

22 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Milosevic, please.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. The Ministry of the Interior, the staff of the ministry, and then

25 it says, "12a Strictly Confidential number 14, 2 May, 1999."

Page 39529

1 A. Yes. Obviously there's a number there.

2 Q. And here it says, "Head of Staff, General Sreten Lukic," and that

3 was typed out. Is that because it was sent as a dispatch, as a telegram

4 to everyone?

5 A. It's obvious that it's a document of the staff. You can see the

6 date, you can see the number; the only thing missing here is an authentic

7 signature. But I assert that this is a document --

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, General, yes. I think we have enough

9 information.

10 Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. General, in your previous answer you mentioned that the staff of

13 the ministry or, rather, the police in Kosovo and Metohija organised the

14 return of internally displaced persons. Did you personally have an

15 opportunity of participating in any such activity? Were you present when

16 such activity was carried out related to the return of internally

17 displaced persons to their homes?

18 A. Yes. Sometime in the summer or autumn 1998, I myself spent four

19 or five days in the village of Istinic in the municipality of Decani.

20 After terrorist activities, tens of thousands of Albanians had moved

21 there. They were internally displaced persons. It was very hot there, I

22 remember, although it was already well into the autumn. I remember that

23 three or four -- for three or four days the local government vehicles were

24 engaged in order to return all the Albanians to their homes, to their

25 places of residence.

Page 39530

1 On that occasion in that large group of Albanians there were many

2 terrorists with weapons, and after specific negotiations with some of the

3 prominent local Albanians, we managed to convince them that they should

4 hand over their weapons, that they should not fear for their safety, that

5 they would all be returned to their homes, although they possessed

6 weapons.

7 To be very brief, on that occasion they handed in perhaps over

8 2.000 pieces of weapons, including military equipment. They were returned

9 to their homes at the time. So at that moment, this problem which

10 threatened to grow into humanitarian catastrophe was overcome.

11 Q. In this document that we mentioned a few moments ago, the one in

12 tab 84, in paragraph 3 it says in the first subparagraph that you did not

13 quote because you quoted the establishment of local security, but here it

14 says: "Persons who are residing at a particular place should be

15 protected," et cetera, and then subparagraph 1 is that: "they should hand

16 over weapons, ammunition, and military equipment which they were forced to

17 receive from terrorists..." They could hand it over without any

18 consequences. Does this mean that they would not be held accountable by

19 anyone even though they would hand in weapons?

20 A. Yes, that's right. They were very frightened that they would

21 suffer consequences because they had weapons. However, in order to

22 resolve the more serious problem at hand, namely, to return them to their

23 homes, our minimum requirement was that weapons be handed over without the

24 persons who possessed the weapons suffering any consequences.

25 I can just mention that while working in Istinic, I had a certain

Page 39531

1 problem with the representatives of I think the members of the

2 International Red Cross. And in one of these dispatches I think we can

3 find the name of this person who did everything in his or her power to

4 persuade the Albanians that they should not leave Istinic, and that they

5 were the safest there and that they may be the victims of violence in

6 their own village. That was highly unusual, and I strongly protested in

7 this case, but persistently in various corners here and there in -- they

8 were trying to persuade the Albanians that what we were doing was wrong.

9 However, within a few days we did manage to persuade the Albanians that

10 they should go back home.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: We have to take the break now, but before we take

12 it, just tell me, what was the response to the offer to have them hand

13 over weapons without suffering any consequences? Were any weapons handed

14 over?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Perhaps I didn't explain it

16 properly. I said specifically in Istinic. As far as I can remember,

17 around 3.000 different pieces of weaponry were handed over. And later on,

18 we were always in a position to receive from citizens weapons that they

19 had handed over themselves. This will probably become evident on the

20 basis of various documents.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. We'll now take a break of 20 minutes.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you too.

23 --- Recess taken at 10.37 a.m.

24 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

Page 39532

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. General, what did the police do in this entire period, 1998 and

3 1999, with regard to the reporting of temporary residence by citizens and

4 with regard to providing temporary accommodation?

5 A. I have already said a couple of things about this. I can only say

6 more specifically that both in 1998 and 1999 every effort was made so that

7 people who were residing outside of their homes temporarily returned to

8 their homes. Staffs for combatting terrorism and police secretariats in

9 Kosovo and Metohija undertook during the war, I believe sometime in May,

10 to have accommodation provided for all internally displaced people and to

11 have them report their temporary residence so as to ensure precise

12 statistics and for proper accommodation to be provided with precise

13 information about who is residing where. This was reflected in a document

14 we recently had on the overhead projector. That was an order issued to

15 secretariats specifying what the secretariats were supposed to do in terms

16 of organised activity aimed at reporting the residence of internally

17 displaced persons.

18 Q. Was this dictated by the need to provide accommodation and protect

19 those people? What kind of danger were they in?

20 A. I spoke about the reporting of temporary residence. However, the

21 police also took steps to protect columns of people who were moving out of

22 their places of residence from all sorts of danger, and there were all

23 kinds of danger.

24 Q. Did you have any reports or requests made by certain groups or

25 villagers to provide protection?

Page 39533

1 A. According to my information, there were -- there were indeed

2 individual requests from families to provide protection for their families

3 in their movement from their homes to other places. I remember a visit by

4 Mr. Rugova, Ibrahim Rugova, who wanted protection for his family which

5 wanted to move to Macedonia from Pristina.

6 Q. Thank you, General. Several questions about the Verification

7 Mission in Kosovo and Metohija.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Just before moving on to that, are there records of

9 the displaced personnel?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Records on newly reported residences

11 are to be found in every secretariat and every police station in Kosovo

12 and Metohija. Of course they are now dislocated into Serbia proper,

13 central Serbia.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. General, did you attend to the -- the conclusion of the agreement

17 on the Verification Mission?

18 A. Yes, I did. I was a member of the delegation of the Republic of

19 Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the negotiations with the

20 representatives of NATO in Belgrade towards the end of summer, the

21 beginning of autumn, 1998. The delegation of NATO was led by Generals

22 Clark and Naumann, and the delegation of the Republic of Yugoslavia and

23 the Republic of Serbia and included several generals of the army, several

24 generals of the police, and some representatives of the state authorities

25 of Serbia and Yugoslavia.

Page 39534












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Page 39535

1 Q. What were these negotiations about? What was the substance of the

2 negotiations?

3 A. The substance of these talks were attempts to agree on a specific

4 reduction of the police force in Kosovo and Metohija and on reducing the

5 activities of the army and the police in time and in territory. The aim

6 was to reduce the police to a number of 10.021 and to reduce the number of

7 police checkpoints to a total of 27.

8 Q. General, what can you tell us about the coordination of activities

9 with the Verification Mission in Kosovo and Metohija, and specifically

10 about this reduction of police presence and the forms of police activity

11 in Kosovo?

12 A. After this agreement in Belgrade and after the signing of the

13 document that was signed by General Djordjevic and by Mr. Shaun Byrnes,

14 representative of the Verification Mission in Kosovo and Metohija, I got

15 an assignment from the minister, Mr. Stojiljkovic, to familiarise all

16 heads of secretariats and the chief of the state security sector and heads

17 of police units in Kosovo with the plan. After that, I had intensive

18 talks with Mr. Byrnes about the timetable of implementation of this

19 agreement.

20 Q. We are now going to deal with tabs 36 to 44. In 36, we see the

21 agreement on the OSCE mission for verification in Kosovo and Metohija.

22 That is the agreement that was signed by the then chairman of the OSCE,

23 Minister Branislav Jeremic, and our Minister of the Interior Zivadin

24 Jovanovic.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, this is not translated, what I

Page 39536

1 have here. Is it -- have you received it?

2 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Minister of Foreign

3 Affairs Jovanovic.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It must be a technical error,

5 Mr. Robinson, because that agreement was originally done in English when

6 it was signed with the OSCE. It has to exist on record. It must be a

7 technical error. There was no need to translate it at all, not here.

8 MR. NICE: Your Honour, it may be that we can find it, but of

9 course if the accused is putting in documents that he or his associates

10 know are already translated, I'm sure -- I don't deal with communications

11 with CLSS directly myself, but I'm sure it's of assistance to them to know

12 that the document is one that they can find elsewhere, or alternatively,

13 for them to find the translation and then not put it in for translation.

14 MR. KAY: General DZ.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Through General DZ, yes. But if you could assist

16 us, Mr. Nice, we would be grateful.

17 Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. General, here under tab 39 we see an enactment of the Ministry of

20 the Interior that was sent to all Secretariats of Internal Affairs in

21 Kosovo and Metohija. Can you find it?

22 A. I have found it.

23 Q. It was signed by the commander or, rather, head of staff for

24 Kosovo and Metohija. The subject is the OSCE agreement on verification in

25 Kosmet.

Page 39537

1 A. That is a document indeed whereby the ministry makes the text of

2 the agreement available to all secretariats in Kosovo and Metohija with a

3 view to implementation.

