Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 8261

 1                           Thursday, 28 October 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.22 p.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good afternoon to everyone.  Madam Registrar, would

 6     you please call the case.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Good afternoon,

 8     everyone in and around the courtroom.  This is the case IT-03-69-T, the

 9     Prosecutor versus Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

11             I've few procedural issues to start with.  Mr. Jordash, would you

12     mind if I delay a decision on your request to address the Court for ten

13     minutes why you need more time until we have perhaps talked a bit more

14     about scheduling.

15             Then second one.  Prosecution's formal application in relation to

16     witness Dr. Charles Kirudja.  I think that the parties indicated that

17     they would express themselves on this motion at the beginning of this

18     hearing.

19             MR. JORDASH:  We don't object to the proposal, Your Honour.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  You don't object.  Mr. --

21             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] We do not object, Your Honour.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Then perhaps it's very practical to already inform

23     the Prosecution about the decision if we have reached one.

24                           [Trial Chamber confers]

25             JUDGE ORIE:  The Chamber grants the formal application in every

Page 8262

 1     respect as found under 8(A), (B), and (C) of the formal application which

 2     was filed on the 21st of October.

 3             Since two Prosecution teams are involved, the Chamber will put

 4     its decision on paper, but I think for practical purposes it would be

 5     important for you to know right away whether the motion is granted.

 6             That's the Kirudja issue.  Then I would like to move into private

 7     session.

 8                           [Private session]

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Page 8263











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Page 8271

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19                           [Open session]

20             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

22             Mr. Jordash.

23             MR. JORDASH:  This is an application to allow the Defence an

24     opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Theunens until -- for the

25     Stanisic Defence until the end of tomorrow.  At the moment, if

Page 8272

 1     Your Honours give the extension you're considering, which is until, as I

 2     understand it, the end of Tuesday, I intend, having spoken to Mr. Bakrac,

 3     to stop after the first session of tomorrow to leave Mr. Simatovic's team

 4     an ample and a fair opportunity to deal with Mr. Theunens the remainder

 5     of tomorrow, Monday and Tuesday.

 6             I'm asking that I -- we have an extension to allow our team to

 7     cross-examine until the end of tomorrow, and if that is granted, it would

 8     still be, in our respectful submission, much less than has been granted

 9     in other cases of a comparable nature.

10             Your Honours, I hear what Your Honours say about the inefficiency

11     of the cross-examination.  We don't accept it, the criticism in its

12     totality.  Even if the cross-examination was as inefficient as

13     Your Honours suggest, in our respectful submission, it does not justify

14     curtailing the cross-examination to the extent that Your Honours intend.

15     I would simply say this in this regard, that I went through two-thirds of

16     the Prosecution's thesis on Arkan and his links to the Serbian MUP in

17     approximately one hour yesterday, and in total yesterday we had no more

18     than three and a half hours.  If Your Honours curtail the

19     cross-examination as Your Honours suggest, I will finish tomorrow after

20     the first session, and I would have had approximately three and a half

21     hours yesterday, had less than two and a half hours today, and then an

22     hour tomorrow, which will be approximately six hours.

23             The Prosecution's report is 500 pages long with 500 exhibits.

24     Many of those exhibits run into the tens of pages and some of them the

25     hundreds of pages.  If we were granted until the end -- if the

Page 8273

 1     Stanisic Defence was granted until the end of tomorrow, we would have had

 2     approximately, I think, nine hours, which we would submit still is well

 3     within what has been granted to other teams on the basis of comparable

 4     reports.  And if we were to be granted until the end of tomorrow, we

 5     would still be asking for Your Honours to take a flexible approach to

 6     Mr. Theunens' previous testimony in five other trials, which is full of

 7     extremely rich testimony, inconsistent in many parts to the testimony

 8     that he's given in this case, given for different accused and for

 9     different purposes.  In an ideal world we would have the opportunity to

10     take Mr. Theunens through that voluminous testimony, which amounts to

11     hundreds of pages, so that we might take advantage of those

12     inconsistencies.

13             So in short, we submit, given the size and complexity of this

14     report, that nine hours that we're asking for is --

15             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm listening and at the same time I'm trying to

16     digest some of the things you're saying.  I'm trying to seek solutions

17     all the time.

18             MR. JORDASH:  Your Honour -- I know that, Your Honour.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.

20             MR. JORDASH:  Given the size and complexity of the report, and

21     I've referred Your Honours to that, hundreds of hours have been spent and

22     had to have been spent over the last weeks reading this report and trying

23     to take notice of what Mr. Theunens is saying.

24             Secondly, we remind Your Honours of the previous precedent and

25     the most comparable, we would say, is the Seselj case, where Mr. Theunens

Page 8274

 1     testified there for eight hours.  But, Your Honour, the Presiding Judge

 2     knows that Mr. Theunens also testified for 45 hours in the Gotovina case,

 3     an indictment spanning only three months and an indictment with a joint

 4     criminal enterprise and a forcible transfer related to one region.  We

 5     would say we are asking for much less than they asked for in that case.

 6             And finally, the weight that the Prosecution will seek to put on

 7     this report.  The report is, we say, transparently a selection of what

 8     Mr. Theunens and the Prosecution consider to be the highlights of their

 9     case, and in order to expose that and go through the many -- the very

10     many things that Mr. Theunens has missed out, and we would submit

11     misrepresented, takes time.  We're not asking to do all of that.  We're

12     going to take some of that on trust that Your Honours will see that

13     anyway, but nonetheless, we would like to have a reasonable opportunity

14     to do it to a degree.

15             And may I make -- the final point is this, that Your Honours make

16     the point that we are losing witnesses.  In our submission, we are not

17     losing witnesses.  We have, in our submission, been somewhat hijacked by

18     the Prosecution's schedule.  The Prosecution said and listed in their

19     schedule that Mr. Theunens should take and be dealt with in a week.  We,

20     the Defence, have been saying for months that that was an unrealistic

21     assessment of a witness such as Mr. Theunens.  So we said it in court,

22     and we said it at the time when we met Your Honour in an informal

23     setting, and we understood that Mr. Theunens would be sent away and come

24     back to deal with what we then were predicting from the Stanisic Defence

25     side a cross-examination lasting between 10 and 15 hours.  And I repeat,

Page 8275

 1     we're asking for less than we predicted several months ago.  And in our

 2     submission, we ought not to be hijacked by the Prosecution schedule,

 3     which we've repeatedly said, in relation to this witness and most of the

 4     other witnesses, is unrealistic.

 5             We submit that we ought to, with a witness such as this, be given

 6     a little bit of latitude to examine this huge complex report.

 7             Those are our submissions.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Jordash.

 9                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

10             JUDGE ORIE:  We'll further consider the matter, Mr. Jordash.

11             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Bakrac.

13             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I'll be very brief.  I fully agree

14     with Mr. Jordash.  I do not wish to criticise anyone.  We have an

15     excellent co-operation with the Prosecution, but I think that the whole

16     problem stems from the planning carried out by the Prosecution.  You said

17     that from the 25th of October onwards that we'll be sitting three days a

18     week, and had the OTP been more realistic and had they planned to hear

19     this witness over those two weeks, the situation would have been

20     different.

21             However, I don't want to criticise only the Prosecution.  We

22     received this from Mr. Weber, namely that by 2.15 tomorrow, the Simatovic

23     Defence should hand over their documents so that Mr. Theunens could see

24     them.  Some of these documents are still being translated, and then we

25     would like to move faster and more efficiently if we manage to do this.

Page 8276

 1     All of this speaks in favour of allowing Mr. Jordash to cross-examine

 2     until the end of tomorrow, and then Mr. Theunens can look at the

 3     documents provided by the Simatovic Defence over the weekend so that we

 4     can work fast and efficiently next week.

 5             Another thing.  Please, precisely because of the fact that we are

 6     in the situation that we're in, the Simatovic Defence team kindly asks

 7     the Trial Chamber to hand down your ruling as soon as possible so that we

 8     would know when we are to start.

 9             Thank you so very much.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Bakrac.

11             Mr. Weber, do you want to add anything?

12             MR. WEBER:  No, Your Honour, but I did want to clarify one thing.

13     The Prosecution did inform the Defence and believes it's our position

14     that we've been very transparent with both the Chamber and the Defence

15     concerning the scheduling of this witness.  With that being said, we take

16     no position.  We believe this is a matter for the Chamber in its

17     discretion to decide.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Weber, for that.

19             I think there's one thing I have to put on the record, but

20     meanwhile, I think we could ask the Usher to -- to escort, Mr. Theunens

21     into the courtroom.

22             On transcript page 8117, lines 13 to 15, I said P1347 up to and

23     including P1367 are admitted into evidence.  I made a mistake there, or

24     at least there is a mistake.  It should have been P1346 up to and

25     including P1367, which also makes understandable now why I said

Page 8277

 1     immediately after that, among them P1346, P1347, and P1349 under seal.

 2             This is hereby corrected and put on the record.

 3                           [The witness takes the stand]

 4                           WITNESS:  REYNAUD THEUNENS [Resumed]

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good afternoon, Mr. Theunens.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  First our apologies for the late start.  Part of the

 8     time was needed to discuss your further -- the time your testimony would

 9     further take.  I can already tell you, as a result, that we'll certainly

10     not finish this week, and the Chamber will take proper care that

11     communication between VWS and your employer will be -- will be dealt with

12     in an appropriate way, because we do understand fully your problems and

13     the problems your employer may have.  So communication will be

14     established in relation to that.  Unfortunately, I cannot give you a

15     final outcome.  The parties do not know.  The Chamber is still

16     considering various options, but it is on our mind to conclude your

17     testimony as quickly as is reasonably possible.

18             Having said this, I would like to remind you that you are still

19     bound by the solemn declaration you have given at the beginning of your

20     testimony.  And Mr. Jordash will now very efficiently continue his

21     cross-examination.

22             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honours.

23                           Cross-examination by Mr. Jordash:  [Continued]

24        Q.   Good afternoon, Mr. Theunens.

25        A.   Good afternoon, Mr. Jordash.

Page 8278

 1        Q.   I want to go straight to page -- page 70, chapter 1, of your

 2     report.

 3             MR. JORDASH:  For the -- Madam Registrar, the -- for

 4     Madam Registrar, Exhibit P1575, MFI, please.

 5        Q.   And I want to deal, Mr. Theunens, with your opinion concerning

 6     Article 118 of the 1991 Law on Defence of the Republic of Serbia.  And as

 7     I understand your opinion, you conclude that this article, as it states,

 8     prohibits anyone but competent state bodies from organising, reinforcing,

 9     arming, equipping, and training armed forces, and from that you say

10     obligations arose which the Serbian MUP, amongst other ministries, failed

11     to fulfil, giving rise to the formation of paramilitaries and their

12     encouragement into the regions of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Do I

13     summarise you correctly?

14        A.   Yes, but I -- I'm not sure what you mean by "their encouragement

15     into the regions of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina."  I mean, just to

16     correct, they were established in Serbia, and they participated in combat

17     operations and other activities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And

18     to be fully accurate, it's not just a matter of establishing them but

19     also allowing them to exist during several years.

20        Q.   Yes.  It's the failure to fulfil the duties which flowed from

21     Article 118 which gave rise to the formation of the paramilitaries and

22     their continued existence.  And what then precisely do you say was

23     encouraged?  Is it the formation and their continued existence?

24        A.   Exactly.  It was my conclusion that if you do not enforce the

25     law, then by failing to enforce it you actually encourage this kind of

Page 8279

 1     violation of the law.

 2        Q.   Right.  Now, if we can move to page 111 of your report,

 3     chapter 1, please.  And I want to ask you about the 14th of August, 1991,

 4     Serbian government decree.  Am I correct that this effectively was a law

 5     which enabled volunteers to register with their local and/or any TO?

 6        A.   Indeed it concerned the registration of volunteers in the TO of

 7     the Republic of Serbia.

 8        Q.   And it was a law which you say regularised what was a de facto

 9     situation.

10        A.   Actually, in my report I say it's -- it's one of the three legal

11     measures.  I mean, there is this -- this decree.  There is a further

12     order on the level of the SFRY armed forces, and then there is the

13     presidential order number 73 of the 10th of December.

14        Q.   Let me just stick, if I can --

15        A.   Yeah, okay.

16        Q.   -- with the August decree.

17        A.   Mm-hmm.

18        Q.   This effectively widened the definition of what was a volunteer;

19     is that correct?

20        A.   No.  My understand is that the same definition for volunteers is

21     included in this decree as what was defined elsewhere.

22        Q.   What did the decree allow that it hadn't -- that hadn't been

23     allowed before?

24        A.   I'm not sure whether the -- I mean, I can't identify what the

25     decree allowed that had not been allowed before.

Page 8280

 1        Q.   What was the object and purpose of the decree as you interpret

 2     it?

 3        A.   Well -- and again you can find the background in my report.  I

 4     will not go in detail now, but we have a situation where an increasing

 5     number of especially - I mean, we're talking about Serbia - young men who

 6     have military obligations.  They refuse to join the JNA, I mean, for

 7     example, for political or nationalistic reasons because they consider the

 8     JNA as a Communist army.  This is specifically the motivation of

 9     volunteers who join the groups organised by the Serbian Radical Party.

10     Then we have other motivations.  So what we see is that people even if

11     they don't fulfil the legal obligations to be a volunteer because they

12     have military obligations, they still refuse to join the regular armed

13     forces and are part of volunteer groups.

14        Q.   So it enabled those who individually or collectively refused to

15     join the JNA to organise themselves as volunteers and then, through this

16     decree, register with the TO; is that correct?

17        A.   You've mentioned a very important point, organise themselves.

18     It's something I've tried to highlight also in this report.  Volunteers,

19     when they decide to join the armed forces, they do this on an individual

20     basis, and then the armed forces will decide where do we need these

21     volunteers, based -- I mean, based on the operational and other

22     requirements and obviously also the qualifications of the individual

23     volunteers.  At this stage, it is not yet the -- I mean, it doesn't seem

24     to be the policy yet that you have a group of people who call themselves

25     a volunteer group and then that volunteer group joins the TO and remains

Page 8281

 1     in the same configuration.  That is, in my understanding, not the aim of

 2     this decree.

 3        Q.   Right.  But what this decree did was say, look, those of you who

 4     have been forming groups as we know, forming groups organised around

 5     political ideals, will now be allowed to register with a TO.

 6        A.   If you look at Article 2 of the decree, which you can find on

 7     page 112 of part 1 of my report, it -- it reminds the reader of the

 8     criteria that applied to volunteers, i.e., persons who do not have a

 9     military obligation and are not younger than 17.  The age is not so much

10     an issue.  The real issue is the military obligation, as I explained

11     earlier.

