Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 996

 1                           Tuesday, 29 April 2008

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused Simatovic entered court]

 4                           [The accused Stanisic is not present]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 1.16 p.m.

 6             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Mr. Groome, you are to continue with your

 7     opening.

 8             MR. GROOME:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 9             When court day ended yesterday, I was beginning my remarks

10     regarding the joint criminal enterprise and explaining why in our summary

11     diagram, we had placed Mr. Stanisic in both a box for the Serbian MUP and

12     also in a box for Serbian politicians.  As an illustration of how

13     Mr. Stanisic was involved in realisation of the common plan through

14     political activity, I played an intercept on slide 16 between Stanisic

15     and Karadzic in which they expressed their view that Babic is not adept

16     in political matters.

17             Stanisic informs Karadzic that he has had a serious discussion

18     with Babic about how to act politically.

19             Similarly, as you can see on the left-hand side of the diagram,

20     Milan Martic can be found not only in the Republika Srpska Krajina or the

21     RSK Ministry of Internal Affairs but also in the box for RSK political

22     figures.  This represents the dual role that he played.

23             My colleagues and I will come back to this diagram on several

24     occasions during the course of the opening.

25             The Prosecution will over the course of this trial establish the

Page 997

 1     shared intent of these core members with a primary focus on these accused

 2     present, their intent and their acts of contribution to the overall

 3     criminal plan.

 4             It is difficult to trace the roots of a covert criminal plan,

 5     particularly in a case such as this in which secrecy and surprise was

 6     viewed as an essential component of the plan's success.  As best we can

 7     determine, we see the germination of this criminal plan in the words of

 8     its primary architect, Slobodan Milosevic.

 9             Slide number 18 shows the words Milosevic spoke on the 16th of

10     March, 1991, to a closed group of deputies after a period of steadily

11     increasing tensions.

12             In this context, and at a meeting with the presidents of Serb

13     municipalities, Milosevic said, "The government has been tasked with

14     creating suitable units which will make us safe at all times, that is,

15     capable of defending the interests of our Republic, but also the

16     interests of Serbs outside Serbia."

17             It is the Prosecution's case that approximately six weeks after

18     Milosevic gave this order for the creation of special units tasked with

19     protecting Serb interests outside of Serbia, Jovica Stanisic established

20     these units in the State Security Department of the Serbian Ministry of

21     Internal Affairs.

22             Let me once again direct your attention to the awards ceremony in

23     Kula in May of 1997 where Franko Simatovic gave a retrospective of the

24     special unit's history.  A candid history of it in a private setting to

25     the select group of people who supported the unit and its objectives.

Page 998

 1                           [Videotape played]

 2             MR. GROOME:  Here on slide number 20, you can see the two

 3     statements side by side and considering that there is no other unit that

 4     we know of that Milosevic created, it becomes clear that we are talking

 5     about one and the same unit.

 6             Mr. Simatovic would go on to say in his speech, "The contribution

 7     of the Special Operation Unit is enormous.  47 soldiers were killed and

 8     250 wounded in combat operations at 50 different locations."

 9             With his own words, Simatovic tells us that the special units of

10     the Serbian DB operated in 50 different locations in Croatia and

11     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  He would also say, "26 training camps for special

12     police units of Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina were

13     also formed in that period."

14             26 training camps mostly in Bosnia and Croatia.

15             The genesis of the special units was the day that Milosevic

16     charged Stanisic with the task of establishing a covert fighting force

17     not bound by law but only by the dictates of Mr. Milosevic.

18             On this day which we are able to identify with no greater

19     precision than it was during the spring of 1991, Stanisic would join

20     Milosevic's plan to ensure that in the break-up of Yugoslavia, a break-up

21     which appeared inevitable, in this break-up, they would ensure that Serbs

22     came out on top regardless of in which republic those Serbs were and

23     regardless of the cost or harm to the other ethnic populations in

24     Yugoslavia.

25             Stanisic would, in turn, give the day-to-day administration of

Page 999

 1     the special unit to his most entrusted subordinate, Franko Simatovic.

 2             From the outset, secrecy was an important principle for the unit.

 3             Former members of the special unit will describe how they only

 4     learned they were working for the Serbian DB some time after they joined

 5     the Special Units.  Often these men only knew their comrades by aliases

 6     and nicknames, forbidden to reveal or to ask another's name.  Such

 7     secrecy helped create confusion over who was behind the unit.  Public

 8     knowledge that the Serbian DB had created and maintained such an

 9     extra-legal unit would have had negative consequences for Milosevic.

10             Such secrecy was also essential because Milosevic, Stanisic,

11     Simatovic, and other members of the core group knew that their work in

12     Croatia and Bosnia would be criminal, involving the perpetration of

13     serious crimes against the non-Serb populations there.  They realised at

14     the outset what the world would come to understand as the tragedy

15     unfolded.  You cannot forcibly remove large civilian populations from

16     their homes without committing grave crimes against them.

17             I would like to play an intercept for you to illustrate

18     Mr. Stanisic's ever-present concern for secrecy.

19                           [Intercept played]

20             MR. GROOME:  On slide number 21, Stanisic reminds Karadzic that

21     they must be careful what they say on the telephone.

22             In another intercept, Stanisic says to Karadzic, "Could you maybe

23     do it in a way so that I am not shown as part of the initiative?"

24             In other intercepts, the Prosecution will introduce into

25     evidence, you will hear Franko Simatovic talk in guarded cryptic

Page 1000

 1     sentences to another core member of the criminal enterprise.

 2             The map that Stanisic shows Milosevic in the earlier clip is

 3     affixed to the wall at the Kostic Training Centre in Kula.  It is a map

 4     of Yugoslavia and has markers identifying all of the places in Croatia

 5     and Bosnia where the special units had training camps.  Mr. Simatovic

 6     lists those locations in his speech.

 7             Here on the bottom left corner of slide 22 is a photo still of

 8     that map.  On the right are those same locations marked on a standard map

 9     of Yugoslavia.  Those locations indicated in green boxes are located in

10     Croatia.  Those in yellow are in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Those in pink are

11     located in Serbia proper.

12             Over the course of their establishment and evolution, the units

13     of the Serbian DB would refer to themselves by several names.

14             Slide number 23 contains a list of these names as well as some of

15     the badges that members of the special units displayed on their uniforms.

16             Some of these names such as JATD and JSO would be official names

17     used within the State Security Service.  Some of the units were named

18     after the individuals who led that particular unit, Arkan's Men,

19     Arkan's Tigers, Martic's men, Captain Dragan's Knindzas.

20             One of the names they were commonly referred to describe the head

21     gear they often wore on operations, the red berets.

22             Your Honours, the units of the Serbian DB was a large

23     organisation with many members.  We will throughout this opening

24     introduce you to a few of the most prominent members, those particular

25     members you will hear referred to numerous times during this trial.

Page 1001

 1             Slide 24 is of Milorad Ulemek, or more popularly known as Legija

 2     because of the time he spent in the French foreign legion.  His uncle

 3     Mihajlo Ulemek was a member of Arkan's Serbian volunteer guard and

 4     Legija, after joining his uncle in the guards, became one of its most

 5     respected and feared members.

 6             Because of his leadership ability, Legija quickly rose to become

 7     one of the main instructors and ultimately one of the main commanders of

 8     Arkan's Serbian volunteer's guard.  He is the special unit member who

 9     features most prominently in the Kula video because he is always at

10     Stanisic's side as they show Milosevic their new centre.

11             Slide 25 concerns Zika Crnogorac, or Zika the Montenegrin.  He

12     was another prominent member of the Red Berets.  You will hear of his

13     involvement in Mount Fruska Gora at the training centre in Ilok.

14             I will show you a clip from Kula video in a few moments in which

15     he greets Milosevic and introduces him to the senior members of the

16     Special Units of the Serbian DB.

17             In light of the Chamber's limitation on the Prosecution's

18     opening, I will skip slide 26 concerning Mr. Bozovic and move directly to

19     slide 27.

20             Over the course of the celebration in Kula in May 1997,

21     Mr. Stanisic would give Mr. Milosevic a tour of the equipment the

22     Special Unit of the Serbian DB had.  In this video slip on slide 27,

23     Milosevic is shown a mobile operating room, armoured personnel carriers,

24     and trucks with rocket launchers and anti-aircraft guns mounted on the

25     back.

Page 1002

 1             Keeping in mind that the legal mandate entrusted to Mr. Stanisic

 2     and Mr. Simatovic's department was the collection of data and

 3     information, these images make clear that the unit had equipped itself

 4     for a very different task.

 5             While the idea of creating a Special Unit was conceived in

 6     Belgrade, its birth would be in the Krajina during the spring of 1991.

 7     While the idea of creating a Special Unit was conceived in Belgrade, its

 8     birth would be in the Krajina during the spring of 1991.  The Krajina is

 9     the part of Croatia that extends downward along the Dalmatian coast.  The

10     Krajina had a large majority of Serbs who felt increasingly vulnerable as

11     they listened to nationalistic Croatian rhetoric being spoken in Zagreb.

12     In the context of this fear and mistrust, several ordinary Croatian Serbs

13     would rise to prominence and become pivotal players in the unfolding

14     events.  I would like to introduce you to two of them now.

15             Milan Babic was the first prime minister and president of the

16     government of the Serbian Autonomous Regina of the Krajina.  The

17     self-declared region was more commonly referred to as the SAO Krajina.

18             He testified in several trials before this Tribunal and pled

19     guilty to the crime of persecution.  He was sentenced to a term of

20     incarceration of 13 years.  A little over two years ago, he committed

21     suicide in the UN Detention Unit.  His testimony before this Tribunal

22     sets out the events of the Krajina from an insider's perspective.

23     Admission of that testimony is a matter that is pending before this

24     Chamber and I will therefore refrain from discussing his testimony in

25     this opening.

Page 1003

 1             Another Croatian Serb who rose to prominent was a local police

 2     official by the name of Milan Martic.  In time, he would come to hold

 3     several leadership positions in the SAO Krajina and the subsequently

 4     so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina.

 5             On the 12th of June last year, a Trial Chamber convicted him of

 6     murder, persecutions, deportation, and other crimes and sentenced him to

 7     35 years imprisonment.  His appeal against this judgement is currently

 8     pending.

 9             Here on slide number 29, you can see an excerpt from his driver

10     describing how Milan Martic and Jovica Stanisic met regularly.

11             This close relationship becomes apparent in September 1991 after

12     Milan Martic was arrested in the Bosnian town of Bosanska Krupa.  His

13     release was arranged after a series of telephone calls, one of which I

14     will play as an example.  The call is transcribed on slide 30 and is a

15     call from the 9th September, 1991.

16                           [Audio tape played]

17             MR. GROOME:  In this intercepted phone conversation, we not only

18     see Milosevic and Karadzic discussing how to free Martic after he was

19     arrested, but how Jovica Stanisic serves as the person who is carrying

20     Milosevic's directives to another core member of the joint criminal

21     enterprise.

22             The Special Units of the Serbian DB would take their initial form

23     by supporting, training, and facilitating the crimes committed against

24     the non-Serb population of the Krajina.  Franko Simatovic personally

25     oversaw this effort.

Page 1004

 1             When he first went to the Krajina, he would take with him a

 2     person by the name of Dragan Vasiljkovic who would develop the training

 3     programme.

 4             Dragan Vasiljkovic, also known as Captain Dragan, born in Serbia,

 5     Dragan Vasiljkovic moved with his parents to Australia and returned to

 6     Yugoslavia in early 1990.  He was a veteran soldier and the DB took

 7     advantage of his experience and sent him to the Krajina in order to act

 8     as an instructor for the newly-established Krajina police forces.

 9             As the report from the Yugoslav army on slide 31 demonstrates, it

10     was clear that Captain Dragan was working with and for the Serbian

11     Ministry of Internal Affairs under the supervision of Jovica Stanisic.

12             I would like to show you on slides 32 and 33 a letter drafted by

13     Captain Dragan on the 8th of November, 1991.  You can see his signature

14     at the bottom of slide 32.

15             At this time, Vasiljkovic did not fully appreciate Stanisic's

16     demand for secrecy and candidly revealed his connections with the DB in

17     this request we see on slide number 33 where he stated that he had "the

18     obligation toward the State Security Service of the Republic of Serbia"

19     and his activities had to be "fully in accordance with the mentioned

20     service."

21             In this excerpt from the Kula dedication or the Kula awards tape

22     on slide number 34, we can see Jovica Stanisic embrace Captain Dragan

23     when he gives him an award.

24                           [Videotape played]

25             MR. GROOME:  In early April, as Milan Martic began to cobble

Page 1005

 1     together a police force of mostly unarmed and untrained men, Simatovic

 2     and Captain Dragan arrived bearing the support of Jovica Stanisic and

 3     Slobodan Milosevic.

 4             Martic took the State Security delegation of Simatovic and

 5     Captain Dragan to a place called Golubic, approximately 9 kilometres

 6     north of Knin, where within a few days, they established a Serbian DB

 7     training centre to prepare Serbs for the takeover of Serb lands in

 8     Croatia.

 9             The training that would take place created a formidable

10     well-equipped fighting force that not only prevented the Croatian

11     government from imposing its will in the Krajina but would also be used

12     to ethnically cleanse the Krajina of non-Serbs.  Six years later in Kula,

13     Mr. Simatovic would refer to Golubic as one of the accomplishments of his

14     unit.

15             In all, over 3.000 men received training in Golubic.  Some who

16     received this training would go on to set up the next 25 training camps

17     Stanisic and Simatovic would establish.  These first members of the

18     Special Units would be dubbed with the name Knindzas because of the

19     proximity of the Golubic camp to Knin.

20             One of the early battles that the Knindzas would fight was in

21     Glina.  After the battle, Captain Dragan would distribute some red

22     berets; this would become one of the emblems of the unit and be the basis

23     of their most commonly used name, the Red Berets.  Here on slide 35 are

24     some pictures of its prominent members as well as a display case in the

25     Kostic training centre in Kula in which the red beret is in the centre of

Page 1006

 1     the display surrounded by weapons.

 2             And while the unit was referred to by several names over the

 3     course of its history, its use of the red beret remained a constant.  And

 4     although some military units not directly affiliated with the DB donned

 5     berets of this colour, the red beret soon became emblematic of the units

 6     of the DB.

 7             Much of what we know about the birth of the Special Units is

 8     corroborated by documents the Office of the Prosecutor has been able to

 9     obtain.  I will take this opportunity to show the Chamber some of the

10     most significant of these documents.

11             I will skip over the document on slide 36 to shorten the opening

12     but will go to slide 37.

13             As we can see from this document on slide number 37, on the 14th

14     of June, just a few weeks after Captain Dragan made his proposal,

15     Captain Dragan and Frenki held a planning meeting attended by several

16     officers of the Yugoslav army.  This document confirms that the Yugoslav

17     army was not a neutral presence in the Krajina.

18             Two days later, Mr. Simatovic himself would issue a written

19     order.  Slide 38 is a photo of the original document.  It is an order

20     signed by Franko Simatovic ordering the removal of all weapons and

21     armaments from the Knin fortress to the Golubic camp.

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Groome kindly slow down now.  Thank

23     you.

24             MR. GROOME:  Yes.

25             This order gives an insight into how Simatovic viewed his

Page 1007

 1     authority in the Krajina.  It is he and not the Yugoslav Army, not

 2     Milan Babic, not Milan Martic who gives the order on such an important

 3     matter as the removal of weapons.  And Your Honours by this time will

 4     have noted the letterhead, "Republic of Serbia, SAO Krajina centre,

 5     Golubic."

 6             He would sign the order not with his full name but with his

 7     nickname, Frenki, the name most would come to know him by.

 8             The Prosecution will also tender documents such as the one on

 9     your screens which makes reference to orders given by Frenki.  According

10     to the author of this report shown on slide 40, the Serbian Ministry of

11     Internal Affairs previously provided four vehicles.  Two months after

12     receiving the equipment, the author reports that he received an order

13     from "Frenk" who he explains is the chief representative of the

14     Serbian MUP to remove radio equipment from two of the vehicles.

15             Around this time, Captain Dragan drafted a report.  Based on the

16     initial success of Captain Dragan, he now proposed a way for

17     Special Units of the Serbian DB to grow.  He believes their objective

18     must be more than simply training individuals.  He has a vision for

19     training men who can go to other areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

20     and establish new training facilities and new branches of the

21     Special Units.

22             As slide number 41 shows, he suggests that the three men directly

23     responsible for this initial success tour the field to boost morale.

24     Those people being Milan Martic, Frenki, and Captain Dragan himself.

25             He suggests that these three as well as prominent specials, a

Page 1008

 1     reference to members of the Special Units, visit these newly-formed local

 2     formations to boost morale and to "give advice on further formation of

 3     units in the field."

 4             The Prosecution will produce other reports that demonstrate that

 5     Frenki, or Mr. Simatovic, along with the local Serb leaders were provided

 6     detailed information about what was transpiring in the Krajina.

 7             On slide 42, you can see a report of 19 July.  It bears pointing

 8     out with this document the use of the term "special units", perhaps the

 9     first use of this term to describe these units created by the Serbian DB.