4 Q. Look at page 1. It says: "With a view to lawful and appropriate

5 action on the implementation of the provisions of the agreement from the

6 jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior, it is necessary to

7 familiarise all leaders and members of the police with the text of the

8 agreement and the communique immediately at working meetings or

9 otherwise."

10 A. Correct.

11 Q. It says: "It is necessary to take the following action:

12 "Take appropriate measures to ensure the security of the members

13 of the mission by locality of work and movement.

14 "Provide them with full freedom of movement without stopping their

15 visibly marked vehicles except when necessary for reasons of their own

16 safety.

17 "At the request of the mission, district or municipal leaderships

18 attend meetings or organise meetings to discuss issues of importance for

19 the implementation of the agreement in areas which are in the purview of

20 the ministry.

21 "Warn members of the mission as to the roads and areas where their

22 safety cannot be guaranteed and draw up appropriate notes."

23 A. Yes. That was envisaged by the agreement governing the presence

24 and movement of the members of the mission in Kosovo and Metohija.

25 Q. Was security indeed provided to the members of the mission for the

Page 39538

1 entire duration of the KVM?

2 A. Absolutely. During the entire time that the mission was present

3 in Kosovo, the police absolutely honoured all the elements of the

4 agreement and everything that was agreed with Generals Clark and Naumann

5 in Belgrade. These measures also include measures of protection for the

6 mission in case of their withdrawal from Kosovo, which of course happened

7 just before the bombing by NATO. So that all members of the mission were

8 under the protection of the police and the army of Yugoslavia, and they

9 managed to leave Kosovo and Metohija safely.

10 Q. Under the next tab we see a note on talks with the mission that

11 took place on the 22nd of October in Pristina.

12 A. Yes. That is a note from a meeting - tab 40 - a meeting that I

13 attended myself and where I talked with Mr. Shaun Byrnes about some

14 details of implementation in high risk areas in Kosovo and Metohija, and

15 from this we can see which measures were agreed upon in order to maintain

16 security while at the same time implementing all the measures envisaged by

17 the agreement.

18 Q. What were these specially sensitive areas? We see here that there

19 is reference to the settlements of Ostrozub and Dragobilje, namely that

20 citizens should return to these population centres without weapons,

21 uniforms, et cetera. Yes?

22 A. This area, Ostrozub and Dragobilje, which is very near Malisevo,

23 was very sensitive and it was very high risk because of the presence of

24 the KLA, and the KLA, as we know, had certain demands geared at

25 implementing the agreement more slowly. At the proposal of Mr. Shaun

Page 39539

1 Byrnes, we accepted these demands by moving forward certain deadlines for

2 deblocking roads. So there were other priorities that were more important

3 than implementing the agreement strictly on time.

4 Q. So we see here that the police had assumed certain obligations

5 that were slightly modified with the guarantees of these American

6 representatives. Did they abide by these obligations that they had

7 assumed?

8 A. In principle they did, because the Orahovac-Lapusnik road was

9 deblocked several days later, and the police and the army were able to use

10 that road safely. Generally speaking, however, KLA representatives

11 frequently violated the ceasefire agreements, and we have records of that

12 in one of these documents.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: General, I see that point number 3 under heading A

14 is that each population centre designate one person or a group of persons

15 to represent the citizens, et cetera. Is that where the idea of having

16 Albanian quasi-police representatives in each municipality came from? The

17 matter we looked at earlier with the list of the names of people who were

18 involved.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the idea about

20 establishing local security certainly precedes this agreement, and this

21 idea was only built into this agreement that we eventually signed with

22 Mr. Shaun Byrnes.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Then under B you agreed that all citizens returning in the

25 prescribed manner, that the police would guarantee their safety, and then

Page 39540

1 all the following stipulations.

2 A. Yes, that's right. Because Shaun Byrnes, in a way, represented

3 the representatives of these inhabited areas and accepted that they should

4 act upon everything specified in point A. And in written form, we

5 accepted those obligations under chapter B.

6 Q. All right. Now, General, did the police adhere to all those

7 undertakings?

8 A. Yes, absolutely so, wherever possible.

9 Q. In tab 41, and the date is the 26th of October, in Pristina, the

10 year is 1998, conclusions of the meeting held in Pristina with heads of

11 secretariats, chiefs of police stations, and commanders of the PJP,

12 special police units, detachments.

13 So this was a meeting that you presided over and held in Pristina

14 in connection with the implementation of the agreement with the

15 Verification Mission.

16 A. Yes, that's right.

17 Q. Now, pursuant to orders from the minister, you went there to

18 explain to the leaders and staff what their duties and obligations were;

19 is that right?

20 A. Yes, that's right.

21 Q. Now, could you just briefly go through the conclusions since you

22 presided over the meeting and you informed the participants of all these

23 details. So what is the important point to focus on here?

24 A. Well, in point 1 we can see that a reduction of engaged units by

25 4.500 members of the police force was required, which meant that the

Page 39541

1 number of members present should be reduced to the figure we already

2 mentioned a moment ago, 10.021, and that can be seen from point 2.

3 Now, point 3 states that the 10.021 should be the numerical

4 strength for Kosovo and Metohija, and later that it should be submitted to

5 the OSCE mission because it had the right to assess the numerical strength

6 in the smaller localities and smaller police units.

7 Now, point 4 states that by the 26th of October, 1998, all traffic

8 control checkpoints should be lifted and the service in those places

9 should be reinforced, and on the roads, with traffic control patrols.

10 Q. Very well, General. Now, pursuant to orders from the minister, in

11 actual fact here did you address all matters related to the conduct of the

12 police force with respect to the implementation of the agreement? Did you

13 go through that with the participants?

14 A. Yes. In fact, I conveyed the positions and agreements reached in

15 Belgrade when the agreement -- general agreement was reached, and I

16 received orders from the minister, and I implemented it in full through

17 this meeting and later on in agreement with the representatives of the

18 missions and controlling the steps that needed to be taken.

19 Q. Very well, General. Now, in tab 24 [sic] we have an overview of

20 obligations and rights. In tab 42, overview of obligation and rights

21 arising from the agreement signed by Colonel General Vlastimir Djordjevic

22 and Shaun Byrnes. We have there in tabular form the contents of the

23 obligation and the rights. Do you need to comment on these?

24 A. I don't think so, not to waste time. It defines the obligations,

25 that is the important point, in vertical column 2, and rights are defined

Page 39542

1 in column 3. So our obligations, the obligations and rights of our organs

2 with respect to the Verification Mission. So for example, in point 1,

3 confidence-building measures among all citizens, or building trust among

4 all citizens, and our right with respect to the mission is that we can

5 count on assistance and support from the OSCE Verification Mission,

6 diplomatic, international, humanitarian, and other organisations on that

7 particular obligation and assignment, and so on and so forth. The speedy

8 return of citizens to their homes under point 3, et cetera, et cetera.

9 Q. I'd just like to focus on tab 43, which is a letter from the

10 minister of the interior sent to the staff in Pristina and all the

11 secretariats, the public and state security systems, and I am just going

12 to quote the last paragraph, which states as following: "We should

13 cooperate with the verifiers and brief them on any developments and they

14 should contribute to the realisation of the basic objectives of the

15 agreement."

16 And then it says: "However, it is the undisputed duty of the MUP

17 organs to uncover any perpetrators of crimes and all those who threaten

18 the personal safety and property of all citizens in Kosovo and Metohija

19 --" and I'd like to emphasise this -- "irrespective of their ethnicity

20 and take all legally envisaged measures against them."

21 Therefore, General, my question to you is this: With respect to

22 the police measures, was there any discrimination at all towards citizens

23 in view of their ethnicity?

24 A. Absolutely not. All the citizens in Kosovo and Metohija, citizens

25 of Serbia and everybody else under the jurisdiction of Serbia, were

Page 39543

1 treated on a footing of equality by members of the police force.

2 Q. Thank you, General. Now we go on to tab 44, which is a document

3 that is titled "Plan for the evacuation of members of the Kosovo and

4 Metohija Verification Mission."

5 A. Yes, that's right. And this, too, is a document which emanated

6 from the agreement with the Verification Mission and the document signed

7 in Belgrade between General Djordjevic and Shaun Byrnes, and it was our

8 obligation to draw up a plan for the evacuation of members and their

9 safety should they be evacuated from Kosovo and Metohija when they so

10 decide, when they decide to leave.

11 Q. Was that plan implemented fully, this plan for the evaluation [as

12 interpreted] of members of the Verification Mission should they make the

13 decision to leave Kosovo and Metohija, to be able to do so under full

14 safety and security, was this fully implemented?

15 A. Yes, this plan was fully implemented, probably with some of the

16 details amended because this is a general plan and the realisation came

17 after the general plan was drawn up. And all the requirements of the

18 Verification Mission, once they had decided to leave Kosovo and Metohija,

19 were respected.

20 Q. We're not going to dwell on your personal experience and knowledge

21 and participation with respect to the Verification Mission any more.

22 We're now going to move on to another area and deal with terrorism in

23 Kosovo and Metohija.

24 General, tell us, please, when and how did the situation escalate,

25 that is to say the Albanian terrorist activities during the 1990s.

