1 Tuesday, 12 July 2005
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, you may continue.
7 WITNESS: BOZIDAR DELIC [Resumed]
8 [Witness answered through interpreter]
9 Cross-examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]
10 Q. We were yesterday in volume 1 at tab 9. I wonder if the witness
11 could take up volume 1 and turn to tab 10.
12 This is a report or -- yes, it's a report of yours of the 16th of
13 March. The second page in the English, and second page in the -- no,
14 first page in the Bosnian. Right at the foot of the page.
15 We see that you deal with the protests of the Siptars, as you
16 describe them, 3.000 people carrying pictures of Mother Teresa, and with
17 slogans roughly equal to "Stop the Serbian terror." I think you will
18 recognise, Mr. Delic, that there are different views about the history of
19 what happened in Kosovo. Where the Kosovo Albanians carried placards
20 saying something like "Stop the Serbian terror," was it entirely fictional
21 or was there something that they were able to refer to by that term?
22 A. Since I was born in Kosovo and Metohija and I lived there at the
23 time, one cannot say that there were any indications of what you would
24 call Serbian terror. On a day-to-day basis, there were all kinds of
1 If you just look one passage below what you've just read. I
2 signed this paper, I think. Yes, I did. Nobody addressed the
3 demonstrators. There was just one person filming them on camera. The
4 person with the camera also had a goal of their own. The picture of the
5 demonstrations was supposed to tour the world for propaganda purposes.
6 And as you can see from here, nobody tried to prevent this rally. There
7 were no problems.
8 Q. Yes, I --
9 A. And on the next page, if you are still following me --
10 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... because I've let you answer
11 at length and we must be somewhat focused. I just want to know, and I'm
12 not concerned about the answer, I just want to know what your position is.
13 Was there anything at all that Serbs had done to Kosovo Albanians that
14 could explain why they carried placards saying "Stop the Serbian terror,"
15 or was it entirely fictional? I hope the question's easy for you to
17 A. That was something that was orchestrated and imposed from outside.
18 Q. Completely fictional.
19 A. Pure fiction. People were living freely whichever way they liked.
20 Can I just say one more thing? While we are on this page 10, look
21 at paragraph 2, the second line, 12th and 13th of March.
22 On several occasions fire was opened at Serbian and Montenegrin
23 houses. Among other things, fire was opened on this occasion on my house,
24 and that is written here. It was the house of my father. My neighbour's
25 house was targeted too. It was certainly not a rally. The houses of my
1 brothers were also targeted.
2 Q. Let's go to tab 14, please. This is where it can be dealt with
3 very briefly with reference to expression of fear by the -- it's on page
4 1, towards the foot of the page in English, just before paragraph 2. And
5 you can find that on page 1, and it says: "It's very likely that these
6 actions are being carried out by KLA members. There are those who plant
7 rumours among the local Albanians that their hay barns are being burned by
8 Chetniks and Arkan's Army." And you made an observation in your evidence
9 about that and about the impossibility of that.
10 You say it's impossible that their hay barns were being burnt by
11 anyone. Whether Chetniks or Arkan's army not being the point, but do you
12 say it's impossible that their hay barns were being burned, hay and barns?
13 A. Please, just one correction, if I may. You've just read that
14 somebody was burning their villages and hay barns. It's not a village.
15 It's hay. That should be corrected in the transcript.
16 Q. Again, is this just made up altogether?
17 A. That somebody was burning their hay and their barns is not true,
18 because this was going on on the ground. But if there had been Arkan's
19 troops or some sort of Chetniks, that was absolutely impossible. This was
20 designed to create fear among Albanians who did not join the KLA and to
21 force them in this way to join the KLA, because a considerable number of
22 Albanians at the time was against the KLA.
23 Q. Just move on to tab 16, and we'll look at that briefly. It's an
24 order of yours, I think, or a report of yours. A report of yours.
25 And --
1 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: In the previous
2 answer, the beginning of the answer, somebody was burning their hay and
3 barns, that is true.
4 MR. NICE:
5 Q. Now, it was in respect of tab 16, it may not be in the document
6 itself, but it was when you were telling us about tab 16 that you told us
7 this in answer to the accused: "Any contact with civilians --" this is
8 speaking of yourself, or the army. "Any contact with civilians is outside
9 the competencies of the army. That's something that the police is
10 authorised to do. They can check identities, and they can issue warnings,
11 but the army doesn't do that."
12 You said that in the context of a question about journalists, but
13 does this answer of yours, given in relation to a document that was March
14 1998, reflect again the recognition that in the absence of a state of
15 emergency, the army and the civilians have nothing to do with one another?
16 A. I said what you just quoted on another occasion, but I can answer
17 this question as well. It's all the same.
18 First of all, you see that there is no army involved in this
19 operation. Tab 16 refers to a purely MUP activity. In the army, there is
20 a part of the troops called the unit of the military police, and they have
21 the same powers as MUP. They, therefore, are authorised to contact with
22 citizens in relation to certain acts. But as for contact between the army
23 and civilians, that applies to operations involving combat.
24 If the army were acting in support of the MUP, then it was the MUP
25 who had direct contact with civilians. But I'm not saying we never had
1 any contact. I personally contacted civilians. Why wouldn't I if I know
2 their language and they understand me and if we need to communicate about
3 a particular thing? But due to the nature of the MUP's job, it was always
4 they who contacted with the civilians.
5 Q. Just looking at tab 16 itself, by the way, before I move to my
6 next point, and the Court can see it at the first page, as can you,
7 Mr. Delic, it says this: "It was characteristic that there were foreign
8 journalists in the sector where the operation was carried out, probably
9 inside the houses of terrorists, filming only when MUP members opened fire
10 and took action and the population fleeing from the surrounding villages
11 to the woods. They did not film the actions of the terrorists," in
12 relation to a particular incident.
13 Is it your belief and position that foreign journalists were
14 always capable of being deceived, or is it your position that they were
15 engaged in some kind of conspiracy to advance false accounts? What is it?
16 A. You know that there are all sorts of journalists. I believe I
17 mentioned a journalist here, Sali Beqe [phoen], who took the liberty of
18 actually crossing the state border together with the terrorists in a group
19 that was combatting our border units. So there were all sorts of
20 journalists, including freelancers who write independently to reporters of
21 particular televisions and newspapers.
22 On the 17th of July, 1998, as terrorists were attacking Orahovac,
23 one foreign television filmed this, and I have some of their recordings.
24 So there were journalists who would come to the country in all sorts of
25 ways, legally or illegally, and then followed the terrorists in their
1 activities. This applies especially to journalists and televisions from
2 Albania, because they, in their news bulletins, regularly reported on
3 events from Kosovo and Metohija.
4 Q. As to so-called Western, which I suppose means American and
5 Western European journalists, do you say that they were all misled by the
6 KLA or that they were all involved in a conspiracy?
7 A. You can never lump everyone together and say that they were all
8 part of a conspiracy. There were television companies and newspapers who
9 objectively tried to monitor events in our country, but there were also
10 journalists, especially from Albania, who write -- who wrote in a biased
12 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... journalism, there was a
13 television programme produced in Serbia called The Serb Version of the
14 Split, I think, in 2000. Did you see that programme? I think it was in
15 probably more than one part. Did you see that programme?
16 A. Which television showed that?
17 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...
18 A. At what time also?
19 Q. I can't recall the date and time at the moment, but is it
20 critical? Can you remember a programme that was The Serb Version of the
22 A. Even if this programme was in 2000, I did watch certain programmes
23 but not in 2000. I watched them in 2004.
24 Q. And in 1998, what position was General Pavkovic in relation to
1 A. In 1998, General Pavkovic was the commander of the Pristina Corps,
2 and I was commander of the 549th Brigade. He was my superior commander.
3 Q. And of course General Perisic was the Chief of the General Staff;
5 A. Yes, General Perisic was at the time Chief of the General Staff of
6 the army of Yugoslavia.
7 Q. Let's just look at a couple of very short clips.
8 MR. NICE: Oh, yes, the transcripts are available. Your Honour,
9 these are clips 8 and 9 we're going to be looking at at the moment.
10 [Videotape played]
11 MR. NICE: So that was, we saw, General Pavkovic, and what he said
12 was that the attitude of the General Staff was that the army shouldn't
13 interfere in those matters. Terrorism is to be dealt with by MUP.
14 Can we look at the next one.
15 [Videotape played]
16 MR. NICE:
17 Q. So we there saw the Chief of the General Staff explaining that the
18 army was waiting for a decision from the Assembly and from the Supreme
19 Defence Council before the army could get involved. Was that your
20 understanding on the ground of what was happening? He [Realtime
21 transcript read in error "you"] said that the decisions were blocked by
22 Milosevic. Was that your understanding of the position on the ground?
23 A. Well, look, the situation on the ground was so hard, and of course
24 I lived it every day, unlike Perisic who visited the territory of Kosovo
25 and Metohija maybe once a month.
1 May I describe to you my meeting with Perisic in this context?
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a second. Just to correct the transcript
3 which has you said that the decisions were blocked by Milosevic which
4 should be he said --
5 MR. NICE: Sorry, he said the decision, yes -- Your Honour is
6 quite right, the decisions were blocked by Milosevic.
7 Q. As to your suggestion of mentioning your encounter with Perisic,
8 what date?
9 A. It was in end May 1998 when he came to visit my unit together with
10 the commander of the 3rd Army, General Samardzic.
11 Q. We'll take that when we reach -- if it's material, we'll at least
12 take it when we reach May of 1998, but at the moment -- well, just two
13 things. You explained that you looked at television programmes in 2004,
14 presumably when you were preparing evidence. Did you see this programme
15 containing these and other interviews with Pavkovic and Perisic?
16 A. The programme that I saw in 2004 was called The War That Could
17 Have Been Avoided, and you can see a lot of foreign protagonists in that
18 programme, people who had a considerable and negative impact on the
19 aggression on Yugoslavia. But those short excerpts that you just showed,
20 I had occasion to see them already, but probably not in 2000; a bit later.
21 Q. And I just simply want to know, do they depict maybe the
22 frustration of the army on the ground, that everyone was waiting for
23 action to be taken to allow the army to intervene?
24 A. No, the army was not frustrated. The army, just as the population
25 in the entire territory of Kosovo and Metohija, was seriously endangered
1 by terrorism. Incidents were happening on the road. A large chunk of
2 territory was controlled by terrorists. Murders happened on a daily
4 Q. On your account the army didn't and indeed couldn't intervene,
5 could it?
6 A. At that time, and this talks also about the beginning of 1998, we
7 reported to our superiors. You can see these reports under tabs 10 to 16.
8 All of these are my reports to the corps commander, and it always says
9 "Attention: Corps commander or Chief of Staff," so they should know how
10 hard the situation is in my area.
11 MR. NICE: Let's see how things developed. If we can look now,
12 please, at clip 11. This is going to be Pavkovic, again, following a
13 passage by a narrator.
14 [Videotape played]
15 MR. NICE:
16 Q. Now, same television programme, something that you've seen before.
17 Something that you've seen before, Mr. Delic, this passage?
18 A. Yes, yes, I've seen this before, the commander.
19 Q. And what General Pavkovic made clear is that during 1998 the
20 circle of hatred was spreading, executions and mass graves were
21 increasing, and the VJ was getting involved in various ways. One is
22 logistic, but it was also getting involved, in 1998, by support with arms
23 fire in specific regions.
24 Well, now, first of all, is General Pavkovic right that in 1998
25 the army was giving fire support to the police?
1 A. Please, let me just correct what you've said at the very outset.
2 Now you're saying what the commentator said here. You're saying that
3 General Pavkovic said it. It was the broadcaster who said hatred was
4 spreading, that there were a lot of killings. General Pavkovic was only
5 saying -- that has to be distinguished.
6 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... that's what I'm interested
8 A. What General Pavkovic said is quite correct. It pertains to the
9 second half of 1998, when practically half of the territory of Kosovo and
10 Metohija was under the control of the terrorists and when the terrorists
11 held practically all the roads in Kosovo and Metohija and hindered not
12 only military transportation but also civilians could not freely travel in
13 their own country. They would be kidnapped, especially Serbs and
14 Albanians who were loyal citizens of Serbia and who worked in state
15 institutions. In a country that was free, no one could travel from
16 Prizren to Pristina or from Pec to Pristina and be sure that they would
17 not be killed or kidnapped along the way.
18 I fully agree with everything that General Pavkovic said.
19 Q. Thank you. We'll move chronologically so far as I'm able to
20 arrange that. Would you be good enough to go to tab 17. We still don't
21 have a translation of this. Oh, yes, we do.
22 This is just a question about a document, because I think this may
23 have been the first document where we explored the certification by
24 Colonel Markovic, which we see at the end of the document, and in respect
25 of which you explained that Markovic was one of those who produced these
1 excerpts, this and the subsequent one. I'm not really interested in the
2 document itself particularly, save for this: If we look at the original
3 of the document, as you'll be looking at it, and if the learned Judges
4 observe what can be seen in the various markings on the English, we'll see
5 that the material has simply been redacted, blanked out, so that we only
6 see part of the document. Now, what's all that about, or are you quite
7 unable to tell us?
8 A. I can tell you because I was interested in the same thing. This
9 is a document from the security administration. This document was
10 submitted to the Prosecutor's office over two years ago. I submitted it
11 to the investigator who was investigating Siptar crimes.
12 As for this that is blanked out, Mr. Markovic made an excerpt from
13 this document, from those parts of security reports that pertain to my
14 zone only.
15 As for what is blanked out, it was said that all portions where
16 names are mentioned of Siptars who cooperated with the service, in order
17 to protect them, and also -- their names would be blanked out, and also
18 their places of residence so they could not be identified.