10             The significance of the training they received is evident in the

11     last sentence, "Our forces are deployed according to the training plan."

12             Slide 43 shows a report from the 6th of August, 1991, announcing

13     a cease-fire we can once again see Mr. Simatovic's alias or nickname

14     Frenki.

15             On your screen, you will see two excerpts of reports from

16     July 1991.  Later that summer on the 19th of July, Captain Dragan made a

17     detailed report to his superiors, to Frenki, to Milan Martic, and to

18     Major Fica who according to the JNA intelligence service was an inspector

19     in the MUP of Serbia.

20             From the outset, it is clear the people they have trained and

21     equipped are perpetrating war crimes.  To Captain Dragan's credit, his

22     initial view of this behaviour was that it was something that needed to

23     be corrected.  As the Chamber will see over the course of the trial,

24     these crimes were not incidental to the plan but an integral part of it.

25             In the second report on slide 44, an excerpt from a 23rd of July

Page 1009

 1     report, we can see from the earliest days of the unit, less than three

 2     months after its establishment, an organised system of reporting has been

 3     established.

 4             We can see from this document that one of Captain Dragan's

 5     foundational tasks in the Krajina was to organise a system of command and

 6     reporting that included the Republic of Serbia.

 7             Did Stanisic and Simatovic receive reports about the activities

 8     of the units they created?  Did Milosevic know what the unit was doing?

 9             I draw your attention to slide 45 and once again to the Kula

10     video.  In this segment, Stanisic takes Milosevic over to a dress

11     formation of the unit's senior commanders and they introduce themselves.

12     After being saluted by Crnogorac, Milosevic shakes his hand and then

13     walks over to Colonel Rajo Bozovic.  I will make an observation about

14     their exchange after you view the video.

15                           [Videotape played]

16             MR. GROOME:  It is the Prosecution's case that Milosevic, through

17     Simatovic and Stanisic were regularly informed of where their unit was

18     and what it was doing.  In this exchange, Milosevic is meeting Bozovic in

19     person for what appears to be the very first time.  Milosevic, upon

20     hearing the name, recognises it immediately from reading his reports,

21     reports the Prosecution asserts must have passed through Simatovic and

22     Stanisic.  Reports that were provided with sufficient frequency that

23     Milosevic quickly recognised the name.

24             I now invite Ms. Brehmeier-Metz to address the role Mr. Stanisic

25     and Mr. Simatovic played in the crimes committed in Croatia.

Page 1010

 1             MS. BREHMEIER-METZ:  May it please the Court, Mr. President,

 2     Your Honour.

 3             As the seams of Yugoslavia unravelled, large concentrations of

 4     Serb minorities living in Croatia began to declare themselves to be in an

 5     autonomous region, a region that while it lay within the geographic

 6     boundaries of Croatia was not bound by Croatia law or governmental

 7     administration.

 8             These self-declared regions were called Serb Autonomous Regions

 9     or SAOs, the acronym in the -- from the B/C/S language.

10             In August 1991, Milan Martic decided to take control of the

11     Croatian village of Kijevo situated south-east of Knin.  Martic issued an

12     ultimatum to the Kijevo police station threatening to attack the civilian

13     population of the village.  At this moment, the Yugoslav Army openly

14     entered the conflict on the Serb side.  After the ultimatum had expired,

15     a combined force of Martic's men, the Yugoslav Army and the local Serb

16     reservists or TO members attacked and took control of Kijevo and removed

17     the entire Croat population.

18             From this time onwards, the Yugoslav Army and the local

19     Serb Krajina armed forces, that is the police forces, the TO units, and

20     some Serb volunteer units, many of them trained, equipped, financed, and

21     supported by the Serbian DB under Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic

22     started attacking Croat villages in the SAO Krajina.

23             The TO, that is, the Territorial Defence in the former Yugoslavia

24     were comprised of former members of the Yugoslav People's Army that

25     retained their uniforms and a weapon and remained as reservists under the

Page 1011

 1     command of the Republic in times of peace and were incorporated into the

 2     Yugoslav Army in times of war.

 3             In August 1991, Slobodan Milosevic would settle a dispute between

 4     Babic and Martic over the control of the TO forces by forcing Babic to

 5     appoint Milan Martic as Deputy Commander of the TOs.

 6             This appointment, together with the fact that many of the TOs in

 7     SAO Krajina were loyal only to Martic ultimately led to Martic's control

 8     over the TOs.  On 1st August 1991, the SAO Krajina government decided

 9     that the police special purpose units and the TOs would jointly form the

10     armed forces of the SAO Krajina.

11             THE INTERPRETER:  Kindly slow down for the interpretation, thank

12     you.

13             MS. BREHMEIER-METZ:  Slide number 46 that is now shown

14     illustrates the locations in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and in

15     particular, the municipalities and villages that are of relevance for the

16     indictment against Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic.  The villages in

17     SAO Krajina that I will deal with now have been marked with red circles.

18     And in the circle that is at the bottom of the map, you can also see the

19     town of Knin and Golubic.

20             Dubica, Bacin and Cerovljani are villages situated on the border

21     between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  In 1991, approximately one

22     half of the inhabitants living in Dubica were of Croat ethnicity with a

23     small Muslim minority whereas the villages of Bacin and Cerovljani were

24     predominantly Croat.

25             Until 1991, the relations between the ethnic groups had been

Page 1012

 1     friendly and harmonious.  In summer 1991, however, these relations

 2     deteriorated.

 3             Armed clashes occurred between the Croatian and Serb armed

 4     forces, and in September 1991, the Croatian army withdrew, Serb forces

 5     and in particular Martic's police and his TO took control of the

 6     villages.  Serb forces came repeatedly, burning the houses of Croat

 7     inhabitants, using them as human shields and killing people.

 8             They did, for example, not refrain from firing a rocket launcher

 9     at the bell tower of the Catholic church of Dubica.  After that, Croats

10     decided to leave their village, only a few elderly and sick remaining.

11             On the 20th of October, 1991, members of Martic's police and of

12     Milicija Krajina went around Dubica with a truck picking up a total

13     number of 53 of the remaining civilians and taking them to a fire station

14     in Bacin.  They pretended that a meeting would be held there.  In fact,

15     at the fire station, the people were detained.  One of those detained

16     there witnessed that some 10 civilians were later released apparently

17     because of connections they had with Serbs.  He himself was let go by one

18     of the guards who happened to be a former student of his.  The witness

19     later compiled a list of the people that were detained together with him

20     in the fire station.

21             Looking at the ages of the civilians on the list that is now

22     shown on slide 47, you will notice that the vast majority of them were

23     older than 60.  The following day, the remaining civilians in the fire

24     station were executed by Serb forces together with a number of elderly

25     civilians from Bacin and Cerovljani.  One of those killed was a

Page 1013

 1     90-year-old woman.

 2             The village of Saborsko is located in Ogulin municipality near

 3     Plitvice.  In August 1991, its population was almost entirely Croat as

 4     was that of the neighbouring villages of Poljanak, Lipovaca and Vukovici.

 5             These villages were surrounded by villages with mostly Serb

 6     population.  In August 1991, Serb forces started shelling Saborsko aiming

 7     at linking the Serb territories that were separated by it.  In the

 8     following months, members of Martic's police and other Serb forces

 9     started a campaign of harassment, arbitrarily arresting detaining and in

10     many cases severely beating Croat civilians.  Most of the Croats left the

11     villages as a result of this.

12             In late October and early November 1991, Poljanak, Lipovaca,

13     Vukovici, and finally Saborsko were again subject to attacks by Serb

14     forces.  In the course of these attacks, Croat civilians were

15     deliberately and intentionally murdered.  In Vukovici for example, Serb

16     forces removed eight Croat civilians from a house, among them both

17     elderly and women.  They lined them up against a wall and simply shot

18     them.  Another man who was too sick to leave the house was shot by Serb

19     forces while still in bed.

20             On 12 November 1991, Serb forces started a further heavy attack

21     on Saborsko.  The village was first attacked by JNA planes dropping bombs

22     and then by heavy artillery.  Afterwards, ground units moved into

23     Saborsko.

24             Slide number 48 refers to this attack.  It is a letter of a

25     representative of the village of Plaski explaining the attack as directed

Page 1014

 1     against evil people.

 2             A Catholic church in Saborsko was shelled and damaged.

 3     Subsequently, the artillery withdrew leaving Serb soldiers and policemen

 4     in the village.  Those Serb forces then started looting the hamlet,

 5     driving away private cars, stealing household goods and cattle, and

 6     burning houses.  Civilians were pulled from basements, men were separated

 7     from women, and some 20 men were executed.  Most of the inhabitants of

 8     Saborsko fled or were taken by bus and released in Croatian territory.

 9             During the course of this trial, we will present witnesses that

10     will speak about the attack on Saborsko.  On slide number 49, you see

11     quotes of the testimony of one of them during the trial against

12     Milan Martic.  You will notice, as is highlighted in red, that when asked

13     who took part in the attack on Saborsko, the witness answers that these

14     had been men trained in Golubic, the Red Berets.

15             As a final example, Skabrnja.  Skabrnja and the surrounding

16     villages are situated near Zadar in south-western Croatia.  In 1991, the

17     village was almost entirely Croat.  Following the pattern that I have

18     described, this area was shelled and bombed by Serb forces from September

19     1991 onwards.  The final attack took place on 18th November, 1991.

20             There were three Catholic churches in and around Skabrnja.  One

21     of them was the Church of the Assumption of the Virgin.  The following

22     photos on slide 50 show this church before the attack and afterwards.  It

23     was shot at and damaged by a JNA tank.  Serb forces took the civilians

24     out of the village and transported them against their will to territory

25     controlled by the Croatian government.  Serb forces moved from house to

Page 1015

 1     house, searching for those who remained and looting and burning the

 2     houses.

 3             In all, some 38 civilians were killed in Skabrnja.  On 21st

 4     December 1991, Martic's police in joint operations with other Serb

 5     forces, forced themselves into houses in the tiny village of Bruska which

 6     is situated between Skabrnja and Benkovac.  They took the men outside,

 7     lined them up and shot them.  They also fired at fleeing women.  In all,

 8     nine people were killed.

 9             All this shows the repeated and eventually predictable pattern of

10     attacks on Croat villages in the Krajina in the fall and winter of 1991.

11     Villages with Croat population were first put under JNA siege, blockaded,

12     and then often shelled.  After that, Serb forces, including Martic's

13     police entered the villages.

14             Non-Serb buildings were destroyed.  Non-Serb property was looted.

15     Very often, individual Croats were arrested and detained, others were

16     driven out.  Those that remained, mostly the elderly population, were

17     murdered thus ethnically cleansing the villages.

18             Again, I would like to refer you to what a witness who is going

19     to be called by the Prosecution said in the trial against Milan Martic.

20     An excerpt of his testimony is shown on slide 52.  This witness was

21     personally present when Franko Simatovic, acting on behalf of

22     Jovica Stanisic brought weapons and money to Milan Martic in Knin.

23             For reasons that are unclear, the relationship with

24     Captain Dragan temporarily cooled after the summer of 1991 and he was

25     recalled to Belgrade and forbidden by Stanisic from returning to the

Page 1016

 1     Krajina.  As Captain Dragan's Knindzas broke up, Franko Simatovic

 2     hand-picked the best of them to create a select group that would be

 3     cultivated into a more organised and professional covert fighting force.

 4     This would take place in Mount Fruska Gora in Serbia proper.

 5             Your Honours, if I might refer you back to slide 22 of this

 6     presentation or to map 6 of the map book that has been handed over to you

 7     yesterday.  We will show it again later in the opening, but you will see

 8     Fruska Gora on the right-hand side of the map just outside

 9     Eastern Slavonia on Serbian territory.  It's the fourth box from the top

10     which states Lezimir, Mount Fruska Gora.

11             Here, on Mount Fruska Gora, the elite force was within striking

12     distance of Eastern Slavonia where there was a tentative peace or in

13     Bosnia which was quickly reaching the boiling point.  Dragan Vasiljkovic

14     would be brought back to help train these men on Mount Fruska Gora.

15     Zika, also known as Crnogorac, was appointed the head of the unit.  He

16     like the others would be issued a red beret, a state security

17     identification number and a nickname.

18             Stanisic would keep this evolving unit from the public eye by

19     keeping them as part of the State Security Service and not part of the

20     ordinary police or military units of Serbia or the SFRY.

21             The Prosecution's case is summarized on slide number 53.  It is

22     the Prosecution's case that Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic's role

23     in the organisation, training and outfitting of the direct perpetrators

24     of these crimes as one of the contributions they made to a joint criminal

25     enterprise to forcibly remove Croats and other non-Serbs from targeted

Page 1017

 1     lands through the crimes of persecution and murder makes them

 2     individually criminally liable for these crimes.

 3             The second region in Croatia covered by this indictment is

 4     Eastern Slavonia.  The Serb Democratic Party or SDS had been established

 5     in Slavonia in 1990.  As in other regions in Croatia, tensions rose in

 6     Slavonia throughout 1990 and in January 1991, the Serb National Council

 7     or SNC of Slavonia Baranja and Western Srem, which will be from now on

 8     referred to by its abbreviation SBWS, was established.  The SNC

 9     proclaimed the Serbs in Croatia to be a sovereign people with a right to

10     autonomy in February 1991.  The area is depicted on slide 54.

11             At a meeting held in Backa Palanka just across the Danube river

12     in Serbia, representatives of all the Serb villages in the SBWS formed

13     the so-called Great National Assembly of SBWS.  On 25 June 1991, the very

14     day that Croatia and Slovenia declared their respective independence,

15     this Great National Assembly declared secession from Croatia and

16     established the Serb Autonomous Region or SAO SBWS.

17             Goran Hadzic who had been the president of the Serb National

18     Council was elected prime minister designate.

19             The SAO Western Slavonia was established in August 1991.  This

20     entity, however, will not play a prominent role in the proceedings before

21     this Court.  Suffice it to say that in February 1992, the SAO

22     Western Slavonia, along with the SAO SBWS joined the SAO Krajina and

23     created the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

24             Goran Hadzic who is depicted in slide number 55 turned out to be

25     the most prominent political figure in the self-proclaimed SAO SBWS.  He

Page 1018

 1     had been a founding member and president of the Serbian National Council

 2     and was elected the first prime minister designate and on 25th

 3     September --

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Please slow down for the record.

 5             MS. BREHMEIER-METZ:  I'm sorry.  He had been a founding member

 6     and president of the Serbian National Council and was elected first prime

 7     minister designate and on 25th September 1991, prime minister of

 8     SAO SBWS.

 9             When the three SAOs in Croatia merged into the RSK in February

10     1992, he became president of this newly built entity and remained in that

11     position until December 1993 when Milan Martic took over.

12              Like the political figures in the Krajina, the leadership of the

13     newly created SAO SBWS would also refrain from doing anything without

14     first consulting with Belgrade.  Hadzic would regularly travel there to

15     meet with both Slobodan Milosevic and Jovica Stanisic.  He would receive

16     instructions on how to proceed.  When he came back to Dalj, he would

17     convene the police and TO commanders and frequently mention things he was

18     told by Milosevic.

19             During an intercepted telephone conversation with Karadzic on

20     14th December, 1991, Stanisic would say, amongst others, "I barely

21     convinced Hadzic not to go," thereby again indicating his close

22     connections with the political leadership of SAO SBWS.

23             Like the Krajina, the SAO SBWS also lacked money and resources

24     and the government of Serbia provided the region with everything that was

25     needed to support them.  During his regular meetings with

Page 1019

 1     Jovica Stanisic, Hadzic would continuously address the question of

 2     equipment for his police force and Stanisic would see that it would be

 3     provided.

 4             Jovica Stanisic, however, not only exerted his influence during

 5     meetings with Hadzic in Belgrade or other places in Serbia.  He also

 6     personally came to Eastern Slavonia.  Around 19th or 20th September,

 7     1991, he arrived in Dalj.  We will present evidence that Stanisic

 8     screamed at people and berated them because Vukovar, the town that then

 9     lay under siege by the JNA had not surrendered yet.

10             The witness will recall that Stanisic pointed out that they had

11     all the equipment necessary to take the city.  Stanisic ordered Hadzic to

12     be brought to a meeting in Dalj -- Stanisic ordered Hadzic to be brought

13     to a meeting in Dalj together with all the TO commanders.  Indeed, that

14     meeting took place with Stanisic, Hadzic, and others being present.  And

15     in October 1991, as can be seen from slide 56, Stanisic came to see

16     General Arandjelovic accompanied by two members of the Red Berets,

17     Bozovic, and Ivanovic, Crnogorac.

18             The person to organise this was Radovan Stojicic, also known as

19     Badza, a member of the Serbian MUP who later became the deputy minister

20     of interior of the Republic of Serbia.  Slide 57 summarizes what we know

21     about him.  Stojicic had been the head of the anti-terrorist unit, or

22     SAJ, in the MUP Serbia since the late 1980s.

23             He came to the SAO SBWS by the end of September 1991, after

24     Jovica Stanisic had come to Dalj and complained about Vukovar.  We will

25     invite Your Honours to draw the inference that although according to the

Page 1020

 1     organisation structure of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs,

 2     Stojicic was not Stanisic's subordinate; he was sent by Stanisic in order

 3     to ensure that the local police forces would function according to the

 4     wishes of the leadership and in order to assist the furtherance of the

 5     JCE's common plan which included the fall of Vukovar.

 6             Consequently, Stojicic, a member of the Ministry of Internal

 7     Affairs of Serbia, or Serbian MUP, was appointed the commander of the

 8     SAO SBWS TO in early autumn 1991.

 9             Here, on slide 58 we have some photos taken at Stojicic's

10     funeral.  We can see Milosevic and Arkan standing close to each other

11     paying their respects.  And the right frame of the slide shows

12     Jovica Stanisic also present during the same occasion.

13             Another member of the Serbian MUP who came to be of importance in

14     the SAO SBWS was Radoslav Kostic also known as Kola or Ante.  Kostic had

15     been an agent for the DB from early 1991 onwards.