Page 39544

1 A. In the 1990s, terrorist acts appeared sporadically. That is to

2 say from 1991 to 1997, even up to mid-1998, they were sporadic. But the

3 escalation of terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija occurred in mid-1998, from

4 mid-1998 onwards, and of course the first half of 1999. And it is clear

5 to one and all that the continuity of the terrorist acts was followed up

6 and has been followed up to the present day of different intensity and

7 during different periods of time.

8 Q. Without taking up too much time in verbal explanations, although

9 of course they are extremely important, important testimony, General, with

10 respect to this area, would you take a look at tab 124 now, please, which

11 is where we will find tables that I'd like to ask you to comment on

12 briefly.

13 Have you found tab 124?

14 A. I'm just trying to locate it, yes. I have found it. I've found

15 tab 124, if that's the one you had in mind.

16 Q. All right, fine. Tab 124 is the one we're dealing with, and that

17 tab contains a very clear list of tables which relate to terrorism in

18 Kosovo and Metohija.

19 On the first page we have a list of terrorist attacks carried out

20 in Kosovo and Metohija from 1991 to 1997.

21 A. Yes, that's right. And as I've already said, that is the period

22 of sporadic terrorist acts which did not reach levels of concern but were

23 present. And we can see that the total number of terrorist acts during

24 these one, two, three, four, five, six, seven years in all was 134 in

25 total. That can be seen in the first vertical column under point 1.

Page 39545

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Tell us the source of this document. Who

2 compiled this list?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is an official statistic review

4 by the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia. It was carried

5 out by them. And the associates of President Milosevic received access to

6 that in correspondence with the Ministry of the Interior. But I think

7 that this document also was published in the white book, the first white

8 book.

9 JUDGE KWON: The first page of English translation refers to the

10 period from 1st of January to 31st December, 1998.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In my tab, that is on page 2.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Explain to us briefly, please, how this list was conceived. What

14 are the vertical columns? What are the horizontal columns? I'm going to

15 ask you to do that with the other tables as well.

16 A. Well, we're talking about terrorist attacks in the region of the

17 autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija, and the vertical columns show

18 the number of attacks and the consequences of the attacks. The number is

19 under horizontal 1, and the consequences are under 2, or the horizontal

20 line 2. And the consequences once again are divided into vertical columns

21 on the basis of calendar years ranging from 1991 to 1997. And of course

22 the last vertical column is the total number of events and the total

23 number of concrete consequences described.

24 MR. NICE: Your Honour, on this document, apart from the point

25 that His Honour Judge Kwon has already identified that the English

Page 39546












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Page 39547

1 translation misses the page that relates to 1991 to 1997, if the

2 document's part of a report, something that would seem to fit with the

3 appearance of the original although the original is not marked as a

4 schedule or an annex here and doesn't have page numbers, but if it is part

5 of another report, then clearly it's a report to which we should have

6 access. It may be, of course, it's produced elsewhere. If so, we have

7 not identified the report of which this is a part. We should obviously

8 have access to the whole document of which this is a selected part.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. General, you mentioned that page 1 was also contained in the white

11 book.

12 A. Yes, that's right.

13 Q. The white book on terrorism of Kosovo and Metohija.

14 A. Yes, I seem to remember that well.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, all seven volumes of the white

16 book have been presented here and are exhibits. They have been taken in

17 evidence. Your conclusions were, I believe, that they should be tendered

18 as exhibits when I bring in somebody to testify about the authenticity of

19 their contents, and you have been provided with copies in English.

20 General Stevanovic is able to testify to their authenticity --

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: They are not in evidence. They haven't yet been

22 admitted.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I wasn't specific enough in

24 what I said. Of course evidence, in evidence, and -- I should have said

25 for identification, marked for identification, because the words

Page 39548

1 "evidence" are different in Serbian and in English. That's what I meant

2 to say.

3 General Stevanovic in the Ministry of the Interior worked on

4 matters of this kind, that is to say an overall review of the white book,

5 which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had translated into English and

6 transferred through its channels. So he is able authentically to confirm

7 the exactitude and correctness of the facts and information contained in

8 the seven volumes of the white book that have been marked for

9 identification. So that table number 1 has not been translated here

10 because you already have a translation of it in one of the white books,

11 one of the volumes. But as we're dealing with figures, I assume you can

12 follow figures. It's not difficult for us to follow figures if the

13 General comments on the various columns and lines.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, there is nothing in the document

15 itself which tells us where it comes from or how it was compiled. I have

16 turned to the last page. I don't see anything so indicating. But if the

17 witness can provide that information, then we'll hear it.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Yes. Go ahead, General.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'd like to address the President of

21 the Trial Chamber in respect of this table, and I can say with absolute

22 certainty that it is contained in one of the volumes of the white book. I

23 can also state that this table was compiled by the analytics department of

24 the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia on the basis of

25 concrete lists of concrete events and concrete consequences from those

Page 39549

1 events. And of course we're referring to terrorist acts performed in

2 Kosovo and Metohija for this period and the consequences in that period of

3 those acts. And I'm almost absolutely certain that in the first white

4 book you will find a list of the specific events per locality,

5 perpetrator, consequence, and so on. And the table is just the statistics

6 of all this, a statistics of the description of events on the basis of

7 that list.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: How did the ministry get this information? The

9 information which is the foundation for the statistics, how did the

10 ministry get that information?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, in the usual form. It is the

12 daily business of the Ministry of the Interior to compile things like

13 this. The analytics department combines all the reports having to do with

14 events in the republic, Kosovo and Metohija, as an area in which these

15 events took place. So all the secretariats from Kosovo and Metohija send

16 in daily reports to the Ministry of the Interior about all security

17 related information and events which are then recorded in the ministry in

18 one place. And on the basis of information and reports received in this

19 way, the analytics department processes the material and draws up

20 statistical material of this kind like this table and list compiled on the

21 basis of the daily reports coming in from the secretariats and the staffs

22 of the ministries in the area of Kosovo and Metohija, sent in to the

23 ministry, of course.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 39550

1 Q. General, on this first page, in the horizontal column we see

2 number A, the total number of killed persons that throughout those years,

3 from 1991 to 1997, as a consequence of these terrorist acts, 39 persons

4 were killed.

5 A. That's right. In a total of 134 attacks.

6 Q. And underneath there is a column stating terrorist attacks against

7 the Albanians. Terrorist attacks against ethnic Albanians, members of the

8 ethnic Albanian minority loyal to the Republic of Serbia. Does that

9 include the 39?

10 A. The 17 Albanians killed are part of this total number of persons

11 killed in the upper part of the table.

12 Q. Thank you, General. Let's now take a look at table 2. It was my

13 understanding that you have a translation of this. Survey of terrorist

14 attacks carried out by Albanian separatists in the territory of the

15 autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija in the period from the 1st of

16 January until the 31st of December, 1998.

17 We should bear in mind what was going on until the end of 1997,

18 and then an escalation in 1998. 134 attacks took place within the span of

19 seven years, whereas in a single year, 1998, there were 2.010 attacks.

20 Can that be seen in this table?

21 A. Yes, table 2, the one that you mentioned. And of course the

22 structure of the attacks can be seen as well, as well as the consequences,

23 as the table goes on.

24 Q. Could you please indicate the characteristic figures for 1998, the

25 ones that have to do with terrorism.

Page 39551

1 A. The characteristic figures are that the total number of attacks is

2 2.010, which is ten or 15 times more than the overall number of terrorist

3 attacks for the preceding seven years. In those attacks, consequences of

4 terrorist attacks, A, are killed persons. 328 is the total. 210 were

5 citizens, and then the ethnic structure of the citizens killed; and then

6 number 2, members of the MUP, 118; and number 3 are members of the army.

7 Their number is not recorded here. Perhaps this would be the right moment

8 to say that these tables do not include figures on the casualties of the

9 army of Yugoslavia, which in a way is a shortcoming of these tables.

10 B shows the number of persons wounded.

11 Q. Let's just have a look at this sub-heading "Citizens who were

12 killed." Serbs and Montenegrins 41.

13 A. That's right.

14 Q. Albanians 83.

15 A. Yes. That's right. Others, that is to say different ethnicities,

16 73; and unidentified persons 13. Of course, members of MUP irrespective

17 of ethnicity, a total of 118.

18 Then there are figures on wounded persons and what is

19 characteristic is abducted persons. That is under C. And there is a

20 total of 310. Most of them are citizens, 294. And then again there is

21 the ethnic structure; Serbs and Montenegrins 174; Albanians 101; others

22 19; members of the MUP 16. Of course, what follows is the fate of the

23 abducted persons, and it changed practically from one day to the other.

24 Q. In this year of 1998, a total of 310 citizens were abducted. A

25 bit more than a half of the number were Serbs and Montenegrins, about a

Page 39552

1 third were Albanians, and the rest are members of other ethnicities and

2 the police.

3 In table 3 -- in table 3, do we see cumulative figures for 1999?

4 A. Table 3 only pertains to the calendar year of 1999 according to

5 the same methodology. Again we have the same statistical data.

6 Q. General, do you think that there is anything particularly

7 characteristic here?