19 Q. Do you know if it ever occurred to the commission or the committee
20 group of officers sitting around the table or anybody else doing this
21 exercise in document production that the question of whether names of
22 informers should be available to the Prosecution would -- should
23 ultimately, in courts like this, be a matter for the court itself? Did
24 that ever occur to anybody preparing this material?
25 A. As far as the security service is concerned, they have their own
1 methods, and I'm not aware of them. They have their own connections.
2 They have their own informers, and they're duty-bound to protect them.
3 Q. It didn't occur to them or to you or to anybody else that the
4 question of redacting documents, and although this relates to a KLA issue
5 in 1998 and may not be material, there's redactions right through these
6 documents, never occurred to anyone that this was a matter that ought
7 first to be raised with the court to see if these documents could be
8 presented in redacted form?
9 A. This document was written or, rather, prepared for the
10 Prosecutor's office, and the investigator who talked to me about this
11 absolutely did not insist on knowing who these informers were.
12 Discovering the names of the informers would quite simply mean their
14 Anyway, many persons who cooperated with Serbs or the state organs
15 of Serbia in 1998 and 1999 were killed, all the way up to the present day.
16 MR. NICE: Your Honours, the point I'm trying to make through the
17 witness and he hasn't answered it, I'm not going to ask it again, may be a
18 point that relates to range of documents where you'll find editing marks
19 of the same kind. I'll draw your attention to them from time to time.
20 You've probably already seen them in the papers.
21 Q. Can we move on now, please, to tab 20. Now, again, I'm not
22 particularly interested in tab 20 itself. We can scan it indeed. It's an
23 interim report on a border incident, and we can see its format which has
24 participants in the event.
25 MR. NICE: And if the Court goes over to the second page, it sees a
1 narrative of events set out with names and places and activities.
2 Q. Mr. Delic, is this form of report by the military - it's a report
3 of your brigade - is this report a standard form of report for a serious
5 A. Through the documents you could see the different types of reports
6 that existed, but it's important that participants in the event concerned
7 are referred to, the description of the event concerned, and the measures
9 Q. And of course in the event of casualties, fatalities or injuries,
10 they are identified. In the event of --
11 A. If there is any such thing, then an investigating judge is called
12 in. The investigating judge comes to the scene.
13 Q. And the army, if it's involved as it was at this border incident,
14 will have provided a full and detailed report, built on all its records,
15 setting out its version of what happened.
16 A. Since the incident was on the border, then the local mixed
17 commission was also informed. These commissions had their own sectors.
18 Here it is commission number 4 that calls from the other side the Albanian
19 local commission number 4 to attend the on-site investigation with regard
20 to that particular incident. That was the type of practice that existed
21 in peacetime.
22 Q. You see, the reason I ask you this question is as follows: Racak
23 was outside your area, wasn't it? Not very far outside, but it was
25 A. Yes.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. We've seen the senior policeman, now General, Radosavljevic,
2 making it clear that the VJ were involved at Racak. That's not for you to
3 decide. It's for the Judges, of course. But if the VJ were involved in a
4 proper operation at Racak, would it be reasonable to assume that a report
5 of at least this detail should exist somewhere in the army files?
6 A. There are different reports in relation to Racak. I believe that
7 the commander of the army unit, whose individual members were not in Racak
8 but in the immediate vicinity of Racak but on the other side of the road
9 in cooperation with the OSCE agreement, will come to this courtroom and
10 testify. But I talked to the OSCE people, Krsman Jelic --
11 Q. Thank you. And --
12 A. -- Commander of the 243rd Brigade.
13 Q. Thank you. And his report, have you --
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I just add what's missing from
16 the transcript? The witness said General Krsman Jelic.
17 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: It is impossible to record
18 everything that's said if there is more than one speaker at the time.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am commander of one brigade, he is
20 the commander of another brigade. I simply see no reason for me to read
21 his reports. As for Mr. Guri, he was commander, or perhaps not even a
22 full-fledged commander but the leader of a unit that was of a lower rank.
23 He could not even have communication with the army. At that time he held
24 the rank of major.
25 MR. NICE:
1 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...
2 A. And as for the MUP is concerned, it is the head of the Secretariat
3 of the Ministry of the Interior from Urosevac that can speak about this
4 particular action.
5 Q. Thank you for the answers you've given. All I wanted from you.
6 When you were dealing with tab 21, we needn't revisit it, it's a
7 video, but you did make the point that the 53rd Border Battalion based in
8 Djakovica and directly attached to the Pristina Corps was responsible to
9 you in the disciplinary sense because it was based in the same barracks.
10 Now, you didn't go on to amplify that, but perhaps you just could
11 explain that. What were your range of responsibilities for the 53rd
12 Border Battalion based in Djakovica?
13 A. The 53rd Border Battalion based in Djakovica was in my barracks.
14 He -- it received orders from the Pristina Corps and sent reports to the
15 Pristina Corps. However, since it is in my barracks, as for the
16 discipline of its soldiers in the barracks and in town, it was responsible
17 to my battalion commander who was in the Djakovica garrison. Further on,
18 I was responsible for their logistics, for their supplies, because they
19 had very small logistics units of their own, and it is from my warehouses
20 that they got food, weapons, clothing, and whatever else they needed.
21 Another responsibility I had in respect of that battalion was that
22 if that unit is attacked on the border with strong forces, that I give
23 them assistance.
24 As for discipline and as for logistics, they were responsible
25 towards me.
1 Q. Very well. So if they did something wrong, you'd be the person
2 who would have to discipline them.
3 A. Only my unit had the military police. So all events, border
4 incidents and others, were dealt with by my military police unit. They
5 documented it and they reported it to the Pristina Corps regardless of
6 whether it had to do with my unit or the 53rd Border Battalion.
7 Q. And was -- were they co-extensive with what -- was their area
8 co-extensive with yours?
9 A. They were responsible for the border only. In my barracks in
10 Djakovica, they had only a small part of their personnel. I think they
11 had about 12 border posts. We could count them here. They had border
12 posts that were taken up all the time, and they had the type of border
13 posts that we called summer border posts in the mountains. Most of the
14 personnel of that battalion was on the border posts all the time providing
15 security for the border, and only a small part, the intervention company
16 and the training company for training young border soldiers who came to do
17 their military service at the border, only they were in my barracks.
18 Q. Just this: All their border posts were within your general area
19 of responsibility, or did they extend beyond it?
20 A. Well, most of the border posts were in my zone, or to be more
21 precise, from Mitar Vojinovic, which is a border post on the north, all
22 the way down to the border post of Likane, which is near Mount Pastrik.
23 Those border posts of theirs were in my zone of responsibility.
24 Q. And the ones that were outside of your responsibility, were they
25 further to the north? On which side?
1 A. Yes, they were to the north, further to the north, from Mitar
2 Vojinovic, the next one is Morina, then Kosare, Koznjar, and so on and so
3 forth. Then further up north and towards Mount Prokuplje, its highest
4 peak Djerevica, that was in the area of responsibility of the 125th
5 Motorised Brigade.
6 Q. Thank you very much. Tab 22, please. Now, this document, which
7 we looked at briefly, is an order for the deployment of stand-by forces.
8 And if we go to 3.2, it says on English page 2, set up in-depth state
9 border security, and in a joint action with the MUP and the 549, block
10 routes and then smash and destroy the DTG and other forces.
11 Did this order at this date represent a change of gear for the
12 involvement of the army in any way?
13 A. There's no change. This is an order which meant that the army
14 left the barracks for the first time to three different localities. As
15 far as my brigade is concerned, they went to three different localities
16 outside the barracks. If necessary, we can find the right map and show
17 this on the map, because we've already had a look at it.
18 Q. You're now engaged in smashing, as we can see, and destroying the
19 DTG and other forces. How were you doing that, by the ambush points on
20 the borders?
21 A. You didn't read this right. This is the first time that the
22 troops went out into the area, and it says that the troops should be on
23 the ready, standing by for in-depth security of the state border and for
24 dealing with possible attacks on military facilities and smashing forces
25 in Koritnik, Suva Reka, Pastrik and so on, in concert with the MUP of
1 Serbia. That is the only thing that is referred to here, that the army
2 should be on the ready, but they do not have to engage in such activity.
3 Everything that is mentioned here has to do with the border.
4 Q. I was reading, I thought -- maybe the translation is a problem,
5 but I was reading from 3.2 and I thought it said -- or it says in English
6 "smash and destroy the DTG and other groups," and that was the order, I
7 think. Does this not amount to an order to relate to whoever you could
8 find in the form of that group?
9 A. You said you were reading 3.2, paragraph 3.2?
10 Q. Yes.
11 A. 3.2 does not pertain to my unit. It pertains to the 55th Border
12 Battalion, and 55th Border Battalion is on the state border itself, since
13 weapons were being carried over very intensively and all their activities
14 are geared towards preventing this bringing in of weapons.
15 Q. Well, now, as to your group, what was your group's functions?
16 Shall we go over to 4.2.1?
17 A. Yes. That's my decision, from point 4.1 until 4.2.3. My units
18 are given an assignment here.
19 Q. We see the same language there, don't we, in 4.2.1. Your units
20 were to smash the forces of armed rebellion and infiltrated DTG on the
21 following axis: Pastrik-Prizren-Suva Reka. Had the intention already
22 become clear to eliminate people when you found them?
23 A. Well, you're even misreading this text. What is a key point here
24 is to be on stand-by, on the ready. And then it says here for what; for
25 in-depth security of the state border. That is the first task. The
1 second one is intervene in the direction of threatened military features.
2 And then it's the depot of Ljubizda, the depot of Djinovci, and the
3 barracks, and smash the forces of armed rebellion and infiltrated groups
4 on the following axes, those that lead from the border to the territory
5 in-depth. So until the 17th of July the army was not engaged at all and
6 this is dated the 22nd of April, as you can see.
7 Q. And finally, 4.5.5, or the second to last point on this document.
8 4.5.5, please. The preparation with anti-nuclear, chemical and biological
9 measures. Were there biological measures within your brigade's capacity
10 and capability?
11 A. Well, of course such things do not exist in my country at all let
12 alone in my brigade. How could I have them in my brigade? These are
13 general measures in terms of anti-nuclear, chemical and biological
14 defence, self-reliance, relying on one's own resources that every stand-by
15 soldier has.
16 Q. Let's just go to the last part of the document, very last
17 sentence. "File reports every day at 0600 hours --"
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson. Mr. Nice is putting
19 questions improperly, and the witness did not notice that. Mr. Nice is
20 talking about some kind of weapons, but this does not have to do with
21 weapons at all. These are protective measures from chemical weapons.
22 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ...
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understood what Mr. Nice was
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Well, the witness answered. Let us move
2 MR. NICE:
3 Q. The last part of the document is: "File reports every day at 0600
4 hours on the situation at 0530, and to the duty operations officer at 2200
5 hours on the situation at 2100 hours, and interim ones as necessary."
6 Was that the sort of standard of daily reporting that you expected
7 from your subordinate groups throughout the various incidents that you've
8 been telling us, telling us of?
9 A. I'm saying that at this time incidents occurred only at the
10 border. This is customary form. The time of reporting is given, and then
11 this reporting that is referred to here is oral, by telephone, and there
12 have to be these deadlines so that written reports could be sent to the
13 superior command.
14 Q. We would then have passed over or reached Ashdown. Unfortunately,
15 I find that I've not mislaid but I must have left in my room some of the
16 papers I need for that so I'll come back to it after the break. But we
17 can move on to tab 45, which is potentially related and we'll come back to
18 Ashdown after the break. Would you go to tab 45, please.
19 Now, here is a very urgent document, and it comes from Major
20 General Negosav Nikolic, and it goes to the -- from the command at the
21 Pristina Corps. He says this: "Considering that it is expected that
22 numerous delegations of diplomatic representatives, observer missions,
23 representatives of humanitarian organisations -" and so on - "will visit
24 the territory of Kosovo, and as they tour certain areas according to their
25 own plans and without announcement, in order to prevent opening fire on
1 the sectors in which the said persons might happen to be..."
2 You then go on to say the following or, rather, the order goes on
3 to say the following: "... prohibit opening fire from artillery weapons...
4 without the approval of the Corps Command.
5 "Fire may be opened from other types of weapons only if the
6 brigade commander deems this appropriate in order to neutralise targets
7 that are a threat to human lives, such as: bunkers, buildings in which
8 there are no civilians and other facilities from which fire is opened from
9 mortars and other weapons ..."
10 And then in 3, it says: "Open fire on siptar terrorist forces
11 only if you have reliable information that diplomatic representatives and
12 observer missions are not present in their combat formation. Abstain from
13 opening fire as much as possible, and only do so in case of extreme need."
14 What does that tell us, please, Mr. Delic?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is --
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, the interpreter who is
19 interpreting into Serbian is reading the Serbian text, the original, which
20 is right, but the English translation says -- "[In English] ... observer
21 missions are not present in their combat formation," [Interpretation] and
22 so on. The translation has completely omitted a particular section, and
23 that's why I insist that you give me a recording because the translations
24 are catastrophic and malicious.
25 The buildings where there are no -- where there's no civilian
1 population, that was totally omitted. And there is particular emphasis on
2 that. Mr. Nice quoted that from the English translation. It's not in the
3 transcript, and it says here right in front of me, and the interpreter was
4 reading out this paragraph, too, that is to say this can be carried out
5 "... only if the brigade commander deems this appropriate in order to
6 neutralise targets that are a threat to human lives, such as: bunkers,
7 buildings in which there are no civilians," and so on and so forth.
8 MR. NICE: Your Honour, before we deal --
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: What paragraph is that? That's paragraph 3? 2?