12        Q.   And the real issue as well, if we read on in Article 2, is that

13     it allows those who do not have wartime assignments in the JNA to travel

14     from Serbia to a TO and join up in that way.  Is that not correct?

15        A.   Yes, but I mean it's partly correct.  The reference to no wartime

16     assignments in the JNA is indeed made, but the TO -- if you're talking

17     about the TO of the Republic of Serbia, and I agree it's a complicated

18     matter, but there was no -- I haven't found a document that justifies the

19     participation of units of the TO of the Republic of Serbia on -- in

20     operations outside of Serbia with the exception - and again this is just

21     one aspect of the whole story - that a number of units of the TO of the

22     Republic of Serbia were part of the 1st Military District.  And since the

23     1st Military District also covers part of the territory of Croatia, it

24     could be argued from a purely military point of view, and I'm not talking

25     about legal implications, i.e., the declaration of a state of war and so

Page 8282

 1     on, but from a purely military point of view, that these units of the TO

 2     of the Republic of Serbia would be allowed to operate under the command

 3     or in the framework of units of the 1st Military District on the

 4     territory of -- of Croatia.

 5        Q.   Well, I think we might be jumping ahead.  What I'm concerned with

 6     initially is what it enabled people in Serbia to do in relation to

 7     joining a TO within Serbia.  It enabled, didn't it, this decree, those

 8     who were so minded, those who did not have wartime assignments in the

 9     JNA, to travel to their local TO or travel to another TO within Serbia,

10     register and become regularised as a volunteer.  Isn't that the whole

11     point of this decree?

12        A.   I mean, there was one TO.  It's not a TO in Serbia.  There was

13     one TO in the Republic of Serbia, obviously with its sub-units.  And once

14     these people registered in the TO, they lose their status of volunteers

15     and they become members of the TO like any other member of the TO.  If

16     the legal conditions, and they are explained in the decree, are

17     fulfilled.

18        Q.   I think the answer then is yes.  This is what the decree did,

19     enabled individuals in Serbia who had not had wartime assignments in the

20     JNA or who had not joined the JNA prior to set off from their various

21     homes and join the TO.  Isn't that the point of the decree?

22        A.   Yes, but --

23        Q.   Is that a yes?

24        A.   No, no, I'm sorry, you forget the first line of Article 2.  It's

25     not just an issue of a wartime assignment.  The main issue is no military

Page 8283

 1     obligations.

 2        Q.   Okay.  No, I don't -- I'm not sure we need to disagree about

 3     anything here.  Putting aside --

 4        A.   But I'm surprised you forget that part.

 5        Q.   Well, can -- do you agree with the other part?  Do you agree that

 6     it enabled those without military obligation and those without a wartime

 7     assignment to travel from their homes and join the TO of Serbia?

 8        A.   If the conditions -- the legal conditions set out in Article 3

 9     are fulfilled.  Because that Article 3 explains when the registration

10     takes place.  And at the date of this decree, none of the three legal

11     states, i.e., the state of war, the state of emergency, or the state of

12     imminent threat of war, had been declared or announced.

13        Q.   But do you not now fall victim to what I did, which is to miss

14     out the next section which says in peacetime and for training purposes

15     from Article -- persons from Article 2 of this decree can voluntarily

16     join the military manoeuvres and other forms of training of the unit,

17     headquarters and institutions of Territorial Defence.

18        A.   I'm not sure I completely follow you because in my view that is

19     not the same as a registration in the TO.  That is just a voluntary -- as

20     it explains a voluntary participation for training purposes which

21     probably lasts as long as the training lasts and then everybody goes home

22     again and life continues.  It's not the same as registering in the TO.

23        Q.   Okay.  Point taken, but that's -- so we have two forms of

24     enabling provisions effectively, those -- the registering and the

25     attending for training; correct?

Page 8284

 1        A.   Yeah, and I think it would be useful if we really want to be

 2     hundred per cent precise to go through the whole decree and --

 3        Q.   Well, I don't really have time for that.

 4        A.   No, okay.

 5        Q.   We'll keep going if you don't mind.

 6        A.   Yeah.  No.  It's no problem.

 7        Q.   This decree, as you note in your report, is the first of three

 8     pieces of legislation which slowly widened the notion of what individuals

 9     within Serbia were permitted to do in terms of registering with Serbian

10     TO and the Serbian JNA; is that correct?

11        A.   I just want to be more precise.  It -- I mean if you want to put

12     it in one sentence, it's widening the notion of individuals to register

13     in the SFRY armed forces or what remains of the SFRY armed forces at that

14     stage because the TOs -- obviously Slovenia is gone and the republican TO

15     of Croatia is not a component anymore of the SFRY armed forces.

16        Q.   So did this new legal framework then allow military conscripts,

17     individually or collectively, who had initially refused to serve in the

18     JNA but then having been recruited by nationalist parties to be then

19     accepted in JNA or TO units?

20        A.   Again, and I have highlighted that had in my report, I have not

21     seen any reference to collectively joining the armed forces at that early

22     stage.

23        Q.   Well, I'm asking in relation to the new legal framework that

24     arose due to the three pieces of legislation which you refer to in your

25     report.

Page 8285

 1        A.   Yeah, for that I'm reading the -- re-reading the order number --

 2     the presidential order number 73 which is discussed on page 117 and 118

 3     of my report.  Again we talk about even if the volunteers show up in

 4     group -- groups their assignment in a unit of the SFRY armed forces,

 5     i.e., at that time mainly the JNA, would decide -- would be decided by

 6     the JNA based on the requirements of the units, where do we need what

 7     kind of military personnel on one hand and on the other hand, obviously,

 8     the qualifications of the volunteer.

 9        Q.   Yeah.  So what you're saying is that you haven't seen anything

10     which - is this right? - enables the group which arrives to register to

11     then remain as their own subordinate group.  Is that what you're saying?

12        A.   We're talking here about the legislation.  Obviously there are

13     documents, I mean, when we talk about the combat operations, for example,

14     in Eastern Slavonia when we see OG South, and, okay, these operations

15     take place prior to the order 73, that there the command of OG South

16     allows a number of volunteers to remain in their separate group albeit --

17     although under JNA command during combat operations.  And most well-known

18     examples there are, for example, the Leva Supoderica and the Petrova

19     Gora, they are officially called local Serb TO detachments but, in fact,

20     they consist for the largest part of volunteers who joined the Serbian

21     Radical Party volunteer groups, including people from the area but also

22     from Serbia.

23        Q.   Looking back at the August decree, what -- what do you say prior

24     to that August decree were the acts which were unlawful in Serbia

25     according to 118?

Page 8286

 1        A.   We know, for example, that -- and I haven't gone in detail on the

 2     Serbian Radical Party volunteers in this report, but I mean my report on

 3     the SRS volunteers is in evidence -- has been admitted into evidence in

 4     the Seselj trial, and there we know that already at those early stages

 5     the Serbian Radical Party is organising volunteers, I mean by that

 6     recruiting them as well as gathering means to -- to arm them at a later

 7     stage.  Another example is --

 8        Q.   Could I just stop you there.  I'm trying to at this stage not

 9     move into what was happening on the ground according to you but your

10     interpretation of 118.  You've said, look, the 118 means something.

11        A.   Yeah.

12        Q.   Serbian MUP didn't abide by it.  Now, what I'm trying to have you

13     explain to the Court is what do you say were the acts, the actual acts

14     which were impermissible in law according to 118?  Prior to the August

15     decree.

16        A.   Well, a first example would be the activities of

17     Captain Dragan --

18        Q.   No, Mr. Theunens, I mean, I'm trying to get you to break down --

19     like I say, please, if you'd stay away from the -- what were the facts,

20     but I'm trying to have you explain what this law means.  You've made a

21     judgement on this law.

22        A.   Yeah.

23        Q.   And I'm -- the law seems to say, well, you can't form armed units

24     outside of state competent bodies.

25        A.   Indeed.

Page 8287

 1        Q.   Now, when do you say the illegality arises?  What are the acts

 2     which you say were impermissible such that, and we'll come to this in due

 3     course, such that the MUP's responsibilities arose and thereby, according

 4     to you, they failed to abide by them?  So the first step, as I see it in

 5     this analysis, is what acts were impermissible according to 118 prior to

 6     the decree in August.

 7        A.   Yeah.  I tried to understand your question, but when you talk

 8     about acts I would refer to facts.

 9        Q.   Well, acts or behaviour.  For example -- let me try to concretise

10     this.  Was it unlawful for a group of men with a nationalistic political

11     agenda to gather in a room and discuss going to Croatia to fight?  Would

12     that be under 118 unlawful?

13        A.   It depends what the discussions would be about.  If the

14     discussions concerned really to -- to organise a group and to set up

15     structures, for example, to recruit members, to transport them from

16     Serbia to Croatia, to -- if the discussions would also involve how these

17     people would be armed, how they -- what they would do, then we would -- I

18     mean, looking at the duties of the state security, for example, one would

19     expect that these groups would be monitored.

20        Q.   Well, hold on a second.  We'll come to the duties.

21        A.   Okay.

22        Q.   We'll come to the duties.

23        A.   Okay.

24        Q.   I want to deal with the law and what you say was -- you -- you

25     say that this 118, in fact, made it unlawful for groups of people to get

Page 8288

 1     together and discuss how they might go about organising a group to go

 2     and -- into Croatia and join up with the war effort.  You'd say that was

 3     unlawful under 118?

 4        A.   Well, I think we may read the article.  It's quite clear.

 5        Q.   Well, okay.

 6        A.   Because I mean if you organise -- just quoting your question,

 7     organise a group to go and Croatia join up with the war effort.  If the

 8     nature of the group involves organising, reinforcing, arming, and

 9     equipping, and training armed forces, i.e., people who use weapons for --

10     in combat conditions, I would say that this is unlawful.

11        Q.   Well, if it's only limited to discussion at that point.  Would

12     that be unlawful, the mere discussion of it?

13        A.   I'm not sure what you mean by the point discussion because

14     anything involves communication, I mean --

15        Q.   Well, a group of people --

16        A.   [Overlapping speakers] ...

17        Q.   A group of people in a room, belonging to Seselj or Seselj's

18     party, sitting there saying, well, you know what, maybe we should get

19     together, maybe we shouldn't go and get some arms, and maybe we should go

20     down to Croatia, and maybe we should join the war effort.  Would that be

21     unlawful under 118 according to your interpretation?

22        A.   It could become unlawful.

23        Q.   Would it be unlawful and in what circumstances would it be

24     unlawful according to you?

25        A.   Well, if you -- if you -- if you start implementing these issues.

Page 8289

 1        Q.   Right.  Okay.  So it's not the discussion, it's the -- it's the

 2     commencement of implementation?

 3        A.   I mean it's a discussion about words we're doing here and I'm --

 4        Q.   No, I don't think it is actually, because if I'm a police officer

 5     and I want to know who I can arrest if I have an arrest power, and we'll

 6     come to that in a minute, and I need to know what I can arrest somebody

 7     for.  And if I can arrest them for sitting around having a discussion,

 8     that's one thing.  If I have to wait for them to go and get arms, that's

 9     a totally different thing.  You'd agree with that, no?

10        A.   I mean, what do you mean by discussion?

11        Q.   Well, this is the point.  You've interpreted 118, and you say

12     that the MUP failed to abide by it.  So you must have come to a

13     conclusion -- this is our position at least, that you must have come to a

14     conclusion about what behaviour was prohibited by 118.

15        A.   That is what I've been trying to help to mention in the

16     beginning.  For example, the fact that Dragan is, according to an SSNO

17     security organs report, doing certain things in -- in Croatia.  Not that

18     fact that he is in Croatia is covered by 118 but there is a whole history

19     prior to that.

20        Q.   Okay.  So what would be the history --

21        A.   That is an example.

22        Q.   -- prior to that?  It's -- it's --

23        A.   Well, we would --

24        Q.   Sorry.  Let me just say we're not talking about behaviour outside

25     of Serbia, are we?  118 applies to Serbia.

Page 8290

 1        A.   Indeed.

 2        Q.   Right.  So Dragan's misbehaving, let's say hypothetically,

 3     outside of Serbia.  Nothing to do with 118.  Except insofar as 118

 4     applies to what he did before he left Serbia.

 5        A.   Yeah, because the misbehaviour -- I mean, you have to define the

 6     misbehaviour.  If the misbehaviour consists of using armed groups or an

 7     armed group which he has established in Serbia or trained or organised or

 8     equipped, then 118 comes into -- into play.

 9        Q.   Yeah.  Well, how -- this is -- right.  So what is the behaviour

10     that Dragan would have to do in Serbia to fall afoul of 118, according to

11     your interpretation?

12        A.   He would have -- he or assisted by others would have had to,

13     again looking at the text of 118, organised, reinforced, armed, equipped,

14     or trained armed forces.

15        Q.   You said "or trained."  The legislation --

16        A.   And trained, I'm sorry.

17        Q.   And trained.

18        A.   And trained, yeah.

19        Q.   So it's -- Dragan would have to have been found to do those

20     things, organise --

21        A.   Yeah.

22        Q.   -- reinforce, arm, equip, and trained armed forces?

23        A.   Yeah.

24        Q.   Okay.  At that point the obligations was arise upon the Serbian

25     MUP?

Page 8291

 1        A.   It would arise upon the Serbian government as a whole and I

 2     understand -- I mean, I haven't analysed the duties of the ministry of

 3     interior of the MUP, but --

 4        Q.   Well, would --

 5        A.   If you allow me to answer --

 6        Q.   Sorry.

 7        A.   But Article 94 of the constitution, I mean, states that

 8     ministries have to abide by the law, so ...

 9        Q.   Right.  Okay.  Now, that's the law that was prior to the decree.

10     Now, after the decree in August, what was permitted as a result of that

11     decree?

12        A.   You mean the one on the TO?

13        Q.   The Serbian decree in August, the one that related to both the

14     registration of the -- in the TO and the training by the TO.

15        A.   It allowed for the registration of volunteers in the TO of the

16     Republic of Serbia.  If one -- as is referred to in Article 3, if one of

17     the three states, i.e., a state of war, a state of emergency, or -- I'm

18     sorry for the transcript.  So Article 3, the state of war, the state of

19     emergency or the state of an imminent threat of war had been declared.

20        Q.   Or peacetime training?

21        A.   Or peacetime training.

22        Q.   Yeah.

23        A.   But for me that is not registration, as I've tried to explain.

24        Q.   No.  Fair enough.

25             MR. JORDASH:  I don't know what time we started, Your Honours.

Page 8292

 1     I'm conscious of ...

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  We started approximately 20 minutes past to

 3     25 minutes.  This clock is always a bit ahead.  I think on the transcript

 4     it says 2.21 or 22.  So perhaps within the next couple of minutes a

 5     break.