8 A. Well, perhaps by way of clarification in terms of this third table

9 that pertains to 1999, it is important to see that this includes the

10 period up to the end of the war and the period after the end of the war,

11 that is to say, after the army of Yugoslavia and the police of Serbia

12 withdrew from the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. Terrorist attacks

13 were committed in that period under the authority of the government of the

14 Republic of Serbia and later under the administration of international

15 authorities in Kosovo and Metohija. It can be seen that the total number

16 of attacks and consequences is almost double. The number of attacks is

17 double, and the number of consequences is manyfold compared to 1998.

18 Another point: There were more attacks and more consequences, to

19 the best of my knowledge and according to MUP statistics, after the

20 international security and other forces arrived in Kosovo and Metohija.

21 Q. That is to say in the second half of 1999?

22 A. That's right. But there is information about that here.

23 Q. There is information about that in the following tables. Table

24 number 4 shows the year 2000, terrorist attacks in 2000. That is to say

25 when the army and the police, our army and police were not in Kosovo and

Page 39553

1 Metohija; is that right?

2 A. Yes, that's right. The number of attacks was somewhat lower,

3 perhaps half of those in 1998, but obviously there is still this

4 continuity of attacks. The intensity is somewhat lower in the year 2000,

5 but the methodology of this table is identical to that of the previous

6 tables.

7 Q. 1.028 attacks in the year 2000.

8 A. That's right. And 90 persons who were killed.

9 Q. 2000 is the year when there were no authorities of ours in Kosovo

10 and Metohija. Then also you have the year 2001, don't you?

11 A. That's right.

12 Q. 320 attacks.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And 59 persons killed.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, this is outside the period in the

16 indictment.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I'm quite aware of

18 that fact. But it is very important to show that after leaving the

19 territory of Kosovo, after our army and police left, terrorism continues.

20 So obviously the explanations, which boil down to the supposition that

21 they were against the Albanian -- anti-Albanian authorities that were

22 pursuing an anti-Albanian policy, how can 2000 and 2001 and 2002 and the

23 second half of 1999 and all of 2003 and 2004, how can that be explained?

24 Thought those years, every one of those years, there were more terrorist

25 attacks within one year than during the preceding ten years in Kosovo and

Page 39554

1 Metohija.

2 So if you compare the phenomena and if you seek to find out what

3 their causes are, obviously they could not have been caused by someone who

4 was absent from the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. There is no army.

5 There is no police. Terrorism continues. People are getting killed.

6 Ethnic cleansing continues.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let's deal with it quickly. You're going to take

8 us through the other pages, then, to 2003?

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Can I -- before you do, can I ask how the

10 statistics for the period when the area was not governed by the Republic

11 of Serbia were compiled.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the territory of Kosovo and

13 Metohija, of course, there are international security forces. However,

14 within the Ministry of the Interior, until the present day there is a

15 staff of the ministry in the town of Kursumlija. And also there were

16 relocated secretariats which do follow the situation in Kosovo and

17 Metohija in a way. Namely, they record everything that the citizens

18 report; Serbs, Montenegrins, Albanians, if they show up and report such

19 incidents.

20 Of course, since these are security related incidents in the

21 territory of the republic and since it is a fact that the organisational

22 units of the ministry received such information, then the appropriate

23 department in the ministry keeps records of this kind and compiles

24 statistics of this kind as well as surveys, like the documents we have

25 here.

Page 39555

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. General, in order to save time, let us look at table number 11,

3 please. It has to do with terrorist attacks carried out by Albanian

4 separatists in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija in the period from the

5 10th of June, 1999. That is to say, from the day when our police and army

6 left the territory of Kosovo and Metohija and when the so-called

7 international security forces took over. From the 10th of June, 1999,

8 until the 30th of September 2004. These are terrorist attacks under the

9 auspices of the UN?

10 A. That's right.

11 Q. 7.338 terrorist attacks. So at that time there was not a single

12 policeman or soldier of ours in Kosovo and Metohija?

13 A. That's right. And I can just say one more thing in relation to

14 Judge Bonomy's question: These are minimal figures involving incidents

15 and consequences, because this is only on the basis of information

16 received by our police. It can only mean that there were more but that

17 the police of Serbia was not in a position to record all of them after

18 withdrawing from Kosovo and Metohija. So the figures provided in this

19 table are the minimal figures.

20 Q. You mean they can only be higher than this?

21 A. They can only be higher than this.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Are your people in a position to investigate any of

23 these complaints?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, unfortunately, they are not.

25 They're in a position to --

Page 39556

1 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand. It's a simple question. And can I

2 follow that by asking you, are you aware whether the international

3 authorities keep similar records?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sure they do. The question is,

5 though, how they qualify each and every incident. But I believe that they

6 do record them.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Do you ever have communications with them to

8 compare your records?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I personally, of course, do not.

10 But some authorised officials, including top officials from the Ministry

11 of the Interior, who work on the staff I mentioned a few moments ago, as

12 far as I know have weekly meetings of consultations regarding these

13 issues, and I think they do exchange information.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you very much.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. General, if you look at table 3, the number of persons killed in

17 1999 from the 1st of January until the 31st of December, and if you

18 compare that to table 11, how many persons were killed from mid-June 1999

19 to the year 2004, you will get numbers that are basically identical.

20 A. That's right. 1.114 in 1999, and then after the 10th of June,

21 1999, the figures are on the rise.

22 Q. Exactly. After our forces left.

23 A. That's right. But table 3 includes attacks and consequences after

24 the police force withdrew from Kosovo.

25 Q. In table 11, you can see that 1.151 persons were abducted from the

Page 39557

1 departure of our forces from Kosovo and Metohija.

2 A. That's right.

3 Q. But let us look at the very top of the table that has to do with

4 the time when our forces were not present. 7.338 is the number of total

5 terrorist attacks. 7.271 are the attacks against citizens as such; 6.674

6 against Serbs and Montenegrins, and 248 against Albanians, and that makes

7 up the total then?

8 A. That's right.

9 Q. 1.010 Serbs and Montenegrins were killed, and 120 Albanians were

10 killed, 74 are other.

11 What does this table show, General, in terms of continuity, the

12 continuity of terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija even after the protection

13 force came, and as a matter of fact, under their patronage?

14 A. It shows what you said; the continuity of terrorist attacks,

15 irrespective of who exercises power and authority in Kosovo and Metohija.

16 Q. In table 12, in tab 124, there is a list of terrorist attacks

17 carried out from the date of the deadline for the disarming of the KLA.

18 That is to say from the 22nd of September, 1999, to the 30th of September,

19 2004. That is to say after their alleged disarming.

20 Do you remember that General Jackson announced that they were

21 disarmed immediately upon his arrival in Kosovo and Metohija?

22 A. I remember that.

23 Q. Do you have any knowledge as to whether they were actually

24 disarmed?

25 A. Well, of course they were not disarmed. Weapons were never a

Page 39558












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 39559

1 problem in Kosovo and Metohija, and I'm sure that there were -- there was

2 much more weapons than members of the units involved.

3 Q. Could we please look at tab 125 now, General. What is the

4 underlying concept of this table, of this survey, rather? I have a few

5 questions, so I don't interrupt you but I would like to know --

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we're trying to find a translation

7 for tab 125. Is there one?

8 MR. NICE: We haven't received one.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It seems that we don't have a

10 translation, but it's only figures.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: You are not to proceed unless and until the

12 Chamber is satisfied about those matters. Let it be placed on the ELMO.

13 THE INTERPRETER: The French booth has the translation.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: The French booth has a translation.

15 THE INTERPRETER: The Albanian booth has the translation too.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: There is some kind of discrimination.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Probably.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Very well. Proceed.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I continue?

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, continue.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So on the overhead projector we have

22 an overview of --

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, tell us what the heading is.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- of the registered -- the heading

25 is: Schedule of security related incidents involving abducted and missing

Page 39560

1 persons from the period 1st of January, 1998, to the 31st of December,

2 2003 in the area of Kosovo and Metohija by period.

3 So in various columns we have data on abducted and missing

4 persons, such as column 2. And columns 3, 5, 6, and 7 denote certain

5 periods. So that column 3 is 1998, column 5 is from the 1st of January

6 until the 23rd of March, 1999, the beginning of airstrikes, the

7 aggression. Column 4 is the period of the duration of the aggression

8 until the 20th of June, that is the complete withdrawal of the police and

9 army from Kosovo and Metohija. And column 6 is from the 20th of June,

10 1990 to the 1st of June, 2001. And the last column is from the 2nd of

11 June 2001, to the 31st of December, 2003.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. You see in column 7, which encompasses the period from the 20th of

14 June, 1990, that is, only after the departure of police and the army from

15 Kosovo, a total of abducted persons that equals the totals for -- the

16 combined totals for 1998, 1999, and the entire duration of the war. A

17 total of 450, whereas in 1998 there were 343, and in 1999 there were 66.

18 787 people were abducted in Kosovo and Metohija according to the

19 information of our police.