16             On slide 59, you see another excerpt from the video taken at Kula

17     in 1997 at the training centre that was named after Radoslav Kostic.

18     Jovica Stanisic pays tribute to his comrade by laying down a wreath at

19     Kostic's memorial.

20             The Serbian DB had been involved in transporting weapons from the

21     JNA barracks at Bubanj Potok south of Belgrade to Borovo Selo as early as

22     April 1991.

23             Kostic would oversee the transport of weapons.  We will present

24     evidence that huge quantities were arriving from Serbia in the region in

25     June 1991.  The weapons belonged to the JNA and the deliveries were

Page 1021

 1     organized by the Novi Sad DB with Kostic in charge.

 2             Kostic was also involved in forming the SAO SBWS Milicija and

 3     oversaw their equipment with weapons through the Novi Sad DB.  In

 4     September 1991, he accompanied Jovica Stanisic to Dalj.

 5             Slide 60 shows the amount of financial support that came from

 6     Serbia.  It deserves to be noted that it was acknowledged that all this

 7     did not have any legal foundations but that one planned to continue to

 8     provide assistance nevertheless.

 9             Another intermediary between the political leadership in SAO SBWS

10     and Belgrade was perhaps most notorious paramilitary leader during the

11     whole war:  Zeljko Raznjatovic, also known as Arkan.

12             He had begun his "career" in the 1980s committing several serious

13     crimes throughout Europe.  Arkan had been a fervent supporter of the

14     Belgrade soccer club, Red Star Belgrade and had assembled a large group

15     of violent hooligans around him.  In 1990, using members of this group,

16     he set up a paramilitary unit called Serbian Volunteer Guard or more

17     notoriously, Arkan's men with its elite sub-unit, Arkan's Tigers.  It was

18     this group that would come to terrorise the non-Serb civilians in

19     SAO SBWS and later in Bosnia.  Arkan openly advocated the commission of

20     war crimes to the men he trained.

21             His second in command was another person who was already

22     introduced, Milorad Ulemek or Legija.

23             They would serve as a shock force, the strike force for the JNA

24     that preferred that some of the more blatantly illegal crimes perpetrated

25     against the population be committed by people like Arkan.

Page 1022

 1             Arkan had a very close working relationship with the Serbian MUP.

 2     His unit was supplied by the MUP, and he would claim that he would do

 3     nothing without Jovica Stanisic's knowledge and orders.  A few days after

 4     the takeover of Dalj, Arkan came to Borovo Selo with some of his men.  He

 5     introduced them as being from the Serbian DB and showed his ID card which

 6     was a Serbian DB ID card.

 7             Slide number 63 has at the bottom of it an excerpt from a report

 8     detailing the type of training that was being conducted in the training

 9     centres of the Special Units of the Serbian DB.  I would also like to

10     play a short clip in which Arkan, speaking in English, describes his

11     unit's policy towards captured soldiers.

12                           [Videotape played]

13             MS. BREHMEIER-METZ:  There are other military reports such as the

14     one in slide 64 that the Prosecution will tender that show the notoriety

15     of Arkan for brutality and criminal conduct that was not only known by

16     the non-Serbs who fled in terror at the sound of his name, but the JNA,

17     Serb politicians, and most importantly for the purpose of this case by

18     Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic.

19             In all, the SAO SBWS was never an independent entity.  You will

20     hear evidence that Slobodan Milosevic controlled Hadzic through Arkan and

21     Stojicic and Jovica Stanisic was the link between them and Belgrade.

22             Since late 1990, many former members of the Milicija, that is the

23     police forces, had left their office and had established their own

24     Milicija groups which operated independently and without any legal basis.

25     In July 1991, Goran Hadzic along with Radoslav Kostic tried to organise

Page 1023

 1     them.  Kostic would remain the contact person for the Milicija and supply

 2     them with what was needed.

 3             In the course of time, however, it became evident that Arkan had

 4     become so powerful in Erdut and Dalj and that those men in the Milicija

 5     who did not take side with him would endanger their lives.  There were

 6     many who rather joined Arkan in the crimes that were later committed in

 7     the area.

 8             Around the summer of 1991, Hadzic set up a special unit that was

 9     initially meant to ensure his security.  Eventually, this unit was

10     renamed into the Serbian National Security or SNB and became a special

11     unit with specific powers.  It was meant to be the equivalent of the

12     Special Units of the Serbian DB.  Goran Hadzic was in overall command.

13             Amongst those that were of importance within the SNB was

14     Mihajlo Ulemek, Legija's uncle.  He, as a member of Arkan's Tigers, was

15     the head of the security within the SNB.  The SNB, however, did not only

16     serve as security guards for the government.  In the course of this trial

17     we will present evidence that will show how the SNB together with the

18     local TOs, the Milicija, and first and foremost, Arkan's men were

19     involved in the grave crimes and atrocities that were committed in the

20     region during late 1990 and early 1992.

21             In August 1991, Arkan set up a training centre in Erdut that was

22     used not only to train members of his paramilitary group but also

23     volunteers and TO members.  The training centre was well-equipped.  A

24     report of late October 1991 mentions and I quote, "large quantities of

25     different infantry weapons, grenade launchers, hand grenades, zolja

Page 1024

 1     hand-held launchers, et cetera, that Arkan is using to whomever he --

 2     issuing to whomever he wants."

 3             Your Honours, slides 65 to 68 are documents demonstrating how

 4     Arkan would submit bills for payment and on the mechanisms that would be

 5     used to financially support his men and to compensate him.

 6             I will skip them in slight of the Chamber's limitations on the

 7     length of this opening.  Arkan's, however, was not the only training

 8     centre in the region.  In December 1991, the DB set up its own training

 9     centre near Ilok just across the border from Backa Palanka.

10             This training centre, which sometimes will also be referred to as

11     Pajzos, served as one of the training camps of the DB for both Red Berets

12     and volunteers and it was specifically mentioned in Franko Simatovic's

13     speech in Kula in 1997.

14             Crnogorac was in charge of the camp with Franko Simatovic paying

15     regular visits to it.

16             Your Honours, the Prosecution alleges Jovica Stanisic and

17     Franko Simatovic to be ultimately responsible for several incidents in

18     Erdut and Dalj between September 1991 and July 1992.  As a result of

19     these incidents, non-Serb civilians were forcibly removed from their

20     lawful homes and a total of 107 persons were killed, merely because they

21     were not of Serb ethnicity.

22             Arkan's men and the local police set up makeshift detention

23     centres where they would then hold non-Serb civilians under inhumane

24     circumstances for the only reason of being non-Serb.  They would

25     constantly beat the detainees and threaten to kill them while they

Page 1025

 1     interrogated them.

 2             In the course of this opening, the Prosecution will not describe

 3     all seven of these incidents, two of them may serve as examples as to how

 4     the events in SAO SBWS took place.

 5             The first incident that the accused are charged with occurred in

 6     mid-September 1991.  Goran Hadzic himself brought a number of Croat

 7     civilians to the police headquarter in Dalj.

 8             For the detainees, life turned to be hell.  Every night and also

 9     during the days, some of them were taken out of the cells and beaten

10     severely.  You will hear the evidence of one of the detainees who will

11     describe to you that at one point, a man kicked the door of the cell,

12     broke the lock and entered.  He told the detainees, "I want you to know I

13     am Arkan."  And looked on while the three men accompanying him started

14     beating the prisoners with iron chairs.

15             Around the 23rd of September, 1991, Hadzic and Arkan came back to

16     the detention centre in Dalj.  Arkan was accompanied by some 20 of his

17     Serbian Volunteer Guard.  They selected two of the detained civilians and

18     let them go.  The remaining 11 detainees were then taken out of detention

19     and killed by Arkan and his men.  Immediately afterwards, the commander

20     of Dalj police station, a Serb, reported the incident to the Ministry.

21     His report is shown on slide number 70.  He was removed from his post on

22     1st October 1991.

23             On 9th November 1991, members of the local TO, SAO SBWS MUP

24     forces and members of Arkan's men arrested at least nine non-Serb

25     civilians in and around Erdut and took them to the TO training centre in

Page 1026

 1     Erdut where they shot them dead the following day.  Several days later,

 2     the widow of one of the men started to make inquiries about her husband.

 3     Mihajlo Ulemek intervened and ordered the execution of the rest of the

 4     family whereupon members of the SNB and of Arkan's men arrested and

 5     killed the widow, her son, and his wife.

 6             Another widow of those men that were killed on 10 November asked

 7     for their whereabouts.  On 3rd June 1992, she was arrested by members of

 8     the SNB.  They took her to Erdut, killed her and threw the body in an

 9     abandoned well in Dalj Planina.

10             It is the Prosecution's case as summarized on slide number 71

11     that Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic participated in the joint

12     criminal enterprise to forcibly remove Croats and other non-Serbs from

13     targeted lands in the SAO SBWS through organising, training, and

14     financing the direct perpetrators of the crimes in Eastern Slavonia.

15     They also contributed to this common plan by exerting a huge influence on

16     and directing the SAO SBWS government and in particular Goran Hadzic who

17     would then order and direct the crimes that were committed.

18             Your Honours, as we have seen, the storm that was intended to

19     sweep away anything non-Serb began in the south of Croatia in the

20     Krajina.  From there, it moved to Eastern Slavonia where it reached its

21     climax in late 1991.  It seems apparent that Serb forces would now turn

22     their attention to the areas in Eastern Bosnia that lie on the border to

23     Croatia and Serbia and the first municipalities that would suffer would

24     be Bijeljina and Zvornik.

25             I would like the give the floor to my colleague, Mr. Docherty,

Page 1027

 1     who will introduce you to the Prosecution's case for Bosnia and

 2     Herzegovina.  However, I might also suggest that this might be a

 3     convenient moment for the break.

 4                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 5             JUDGE ROBINSON:  We'll accept your recommendation.  We'll take

 6     the adjournment now, 20 minutes.

 7                           --- Recess taken at 2.36 p.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 3.01 p.m.

 9             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Mr. Docherty, you're closing the innings.

10             MR. DOCHERTY:  There may be a clean-up inning after mine,

11     Your Honour.

12             JUDGE ROBINSON:  I should have said at the outset of the hearing

13     that today, in the absence of Judge Picard, Judge David and I sit

14     pursuant to the provisions of Rule 15 bis.

15             Yes, thank you.  Please proceed.

16             MR. DOCHERTY:  May it please the Court, Mr. President,

17     Your Honour, counsel.

18             In order to understand how the joint criminal enterprise applied

19     its programme in Bosnia, the Chamber has to recognise why Bosnia was

20     unique among the six former Republics of Yugoslavia, why it presented

21     fundamentally different challenges to implementation --

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Please slow down.  Thank you.

23             MR. DOCHERTY:  Why it presented fundamentally different

24     challenges to implementation of the joint criminal enterprise's

25     objectives and why Bosnia tragically suffered some of the gravest crimes

Page 1028

 1     committed during the war.

 2             In the simplest terms, the characteristic which made Bosnia

 3     unique and which must be understood is that unlike other former republics

 4     that had large minority populations that were relatively contiguous,

 5     Bosnia's pockets of large ethnic populations were disconnected, spread

 6     out across the country in a polka-dot pattern, some communities

 7     resembling ethnic islands in a sea dominated by some other ethnic group.

 8             What historians and other observers rightly extolled as evidence

 9     of the peaceful integration of different ethnicities and cultures would

10     prove to present a special problem for members of the joint criminal

11     enterprise.

12             What plan did they decide upon to break up this large patchwork

13     of ethnicities and carve out and area that would be dominated by Serbs?

14     The clearest articulation of their plan can be found in a document.

15             But before describing that document and what happened in Bosnia,

16     I would like to take a few minutes to speak about some of the central

17     people involved in the crimes that occurred in Bosnia.

18             Radovan Karadzic was the first president of the Bosnian Serb

19     government which would eventually be called the Republika Srpska.  As

20     such, he had formal authority over the Bosnian Serb Army and the

21     Bosnian Serb Police.

22             He has been indicted by this Tribunal and is currently a

23     fugitive.  He made his intentions clear in a speech given on 15 October

24     1991, which is before you in slide number 73.

25                           [Videotape played]

Page 1029

 1             MR. DOCHERTY:  The Prosecution will establish with intercept

 2     evidence, documents, and testimony the interaction between

 3     Jovica Stanisic and Dr. Karadzic who played a paramount role as a core

 4     member of the joint criminal enterprise.  The Prosecution will introduce

 5     a number of intercepts between Mr. Stanisic and Dr. Karadzic, most of

 6     them from the critical period of August 1991 until February 1992.  In

 7     these conversations, you will hear them discuss both political and

 8     practical issues related to the implementation of the joint criminal

 9     enterprise's plans and will understand that the two men realised that

10     what they were discussing was covert and had to remain hidden because you

11     will hear them talk on these intercepts in guarded language, at times

12     even reminding each other of the importance of not saying too much on the

13     telephone.

14             In an intercept of 14 December 1991, Jovica Stanisic tells

15     Radovan Karadzic that he will send his men over into Bosnia to deal with

16     a specific problem.  Stanisic also refers to "his boys" whom he says he

17     has sent in previously.  And finally, Stanisic tells Karadzic that he

18     will order Goran Hadzic, a Croatian Serb leader from Eastern Slavonia, to

19     do something.

20             Momcilo Krajisnik shown here with Biljana Plavsic on slide number

21     74 was a member of the Bosnian Serb leadership during the war.  He held a

22     number of senior political positions including being a member of the

23     National Security Council, the expanded Presidency of the

24     Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  He was also the President of

25     the Bosnian Serb Assembly.  He was convicted of persecutions as a crime

Page 1030

 1     against humanity and is currently appealing his trial judgement and

 2     sentence.

 3             Biljana Plavsic was a leading Bosnian Serb politician from before

 4     the conflict until the war's end.  She was notorious for the extremity of

 5     her Serb nationalist ideology.  She was a member of the collective

 6     Presidency of Bosnia, a member of the three-member Presidency of the

 7     Serbian Republic, and was a member of the Supreme Command of the

 8     Bosnian Serb army.  After pleading guilty to the crime of persecution as

 9     a crime against humanity, she was sentenced to imprisonment for 11 years.

10             Ratko Mladic was a career JNA officer who became chief of the

11     Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska.  He has been indicted by this

12     Tribunal and is currently a fugitive.

13             He said, and it is printed on slide number 75, "People and

14     peoples are not pawns, nor are they keys in one's pocket that can be

15     shifted from here to there.  We cannot cleanse, nor can we have a sieve

16     to sift so that only Serbs would stay, or that Serbs would fall through

17     and the rest leave ... I do not know how Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Karadzic

18     would explain this to the world.  People, this would be genocide."

19             The document that clearly articulates the objectives of the joint

20     criminal enterprise, the document I referred to a few moments before, was

21     officially introduced at the 16th Session of the Assembly of the

22     Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 12 May 1992.  It lays out six

23     strategic objectives for the Bosnian Serb people.  In Mr. Simatovic's

24     speech in Kula, he tied the activities of the Special Units of the

25     Serbian DB to those six objectives.

Page 1031

 1             The first objective, shown here on slide number 76, is the

 2     separation of the Serbian people from the other two national communities.

 3             Two, establishment of a corridor between Semberija and the

 4     Krajina.

 5             Mr. Simatovic's remark at Kula that his units were involved in

 6     the "corridor at Brcko" is a reference to the second strategic objective

 7     to connect lands the Serbs targeted in the western and the eastern parts

 8     of Bosnia.

 9             Three, shown here on slide number 78, establishment of a corridor

10     in the Drina valley eliminating the Drina river as a boundary between

11     Serbs.

12             This "corridor" was really a large chunk of territory comprising

13     most of the eastern half of Bosnia.  Mr. Simatovic refers to his units'

14     presence in "the Drina."

15             Slide number 79 shows the fourth strategic goal, establishing a

16     border on the Una and Neretva rivers.

17             Five, the division of Sarajevo.

18             When Mr. Simatovic refers to operations in Sarajevo, he is

19     referring to this objective.

20             And six, the sixth strategic objective was providing the Serbs

21     with access to the sea.