 6             MR. JORDASH:  This is -- if -- if -- yeah --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  This --

 8             MR. JORDASH:  Yes.  Thank you.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Before we take the break, Mr. Theunens, you don't

10     have to wait for it, but it will not take long.  If we would insert, as

11     we already provisionally announced as a possibility to be explored, a

12     Monday afternoon session, if we would in addition to that add two

13     sessions in the morning of Tuesday and, if need be, two sessions in the

14     morning of Wednesday, of course then having five sessions a day, which

15     is -- in view of Mr. Stanisic's condition might be too much, but would

16     then try to agree on -- on how to arrange those sessions during the day,

17     whether we would have a bit of a longer break, perhaps three sessions in

18     the morning, start late in the afternoon, or start earlier in the

19     afternoon but then to finish early.  So that's still to be considered.

20     This would add to the Monday and the Tuesday afternoon.  We have already

21     at least four sessions, perhaps sessions of sometimes one hour, but we

22     have to find out a schedule for that.

23             Would that work?  And I'm just asking this to consider over the

24     break not only with Mr. Stanisic but also whether you could find a

25     division of time such that this would work.  This is not an answer yet in

Page 8293

 1     any way to the other matter, which is Witness JF-26, whether we should

 2     start that or not.

 3             One question, Mr. Weber.  If we would have a bit of a -- now, let

 4     me see.  Any deadline for tomorrow in such a new schedule, documents to

 5     be provided, we have several duties, would there be some flexibility in,

 6     for example, giving that an extra day?  You were all working over the

 7     weekends anyhow, isn't it?  That's -- would you please try to find out --

 8             MR. WEBER:  Yes.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  -- whether you could come to an agreement on those

10     deadlines.

11             MR. WEBER:  Your Honour, that's just largely a matter of

12     fairness.  If there's something that's fair that the Defence could do in

13     terms of notifying us of the bulk or what they may use first, things of

14     that nature, we will discuss that with them.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  If you could agree with Defence on that, that

16     would certainly be appreciated.  We'll have a break and we will resume at

17     5 minutes past 4.00.

18                           --- Recess taken at 3.35 p.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 4.10 p.m.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Before we continue, I suggested a possible solution

21     exclusively on the basis of available courtrooms, nothing else yet being

22     explored and arranged for.  Would it resolve the problem to such an

23     extent that we could agree on that, that means additional sittings on --

24     a sitting on Monday in the afternoon, which is in addition, Tuesday

25     additional sessions in the morning, Wednesday, if need be, also

Page 8294

 1     additional sessions in the morning?  Would that work?  In all respects I

 2     am thinking about Mr. Stanisic's condition, and we would have to work out

 3     a daily schedule, and in terms of what you need for cross-examination.

 4             MR. JORDASH:  It would and we would be very grateful for that

 5     solution.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Bakrac, who is silent usually -- no.  That's --

 7             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, whenever I'm in

 8     agreement, I'm silent, and I stand up when I have something to object

 9     about.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, well, in criminal procedure, remaining silent

11     and agreeing to something is not the same.  But we will further, then,

12     explore on the basis of the suggestion I made before this break and which

13     is agreeable to the Defence and the Defence is here the party who is most

14     interested in changing the schedule, Mr. Weber, but I nevertheless also

15     ask you whether it would meet major difficulties.

16             MR. WEBER:  No, Your Honour.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Then, Mr. Jordash, please proceed.

18             Perhaps it's also good to inform you, Mr. Theunens, we discussed,

19     as you were aware, of intensifying the schedule for the early part of

20     next week, and the parties agree with that.  I said before that we

21     would -- that VWS would assist in communications with your employer.

22     Would it meet any further problems apart from the problems you have

23     already?

24             THE WITNESS:  No.  I mean I think the Trial Chamber is aware of

25     the issues in the sense that they don't like me to be absent too long.  I

Page 8295

 1     understand -- I mean, they will understand the requirements here,

 2     obviously, so I think to spend more hours a day is also better for me.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Then we'll further explore that possibility.

 6             Mr. Jordash.

 7             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 8        Q.   So I want to one to 118 and ask you perhaps more concretely what

 9     you say was prohibited.

10             It wasn't prohibited, was it, under 118 to -- to travel and head

11     towards the border to cross into Croatia intending to volunteer?

12        A.   I mean, we talk about two different matters.  Article 118 does

13     not deal with volunteers.  Legal volunteers at least.

14        Q.   Sorry, what do you mean by that?

15        A.   Sorry.  Volunteers are dealt with by other legislation than

16     Article 118.

17        Q.   Well, I'm just trying to work out whether 118 prohibited that.

18     Is your answer to that then no, it doesn't prohibit that?

19        A.   It does, and I think it would be more efficient if we look, for

20     example, at P1051, which is included on page 87 of part 1 of my report,

21     where actually the person who is well placed to deal with these issues,

22     i.e., the minister of defence of the Republic of Serbia, at that time

23     Vice-Admiral Milorad Jokic, expresses his views on the 25th of July,

24     1991, in relation to a press conference where a political party announces

25     the establishment -- or excuse me, the recruitment and training of

Page 8296

 1     volunteers for its group.

 2        Q.   I think we're falling prey to the same thing.  I'm interested in

 3     the process by which you came to your conclusion about the dereliction of

 4     duty by the Serbian MUP.  So I'm trying to work out the process by which

 5     you came to that conclusion, and for that, I suggest you must have gone

 6     through this process.  Tell me if I'm wrong.  One, to work out what 118

 7     prohibited in concrete terms; is that correct?

 8        A.   Yes, and I gave elements of -- of --

 9        Q.   Okay.  We'll come back to that.

10        A.   Okay.

11        Q.   Two, to have analysed what enforcement powers that the Serbian

12     MUP had which it failed to use; correct?  I'm just asking whether --

13        A.   Yeah, but I'm looking at the wording I used in my report when I

14     discussed this.

15        Q.   Well, if you go to chapter 1, page 91, you say this --

16             MR. JORDASH:  Could we have, perhaps, that on e-court.  P1575,

17     MFI'd, and it's page --

18             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

19             MR. JORDASH:  -- 113 of e-court.

20             THE WITNESS:  No, no.  Mm-hmm.

21             MR. JORDASH:

22        Q.   And you say this.  Based on Article 94 of the constitution, I'm

23     paraphrasing, 1991 Law on Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, it

24     was incumbent upon the Ministry of the Interior to enforce the law in

25     general and Article 118 of the Law of Defence of Serbia on the

Page 8297

 1     prohibition of the establishment of armed forces that were not under

 2     state control.

 3             And you stand by that?

 4        A.   Yes.  And even there are examples.  There is a letter include --

 5        Q.   Yeah, but I don't want to move to the examples.  I want to move

 6     as to your understanding of the legislation and how it was you arrived at

 7     this view.

 8        A.   Indeed, but the example shows -- it's a concrete example.

 9     Radovan Stojicic informs a member of the parliament of Serbia which --

10     about the measures the MUP has taken against a party affiliate.  I think

11     it's Bokan from the White Eagles.  And Stojicic in his position as deputy

12     minister of interior informs that he has been arrested and then

13     transferred to the competent authorities.  So there we see that the

14     Ministry of the Interior carries out its -- its duties.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Theunens.

16             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  The question was simply whether you stood by what

18     you wrote.  Now, you did not only say that you stood by that but you also

19     started explaining why.  Might well be that Mr. Jordash would have easily

20     accepted that and that there was no need to explain why.  So therefore,

21     if we want to conclude somewhere early next week, perhaps you focus very

22     much on the questions.  And if at a later stage you think that by not

23     pointing to the example misunderstandings could arise, let's then wait

24     until the moment where that's the case rather than to already anticipate

25     on all kind of possible developments which may but also may never follow.

Page 8298

 1             MR. JORDASH:

 2        Q.   118 you say prohibited certain conduct.  Did it prohibit a

 3     volunteer or a person travelling towards Croatia with the intention to

 4     volunteer?

 5        A.   If -- if he's to volunteer in a -- an armed group, then it would

 6     fall under the prohibitions included by Article 118.

 7        Q.   If he travels alone to the border in order to join the TO of the

 8     SBWS, you would say that that was unlawful under 118?

 9        A.   Yeah, but the TO of SBWS is another thing.

10        Q.   Would you say that's unlawful under 118, Mr. Theunens?

11        A.   I think it would be a matter of legal interpretation and I'm not

12     qualified for that.

13        Q.   Well, you've interpreted 118 and your interpretation is critical

14     for this issue.

15        A.   Indeed, but as you see in my report, my interpretation is based

16     on much more obvious examples and these examples you can find throughout

17     my report.

18        Q.   Okay.  But --

19        A.   And okay -- yeah.

20        Q.   Was it illegal to carry weapons in Serbia in 1991?

21        A.   I think -- I mean, it would require a weapons permit depending on

22     the nature of the weapon.

23        Q.   What kind of weapon could you obtain a permit for?

24        A.   That's something I don't -- I didn't analyse but I know -- okay,

25     and I'll stop here.

Page 8299

 1        Q.   You didn't analyse that?

 2        A.   No, but I think common sense would dictate that carrying what we

 3     called "war weapons" would not be allowed without the person carrying the

 4     weapon having specific permits.

 5        Q.   What's a war weapon?

 6        A.   It's a weapon which has a particular calibre and which may have a

 7     particular rate of fire and a particular range.

 8        Q.   Was it unlawful to carry a hunting rifle?

 9        A.   I mean, in my country you need a permit for that.  I don't know

10     whether it was in Serbia at the time.

11        Q.   Was it unlawful to travel to a TO sub-unit in Serbia with a

12     hunting rifle?  In 1991.

13        A.   No.

14        Q.   Was it unlawful to travel in a vehicle with three other people

15     with hunting rifles towards a TO with the intention of joining up?

16        A.   If you -- if all the three people had permits for their hunting

17     rifles, they could drive wherever they want in Serbia.

18        Q.   Was it unlawful for a political party to organise a bus full of

19     potential -- people intending to volunteer and travel to the TO within

20     Serbia?

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, before we start asking the next

22     question whether it was unlawful to use a train for the same purposes or

23     to use a Volkswagen bus which could carry eight persons, so -- I mean, if

24     we would do the same in interpreting the law, we might have a very nice

25     evening in testing each other whether buying a knife under certain

Page 8300

 1     circumstances would or would not be an attempt.  The issue is let's look

 2     at what happened, and let's ask the witness whether he considered this to

 3     fall within the scope of, and then you mention the article, and then ask

 4     him why he comes to the conclusion rather than to go from a -- from a

 5     scooter to a bike to a car to a -- I see your point.

 6             The point is perfectly clear.  Where to draw a line in respect of

 7     this.  What does it mean?  Is it purely domestic?  Is it not purely

 8     domestic?  You've made that point already five or seven or eight times by

 9     saying, well, but if it's just in Croatia or it's just in Bosnia would

10     that be covered by -- that is a rather difficult issue of the -- of the

11     scope of the territorial jurisdiction of legislation.  Are we talking

12     about criminal legislation?  Are we talking about administrative

13     legislation?  We have not yet discussed the matter of criminal or not

14     criminal.  If it is criminal, would the active personality principle

15     apply?  I mean, that's a kind of legal expertise, I think, which I do not

16     mind you testing the witness on why he came to those conclusions, but the

17     way in which you're doing takes an enormous amount of time and does not

18     assist the Chamber a great deal.

19             I'm not saying don't touch upon the subject, but do it in such a

20     way that it assists the Chamber.

21             MR. JORDASH:  I'm not sure how to test the theory -- theory of

22     Mr. Theunens without seeing what knowledge he had or had not of what was

23     illegal and what was the Serbian MUP's duty.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  You could spend two days on going from the one end

25     of the scale to the very other end of the scale.  Rather, look at what

Page 8301

 1     appears to have happened or what the expert considers that may have

 2     happened on the basis of the documents and then try to find out why he

 3     considered this to be -- to fall within or outside the scope, rather than

 4     to come with all kind of examples which --

 5             MR. JORDASH:  Your Honour, could I ask Mr. Theunens to leave.

 6     I'm trying to explain why I'm taking this approach, and I'd rather do it

 7     without Mr. Theunens --

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm afraid that that would take even more time.  You

 9     may have understood what my concern is and what the Chamber's concern is.

10     I consulted with my colleagues.  I will allow you to proceed.  Keep that

11     in the back of your mind.  Don't give up perhaps necessarily on every

12     inch of your approach, but when I talked about the train and the scooter

13     and the Volkswagen bus, I think you understood what I meant.

14             MR. JORDASH:  Could I please have on e-court P1042, e-court

15     page 0216-2288.

16        Q.   I'm interested in whether you looked at Article 19, Mr. Theunens,

17     of the Defence law which contains 118.

18        A.   I must have done so.  I'm just checking whether I included in my

19     report, because I tried to restrict myself to the most -- to the articles

20     I considered most relevant.

21        Q.   I don't think it is in your report.

22        A.   Okay.

23        Q.   But I think if we could have page 0216-2288, if you look at the

24     screen, Mr. Theunens.

25             Article 99 referring to Defence training.  Just to be clear, we

Page 8302

 1     may not need to turn to it, but Article 1 of this law is the

 2     jurisdictional provision which limits the scope of 118 to issues of

 3     defence within the Republic of Serbia.  Do you accept that?  We can turn

 4     to it if you want, but --

 5        A.   Yeah, please turn to it.

 6        Q.   Okay.  Let's go back again.

 7             MR. JORDASH:  Can we go please to page 0216-2249 of e-court,

 8     please.  And Article 1 there under general provisions.  This law

 9     regulates rights and duties of the Republic of Serbia within the domain

10     of defence.

11        A.   Mm-hmm.

12        Q.   As well as rights and duties of citizens and obligations of

13     companies, institutions, and other organisations in defence,

14     Territorial Defence, civil protection, monitoring and reporting

15     communications and crypto-protection, training for defence, security

16     within the defence domain, defence planning, as well as other issues of

17     importance for defence within the republic.

18             We could also refer to Article 2 as well, which again perhaps is

19     the general provision which is equally applicable.

20             MR. JORDASH:  Could we go to the next page, please.

21        Q.   Article 2.  Defence preparations in the republic shall be

22     organised, planned and conducted in order to protect the sovereignty,

23     independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia.

24             So you agree that the scope of 118 is that, relating to

25     activities within Serbia?

Page 8303

 1        A.   Yes, and that's also how I interpreted it in my report.

 2        Q.   All right.

 3             MR. JORDASH:  Can we go to 0216-2288, please, Article 1999 --

 4     sorry, Article 99.