20 A. That is correct. And below, we see the ethnic structure.

21 Q. Albanians, Serbs and Montenegrins, Roma, Muslim, et cetera.

22 A. And in item 2, we have the consequences.

23 Q. As established so far.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. So we still don't know what happened to 758 persons. In total it

Page 39561

1 is 758. The figure of 392 is the total for the period after the

2 withdrawal.

3 Very well, General. Let us look at the table under tab 126. It

4 is very indicative. Do you have, because these are photocopies of the

5 original document, do you have a copy in colour?

6 A. Yes, I do.

7 Q. Please place it on the ELMO.

8 A. Which page do you want, 1 or 2?

9 Q. You can place both 1 and 2, and give us brief comments on what you

10 believe is pertinent. Please explain, what is this all about?

11 A. We see the charts denoting terrorist attacks in Kosovo and

12 Metohija from 1991 to the 30th of September, 2002. In the first chart we

13 see that a total of 2.061 attacks were carried out against MUP members and

14 facilities, and a total of 7.012 attacks against civilians and other

15 buildings. So the total number of attacks is far higher against civilians

16 than against MUP members.

17 Q. In terms of percentage, it is 77.3 versus 22.7 per cent.

18 A. Correct. The next chart is a survey of people killed. 82.9 per

19 cent of civilians versus 17.1 per cent of MUP members. The total of those

20 killed was 1.883.

21 And then we have chart number 3, in the form of a pie, denoting

22 abducted persons. 96.6 per cent, an overwhelming majority, of civilians

23 versus only 3.4 per cent of MUP members.

24 Q. Now, look at table number 2. That is a comparison of the number

25 of attacks by Albanian terrorists and extremists involving certain

Page 39562

1 consequences before and after the arrival of the KFOR.

2 A. Correct. We have the numbers for both before and after the KFOR

3 arrival. We see that 34.29 per cent of attacks were carried out before

4 KFOR arrived, and 65.71 per cent of the total number were carried out

5 after KFOR arrived.

6 And the next chart shows us how many people were killed. In terms

7 of percentage, 37.81 per cent were killed before KFOR arrival; and

8 afterwards, up to 2002, 62.19 per cent.

9 And the third chart here shows us the number of persons abducted.

10 Before the arrival of KFOR, 27.95 per cent; and from the arrival of KFOR

11 until 2002, 72.05 per cent of the total number of those abducted.

12 Q. From these figures, which are perfectly accurate, does it follow

13 that the situation became worse after the arrival of international forces?

14 A. The statistics in terms of people killed and abducted seem to

15 confirm that.

16 Q. General, in tabs 127, 128, and so on until 133, we have overviews

17 for all the Secretariats of Internal Affairs; is that correct?

18 A. I think so. I'm not quite sure.

19 Q. In 127 we have the secretariat of Kosovska Mitrovica; 128,

20 Djakovica; 129, Prizren; 130, the secretariat for Urosevac; 131, Gnjilane;

21 and 132, Pristina.

22 A. Unfortunately, I am missing Pristina and Pec. But these

23 statistics can be explained on the basis of just one table.

24 Q. Then would you please deal with one of these tables. How are they

25 designed?

Page 39563

1 A. Well, they are designed in such a way as to show us an overview of

2 terrorist activities and their consequences in the area of one single

3 secretariat from the 1st of January, 1998, until the 1st of June, 2001,

4 broken down into several periods.

5 In column 2 we see the total number of terrorist acts, and in

6 lines horizontally, we see the types of terrorist acts, and then we see

7 who the victims were; acts against Serbs and Montenegrins, against acts

8 Albanians, acts against Roma and others, with unidentified or identified

9 perpetrators. The structure of terrorist acts listed by the relevant

10 article of the law can be understood if we look at tab 132, which explains

11 these various articles.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: We have the translation for 130 but not for the

13 others that you have mentioned. This will, even though it's in tabular

14 form, disadvantage the Prosecutor if he wishes to cross-examine.

15 132?


17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Did you say you have translation

18 only for 132?

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, no, 130. We don't have 132 at all, not even

20 in the original.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. 130, then.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. General, this overview under tab 130, is it completely identical

24 to the other tabs as regards the headings?

25 A. Yes. It's a completely identical table in terms of structure.

Page 39564

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So, Mr. Robinson, if tab 130 was

2 translated, everything that is necessary has been translated. The only

3 thing that is not translated are the numbers, which need not be translated

4 at all. The structure, the layout of the table is the same. Everything

5 is the same, only the numbers need to be replaced with the numbers from

6 each of the tabs.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: The only difference with 130, I see in the original

8 it's handwritten.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. The only difference is that in

10 this table under 130, the figures were handwritten into the form, whereas

11 in other tabs they were typewritten.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: These various records of events in municipalities

13 -- in regions, rather, what is the source of the material? In other

14 words, where do these statistics -- where are the factual narratives

15 behind these statistics?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, maybe I should have

17 said this earlier. Behind every single figure there is a specific case

18 file in the competent regional secretariat. So this tab 130 relates to

19 the secretariat in Urosevac. If I remember well, under it there are four

20 municipalities, and in each one of them in the locality where the crime

21 was committed there is a case file which is reflected here in the form of

22 a figure. And you can see from -- I'm sorry. I assumed something that

23 does not exist here after all. That is the number of cases, how many

24 cases were opened with regard to a specific type of incident.

25 If we look at the lower part of the list, every crime is reflected

Page 39565

1 in a criminal report, but it is all to be found in the relevant

2 territorial unit, that is the relevant secretariat.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Are these events also summarised in the white books

4 or are these quite separate from what's contained in the white books?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The data should be absolutely

6 identical for the same period. This list encompasses a slightly larger

7 period than the white book lists, and the only difference, if any, can be

8 explained by the fact that certain cases were solved in the meantime and,

9 therefore, recategorised in the lists.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: And going back to the earlier lists which were for

11 the whole area of Kosovo and Metohija, you told us that the very first

12 one, which we didn't at that time have, was a reflection of material in

13 the white books. Does that apply to all the other subsequent lists or did

14 it only apply to the very first one that you told us about?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When I was replying to your earlier

16 question, that period related only to 1991 to 1997, and I believe I

17 remember correctly that the table is identical in the white books,

18 identical to the table I've shown here.

19 I don't think these tables can be completely identical because

20 they do not reflect the same periods. The white books, if I remember

21 correctly, were written in 1999 and 2000, whereas these tables cover

22 periods after 2000 as well, and that can explain some of the differences.

23 But other differences for the same period can only be at the level of

24 human error or statistical error.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you for that explanation.

Page 39566

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's time for the break. We'll adjourn for 20

2 minutes.

3 --- Recess taken at 12.18 p.m.

4 --- On resuming at 12.44 p.m.


6 MR. NICE: Your Honour, the witness's last answer, where he says

7 that the tables can't be completely identical because they don't reflect

8 the same periods, and his answer on page 57 leave the Prosecution in some

9 considerable doubt as to where these tables came from. It would obviously

10 help us to have the witness's final position on what he can say about

11 these tables, if anything, before we move on to another topic in evidence

12 that's clearly going to take a long time, and if the Chamber feels it can

13 help.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, let's ask him again.

15 General, tell us precisely where these tables come from.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These tables were collected by the

17 associates of Mr. Milosevic in official correspondence with the Ministry

18 of the Interior and the Republic of Serbia. Therefore, these tables were

19 compiled in the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia on the

20 basis of lists of events that took place in the corresponding periods in

21 Kosovo and Metohija and which the corresponding organisational units in

22 the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia recorded as

23 security related events. I don't know whether that suffices.

24 So the tables are just a statistical processing of existing cases

25 and case files and lists of events that took place during the pertinent

Page 39567

1 period of time in Kosovo and Metohija.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: And the case files are made up of statements and

3 information from the various secretariats?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right. The secretariats and

5 their organisational units are in charge of a given territory. And in

6 those police units, they have the specific cases and case files for each

7 event. Of course, each one will be slightly different than the other by

8 virtue of the description of the event and so on, whereas here they have

9 been classified and systematised following a set method which can be

10 recognised at first glance looking at the lists and tables themselves.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: You started that answer, Mr. Stevanovic, by

12 referring to the associates of Mr. Milosevic obtaining these documents

13 from the ministry, and you went on to say and therefore they must have

14 been compiled from information there. That sounded as if you did not

15 personally know that to be the case. What is the position?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course I personally didn't draft

17 the tables, the lists, but I'm certain that the service in the Ministry of

18 the Interior dealing with this type of matter is a serious service, and I

19 am fully convinced that the tables are correct and are based on the facts

20 that exist in the official police files in the corresponding units in the

21 localities. Now, the fact that they were received from the Ministry of

22 the Interior, I considered that to be an important fact because the

23 Ministry of the Interior certainly wouldn't send to this Tribunal a

24 document which would not have the necessary level of seriousness and

25 correctness.