22             As I describe the crimes committed in the six Bosnian

23     municipalities in which the present indictment charges crimes, I ask the

24     Chamber to keep in mind how the locations targeted by the accused and the

25     crimes they perpetrated there advanced the objectives expressed in these

Page 1032

 1     goals.  With respect to the joint criminal enterprise as it was applied

 2     to the unique geography and demography of Bosnia, these goals are clear

 3     articulations of the shared intent of the members of the joint criminal

 4     enterprise.

 5             In December 1991, a document with the title, "Instructions for

 6     the organisation and activity of the organs of the Serbian people in

 7     Bosnia and Herzegovina in extraordinary circumstances," was promulgated

 8     among high-level representatives of the Serbian Democratic Party, its

 9     initials SDS, of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

10             The document became more popularly known as the Variant A and B

11     document because of its contents.  When it prescribed the actions to be

12     taken by SDS functionaries, it distinguished between municipalities in

13     which the Serbs were the majority - this was variant A.  And those

14     municipalities in which the Serbs were in the minority - this was variant

15     B.

16             In essence, the document contained precise instructions regarding

17     how local Serbs were to convene and declare a local assembly of Serbian

18     people in the municipality which would then take upon itself the

19     authority to take over the functions of the existing government including

20     the function of the existing police and security structures.

21             Municipal takeovers proceeded in four steps.  The first step was

22     the construction of a system of governance that paralleled the official

23     government, but was for Serbs only.  Second, the arming of the Serb

24     population.  Third, the violent armed takeover of non-Serb

25     municipalities.  And fourth, the ethnic cleansing, whether through murder

Page 1033

 1     or expulsion of the non-Serb population.

 2             Here in slide number 82 is a map of the Special Units training

 3     facilities.  The 13 labelled in yellow are camps that the accused

 4     established in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  As you can see, these camps are in

 5     areas marked for Serbs by the second, third, and fourth strategic

 6     objectives.  Eastern Bosnia, along the Drina, northern Bosnia, the land

 7     bridge between Semberija and the Krajina, and southern Bosnia, along the

 8     Una and Neretva Rivers.

 9             In this trial, the Prosecution will confine its evidence to just

10     six of the many municipalities that were taken over.  These

11     municipalities are:  Bijeljina in northwestern Bosnia.  Our evidence will

12     be confined to the forcible transfer of people from that municipality.

13             Zvornik, the label for Zvornik is in the right-hand column, it's

14     number 6 from both the bottom and the top.

15             Bosanski Samac, the label for Bosanski Samac is in the top row,

16     far right.

17             Sanski Most, in north central Bosnia.  Later, Mr. Groome will

18     talk about the events in Sanski Most in 1995.

19             Doboj, the label for Doboj is in the top row, second from the

20     left.

21             Trnovo near Sarajevo.  The Special Units were not involved in the

22     takeover of this area but in June and July of 1995, in the aftermath of

23     Srebrenica, one of these paramilitary units, the Skorpions participated

24     in the executions that followed the fall of Srebrenica by summarily

25     executing six Muslim males.

Page 1034

 1             The special units of the Serbian DB directly participated in the

 2     takeover of each of the other five municipal areas.  After the violent

 3     takeover of these towns, non-Serbs, predominantly Muslims, were forcibly

 4     removed from their homes and their land through the commission of the

 5     crimes of murder and persecution perpetrated with the intent to secure

 6     the area for Serbs.  Many who were not killed were forced at gun point to

 7     sign over the property rights to their lands and then placed on a bus to

 8     take them out of the area.  Others were subjected to unrelenting

 9     harassment and persecutory acts which took the form of arbitrary arrests,

10     illegal detention in appalling conditions, beatings, curfews, and

11     frequent aggressively conducted searches of the homes of non-Serbs.

12             Creating an ethnically pure Serb municipality in a peaceful

13     multi-ethnic community is hard to imagine in any case.  It really

14     stretches our capacity to imagine what such an enterprise would entail

15     when we consider a place like the municipality of Zvornik which, before

16     the war in 1991, had a population that was 54.8 per cent Muslim.  After

17     the war, in 1997-1998, only 0.6 per cent of the population of Zvornik was

18     Muslim.  I will discuss these five towns in chronological order of the

19     date on which the crimes in them occurred.

20             On 24 March 1992, about eight days before the Bijeljina takeover,

21     Radovan Karadzic stated, as shown in slide number 83, that soon the

22     Serbian municipalities will begin the takeover process.

23             The takeover of Bijeljina and Zvornik was a well-planned and

24     well-executed campaign that occurred with precision and lightning speed

25     over the course of a few days.  The Special Units of the Serbian DB, in

Page 1035

 1     this case Arkan's men, established a camp just -- in Serbia just over the

 2     border from Bijeljina poised to attack when given the signal in the early

 3     morning hours of the night of March 31 into the morning of April 1, 1992.

 4             Both Bijeljina and Zvornik fell within the first and most

 5     important goal, the separation of the ethnic communities.  They also fell

 6     within the second and third strategic goals, the establishment of a

 7     corridor to areas targeted by Serbs that lie in central and western

 8     Bosnia and the establishment of a Serb corridor in the Drina River

 9     Valley.

10             In an effort to shorten the length of this trial, the Prosecution

11     will no longer seek to prove the killings and persecutions that occurred

12     in Bijeljina.  And while we will only prove the crimes against humanity

13     of deportation and forcible transfer with respect to Bijeljina, a basic

14     understanding of what happened in Bijeljina is essential in order for the

15     Chamber to understand who Arkan was and what Mr. Stanisic and

16     Mr. Simatovic knew about him.

17             The brutality of Arkan in Bijeljina was even reported

18     contemporaneously by senior officers in the Yugoslav Army, one of whom

19     saw the awesome potential for unimaginable interethnic crimes as recorded

20     here on slide number 85.  In this contemporaneous report, a Major General

21     in the Yugoslav Army complains that movements of his armoured units were

22     restricted by Arkan and his men.

23             Arkan and his 50 men could hold up a JNA armoured column because

24     Arkan was a core member of the group of people who were behind these

25     crimes.  Shortly after the takeover of Bijeljina, we see Arkan and

Page 1036

 1     Plavsic greeting each other with a kiss in this slide.

 2             It would be Bijeljina where Arkan would cement his reputation for

 3     unbridled brutality.

 4             Slide 87 shows two photographs shot by Ron Haviv, a war

 5     photographer.  The world was introduced to the brutality of Arkan's men.

 6     Shortly after these pictures shocked the world, Arkan himself identified

 7     the men in the pictures as his to a correspondent of the BBC.

 8             As a result of the efforts of the joint criminal enterprise and

 9     relevant to the indictment now before the Chamber, many of the non-Serbs

10     of Bijeljina were forced out or fled in terror.

11             Zvornik.  If there was a colourable claim that the two accused

12     were unaware of Arkan's penchant for extreme violence before Bijeljina,

13     there can be no escaping this knowledge after Bijeljina, as Arkan made

14     his way to his next target, Zvornik.

15             Zvornik is one of the towns that lies on the eastern border of

16     Bosnia separated from Serbia by the Drina River.  Several bridges in the

17     town connected it to Mali Zvornik, its sister town in Serbia.  You will

18     hear witnesses describe how in the weeks before the takeover of the town,

19     JNA artillery positions were established in Mali Zvornik, their guns

20     pointing towards Bosnia.

21             The takeovers of Bijeljina and Zvornik were the product of one

22     well-planned operation.  We will introduce the transcript of an

23     intercepted telephone conversation in which Plavsic speaks with Arkan's

24     deputy and asks about how things went in Zvornik and asks him to pass on

25     her request for Arkan to come to another municipality.

Page 1037

 1             A group of responsible local Serb and Muslim leaders from Zvornik

 2     tried tenaciously to keep the peace in Zvornik.  During a meeting in

 3     which they had reached agreements that would hopefully prevent violence,

 4     Arkan burst into the room and slapped the Serb representatives, accusing

 5     them of giving away Serb lands.  This is referred to on slide number 91,

 6     "two representatives were beaten before that."

 7             Arkan turned to the Muslim negotiator and gave him an ultimatum.

 8     It is in red at the bottom of the slide.  Izet Mehinagic would recount

 9     these events in a desperate telegram to the Yugoslav People's Army which

10     is the text above the ultimatum on this slide.

11             On the evening of the 8th of April, the takeover was underway.

12     The adult men were separated and at least 20 civilians murdered.

13     Following the takeover, the surviving Muslims of Zvornik were subjected

14     to a reign of terror.

15             Reports like this one on slide number 92 and others we have seen

16     show Arkan's effectiveness at achieving the goals of the joint criminal

17     enterprise.  They also show notice to the core members of the joint

18     criminal enterprise of Arkan's ability to whip up Serbian nationalistic

19     fervour.

20             Kozluk was a small town on the outskirts of Zvornik.  After the

21     initial takeover, the predominantly Muslim population sought to reach a

22     peaceful settlement with the Serbs now in power.  But on 26 June 1992,

23     the Muslims of Kozluk were told to leave by the Serb mayor.  Here is a

24     list of those who left on slide number 93.

25             The mayor told the Muslims that if they did not leave, "an all

Page 1038

 1     out attack" would be launched, which would kill all the Muslims.  The

 2     Muslims left, but not before the Serb authorities had made them sign

 3     papers giving their homes, land, and personal property to the new Serb

 4     government in Zvornik.

 5             The deportees were taken along the route shown by the blue line

 6     on this slide toward Hungary.  When Hungarian authorities denied them

 7     entry because they did not have passports, the deportees were issued

 8     Serbian passports, that is, Bosnian nationals were issued with Serbian

 9     passports.  You will remember that one of the functions of the

10     Ministry of Internal Affairs was the control of passports.

11             Vojislav Seselj was a core member of the joint criminal

12     enterprise, President of the Serb Radical Party who formed the

13     Serbian Chetnik movement and sent his volunteers to conflict areas of

14     Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

15             In a videotaped interview with the BBC, Vojislav Seselj described

16     the involvement of Simatovic in the planning of the takeover of Zvornik

17     and I will now ask that the video on slide number 96 be played.

18                           [Videotape played]

19             MR. DOCHERTY:  One of the reasons that Zvornik was one of the

20     municipalities selected by the Prosecution is that it clearly

21     demonstrates the intent that the members of the core group of

22     perpetrators shared.  The excesses perpetrated against the Muslim

23     population of Zvornik had spiralled into a level of chaos in which no

24     one, not even Serbs were safe from the criminals turned loose with

25     impunity on the municipality as we can see in this report on slide number

Page 1039

 1     97.

 2             In a report drafted by Colonel Zdravko Tolimir, about events all

 3     over Bosnia, on 28 July 1992, he raised the question with his superiors

 4     about the men who had perpetrated such grievous crimes in Zvornik.

 5             Here in slide number 98, he identifies by name Arkan's men,

 6     Captain Dragan's men, and Seselj's men.

 7             He describes these three groups as being composed of many

 8     criminals, even pathological criminals.

 9             He states that these formations "display hatred of non-Serbian

10     peoples and one can conclude without reservations that they are the

11     genocidal element among the Serbian people."

12             He continues, "War profiteering and looting are the motive for a

13     great majority of paramilitaries."

14             Here, he enumerates the 30 to 40 million German marks worth of

15     booty stolen from the area of Srebrenica and Skelani.

16             In the end of July 1992, there was a crackdown against

17     paramilitary forces in Zvornik.  In fact, the Serbian DB would itself be

18     involved in the investigation of these paramilitary units.  Two

19     paramilitary leaders, the Vukovic brothers, leaders of the Yellow Wasps

20     would ultimately be investigated and arrested by the Serbian MUP.

21             The two accused contributed to the goals of the JCE in the ways

22     outlined in the box on the right-hand side of this slide and by so doing

23     made themselves individually criminally liable for the crimes committed

24     in Zvornik.

25             All elements of the JCE except only those from the Republic of

Page 1040

 1     Serb Krajina on the far left of the diagram, had some involvement in the

 2     takeover and ethnic cleansing of Bijeljina and Zvornik.

 3             Bosanski Samac.  Bosanski Samac, shown here on slide 101, located

 4     along the Sava River in northeastern Bosnia had the misfortune of lying

 5     in the lands targeted to create the land bridge between land targeted by

 6     Serbs in the east of Bosnia and the land targeted by Serbs in the Krajina

 7     region.  A successful conquest and cleansing of Bosanski Samac would

 8     achieve the first and second goals, namely separation of the ethnic

 9     communities and establishment of a corridor, a Posavina Corridor as it

10     came to be known.

11             In early 1992, the Serb Crisis Staff of the Bosanski Samac

12     municipality sent 20 local men to be trained in the Red Beret training

13     camp in Ilok.  These men were just completing their training at the

14     Red Beret camp in Ilok when the takeovers of Bijeljina and Zvornik were

15     underway.  They were airlifted back to Bosanski Samac on JNA helicopters

16     with 30 of Seselj's men.  Before leaving, they were briefed by

17     Mr. Simatovic.

18             The day after Arkan announced he had finished his task in

19     Zvornik, they commenced their attack on Bosanski Samac.

20             Among these 50, there were others who were trained by the Serbian

21     DB who would work with them in the takeover of the town.

22     Slobodan Miljkovic also known as Lugar was present, as were

23     Dragan Djordjevic also known as Crni, and Srecko Radovanovic also known

24     as Debeli, and a group of men from Serbia.

25             As this report on slide 102 indicates, Crni one of the leaders of

Page 1041

 1     the crimes perpetrated in Samac was in fact arrested and what happened

 2     after his arrest demonstrates the role that both Simatovic and Stanisic

 3     played in the takeover of Samac.

 4             Another report shown here on slide 103 summarizes the time of

 5     crimes that Crni and his men were believed to have perpetrated.  They

 6     include specific allegations including murder, and the looting of

 7     expensive cars.

 8             A local Serb leader recognising the loss of Crni to their efforts

 9     to ethnically cleanse Samac went to the Serbian MUP building in Belgrade

10     in search of Franko Simatovic.  He intended to ask Mr. Simatovic if there

11     was anything he could do to secure Crni's release from the military

12     police.  He was unable to find Mr. Simatovic but as he walked in the

13     parking lot, by chance he saw Jovica Stanisic who he approached and

14     explained the problem.  Mr. Stanisic told him that he would see to the

15     matter by sending a telex to the military.  Shortly thereafter, Crni was

16     released to continue his crimes.

17             The answer to how Crni, a man whose excesses resulted in his

18     arrest by the Bosnian Serb army that he was fighting alongside of could

19     promptly be released is perhaps best captured in a report issued by the

20     local military authorities.

21             In this document on slide 104, the author makes the observation

22     that the crimes now being committed in the name of Serbs are comparable

23     to the crimes committed against the Serbs in the Second World War.

24             The basic facts of Crni's release were set out in this Bosnian

25     police report on slide number 105.

Page 1042

 1             The Prosecution charges that the two accused contributed to the

 2     achievement of the JCE's goals in the ways listed in the box on the right

 3     of slide 106.  By doing so, they made themselves individually criminally

 4     liable for the crimes committed in Bosanski Samac.

 5             As in Bijeljina and Zvornik, all elements of the JCE except those

 6     in the Republic of Serb Krajina were involved.

 7             Before the war, the population of Bosanski Samac had been 29.8

 8     per cent Croat and 8.7 per cent Muslim.  After the war, those figures

 9     were 1.9 per cent Croat and 1.3 per cent Muslim.

10             Doboj.  Like Samac and Brcko, these municipalities not only had

11     large non-Serb populations that needed to be removed but they also lay in

12     the corridor or land bridge that was to be created between the targeted

13     lands in the west of Bosnia and the targeted lands in the east of Bosnia.

14             Over 15.000 Muslims fled Doboj during the takeover.  When the war

15     began, Doboj municipality was 30 per cent Muslim, 11.5 per cent Croat,

16     and 50 per cent Serb.  At war's end, it was 0.6 per cent Muslim, 1.5 per

17     cent Croat, and 92.5 per cent Serb.

18             Before the takeover of Doboj, men from a long list of DB

19     paramilitaries began converging on Doboj including Martic's men from the

20     Krajina.

21             While Arkan commanded his own men and Seselj's men had their own

22     commanders, the remaining men were referred to as Red Berets and were

23     commanded by Rajo Bozovic, a Colonel in the special units of the

24     Serbian DB.

25             The takeover of Doboj ended on the 3rd of May, 1992.  This

Page 1043

 1     overwhelming force, many trained and outfitted by Mr. Stanisic and

 2     Mr. Simatovic, were able to quickly and decisively seize control of a

 3     municipality with a population of 102.549 covering 684 square kilometres.

 4             When the town was firmly in Serb control, the campaign of

 5     persecutions against Doboj's municipalities began, mirroring what by this

 6     time had become the well-known signature of these units.  Beatings,

 7     arbitrary arrests, interrogations, and murder.  Non-Serb homes were

 8     aggressively searched and damaged, making it clear that non-Serb families

 9     who had lived in Doboj for generations had now better leave.

10             Non-Serb civilians from Doboj were taken into custody and housed

11     in various make-shift detention facilities in and around Doboj.  For

12     example, nearly 200 people were imprisoned in a discotheque.  In these

13     facilities, the detainees were beaten and some prisoners were taken out

14     and summarily executed.  Muslim prisoners were forced to eat pork in

15     violation of their religion.  And in acts of almost unspeakable

16     vulgarity, prisoners were compelled to perform sexual acts upon each

17     other.