 5        Q.   And we see there a title, "Defence Training."  In order to

 6     acquire military and other expert skills and knowledge, the citizens have

 7     the right to be trained and taught as regards defence and protection.  In

 8     further the text referred to as defence training.

 9             This is the aspect I'm particularly interested in.  The defence

10     training is to be organised by the defence ministry, companies, and other

11     organisations with a uniform curriculum and programme.

12             How do you or how did you interpret that in relation to what

13     companies were permitted to do under Article 99?

14        A.   This article is part of the concept of what was called

15     All People's Defence, i.e., whereby the TO, as is defined -- is defined

16     as the widest form of -- I don't recall the exact wording but of

17     participation of the population in the defence effort, and there was a

18     time in the -- I mean in the former Yugoslavia where state-owned

19     companies would -- would participate in the defence of the country

20     together with the -- with the regular armed forces.  And that, for

21     example, weapons were available in state-owned companies.  I would stop

22     there.

23        Q.   So the All People's Defence doctrine, if I can refer to it as

24     that, was powerfully entrenched within the notion of Serbian defence.

25     Would you agree with that?  Serbian defence preparations, if we can put

Page 8304

 1     it that way.

 2        A.   It was a Yugoslav thing and the republics -- all the republics

 3     participated in it in accordance with the legislation and the

 4     regulations.

 5        Q.   And a power --

 6        A.   It was a -- sorry, Yugoslav doctrine.

 7        Q.   Right.  And enacted in -- in -- as a matter of fact as a powerful

 8     incentive for many people to join up.

 9        A.   I mean, I haven't looked into that aspect, but I mean if you talk

10     about join up, it's joining up existing legal units, i.e., the JNA or the

11     TO and there was also something like civil defence, but the armed forces

12     consisted only of the JNA and the TO.

13        Q.   Did Article 99 then allow companies to run training if they'd had

14     that authority delegated to them by the defence ministry as seems to be

15     the case looking at the plain reading of Article 99?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   Yes.  So there would be nothing wrong with a group of individuals

18     heading towards training within Serbia being organised by companies if

19     they'd had that authority delegated to them by the Ministry of Defence?

20        A.   I'm not sure what you mean by there would be nothing wrong with.

21        Q.   [Overlapping speakers] ...

22        A.   Are you referring to 118?

23        Q.   Yes.  Sorry, yes.

24        A.   Okay.  If the Ministry of Defence was apply -- was abiding by the

25     law, there would be no problem.

Page 8305

 1        Q.   Right.  But once the Ministry of Defence had delegated that

 2     training to companies, there wouldn't be any responsibility on the

 3     Serbian MUP to act to stop it.  In fact, they couldn't.  Would you agree

 4     with that?

 5        A.   I'm not sure, because I mean are we talking about the theory or

 6     the way how this legislation was implemented?

 7        Q.   Well, the theory which -- the interpretation of the law that you

 8     would put on it.

 9        A.   Yeah.

10        Q.   I mean, if there's training going on, it's arranged by a company,

11     the Ministry of Defence has okayed it, they've authorised it, would you

12     agree the Serbian MUP would have no right to stop it?

13        A.   Again, if the Serbian -- the Ministry of Defence is abiding by

14     Article 118, so no activities that are prohibited by 118 are taking place

15     or can take place, and they give an authorisation to a state-owned

16     company to conduct training that is part of a wider programme that has

17     been approved before, then there is no reason for the MUP to -- to

18     intervene.

19        Q.   But on what basis could the MUP intervene if, for example, the

20     Ministry of Defence had not abided by Article 118?  What -- what

21     regulations or laws could the Serbian MUP act pursuant to?

22        A.   I mean, there is the -- I mentioned it earlier, Article 94 of

23     the -- I think the Serbian Constitution which states that ministries have

24     to enforce the law.  There's also a matter of state security can be

25     involved, because again I'm referring to the situation as it was

Page 8306

 1     developing in the former -- in Serbia during fall -- I mean, actually

 2     already summer but fall 1991.  There may have been cases where the

 3     Serbian Ministry of Defence was maybe organising these kind of -- or

 4     allowing such activities to be organised by non-government or non-state

 5     approved, yeah, units or groups, and then it could involve state

 6     security, because you have people who do not fall under state authority

 7     doing certain things, I mean military training, which can also affect the

 8     stability -- I mean the --

 9        Q.   Would you agree with me that --

10        A.   Yeah.

11        Q.   -- what you're referring to then is the remit of the state

12     security of Serbia, which was to act, in the widest definition, to stop

13     acts which threatened the constitutional order?  Is that correct?

14        A.   Indeed.

15        Q.   And the state security of Serbia was regulated such that it could

16     and should take steps to prevent civil disorder if it threatened the

17     constitutional order of Serbia or the constitutional order of the SFRY.

18        A.   I haven't analysed that aspect in detail but my understanding of

19     role of state security in general, independent of SFRY, corresponds with

20     what you just said.

21        Q.   Yeah.  Different to the public security which had a role to

22     prevent civil disorder, full stop.

23        A.   We would have to look at the articles.  We haven't -- as I said,

24     my report does not cover the -- the duties, the legal duties, the

25     detailed legal duties of the state or the public security.

Page 8307

 1        Q.   Right.  You don't then proffer an opinion as to whether the state

 2     security fulfilled its duties.  You offer a global opinion that the

 3     Serbian MUP didn't.

 4        A.   Yes.  That's as far as my report goes.

 5        Q.   And you don't know anything -- or maybe that's going too far.

 6     Sorry.  But you don't know the details of what the state security's

 7     jurisdiction was in regard to preventing civil disorder which

 8     prevented -- which would have caused constitutional fragmentation?

 9        A.   As I said, I mean, I haven't analysed the duties nor the

10     organisation -- I mean, the duties of the state security, sorry, nor the

11     organisation of the Ministry of the Interior, so I cannot answer that

12     question.

13        Q.   You can't, is this right, give -- I mean, apart from the extreme,

14     let's take the example of -- a hypothetical example of Seselj in -- in

15     Nis in 1991 setting up a training camp, arming individuals, putting them

16     on a bus in that form and sending them to Croatia.  Now that, would be

17     unlawful under 118; correct?

18        A.   It would be, yes.

19        Q.   But apart from that, are you able to offer the Court any

20     information concerning what powers the Serbian MUP had to stop elements

21     of that behaviour?  Do you understand what I mean when I say "elements of

22     that behaviour"?

23        A.   I understand, but again I gave a very small overview of the key

24     articles which would be understandable for -- for, I think, any citizen

25     of relevant legislation that briefly touches upon the duties of the

Page 8308

 1     Ministry of the Interior, and that's something you can find at the bottom

 2     of page 91 in -- in part 1 of the report.  I mean, one of the articles,

 3     Article 94 of the constitution states that the ministries, including the

 4     Ministry of the Interior, have to enforce the law.  Article 118 is part

 5     of the law.

 6             And then, excuse me, I refer to the ministry -- to the Law on

 7     Internal Affairs.  Again I didn't analyse it because it didn't fall

 8     within the scope of my report, but these articles are very

 9     straightforward.  The Ministry of the Interior can arrest people.  I

10     mean, they are responsible for internal affairs.  They can arrest people.

11        Q.   Do you know on what basis they can -- could arrest people in

12     1991?  I mean the specific -- this is what I'm trying to get at.  It's

13     one thing to have an authorising or prohibiting law.  It's another thing

14     for the policeman on the street to interpret and know what he's entitled

15     to do to remain within the law.

16        A.   I understand.  But what I tried to mention earlier, P1057, i.e.,

17     the letter -- Radovan Stojicic --

18        Q.   Let's turn to that then --

19        A.   Yeah.

20        Q.   -- because I did want to discuss that.  Page 93 of your report --

21        A.   Indeed.

22        Q.   -- footnote 258.

23             MR. JORDASH:  Could we have P1057 on the screen.

24        Q.   And while that's coming up, what you say about that page 93 of

25     your report is that the response to a question by a member of the

Page 8309

 1     Assembly, Vojvodic, indicates that the Serbian authorities in general and

 2     the Ministry of Interior in particular selectively enforce Article 118 of

 3     the 1991 defence law.  And just before we get to looking at the exhibit,

 4     how did you come to that conclusion by looking merely at the question?

 5        A.   Actually, I looked at the answer.

 6        Q.   Okay.  Well, let's --

 7        A.   The answer --

 8        Q.   Let's look at the answer then.

 9             MR. JORDASH:  Could we go to page 1 -- could we go to the next

10     page, please.  And if we could just enlarge it slightly.

11        Q.   This is the answer.  So we have Vojvodic asking the question

12     which, and I paraphrase, why has Bokan, the leader of the White Eagles,

13     been arrested by the Ministry of Interior when it is known that a great

14     number of volunteers owned unregistered weapons and none have been

15     arrested.  And then the Ministry of Interior answers:

16             "Increased interest of the citizens of the Republic of Serbia for

17     armaments and greater quantities of illegally possessed weapons,

18     ammunition and explosive devices, demand for more intensive measures of

19     the Ministry of the Interior in order prevent carrying in of weapons

20     through illegal channels especially from war-affected areas."

21             And before we move to the next page, this was the context in

22     which the Serbian MUP was working at that time, wasn't it?  It was an

23     increased interest amongst the civilians of Serbia who -- especially

24     along the border who felt, rightly or wrongly, under threat?

25        A.   The document does not make any reference where Bokan was -- I

Page 8310

 1     mean he's arrested in BelgradeBelgrade is, I think, 70 or

 2     80 kilometres from the border.

 3        Q.   Yes.  But I'm saying isn't it your knowledge -- isn't it within

 4     your knowledge that this was the context in which the Serbian MUP was

 5     working?  Its workload had increased because there were -- there was an

 6     increased interest amongst the civilians for weapons.  Whether they were

 7     right to feel threatened or not, but there was this increased interest.

 8     Don't you accept that?

 9        A.   I accept that that is what Radovan Stojicic wrote in his reply to

10     discretion.

11        Q.   You don't accept that there were volunteers heading off and

12     coming back with weapons?  Heading to the war zones and coming back with

13     weapons?

14        A.   That's something else.  I do accept that, but the text here

15     doesn't refer to volunteers.

16        Q.   Okay.  If you don't want to give your views, then we'll move to

17     the next page.

18        A.   No.  I mean, the text talks about citizens of the Republic of

19     Serbia.  First you try to say that you know they live close to the

20     border, and maybe they want to defend themselves.  And then you introduce

21     the word "volunteers."

22        Q.   I'm asking you a straightforward question as to whether it's

23     within your knowledge that civilians in Serbia in 1991 evinced, like not

24     before, a desire to arm themselves.

25        A.   Yes, and if you want my view on that, that was -- I think that is

Page 8311

 1     a -- a diplomatic description of what was happening with the -- i.e., the

 2     organisation, recruitment, and -- and arming of nongovernment-controlled

 3     armed groups.

 4        Q.   Okay.  If that's -- that's fine.  Let's -- let's move on.  That

 5     suffices.

 6        A.   Okay.

 7        Q.   For the same reason goes on the minister of interior.  In other

 8     words, for owning weapons, a sniper gun with an optic sight and several

 9     grenades, so-called kasikara, which acquisition, carrying and holding is

10     forbidden by the aforementioned law, as well as for owning weapons

11     without a permission of the authorised organ, criminal charges were

12     brought against Dragoslav Bokan by the MUP, Belgrade department, for the

13     criminal act from the article number 33, paragraph 1 and 2, of the Law on

14     Weapon Ammunition.

15             Nothing so far to show selectivity, you accept?

16        A.   I mean, obviously I'm not going to draw a conclusion just on one

17     document.  If you want, I can explain why I put -- why I wrote

18     selectively.

19        Q.   Let's go to the next page before you do that.  Maybe there isn't

20     a next page.

21        A.   I think that that's all.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  It's just three pages.

23             MR. JORDASH:  Could we go back to the second page, please.

24        Q.   Okay, I think I've made a mistake.  Okay.  Would you explain then

25     why you came to the conclusion?

Page 8312

 1        A.   Indeed.  The issue is that Bokan and the White Eagles were quite

 2     infamous from at a much earlier stage and I refer, for example, to a

 3     report by Human Rights Watch sent to President Milosevic as well as

 4     General Kadijevic.  There is also the Eremija [phoen] letter in my report

 5     which talks about other politically oriented groups who are committing or

 6     allegedly committing crimes in Croatia during their participation in

 7     combat operations as well as outside that participation.  We have seen

 8     several documents over the past days, information reports by the 1st

 9     Military District security organs about Arkan moving around weapons.  And

10     here we see that 27th of May, 1992, which is actually quite late, I mean

11     the war in Croatia is officially finished, but we see that similar

12     groups, including groups I have considered to be controlled by or related

13     otherwise to the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia, are

14     still moving around weapons and ammunition.  But the only person, I mean

15     at least on the basis of my research, who was arrested by that -- by that

16     stage is Dragoslav Bokan.

17        Q.   Okay.

18        A.   I haven't seen that Dragan was ever -- Captain Dragan was ever

19     arrested.  The same for Zeljko Raznjatovic.  I know that a number of SRS

20     volunteers were arrested after November 1993.

21        Q.   Can you just, though, answer this question --

22        A.   Okay, yeah.

23        Q.   What was it about Dragan's behaviour in Serbia which justified

24     arrest?

25        A.   Because unless -- and that brings us back to the to the crux of

Page 8313

 1     the matter.  Unless he was operating with the blessing of the Ministry of

 2     Interior and under their control, he was violating Article 118.

 3        Q.   In what way?

 4        A.   Because he was organising armed group, and of course these

 5     people -- he recruited people, and they moved to Croatia where obviously

 6     he became more active in the field of --

 7        Q.   Are you saying he --

 8        A.   -- training.

 9        Q.   Are you saying he organised -- let me just read the -- are you

10     saying that within Serbia he organised, reinforced, armed, equipped, and

11     trained armed forces?

12        A.   Armed groups or armed individuals who qualified as a group --

13        Q.   Armed -- armed forces it says in Article 118.

14        A.   Yeah, but I think --

15        Q.   So did he do that?

16        A.   Do you want to know the legal definition of armed forces?  I

17     don't think that Article 118 doesn't make a distinction -- I mean,

18     Article 118 talks about legal armed forces.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Let me try to understand what's happening.

20             Mr. Jordash, you're asking what's the basis for arrest Dragan or

21     anyone else.  What we see from the example is that at least Mr. Bokan was

22     arrested for carrying arms, which is, from what I understand, not -- not

23     one of the offences described in this legislation, in the legislation we

24     are talking about.