Page 39568

1 MR. NICE: Well, Your Honour, I'm grateful for the inquiries that

2 the Court has made. I realise that in the absence of either underlying

3 material or in the absence of this material itself having been made public

4 on an earlier occasion, which it may have been, it's probably going to be

5 impossible for me to cross-examine on its detail in any way. I make no

6 objection, I simply make that observation.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I'd just like to draw

9 your attention to one thing. Professor Rakic told me something with

10 respect to the translations of the documents in the various secretariats,

11 and it is as I have explained to you. The translation service didn't

12 translate each and every table or list but just one in tab 131 -- 130, I'm

13 sorry, because the tables and lists are identical for all the

14 secretariats. So that one list and all its columns was translated, and

15 you can apply it to each of the secretariats in the previous tabs, and you

16 will be able to see the figures in the different columns. So that -- the

17 translation is that of tab 130, because it is identical to all the other

18 lists referring to the individual Secretariats of the Ministry of the

19 Interior in Kosovo and Metohija.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you for that information, but in my view

21 the translation service, if it takes that course, should insert a

22 notification to that effect, but thank you for the information. Continue.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. General, coming back to the facts and figures relating to

25 terrorism, you have tab 133, and you have the breakdown according to the

Page 39569

1 secretariats, the instances where the ceasefire was violated by KLA

2 terrorists during the sojourn of the Verification Mission, while they were

3 in the area. And in one of your previous answers you did mention the

4 agreement that was reached between you and the American representatives

5 and taking over their obligations and not to exert any form of violence,

6 and here we have the different secretariats and the months involved. From

7 the arrival of the Verification Mission, we have November 1998, then

8 December 1998, January 1999, February 1999, and March 1999.

9 A. Yes, that's right.

10 Q. Now, in tab 133, in list number 1, we have Pristina, the cases in

11 which the ceasefire was violated, the number of armed attacks. There were

12 a total of 52 of those.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. That was during the stay of the Verification Mission, while they

15 were there?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Number 2 is Kosovska Mitrovica, and so on and so forth.

18 A. Right, in order.

19 Q. But let's take a look at this one table. You have the months when

20 the Verification Mission was there, was in place. The first column refers

21 to -- for the first line, the first horizontal line is the number of armed

22 attacks per month, a total of 52 of those in Pristina, 1 against premises,

23 48 against civilians, 101 against individuals, and 53 against the MUP and

24 the army of Yugoslavia. And the same thing has been compiled for Kosovska

25 Mitrovica. So in Pristina there were 52 attacks, in the secretariat's

Page 39570












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13 English transcripts.













Page 39571

1 area, not in Pristina itself. In Mitrovica there were 63 attacks, in Pec

2 there were 61 attacks, Djakovica 62, Prizren 118, Urosevac 24.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, what tab is this? 133.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is tab 133. The last tab in that

5 series, in the binder relating to an overview of the terrorist attacks.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's not translated.

7 MR. KAY: It's part of 131. It's been incorrectly attached.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: I see. I was just told that.

9 MR. KAY: If you go to the end of the English --

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: The last page of 131 should be the first page of

11 133.

12 JUDGE KWON: Last page of English translation should refer to 133.

13 131.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well, Mr. Milosevic, continue.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. So, General, during this period of time while the Verification

18 Mission was there, we have examples of several hundred attacks, terrorist

19 attacks, against facilities, persons, members of the army and police, and

20 of course civilians.

21 A. Yes, that's right. And in keeping with the agreement with the

22 Verification Mission and the documents signed later on in Belgrade, all

23 these events or, rather, representatives of the Verification Mission in

24 the territory was informed about each of these events.

25 Q. General, in going through these tables, we have just seen a

Page 39572

1 precipitous escalation in the level of terrorism in 1998; namely, you

2 compared the period conclusive with 1997 and then 1998 onwards, and in

3 that respect I'd like to ask you a question now. What were the

4 prerequisites for this escalation of terrorism? What were the conditions

5 that led up to it?

6 A. Well, according to our information and knowledge, the key

7 prerequisite or reason or pretext for this kind of escalation in terrorist

8 attacks in Kosovo and Metohija during 1998 was the infiltration of large

9 quantities of weapons from the Republic of Albania and across the border

10 with the Republic of Macedonia. And most of the weapons were brought in

11 from the warehouses of military materiel and armaments looted in the

12 Republic of Albania in the course of 1997.

13 Q. General, in tab -- and we'll have a look at tab 134 now, 134, 135,

14 and 136, and 7, but let's take tab 134 first. Does tab 134 contain a list

15 of weapons found and seized from Albanian terrorists, and MTS, in the

16 period from the 1st of January, 1998 to the 1st of June, 2001?

17 A. Yes, that's right. We find that list in tab 134.

18 Q. Very well. Thank you.

19 A. It is set out in tabular form.

20 Q. Now, would you be so kind as to explain to us how this list and

21 review was prepared and what the vertical columns mean, what the

22 horizontal lines mean, et cetera.

23 A. This review was drafted in such a way as to show how many weapons

24 were seized from Albanian terrorists per secretariat and what types of

25 weapons. So the first table, which is wider than it is long, refers to

Page 39573

1 Kosovska Mitrovica. The second relates to the secretariat in Pec, the

2 third to Djakovica, the fourth to Prizren, and so on in order until we get

3 to a total overview at the end of page 2.

4 Q. But this combined review in page 2, it says in brackets, "Not

5 counting Pristina."

6 A. Yes, that's right. There is no information and figures from

7 Pristina, but as a general rule, we can say that Pristina can incorporate

8 a quantity of about a quarter to a third of the total number of weapons

9 seized in Kosovo and Metohija. Pristina counts for that third or a

10 quarter.

11 And I propose now that we look at the overall total, the combined

12 total, because the previous totals were worked out according to identical

13 methods for each individual secretariat territory.

14 Q. Right. Let's not go into the individual secretariats. So we are

15 looking at this combined total at the end of the second page without

16 Pristina, as we've just said. What does that contain?

17 A. Yes, that's right. If we look at column -- the vertical column 2,

18 it contains the types of weapons. And in columns 3 to 7 we have the

19 different periods. Column 3 is 1998, column 5 is 1999 up until the

20 aggression. Column 6 is the period during the aggression; and column 7,

21 which has not been filled in here, quite obviously, is the period after

22 the 20th of June, 1999.

23 Q. That means you didn't have the figures there.

24 A. No, of course not. We didn't have any competence for us to be

25 able to fill that in.

Page 39574

1 Q. At any rate, these figures relate to the quantities and types of

2 weapons seized ending with the 20th of June, 1999; is that right?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And what can we see? What does this show?

5 A. We see that mortars, hand-held rocket launchers and so on, of

6 1.045 pieces, excluding the Pristina area. Then machine-guns,

7 semi-automatic rifles, automatic rifles and similar rifles, a total of

8 8.320. 360 pistols; mines and explosive devices of different types,

9 4.224; and different types or calibres of ammunition, 723.531.

10 Q. From what you've just said, can we conclude that the origins of

11 the weapons were mostly the warehouses that were looted in the Republic of

12 Albania in the events that took place before those periods?

13 A. Well, most of the weapons listed here were made in China and came

14 from those warehouses. However, in Kosovo and Metohija, there were other

15 types of weapons as well, including state-of-the-art rifles, armoured

16 devices, and so on.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, that was a leading question.

18 Properly put, it should have been: "What conclusions can we draw about

19 the origins of the weapons?"

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I didn't wish to ask a leading

21 question, Mr. Robinson. What I wanted to do was to focus on what the

22 witness had said in the previous answer, that the origins of these weapons

23 were from the looted warehouses in the Republic of Albania. I just wanted

24 to check that out.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 39575

1 Q. Now, General, did you have any information and figures about the

2 -- where the majority of the weapons came from?

3 A. Yes, we did, and those figures are the ones I have just explained

4 and read out to you.

5 Q. Thank you. Now in tab -- and we now come to tab 135, which is a

6 document which is dated the 21st of September, 1998, and we can see that

7 it is a report on the weapons and ammunition handed over from the SUP of

8 Djakovica, Decani, to the SUP in Pristina. So it was the SUP in Djakovica

9 and Decani that handed over these items to the SUP of Pristina.

10 A. Yes, that's right. And it's -- it's an example of a document

11 which shows that the SUP in Djakovica handed over the stipulated

12 quantities of arms and ammunition to the SUP in Pristina. Of course, the

13 SUP of Djakovica and Pristina are SUPs of equal level, but the Pristina

14 SUP was the collection centre for this type of device.

15 MR. NICE: I expect none of us has a translation for this. For

16 what it's worth, the right-hand part of the page is also cut off but I

17 think it's probably only to a limited extent.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: We have no translation, Mr. Milosevic. It's

19 becoming more the norm than the exception.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I would say that it's an

21 exception, because indeed most of these documents have been translated.

22 This is just an example of how these weapons were taken over from various

23 places. Ammunition too.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let it be placed on the ELMO.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 39576

1 Q. General, please, bearing in mind the fact that this is the 21st of

2 September, 1998, were these weapons that were seized or weapons that were

3 voluntarily surrendered, or both, or what was the predominant case?