10 MR. NICE: 2. But, Your Honour, before we deal with that, I
11 would --
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Paragraph 2 that you quoted and that
13 I heard in Serbian from the interpreter, but in the English text that is
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. -- Mr. Milosevic, irrespective of how this is
16 to be dealt with, I cannot allow you to say, as you said, that the
17 interpretation is malicious. A mistake may be made, and if a mistake is
18 made it is only human to err, and we'll do our best to correct it. But to
19 say that it is malicious, that it was prompted by improper motives, is
20 without foundation.
21 Now, what are you saying? You're saying that the interpreter
22 omitted a reference to "civilians"?
23 JUDGE KWON: I don't follow what is missing.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: What is missing? Let us just have it clear.
25 What is missing? What is missing from the interpretation, Mr. Milosevic?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I told you that I heard the
2 interpreter reading the Serbian translation from the document. What is in
3 the Serbian text is not in the transcript. I did not listen to Serbian
4 and English at the same time.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: And what exactly is missing? What's the phrase
6 that's missing that you're complaining of?
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What is missing in the transcript
8 are the words that refer to the fact that only facilities where there are
9 no civilians can be targeted. This civilian population reference was
10 completely omitted. This is the commander's order, saying that people
11 were moving about unannounced and that therefore fire cannot be opened,
12 that only firing targets can be engaged, but to be sure not to open fire
13 at facilities where there is civilian population. And that is a very
14 important thing.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Now, Mr. Nice, you were reading from
16 paragraph 2, and the interpreter was interpreting what you were reading
17 from paragraph 2.
18 MR. NICE: I assume so, yes.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: That may be the -- that may be the problem. The
20 passage that you said was omitted is in our text in --
21 JUDGE KWON: It's not omitted. I don't think it's omitted. I
22 checked the transcript and it appeared, so I'm a bit confused.
23 MR. NICE: Well, Your Honour, it seems to me that after this
24 diversion it's clear that the text is in both documents. As far as I'm
25 concerned, I read it out, and with your leave I'll press on with the next
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Let's move on, then, yes.
3 MR. NICE:
4 Q. Let's go to back, then, to what I was actually asking you about,
5 Mr. Delic, which is paragraph 3. And in case you've forgotten it, I'll
6 read it slowly and in full.
7 "Open fire on Siptar terrorist forces only if you have reliable
8 information that diplomatic representatives and observer missions are not
9 present in their combat formation. Abstain from opening fire as much as
10 possible and only do so in case of extreme need."
11 Why was it necessary to change what you would be saying was
12 entirely lawful conduct because of the presence of international observers
13 apart, of course, from to respect their safety?
14 A. You are just taking one order here, whereas there are dozens of
15 orders governing the opening of fire on Siptar terrorists. This is quite
16 normal if diplomatic representatives are coming, and our state is
17 answerable for their security, we have to take care, even at the cost of
18 Siptar terrorists targeting our units, as long as there are no losses
19 incurred on the mission.
20 Second, it is prohibited to fire from any of these enumerated
21 weapons without an order directly from the corps commander. So even I as
22 brigade commander can issue such an order. The next aim is to protect
23 civilian population.
24 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... focus of my question. And in
25 case you can't remember it, I'll read it to you again. Why was it
1 necessary to change what you would be saying was entirely lawful conduct
2 because of the presence of international observers, apart, of course, from
3 to respect their safety? Now, that's the question.
4 A. There is an undertone to your question that is unfair. You seem
5 to imply that we acted until that time without any restriction and now we
6 are introducing restrictions.
7 The opening of fire was always restricted to sources of fire, to
8 terrorists acting against our units. It was never allowed to open fire at
9 buildings, and it says here that it is even prohibited to target a
10 building from which terrorists are firing if there are civilians inside.
11 And it also says that units should be contained to the maximum in opening
12 fire. I believe this order is quite normal in any professional army,
13 including your own.
14 Q. It's not an undertone. It was going to be the subject of my next
15 question, and you anticipated it in your answer to a degree.
16 This document gives the game away, doesn't it, because by July of
17 1998, death of Kosovo Albanians had become something that was easy to
18 bring about from time to time and something that the police and the army
19 were prepared to accept as an incident of what they were doing, but with
20 observers around, you had to be more careful. Is that the truth?
21 A. What you're saying is absolutely untrue. It has nothing to do
22 with reality. I was there and you were not, Mr. Nice, and what you are
23 saying are pure insinuations.
24 The army acted in a professional manner, just as the Ministry of
25 the Interior, at all times. And while you are speaking about the
1 Albanians who were killed, please give me a number. How many Albanians
2 were killed in one month, the next month, the month after next, and where?
3 You cannot find such data because that did not happen, so the data does
4 not exist.
5 Q. Let's just look at another small clip. I may have to expand this
6 clip later, but I'll look at it now in its present form from the same
7 film, again General Pavkovic. Sorry. It's clip number 13. I'm grateful
8 to Ms. Dicklich.
9 [Videotape played]
10 MR. NICE:
11 Q. Now, we may need to expand on the meaning of activities, but you
12 saw there General Pavkovic making it clear that one of the obstacles that
13 was being faced was the presence of the eyes of the international
14 community on what you were all doing. Did that affect the way you
15 conducted yourself, Mr. Delic?
16 A. As far as my conduct is concerned, whether there were any
17 observers around or not, my conduct was always soldierly and professional,
18 and the observers did not influence that in any way. They were an
19 additional burden in the sense that I also had to worry about their
20 security. And my professionalism cannot be affected by any presence of
21 the observers and it cannot be questioned, today or in the future.
22 Q. And can we then go to the next volume, please, of exhibits, tab
23 71. This is still in July of 1998, and it's an order, I think, from your
24 brigade, and it relates to the -- I'm so sorry. You haven't found it.
25 This document, if you have it there, I see it's highlighted so --
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 oh, no. Tab 71. I see you've highlighted it, so you've read it. Indeed,
2 it looks like you've highlighted the same part I'm interested in.
3 It says: "Since numerous delegations of diplomatic
4 representatives, monitoring missions, representatives of humanitarian
5 organisations, local and foreign journalists are expected to visit certain
6 areas in Kosovo according to their own plans and without advance notice,
7 in order to prevent opening fire on sectors where these people might find
8 themselves ... I hereby order:
9 "1. I hereby strictly forbid opening fire with 122-millimetre
10 calibre artillery pieces and 100-millimetre tank guns without the
11 authorisation of this command."
12 May we take it, then, that you had been spending those rounds in
13 the period and up until the 9th of July, 1998? Large calibre weapons --
14 A. As you can see, this order of mine is associated with the order
15 you read previously.
16 Q. Yes.
17 A. My order is a follow-up of the order dated the 7th of July. I
18 received an order from the corps command, and I'm writing an order to my
19 units. I do not mention calibres others -- other than those I have. And
20 this is the month of July.
21 Up to the 17th of July, no tank projectile and no artillery shell
22 was fired from my brigade. So until the 18th, actually, of July. And you
23 see that the order is very similar to or identical to the order I received
24 from the corps.
25 Q. Now, have we -- we've passed, I think, the date of your meeting
1 with General Perisic that you wanted to tell us about, but perhaps we'll
2 just make available to you first of all his letter of the 23rd of July of
3 1998, and you can comment on that. And then if there's something relevant
4 in your meeting in May, then of course you must have an opportunity to
5 tell us about that too.
6 This is already an exhibit, twice, I think. 469, tab 23 is one
8 It's a long letter. You're familiar with it, I assume?
9 A. I'm not familiar with the letter.
10 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... some detail --
11 A. -- I was not --
12 Q. "Having analysed," he says, your relations with the Yugoslav army,
13 "I find it necessary to present you with a few facts ..."
14 Next paragraph: "I hope you've been convinced of its high
15 military and political awareness," et cetera.
16 I move to the next paragraph to save time: "However, we would not
17 be correct and sincere in the fateful circumstances if as professionals
18 who have preserved the army and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under
19 conditions of which you are aware, we were not to furnish you with the
20 following negative facts:
21 "Constant tendency to use the VJ outside the institutions of the
23 "Separating VJ units from the Yugoslav army;
24 "Attempting to command VJ units by unauthorised persons;
25 "Bypassing levels of command in official talks with VJ members;
1 "Conducting personal policies on an illegitimate basis and
2 groundless foundations;
3 "Supplying material extra-legally ..."
4 Before we look on, does that fit with your understanding of events
5 in the summer of 1998, that there was using the VJ outside the system,
6 separating units from the army, bypassing levels of command?
7 A. The knowledge that I gained on the ground is quite contrary to
8 what is written here, but I could only speak about the level of the
9 Pristina Corps and the level of my brigade. None of these things that are
10 written here apply. Perhaps this is a reference to some higher levels.
11 Everything that was done on the level of the Pristina Corps and my brigade
12 was in keeping with the rules.
13 Q. He says this under the next paragraph, specific examples: "The
14 tendency to use the VJ outside the institutions of the system.
15 "The situation in Kosovo could have been avoided by the
16 introduction of a state of" - must be state of emergency - "promptly on
17 the 20th of April, 1998 - when I submitted a written proposal to you ...
18 Since this was not accepted by you, the situation has escalated and so
19 representatives of the Ministry of the Interior, you too, sought the use
20 of the VJ, some smaller units were used directly and indirectly, which is
21 from a legal aspect against the law..."
22 Now, Mr. Delic, two points: First of all, does that accord with
23 your recollection of events?
24 A. I know my unit, and this does not reflect the reality. I believe
25 that Mr. Perisic overstepped his authority as Chief of General Staff
1 because he seems to be lecturing here about state affairs. He is a
2 soldier, not a politician.
3 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...
4 A. In order to introduce a state of emergency --
5 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... come back in a minute.
6 Pausing there. Do you remember I asked you yesterday whether you, if
7 you'd been instructed by Pavkovic in the year 2000 without a state of
8 emergency to take the tanks onto the street, you said you wouldn't, you
9 would have disobeyed the order. Are you saying it was wrong for General
10 Perisic to draw to this accused's attention the legal requirements for the
11 situation in which he found himself?
12 A. His powers including report -- included reporting to Mr. Milosevic
13 about the situation on the ground and to submit proposals but not to
14 lecture. This letter sounds as if a subordinate were lecturing his
15 superior, and at the end of the day, Mr. Perisic was a traitor to his
16 country. He betrayed his country, and I don't want to discuss him any
18 Q. Don't you? Well, you'll answer the questions, if you'd be so
19 good, that I'll put to you on the basis of this letter.
20 "(b): So that the relevant and professional conclusions of the
21 session of the Supreme Defence Council on the 9th of June, 1998 might be
22 implemented, we requested the FRY government to assure us (by proclaiming
23 one of the states: Of emergency, or immediate threat of war or war)
24 legitimate material and financial resources ... that has not, to date,
25 been done, which means that any engagement of the VJ in combat operations
1 outside the border zone ... is still illegal - with possible consequences
3 In that paragraph was your Chief of General Staff not seeking to
4 support the army, ensure that it was properly resourced and activated
5 according to the law?
6 A. The army was always engaged in accordance with the law. The rules
7 of service envisage engagement of the army in several situations. First,
8 in the case of natural or major disasters on the territory, in which case
9 the decision on the use of the army can be taken by the brigade commander.
10 Second, in case of the holding of large rallies, sports events, and
11 similar. And third, the army of Yugoslavia may be used in fighting
12 terrorist and renegade groups, and the army did that. So that is
13 envisaged by the rules of service, and that does not require the
14 introduction of any state of emergency.
15 The state of emergency is something to be proclaimed by the
16 Assembly. One man cannot lecture the Assembly. He can only suggest, and
17 that is linked with a number of others, international, political and other
18 problems that are associated with a state of emergency, which in itself
19 restricts the rights of citizens.
20 Q. The rules of service, as you will be able to confirm, are internal
21 military secret documents and they're not public documents, are they?
22 A. What do you mean? Which rules of engagement? There are no such
23 rules. There are combat rules, and there is a rule of service. There is
24 a rule of service, and you certainly have it here. I even think that my
25 administration submitted it to you through the National Council for
1 Cooperation, the rules of service for the army of Yugoslavia.
2 Q. You've suggested that the army could be engaged in these
3 circumstances legitimately under the rules of service. That's what our
4 translation says. I'm going to suggest to you that the rules of service
5 were a secret document, and even if they were signed by this accused they
6 couldn't pass or surpass the constitution. Do you accept that?
7 A. The rule of service is not a secret document. It is an internal
8 document. That means it has the lowest level of confidentiality of all
9 the documents we have. That means it may be available to institutions
10 other than the army. It is not at all secret. There is nothing secret
11 about it because every soldier who comes to do his military service can
12 read it so that he can behave in the way required by the rule of service.
13 Q. Let's go down in General Perisic's letter, because the Court has
14 seen it before. We don't need to go through it all, but of course if you
15 want to look at it, you're entitled to do so I think in these
16 circumstances, but let's go down to paragraph 3, shall we, where he turns
17 to the particular problem of attempting to command the VJ by unauthorised
18 persons. He says this: "The constant desire of members of the MUP that
19 we subordinate a VJ unit to them causes disputes if it is not permitted
20 them, if one is granted them then it is used purposelessly and
21 unprofessionally, which proves counterproductive. The best example is
22 Decani and Orahovac."
23 A. We can stop here for a moment, because Orahovac is in my area.
24 What happened in Decani, I don't know, but as far as Orahovac is
25 concerned, I know all about it.
1 Q. Well, then, please tell us, because however much you may
2 disapprove of the Chief of General Staff lecturing this accused, it's hard
3 to think of him, is it not, writing something without a foundation in
4 fact. So what was he in July 1998 writing about so far as Orahovac was
5 concerned? You must be able to help us.