25             MR. JORDASH:  Yes.

Page 8314

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  That seems to be very much administrative

 2     legislation, whereas any arrest or whatever, that could be in legislation

 3     on arms, legislation on property, legislation on -- on creating civil --

 4     I mean, we all know that, and I tried to look at -- at the -- the --

 5     at -- almost at the end of this legislation you find a few offences which

 6     seem to be minor offences rather of an administrative nature and not

 7     providing information, et cetera.  So therefore, to focus that much on

 8     118, which is a transitional -- it's -- it's not the main basis of it.

 9     It's a transitional paragraph in this legislation.  How could we think

10     about being arrested applying investigative criminal procedural

11     legislation on the basis of 118?  I mean, I'm -- I'm just asking myself.

12     The matter is, I think, by far more complex --

13             MR. JORDASH:  Well, this -- this -- sorry, Your Honour.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  -- than -- and the complexity is not, I would say,

15     clearly analysed by proceeding in the way we do.  For me it just

16     confused.  Is 118 enough to arrest someone?  Or apparently in Bokan

17     others were arrested on a totally different ground, on a --

18             MR. JORDASH:  But that -- but --

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes?

20             MR. JORDASH:  Sorry.  But that's the point I'm trying to make.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, then let's -- so therefore this legislation

22     doesn't provide for the answers.  The same for jurisdiction, whether

23     jurisdiction is purely -- whether this legislation is of a purely --

24     jurisdictionally on a purely territorial basis.  Of course, in any system

25     you'd first start looking at the criminal code, or in France, I think the

Page 8315

 1     code of criminal procedure where the jurisdiction or rules are found.  So

 2     it's --

 3             MR. JORDASH:  That's the point, though.  Mr. Theunens hasn't done

 4     that.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  Let's -- let's then --

 6             MR. JORDASH:  But --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  But that can be established in such a simple way.

 8             MR. JORDASH:  But that's what this is -- I mean, Mr. --

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, apparently I understood what you're aiming at.

10     So you have achieved your goal, isn't it, that the matter is far more

11     complex.  At the same time, whether issues like arrest resolve the whole

12     matter, whether law enforcement is purely a matter of arrest or

13     administrative matters, there are a lot of instruments in law, as you may

14     know, to enforce the law.

15             MR. JORDASH:  Yes.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm just trying to understand where we are at this

17     moment, what -- apparently I've understood part of the point you wished

18     to make.

19             MR. JORDASH:  Yes.  I'm aiming at Mr. Theunens' conclusion that

20     the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia pursuant to Article 118 had duties

21     which they failed to enforce.  I'm --

22             JUDGE ORIE:  One second, please.

23             MR. JORDASH:  I'm hopefully cross-examining to show Mr. Theunens

24     actually doesn't understand what enforcement or regulation the Serbian

25     MUP had, and that's, in our submission, a condition precedent for the

Page 8316

 1     conclusion that he's reached.  If he doesn't understand the duties and

 2     the enforcement powers that the Serbian MUP had, then they cannot say

 3     that they failed to abide by them.  That's the point.  I mean --

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Unless you take it a very -- I would say a very

 5     global level, that state organs have a general duty to -- to abide by the

 6     law and to do whatever is within their competence apart from what that

 7     is.  And then we'll further have to look at that --

 8             MR. JORDASH:  Apart from what --

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  -- in order to -- in order to ensure law

10     enforcement.

11             MR. JORDASH:  Yes.  And apart of what's within their competence,

12     and this is what I submit Mr. Theunens hasn't analysed.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  So the simple question is:  Mr. Theunens, have

14     you specifically looked into competencies as far as arrests are

15     concerned, administrative enforcement?  Apparently you have not.

16             THE WITNESS:  No, but --

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Theunens.

18             THE WITNESS:  I haven't looked at these detailed competencies but

19     the conclusion is based on the fact that I haven't seen any document that

20     any of the by then well-known paramilitaries or volunteers was arrested

21     on the basis of Article 118.  The only legal action that took place --

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Apart from whether 118 is an article which would

23     provide for a proper basis for arrest or whether you would have to rely

24     on other legislation, such as the legislation on weapons and armament,

25     because this law seems not to be very prominent in providing -- providing

Page 8317

 1     definitions of offences.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Indeed, Your Honours.  So -- but -- but to

 3     continue, for example the volunteers of the Radical Party, it is only

 4     after -- I mean on the basis of the material I have reviewed, it's only

 5     after there is a political fallout between Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Seselj

 6     that the state -- the competent state authorities in the Republic of

 7     Serbia, including the MUP, the police, arrest volunteers, I mean, senior

 8     volunteers who were affiliated to the SRS and they're all arrested on the

 9     basis of violation of the law -- of the legislation in relation to

10     possession of arms.  Article 118 never appears even if, in my conclusion,

11     the possession of arms is directly related to activities they were

12     conducting in violation of Article 118.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Okay.  Let's then -- if I careful listen to

14     you is the following, that where those who might have violated

15     Article 118 most likely would have committed offences again the law on

16     arms and ammunition as well, it comes as a surprise that it was so --

17     such a small number of arrests, which, although based on the Law of Arms

18     and Ammunition, would be linked to activities you would consider to be

19     relevant in the context of Article 118.  That's apparently what your

20     reasoning is without going into any further details as to the exact

21     competencies of those who were, as you say, supposed to act or those who

22     really acted.

23             Mr. Jordash, I'm trying to understand what we're doing.

24             MR. JORDASH:  Yes.

25        Q.   And, Mr. Theunens, you'll concede that that what Mr. -- what

Page 8318

 1     His Honour Judge Orie just said doesn't appear in your report.  You don't

 2     quote from the relevant --

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, it's clear that the specifics on police

 4     investigations or prosecutions do not --

 5             THE WITNESS:  They're not in --

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  They're not in the report.

 7             MR. WEBER:  Your Honour, I just --

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Weber.

 9             MR. WEBER:  Sorry to step in.  We're discussing one article.

10     There are many other things that are referenced in the report and --

11             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm not saying that there is not, but I'm trying to

12     understand what Mr. Jordash apparently wants to elicit from this witness.

13     And it's relatively simple.  If you have a -- would have asked in the

14     beginning apart from whether 100 -- Article 118 creates a proper basis

15     for arrest where we see that arrests are usually done on other basis,

16     have you specifically paid attention to these competencies, and do you

17     not consider to form a final opinion on what should have done also in

18     this respect, that you would have to need -- that you needed to attention

19     to that as well.  And then I think that Mr. Theunens would have easily

20     said yes.  I'm not quite sure, Mr. Theunens, but that's what I understand

21     from your -- from the answers to some of my questions, and then we can

22     move on.  Which means that a certain element, a certain aspect is not

23     dealt with in substance in drawing the conclusions.  Now, whether what

24     Mr. Theunens did deal with sufficiently support his conclusions is, of

25     course, then another matter.

Page 8319

 1             MR. JORDASH:  Well, I thought that's what I was aiming at but

 2     if --

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, apparently I -- if I understand you well, I

 4     have understood more or less what you were about to continue to ask

 5     Mr. Theunens.

 6             MR. JORDASH:

 7        Q.   So --

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  But what I'm trying to tell you is that why not get

 9     to the core of that --

10             MR. JORDASH:  Because I'm trying to highlight to Your Honours

11     that the complexity of the situation, because we will in due course or we

12     may in due course call evidence to establish in front of Your Honours

13     what the competencies of the Serbian MUP were and to deal with the

14     aspects of Mr. Theunens' analysis which we say he should have engaged in

15     and failed to.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  He didn't -- he didn't pay attention to those

17     specific aspects.  That's the most important thing we've established now.

18             THE WITNESS:  I mean, I -- as I said, for me this -- the -- the

19     reply by Stojicic is an example.  It shows that the Ministry of the

20     Interior can arrest people for illegal possession of weapons.  I think

21     from the contents of my report it can be concluded that the groups you're

22     talking about were in the possession of weapons and that these weapons

23     were acquired in or via Serbia.  And based on the fact that I've only see

24     a document here for the arrest of Bokan and then -- but these documents

25     are not included in this report, but arrests for volunteers of -- of

Page 8320

 1     Mr. Seselj's party, whereby these arrests only took place after there was

 2     a political conflict with Mr. Milosevic, I concluded from that that the

 3     legislation was selectively applied --

 4             MR. JORDASH:

 5        Q.   Well, the report in fact says that Tode Vojvodic, his answer to a

 6     question indicates that the Serbian authorities in general and the

 7     Ministry of Interior in particular selectively enforced.  Now you're

 8     adding to your report.  That's the point.  That's not what your report

 9     says at page 93.  Anyway, let's move on.

10        A.   It's coherent, but I haven't included the information on the SRS

11     volunteers in my report, that's correct.

12        Q.   Let's have a --

13        A.   But you have the Seselj report.

14        Q.   Let's have a look -- well, we'll come to that shortly.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  We don't have the Seselj report, Mr. Theunens.  You

16     should be aware of that.

17             Mr. Weber.

18             MR. WEBER:  Your Honour, just putting on the record that I

19     believe his opinion is that he -- that the article implies and I believe

20     it's talked about on different context.  I just -- Mr. Jordash is quoting

21     to it, and I just wanted to make sure the opinion is on the record

22     correctly.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  Mr. Jordash, please proceed, and --

24             MR. JORDASH:  It doesn't say "implies."  It says "indicates."

25             JUDGE ORIE:  In the next break you are invited to sit together

Page 8321

 1     and to see whether it says "implies" or "indicates," and if there's any

 2     ongoing disagreement, the Chamber will be glad to further pay attention

 3     to it.  Please proceed.

 4             MR. JORDASH:  I'll move on.

 5        Q.   You only rely in your report on 118 as the sole criminal piece of

 6     legislation, don't you?

 7        A.   No, not specifically.  I mean, I -- I -- I use 118 to show that

 8     the Serbian authorities did not act against the establishment of -- of

 9     political party based volunteer groups as well as other groups which are

10     not foreseen by -- by the legislation but, by analysing the

11     documentation, proved to be controlled by or linked otherwise to the

12     Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia, even if these groups

13     were not initially foreseen in the law.

14        Q.   Thank you for the answer.  Is there a power of arrest in 118?

15        A.   No.

16        Q.   No.  Is there a power of arrest in that particular piece of

17     legislation?

18        A.   Which particular piece of legislation?

19        Q.   The Law on Defence.

20        A.   We would have to look at it.  I --

21        Q.   Well, I'm putting it to you there isn't.  You don't know.

22        A.   That's fine.

23        Q.   Let's have a look at footnote 259, which is P1057.

24             MR. JORDASH:  Please could we have that on e-court.  You will

25     have to forgive me, I don't have the e-court number.

Page 8322

 1             THE WITNESS:  This is P1057.

 2             MR. JORDASH:  Oh.  I beg your pardon.  I'll come back to this.

 3     Could I just have a moment, please.

 4             Could -- could we have footnote 258, which is P1057, or is that

 5     the same one?  I beg your pardon.  Sorry, Your Honours.  Let's move on.

 6     I'll come back to that point.

 7        Q.   I want to have a look instead at P1054, just moving back to

 8     page 92 of your report.  Footnote 255 and 256, where you use this

 9     document to establish in your mind the notice that the Ministry of the

10     Interior had concerning --

11        A.   Yeah.

12        Q.   -- private armed volunteer groups.  If we look at page 1, we have

13     a discussion in a response to Seselj's comments.  And if we move down

14     below, the answer to Seselj is the part I'm interested in.

15        A.   Okay.

16        Q.   The Ministry of the Interior issues the following response with

17     reference to 118, reiterating what it says, and then saying:

18             "It's becoming more and more obvious --"

19        A.   Can I interrupt you?  Just the -- because I want to correct my

20     previous answer.  I said that Article 118 -- I agreed with you that you

21     said -- you suggested it didn't have any implications to arrest, and I

22     was just referring to the actual text as it is in the Law of Defence.

23     But in this letter, actually, it is said that people can be in prison for

24     60 days now.

25        Q.   That's different to a power of arrest.  That's a power of --

Page 8323

 1     that's a punishment rather than a power of arrest, Mr. Theunens.

 2        A.   Okay, but in my nonlegal mind I assumed that imprisonment

 3     includes -- assumes --

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Let's get rid of this.  If you want to imprison

 5     someone, if he reports voluntarily you don't have to arrest him.  If you

 6     are talking about pre-trial arrest or arrest in the context of an

 7     investigation -- let's -- what you say, it's an offence, and let's leave

 8     it to that.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Okay, Your Honours.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Because if it's not an offence, there should be no

11     penalty.

12             MR. JORDASH:

13        Q.   If we can go to the next page to have a look at the remaining

14     answer.

15             MR. JORDASH:  Could we go back again, please.

16        Q.   What was the significance you gave this -- this answer, that this

17     informed the Serbian MUP?

18        A.   Indeed.  In Roman II on page 92, I drew the conclusion that this

19     reply explicitly -- or shows that the Serbian Ministry of Interior

20     explicitly recognised that it was aware of the existence of armed

21     volunteer formations.  Then I quote from the text, it is becoming more

22     and so on until the end of the paragraph with carried out.  I also quote

23     the paragraph where it's stated that the Serbian -- the MUP of the

24     Republic of Serbia is carrying out its duties.  Maybe that's on the next

25     page.  Yes.  I think on the fifth line, and I ended -- I mean that's on

Page 8324

 1     the top -- the bottom of page 92, part one, that the reply does not

 2     indicate which specific measures the MUP Serbia is taking.

 3        Q.   So you can see there that the ministry is saying that it's

 4     carrying out its duties in accordance with the Law on Defence.  It is

 5     co-operating with the state authorities and is taking measures with an

 6     aim of preventing any activities of illegal armed groups on the territory

 7     of the republic.  And it then states the operational work which is

 8     focused on illegal possession of arms, military training that is

 9     violating Articles 99 and 103 of the Law on Defence, and all other forms

10     of paramilitary activities disturbing the public order.  In that respect,

11     MUP has filed 13 criminal reports.

12        A.   That's what the document states, yes.

13        Q.   Right.  So it did give some detail about what the Serbian MUP was

14     doing.

15        A.   Okay.  You can discuss -- one can debate some detail or more

16     detail.

17        Q.   Yeah.  Okay.  Well let's go to P1048, please, which is at page 95

18     of your report, footnote 264.  And you rely upon this report to show

19     the -- to show the involvement of the Ministry of the Interior and the

20     arming of volunteers and paramilitaries.  Can you see that?