4 A. This is a list of weapons. May I repeat this: The SUP of

5 Djakovica handed this over to the SUP of Pristina, and we cannot see

6 explicitly what the origin of the weapons was, but obviously these were

7 weapons primarily the citizens handed over to police stations in the

8 territory of the SUP of Pristina. Of course, it is possible that to a

9 lesser extent there are also weapons that were seized from citizens who

10 illegally possessed them or did not have --

11 Q. All right. But out of all these weapons, is there anything that

12 citizens could have legally in their possession? For example, number 1 is

13 a recoilless gun, Chinese made. Can a citizen legally possess a

14 recoilless gun?

15 A. Well, of course not. But I don't think that there's actually a

16 single weapon here that citizens could have in their legal possession.

17 Most of these weapons are forbidden, prohibited in the territory of the

18 Republic of Serbia. They cannot be held by citizens themselves.

19 Two recoilless guns; 20 shells for recoilless gun; a 60-millimetre

20 mortar -- rather, seven of them, shells for the 60-millimetre mortar; a

21 machine-gun, 61 of those.

22 Q. That's a heavy machine-gun?

23 A. Yes, anti-aircraft.

24 Q. What we see here, is it a customary report of the type that you

25 had occasion to have in your hands and that you received as information in

Page 39577

1 the Ministry of the Interior?

2 A. This is just one example. Of course, from all the secretariats in

3 Kosovo and Metohija, there was at least one such copy, because illegally

4 possessed weapons were, in principle, collected once a year at the level

5 of the Ministry of the Interior. In Kosovo and Metohija, certainly this

6 may have been the case more often than that.

7 Q. And now in 135.1, we have what is in warehouses in the SUP of

8 Djakovica and in the Department of the Interior in Decani.

9 A. That's right.

10 Q. Six recoilless guns, et cetera. Number 7, automatic rifle,

11 Chinese made, 664 pieces.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Is that from warehouses in Albania?

14 A. It is generally known that the Albanian army was generally and

15 predominantly armed by Chinese-made weapons. Item number 7 includes

16 weapons that were certainly Chinese made, yes.

17 Q. Is there anything else that is characteristic of this document?

18 A. Not as far as this document is concerned. Of course anti-tank

19 shells are also referred to. That is number 19, et cetera.

20 Q. In tab 136, do we see an example of what kind of action the police

21 took when a citizen would hand in weapons? We see tab 136 -- in tab 136

22 an Official Note from the department of the traffic police in Djakovica.

23 It says here that a certain person here, and his name is given, in the

24 village of Glodjane, has an ID, et cetera. And it says the person walked

25 up to us and handed over a rifle, Chinese made, and the serial number is

Page 39578

1 there, with ammunition.

2 A. That's right. The date is the 12th of September, 1998, and it was

3 a specific citizen who handed over a specific rifle to a policeman.

4 Q. Were any of these citizens who handed over weapons arrested or

5 maltreated, those who handed over weapons?

6 A. I have already explained that that was not the case.

7 Q. What is tab 136.1? That is also an Official Note.

8 A. That is another example but a similar one. A woman reports to the

9 policeman that a machine-gun belonging to her late son who got killed in

10 the village of Eric [phoen] is in her house and she wants to hand it over

11 to the police, and indeed she did that. We can see it from the text. And

12 also we can see here the manufacturing number of that machine-gun.

13 Q. All right. Let's not dwell on the weapons handed over, then, much

14 longer.

15 Tell me, what were the tactics of the terrorists and of their

16 terrorist attacks, General?

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: We're trying to find 137. We don't seem to have

18 it.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's just see what it is. We dealt

20 with 136. I haven't got 137 either.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have 137.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Oh, General, you have 137?

24 A. Yes, I do. It's a list, a longish list on the hand-over of

25 weapons and ammunition, and it is considerably longer than the rest, the

Page 39579

1 preceding ones.

2 Q. Can you please place it on the ELMO.

3 A. This is a record of a hand-over of weapons, ammunition, and

4 explosive devices that took place on the 29th of September, 1998. This

5 gives a specific list of every weapon that was handed over, including the

6 manufacturing number of the weapon concerned.

7 On the first page we can see that the first items are automatic

8 rifles, Chinese made, with the following numbers, so then from 1 until 120

9 there are the exact numbers of each and every one of these specific

10 weapons. Page 2 continues in the same way, then all of page 3 as well,

11 and on page 4 up to 725.

12 On page 5, there is a heading, "Automatic rifles, Chinese made,

13 with --" and now this is illegible. And again we have numbers from 1 to

14 222.

15 On page 6, semi-automatic rifles, Chinese made, from number 1 to

16 244. And then page 7 goes all the way to 419.

17 Page 8 includes various rifles, M-48s, et cetera, a total of 23.

18 Then the Spagin Russian automatic rifle, the total is 7, as far as I can

19 see. Then sub-machine-guns, 7.62 times 39, a total of 82. Then

20 sub-machine-guns, 7.62 times 54, a total of 70. Then a Browning

21 submachine-gun, total 35. Then on page 9, hand-held rocket launchers,

22 Chinese made, a total of 53. Recoilless guns, 6; mortars, 82-millimetres,

23 1; 60-millimetre mortars, 7; and then there are different quantities of

24 ammunition, shells for recoilless guns, and so on and so forth.

25 Q. General, whose document is this?

Page 39580

1 A. Let me just have a look at the first page. This is the

2 Secretariat of the Interior from Djakovica too. They are submitting this

3 report to the staff of the MUP of the Republic of Serbia in Pristina, and

4 it says: "Record of hand-over of weapons, ammunition, and explosive

5 devices that were found by MUP employees as well as those handed over by

6 citizens of Siptar ethnicity from the village -- from the villages in the

7 municipality of Decani."

8 So this is what the SUP of Djakovica had at that point in time

9 that was handed over by Albanian citizens.

10 Q. I don't think it's necessary to dwell on this document in tab 137

11 any longer.

12 General, I asked you about the tactics of terrorists in their

13 terrorist attacks.

14 A. Well, it could be said that the tactics of the terrorist attacks,

15 especially in 1998 and 1999 in Kosovo and Metohija, was to attack members

16 of the police and citizens most often from ambushes along roads where

17 citizens and the police moved. I am primarily referring to roads that

18 were blocked in a certain period of 1998, namely Lapusnik-Dolac along the

19 Pristina-Pec road, and then the road between Pec and Djakovica, and part

20 of the road between Pristina and Prizren, namely the section from

21 Crnoljevo to the Dulje pass.

22 After such attacks, if the police would react, the terrorists

23 would as a rule withdraw into the villages. From the outskirts of the

24 villages they would attack the police by opening fire from different types

25 of weapons, and after awhile they would discard their weapons and

Page 39581

1 uniforms, they would mingle with civilians, they would get civilians on

2 the move, and then under the protection of civilians, they tried to leave

3 the area where they otherwise would have been arrested. In this way, they

4 practically jeopardised the freedom of movement and safety of movement in

5 Kosovo and Metohija. In a considerable number of terrorist attacks, the

6 victims were killed or seriously wounded, but at the same time, when

7 civilians are on the move and when they retreat into inhabited areas, they

8 create the impression that there are big migrations involved and then in

9 their propaganda they try to portray this as forceful movement of the

10 population. They know that the police will not open fire where they know

11 that civilians may be the casualties of that gunfire.

12 Q. Please, you said that they would take masses of civilians along

13 with them when they would retreat.

14 A. That's right. They would take a mass of civilians because this

15 made them feel safer. And at the same time they used that fact in order

16 to portray the overall situation as persecution of Albanians by the

17 police.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Give us an example, General, of the number of

19 civilians that they would take with them.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In almost every anti-terrorist

21 action and every reaction to an act of terrorism, that would happen on

22 roads near villages. After the police reaction, they would always

23 withdraw into villages and then they would open fire from villages.

24 After a brief clash, because usually they would not put up

25 resistance for long within the settlements where they were, they would

Page 39582












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 39583

1 leave the villages. Of course they would take civilians with them because

2 they would be convincing them that the police would be repressive towards

3 them, and it is possible that they used certain forms of coercion in order

4 to force the civilians to come along with them. But we don't know about

5 that now.

6 It is a fact that after brief clashes on the outskirts of the

7 villages --

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: I asked you specifically about the number. And

9 then could you also tell us about the ethnicity of the civilians. About

10 how many would be with them, they would take?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As a rule, many civilians from the

12 specific settlement. Hardly anybody would stay behind after this kind of

13 a clash with the police once the police would enter the village. Usually

14 when the police would enter the village, there would be no civilians left

15 in the village, and of course no terrorists either.

16 As far as their ethnic background is concerned, they were

17 Albanians for the most part. They would not withdraw into settlements,

18 villages that were not Albanian.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. When you say "they" --

21 A. I mean the terrorists. Of course I mean the terrorists.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. The civilians that they took with then were

23 for the most part Albanians?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right. When I said that they

25 attacked from ambushes, I am referring to the well-known principle of hit

Page 39584

1 and run. They were not prepared to remain in combat contact with the

2 units attacked. They would withdraw immediately into villages for the

3 most part. In they would withdraw to areas that were outside settlements,

4 they would remain -- that they would remain in close contact and that --

5 for a longer period of time and that they could be arrested during the

6 course of that action.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. General, a very specific question: Did the police open fire at

9 members of the KLA if there was any danger of hurting civilians?