6 A. From this point A, one is supposed to conclude that the liberation
7 of Orahovac town involved the MUP commanding my unit. Mr. Nice, not you,
8 not Perisic, nobody in this courtroom was in Orahovac. Only I was, both
9 on the 18th and the 19th, and I know what happened minute by minute.
10 Perisic did not clarify the issue of Orahovac in detail. He just
11 mentioned it in passing. My unit was there, and directly under my command
12 supported MUP forces which liberated Orahovac from terrorists. I even
13 have a video recording here about the liberation of Orahovac. One part
14 was recorded by the Siptars, and another part was recorded from our side.
15 There were certain forces of the MUP there. There was a part of my unit
16 acting in support. At no point did anybody from the MUP, because I was
17 there as brigade commander and the MUP was represented only by
18 lower-ranking commanding officers, their chief of secretariat was in
19 Prizren, I was commanding my unit. All that MUP could do was to ask me to
20 neutralise the source of fire that was in their way. To liberate a town
21 with a population of 50.000, only 12 projectiles were fired from a T-55
22 tank, only 12, whereas Siptar forces, and we probably have this figure
23 here, had 1.500 men. 150 Serbs had been kidnapped between the 17th and
24 the 19th. How can Mr. Perisic write something about it when he wasn't
25 there? With all due respect, after all, he was my chief of General Staff.
1 MR. NICE: In the circumstances I was allowing the witness to run
2 along, but I think I'm going to bring it to a conclusion with this
3 question, if I may.
4 Q. You've spoken now of events between the 17th and 19th. That's the
5 17th and 19th of which month?
6 A. July.
7 Q. And help us, please. Have you set out these documents that relate
8 to this event in the papers that we've got?
9 A. The map, the order, the analysis, all the documents about this
10 event exist, but not here perhaps, I have to check.
11 Q. We now see, you see, from your long answer, which I did not
12 interrupt, that in the apparent liberation of this place your group, in
13 collaboration, cooperation, or subordination to the MUP, fired 12
14 projectiles from a tank. Did you not think that might be material we'd
15 like to see in this Court, investigating as we are the role of the army?
16 A. If you want to know, this was an operation conducted
17 professionally. To liberate a town with 40 or 50.000 population with 12
18 projectiles, I would really like to see a NATO force that could do it the
19 same way. So if we don't have this document here, and if the Trial
20 Chamber should insist, considering that I have received a waiver from the
21 Official Secrets Act, if you want my documentation from Belgrade, I will
22 try to get it. The complete documentation for the 18th --
23 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... enough on this
24 point. I don't want to be offensive to anybody, but I think the point has
25 been made.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. It's time for the break. We'll adjourn for
2 20 minutes.
3 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
4 --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.
6 MR. NICE:
7 Q. Going back to General Perisic's letter and what's said there about
8 Decani and Orahovac, can I remind you of something, or tell you of
9 something that was given in the evidence of Mr. Crosland, who had
10 discussions with General Dimitrijevic at the time, and he said that it was
11 obvious, clear to him, that Perisic and Dimitrijevic were not fully
12 informed as to what was going on on the ground in Kosovo, being excluded
13 from the operational chain of command which went directly from General
14 Pavkovic to this accused, Milosevic, and to Sainovic. Now, what do you
15 say to that? He was your commander, Pavkovic. Did he have a direct line
16 of command that bypassed Perisic and Dimitrijevic?
17 A. Dimitrijevic is absolutely not in the chain of command. General
18 Pavkovic has nothing with Dimitrijevic.
19 As for Perisic, General Pavkovic does not have direct
20 communication with Perisic either, because General Pavkovic has
21 communication with the commander of the 3rd Army. Let me just tell you
22 that at this time and all the way up to the month of October there was the
23 forward command post of the army in Pristina, and it was headed by
24 Lieutenant Colonel General Simic. Mr. Pavkovic could not make a single
25 decision without that decision having been approved by General Simic who
1 is the Chief of Staff the 3rd Army and the deputy commander of the 3rd
2 Army of General Samardzic. So the chain of command was absolutely not
3 harmed in any way.
4 The security service is not in the chain of command. General
5 Dimitrijevic, therefore, is not there. There is the vertical chain up to
6 brigade level that links up all the security organs. And quite simply it
7 was not envisaged that commanders of any unit, corps, et cetera, would
8 have any kind of obligation to report to Dimitrijevic as head of that
10 Q. [Previous translation continues]... simple. As far as you were
11 concerned, was it the case that you could see that Pavkovic had a direct
12 line of command that bypassed Perisic? Yes or no.
13 A. No.
14 Q. Insofar as paragraph 3 A of the letter is concerned, of course
15 Perisic should have had access to any intelligence he wanted, shouldn't
16 he? The line of reporting would lead to him ultimately and he could have
17 access to it if he wanted to?
18 A. Certainly.
19 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... complaining about something
20 that's happened immediately in your area of command contemporaneously
21 there and then on 23rd of July, according to your account, four days after
22 things happened. How could General Perisic have got it wrong?
23 A. General Perisic is here, so ask him. I think that I have relevant
24 documentation for this case. If it is important, we can deal with it
1 Q. Do you remember -- ah, you mean you've got some other
2 documentation not here in Court that relates to this topic? Is that what
3 you're saying?
4 A. I said that I already took the largest number of documents that I
5 thought could assist me in cross-examination so that I would not be
6 talking just like that but that I could document every word I say.
7 Q. I understand, then, you've come armed with additional
8 documentation to meet the questions you have forecast I'm going to ask but
9 they haven't been included in the original 629 documents presented to us;
10 is that right?
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, "armed" might be an unfortunate word,
12 Mr. Nice.
13 MR. NICE:
14 Q. Equipped.
15 A. I have my own documentation. The legal advisors selected
16 documentation in accordance with their own way of thinking on particular
17 topics that they asked me to prepare on. Had I been in a position to
18 select documentation, I would have taken a lot more documents.
19 Q. Are we going to be able to know in general or by an index or
20 something or other what it is you've got that is all this additional
21 material or are we just going to wait for it to be produced right at the
22 end of the exercise? Can you tell us what you've got?
23 A. The documentation that I have is documentation that pertains to my
24 unit. Every document that we use in this courtroom will be submitted to
25 the representatives of the Defence if that is deemed necessary for this
2 MR. NICE: Well, Your Honours, that's going to create an
3 interesting problem, but we'll come to it a little later.
4 Q. You remember you were asked a lot of questions about the Joint
5 Command, both by the Court and by me yesterday and last week. Will you
6 now look at paragraph 3(B). "The attempt by the civilian part of the
7 staff to command the corps. The corps commander is responsible for
8 assessing the situation and for planning VJ and MUP operations in
9 cooperation with the civilian part of the staff and the MUP, for
10 forwarding it to Sainovic and Minic for them to distribute assignments to
11 all except the Pristina Corps. In practice, the commander of the Pristina
12 Corps plans what he has been ordered to do, and this is at the request of
13 Sainovic and Minic and the MUP, and so turns into something like a service
14 of theirs --"
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: The page on the ELMO needs to be changed.
16 MR. NICE: Sorry. I failed to observe that.
17 Q. "... so it turns into something like a service of theirs for
18 planning and execution. Since it is his wish and that of all of us that
19 the plan be realised if others will not or cannot, he executes it with the
20 Pristina Corps units, which leads to an illegitimate, unsystematic and
21 inadequate utilisation of VJ units, thereby wrecking the system; they
22 split up the units, expend them, tie them down, and so if it is actually
23 necessary to use the corps according to the regulations on its use in
24 combat, it may not be possible to use it.
25 There are we see Sainovic and Minic, the civilians, and a
1 reference to the Pristina Corps and the way it was circumventing the
2 rules. What was General Perisic referring to?
3 A. Through this point we can only see the vanity of Mr. Perisic.
4 There could not have been any illegal use of the corps at any point in
5 time. General Simic was in Pristina. That is the next officer in the
6 chain of command above the Pristina Corps. General Pavkovic, when he'd go
7 to these meetings, would have to tell General Simic why he was asked to go
8 to a meeting. If he took upon himself an obligation, or if he was
9 supposed to engage any unit of the Pristina Corps, then General Simic had
10 to approve that. General Simic is the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Army of
11 General Samardzic, who is the first person in the chain of command right
12 after General Perisic. So General Simic either allowed the use of some
13 unit or did not allow the use of some unit. General Pavkovic could not
14 use a single unit of the corps without General Simic if it was supposed to
15 act in concert with the MUP.
16 My unit was never used illegally. It was never given to anyone
17 else to command. The first use of my unit was on the 18th of July during
18 the liberation of Orahovac.
19 Q. Let me make a simple suggestion to you and then we're going to
20 move on from this letter. You had, I must suggest to you, the greatest
21 difficulty in explaining to the learned Judges when they asked you
22 questions, or to me, what the chain of command was where the word "Joint
23 Command" was used, and the reason you had that difficulty is because you
24 knew you were responding to an illicit and improper body that had no
25 rights to command you. Is that the truth?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. It's the other way around. I have no difficulty whatsoever in
2 connection with the Joint Command. Please, let us take a tab out where
3 there is reference to the Joint Command and let me show it to you again.
4 The Joint Command the way you see it did not exist. For me, the Joint
5 Command was the Pristina Corps from which I received my orders. Can we
6 take tab 4 and look at an order of the Joint Command.
7 Q. I'd prefer us not to. You can deal with it in re-examination.
8 I've put my point to you and I want to move on, or to be precise, I want
9 to move back to Lord Ashdown.
10 A. Could I first tell you about my encounter with General Perisic,
11 because you mentioned him, and you said that I had the opportunity of --
12 Q. It relates to the topic --
13 A. It directly relates to this topic. Towards the end of May, 1998,
14 I was visited on the same day by General Perisic together with the
15 commander of the 3rd Army. I met them in Prizren at my sports field,
16 which was a heliodrom, a heliport at the same time. Of course, as soon as
17 they got out of the helicopter I reported to General Perisic, saluted him,
18 shook hands with him, and the first thing he asked me was, "How are things
19 going, Delic?" and I said, "It's very hard. The situation in my zone is
20 very difficult."
21 As I was -- as we were going towards the car because we were
22 supposed to go to my office, I said, "General, please do something. All
23 the roads in my zone, the Djakovica-Klina-Pristina road is broken off and
24 is held by terrorists. The Prizren-Orahovac-Malisevo road is also
25 intercepted by the terrorists. I have information that the Suva
1 Reka-Stimlje road will also be cut off one of these days, and apart from
2 this communication here via Sredska, which is a bad road, I'm not going to
3 have any links with my rear. General Samardzic used a vulgar word that
4 I'm not going to utter now, and General Perisic said, "What do you care?
5 Let them introduce a state of emergency and we're going to resolve it in
6 ten days' time."
7 I'm surprised that such a high-ranking officer of such high rank
8 would have such an attitude of underestimation towards this kind of
9 problem because this kind of problem could not be resolved in ten days.
10 It couldn't even be resolved in ten months. Now, he's the one who knows
11 how he thought it could be resolved in ten days. He didn't give me any
12 help. This road was cut off, and I had no communication whatsoever except
13 for that very bad road via Sredska between Metohija and Kosovo.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, proceed.
15 MR. NICE:
16 Q. Let's now go back to Lord Ashdown, and having seen the
17 observations about avoiding the sight or the eyes of international
18 observers, I make this simple suggestion to you: The problem with Lord
19 Ashdown and his evidence is that as he was observing you from Albania
20 through field glasses, you had no reason to know he was there, and you got
21 caught. Isn't that the truth?
22 A. The first thing you said, the first statement of yours in relation
23 to international observers is ludicrous. We were in our own country. We
24 were attacked by terrorism, like London was the other day. Isn't
25 terrorism a danger for all countries in the world? We had nothing to
1 hide. We wanted to --
2 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... your answers, otherwise we
3 won't make much progress.
4 MR. NICE: By the way, this was dealt with at tab 37, for the
5 Court, if it has a desire to turn to the tab.
6 Q. Now, I want to know what you're saying about Lord Ashdown's
7 evidence and how it is you're saying it. First of all, did you listen to
8 his evidence?
9 A. First of all, you said that we were caught by Lord Ashdown.
10 According to the way you presented things here where he was in Albania,
11 and I drew that schematic for you, he could absolutely see only one
12 Albanian village and one that is scattered around --
13 Q. I want to give you an opportunity to deal with this in a
14 straightforward way, and perhaps you'd be good enough to listen to the
16 Did you listen to Lord Ashdown's evidence?
17 A. No. Except for this transcript.
18 Q. Ah. Did you read the transcript?
19 A. This part that was read out to me by Mr. Milosevic.
20 Q. And is that all that you've relied on in order to express the
21 views on Lord Ashdown that you have so far expressed?
22 A. What was read out to me and what was said in relation to some
23 point on the border with Albania. As for what I was asked to do, that was
24 more than sufficient.
25 Q. How do you mean as to what you were asked to do?
1 A. Well, you asked me. If I said that there was this post on the
2 border with Albania near the village of Gegaj or near the Albanian border
3 post Kamenica, as Lord Ashdown said, from that point you can see all of
4 Kosovo all the way to Pristina. That is absolutely untrue. Whoever knows
5 topography, at least, who has a bare knowledge of topography can know that
6 not more than three or four kilometres can be seen from that point, and
7 that is one single Albanian village, the village of Moric [as interpreted]
8 that can be seen from there.
9 Let me just have a look now.
10 Q. What map is it that you're going to be most assisted by?
11 A. Could the -- could the Albanian -- could the name of the Albanian
12 village be corrected in the transcript. It's the village of Morina, the
13 village of Moric cannot be seen. I was there -- well, not to say a
14 hundred times but tens of times. I know every meadow in that area.