18             On 12 July 1992, about 50 detainees were taken from the

19     discotheque and used as human shields.  These detainees were placed in

20     front of the Serbian front lines and made to walk toward the front lines

21     of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  When the detainees hesitated, a

22     Serb shot one detainee in the head to encourage the others.  When the

23     Bosnian soldiers began beckoning the detainees calling them to run

24     towards the Bosnian front lines, the detainees broke into a run.  The

25     Serbs then opened fire, killing 27 of the human shields.

Page 1044

 1             So decisive and absolute was the Red Berets campaign in Doboj

 2     that those in the neighbouring municipality of Teslic would look to it as

 3     an example, as indicated in this report shown on slide number 108.

 4             These are but four of the many municipal areas that were taken

 5     over by Bosnian Serbs in the spring and summer of 1992.  Takeovers that

 6     were marked by the precision of their execution and the brutality of

 7     their success.

 8             The Prosecution charges that the two accused contributed to the

 9     achievement of the JCE's goals in the ways set out in the box on the

10     right of slide number 109 and by doing so, incurred personal criminal

11     liability for the crimes committed in Doboj.

12             Here, one difference from the previous municipalities is that it

13     is also the Prosecution's case that the direct involvement of Martic's

14     men also implicates the individual criminal responsibility of the

15     accused.

16             Thank you, Your Honours.  I now turn the floor back to my

17     colleague, Mr. Groome.

18             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Thank you.  Yes, Mr. Groome.

19             MR. GROOME:  Your Honours, the overall criminal plan was a

20     success and many municipalities were placed under Serb control in the

21     spring of 1992.  To place the crimes committed in these four

22     municipalities in context of the overall plan of the joint criminal

23     enterprise, it is helpful to look at a series of maps on slides 110 to

24     117 that show in chronological order the takeover of territory as well as

25     the role the two accused took in this process.  The rapid comprehensive

Page 1045

 1     and organised assertion of Serb control over territory in

 2     Bosnia-Herzegovina is evidence of the existence of and effectiveness of a

 3     joint criminal enterprise.

 4             The takeover process begins when Arkan enters Bijeljina on the

 5     night between the 31st of March and the 1st of April.  In that first

 6     week, over a dozen municipalities would be taken over and placed under

 7     Serb control.  While some of those municipalities such as Tito Drvar were

 8     predominantly Serb and asserting control was primarily done by switching

 9     allegiance from Sarajevo to Pale, in other municipalities, such as

10     Bijeljina, these municipalities were taken by armed force and the

11     commission of grievous crimes against the civilian population.

12             During the second week, the focus of the takeovers would remain

13     on the Drina valley and Serb takeovers swept over eastern Bosnia in

14     places like Visegrad, Foca, and Sekovici.  As you have already heard,

15     Mr. Stanisic and Simatovic played a direct role in the takeover of

16     Zvornik and the expulsion of its large Muslim population.

17             In Central Bosnia, the municipality of Teslic fell during the

18     second week of April.

19             Here in slide 113, we see that in the third week of the takeover,

20     after Arkan would advise that his work was completed in Zvornik, the

21     Special Units of the Serbian DB would turn their attention to the

22     municipality of Bosanski Samac.

23             The takeovers continue along the Drina River with Bratunac, and

24     in Foca's neighbour to the west, Kalinovik.  Vogosca, part of the greater

25     Sarajevo area, would also fall under Serb control this week.

Page 1046

 1             Up in the northwestern part of Bosnia in the Bosnian Krajina,

 2     Serb control would be forcibly imposed in Bosanski Novi and Sanski Most.

 3             Serb gains would continue in the Bosnian Krajina into the last

 4     days of April when Prijedor, where some of the most grievous crimes of

 5     the takeovers were committed.  Serb control was asserted over

 6     Mrkonjic Grad and large parts of Bosanska Krupa bringing the border of

 7     the Serb-controlled lands to the banks of the Una river.  The campaign in

 8     the Drina valley would continue with the takeover of Vlasenica.

 9             Your Honours, by the end of April in this 30-day period, 35

10     municipalities would be taken over, an average of over one municipality

11     per day.

12             While the pace of the takeovers would slow a bit during the

13     following months, the pace of the crimes only accelerated.  The accused

14     would send Colonel Bozovic along with other members of the Special Units

15     to spearhead the takeover of Doboj.  The encirclement around Sarajevo

16     would be complete with the taking of Hadzici, Trnovo and Ilidza in May.

17             And with the fall of Rogatica and Rudo, the takeover of the

18     municipalities along the eastern border of Bosnia would be complete with

19     the exception of Srebrenica.

20             The Bosnian Krajina would be completely secured by the end of

21     June with the takeover of Prnjavor and Kotor Varos.

22             During June, the primary focus of takeovers shifted to the

23     southern areas of Bosnia where Nevesinje, Bileca, Ljubinje, and parts of

24     Trebinje would be taken over.  By the end of the summer with the takeover

25     of Derventa and Odzak, over 50 municipalities would be placed under Serb

Page 1047

 1     control to secure the functioning of the Posavina corridor.

 2             The two maps you see on the screen in slide 118 are demographic

 3     maps, one from 1991 before the ethnic cleansing campaign of 1992 and one

 4     from 1997.

 5             You may observe the success of the joint criminal enterprise as

 6     measured statistically in the dramatic demographic changes it occasioned.

 7             You will look along the Posavina corridor that is the horizontal

 8     oval at the top of the map, the target of the second strategic goal, you

 9     will see a dramatic shift in the population as marked by the change of

10     the colour to red.

11             The vertical oval on the right-hand side of the map is the

12     Drina Valley and again, you can see the dramatic shift in colour

13     represents the restructuring of the demographic landscape from mixed or

14     Muslim majority municipalities into red or Serb municipalities.

15             These takeovers and subsequent crimes resulted in population

16     shift of hundreds of thousands of people.  Nearly 400.000 people forcibly

17     removed from their homes.

18             The map on slide 119 shows what happened after the summer of

19     1992.  Some takeovers would continue.  The light blue municipalities on

20     this map show where the Prosecution will lead evidence of involvement by

21     the Special Units of the Serbian DB.  The dark blue municipalities

22     indicate those municipalities in which the two accused are charged with

23     the commission of crimes.

24             The next charges in the indictment concern the serious crimes

25     committed toward the end of the conflict in 1995.  It would be incorrect

Page 1048

 1     for the Chamber to conclude that Mr. Stanisic's and Mr. Simatovic's

 2     involvement in Bosnia went into a hiatus.  Throughout this period, they

 3     were very much involved in joint operations designed to hold on to

 4     targeted lands they seized in 1992.

 5             You will hear summary evidence of the accused's involvement in

 6     Bosnia in the time between 1992 and 1995, primarily from a headquarters

 7     they established in Bajina Basta in Serbia just across the border with

 8     Bosnia.

 9             I would now like to turn the attention of the Chamber to the

10     crimes charged in the indictment related to Trnovo.  The facts of what

11     occurred in Srebrenica in July 1995 have been the subject of several

12     trials in these courtrooms.  I will not repeat them.  They are well

13     known.

14             The two accused here today are charged with the death of three

15     boys and three men whose murder was captured on videotape.  In order for

16     you to understand the Prosecution's case as to why Mr. Stanisic and

17     Mr. Simatovic are responsible for the deaths of the six, we must take a

18     look at what is occurring in another part of the country prior to

19     Srebrenica.

20             I want to focus your attention on the north-west corner of Bosnia

21     shown here on slide 121, a place referred to as the Bihac Pocket which in

22     1993 had a population of approximately 300.000 people, mostly Muslim.

23             Its local leader, a Muslim man by the name of Fikret Abdic sought

24     to extricate himself from the war in Bosnia by disassociating himself

25     with the Bosnian government and entering into an uneasy alliance with

Page 1049

 1     Milosevic in Belgrade.

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Kindly slow down for the record, please.

 3             MR. GROOME:  So in October 1993, Abdic traded his war with

 4     Croatia and Serbia for a war with his Bosniak brothers in Sarajevo and

 5     shortly thereafter, the Bosnian army was engaging Abdic's poorly trained

 6     and equipped men.

 7             Abdic turned to Milosevic for help and within a short time,

 8     Milosevic responded by sending Stanisic and Simatovic to the Bihac Pocket

 9     to command an operation called Pauk or the spider.

10             Milosevic sent the two men whom he could rely on for this task.

11     Stanisic would in turn bring with him the men who he had come to rely on

12     in his covert operations in Bosnia, the units of the Serbian DB led once

13     again by Colonel Bozovic, Legija, Captain Dragan, and Arkan.  They

14     established their headquarters in Mount Petrova Gora in the Krajina.

15             The diary depicted here on slide 122 is of one of the commanders

16     in the Pauk operation and if you look at it you will see it shows a

17     number of references to Mr. Simatovic and one of several references to

18     Mr. Stanisic.

19             The Special Units of the Serbian DB were to join forces with the

20     Serbian Krajina Army as well as Abdic's men.  Two of the three tactical

21     groups formed with these joined forces would be under the direct command

22     of the Special Units of the Serbian DB.  The second tactical group would

23     be placed under Legija's command and the third tactical group would be

24     placed under the command of Colonel Bozovic.  The Scorpions, the

25     perpetrators of the crimes at Trnovo, were part of Legija's tactical

Page 1050

 1     group.

 2             The Scorpions were first formed after the fall of Vukovar

 3     following a request by the Djeletovci oil company to Milan Milanovic, a

 4     minister to the SAO SBWS.  It's commander Slobodan Medic, aka Boca, the

 5     unit's task was to protect the oil fields in Djeletovci; a task that at

 6     times was shared with Arkan's men.  The unit grew quickly to include

 7     several hundred men.  The Serbian DB provided the Scorpions with

 8     significant equipment and paid the salaries of its members in cash.

 9     Approximately 30 per cent of its members had been trained in one of the

10     Serbian DB's camps in Kula, Mount Tara, Lipovaca, and Golubic.  In 1996,

11     after the war, some members of the unit would remain in the service of

12     the Serbian DB and join the JSO.

13                           [Videotape played]

14             MR. GROOME:  The two men you see in the video on slide 123 are

15     Legija, you've already heard much about him, and Slobodan Medic, the man

16     who gave the direct order to kill the captives in Trnovo.

17             This video is long and I will not ask the Chamber to look at all

18     of the relevant parts today, but in one segment you will hear Legija take

19     a decision regarding what to do with captured Muslims.  His decision as

20     you might expect is consistent with his treatment of non-Serbs in other

21     areas of the conflict.

22             Mr. Simatovic would mention this involvement in Pauk in his May

23     1997 speech in Kula when he said, "In western Bosnia, the unit was the

24     backbone of Fikret Abdic's army."  The Pauk operation would last until

25     August 1995.

Page 1051

 1             Let me now take you back to eastern Bosnia, July 1995.  The

 2     Bosnian Serbs decided to overtake the UN protected area of Srebrenica.

 3     By the end of July, nearly 8.000 Muslim boys and men would be summarily

 4     executed.  Not all of the murders were committed in the immediate

 5     vicinity of Srebrenica.

 6             In addition to their presence in the Bihac pocket, Special Units

 7     of the Serbian DB were also present in Central Bosnia.  In late June, the

 8     Serbian MUP was active in rounding up Serb men who were believed to be

 9     avoiding their military service.  Slide 124 is a document recording this.

10     Morale of the Serb soldiers at this stage was very low and there was a

11     high incidence of desertion.  Many of these men crossed into Serbia to

12     stay with family or hide among the crowds in Serbia's cities.

13             In this document, Tomislav Kovac, the deputy minister reports

14     that on June 23rd, he has handed over to the VRS in excess of 1500 men

15     taken into custody in Serbia and turned over to the RS MUP.

16             Even with this operation to compel able-bodied men to go to the

17     front lines in Bosnia, Mladic and Karadzic were still woefully in need of

18     additional troops.  In late June 1995, weeks before Srebrenica, in a

19     meeting attended by Arkan and Slobodan Medic, the decision was taken that

20     members of the units of the Serbian DB under the command of Vaso Mijovic,

21     a senior commander in the unit, would go to Bosnia and help fight with

22     the Bosnian army.

23             I would draw your attention to slide 125 and would like to return

24     to a portion of the Scorpion videotape that shows their arrival in Pale

25     on the 26th of June.  After the religious ceremony I showed you at the

Page 1052

 1     start of this opening, a ceremony which took place in Deletovci, this

 2     group travelled to Pale in the Serb-controlled area just outside of

 3     Sarajevo.

 4                           [Videotape played]

 5             MR. GROOME:  As you can see in the excerpt of a report at the

 6     bottom of slide 125, an RS MUP report records their arrival and their

 7     planned deployment to the Trnovo battlefield the next day.

 8             The map on slide 126 shows the relationship between Pale, Trnovo,

 9     Sarajevo, and Jahorina.  The ski resort at Jahorina was what was used as

10     a command post.  During the course of the trial, you will get a sense of

11     the size of this operation by seeing video from Jahorina and the many

12     paramilitaries and troops gathered there.

13             One of the ways that we can track the presence of the units of

14     the Serbian DB is that they sustained significant and regular casualties

15     in the Trnovo area.  Slide 127 shows a chart of eight of the documents

16     that the Prosecution will introduce establishing that throughout this

17     period, units of the Serbian DB were present in the Trnovo region.

18             Another senior member of the Special Units of the Serbian DB I

19     would like to introduce you to is Vaso Mijovic.  It was him that

20     commanded the Special Units of the DB while they were operating in

21     Trnovo.

22             When Srebrenica fell on the 11th of July, a column of 10.000 to

23     15.000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys fled.  The column was hit by

24     Bosnian Serb artillery on the 12th, and those that survived the artillery

25     barrage, several thousand, were captured.  These prisoners were

Page 1053

 1     systematically executed at a variety of places between the 13th and 17th

 2     of July.  Some of the captured were distributed for execution outside the

 3     Srebrenica area.  Approximately 15 captives were given to the Scorpions

 4     as their complement of detainees for killing.  Some of these prisoners

 5     were delivered to the Scorpions at their base in Trnovo.

 6             Slide 129 shows a report of Mijovic on the letterhead of the

 7     Special Units of the Serbian DB.  At this stage, officially called the

 8     Unit for Anti-terrorist Operations or JATD.  On the 19th of July, Mijovic

 9     notifies his counterparts in the Republic of Srpska Ministry of

10     Internal Affairs that he was ordered to pull back from the zone of combat

11     to "undertake other assignments."  What those assignments were, the

12     report does not say.  We do know that this is around the period in which

13     the six captives were killed.

14             Slobodan Medic and a group of Scorpions put six of the captives

15     in a truck and drove them to an isolated area near Trnovo to kill them.

16             Medic ordered that what they were about to do would be

17     videotaped.  Slide 130 contains a short excerpt of that video.  It does

18     not include the executions.

19                           [Videotape played]

20             MR. GROOME:  The Scorpions shouted abuse at the prisoners, kicked

21     them, taunted the youngest boy that he would die a virgin.  The six

22     almost certainly knew they were about to die.  They were made to wait

23     while the truck driver went into town to get a newly-charged battery for

24     the video recorder.

25             Once the camcorder was ready, four of the prisoners were made to

Page 1054

 1     stand in a line while the other two were forced to lay in the grass.  The

 2     four standing up were then shot one by one.  After the first was shot in

 3     the back, the others were made to walk to the spot where the previous

 4     victim had just fallen, to stand and wait.

 5             As some of the victims twitched in the grass, additional shots

 6     were fired into their heads to ensure they would not survive.

 7             The two who had been forced to lie in the grass were made to

 8     carry the bodies to a nearby house. The Scorpions then shot and killed

 9     the two remaining men.

10             In this report of the 24th of July, 1995, shown on slide 131, we

11     can tell by this rotation report that the Scorpions are still in the

12     Trnovo area and have returned to their regular duties.

13             It is the Prosecution's case as summarized on slide 132 is that

14     the Scorpions were one of the units of the Serbian DB and that the

15     accused are criminally responsible for the killing of the three men and

16     three boys in Trnovo.  In this case, these members of the units of the DB

17     under the command of a senior DB officer, Vaso Mijovic were made

18     available to Karadzic, Mladic and other core members of the joint

19     criminal enterprise to perpetrate crimes in furtherance of their common

20     criminal plan.

21             Around the same time period, Arkan himself was in the

22     municipality of Sanski Most.  He was there primarily to frighten

23     deserters from the Bosnian Serb Army into holding the front lines against

24     Croatian forces who were by now retaking some of the territory lost to

25     Serbs in 1992.  We can see from this report in slide 134 that

Page 1055

 1     Mr. Stanisic is in direct contact with Arkan on these matters.

 2             While in the municipality of Sanski Most, a place that after 1992

 3     had few Muslims left, he engaged once again in his characteristically

 4     brutal crimes.  His presence there was part of a larger Serbian DB

 5     operation that encompassed not only Sanski Most but Mrkonjic Grad, Kljuc,

 6     and Prijedor.  This coordinated mission involved the Special Units of the

 7     Serbian DB commanded once again by Colonel Bozovic.  Arkan's Tigers were

 8     under his command.