21        A.   Indeed.

22        Q.   And if we look at the text of the report, at page 1 we can see

23     some detail in the second paragraph there.  Four or five lines down.  In

24     addition, they are establishing arming and training party-related

25     paramilitary groups.  Some individuals are trying to get permission from

Page 8325

 1     their members and supporters to be trained at VJ barracks.  Making

 2     preparations for attacks against military installations and operations to

 3     topple the legal authorities.  Discouraging men liable for military

 4     service from responding to summons from military organs.  And encouraging

 5     members of peacetime and reserve formations to operate VJ units from the

 6     party's positions.  And attempting it get their own positions and support

 7     within the VJ.

 8             Was it known at that point that these political parties were

 9     organising groups and their aim was ultimately to topple the Serbian

10     government?  Is that something which was common to these opposition

11     parties and their activities?

12        A.   There were political parties who were organising armed groups.

13     Now, it's not clear from the outset that they want to topple the Serbian

14     government.  It may be that some groups developed that goal, because

15     obviously most of them were of nationalistic orientation and were

16     suspicious of the Serbian authorities, but that's what I tried to explain

17     and I try to be brief.  Earlier that my conclusion is that somebody like

18     Vojislav Seselj, for example, relied on the -- call it tacit

19     authorisation of the Serbian authorities and his relationship with

20     Slobodan Milosevic, his good relation with Slobodan Milosevic, in order

21     to organise and so on the -- his groups, and that only when there was a

22     political fallout between two in November 1993, that legal steps were put

23     against his volunteers.

24        Q.   Okay.  Let's go to -- you do accept then that many of these

25     groups did want to topple the Serbian government?

Page 8326

 1        A.   It depends at which moment in time.

 2        Q.   Well, in 1991, which ones do you think -- did you conclude wanted

 3     to topple the Serbian government?

 4        A.   I haven't -- in my analysis I haven't addressed that specific

 5     aspect.

 6        Q.   Let's have a look at page 2 of this exhibit.  You can see there

 7     at the top of the page the party -- perhaps we -- discussing the SPO.

 8     Who are the SPO?

 9        A.   The Serbian Renewal Movement of Vuk Draskovic.

10        Q.   And it says there at the top this party reportedly has

11     detachments formed on paper all over Serbia which it plans to activate at

12     a given moment to try to topple the legal authorities.  Would you accept

13     that that was the case?

14        A.   That is what the document states, but again when I would analyse

15     that specific issue, I would also look for -- for other documents, from

16     all documents, as I've done throughout my report for the topics I have

17     discussed here.

18        Q.   You haven't put that in your report, have you, that this group

19     wanted to at some point topple the legal authorities?

20        A.   No, because I believed it was outside the scope of my report.

21        Q.   Okay.  Let's move down the page to the third paragraph.  The

22     command of the Hajduk Veljko Detachment also has several platoons and

23     assault groups of the Serbian Volunteer Guard subordinated to it which

24     were formed in some of the bigger towns in south-eastern Serbia - there's

25     the list of towns - and have the task of engaging in the forcible

Page 8327

 1     occupation of important military installations, MUP installations, and

 2     infrastructure, and prompting their members and supporters to engage in

 3     widespread armed insurrection at a given point -- moment in order to

 4     seize power.

 5             Isn't that something that was within your knowledge,

 6     Mr. Theunens, that this kind of activity was what the Serbian government

 7     was facing around this time?

 8        A.   There were for sure groups that wanted to topple -- I mean,

 9     topple or act against the government because they were of very

10     nationalistic orientation, but my focus in the report was on groups of

11     parties that enjoyed good relations with the government.  And there is,

12     for example, in the document a reference to the paramilitary groups

13     organised by the SRS --

14        Q.   So you didn't consider in your report the groups that didn't

15     enjoy good relations with the government?

16        A.   No, because that was outside the scope of my report.  And I mean,

17     just to be complete, I -- I -- of course I conducted searches on the

18     names of these groups but I couldn't really identify precise information

19     on -- on their involvement in -- in issues that were of interest for this

20     report.  I know that the Serbian Renewal Movement -- I mean the

21     Srpska Garda of the Serbian Renewal Movement were involved in operations

22     in Gospic in 1991, but that was not within the scope of my report, these

23     specific operations.

24        Q.   Could we have a look, please, at 2 -- footnote 261, page 93 of

25     your report.  P1059.  This is what you rely upon to --

Page 8328

 1             MR. WEBER:  Your Honour.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Weber.

 3             MR. WEBER:  The document's under seal.

 4             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Therefore, not to be shown to the public.  Please

 6     proceed.

 7             MR. JORDASH:

 8        Q.   This is what you used to rely upon to show that the

 9     State Security Service of the Republic of Serbia collected information on

10     the activities of at least one volunteer group; is that right?

11        A.   I think it's footnote --

12        Q.   Sorry, it's 1058.  P1058.

13        A.   Yes.  It's footnote 260.  Indeed.

14        Q.   And if we could have a look at it, if we could, please.  This

15     is -- what is this, Mr. Theunens?

16        A.   It's an information, a report on the situation in

17     Western Slavonia, i.e., in Croatia.

18        Q.   Right.  And it's a report which was sent, is this right, from the

19     SSNO to the state security?

20        A.   I mean the heading clearly states SDB State Security of -- I

21     mean, the Republic of Serbia, so the MUP.  So it's -- it's -- according

22     to what I see, it has been compiled by the SDB of the MUP Serbia.

23        Q.   My mistake.  One second, please.

24             MR. JORDASH:  I'm going to have to come back to that actually.  I

25     do apologise, Your Honour.  I tabulated things wrong.

Page 8329

 1             THE WITNESS:  But of interest is that the SDB compiles a report

 2     about the situation in Croatia.

 3             MR. JORDASH:  Let's have a look, please, at P1059.  Footnote 261,

 4     under seal.

 5        Q.   And it's what you rely upon to show further awareness by the

 6     Serbian MUP of information that the UB had collected on the alleged

 7     involvement of paramilitary and volunteer formations in the commission of

 8     crimes against the civilians in the RSK, including the identity of the

 9     alleged perpetrators.

10             Now, this is what you would say is a report sent to the Serbian

11     MUP; correct?

12        A.   Yes.  I mean I only see the cover page where it says SSNO, but

13     then it's --

14        Q.   But looking at your -- your report at page 93, I think that you

15     say the document, is this right, the document entitled "Analysis."

16        A.   Yeah, but we would have to go --

17        Q.   Okay.  Let's go to the next page.

18        A.   Because the ERN I put for the --

19        Q.   Information on the crimes against civilians.

20        A.   Yeah.  Footnote 261 consists of a document that is sent by the --

21     the security administration, i.e., the SFRY Armed Forces.

22        Q.   Sent to --

23        A.   No, no.  I'm sorry for the confusion.  What I tried to do, I

24     compared two different documents.  I compared a document compiled by the

25     state security of the Republic of Serbia.  I think that was the previous

Page 8330

 1     document we saw.

 2        Q.   Yeah.

 3        A.   With --

 4        Q.   This was an information sent to the Serbian MUP and then there is

 5     a response document by the state security; is that right?

 6        A.   I mean, that's not how I described it in my report.  Maybe, I

 7     don't know, during the break if I could look at the hard copies, I could

 8     check it.

 9        Q.   Okay.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Look at the clock, Mr. Jordash.  That might even be

11     a good suggestion.

12             MR. JORDASH:  Yes, it would and I can get my papers in order.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  We'll have a break and we resume at

14     ten minutes to 6.00.

15                           --- Recess taken at 5.25 p.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 5.58 p.m.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Jordash.  No, before I ask you

18     to do that, Mr. Weber, I earlier asked you for information about the

19     history of the scheduling of Witness 26.  Of course, in the context it

20     should have been understood as asking for the history of Witness JF-52.

21             MR. WEBER:  Your Honour, that's how I understood it, actually.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Jordash.

23             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you, Your Honour.

24        Q.   Let's go back to page 93 of chapter 1, Mr. Theunens.  I want to

25     have a look at two documents you detail there at (C), and you note, in

Page 8331

 1     relation to these two documents, that what you took from them was that

 2     the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia was aware of the

 3     information that UB had collected on the alleged involvement of Serbian

 4     paramilitary and volunteer formations in the commission of crimes against

 5     civilians in the RSK, including the identity of the alleged perpetrators.

 6     Was there nothing else you took from those documents of significance to

 7     the issues worth considering?

 8        A.   I don't remember whether I addressed -- I used these documents in

 9     other sections of my report, but basically just a small correction.  It's

10     one document, P1060.  That is a document compiled by the state security.

11        Q.   Yeah, but the first document is P1059, which is the UB report,

12     no?

13        A.   Exactly.  Indeed.

14        Q.   And then there's P --

15        A.   And P1060 is the state security document.

16        Q.   Is the response --

17        A.   Yeah.

18        Q.   -- of the state security.  Let's have a look briefly at P1059,

19     and what this is is a report, an information report.  Is it a report to

20     the -- sent from the SSNO to the Belgrade DB, department -- state

21     security department?

22        A.   From what is on screen I can see that it's indeed a document from

23     the SSNO, but I'm not sure where the addressee -- I can't see the

24     addressee on the document.

25        Q.   Well, if you look at your report, and we'll come to that in a

Page 8332

 1     minute, but it says which was compiled in response to a similar report by

 2     the UB.

 3        A.   Indeed.

 4        Q.   Right.  Or you're saying it may not have got -- it may not have

 5     been sent from the SSNO to the Belgrade DB?

 6        A.   No, no, no.  What I'm trying to say is that we should actually

 7     look at P1060, which the state security document, because that should

 8     then show -- could mention that it's compiled in response to the UB

 9     document.

10        Q.   It does, and we'll get to that.  It does.

11        A.   Exactly.

12        Q.   So if you just take that one trust from me for the moment and

13     then --

14        A.   Okay.

15        Q.   So let's look at 1059 and let's look at page 2, please.  And its

16     entitled, as you can see, "Information on the crimes against civilians."

17     And then, I don't want to go through all of the document, but the

18     document lists at page 2, crimes by -- or suspected crimes by the

19     Valjevo TO Detachment with approximately ten members of the Dusan Silni

20     Detachment.

21        A.   Mm-hmm.

22             MR. JORDASH:  If we go to the next page, please.

23        Q.   And we can see page 3, and 3 of the B/C/S as well, further

24     details there of the crimes alleged.  And then if we go further down the

25     page you can see that the persons -- or the institutions it was sent to.

Page 8333

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   You only quote, I think, very few -- I think it may be only this

 3     report from the SSNO to the Belgrade DB.  Is that -- am I correct that

 4     it -- that you haven't come across many of these documents from the SSNO

 5     to the Belgrade DB?

 6        A.   Exactly.  I mean, this is one of the few which explicitly

 7     indicates, and also on the first page, that the information is passed to

 8     the DB.

 9        Q.   Yeah.

10        A.   And the Ministry of the Interior.

11        Q.   There is no obligation on the SSNO to send information to the

12     Serbian MUP.

13        A.   I don't know the regulations that apply to that, but I would

14     assume -- again it's my interpretation of the regulations that the SSNO

15     UB, the security administration, would share information with the

16     Ministry of the Interior if they're obliged by law, i.e., to ensure that

17     the proper law enforcement measures are implemented or if there is an

18     operational need to share the information.  But again that's just my

19     interpretation.  I cannot refer to a specific regulation or legislation.

20        Q.   Right.  But --

21        A.   Maybe if we go back to page 1 because I saw a reference to

22     Ministry of the Interior in the middle.  Maybe that explains why it was

23     sent to the Ministry of the Interior.  It's in the middle of the page

24     more or less.

25        Q.   Yeah.  "However, while carrying out the basic tasks as the

Page 8334

 1     priority under the condition of combat activities and the nonexistence of

 2     the legally enforceable jurisdiction, as well as the fact that the

 3     purpose of the -- the perpetrators of these crimes would most often

 4     desert the unit immediately in an organised manner or on a

 5     self-initiative, the committed crimes were generally only registered and

 6     only partially documented.  All information was immediately passed on to

 7     the local organs of government, the organs of internal affairs of the

 8     Republic of Serbia," and so on.

 9        A.   Yeah.  That's what I tried to say.

10        Q.   What did you try to say, sorry?

11        A.   That, as I explained earlier, that the SSNO -- or the UB of the

12     SSNO forwarded the information because there was an operational

13     requirement or in order to ensure that the proper law enforcement

14     measures were taken.

15        Q.   Right.  So are you not surprised that you haven't come across

16     more of these types of documents in your time with the ICTY?

17        A.   Not really, because as you know, most of the documents I -- I had

18     were documents that the 1st Military District sent to the SSNO.  This is

19     one of the few documents we had at the time when I compiled my report

20     that is compiled at the level of the SSNO.

21        Q.   Okay.

22        A.   And I can assure you that such documents were requested at the

23     time, not specifically -- not only for this case but for many other cases

24     before.

25        Q.   Right.  If we go -- thank you.  If we go to -- are we on page 3?

Page 8335

 1     Can we go it page 3, because there's a report there of an incident in the

 2     Lovas village.

 3        A.   Indeed.

 4        Q.   Are you familiar with that?

 5        A.   I am.

 6        Q.   And are you familiar with who the perpetrators were and whether

 7     there was a follow-up by the SSNO in terms of these suspected crimes?

 8        A.   I'm not -- I think the perpetrators belong to the Dusan Silni

 9     group.  When -- I say "I think" because I remember there is the letter or

10     the report by Lieutenant-Colonel Eremija, who was the officer responsible

11     for morale in the Proletarian Guards Motorised Division, i.e., the unit

12     that covered the area of Lovas at the time, and I think this report dates

13     from fall 1991, in which this crime -- sorry, in which this crime or this

14     alleged crime and the alleged perpetrators are described.  I am not

15     familiar with the follow-up.

16        Q.   Okay.  If we look at page 4, please.  You see there noted halfway

17     down the page the authorised official from the military post Novi Sad --

18     4323 Novi Sad submits a criminal report against Strigic, Slobodan, to the

19     military proud, the VP 282 Belgrade.  Strigic, as we can see further up

20     the page, was a member of special purpose unit of the Beli Manastir SUP

21     and yet he was prosecuted by the military police.  Why would that be?

22        A.   We -- I mean, we would have to go through the whole document

23     because maybe he was somebody with -- I mean, I'm just -- maybe he was

24     somebody with military speculation -- a military obligation, I'm sorry.

25        Q.   What do you mean military obligation?  In which circumstances

Page 8336

 1     would the military police jurisdiction kick in, if I can put that way?

 2        A.   If he was -- for sure if he was a member of a military unit at

 3     the time of when the crimes were committed.

 4        Q.   Right.  Thank you.  Are you surprised that such a report dated

 5     May 1992 emanating from the SSNO doesn't include such things as Arkan and

 6     his conduct?