15 Q. Don't, please, fall into a trap or what you think is a trap, but
16 we want to assess how you've given your evidence and what you're saying,
17 what it amounts to. Are you saying that Lord Ashdown is definitely wrong
18 and must be, frankly, making it up, or are you saying that he may be
19 mistaken? And having expressed which of the views you're holding to, then
20 tell us why.
21 A. You told me where Lord Ashdown was in Albania. I have an
22 excellent knowledge of that terrain.
23 Q. No, Mr. Delic, I didn't. Just to get the sequence right, and
24 that's why I want you not to be lulled into any trap, the accused gave a
25 summary of the evidence, we suggested that it was marked on a map, and you
1 were provided, first of all, with a map which you rejected because it was
2 too detailed and not perhaps topographical enough. Then you were provided
3 with a blank version of this map, and it came --
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. You marked on it the position where you, for whatever reason --
6 and perhaps you'd like to have it, just have another look at it. You
7 marked on it yourself the position where you say Lord Ashdown was, and you
8 then shaded in the map with areas that you said could and couldn't be
9 seen. And just to complete the history, you explained the position to
10 Ms. Dicklich. I asked the Court if they wanted to deal with the map then
11 and there and they said no, in cross-examination, and I think that
12 Ms. Dicklich took an opportunity, so that the accused couldn't be
13 disadvantaged, to explain to him what you'd said to her.
14 So this map was not marked by us, it was marked by you. Do you
15 remember that?
16 A. Yes, yes.
17 Q. The evidence that Lord Ashdown gave, as you understand it, was
18 what, that he was at the village of Gegaj with a view of Junik. Is that
19 what you understand his evidence to be?
20 A. Junik was mentioned.
21 Q. Please, you're expressing views about the accuracy of a person who
22 has been a witness in this case, somebody who I'm sure would seek no
23 special credit for his position and, therefore, who must be assessed
24 objectively. I want you please to tell me, what did you understand his
25 evidence to be? Very simple question. That he was standing where and
1 that he saw what?
2 A. Now that you mentioned Junik, the Trial Chamber asked me about
3 Junik when the map was shown that the legal advisors obtained, and that
4 map was shown on the ELMO. I was asked where Junik was, and I said that
5 Junik was to the north, and that from the point where Lord Ashdown was it
6 could not be seen. In the transcript in relation to Lord Ashdown, it was
7 said that he was in Albania at the border with the Federal Republic of
8 Yugoslavia, near the village of Gegaj, that in front he had all of Kosovo
9 and Metohija, practically all the way to Pristina, that he saw mortar
10 positions, and he assessed that they were 82-millimetre mortars. He saw
11 tanks and so on --
12 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... the accused suggested to you
13 that he had a very good view of the entire area to the south of Junik.
14 This is, in fact, what Lord Ashdown said, and I'll read it slowly, and I
15 hope you can follow it. He said: "I journeyed from Bajram Curiju through
16 Trepoje, along the lines here - there is a very rough track up to the
17 border crossing here - and then followed this border crossing up to a
18 point on the Albanian-Kosovo border ..." he marked it on the map -
19 "... above a village which I was informed was called Gegaj ... this gave
20 me a very good view of the whole of the south of the -- of the whole area
21 around south of Junik. There are some small villages down here. And
22 indeed, I could see deep into Kosovo, because this is an area of plains
23 here, almost as far as Pristina."
24 With that evidence in mind, we sent to Lord Ashdown a transcript
25 of your evidence and of that map.
1 If Mr. Prendergast would be good enough, if we could distribute
2 first this one.
3 MR. KAY: In this exercise, I wonder if the Prosecution could
4 produce where Lord Ashdown marked on the map so that we can see that.
5 Apparently it was originally made an exhibit. I can't remember the
7 MR. NICE: I think it was a -- I think it was a pointer as we've
8 had with this witness. I think, Your Honours, it was a pointer on a map
9 in Court.
10 MR. KAY: That's probably why I can't remember it then.
11 MR. NICE: So that we can have things in sequence, can we
12 distribute this one.
13 Q. Lord Ashdown, who did do several years in the services, not at
14 Bloody Sunday, as the accused suggested, but elsewhere, then drew for us
15 his own cross-section from the map, which shows an observation point a
16 thousand metres up with a view through to Ponosevac. And because Lord
17 Ashdown's faxed map, which we've just been looking at, in black and white
18 wasn't very clear, we have attempted to translate that onto this one,
19 which is more easily seen.
20 If that could be placed on the overhead projector.
21 This, I think, we might just deal with as a potential factor. In
22 the former Yugoslavia, your maps, I think as in the one that's most
23 recently produced, are marked on longitude and latitude lines, whereas the
24 map that Lord Ashdown has marked has those lines but is used for reference
25 by grid lines. And if you look at the grid lines on the map that's been
1 produced, his marked position is at 359, as you can see, 982.
2 And if we now turn to the last document that you've produced -
3 I'm not sure what exhibit number it is - it's this map, as the Court will
5 JUDGE KWON: Tab 630.
6 MR. NICE: Your Honour is very obliging.
7 Q. If we turn to that, we have to do the translation, but you've
8 marked his position there not at the equivalent of 359 962 but at the
9 equivalent at 362 98 -- sorry, you've marked him not at 359 982, which is
10 what's marked on the map with the red dot, but you've marked him at 362
11 982, which is about a thousand feet below where he says he was. Do you
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am following you, yes.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, it then becomes important to ascertain,
16 as Mr. Kay said, where Mr. Ashdown in evidence said he was.
17 MR. NICE: He pointed to a map with a pointer. That we don't
18 have, I'm afraid.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, but what did the transcript say?
20 MR. NICE: The transcript says, because of course he wasn't
21 challenged on these issues in this way at all, the transcript says that he
22 went up a border to a point above a village which he was informed was
23 Gegaj, which gave him a good view of the whole area of the south of Junik.
24 And we can see on the map Gegaj, which is in altitude below the point
25 marked, and the rest follows. Had he, of course, been challenged on this
1 detail at the time, this topic could have been explored with him.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Okay. Well, let's hear the precise question
3 you're putting to the witness, and the answer.
4 MR. NICE: Thank you.
5 MR. KAY: Just one matter, sorry to interrupt.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
7 MR. KAY: There are, of course, the video archives which will
8 reveal, raising a current topic there, and maybe I haven't been making
9 myself familiar with the procedures. Ms. Higgins has been dealing with
10 that, but maybe that could be sourced for that particular day and point so
11 that we can look at the video record.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, that would be useful.
13 MR. NICE:
14 Q. In his evidence, just to conclude it and then -- because I've got
15 one more document to show you. In his evidence on this topic, he also
16 said that he saw a mortar position laid out in a classic Warsaw Pact
17 style, he saw platoons moving around in armoured personnel carriers, APCs
18 bombarding subject -- subjecting to tank fire and mortar fire the houses
19 and the villages in the area he was observing. That's his evidence.
20 Now, one other feature that may be relevant because he's looked at
21 the maps in light of the evidence you've given, if we look at this map,
22 the map in your hand, we see Brovina, a village to the north, and to the
23 east of the yellow road running north/south at Brovina we see another road
24 white in colour, and I forecast that were Lord Ashdown to come back and
25 give evidence, as he's entirely willing to do, he would calculate from his
1 recollection and notes and diaries and so on that it was tanks on that
2 eastern of the two roads that were shelling houses on the western of the
3 two roads, on the yellow road.
4 As to Brovina, would you like to look at this last document,
5 please, so that the position can be made clear.
6 Now, this map -- not this map. I beg your pardon. This
7 cross-section that's been drawn, not by Lord Ashdown but by somebody in
8 the Office of the Prosecutor, shows the cross-sectional line from the same
9 observation point to Brovina and thus suggests that from the map Brovina
10 would be visible from the observation point.
11 In order, do you accept that the --
12 A. But -- yes, I'm waiting for your question.
13 Q. Do you accept that if the observation point --
14 A. No, absolutely not. This map was drawn by an amateur who has
15 nothing to do with military topography. Have a look at it. Don't use
16 things like this, please. If you look at it, it says Planning [as
17 interpreted] here -- Planik, which means that Planik is at a distance of 5
18 kilometres from this point. Now look at the map. You see that Planik is
19 537 metres above sea level, and you show it to be 500 metres, so from
20 Planik you cannot see Ponosevac at all. Ponosevac is located right under
21 Planik --
22 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...
23 A. No, the right drawing is on the overhead projector. However, this
24 is incorrect. It's absolutely not correct. The person who drew this has
25 no idea about topography at all. Just take a look at this point, for
1 instance. I don't wish to deal here with amateur work.
2 Q. Honestly, Mr. Delic, if you think it's going to be helpful to make
3 remarks like that, carry on doing it, but I'll just tell you that this
4 plan was drawn by Lord Ashdown in response to your evidence with the maps
5 that were available to him, no doubt in the short period of time available
6 to him, but you carry on saying what you like and help us with why it's
7 actually inaccurate.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I'm a little confused.
9 MR. NICE: This one was drawn by Lord Ashdown.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: I thought earlier you said it was --
11 MR. NICE: This one was by someone in the Office of the
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: So the one that is on the ELMO now was drawn by
14 Lord Ashdown.
15 MR. NICE: Yes.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: I don't know whether that makes any difference to
17 the witness's conclusions.
18 MR. NICE: No, it doesn't make any difference to the conclusions,
19 but it's a matter for him --
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. I'm just saying -- inviting the witness
21 to --
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's very important. I say that it
23 is extremely important. Although I can go back to all the other points,
24 but just take a look at this one point that I'm indicating on the overhead
25 projector now. That is the point which shows at a distance of four or,
1 rather, five kilometres, the Planik feature, and then it says here that it
2 is at an altitude of 500 metres. Planik is not 500 metres. Planik is 537
4 Then here we have -- it says Ponosevac down here. Now take a look
5 at the map, the altitude of Ponosevac. Ponosevac's altitude is a little
6 over 400 metres, which means that the Planik feature is right underneath
7 or, rather, Ponosevac is right underneath Planik feature the altitude is a
8 hundred metres less. So Ponosevac cannot be seen from this feature here.
9 MR. NICE:
10 Q. That's the issue between you and Lord Ashdown, and he has
11 identified, to the extent possible, the position he was at above Gegaj.
12 You weren't aware, were you, when you gave your original evidence that he
13 was above that village?
14 A. But you place him at the village of Ljukaj now, not Gegaj. Now,
15 you can, of course, adjust this as suits you now, but let me tell you
16 this: From any point, you cannot see Ponosevac because of the Planik
17 feature, from any of the other points. You told me the village of Gegaj.
18 You didn't give me the coordinates of the village. You've now mentioned
19 those coordinates and you've moved that point to the proximity of village
20 -- the village of Ljukaj, because the village of Gegaj, you say, was
21 drawn by Lord Ashdown himself on the map, which is more than one kilometre
22 above the village of Gegaj closer to the village of Ljukaj.
23 But independently of that, let's leave that alone, even if we take
24 that what Lord Ashdown has drawn here stands, you still cannot see
25 Ponosevac from the Planik feature, and this is something that is taught to
1 students at the military academy in their third lesson, and people will
2 laugh at us for the observations of this kind.
3 Q. You see --
4 A. I would like this to be corrected. If somebody has drawn diagrams
5 like this, then I ask that they be corrected, because they absolutely do
6 not correspond to the actual situation, and it is not serious to discuss a
7 diagram and drawing like this which was drawn by amateurs, and most
8 probably with some goal in mind at that. And if you just glance at this
9 map and this drawing here, things will be quite clear to you that all this
10 is incorrect.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: We have in evidence, General, the comments that
12 you have made on the drawing.
13 JUDGE KWON: General, do you have any observation on this drawing,
14 which shall be put on the ELMO.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This drawing once again shows Molic
16 stream or brook. That is something that can be seen. However, Brovina
17 cannot be seen. Brovina is at an altitude of 453 metres, and above it
18 there is another feature called Hordup, which is at an altitude of 600
19 metres. So the difference between the altitudes is 150 metres. So as I
20 say, you cannot see both those features.
21 JUDGE KWON: And where can we find the altitude of Ponosevac? You
22 said it's 400 something.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The altitude of Ponosevac,
24 gentlemen, is easily calculated if you look at the isohypsa. We have the
25 isohypsa, with which we can calculate the altitude, but this is a
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 photocopy of the map, and all I can tell you now is a rough estimate of
2 that altitude.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But from some other map, using some
5 other map.
6 MR. NICE:
7 Q. You see --
8 A. The altitude of Ponosevac, if you look at it, is a little below or
9 a little under 440. About 440 metres above sea level, roughly. I can't
10 be precise based on this map because, as I say, the map is a photocopy.
11 So if you have a feature that is at an altitude of about 440 metres and
12 just below it at half a metre you have 537 metres, you cannot see that
13 other feature.
14 Q. Just a couple of other things on this before I move on to
15 something else. You will accept, won't you, that the observation point
16 indicated on this map that your people or military people constructed in
17 wherever it was, Belgrade, is a different observation point from that
18 indicated in the map now produced by Lord Ashdown?
19 A. Yes, because you didn't specifically determine the coordinates.
20 It's only today that you've been speaking about the coordinates of the
21 points, but you did say in the vicinity of the Gegaj village. What you
22 showed here was not near Gegaj village but near Ljukaj village.
23 Q. So far as this map is concerned - I'll just hold it up, this
24 little one here - on any reckoning, whether you can see over the top of
25 the intervening feature or not, you could see from the observation point
1 some or all of Brovina, looking along the southern flanks of the feature
2 that you say would obstruct it. Would you accept that?