10 A. Absolutely not. That was not the policy involved, nor were there

11 such orders involved, nor was that the general thrust.

12 Q. Is there a single order that you are aware of that gunfire may not

13 be opened if civilians could be hurt?

14 A. There were several orders that I saw myself, and I think that in

15 these documents there are such orders, but at this moment I cannot find

16 them.

17 Q. All right. We'll get to that. They were withdrawing, and they

18 were forcing entire villages to withdraw with them. Does that show their

19 awareness that the police would not target civilians or does this show

20 that they think that the police would target civilians?

21 A. I've already explained that, that they were doing that inter alia

22 because they were aware of the fact that the police in such situations did

23 not have the right to fire or did they have any wish to fire or, rather,

24 use firearms.

25 Q. Were you personally ever in a position to see an event of this

Page 39585

1 kind when a number of KLA members were withdrawing with civilians?

2 A. I can say specifically that during 1998, in the summer, after the

3 terrorist incursion in the town of Orahovac and during the police and

4 military operation aimed at the deblockade of the town of Orahovac I was

5 present there and within the operations of the police and the military I

6 was following what was going on in the territory of Orahovac. We saw that

7 a large number of civilians left Orahovac, that they moved towards

8 Malisevo. I myself saw that no one fired at this group of civilians.

9 That was only logical because it was such a big group of civilians. It

10 was quite clear that terrorists were getting out the same way too.

11 Q. Could you in any way establish whether there were KLA members

12 among the withdrawing civilians?

13 A. We were at quite a distance, a kilometre away or more, which was

14 too far. But I already explained that terrorists were not wearing

15 uniforms when they were retreating. They would only wear uniforms in

16 Albanian settlements, when they were along roads. When they were clashing

17 with the police they rarely wore uniforms, and if they did, they wore them

18 only briefly.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: The example you've given just now relating to

20 Orahovac, did that involve killing of Serb civilians or Serb MUP members;

21 and if so, where is the report into the investigation?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The incident involving the capture

23 of Orahovac is a very complex case. From the incursion of terrorists into

24 Orahovac it involved a number of preceding actions in Velika Hoca [phoen],

25 Zociste and a large number of other villages, when just before entering

Page 39586

1 Orahovac the terrrorists kidnapped several dozens of Serb civilians from

2 the said villages, and even the Monks from the monastery in Zociste. Some

3 of those civilians were later found dead, others have not been found to

4 this day and are still missing.

5 In this operation to lift the blockade of Orahovac, the police

6 station was liberated after a blockade and a cut-off of water and other

7 supplies, including food, before the surrounding roads were also

8 deblocked. But I cannot tell you specifically whether a policeman was

9 killed in the operation or not. I believe there were some policemen

10 killed but I'm not sure.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. General, I believe that there are many written records on this

13 incident.

14 A. Certainly.

15 Q. Thank you. General, this terrorist organisation called itself an

16 army. Now, in view of your experience, are you in possession of any

17 elements that would support this claim that this was an army?

18 A. I personally am convinced that the so-called KLA never became an

19 army. They indeed had the capacity to mount perfidious hit-and-run

20 attacks, but they were never organised or structured in such a way as to

21 be able to hold a certain territory in a serious military manner and to

22 use that territory as a base from which to mount long-term military

23 operations. I have already said that after short-lived attacks and

24 clashes with the army or the police, they discarded their weapons and

25 uniforms and blended with civilians in order to retreat and avoid arrest.

Page 39587

1 Q. From the viewpoint of the attributes that are necessary for a

2 force to be called an army, you've already told us that the KLA could not

3 be an army. Do you know, however, of any case where they honoured and

4 respected international humanitarian law or any other convention that

5 regulated armed conflicts?

6 A. It was perfectly obvious that the terrorists had no respect for

7 any norms of international law. Earlier today we have analysed many

8 documents that support this conclusion.

9 Most of the victims in terrorist attacks were civilians.

10 Policemen, soldiers and others came second on the list of casualties. But

11 the main casualties were civilians, and that indeed points to the

12 conclusion that they had no respect for international norms of

13 humanitarian law.

14 Q. How did you qualify the nature of their attacks on the police?

15 A. As far as attacks on the police are concerned, until the

16 proclamation of the state of war, we categorised them as attacks against

17 civilians although we did not present them as such in statistics, because

18 as long as the police were doing their normal policework without joining

19 any military activities, they can also be considered as civilians.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: In your case, is any of these attacks on the

21 police related to an allegation in the indictment?

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, certainly they are, but I

23 haven't come to that yet. I can ask the witness.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm going to bring the witness to that for that

25 purpose. Or you will ask the witness questions.

Page 39588

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will ask questions of this

2 witness, certainly, among other things about all these allegations

3 concerning alleged crimes listed in various paragraphs of the indictment.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, that kind of evidence will be more

5 helpful than the sort of general framework he's outlining as to the

6 pattern of conduct of the KLA. It will be more helpful to your case, I

7 mean.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. General, with regard to what you've just said about the attacks,

10 the terrorist attacks -- let me see. Yes, here it is.

11 What you've just said about civilians being the predominant

12 casualties, does that completely correspond to the charts that we saw in

13 tabs 124 and 126 regarding attacks on civilians versus attacks on

14 policemen, et cetera? Does your testimony completely correspond in this

15 area to the statistics and the charts?

16 A. One of those pie charts in colour specifically deals with the

17 ratio of civilian victims and the police victims, and it shows clearly

18 that civilians were the predominant casualties of terrorist attacks.

19 Q. And now tell me, were Albanian civilians also the casualties of

20 terrorist attacks in Kosovo and Metohija, the members of their own ethnic

21 community? Let me just draw your attention to this very extensive

22 document under tab 138. But before that, please answer my question: Were

23 Albanians also victims?

24 A. According to all the operative and other information in the

25 possession of the police, ethnic Albanians were also victims of terrorist

Page 39589

1 activity in Kosovo, members of the Albanian ethnic community. And from

2 the table -- tables we saw, there were many Albanian deaths. And in

3 addition to that, Albanians were, according to police information,

4 recruited by force into the KLA. They were forced to procure and carry

5 weapons, they were forced to do physical labour for the KLA such as

6 building fortifications, engineering work on roads, putting up obstacles,

7 and they were forced to pay money to the KLA to buy weapons, vehicles, and

8 anything else the KLA needed.

9 Q. Thank you, General. Under tab 138, it says: "Records of certain

10 items found in KLA headquarters," translated from the original. What does

11 this tab contain?

12 A. This tab contains the documents found during one of the

13 anti-terrorist actions mounted in the village of Leskovac, in the Prizren

14 municipality, and we can see that the date is the 3rd of September, 1998.

15 I have yet to find the translation.

16 Q. It is somewhere in the middle of this tab, because in the

17 beginning we have facsimiles of these handwritten messages in Albanian.

18 A. That is correct. And we have translation on pages 1 and 2. This

19 is important in view of the previous answer.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: There are far more documents than this that are not

21 translated than are translated. It makes it even more difficult to try to

22 compare the originals and the translation.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, tab 138 has been translated.

24 I hope you have the translation. And may I draw your attention to the

25 fact that --

Page 39590

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Organisation of this is chaotic.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, we are flooded with the additions

3 throughout the session, and I personally have decided to leave them --

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. It's impossible to --

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- until after to include them in the binders

6 because it's difficult to do that during the case. So we do have a

7 translation.

8 Mr. Milosevic, we have to stop at 1.43 today.

9 JUDGE KWON: The previous page, one page, seems to be page 2 of

10 the document.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, since you have the

12 translation, I will only ask the witness to direct us to some of these

13 documents. They are in the Albanian language, translated into Serbian and

14 translated into English. These documents refer to the pressure exerted on

15 and intimidation of Albanians. They were pressured to do the things that

16 the KLA wanted them to do, as the general just mentioned.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Please explain to us, General, in greater detail.

19 A. Perhaps the document on page 3 is convenient, if we can all find

20 our way. So the translation is 2/346/98.

21 Q. Since we have a translation into English, tell us what the Serbian

22 translation says.

23 A. Well, this is obviously a threat against the person in the case he

24 does not comply with KLA demands and --

25 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters would appreciate it if the

Page 39591

1 witness would tell us exactly where it is.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Witness, let us assist the interpreters by

3 telling them exactly where that is. I believe it's the first page, isn't

4 it?

5 JUDGE KWON: The third page.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: The third page.

7 MR. KAY: The third page.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the English translation is not

9 sorted in my copy. [In English] "We have concluded that you are ignoring

10 our appeal." [Interpretation] That is the quotation that the witness

11 began to read a moment ago. It is marked in tab 138. It says translation

12 2/346/98. In the Serbian --

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: If we are not to trespass on the time of the next

14 case, we will have to adjourn now.

15 We are adjourned until tomorrow, 9.00 a.m.

16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.43 p.m.,

17 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 18th day of May,

18 2005, at 9.00 a.m.