 7        A.   It's not a question of surprise.  This is a document about, I

 8     think -- I would have to go through the whole document again, but I

 9     believe it deals with specific crimes, and more specifically the one in

10     Lovas.

11        Q.   Yes, but it's dealing with -- if we can go to page 2.  It's

12     dealing with issues which relate largely to SBWS; is that correct?  And

13     quite -- and also probably Srpska Krajina generally.  You see at the top

14     of page 2.  Wouldn't you have expected a report at this level to have

15     included Arkan within it at this point in time?

16        A.   Not specifically, because we don't know -- I would assume that

17     this is not the only report.  There may be also reports on Arkan.  We

18     know that the 1st Military District compiled, and actually at a much

19     earlier stage, we looked at them in fall 1991, quite a substantial number

20     of reports on Arkan.  They were sent to the SSNO.  I -- since I don't

21     have the documents from the security administration of the SSNO, I don't

22     know what the SSNO did with the reports it received from subordinate

23     security organs.

24        Q.   And are you surprised -- that same question in relation to

25     Ovcara, the massacre in Ovcara by certain members of the JNA?

Page 8337

 1        A.   I mean the trial judgement and the appeals judgement state that

 2     the executions were committed by members of volunteer groups who were

 3     operating under the command of the JNA.

 4        Q.   Yeah, but no mention in this report, but that's to you not a

 5     surprise?

 6        A.   I mean, there maybe another report on -- on Ovcara.  Ovcara is a

 7     very complex issue.  If you want, we can go into detail, but I'm not

 8     sure whether --

 9        Q.   No, I don't think that is necessary.  Thank you.

10        A.   But I mean this is not an exclusive report.  If we could -- if we

11     would establish this is the only report the SSNO prepared, then indeed

12     there maybe reason for surprise and then we would look into why only one

13     report.  But I cannot establish whether there were more reports, and I

14     cannot establish whether this is the only report.

15        Q.   Okay.  Can we go to P1060, the response by the DB to this report.

16     And it's dealt with in the same -- sorry, across the page 94 in your

17     report.  Footnote 262.

18        A.   Indeed.  And to answer your question from the beginning why --

19     where you said that why do you only -- or why did you deal with that

20     document in such a brief manner, I just used the document for the section

21     notice of the Ministry of the Interior.

22        Q.   Yeah.  But you didn't, and this is what I find significant, and I

23     would suggest it is significant in relation to your methodology.  You

24     don't include the response by the DB and what its response was, which I

25     suggest is -- well, is an interesting response given your thesis.

Page 8338

 1     Page 1, analysis -- so this is a state security department sent to

 2     Belgrade, 27th of May, 1992, responding to the SSNO's number 236, dated

 3     the 26th of May, 1992.  And if we go from page 1 to page 2, you'll see

 4     that -- and I suggest if you read this, you'll see that the DB take --

 5     took its responsibilities fairly seriously and carefully, I suggest,

 6     analysed its own jurisdiction.

 7             We see, for example, on page 2, paragraph 1 and I'll just read

 8     part of it:

 9             "The responsibility for the sufferings of the civilians, first

10     and foremost, lies with Lieutenant-Colonel Miodrag Dimitrijevic and the

11     reserve commanding officers, Peric Darko and Vlajkovic Radovan, both from

12     Valjevo."  And then it gives a description.

13             And then in brackets it says:

14             "We think that the military prosecutor would have authority for

15     the possible criminal procedure against these persons."

16        A.   Mm-hmm.

17        Q.   And then down the page to paragraph 2, noting in response to the

18     crimes against women, a criminal report has been filed with the

19     authorised military prosecutor's office and the investigation is ongoing.

20     And same with 3.

21             And doesn't this response by the DB indicate exactly what I've

22     just said, that this was the DB responding in a way which you suggest the

23     Serbian MUP didn't respond, which was to take its responsibilities

24     seriously?  Did you not think that was worth putting in the report?

25        A.   I -- my view on paragraph 1 or the part that you read out simply

Page 8339

 1     shows that the DB confirms the existing legislation to the military,

 2     i.e., that members of the armed forces who have allegedly committed

 3     crimes shall be investigated and -- or shall face military jurisdiction.

 4             It would be useful if I could compare the two documents then to

 5     see whether if the UB document also identified civilians, for example,

 6     among the volunteers of Dusan Silni, what the recommendations of the DB

 7     in their regard was.  Or maybe you can do that now.

 8        Q.   Well, I can, for example -- sorry, what are you saying is the

 9     jurisdiction, then, of the DB in this situation?

10        A.   I'm not so much saying what the jurisdiction is.  I'm trying to

11     answer to your question in -- if you want, I can repeat it.  Military

12     regulations are very clear that military personnel who have allegedly

13     commit -- or who are suspected of having committed a crime, they shall

14     face military justice system.  I mean, military justice.  My question was

15     to see whether in the UB report civilians are identified or people, not

16     members of the armed forces, like, for example, Dusan Silni group,

17     whether any reference is made to them in the -- in this -- in this DB

18     report here and see what the recommendations or the action undertaken by

19     the DB or the -- is.

20        Q.   Well, let's have a look at page 4.  Well, yes.  Let's go to

21     page 1, first of all, to see what the analysis, the first analysis says.

22             The DB is saying of the information received "with accompanying

23     documentation on the possibility of taking to court the persons who

24     committed crimes against the civilians."

25             So this document appears to be, don't you agree, an response by

Page 8340

 1     the DB looking into the possibility of its own jurisdiction being

 2     operative?

 3        A.   Yes, but -- I'm sorry if I repeat it again, but the military -- I

 4     mean the regulations on -- the 1977 regulation on military prosecutor and

 5     military courts do not make any references to the state security in

 6     relation to the enforcement of justice against members of the armed

 7     forces.  So what I'm trying to say is that the UB has sent this document

 8     with a particular motive to the DB, and one possible motive could be that

 9     the UB, in addition to military suspects or alleged perpetrators, has

10     also identified civilian alleged perpetrators where these would not

11     necessarily be put or be the subject of military justice.

12        Q.   Well, let's have a look at page 3, paragraph 7, and it says:

13             "In the case of the killing of 16 civilians, most of them Croats,

14     which took place on the night of the 6th and 7th November 1991, no

15     evidence was submitted along.  In the analysis of the information, it was

16     said -- it is said that a group of approximately 20 volunteers led by

17     Gogic Milan, aka Zuka, from Novi Sad, was engaged in that area, the

18     village of Enton [phoen], SO Vukovar, besides the unit of the JA, SUP

19     Serb SBWS carried out an investigation.  Further authority lies with the

20     SB JNA as written in the SUP which carried out the investigation in the

21     SRDB Novi Sad."

22             Isn't that the issue that you were addressing?  Isn't that the DB

23     saying, well, actually this may be a situation where we might have

24     jurisdictio for the reasons that you've just given and we're going to

25     look into it?

Page 8341

 1        A.   Yes.  I mean, for example.

 2        Q.   Yeah.  And if we look over the page to page 4, number 9, with

 3     reference to the Zuca, the Vuckovic male, one of two brothers, I think.

 4        A.   Mm-hmm.

 5        Q.   And you can see what reference there is that -- that he's a

 6     criminal from Belgrade, no note -- no reference there to him being part

 7     of a unit which doesn't seem to be information that the DB has, and

 8     then -- then consideration of what the DB could arrest him for.  Isn't

 9     that again a similar point?  In the absence of his stated connection to

10     the JNA or TO, the DB then considers what it can do.

11        A.   Yes.  And he was -- I assume you will come back to Vuckovic at a

12     later stage when we discuss Zvornik but --

13        Q.   Yeah.

14        A.   -- anyway that's in my report.  But yeah, it states here that he

15     was arrested -- oops.  I touched the screen.  But for illegal possession

16     of weapons.

17        Q.   Didn't you think that this was significant, that of the very few

18     reports that you received of the SSNO reporting to the Belgrade DB

19     centre, and you get what I can suggest is a pretty careful response, it

20     seems on the face of it, didn't you think that was important to mention

21     in the report?

22        A.   I agree with you that I could have put -- included this reference

23     that he was arrested for the possession and carrying of firearms.  I

24     could have added that to the Bokan letter as an additional footnote, but

25     otherwise, as I said earlier, I used this document solely for the purpose

Page 8342

 1     of notice, because we are -- I gave the answer already two times.  I

 2     don't see -- I mean, now, looking at it again, anything significant that

 3     the Ministry of the Interior undertook except for reminding the military

 4     of what their duties were in relation to the enforcement of military

 5     justice.

 6        Q.   Okay.  I'll leave the point there if you didn't find it

 7     significant.  Let me move to Mr. Seselj, which you've returned to on many

 8     occasions during your testimony.

 9             MR. JORDASH:  Could we have on e-court, please, 65 ter 1D1349,

10     page 1D01-7542.

11        Q.   And this is some of your comments, I think, on some issues of

12     relevance here.

13             Well, that's difficult to read.

14             This is your testimony in the Seselj case.

15             MR. JORDASH:  Could we go slightly up the page.

16        Q.   The -- you're discussing, as you can see there, the role of

17     political -- certain political parties in the establishment of

18     paramilitary formations, and your response to a question, were these

19     formations based on material that you have reviewed supported by the

20     Republic of Serbia.  And you say:

21             "Well, overall, as an overall comment one would say that they

22     were at least allowed to exist.  There are indications that some groups

23     were the subject of investigation or even that they were prevented from

24     continuing to exist, and I refer, I think, to the Serbian Volunteer Guard

25     in specific references."

Page 8343

 1        A.   Yeah.  Yeah.

 2        Q.   Could you just elaborate on that is answer in the Seselj case,

 3     please?

 4        A.   It must be an error.  I must have meant the Serbian Guard so I

 5     don't -- I mean, I don't check transcripts.  Okay, I should check them

 6     when I'm testifying but -- the Serbian Volunteer Guard --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Theunens, the transcript is the exclusive

 8     responsibility -- it's good that if any mistake was made that it is

 9     corrected, but you have no duty to verify the transcript when testifying.

10     Please proceed.

11             MR. JORDASH:

12        Q.   Thank you.

13        A.   Yeah.  I must have meant the Serbian Guard, Srpska Guard of

14     Vuk Draskovic, because we've touched upon that a few times.  There, as

15     far as I remember, action was undertaken.

16        Q.   When were they prevented from continuing to exist, and by whom?

17        A.   I don't recall exactly.  What I recall is that they were involved

18     in Gospic, I believe in the summer or fall 1991.  And then you still saw

19     some kind of open-source reporting on alleged activities, but including

20     references also in security organ reports, but I don't -- I cannot say

21     exactly when -- or when they were disbanded.  I have a recollection that

22     they were disband -- I mean that they were -- sorry, not just disbanded

23     out of their own volition but action was undertaken.  But I have no exact

24     recollection.

25        Q.   By whom?

Page 8344

 1        A.   By the Serbian -- I mean Serbian government.  I mean the Serb --

 2     the competent Serb authorities.

 3        Q.   And who would they be?

 4        A.   It would involve the -- I mean the Ministry of the Interior,

 5     maybe the Ministry of Defence.

 6        Q.   You didn't think that important to put in your report in this

 7     case?

 8        A.   That's not the issue.  I mean, what I said there in Seselj is --

 9     is based on my general knowledge.  As you see in this report for --

10     except for the conclusions I draw on the facts, for each fact there is a

11     reference.  Now, obviously I cannot find -- I don't have reference for

12     each and every thing I remember about the conflict in the former

13     Yugoslavia, and this is one of them.

14        Q.   But you were analysing the responsibilities of the MUP and their

15     tacit authorisation of opposition paramilitary groups?

16        A.   Indeed.

17        Q.   How significant were the Serbian Guard in terms of these types of

18     groups?

19        A.   It's always difficult to -- to -- to mention -- to judge the

20     significance, but at least based on my research they were -- as I

21     mentioned they were involved in one area, in Gospic, so in the Krajina,

22     and other areas I found some general references in -- in documents of the

23     1st Military Districts but nothing at the level of the groups I have

24     discussed in my report.

25        Q.   I mean, you make mention through -- throughout your report of the

Page 8345

 1     Serbian Guard, don't you, in this case?

 2        A.   If you can remind me where?  I mean probably I mentioned them at

 3     least once or twice but not as often as -- as Arkan or Dragan or

 4     volunteers belonging to the Serbian Radical Party.

 5        Q.   Right.  Okay.  Well, let's leave the point there.  Let's -- you

 6     do make the point there in the next line about focusing in the Seselj

 7     case on this Serbian Radical Party.

 8        A.   Mm-hmm.

 9        Q.   And the conclusion that there was co-operation with the Ministry

10     of Defence and/or the Ministry of Interior in order to organise, equip,

11     arm, and dispatch these units, as well as co-operation with the JNA.  Is

12     there any reason you said "and/or" in that case?

13        A.   I mean, grammatically speaking, "and" would have been sufficient.

14        Q.   Okay.

15             MR. JORDASH:  Let's go to 65 ter, please, on the e-court, 1D1349.

16     1D134G -- 9, sorry.  1D1349.  And page, first of all, 1D01-7667.

17        Q.   And this is where you deal with, I think, Seselj's relationship

18     with Slobodan Milosevic at some point in time.

19             MR. JORDASH:  Could we just -- if we go down the page, please.

20     Could we go back up a little.  And you say, I think -- keep going,

21     please.

22             "THE WITNESS:  This is public knowledge, referring to number 3 on

23     the list.  I'm sorry if this -- I don't -- if you aren't able to locate

24     this in context, then we can come back to it, Mr. Theunens.  But Mr. --

25     what is said there is Mr. Seselj suspected that person of having, yeah,

Page 8346

 1     particular links, i.e., that he was collecting information for the state

 2     security of the Republic of Serbia.  Is this a man called Petkovic?  And

 3     I remember that was a time when this person was kicked out of the

 4     War Staff, a press conference whereby this person more or less had to

 5     make a confession about his ties with the state security of the Republic

 6     of Serbia.  Mr. Seselj sitting on his left or his right side."

 7        Q.   Does this trigger your memory?

 8        A.   Yes, it does.

 9        Q.   Who is that?

10        A.   It was the -- the chief of the SRS War Staff.  At the time I

11     don't recall his exact name but I can find --

12        Q.   We'll come back to it anyway.  But it was somebody kicked out

13     of -- a prominent person in the --

14        A.   He was the chief of the SRS War Staff during the relevant time

15     period, i.e., from, I think, end of 1991, because he's -- I think his

16     predecessor was Zoran Rankovic and he took over from Rankovic.  But I can

17     find out.