3 A. Have you ever been to the village of Brovina? You haven't been to
4 the village of Brovina, I take it. My unit for a time was located in the
5 village of Brovina and I know exactly what you can see there, and I tell
6 you that you cannot see the village of Brovina.
7 Q. The place from which Lord Ashdown made observations was the
8 recognised ECMM observation point at the time and may be one that it's
9 possible to identify again with complete precision, he's obviously working
10 from memory at the moment, and if necessary, we can do that. But if we
11 look at the map, please --
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Was that in evidence?
13 MR. NICE: No, no. I'm making that as an assertion. I'm not sure
14 that that was in evidence, no.
15 Q. If we look at the map, and if we look at those two roads running
16 north/south Brovina to Ponosevac and then the road to the east, running
17 through Stubla and Berijaj -- or Berjah, were those roads roads in your
18 area of responsibility?
19 A. These roads were not in my area of responsibility. However, at
20 that time one of my units was located in the region around the village of
21 Brovina, a smaller unit.
22 Q. If, as Lord Ashdown tells us, tanks were firing at houses in that
23 area, if they weren't your -- your unit's tanks, whose tanks could they
25 A. First of all, the tanks did not fire at the houses, and in one of
1 the tabs there is a report by the military police about the damages on the
2 buildings from which the terrorists acted and that only two tank
3 projectiles were fired, which damaged one particular building. So your
4 observation when you said that tanks were firing at houses, that does not
5 hold water. My unit was there. It was about -- it was in the village of
6 Lajna [phoen] for about 20 days, whereas my area of responsibility was
7 more southerly towards the town of Djakovica, further down, and it was
8 about five kilometres away from Ponosevac.
9 Q. Just a minute. You say that one of the tabs has a report by the
10 military police of damage to the buildings. Does that mean you're aware
11 that these buildings on the north/south road running from Ponosevac to
12 Junik were damaged by tank fire?
13 A. Don't, please, turn my words upside down. I was there. It wasn't
14 Junik. It was the village of Popovac. Popovac is to the south of
15 Ponosevac. So the column was attacked from the houses. The supply column
16 on the road was attacked from the houses. That is to say they were firing
17 at two or three houses, and then the police went to investigate and
18 compiled a report, and the report was shown here during the presentation
19 of Mr. Milosevic. And we also discussed it.
20 Q. Would Popovac have been visible, do you say, from the observation
21 point referred to by Lord Ashdown?
22 A. As far as Popovac is concerned, possibly you could see just
23 individual houses, one or two houses, possibly.
24 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... if we can find the document
25 you're saying covers this. Can you go through the tabs and find out which
1 one it was? It will be in volume 1 at about 40, I think. They're not
2 entirely chronological.
3 A. I'm just looking for it.
4 Q. Mr. Coo says it may be 36. But I'm not sure that you were asked
5 any questions specifically about tab 36. In any event, I haven't got a
6 note of it at the moment against that tab.
7 A. No, it's not 36. I've found it. It's tab 49. And it precisely
8 refers to the village of Brovina.
9 MR. NICE: Well, then, Your Honours, we'd better look at that.
10 Your Honour, just give me one minute.
11 Q. All right. Now -- well, now, this one here you think relates,
12 does it? We haven't looked at this document, I think, in detail or even
13 at all, so you'd better tell us what's significant.
14 A. Yes, we did look at it. We did consider this document. We went
15 through it. And very briefly I made my comments, because we were asked to
16 go through the tabs as quickly as possible. But anyway, this document
17 says that on the 28th of May, a column of motor vehicles was attacked
18 which was taking supplies, food supplies to the Kosare border post or
20 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... Lord Ashdown's visit was on
21 the 20th or 25th of June or thereabouts, so that would seem to be an
22 entirely different incident.
23 Now, if tanks were firing on houses at that part of June, was it
24 your unit or was there any other unit that could have been responsible?
25 A. My unit was not there in June, but there was no firing here in
1 June either. In Junik in June, you had the population there. You had the
2 army there. The terrorists were expulsed from part of the territory along
3 the border belt, the state border.
4 Q. And which army was there? If it wasn't your unit, which unit was
5 in that area at that time?
6 A. It was a unit from the 125th Motorised Brigade.
7 Q. And if Lord Ashdown was able to see the area south of Junik from
8 the vantage point he had, are you able to help us one way or another with
9 whether the 125th Motorised Brigade did what he said in evidence it did?
10 A. At that time, that is -- well, the commander of the 125th Brigade
11 can be called to come here. At that time there were --
12 Q. Could you help us one way or another with whether what Lord
13 Ashdown said about tanks is true or not?
14 A. I already told you. Lord Ashdown could see -- all he could see
15 was if the tanks as part of the supply column were moving towards the
16 village of Morina, which is right up along the border, not towards the
17 village of Brovina, Junik or Moric at all, because you can't see them.
18 All he could have seen was something around the village of Morina, and
19 along that axis, along that road, I assume once or twice a week you would
20 have the supply columns moving that way, a supply column bringing in water
21 to the watchtower at the border post or new shifts. So it would be
22 followed by, accompanied by a tank, perhaps, and a combat vehicle
23 belonging to the military police, a combat armoured vehicle, BOV. That's
24 what he could have seen, but nothing apart from that.
25 Q. You haven't brought with you, have you, the records of the 125th
1 Motorised Brigade for the period of the 20th to the 25th of June of 1998,
2 or any records that cover what they were doing?
3 A. I don't see any reason why I should take with me records of the
4 125th Brigade. It is a brigade that has its commander and it's in
5 Belgrade. I have no reason, no right.
6 Q. You have come here, it's clear from the questions that were asked
7 by the accused, you've come here to assert effectively that what Lord
8 Ashdown has said is untrue. We now know that on the 20th and 25th June,
9 if anybody, it was the 125th Brigade and it wasn't you. You don't have
10 the records and you can't help us, can you?
11 A. I still claim that regardless of which army unit was there, Lord
12 Ashdown could not see what he claims to have seen from the point he was
13 at. That is absolutely impossible except if your Lord Ashdown can see
14 through a hill. Then I do apologise him; perhaps he has that kind of
16 Q. In September he returned. We'll just play you the video of what
17 he could see and what he was doing, please. This was Exhibit 76. I'm
19 [Videotape played]
20 Lord Ashdown: "Bloody angry. I mean angry enough that the truth
21 is that this is exactly -- this is Bosnia all over again. It's not ethnic
22 cleansing. If it is anything, even worse than ethnic cleansing. It is a
23 deliberate two fingers to the rest of the world and this is
24 unquestioningly an act of criminality for which I have absolutely no doubt
25 individuals in command and the politicians who have allowed it on the Serb
1 side could be indicted as war criminals."
2 MR. NICE:
3 Q. Now, this was in September, and he described the area that he was
4 looking at between Suva Reka and Budakova, villages which were being set
5 on fire. What do you say about that? He said some 16 villages
7 A. You must tell me where Lord Ashdown was and from what point --
8 what vantage point he was looking at, looking from --
9 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...
10 A. -- the date was.
11 Q. Near the village of Pecani and in September of 1998. Looking
12 east. Thank you. And the villages he was looking at were the villages of
13 Budakova through to Vranic, and he also spoke of Gornja Kruscica and
14 Kruscica. All these villages were aflame, he said, subject to
15 bombardment, and they had been put to flame. What do you say about that?
16 Whose area of responsibility first, yours?
17 A. At that time, I was with my unit in part of that area, part of
18 that zone. But what Mr. Ashdown says, I'm not going to say that the man
19 is lying, but even what you saw here, what was it that we actually saw?
20 What did you show us?
21 I was there. There was fighting with the terrorist forces whose
22 command was in Budakova. That means, well, at this point in time I can't
23 tell you but I'll take a look this afternoon what Lord Ashdown can see
24 from Pecani and what these manufactured -- what this manufactured footage
1 Q. I'm sorry. Manufactured footage. Don't hesitate to make
2 allegations like that if you think it's going to help. Who do you suggest
3 manufactured the footage?
4 A. For all the footage and pictures I showed here I said who took
5 them, when they were taken, who the editor was, who the cameraman was.
6 Here you just showed me Lord Ashdown looking through a pair of binoculars
7 and then you show me some houses that are aflame.
8 Q. His evidence was of what he saw through the binoculars, supported
9 by the evidence of him in the viewing position, supported by evidence of
10 burning houses in the area he'd about looking at. Now, are you saying
11 that was manipulated; and, if so, by whom?
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that the question is
15 improper because it has to do with the video that Mr. Nice showed.
16 Mr. Nice showed a single house that was in flames, and then there was a
17 close-up of a window on that house. He cannot take footage of one house
18 that is burning as evidence that an entire village is burning and in this
19 way put questions to the witness.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think he's really asking the witness to
21 substantiate his claim that the footage was manipulated.
22 MR. NICE:
23 Q. Incidentally, Mr. Delic, although it doesn't show up very well on
24 the review here, what the film does show, or did show when we looked at it
25 a couple years ago, is a whole area with smoke coming up as from flames
1 from various villages. But there it is.
2 I think I'm going to move on, unless there is anything else you
3 want to say about Lord Ashdown.
4 A. I certainly have something to add. But I'm asking you to tell me
5 at what position Mr. Ashdown was so that I could say tomorrow whether what
6 is being said is correct. I need the position so that I could have a look
7 this afternoon. Since I know where the village of Pecani is, that I was
8 in that village, and from that place there are also a lot of problems
9 involved in order to see the 16 villages that Mr. Ashdown is talking
10 about. And I know the villages that I was in. This assertion is
11 absolutely wrong. I was near the village of Musitiste [phoen], then from
12 the village of Recani, the village of Vranic, the village of Maciteve, the
13 village of Popovjani [phoen], and then let --
14 Q. Pause a minute. I'm not sure that at present the record allows
15 more detail of his observation point for the second part of his evidence,
16 but if you want it, I'll try and find it. It may not be today. It may be
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: On that point with -- again with Judge Kwon's
19 help, the transcript shows Lord Ashdown as saying, "So I was positioned
20 approximately here, near the village of Pecani," and then I think he must
21 have --
22 MR. NICE: Marked a map.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- pointed.
24 MR. NICE: Yes. But it may be I can get further detail, at least
25 of what Lord Ashdown's position is.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm probably technologically disadvantaged, but I
2 don't know whether video, the video would help, would assist.
3 MR. NICE: I'm not sure that it would. It depends on how precise
4 he was and how long the pointer lingered on the map.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
6 MR. NICE: Your Honours, the question will arise as to the status
7 of the documents that I've used to explain the position. The witness has,
8 of course, not adopted any of them. I'm in the Court's hands. Lord
9 Ashdown, as I say, is quite prepared to come back and give evidence if
10 it's thought to be important.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Are you seeking to have --
12 MR. NICE: Before I move on to the next thing, which is another
13 document, and knowing that the Chamber prefers things to be dealt with
14 sequentially --
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
16 MR. NICE: -- if the Court wanted them exhibited or marked for
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 MR. NICE: Oh, and, Your Honours, yes --
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: We will exhibit them, Mr. Nice, for the reason
21 that the witness's answers and remarks make them intelligible, make the
22 evidence intelligible.
23 MR. NICE: Your Honours, the one map that I think I didn't
24 distribute, which --
25 JUDGE KWON: Microphone.
1 MR. NICE: The one map I didn't distribute, which is the map
2 handed out in blank to the witness and marked by him, the first in the
3 sequence. If I can hand that in as well.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Nice, the one that shows the heights which the
5 General said were inaccurately -- sorry. Yes, inaccurately recorded, you
6 say was actually drawn by Ashdown.
7 MR. NICE: That's my understanding, yes.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: And you said that one had been drawn by someone in
9 your office.
10 MR. NICE: That's that one, yes.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Is it the one that shows Brovina?
12 MR. NICE: That's correct.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
14 THE REGISTRAR: 872, given to all these maps, consists of five
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: But should we have some indication that
17 distinguishes the one drawn by Lord Ashdown to the one drawn by the
18 Prosecutor's Office?
19 MR. NICE: Yes, I think that would be helpful. Would it be
20 helpful if we marked the tabs in some way at the break, or would you like
21 us to deal with it now?
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let's deal with it at the break and move on. I
23 have one concern, though, that the witness asked you to inform him in more
24 specific terms of Lord Ashdown's position so that he could review the
25 matter in the evening and come back to it tomorrow, but it doesn't appear
1 that we are in a position to be any more precise than the reading which I
2 gave from the transcript.
3 MR. NICE: Your Honour, no, not from the record. If I can make
4 further contact with Lord Ashdown, I will, and I'll give the witness
5 notification of what he says.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well, yes.
7 MR. NICE: Can I distribute now, please, a document that is a
8 visual aid which I hope may be helpful to the Chamber and to the witness.
9 I'll explain it and then we can use it in part. It's an aide-memoire or a
10 guide. It's nothing more nor less than that.
11 Q. Mr. Delic, this document first of all seeks to show certain things
12 relating to your area of responsibility, and if we look at the bottom
13 left-hand corner of the map, we see an inserted map. Does that inserted
14 map roughly show your area of responsibility?
15 A. The question is how precisely this was done, but that is where my
16 zone of responsibility is. However, this was not done precisely.
17 Q. It's only approximate. We've done our best. Now, if you look at
18 the large map, you'll see a number of places marked, nearly all of them
19 inside the area of responsibility, one or two, like Crnoljevo and of
20 course Racak, which are outside.
21 When we look at areas within your area of responsibility, the
22 boxes show places and sources of information. I'll just explain it to
24 Take one which has a lot of entries in it, so take Suva Reka. If
25 you look at Suva Reka, which is towards the right at the top, we see that
1 there's something about the army happening on the 27th of August of 1998
2 and the material for that is a witness called Crosland through his Exhibit
3 253. Likewise, something at Suva Reka happened involving the army on the
4 15th of December of 1998. Maisonneuve deals with it through his exhibit
5 175, as does the same witness through Exhibit 178 on the 16th of January.