 9             In mid-1995, advances by the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina

10     threatened to retake Sanski Most from the Serbs.  To prevent this,

11     Arkan's Tigers were sent to Sanski Most.

12             On the 19th of September, Arkan's Tigers arrived in large numbers

13     and rounded up any remaining Muslims they could find.  They were

14     imprisoned in the Hotel Sanus in appalling conditions.  30 of them were

15     kept in the hotel's small boiler room; two detainees died from the

16     brutality that they suffered there.

17             On September 20th, 1995, Arkan's Tigers took at least 12 men from

18     the Hotel Sanus to a house in the nearby village.  There, the men were

19     shot two at a time in the back of the head.  The last two victims had

20     their throats slashed when Arkan's men ran out of bullets.

21             On the 21st of September, Arkan's Tigers took another group of

22     approximately 65 Muslims where they were executed in a similar manner.

23     Several days later, several hundred Muslim detainees were placed on a bus

24     and expelled from Sanski Most.

25             One month later on the 23rd of October, 1995, following the

Page 1056

 1     events in Sanski Most, Radovan Karadzic would publicly give an award to

 2     Arkan as he was now leaving Bosnia.  His work now complete.  It is

 3     perhaps not by chance that his presence in Bosnia would end in front of

 4     the very town hall in Bijeljina where he was greeted three years earlier

 5     with a kiss.  I return your attention to slide 135 while I play this

 6     video.

 7                           [Videotape played]

 8             MR. GROOME:  It is the Prosecution's case that the accused are

 9     criminally responsible for the crimes committed in Sanski Most because

10     Arkan was a co-member in the joint criminal enterprise and a member of

11     the units of the Serbian DB.  The accused provided Arkan with some of the

12     support and military supplies he needed to perpetrate these crimes.

13             It is also the Prosecution's theory that they are responsible

14     having made members of the units of the Serbian DB available to other

15     core members of the joint criminal enterprise, in this case, Radovan

16     Karadzic, who directed them to perpetrate the crimes in furtherance of

17     the common criminal plan.

18             After NATO finally struck some Bosnian Serb positions, Mladic's

19     troops took UN peacekeepers hostage in June 1995 and placed them as human

20     shields on potential targets.  Milosevic immediately recognising the

21     jeopardy this placed Serbia in before the international community sent

22     Stanisic to intervene, to go with Simatovic and with the full authority

23     of Milosevic to return with the hostages unharmed.

24             The Prosecution does not deny Mr. Stanisic or Mr. Simatovic any

25     of the honour or respect they have earned and deserve in this display of

Page 1057

 1     courage, freeing the hostage and perhaps even saving their lives.  Should

 2     the Court find them guilty of crimes after this trial, the Prosecution

 3     will join the Defence in submitting that their deeds during the hostage

 4     crisis merits consideration by the Chamber in assessing an appropriate

 5     sentence.

 6             It is the Prosecution's case, however, and there can be no

 7     mistake regarding this, the authority Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic

 8     commanded that day, the day they decided to use their authority and their

 9     ability to save lives is tragically the very same authority and the very

10     same ability that they had used more often over the prior four years to

11     take lives, to persecute innocents, to drive people from their homes.

12             The reason Mr. Milosevic sent them there during the hostage

13     crisis, one of the most tense and volatile events during the war, when

14     all the eyes of the world were fixed on what might happen to these UN

15     peacekeepers, the reason he sent them was because they, like no one else,

16     had the capacity to walk in among this madness and come out with the

17     hostages unharmed.

18             I would like now to turn to the indictment itself and offer a

19     brief explanation of the charges and the Prosecution's theory of the

20     case.

21             The indictment charges both accused with crimes against humanity

22     in violation of Article 5 of the Tribunal's Statute and violations of the

23     laws and customs of war in violation of Article 3 of the Statute.

24             Slide 137 is a summary of the indictment against Mr. Stanisic and

25     Mr. Simatovic.

Page 1058

 1             The crimes against humanity are enumerated in counts 1, 2, 4, and

 2     5 of the indictment and they are respectively, count 1, the crime of

 3     persecution in violation of Article 5(h).  Count 2, murder in violation

 4     of Article 5(a).  Count 4, deportation in violation of 5(d).  And

 5     finally, forcible transfer, one of the inhumane acts prohibited under

 6     Article 5(i) of the Statute.

 7             The crime of murder is also charged as a violation of the laws

 8     and customs of war and is charged in count 3 which charges murder as

 9     recognised by Common Article 3(1)(a) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949

10     and punishable under Article 3 of the Tribunal's Statute.

11             It is the Prosecution's case that the accused are individually

12     criminally responsible for these crimes pursuant to Article 7(1) of the

13     Tribunal's Statute in that they participated in these crimes with the

14     requisite intent in the following ways:

15             1.  They committed the crimes as members of and participated in a

16     joint criminal enterprise whose goal and purpose was to perpetrate these

17     crimes.

18             2.  They participated in the planning of these crimes.

19             3.  They ordered some of the crimes charged in this indictment.

20             4.  They aided and abetted in the planning, preparation and

21     execution of the crimes charged in this indictment.

22             It is the Prosecution's case that both of the accused were part

23     of and helped form a joint criminal enterprise, a criminal enterprise

24     conceived at the highest levels of the government of the Republic of

25     Serbia along with core members of the affected regions in Croatia and

Page 1059

 1     Bosnia and Herzegovina, an enterprise that conceived of and implemented a

 2     criminal plan designed to secure exclusively for Serbs land lying in

 3     Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 4             To acquire these targeted territories, this criminal enterprise

 5     would envisage the large and rapid removal of the non-Serb population by

 6     the perpetration of the crimes of murder and persecution.

 7             It is the Prosecution's position that at all times relevant to

 8     this case, these core members shared the intent to remove non-Serbs from

 9     designated parts of Croatia and Bosnia through murder and persecutory

10     acts.  The glue that bound them together, that harmonized their

11     individual contributions, that ensured that they worked in unison toward

12     a common goal was the shared criminal intent.

13             The jurisprudence of joint criminal enterprise has evolved to

14     recognise that such criminal enterprises may come to take several forms

15     as shown on slide 140.  These different forms reflect the nuances between

16     the different ways in which the --

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Please slow down.  Thank you.

18             MR. GROOME:  I apologise.

19             These different forms reflect the nuances between the different

20     ways in which co-perpetrators can join, conceive of and implement their

21     criminal plans.

22             While the actus reus of each of these forms is essentially

23     identical, they are distinguished based upon their mental element or mens

24     rea.

25             The evidence you will hear in this case is consistent with two

Page 1060

 1     forms of joint criminal enterprise.

 2             JCE I, which is sometimes referred to as the basic form,

 3     conceives of criminal responsibility for members of a criminal enterprise

 4     engaged in a common criminal agreement to commit a specific crime.  While

 5     each member may carry out a different role in the commission of the

 6     crime, they nonetheless each intend for that specific crime to be

 7     committed and contribute to it.

 8             This is to be contrasted with JCE III, sometimes referred to as

 9     the extended form, in which the crime charged, while not part of the

10     originally-intended crime is nonetheless a natural and foreseeable

11     consequence of the implementation of that criminal purpose.

12             With respect to this case --

13             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Mr. Groome, you should be bringing your closing

14     remarks now to an end.  I believe your time would be up at half past

15     4.00.

16             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, my calculation would bring it that we

17     would have 15 minutes after the break which I believe is in keeping with

18     what I have about left.  I believe this is a rather important part of the

19     opening statement, setting out our legal theory.

20             JUDGE ROBINSON:  We're going to take the break at half past.

21             MR. GROOME:  With respect to this case, firstly, and most

22     importantly, and the principal legal theory of the Prosecution is that

23     Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic were members of the core group of

24     co-perpetrators that conceived of the crimes contained in the indictment.

25     At all times relevant to these charges, they had the shared intent to

Page 1061

 1     forcibly remove non-Serbs from designated areas in an effort to effect

 2     fundamental demographic changes in the population.

 3             The intent that they shared was not only to forcibly remove these

 4     targeted groups of non-Serbs but they shared the intent to kill them and

 5     to persecute them as a means to realise their goals.

 6             How do we know they shared this intent?  There will be much

 7     evidence from which the Chamber may conclude that the two accused shared

 8     the criminal intent of other core members such as Martic, Karadzic,

 9     Hadzic, Mladic.  I will confine myself to a single example.

10             In Zvornik, fighters belonging to Seselj, Arkan, and a group

11     called the Yellow Wasps were all engaged in the commission of serious

12     crimes there.  You will hear evidence that the Yellow Wasps were

13     investigated by Mr. Stanisic, by Serbian State Security Service and

14     subsequently arrested by the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs.  They

15     were ultimately prosecuted in a Serbian court for crimes they committed

16     in Bosnia and were sentenced to gaol terms.  While it was proper to

17     investigate and arrest the Vukovic brothers, the question that is raised

18     is why wasn't similar action taken against Seselj's men or Arkan's men?

19     Not only was action not taken, but you will be presented with evidence

20     that the crimes they committed after Bijeljina and Zvornik were

21     facilitated and supported by the two accused.

22             It is the Prosecution's case that the only reasonable conclusion

23     that can be drawn from this is that Arkan and Seselj were among the core

24     members of the JCE and that Stanisic and Simatovic shared their intent to

25     perpetrate the crimes perpetrated in Zvornik.

Page 1062

 1             Your Honour, would that be a convenient place to take the break?

 2             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Yes, it will be.  We'll adjourn for 20 minutes.

 3                           --- Recess taken at 4.27 p.m.

 4                           --- On resuming at 4.58 p.m.

 5             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. Knoops.

 6             MR. KNOOPS:  Your Honour, before we proceed, may we just seek the

 7     guidance of the Prosecution as to question whether they rely their

 8     opening statement on the second revised indictment of May 2006 or whether

 9     they already anticipate the theory and the changes which are included in

10     the proposed third amendment of the indictment.  I think it's rather

11     essential for the Defence to know.

12             As Your Honour knows, there is a motion pending from the Defence

13     against the proposed third amendment of the indictment.  Now that the

14     Prosecution arrives at the legal theory apart from the fact that, in my

15     view, an opening statement should not be meant to argue the law but apart

16     from that, I think if the Prosecution continues with the legal theory,

17     that maybe the Prosecution could indicate whether they rely their opening

18     statement on the second revised indictment and its underlying theory or

19     whether they anticipate this amended -- the third amended indictment

20     changes.

21             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, I haven't anticipated the Court's

22     decision.  Everything I've said is based upon the current indictment

23     that's in effect in this case.  And its the Prosecution's view that one

24     of the essential tasks that I'm charged with is to explain the legal

25     theory of culpability in after effort to help the Defence meet the case

Page 1063

 1     that the Prosecution will present against them.

 2             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Thank you, please proceed.

 3             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, the evidence in this case is also

 4     consistent with what is commonly referred to as Joint Criminal Enterprise

 5     III.  The two accused as well as the other core members of the joint

 6     criminal enterprise shared the intent to forcibly remove non-Serbs from

 7     designated areas.

 8             Under this theory, even absent a finding that the accused shared

 9     the intent to murder and persecute Muslims and Croats, they would remain

10     liable if they shared the intent to forcibly remove these non-Serbs from

11     targeted areas and they willingly accepted the proximate and foreseeable

12     risk that this forcible removal of people would result in the commission

13     of murder and persecutions.

14             In the context of this case, the accused having joined with

15     others possessing the shared intent of forcibly transferring people from

16     their homes bear individual criminal responsibility for the crimes of

17     persecution and murder which are reasonably foreseeable.

18             As I have previously said, the actus reus for a JCE I and JCE III

19     are the same except for slight nuances.

20             First, that there be a plurality of persons.  Given the large

21     collective nature of these crimes, we can in practical terms only

22     identify for you and present evidence regarding those members we believe

23     to be the core members of the joint criminal enterprise.  These are the

24     people indicated on the chart we have used several times during the

25     course of this opening statement.

Page 1064

 1             The second actus reus element is the existence of a common

 2     purpose which amounts to or involves the commission of a crime under this

 3     Statute.  It is the Prosecution's case that each of the crimes charged in

 4     this indictment was a purpose of the joint criminal enterprise.

 5             The third actus reus element is that the accused participate in

 6     furtherance of the common criminal design in a manner that assists in its

 7     achievement, contributes to it, materially helps in its execution.

 8             I will now in very summary fashion using slide 143 to identify

 9     the acts of participation which the Prosecution allege incur criminal

10     liability for Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic.

11             With respect to the Krajina, it's the Prosecution's case that

12     their joint efforts to organise, finance, train, and equip Martic's men

13     and army thereby enabling them to perpetrate the serious crimes they did

14     against the non-Serb population of the Krajina was an act of

15     participation in the overall criminal enterprise.

16             Similarly with respect to the SAO SBWS, it is the Prosecution's

17     case that the accused's acts of participation in the joint criminal

18     enterprise were in part:  Financing and equipping Arkan and his men who

19     directly perpetrated the crimes.

20             With respect to both the Krajina and the SAO SBWS, Mr. Stanisic

21     and Mr. Simatovic gave direction to the local political leaders including

22     Martic, Babic, and Hadzic, to ensure that their political activities also

23     advanced the goals of the common criminal purpose.

24             Finally, even if after the conclusion of this case, the Chamber

25     has a doubt about whether Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic directly funded

Page 1065

 1     and equipped Arkan, they would still be responsible for his crimes, the

 2     crimes of another co-member in a joint criminal enterprise if the Chamber

 3     were satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that they were in fact part of the

 4     same joint criminal enterprise.

 5             With respect to the Bosnian municipalities, Mr. Stanisic and

 6     Mr. Simatovic had a role in their takeover in 1992.  It is the

 7     Prosecution's contention that their culpable acts of participation in the

 8     joint criminal enterprise included:  Planning the attacks; providing

 9     training, arms, equipment and funding.  In some instances, they also

10     arranged military transport for the direct perpetrator of crimes.

11             In the event the Chamber finds that the evidence does not permit

12     an inference that they directed the immediate perpetrators of these

13     crimes and in fact that it was Bosnian Serb leaders alone who directed

14     them to commit the crimes, the Prosecution's case would be that placing

15     these men and this equipment at the disposal of another member of a joint

16     criminal enterprise to use to advance the criminal purpose of the joint

17     criminal enterprise also incurs liability.

18             Finally, in such a large collective crime, the jurisprudence of

19     this Tribunal, in the Brdjanin Appeals Judgement recognises that those

20     most responsible for these serious crimes are often also those most

21     removed from them.  It considers that those high-level members of the

22     enterprise can and do use others to directly perpetrate the crimes they

23     intend and as such bear individual criminal responsibility.

24             Under this theory, the core members of the joint criminal

25     enterprise, sharing a common intent to remove non-Serbs, used others to

Page 1066

 1     directly advance this criminal goal.

 2             Those they used may or may not have also shared their intent, but

 3     this theory holds that even absent proof of a shared intent with these

 4     perpetrators, the accused are criminally responsible because they

 5     employed these people as instrumentalities of their criminal plan.

 6             To give you an example from this case, I remind you about what we

 7     have already said about Bosanski Samac.  When it became necessary,

 8     Jovica Stanisic would personally intercede to have one of the primary

 9     perpetrators released, a man named Crni released so that he could return

10     to Samac to continue his crimes.

11             Did Crni and Stanisic share the same intent?  Probably.  But even

12     absent the finding that they did share the same intent, Mr. Stanisic and

13     Mr. Simatovic bear responsibility for the crimes of Crni if the Court

14     finds that Crni was used as an instrumentality of the joint criminal

15     enterprise to perpetrate its objectives.

16             It is the Prosecution's case that Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic

17     are responsible for and participated in the crimes charged in several

18     ways as set out in the indictment and the pre-trial brief.  It is not our

19     case that each crime relied on only one mode of participation, given the

20     size of the DB units and the breadth of Stanisic's and Simatovic's

21     activities, it is most often the case that in any one criminal event,

22     their involvement in these crimes can be discerned in more than one way.

23             The indictment also alleges that the two accused planned the

24     crimes charged.  Planning a crime considers that one or several persons

25     contemplate designing the commission of a crime at both the preparatory

Page 1067

 1     and execution phases.

 2             It is the Prosecution's position that Stanisic's and Simatovic's

 3     establishment of 26 training camps, the provision of instructors, supply

 4     and military weapons and logistical equipment to the direct perpetrators

 5     of the crimes is evidence upon which the Chamber could conclude they

 6     engaged in acts of planning as defined by the jurisprudence of this

 7     Tribunal.

 8             The Chamber will recall slide number 42 in the Krajina, someone

 9     by the name of Miljovic refers to things going according to "the training

10     plan."

11             You will also recall the statement of Vojislav Seselj in which he

12     identifies Mr. Simatovic as the mastermind behind the plan for the

13     takeover of Zvornik.

14             Ordering.

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Please slow down.  Thank you.

16             MR. GROOME:  Ordering.  According to the jurisprudence of this

17     Tribunal, concerns a person in a position of authority using that

18     position to persuade another to commit an offence under the Statute.  The

19     order can be explicit or implicit and can be proved with circumstantial

20     evidence.