6 On the 28th of March there is something about the army at Suva
7 Reka from the book "As Seen, As Told," of which you've spoken, page 377 in
8 the English.
9 And then for events between March and April 1999, apart from an
10 entry from "Under Orders" pages 382 and 388, there's evidence from
11 witnesses in this case, Baccard, Zdrilic, K32.
12 So that's the general format, so that people can follow it. I'm
13 not going to go through each and every entry or anything like it, but it
14 provides a reckoner, or ready reckoner for what may be available.
15 And in the general chronology of events, we've reached the summer
16 of 1998, and although this is just outside your area of responsibility, in
17 the top right-hand corner we see Dulje, and in July of 1998, according to
18 John Crosland, he saw there evidence of coordination of the VJ and the
19 MUP. He saw an assault force of the special anti-terrorist unit, the PJP,
20 with the army at Kijevo. He saw a heavy MUP and army assault on Dulje,
21 Blace, and Junik.
22 As to Dulje, are you able to help us one way or another with
23 whether at that time in July of 1998, 28th, 29th, there was an army police
24 attack on Dulje?
25 A. You mentioned a few villages here or, rather, you mentioned some
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 places that are about 50 kilometres away from one another.
2 Q. At the moment I'm just really focusing on Dulje. Was there a
3 military police attack on Dulje on the 28th, 29th of July, 1998?
4 A. Do you know what Dulje is? Do you know what Dulje means? How do
5 you see it?
6 Q. I'm sorry. It's not for you to ask questions.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Don't ask -- don't ask counsel questions,
8 General. It's the other way around. You answer the questions. That's
9 the format here.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Dulje is a feature, a land feature.
11 It is a pass. There is not a single house at the pass of Dulje. Later
12 on, in accordance with the agreement reached with the mission, there was a
13 unit from the 243rd Brigade there. There's nothing there except for a
14 forest and this pass on the road between Suva Reka and Stimlje.
15 MR. NICE:
16 Q. Are you able to help whether there was a heavy military police
17 presence at Dulje on those days?
18 A. I was not there, so I cannot tell you whether there were a lot of
19 soldiers or policemen there. At that time, Luznica and Klecka were the
20 directions that operations were aimed at. Klecka is well known due to the
21 fact that a first big mass grave of Serbs was found there. So those are
22 my recollections.
23 Q. A small detail but we'll just pick it up for completeness. If you
24 look at the centre of the top, we see the Orahovac block and we see a
25 Defence witness, Yevgeny Primakov, and through an exhibit in his evidence
1 the evidence came in of an incident at the Morina border post marked as
2 Orahovac but I'm not sure that is a correct reference. It should be over
3 at Morina, I expect. He says that at the Morina -- or his exhibit says
4 that at the Morina border post there was firing by the army onto Albanian
5 territory after a Yugoslav army truck had been hit by a land-mine. Do you
6 remember anything about that? It's a matter of accuracy.
7 A. A truck of the military near Morina came across a mine that was
8 laid by the Albanian terrorists. Staff Sergeant Bubalo, the commanding
9 officer, was killed and five soldiers were seriously wounded. Fire was
10 opened from the territory of Albania. We probably have this in our tabs
12 Q. And was the village the Albanian village of Padesh then shelled?
13 A. I would have to have a look on the map. The territory of Albania
14 was not shelled, but you are producing your own documents. I should now
15 find a report from the on-site investigation for that incident. I am
16 talking about -- you are talking about that incident, and I know that I
17 have a report about it in my tabs.
18 Q. Well, if you can tell us where it is, or give us a hint where it
19 is. It should be around the place where we are at the moment, and I
20 shan't pretend to have memorised the contents of each and every one of
21 these tabs. We're at about 52. If you can find it, do so.
22 Did you find it?
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's time for the break. We'll adjourn for 20
25 --- Recess taken at 12.15 p.m.
1 --- On resuming at 12.39 p.m.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.
3 MR. NICE:
4 Q. Did you find the tab you wanted to draw to our attention?
5 A. Yes. But before that, I've also found the previous matter about
6 Dulje. Tab 125.
7 JUDGE KWON: Binder 2.
8 MR. NICE: Yes, binder 2, tab 125. No translation.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 MR. NICE: I don't think I have a translation.
11 JUDGE KWON: I have it.
12 MR. NICE: It may be a late arrival.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes. It's on the ELMO.
14 MR. NICE:
15 Q. On the evidence, of course, the Dulje incident referred to by
16 Crosland was on the 28th and 29th of July, so this would not appear to be
17 related to the same event. Would you accept that?
18 A. The shooting for the liberating the communication between Suva
19 Reka and Malisevo went on for three days. They started on the 25th and
20 ended on the 28th or 29th. So it was an ongoing operation along the
21 communication lines and Luznica-Klecka, that road. So it's the same
22 event, and this is an Official Note for the 25th.
23 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What month are you talking about?
25 MR. NICE:
1 Q. July.
2 A. This is the month of August. But I found the other tabs --
3 Q. Very well.
4 A. -- which have to do with Morina.
5 Q. Tell us about those, please.
6 A. They are tabs 148 and 149.
7 Q. Still in volume 2. These relate to September. I think the
8 matters I was raising with you were possibly rather earlier than that, but
9 tell us what you derive from these documents.
10 A. The incidents along the border were daily incidents, but you
11 mentioned a truck, and in both these events that took place on the same
12 day, the first event was that a truck belonging to the army, which was
13 moving along or, rather, was at the border and going to pick up supplies
14 came across a mine which was placed by Siptar terrorists and that an
15 officer of that vehicle was killed, Warrant Officer Bundalo, and that
16 another warrant officer, Mihajlovic, was seriously wounded and two others
17 lightly wounded.
18 The other event took place on that same day, once again at the
19 border in the area of the Kosare border post, where five soldiers were
20 killed. And it seems that they stormed in at the very stone denoting the,
21 border because the line goes parallel with the Yugoslav-Albania border.
22 So this patrol path which allowed vehicles to move about goes
23 right up along the border, and the Albanian terrorists on Albanian
24 territory set up an ambush. This vehicle came across that ambush. They
25 opened fire at it from hand-held launchers of the Armbrust type, and there
1 were about 30 terrorists. They opened fire for about five minutes and
2 then withdrew to Albanian territory. Five soldiers were killed in that
4 Q. Your Honours, I'm going to move on now to -- moving through the
5 time period. Whether or not the Court finds the chart helpful, I'll
6 simply refer to things on the chart from time to time. We're now looking
7 at Djakovica, 1st to the 3rd of August.
8 You've made some reference already to K32. He's a protected
9 witness. If there's anything that you're going to say that's going in any
10 way to identify him, please notify us -- or enable him to be identified,
11 please notify us before you say it and then we'll ask for private session.
12 Do you understand?
13 A. I certainly do not wish to identify the witness, and I'll take
14 great care not to do so.
15 Q. Well, now, he has told us that on the 1st -- somewhere between the
16 1st and the 3rd of August, on the road between Djakovica town on the way
17 towards Klina, there was a large Yugoslav army column going to help or
18 reinforce the MUP, and at the first village they came to they stopped and
19 you ordered the driver to turn the tank towards a house and to fire at it
20 and that that order was heard by K32 personally.
21 You deny it, but tell us, please, where were you between the 1st
22 and the 3rd of August; and secondly, please, point us to any tabs that are
23 going to provide contemporaneous accounts of what you were doing over that
25 A. The legal representatives, advisors, did not consider those
1 documents to be necessary, so I'll see whether we can come by them. But
2 there are regular documents that exist for every other --
3 Q. One of the documents that we know you've got is a journal or a war
4 diary. I haven't asked to see it yet but I don't want to be suddenly
5 presented with it at a later stage. Does that document cover this general
7 A. The war diary is called a war diary because it just covers the war
9 Q. I assumed as much. Do you have any other journal, diary, log, or
10 record with you, in your briefcase or in your hotel, that covers this
12 A. I'll check it -- check that. As far as the operational log is
13 concerned, it is in the military archives.
14 Now, as for this one -- this period here, there is an order,
15 there's a map, and there's an analysis.
16 Q. Let's just see how proximate that is, either in geography or time,
17 to the incident described by K32. Which map and which order do you want
18 us to look at?
19 A. I'll do my best to see whether I can come up with those for
20 tomorrow too.
21 Now, as for what you said linked to Witness K32 --
22 Q. From the documents you've got now - we've got to do things in an
23 orderly way - is there any document we've got so far that's going to help
24 us with where you were and what you were doing on this particular period
25 of time?
1 A. I will check that. I can't give you an answer just now. But as
2 for Witness K32, I don't need any documents.
3 Q. You knew coming here that, amongst other things, you would be
4 asked questions about the conduct of the army in 1998. That's why you
5 gave such extensive evidence and came with such extensive documents about
6 1998. Am I correct?
7 A. I am ready to testify for every year that I spent in the army. So
8 it's not essential whether it's 1998 or 1999, and for the duties that I
9 occupied and the units I was in command of.
10 Q. You also knew, because you were very familiar with it when the
11 accused was asking you questions, about the evidence given against you by
12 K32, didn't you?
13 A. Yes. K32, he did testify against me.
14 Q. Why didn't you bring the contemporaneous documents with you that
15 would have helped us, from contemporaneous documents, work out where you
17 A. Well, it's absolutely no problem for you to know where I was, but
18 I don't wish to speak about your witness. Let me just say that your
19 witness from the Logistics Battalion, that's where he was, and that he was
20 never beside me in the operation. And I'll show you on the map where I
21 was and where your witness was.
22 Q. Yes. Show us on the map, then. Which map are you going to use?
23 A. Well, any of these two. Either one.
24 Q. Well, you show us where you were and tell us how -- and then tell
25 us how you're able to remember that.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: You're indicating where you were?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That means the witness was on
3 assignment together with the quartermaster group for supplies, and he was
4 in the region of the chicken farm, whereas I was three kilometres further
5 away in the -- first of all in -- around the village of Mece, that region,
6 and then around Rakovina, the village of Rakovina. This quartermaster or
7 logistics group for supplies, in charge of supplies, would come when I
8 asked them to, to bring in water or ammunition, only upon request. Later
9 on to the village of Rakovi.
10 Q. Thank you. Do I take it then from what you're telling us that you
11 accept that the account given by K32 in general as being part of an army
12 column travelling along a road between Djakovica and Klina is correct but
13 that the detail of what he says he observed is incorrect?
14 A. From Prizren he went in a single column. His column, which was
15 composed of 45 vehicles, stayed in the village of Bec, at the chicken farm
17 Q. What he's described in general is correct. He's not made the
18 whole incident up. His account of the movement of the troops along this
19 road in early -- August 1998 is accurate; yes?
20 A. In general terms, but just that, that he was part of the unit.
21 That is accurate.
22 Q. Remembering the problem with identification, I want you to be as
23 clear and expansive as you need to tell us what reason K32 can have had
24 for making this all up against you.
25 A. K32 -- well, I don't know if you can remember this, but K32 was an
1 army -- a Muslim, a member of the army. He was partly Albanian.
2 Q. You've already reached probably the hinterland of material that
3 might have to be better dealt with in private session.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let's go into private session to get this reason.
5 MR. NICE: Yes.
6 [Private session]
11 Pages 42239-42246 redacted. Private session.
9 [Open session]
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And the other officer that I
11 mentioned earlier on.
12 MR. NICE:
13 Q. Let's go, please, to tab 104.
14 This is from Pavkovic to the Chief of Staff and, I think, to
15 various brigades, including yours. Now, this is what he says: "The
16 latest operations carried out by units of the corps in coordinated action
17 with units of the Serbian MUP in curbing terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija
18 were carried out very professionally and responsibly with sound assessment
19 and prudent use of forces. An analysis of the achievement of the tasks
20 showed that some units overused combat equipment, the consequence of which
21 was greater damage to buildings in areas of combat operations --"
22 A. I'm not receiving any interpretation.
23 Q. I'll go back and try again with that last sentence. Can you hear
24 me? "An analysis of the achievement of the task --"
25 A. Yes, yes.
1 Q. "-- showed that some units overused combat equipment, the
2 consequence of which was greater damage to buildings in areas of combat
3 operations. Specifically, a large number of houses were destroyed and
5 Well, this is only a few days after what K32 told us about your
6 pointing a tank at a house and ordering that the tank should fire, there
7 being no other reason to do so that he could see. And there's reference
8 here to torching of houses.
9 By August of 1998, was the army engaged in rather widespread
10 destruction of houses and torching of them?
11 A. That's not true, and you didn't read this properly, this section
12 of the text, because the way you read this text one reaches the wrong kind
13 of conclusions. It refers to a different period. The corps commander is
14 sending this to the commanders of brigades and chiefs of staff. Obviously
15 there are some problems, but as you say, this is not widespread torching
16 of houses. What you're saying, that I directly ordered a particular house
17 to be targeted, I ordered direct firing against a house from which there
18 was fire coming at the police. To this day I know where this house was,
19 and there were terrorists in that house. That house is in Kramovik and
20 it's from that house that --
21 Q. Are you acknowledging that what K32 said about ordering a tank to
22 fire at a house does have some connection with events of which you have a
24 A. K32 could have heard about something but he was not there.
25 Q. Well, this is, I think, the first time you've told about this. I
1 may be wrong but I think it is, so we'd better just focus on it. So you
2 did order the targeting of a house, and was it on the days that K32 has
3 told us about, the very beginning of August?
4 A. To target a house that had been turned into a fortification from
5 which the terrorists held under their control the bridge on the Drim
6 River. They did not allow anyone to cross that bridge on that day, police
7 vehicles or army vehicles. So that's what I ordered, to fire at that
8 house and to neutralise that firing point. That is my right. It was not
9 a house. For me, it was a bunker.
10 Q. He said it was in the village of Mece or probably -- yeah, I think
11 Mece or Medevci, was that about the right location?
12 A. No. That's a few kilometres further on.
13 Q. But we're getting --
14 A. And he absolutely was not there.
15 Q. Forget whether he was there. That's another issue, for the time
16 being, but we're getting close. So close to where he says you ordered a
17 tank to destroy a house, you did order a tank to destroy a house. He says
18 civilians ran from the house which had not been seen to be offering any
19 fire. Did civilians run from the house, as he told us? Did they?
20 A. The words of that witness are sheer nonsense. I knew that that
21 house had been turned into a fortification. There were no civilians
22 there. It wasn't in that village that the witness is talking about. I've
23 already said where that house was. No one else could have issued the
24 order for the tank to open fire, as you know from the previous tabs and
25 orders, except for me, and I issued orders only when I personally knew
1 that this was a target where terrorists were. It wasn't my tank leader
2 who could open fire on his own and just shoot at a particular feature.
3 Q. Am I --
4 A. We have gone through that tab, or that order, today.
5 Q. Am I right that when you let out that you'd ordered the
6 destruction of this house this was indeed the first time that you'd
7 mentioned it in Court?
8 A. I did not let anything out of my mouth because I came here to this
9 Court to tell the truth, and you should think about the credibility of
10 your own witnesses and the lies they told in this courtroom. I'm always
11 going to say before this Court everything that I ordered and everything
12 that I did. I'm going to repeat 100 times, if necessary: Yes, I issued
13 the order to fire at the house where terrorists were.
14 Q. It's a very simple question. I'll ask it again. If you don't
15 like the phrase "let out," I'll use another one. When you told the
16 learned Judges a few minutes ago about destroying a house with your tank,
17 was that the first time you had mentioned that in this Court?
18 A. That house was not destroyed, because a house cannot be destroyed
19 with one shell only. So far we haven't talked about this particular time
20 and this particular event.
21 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... since you find it so
22 difficult, I'm going to ask it more simply still. When you told the
23 Judges a few minutes ago about your giving an order that the tank should
24 shell this house, was that the first time you had mentioned that in this
1 A. In this Court this is the first time that I'm talking about this
2 event, so it is only natural that this is the first time I mentioned it.
3 Q. Have you brought with you any documents of a contemporaneous
4 nature that deal with this firing of a tank at a house on your orders?
5 A. This is sheer nonsense to keep records of each and every fired
6 bullet. No such thing exists in any army.
7 Q. Well, amongst the various records kept day by day, what a tank
8 does, where it goes, and what it does by way of attempting to destroy the
9 enemy is presumably one of the things, if not the central thing, that
10 should be recorded, isn't it?
11 A. No. Such records are not kept.
12 Q. And indeed we can see -- we will see quite a lot of records of
13 yours with details of what's been fired. But also, this was the centre of
14 terrorists. Did you not want to record somewhere that you'd fired your
15 tank and destroyed a terrorist stronghold? A matter of complete
16 irrelevance to the day, was it?
17 A. A base and one single feature, those are two different things. A
18 base is a broader locality where terrorist forces are. This is a house
19 that was turned into a stronghold, a bunker of the terrorists, from which
20 they controlled movement along a road and fired at vehicles. So what
21 would that be like if I wrote to my corps commander to say that I issued
22 an order today to have a tank fire a shell? That's nonsense. You don't
23 write to your corps that way. You write about larger quantities of one or
24 the other particular type of ammunition.
25 Q. Why were you, the brigade commander, doing this sort of subunit
1 work? Why weren't you at your command headquarters?
2 A. Mr. Nice, you have a short memory span. We went through a few
3 tabs today in which the commander ordered who it was who could permit
4 gunfire. I'm not going to be sitting in my office 40 kilometres away
5 without having my unit under control, my unit that is in combat. The
6 corps commander ordered that, and you read that out today, and after that
7 you read out my own order that only the corps commander can allow fire to
8 be open or, rather, the commander of the brigade. My commanders who were
9 in the field did not have the right to order the use of such weapons. Only
10 I could do that. And I couldn't do that from my headquarters in Prizren,
11 I could only do that on the spot.
12 Q. Very well. If you had to be personally present at every firing of
13 a tank round, then that simply rather confirms, doesn't it, what K32 told
14 us. And I suggest to you, Mr. Delic, you have been caught out by letting
15 drop that you did -- letting slip that you did in fact turn the tank on
16 this house.
17 A. That's ludicrous what you're saying, Mr. Nice. I am a Serbian
18 general, and I'm the commander of a brigade. Therefore, I am responsible
19 for each of my orders. What I did was to open fire at a terrorist
20 stronghold. That is my right because I was defending my country there.
21 As to your comments that you have caught me out or anything like
22 that, that's sheer nonsense.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: And what happened to the inhabitants of the house
24 on which you turned fire?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, in that particular house for
1 months there were no inhabitants. The inhabitants were expelled by the
2 terrorists, and since the house was in a very suitable spot because you
3 could control the bridge on the Drim River from that house at a place
4 called Kramovik, those civilians were probably in some other village or --
5 anyway, they weren't in the house. There were no civilians in the house
6 ever during those two months prior to this event. So at that place, at
7 that bridge, and there was a police checkpoint close by, nine of our men
8 were killed by firing coming from that house.
9 MR. NICE:
10 Q. Can we return just very briefly to tab 104. You will recall it
11 was the one that dealt with the destruction and torching of houses,
12 Pavkovic's order. Let's look at the order itself.
13 If Mr. Prendergast can move it up a little bit, to point number
15 What General Pavkovic ordered was: "Prohibit causing damage to
16 facilities in settlements from which Siptar terrorists have been expelled,
17 regardless of whether they stayed in them earlier and put up resistance
18 from them. Particularly forbid torching of houses and other economic and
19 auxiliary buildings."
20 The army, was it on a rampage of torching buildings until
21 restrained by General Pavkovic, perhaps because of the presence of
22 international observers? Is that what this passage reveals to us?
23 A. No. Your observation is not accurate. What General Pavkovic
24 ordered here relates to individual cases, that is to say individual cases
25 where discipline was violated, and the object of paragraph 2 was to
1 prevent that kind of conduct. So we cannot speak about any uncontrolled
2 behaviour on the part of the forces. It wouldn't be an army if that were
3 the case.
4 MR. NICE: Your Honours, I see the time. Mr. Kay, I believe, or
5 Ms. Higgins, have or has organised the possible screening of the passage
6 of Lord Ashdown's evidence where he points on a map to the locations
7 concerned. We've been provided with photocopies or prints of what we're
8 about to see, and I suspect that before the picture is viewed it may help
9 if I display on the overhead projector -- well, they've been marked
10 slightly by us. Let's look at the first one, please.
11 Now, the first -- I'm not getting anything on my screen. I've
12 gone into a state of frozen suspense. Does the Court have effective
13 overhead projector display? Ah, yes, there it is.
14 Now, the first one, and -- is a frame or frozen picture of the
15 footage that we're about to see. It's a much smaller scale map. One can
16 see that Djakovica is towards the right and the border underneath the
17 pointer to the left, and you can see that written to the right of the arm
18 of the pointer has been added the word "Ponosevac."
19 Q. Just looking at that, please, Mr. Delic, you'll see it on, I
20 think, the film in a minute, you'll see Junik's also been written in above
21 that. So it's a very small scale map, but subject to that, the position
22 indicated by Lord Ashdown, if this is what we're going to see, is very
23 much the same position that he's marked on the map that he showed us or
24 was provided to us since last week; correct?
25 A. What do you mean? What is correct? What are you asking me about?
1 Q. Well, I thought the question was simple but I'm sorry if you
2 didn't follow it. Where he's pointing, assuming this is what we're going
3 to see, where he's pointing is substantially the same as the observation
4 point he's marked for us on the map I showed you this morning.
5 A. That's not correct either. This position corresponds more to the
6 position that I marked when I drew up the map. So this is right above the
7 Cafa Morina pass, and what he's indicating is near the village of Gegaj.
8 So the villages right by here.
9 Now, what you showed us later on is a little above that. You have
10 brought a map of such a small scale, but when Lord Ashdown pointed to this
11 I definitely can say now that Lord Ashdown could not from that point see
12 what you are presenting here. I am very definite on that point now.
13 Q. Mr. Delic, Lord Ashdown gave evidence to which his markings on a
14 map with a pointer were indicative, but we note your observation.
15 MR. NICE: Could the other one be shown, please, Mr. Prendergast.
16 Q. And here --
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, when you said "indicative," you mean it
18 was an approximation.
19 MR. NICE: Yes. We'll see what Lord Ashdown says, if it comes out
20 on the transcript that Mr. Kay has helpfully identified for us.
21 Q. Here we see Orahovac highlighted or outlined to the left and
22 underneath the figure 24 and above Suva Reka we see the point that he's
23 indicated as I understand it there. All right? You wanted to know what
24 these points were. And if time allows and if the video --
25 A. Let's just make ourselves understood. Where the top of the
1 pointer is, and it's probably the same pointer I have in my hand now, that
2 that top of the indicator denotes the place where Lord Ashdown was
3 located. I'll check this out for tomorrow. But as to the first footage,
4 I can say quite definitely, and all experts in topography can bear this
5 out, that what I wrote and what the Geographic Institute showed, only that
6 is what Lord Ashdown could have seen. As to this, I'll check it out by
8 Q. Just before we view the film, because you've been very clear and
9 emphatic in your rejection of Lord Ashdown, you realise that he reported
10 matters to the Prime Minister in England, I think, after the first visit,
11 and he had a meeting with this accused after the second. Is there
12 anything known to you that would explain why Lord Ashdown would want to
13 make up something, since you're so emphatic that he's got it wrong? And
14 don't feel inhibited. You say whatever you want to. Tell us: Why should
15 he make it up?
16 A. Well, that's not my problem. My problem is from the professional
18 Q. You've been very emphatic, and we've had all sorts of allegations
19 made, and this is 1998 when the international community was trying, you
20 may think, to save Kosovo from the fate into which it fell and where Lord
21 Ashdown was reporting things back contemporaneously. Can you point to any
22 reason why he might want to make this stuff up?
23 A. Well, we were able to see how it was that the international
24 community saved Kosovo. I taught military topography, and I am only
25 giving my professional opinion as to what can be seen from this particular
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 point, and what I state, what I have been saying you can give your
2 military geographical institutes and your experts to check out and give
3 you their opinion whether what I say is correct or not.
4 The motives of Lord Ashdown are unknown quantities, as far as I'm
5 concerned, and you will I'm sure recognise that I haven't come to this
6 courtroom to guess as to what Lord Ashdown was thinking or thought. All
7 I'm saying is for the point that was shown, and what I'm saying that what
8 he said there does not correspond to the situation and he couldn't have
9 seen what he said he saw from that point.
10 MR. NICE: Could we just play the video if, as I understand, it's
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, let the video be played.
13 [Videotape played]
14 "Q. Now, while in Albania on this visit, and indeed at this part
15 of your visit, were you able to keep observation, through binoculars, on
16 the area of Junik, which we can see? Perhaps you can just point it out
17 for us.
18 "A. I was. I journeyed from Bajram Curiju through Trepoje, along
19 the lines here - there was a very rough track up to the border crossing
20 here - and then followed this border crossing up to a point on the
21 Albanian-Kosovo border, approximately where my marker is now, above a
22 village which I was informed was called Gegaj, G-e-g-a-j. And this gave
23 me a very good view of the whole area around south of Junik. There are
24 some small villages down here. And indeed, I could see deep into Kosovo,
25 because this is an area of plains here, almost as far as Pristina."
1 "A. So I was positioned approximately here, near the village of
2 Pecani. The -- as we calculate, the guns that were firing were up here in
3 the area of Blace. The villages we were looking at were the villages of
4 Budakovo, which is here, through to Vranic, which is over here, Maciteve,
5 which is here, and Krusica. Both Gornji Krusica -- Gornji Krusica is up
6 here, and Krusica is down here."
7 MR. NICE:
8 Q. That's the way he dealt with it. That's the extent to which, by
9 his pointer, he was being approximate or detailed. You're challenging
10 that he was able to see in general terms the things he said he was able to
11 see in general terms.
12 A. Place the diagram on the overhead projector and we can see what he
13 could have seen and what he could not have seen.
14 Q. To whom was that request addressed?
15 A. Well, you said to me -- you're telling me that I'm challenging the
16 fact that he could have seen that. So on the diagram we have the
17 shaded-in areas that he could see and the surfaces -- surface areas he
18 could not see. So directly he could see part of the village of Morina and
19 a group of houses from Morina village. That village is not grouped, but
20 each household, each family has several houses, and they are at a distance
21 of several hundred metres or even one kilometre away from each other.
22 It's a very scattered type of village. So that was close by, and he could
23 see that within a radius of about three kilometres. Anything further
24 linked to Ponosevac and Moric I've already explained about. So any expert,
25 if you -- if he just took the facts and figures about altitudes, absolute
1 and relative altitudes of individual points, will arrive at the conclusion
2 straight away as to what can be seen and what cannot be seen.
3 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm not going to take that any further at
4 the moment. You've got the answers.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: I agree, Mr. Nice. I think we have gone as far
6 with this as is reasonable.
7 We will adjourn for today and resume tomorrow at 9.00.
8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.42 p.m.,
9 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 13th day
10 of July, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.