21             It is the Prosecution's case that the evidence will support a

22     conclusion by the Chamber that Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic sent

23     Arkan to the several municipalities in the indictment where he committed

24     crimes.  And even if they did not explicitly tell him to commit the

25     crimes of murder and persecution, in the context of their knowledge that

Page 1068

 1     everywhere he went, he committed these crimes, the only conclusion that

 2     can be drawn is that they are directing him to a particular location with

 3     a non-Serb population was an implied order to perpetrate the crimes of

 4     murder and persecution there.

 5             I will not spend any time discussing aiding and abetting at this

 6     stage.  All of the acts the Prosecution attributes to Stanisic and

 7     Simatovic could be the basis of participation as an aider and abettor.

 8     It is the Prosecution's case at the conclusion of the evidence in this

 9     trial, it will be clear that they were the principals in the crimes

10     charged in this indictment.  We are charging aiding and abetting purely

11     as an alternative theory.

12             Your Honours, in the indictment, the Prosecution alleges that the

13     accused committed these crimes by their acts and omissions.  I would like

14     to take a few minutes to expound on what is meant by that phrase.

15             The word omission actually has two distinct meanings according to

16     the jurisprudence of the Tribunal.  One use of omission is as a form of

17     criminal liability.  The other use is a description of a factual

18     situation from which inferences can be drawn.  Omission as a legal form

19     of criminal liability imagines a situation in which an accused has a

20     legal duty toward the victim.  For example, a legal duty to protect.

21             It is not the Prosecution's case that Stanisic or Simatovic had

22     an affirmative legal duty to ensure the welfare of the victims of crimes

23     in Croatia and Bosnia.

24             Omission as it applies to a factual determination from which

25     inferences can be drawn is how the Prosecution uses the word omission in

Page 1069

 1     this case.  For example, if over the course of this case, the Chamber

 2     takes the view of the evidence that despite receiving information about

 3     the crimes which were being committed as a result of their contribution

 4     to the joint criminal enterprise, and that in the face of that knowledge,

 5     they failed to take any corrective measures such as instructing the

 6     members of DB units to refrain from criminal conduct, then the Court can

 7     draw the reasonable inference that such omission constituted

 8     encouragement, material support to the direct perpetrators of the crime

 9     because they were emboldened by the failure of Stanisic and Simatovic to

10     take any corrective action.

11             You have seen a video of Arkan on the veranda of his shop in the

12     middle of Belgrade state publicly that he kills prisoners.  You will hear

13     other evidence that he and his men were a regular sight in Belgrade; they

14     moved openly, dressed in uniform, carrying military weapons often in cars

15     with tigers painted on the hood.

16             His ability to travel freely around Belgrade under the very nose

17     of Stanisic, whose legal responsibility if you recall from slide 7

18     included the control of extremist groups, Arkan's confidence in his own

19     impunity, a result of Mr. Stanisic's failure to ever take action against

20     him materially advanced the crimes Arkan committed in addition to the

21     accused's positive acts of directing and supporting him.

22             Your Honour, this brings to a conclusion the Prosecution's

23     summary of its evidence and overview of why it alleges that

24     Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic are criminally responsible for the

25     crimes charged in the indictment.

Page 1070

 1             I thank you for your time and attention.  As we commence the

 2     calling of evidence, I give the Chamber as well as Mr. Stanisic and

 3     Mr. Simatovic my assurance and the assurance of Mr. Brammertz that the

 4     Prosecution will conduct its case according to the highest standards of

 5     fairness and justice enabling this Chamber to reach a fair and just

 6     adjudication of the charges against the accused.

 7             Your Honours, with that, the Prosecution stands ready to call our

 8     first witness.

 9             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Thank you, Mr. Groome.  And the Chamber will of

10     course hold you to that promise.  We are now going to move into the

11     hearing of testimony.  The first witness ...

12             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, before we call that first witness,

13     there are a couple of administrative things I would like to raise with

14     the Chamber.

15             One is, over the course of the opening we've been referring to

16     slides which looking at the cold record no one would ever be able to

17     figure out what was in the slide.  We did not read everything on the

18     slide in the interests of time.  I would ask that the copy, a copy of

19     those slides be marked for identification, in the event it ever becomes

20     an issue at an appeal stage, what was said during the opening and what

21     was the content of the opening.  I'm not asking that they be introduced

22     as evidence but simply that they be marked for identification.

23             JUDGE ROBINSON:  I see no objection to that.

24             MR. GROOME:  Secondly, Your Honour, I believe it is important

25     that we state on the record the fact that Mr. Stanisic --

Page 1071

 1                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

 2             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, I see that Mr. Stanisic has not been

 3     here and I don't believe he has been in the video conference room and

 4     ordinarily the Court makes a record of that as well as the absence from

 5     the UNDU unit.  I wonder whether it would be prudent to investigate

 6     whether we do have such a unit saying he is too ill or at least identify

 7     for the record that he has not been present during the opening.

 8             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. Knoops.

 9             MR. KNOOPS:  Your Honour, now that the position of the Defence

10     team for Mr. Stanisic factually diminished to guardians of his legal

11     position, I also point to the right of Mr. Stanisic, according to Rule 84

12     bis and in light of the medical evidence and the notification today from

13     the detention centre, I believe that without verifying that information,

14     it would be contrary to the fair rights of this accused to proceed with

15     the first witness without endeavoring the invocation of Rule 84 bis and

16     actually --

17             JUDGE ROBINSON:  But you are his lawyer.  What do you say?  Does

18     he wish to make a statement?

19             MR. KNOOPS:  Your Honour, we don't have instructions whether he

20     will --

21             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Why don't you have instructions?  Don't waste my

22     time.

23             MR. KNOOPS:  I cannot --

24             JUDGE ROBINSON:  If you think I'm going to put up with nonsense,

25     you are mistaken.  Why are you describing yourself as a guardian of the

Page 1072

 1     interests of the accused?

 2             MR. KNOOPS:  Your Honour, if Your Honour reads the motions we

 3     have filed to the Appeals Chamber, Your Honour can read that our present

 4     function is diminished to the guardian of the legal rights because we

 5     don't have instructions.  And I believe it's fair to say --

 6             JUDGE ROBINSON:  As far as I'm concerned, you remain counsel

 7     until the matter that you have raised is settled.  And unless you can

 8     advise me that the accused wishes to make a statement, I will proceed on

 9     the basis that he does not wish to make a statement because that is

10     something which you should have gathered from him before coming here.

11             If you have no other submissions, we'll proceed.

12             MR. KNOOPS:  Your Honour, my submission is that the accused is

13     not able to assess whether he can give a statement.  That is my point.

14             JUDGE ROBINSON:  We've been through that already and I'm not

15     going through it again.

16             Yes, Mr. Groome.

17             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, with respect to B-299, the Prosecution

18     has made two applications, one was 92 ter.  In light that we have not had

19     a decision, we've actually prepared this witness to testify --

20             JUDGE ROBINSON:  I'm going to give the decision.  Before I do

21     that, let me inquire from the court deputy what the position is with

22     regard to the accused, whether the accused is watching the proceedings by

23     videolink from the detention unit.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, the accused is not present in the

25     room.

Page 1073

 1             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Thank you.

 2             This is the Chamber's decision on the application of the

 3     Prosecution in relation to Witness B-299.

 4             On the 18th of June, the Chamber received a motion for the

 5     admission pursuant to Rule 92 ter of the transcript of evidence given by

 6     Witness B-299 in the Martic case and the exhibits that were admitted

 7     during his testimony.  B-299 worked with the DB.  The Chamber has

 8     carefully reviewed the evidence given by and tendered through

 9     Witness B-299 in the Martic case and considers that it is sufficiently

10     probative and relevant to the present case.  The evidence is cumulative

11     of other viva voce or Rule 92 ter testimony the Prosecution has indicated

12     it will present at trial.

13             After reviewing the arguments advanced by the parties, the

14     Chamber allows the Prosecution motion.  The Chamber is also seized of a

15     Prosecution motion for the continuation of protective measures granted in

16     prior proceedings for Witness B-299.  The Prosecution in this motion

17     requests the continuation of protective measures granted in the prior

18     proceedings to this witness.

19             The Defence has not responded to this motion.

20             Rule 75(f)(i) provides that protective measures granted in

21     previous proceedings before the Tribunal shall continue to have effect

22     mutatis mutandis in any other proceedings before the Tribunal unless and

23     until they are rescinded, varied or amended in accordance with the

24     procedures set out in this rule.

25             No application has been made to rescind, vary or amend the

Page 1074

 1     protective measures and those measures will therefore continue.  The

 2     measures are a pseudonym, and voice and facial distortion.

 3             Yes, Mr. Jovanovic.

 4             MR. JOVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  At this

 5     time, I do not wish to take an issue with the -- or discuss the decision

 6     you've rendered but if the decision of Their Honours is based on the

 7     belief (redacted)

 8     (redacted)

 9     (redacted)

10     (redacted)

11     (redacted)

12     (redacted)

13             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Mr. Docherty is on his feet.

14             MR. DOCHERTY:  Your Honour, excuse me, I'm going to be taking

15     this witness and this is a protected witness and if we are going to go on

16     about details of this witness's work, I ask to move into closed session.

17     I don't wish to stop Mr. Jovanovic from making his submission, it's

18     simply the context in which he is making it.  And I'm also going to ask

19     for a redaction of lines 19 through 25 on page 78 of the transcript

20     that's on the screen.

21             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Yes, that redaction will be done.

22             Mr. Jovanovic.

23             MR. JOVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  It was

24     was not my intention to reveal the identity of the upcoming witness in

25     any way.  I merely believed that I ought to point out that if this was

Page 1075

 1     the basis upon which the witness's testimony was to be admitted under

 2     Rule 92 ter, that it was misconceived.

 3             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Thank you.  We have heard your submissions.

 4             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, just one final matter with respect to

 5     B-299, yesterday the Court issued an order restricting examination of 92

 6     ter witnesses to 30 minutes.  Not having the benefit of the Chamber's

 7     decision on 92 ter, Mr. Docherty has prepared the witness for his

 8     evidence as if we did not have a 92 ter decision.  I would ask that we be

 9     allowed to continue with this witness for the two hours of direct

10     examination that we had anticipated before the Court's ruling.  We will

11     try to or I will try to catch up or reduce the time that other witnesses

12     who may spend testifying on similar matters try to identify that and

13     reduce the amount of time that we spend so that we can make up this time.

14     But I appreciate if we could move forward with this witness with the

15     originally-allotted time that we were -- the understanding of yesterday

16     which is the two hours of examination.

17                           [Trial Chamber confers]

18             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Yes.  I really want to say that two hours for a

19     92 ter witness is really much too long, much too long.  But I take

20     account of the point that you have made that you were not aware of the

21     decision that we were going to give that every effort should be made to

22     keep examination-in-chief of those witnesses, those kind of witnesses to

23     half an hour.

24             In the circumstances, I'll allow you to go beyond the half an

25     hour and perhaps to the end of the day's proceedings.

Page 1076

 1             I'm to inquire whether we can sit from the court deputy without a

 2     break.  I know that there are certain guidelines in this matter.  We are

 3     now in the third session for an hour and a half.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  We will need to have 15 minutes break minimum for

 5     technical reasons.

 6             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Now?

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes.

 8             JUDGE ROBINSON:  We need to have a 15-minute break to allow the

 9     technical staff to set up the apparatus.  So we'll take that break now.

10                           --- Recess taken at 5.25 p.m.

11                           --- On resuming at 5.45 p.m.

12                           [The witness entered court]

13             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Let the witness make the declaration.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly swear that I will speak

15     the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

16                           WITNESS:  WITNESS B-299

17                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

18             JUDGE ROBINSON:  You may sit.  And you may commence,

19     Mr. Docherty.

20                           Examination by Mr. Docherty:

21        Q.   Good afternoon, Witness.

22        A.   Good afternoon.

23             MR. DOCHERTY:  May I ask the court usher to take the pseudonym

24     sheet to the witness, please.

25        Q.   Witness, the court usher has just handed to you what is known as

Page 1077

 1     a pseudonym sheet.  Are your name, date, and place of birth correctly

 2     stated on that pseudonym sheet?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4             MR. DOCHERTY:  Could the court usher please show the pseudonym

 5     sheet to counsel for the parties and to the Chamber, and after that could

 6     the pseudonym sheet please be admitted into evidence under seal.

 7             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Yes, it's admitted.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  The document will be Exhibit P2 under seal.

 9             MR. DOCHERTY:  Your Honour, could we move into closed session for

10     a couple of minutes while I take the witness through the witness's

11     personal background?

12             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Yes.

13                           [Private session]

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 1078











11 Page 1078 redacted. Private session.















Page 1079

 1    (redacted)

 2                           [Open session]

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  We are back in open session.

 4             MR. DOCHERTY:

 5        Q.   Witness, did you, in April of 1991, get sent to the Krajina by

 6     your service?

 7        A.   That was in May 1991 and that's true.  But it happened in May

 8     1991.

 9        Q.   And I'm going to ask the court usher to display on the screen a

10     map from the Prosecution map book number 10.  Maps are large files, they

11     take a while to load, so while we are waiting for the map, could you

12     please explain to us what your mission was in the Krajina, what you were

13     doing there?

14        A.   Since general unrest occurred in Croatia between the Serb and

15     Croat peoples residing there, the government of the SFRY and the

16     government of Croatia signed a truce with a view to ensuring normalcy of

17     life in that area.  Thereupon, it was decide that had someone ought be

18     charged with controlling the truce and maintaining the cease-fire out in

19     the field.  Probably the government and the Presidency of the SFRY

20     decided that we from the Federal Ministry of the Interior were best

21     placed to enforce peace in the field and to oversee peace out in the

22     field.

23        Q.   How many people were on your team?

24        A.   Pursuant to the decision of the government, three teams were sent

25     out to crisis areas in the Republic of Croatia.  The first group was

Page 1080

 1     deployed to Sibenik, the second one to Gospic and the third to Plitvice.

 2     These three areas were considered crisis areas where the concentration of

 3     the Serb people was highest.  These were Serbs living in the area and on

 4     the other side, there were Croats whose state this was.

 5             The first group posted to Sibenik included 7 to 8 persons

 6     including auxiliary staff and specialists who were at our disposal to

 7     ensure our security and safety.

 8             Do you want me to name them?  With your permission, I can give

 9     you their names and their respective functions that they held out in the

10     field whilst controlling the cease-fire.

11        Q.   No, the names will not be necessary.  Thank you.  But I take it

12     from that answer that you were on the team that went to Sibenik; is that

13     correct?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   The map is now on the screen beside you.  Do you see it there?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   And with the assistance of someone from the court, I'm going to

18     ask you to make a few marks on that map.  The first thing I want you to

19     do is to put your witness number B-299 and today's date in the lower

20     right.

21        A.   Right here you mean?

22        Q.   That's fine, thank you.  And could you date the map, please.

23        A.   What's the date?

24        Q.   Today is the 29th of April.

25             Do you see on this map the area of Croatia that you have been

Page 1081

 1     referring to as Krajina?

 2        A.   Yes, I do.

 3        Q.   Could you please draw a circle around the Krajina and label it

 4     with K for Krajina.

 5        A.   Yes, I can.  That would roughly be the area.  I can't be asked

 6     really to draw proper maps here, but that would be the extent of the area

 7     there.

 8        Q.   And could you label that circle with the letter K so that in

 9     future, we'll know what we are looking at, please.

10        A.   I can.

11             MR. DOCHERTY:  Your Honour, could the map as marked be admitted

12     into evidence.

13             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Yes.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that would be Exhibit P3.

15             MR. DOCHERTY:  I'm going to ask for another map, this is

16     Prosecution map book number 2, and again that will take a while to load.

17        Q.   While we are waiting for the map to load, did you travel from

18     Sibenik to Knin and, if so, how did you get from Sibenik to Knin?

19        A.   I travelled from Sibenik to Knin because we were accommodated at

20     the Hotel Solaris in Sibenik.  We occasionally travelled to Knin by the

21     car that we had at our disposal and we went along the Sibenik-Drnis-Knin

22     road.

23        Q.   Let me draw your attention -- well, we have the map so let's use

24     the map and then come back to this, please.  Do you see the map in front

25     of you?

Page 1082

 1        A.   I do, but I can't make out any of the text.  It's quite small in

 2     print.

 3        Q.   Could the usher please magnify the area of the map, the Adriatic

 4     coast of Croatia to the west of Bosnia and Herzegovina, please.

 5             Can you see that better, Witness?

 6        A.   I have to get closer.  I can see it now, yes.  I see it.

 7        Q.   As with the preceding map, would you please put your witness

 8     number B-299 and today's date in the lower right.

 9        A.   Do you want the date as well?

10        Q.   Yes, please.

11        A.   I beg your pardon, this should be a 4.  And 08.

12        Q.   Now, you've mentioned two towns, Sibenik and Knin.  Do they

13     appear on this map?

14        A.   Yes, they do.

15        Q.   Could you circle Sibenik and circle Knin, please?

16        A.   [Marks]

17        Q.   Could you please write an S beside the Sibenik circle and a K

18     beside the Knin circle.

19        A.   [Marks]

20             MR. DOCHERTY:  Your Honour, could this map as marked please be

21     introduced into evidence.

22             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Yes.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that would be Exhibit P4.

24             MR. DOCHERTY:

25        Q.   Before the map came up on the screen, we had been talking about

Page 1083

 1     travel between Sibenik and Knin.  Did there come an occasion when you

 2     travelled from Sibenik to Knin in a military helicopter?  Do you know the

 3     incident I'm referring to?

 4        A.   Yes, I do know the incident.  And that was my first visit, the

 5     first time I went from Sibenik to Knin.

 6        Q.   Was there a naval officer in the helicopter with you, and if so,

 7     who was it?

 8             MR. KNOOPS:  Your Honour, I believe this is leading the witness.

 9     Objection.

10             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Yes, it is.  Reformulate, Mr. Docherty.

11             MR. DOCHERTY:

12        Q.   Who was in the helicopter with you, if anyone?

13        A.   It was a military helicopter and at the insistence of

14     Admiral Zec, who introduced himself as an officer for naval security, he

15     proposed that we take the helicopter for security reasons because

16     allegedly in the field, there were quite a lot of snipers and so he

17     recommended that for security reasons, he, together with the

18     helicopter -- that we should go in the helicopter to Knin together with

19     him.

20        Q.   And when you got to Knin, was anything pointed out to you?

21        A.   Near Knin itself, and this is something that I saw later on,

22     there was a fortress, there was a fortress above Knin.  And probably

23     pursuant to an order from the Admiral, the helicopter circled the

24     fortress twice and then the Admiral drew our attention to the fact that

25     there were units in Knin called the Knindzas which were being prepared

Page 1084

 1     and trained by Captain Dragan, that he was conducting training for these

 2     Knindzas.

 3             We weren't able to talk anymore although we were very interested

 4     in learning more.  The helicopter was rather old, you see, and there was

 5     noise from the air.  There was a lot of noise.  So we weren't able to

 6     conduct a conversation very well because we couldn't hear each other.

 7        Q.   Do you know when the word "Captain Dragan" was used to identify

 8     this person, do you know who was being talked about?  Can you identify

 9     that person?

10        A.   Not at that point, no, but later on, we learned more about him

11     when we met various individuals in the field and also privately later on

12     through my life when I returned from the field.  But at the time, he said

13     that he was an expert in combat, that he had completed some sort of

14     military courses, terrorist, anti-terrorist somewhere in the west, and

15     that for the time being, he was conducting training of the Knindzas or

16     rather the Serb forces in the area.

17        Q.   And what was your reaction upon hearing that there were Serb

18     forces in the area since this was Croatia?

19        A.   Well, when we were sent from Belgrade, we were told that in the

20     field, down there, there were some paramilitary units of some kind over

21     there and that's what General Gracanin, the minister also told us.  He

22     informed us about the fact that there were problems with Martic's police

23     and that they were outside the control of the Croatian forces, that they

24     did not respect or recognise Croatian laws but that they were functioning

25     according to some sort of law which was not -- well, which could be said

Page 1085

 1     was inappropriate and did not comply with the laws of the Croatian state

 2     and where all the other laws were in force.

 3             MR. DOCHERTY:  Could we please see on the screen 65 ter number

 4     1269?

 5        Q.   Witness, could you please read the title of this document?

 6             MR. KNOOPS:  Your Honour, at this point, we object because first

 7     of all, there is no proper foundation to introduce the document.

 8     Secondly, we don't know whether the witness is the author of the

 9     document, whether it's beyond or within his personal knowledge, and

10     whether the document itself has any relevance to the case.

11             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Mr. Docherty, lay some foundation.

12             MR. DOCHERTY:  Your Honour, the document just came up on the

13     screen.  I'm just about to ask my first foundation question.

14             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Yes.  Go ahead.

15             MR. DOCHERTY:

16        Q.   Witness, what type of document does this appear to you to be?

17     What category of document?

18             MR. KNOOPS:  Does this call for speculation from the witness?

19     Did the Prosecution ...

20             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Let us hear what the witness says and we'll know

21     whether he's speculating.  Yes.

22             Can you answer the question, Witness?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, from the document, we can see

24     as the title says, it is a proposal to set up a new training centre and

25     transfer the Main Staff of the Territorial Defence to the Knin fortress.

Page 1086

 1             MR. DOCHERTY:  Could we please scroll down in both languages to

 2     the bottom -- excuse me -- yes --

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I were to compare what I saw in

 4     the field when the helicopter circled the fortress and this document,

 5     there is some congruity.  It corresponds to the fact that training

 6     courses did in fact take place at the Knin fortress.

 7             A policeman, volunteers and those from the reserve force of the

 8     police were taken and selected for training.

 9             MR. DOCHERTY:  Could we please go to the signature block which I

10     believe is on the second page.

11        Q.   Do you see a signature block on this document?

12        A.   I can't see a signature here.  I can see the name and surname of

13     Captain Dragan.

14        Q.   No, I'm not asking you for the signature.  I'm asking you for the

15     name on the signature block.

16        A.   Yes, I can see that, it says Captain Dragan Vasiljkovic.  Now

17     we're going back to the time when we were there, our group was interested

18     in knowing the true surname of ...

19        Q.   I think you might have anticipated my next question.  Is there

20     any correspondence between this Captain Dragan and the man that you had

21     described to you in the helicopter over the Knin fortress that day?

22        A.   Well, that's precisely what I was going to connect.  We were just

23     told Captain Dragan.  Although we insisted on learning more, our group

24     insisted on learning more both from Admiral Zec and later on in the

25     field, we were not able to learn his real surname and we learned that

Page 1087

 1     nobody could actually know his real surname.

 2             At one point, we arrived at some information that this

 3     Captain Dragan, as he was referred to, was a sort of nickname and later

 4     on I learned that his actual surname was Vasiljkovic, but at the time

 5     when we were in Knin, we never learned his real surname.

 6        Q.   But you know it now and you know it's Vasiljkovic; is that

 7     correct?

 8        A.   Yes, that's right.

 9             MR. DOCHERTY:  Your Honour, I move the admission of 65 ter 1269

10     and then I'll have some questions about the content of the document.

11             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Yes, it will be admitted.

12             MR. KNOOPS:  Your Honour, we object against admission.  We object

13     against admission of this document.

14             JUDGE ROBINSON:  I have already admitted it but let us hear the

15     objection.

16             MR. KNOOPS:  First of all, we have no form of authentication

17     whether this document is indeed from the person with the name

18     Captain Dragan.  Secondly, it's legally not viable that a document not

19     authored by this witness can be introduced through this witness.

20             The witness merely and only referred to the document as seeing

21     some congruity from what he saw from the helicopter and in this document.

22     But there is no -- this document is not within the personal knowledge of

23     the witness as such.

24             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Yes.  Let's hear Mr. Jovanovic.

25             Are you finished?

Page 1088

 1             MR. KNOOPS:  Yes, thank you.

 2             MR. JOVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  The same

 3     objection.  The document isn't signed, that's the first point.  It wasn't

 4     signed by Captain Dragan for it to be maintained that he was the author

 5     of the document.

 6             On the left-hand version, we can see -- well, you don't have to

 7     be an expert in handwriting to establish this, that the surname which

 8     stands there and which was written there, that the letters are quite

 9     different which leads us to believe that the document isn't authentic.

10     And the witness is referring to Captain Dragan's surname and we see that

11     this, the letters typed out in the surname Vasiljkovic are quite

12     different to the letters that are typed out in Captain Dragan and I'm

13     referring to the B/C/S version.  You can see that with the naked eye.

14             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Let me hear that point again.  Please repeat

15     that last point.

16             MR. JOVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  The witness

17     said that the document was not signed and that at the bottom of the

18     document, we see the name of Captain Dragan Vasiljkovic.  Now, this

19     witness was referring to Captain Dragan's surname which he said he

20     learned subsequently.  It is quite obvious in the B/C/S version if you

21     take a look at it that that surname "Vasiljkovic" is typed out in

22     different letters from the "Captain Dragan" name.  As you can see, the

23     "Captain Dragan" is in bold letters whereas the surname "Vasiljkovic" is

24     in different letters, typed out differently.  And it seems as if the

25     Vasiljkovic surname has been added to this Captain Dragan because the

Page 1089

 1     letters are quite different in the surname Vasiljkovic to the typed

 2     script of all the other words in the text.

 3             Since we don't have a signature, then I don't think we can take

 4     this document to be authentic and whether this has subsequently been

 5     added to the document, this surname.

 6             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. Docherty.

 7             MR. DOCHERTY:  Your Honour, I think that the objection that the

 8     witness did not himself sign the document does not matter.  What matters

 9     is that the witness can identify and lay foundation for the document.

10             In this case, the witness has testified about knowing the person

11     whose name appears on the signature block of the document and has noted

12     that the name that is on the bottom of this document is the same as the

13     name that he eventually learned was the surname of Captain Dragan.

14             In addition, and I can perhaps -- need to get this from the

15     witness, but I believe that it is common for military orders not to be

16     signed in ink but, rather, simply have the issuing person's name appear

17     down at the bottom of it.

18             I believe that any of these objections would go to the weight of

19     the document and would not go to its admissibility.

20             JUDGE ROBINSON:  What do you say to the point, Mr. Docherty, that

21     the name that we see there, Vasiljkovic, is obviously differently written

22     from Captain Dragan and that that poses an issue of authenticity?

23             MR. DOCHERTY:  I respectfully disagree.  The document appears to

24     have been typewritten rather than prepared on a word processor which is

25     what we have all gotten used to and of course typewriters do vary quite a

Page 1090

 1     bit, particularly if the ribbon needs to be changed.

 2             The type face and the size of the type are identical.  There is

 3     no change in the type face.  There is no change in the type size.  And

 4     again, I put it that this is simply the sort of thing that is common when

 5     documents are prepared on typewriters rather than on computerised word

 6     processors.

 7             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Were we to admit this document, Mr. Docherty,

 8     what use would we be able to make of it?

 9             MR. DOCHERTY:  The relevance of this document, Your Honour, is

10     that it shows that the Captain Dragan Vasiljkovic that the witness has

11     said he was informed was in the Krajina area, indeed in the Knin

12     fortress, in fact, has authored a proposal to establish, in fact, a

13     military training centre in the Knin fortress and that it is dated the

14     27th of May, 1991.  So it corroborates what the witness was told by

15     Admiral Zec while flying in the helicopter from Sibenik to Knin at the

16     beginning of his truce mission in May of 1991.

17             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Mr. Knoops, what do you say to that?

18             MR. KNOOPS:  Your Honour, the fact remains that when it concerns

19     the overall contents of the document, it's not from the personal

20     knowledge of the witness.  The witness just said that he observed

21     something from a helicopter but he cannot testify about the accuracy of

22     the content, the full content of the document simply because he didn't

23     write the document itself.

24             I believe it's evidence from the Prosecution himself to say that

25     this is common within the military.  We don't know whether this is a

Page 1091

 1     military document after all.  So I believe that on the basis of what the

 2     witness has testified, there is ample -- there is no foundation, little

 3     foundation to admit the document simply because, apart from the

 4     authenticity, the witness information to the Court is too little to

 5     accept this document as being within his full personal knowledge.

 6             If the Prosecution wants to establish that what the witness said

 7     that there are military training camps at that time in Knin, it cannot be

 8     the case that the document which is totally out of the personal knowledge

 9     and out of the authorship of this witness is introduced merely on the

10     simple saying of this witness that he saw a military training camp or

11     military units being trained.

12             JUDGE ROBINSON:  In the Tribunal, we have admitted, on many

13     occasions, documents through witnesses who have not been the signataries

14     of the documents.  Isn't that so?

15             MR. KNOOPS:  That is correct, Your Honour, although the witness

16     is not a military witness yet the Prosecution alleges that this is a

17     document drafted by a military person, namely -- a person with the name

18     Captain Dragan.  So this contradicts already admissibility.

19             I would agree with Your Honours if we are dealing with the

20     military expert or somebody who works within the military.

21             This is a person working for a civil service.

22                           [Trial Chamber confers]

23             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. Jovanovic.

24             MR. JOVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  Just a

25     short objection.  The Prosecutor said that as far as the documents, that

Page 1092

 1     documents which contain a military order are not customarily signed.

 2     This document here is just a proposal.  So it's not a document of any

 3     military order.

 4             JUDGE ROBINSON:  We'll not admit it at this stage.  We'll mark it

 5     for identification and if you have another witness later on who can speak

 6     more directly to its contents then at that stage we'll consider its

 7     admission again.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P5 marked for

 9     identification.

10             MR. DOCHERTY:  Your Honour, can we please move back into private

11     session.

12             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Yes, private session, please.

13                           [Private session]

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 1093











11 Pages 1093-1100 redacted. Private session.















Page 1101

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5                           [Open session]

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  We are in open session, Your Honour.

 7             JUDGE ROBINSON:  I want to deal with some matters relating to the

 8     accused Stanisic.  We have been told that he has not been following the

 9     proceedings by videolink.

10             Is that so, Madam Court Deputy?

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour, that's correct.

12             JUDGE ROBINSON:  We have also received the form which is headed

13     "Absence from court due to illness," and that form which is the form for

14     today has not been signed by the accused.  And on the second page under

15     the section, "UNDU medical service," the deputy medical officer has

16     ticked the box 2A, confirming that the accused has observable symptoms

17     which indicate that he may feel too unwell to attend court.

18             In light of the decision that has been made by the Chamber, it

19     appears to me that some consideration should be given to amending that

20     part of the officer's declaration because now the question is whether he

21     feels too unwell to follow and participate in the proceedings via

22     videolink because we have already made the decision that the trial will

23     proceed by way of videolink.

24             I just wanted to hear any comments that the parties might have on

25     that.

Page 1102

 1             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, I would agree with that and I would

 2     also ask that there be an additional amendment to it.  As the Court heard

 3     yesterday during the testimony of Dr. Falke, we had a similar form that

 4     also had the box ticked that there were observable signs that

 5     Mr. Stanisic was too unwell to come to court.  Yet when I asked Dr. Falke

 6     what were the observable signs, the medical doctor who saw him the very

 7     day, hours before he was in court, he said that he saw no observable

 8     signs.

 9             So I would suggest that the form also be amended to ask the

10     medical staff to actually list what are the observable signs that they

11     have seen that indicates to them that Mr. Stanisic is too unwell to go to

12     use the video conference centre or come to court.

13             JUDGE ROBINSON:  I'm not certain that I want to go that far

14     because, after all, these are matters of -- may be matters of

15     interpretation and one officer is saying that he has seen observable

16     symptoms and another one is saying that he has not.

17             What I think I'll certainly do is ask the court deputy to bring

18     to the attention of the registrar who will bring that to the attention of

19     the UNDU that the question now is whether the accused is well or unwell

20     to follow and participate in the proceedings via the video conference

21     link.

22                           [Trial Chamber confers]

23             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Let me hear Mr. Knoops.  Do you have anything on

24     this matter to say?

25             MR. KNOOPS:  Thank you, Your Honour.  No comments.

Page 1103

 1                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 2             JUDGE ROBINSON:  The Chamber has considered your submissions,

 3     Mr. Groome.  We believe there is merit in it, so I'll also ask the court

 4     deputy to transmit to the registrar who will in turn pass on to the UNDU

 5     the Chamber's instructions that where there is a confirmation of

 6     observable symptoms, then those symptoms should be indicated, those

 7     symptoms should be identified.

 8             In the box 4A, it says, "I assess that he will require ..." I'm

 9     not certain, is that a two, a number, or a question sign?  Can anyone

10     help?

11             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, based on all of the forms when I

12     reviewed them from my examination for Dr. Falke, I believe it's a

13     question mark and it's been used consistently since, I believe, the

14     second week of April.

15             JUDGE ROBINSON:  It appears to be a question mark, yes.  Yes,

16     they all have that question mark, yes.

17             The Chamber has today issued an order as to the monitoring of the

18     accused while he is watching the proceedings by video conference link and

19     you would have seen that order or if you have not yet received it, you

20     will have it shortly.

21             Before we adjourn, I want to say that on Tuesday, the 6th of May,

22     we will sit in the morning, that's at 9.00 a.m., and also in the morning

23     on Wednesday the 7th, and Thursday the 8th.

24             We'll therefore adjourn until Tuesday, the 6th -- just a minute.

25             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, just -- sorry.  Just one quick

Page 1104

 1     question.  Your Honour, the statements that you've asked us to provide,

 2     do you wish them in hard copy or in electronic format?  The statements of

 3     the witnesses the week prior, would you prefer them ...

 4             JUDGE ROBINSON:  I see.  The prior statements.

 5             MR. GROOME:  Yes.

 6             JUDGE ROBINSON:  I see.

 7             MR. GROOME:  We can provide them in either hard copy or

 8     electronic form.

 9             JUDGE ROBINSON:  Hard copy, please.

10             So we'll adjourn then until Tuesday the 6th, 9.00 a.m.

11                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.00 p.m.,

12                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 6th

13                           of May, 2008, at 9.00 a.m.