18        Q.   Yeah.  No, we'll come to that.  I think --

19        A.   Okay.

20        Q.   It's Petkovic, I think.

21        A.   Yeah, but in the first name I'm not hundred per cent.

22        Q.   But he was kicked out when?

23        A.   I believe in the latter half of 1993, but I can be wrong.

24        Q.   He was kicked out for what in particular, do you know?

25        A.   Yeah, the open-source information states that Vojislav Seselj was

Page 8347

 1     suspicious that the co-operation he had with the Serbian government

 2     Ministry of Defence as well as the Ministry of the Interior went beyond

 3     what I would call advancing the goals of the War Staff, but that

 4     actually, according to Mr. Seselj, this person was, yeah, collecting

 5     information on the activities of the War Staff and the SRS for the DB.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Could we go down the page a bit please.

 7     Judge Antonetti then asks you -- we're keeping the court staff busy.

 8     Judge Antonetti asks you:

 9             "This event indicates that in the Republic of Serbia there were

10     power struggles or between the political parties, the MUP and the

11     Ministry of the Interior, there was a struggle to exert influence; is

12     that right?  Can you confirm this?"

13             And you say:  "... and more specifically that the competent

14     services, i.e., the State Security Service, was aware that certain

15     political parties were organising, I mean recruiting, organising,

16     dispatching volunteers, and also involved in arming them, and from that

17     legal point of view it made sense to keep an eye on them, even though it

18     seems that it took some time before there was any --" can we go over the

19     page, please -- "before there was any action against these activities."

20             And you say:

21             "This is not dealt with in my report but I remember that it's

22     only after a political conflict arises between Mr. Seselj and

23     Mr. Milosevic sometime in October 19 -- November 1993 that the competent

24     authorities in Serbia start with the arrest of volunteers, and they're

25     all arrested -- or most of them are arrested on the ground of illegal

Page 8348

 1     possession of firearms and they're released quite soon."

 2             So you're there making a clear distinction, it seems, between

 3     what the state security was doing, which was keeping them under

 4     surveillance, and then the competent authorities making the arrests

 5     somewhat later in the day.  Is that fair?

 6        A.   Yes, and the state -- I mean the competent authorities can

 7     include the state security.  I have -- as I said today, I have not

 8     analysed the detailed tasks or competence of the state security.

 9        Q.   Thanks.

10             MR. JORDASH:  Could we go to page 1D01-7668 -- oh, we've just had

11     a look at that.  Okay.  Can we go then to 65 ter 1D1349, the same one,

12     page number 1D01-8164.

13        Q.   I mean, you've said on a number of occasions today, I think, that

14     Seselj was, I think this is right, allowed to -- by the -- by the

15     competent authorities in Serbia to arm himself; is that right?  If not

16     today, this is something you've said before?

17        A.   Yes, and, I mean, we have the testimony in Seselj and I have also

18     included some of these -- some of the statements Mr. Seselj made at the

19     time in my report.  He stated that he had -- he collaborated with the

20     Ministry of Defence as well as with the Ministry of Interior Republic of

21     Serbia, and when we talk about specific operations, and the one I recall

22     now is the -- are the operations in Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina early

23     1993.  There is extensive publications by the SRS as well as statements

24     by Mr. Seselj that these operations were conducted in direct

25     co-ordination with Mr. Frenki Simatovic, i.e. --

Page 8349

 1        Q.   Well, we're going to come to some of that.

 2        A.   Okay.

 3        Q.   But interesting that you don't preface these remarks with open

 4     source.  When you implicate the Serbian MUP or the accused, you don't

 5     preface it with open source.

 6        A.   It's open source, but I mean -- open source, I don't have any

 7     qualification in relation to it.  Open source is just material that is

 8     available to the public.  I think the first day I said that in

 9     traditional, call it intelligence work, it's generally stated that

10     80 perk cent of the information comes from open sources.

11        Q.   Okay.

12        A.   And of course there are certain caveats that may apply to open

13     sources, but Mr. Seselj made a lot of public statements and, okay, they

14     are obviously open source but I refer to them as Mr. Seselj's statements.

15        Q.   Okay.  Can we go back one page so we can get the context of what

16     you're saying in the Seselj case.  And you were asked that -- that's

17     perfect.

18             "How did volunteers of the Serbian Radical Party in the Serbian

19     village of Slavonia from April to September 1991 obtain weapons?  Where

20     did they get their weapons from?  Answer me that."

21             And your answer was:

22             "Your Honours, that's the question -- that question was already

23     asked before the break, and I replied that they received the weapons

24     from -- in the area, so from the local village defence.  However, while

25     reviewing my report during the break, I also found a statement by

Page 8350

 1     Mr. Soskocanin, who participated in the incident in Borovo Selo, who made

 2     a reference to the JNA.  It's a very general reference, but anyway,

 3     that's included in my report."

 4             What precisely were you trying to say in that paragraph during

 5     the Seselj case?

 6        A.   Well, this deals with a very specific situation.  It is the --

 7     the incident in Borovo Selo on the 1st and the 2nd of May, 1991, and my

 8     testimony there is based on public statements and articles in SRS

 9     publications whereby the SRS describes in detail how its volunteers

10     travel from Serbia to Borovo Selo, contact local Serb armed structures

11     that are developing there, i.e., the local Serb TO that is being

12     established.  And according to these articles, weapons -- I cannot say

13     all weapons, but weapons are provided by these local Serb TO.

14        Q.   Right.  So they're travelling through Serbia to Borovo Selo and

15     then obtaining their weapons when they arrive?

16        A.   Yeah.  Now -- I mean it's not in the testimony, but if you want

17     to be fully accurate, there's again open source information but I also

18     would like to refer to P1048 when we deal about weapons of SRS

19     volunteers.  With open source information --

20        Q.   What does that say, that exhibit, sorry?

21        A.   P1048 states -- it's on page 94, part 1 of my report.  It states

22     under the heading "Paramilitary groups organised by the SRS."  And then a

23     large number of the people who have joined these formations are armed

24     mostly with small arms from depots of the former JNA, MUP, and Serbian

25     Ministry of Defence that were distributed in large numbers and so on and

Page 8351

 1     so on.

 2             What I was trying to say also is that the local Serb TO, on one

 3     hand, they could lay their hands on weapons that were there even if --

 4     and again I don't want to be too detailed but the JNA had taken control

 5     over all these weapons.  And that goes back to, I think, an order of

 6     May 1990.  And in addition, weapons were distributed by the Ministry of

 7     Defence and, according to Seselj, also the Ministry of Interior of the

 8     Republic of Serbia to these local Serb defence structures, i.e., the

 9     local Serb TO that was established in parts of Croatia.

10        Q.   And you base that on that exhibit, do you?

11        A.   Not only on that exhibit.  I mean, when I refer to the order, the

12     Adzic order, it's in part 1 of the report.  It's May 1990.  It has to do

13     with the Jedinstvo restructuring plan and the distribution of weapons by

14     the Ministry of Defence.  There's other documents in my report that refer

15     to that and there's also open sources on that.

16        Q.   Let's go further down the page, please.

17        A.   Yeah, it's --

18        Q.   You were asked -- it's put to you that they couldn't obtain the

19     weapons from the local TO because the JNA took all the weapons from the

20     TO.  And you say you're aware of the order of May 1990 by General Adzic

21     to relocate the weapons of the TOs of the republic and the autonomous

22     provinces to JNA warehouses, but I understood that some of these weapons

23     in the course of the conflict were redistributed to Serbs in various

24     parts of Croatia.  And you do then say later on down this page with

25     reference to information that the JNA assisted together with the MUP and

Page 8352

 1     the Ministry of Defence.

 2             MR. JORDASH:  Could we go further down the page, please.  To the

 3     next page.

 4        Q.   To redistribute weapons to Serbs in various parts of Croatia.

 5     What did you mean by redistribute?

 6        A.   As a result of the May 1990 order of General Adzic, the weapons

 7     of the Territorial Defence of the republics, I mean, should have been put

 8     in depots that were under JNA control.  Contrary to the previous

 9     situation where the TO was in control of these depots.  I didn't analyse

10     that issue in detail but, okay, it's common knowledge that not all

11     weapons were put under JNA control.  Now, at the same time we also

12     see that -- or later on, I'm sorry.  Later on, in the course of 1991,

13     there are examples of JNA units in control of TO weapons in areas with

14     the Serb -- or significant Serb presence in Croatia distributing these

15     weapons, or some of them, to the local Serbs as a part of the development

16     of local Serb defence structures.

17        Q.   So were you saying there then that the MUP and the Ministry of

18     Defence had collaborated to redistribute those weapons which were already

19     in Croatia then?  Is that what you were saying there?

20        A.   No.  What I'm trying to say is that there are different origins

21     of these weapons.  There are weapons that were already in Croatia and

22     which -- and they belonged formally -- they are formerly to the Croatian

23     TO, and then other weapons -- I mean, weapons were also provided by the

24     Ministry of the Interior, and --

25        Q.   Redistributed by the -- so they're already in Croatia according

Page 8353

 1     to what you're saying.  Isn't that fair?

 2        A.   No.  I think you're kind of mixing it up.  I'm trying to explain

 3     what I meant by my testimony.  I'm looking for the word "redistributed"

 4     now but ...

 5        Q.   You can see it at the top of the page.

 6        A.   Yes, but then we --

 7        Q.   Oh, sorry.  Let's go back then.

 8        A.   What -- I mean what is -- what happened was that the weapons

 9     originated from -- I mean, there were different origins, I'm sorry.

10        Q.   But there you're saying that the Ministry of Defence and the

11     Ministry of the Interior of Serbia - and go over the page - in --

12     please --

13        A.   Mm-hmm.

14        Q.   In -- redistribute weapons to Serbs in various parts of Croatia.

15        A.   I can correct "redistribute" there in the sense that I was told

16     and I remember very well, for example, doing a suspect interview of

17     Miodrag Jokic --

18        Q.   Well, are we going to hear about new evidence that you have

19     picked up --

20        A.   No.

21        Q.   -- which is not --

22             JUDGE ORIE:  You're asking for an explanation if the witness

23     thinks that -- if there's anything that comes to his mind might assist

24     him in explaining that.

25             MR. JORDASH:  Your Honour, I apologise.

Page 8354

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  Miodrag Jokic, who has

 3     been minister of defence of the Republic of Serbia, he explained, without

 4     being very precise, that weapons held by factories, and that brings us

 5     back to the point you raised earlier of the role of state-owned factories

 6     in the defence system, I'm not sure whether it was in 1990 or even

 7     earlier, were gathered, because these were old weapons.  It's the famous

 8     Thompsons and so on, weapons that were, I mean from Second World War.

 9     They were collected and I believe with -- I mean with the involvement of

10     Ministry of Defence and/or the Ministry of the Interior, and then these

11     weapons were redistributed to Serbs or distributed to Serbs in -- in

12     Croatia.  And this explains, for example, that -- I mean there's famous

13     pictures of local Serbs in Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem holding

14     check-points with a Thompson style -- I mean, a Thompson World War II

15     machine-gun.  And to my recollection, that was not a weapon that was part

16     of the inventory of the Republic of Croatia TO.  And I see that in the

17     testimony Mr. Seselj also gave an additional explanation.

18             MR. JORDASH:

19        Q.   Well, let's go to that.  I want to go further down the page

20     because Seselj says to you:

21             "Let's cut this short.  I'll tell you what I know about this and

22     you can confirm whether it's correct or not.  These are weapons written

23     off by the JNA set aside to be destroyed.  General Dusan Pekic, one of

24     the functionaries of the Association of Serbs from Croatia, using his

25     private contacts and channels because he was a well-known famous

Page 8355

 1     commander from World War II, one of the most able generals the JNA ever

 2     had, and although he had been a partisan, I speak very highly of him, so

 3     he had good contacts.  And using his private contacts with certain

 4     officers, he managed to obtain those weapons which had been earmarked for

 5     destruction.  Am I correct in saying this?  You mention Dusan Pekic in

 6     your report."

 7        A.   Indeed it's correct.  And I will just highlight we are not

 8     thinking again in exclusives.  Pekic played an important role together

 9     with other members of the Association of Serbs in Croatia -- from Croatia

10     to organise local Serb defence structures as did the Ministry of Defence

11     and the Ministry of the Interior, as I have explained in this particular

12     report.

13        Q.   Right.  Let's go to the next page, please.

14        A.   Yeah.  I just want to correct Ministry of Defence and Ministry of

15     the Interior to the Republic of Serbia.

16        Q.   So Pekic played an ...

17        A.   There are documents from the Association of Serbs in Croatia and

18     they -- again I haven't analysed that here but I know from the Milosevic

19     case they had also contacts with the Ministry of Defence.  They would

20     meet or they would seek contacts with General Simovic [Realtime

21     transcript read in error "Simatovic"] and played a role and participate

22     in the organisation of defence structures of Serbs in Croatia.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Weber.

24             MR. WEBER:  I just want to note on line -- page 90, line 18, it

25     reflects Simatovic.  I believe the witness said Simovic.

Page 8356

 1             THE WITNESS:  Yeah, yeah, it's Simovic, minister of defence.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  That's hereby corrected.  Please proceed.

 3             MR. JORDASH:  Can we go to the top of this page, please -- sorry,

 4     I can -- could we go three pages on, please, to 4334 in the right-hand

 5     corner.  Three more pages.  Sorry, I cannot count.  And you were asked by

 6     Judge Antonetti:  "Can you confirm or deny that the arms were given to

 7     volunteers through the channel of General Pekic who was able through his

 8     networks to send arms who seemingly were designed for destruction?  Can

 9     you confirm Mr. Seselj's theory or not?"

10             Can we go up the page, please.

11             Mr. Theunens, you answer -- please keep going.

12             "Your Honours, I confirm that thesis but it's not the only the

13     channel.  I'm aware that in -- I'm not sure if it was 1989 or 1990, that,

14     for example, that in Serbia weapons at the civil defence and also weapons

15     that were used or could be used in time of conflict or other condition

16     when there was a requirement to do so, to protect factories and so on,

17     were all confiscated or brought together.  And I'm not sure anymore

18     whether that was done by the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of

19     Interior."

20             Do you stand by that?

21        A.   Yeah it's the same I said today.  I testified today.

22        Q.   "Just to come back to Pekic.  I think in any organised country,

23     and the SFRY was certainly an organised country in 1990, you cannot just

24     redistribute weapons through private channels.  Procedures have to be

25     followed, documents have to be established, and so on and so on.  So the

Page 8357

 1     police most likely didn't have any Thompsons or M-84s or other old

 2     weapons in its equipment.  But one cannot rule out that the police or the

 3     Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of"

 4     - if we go over the page please - "Serbia played a road in organising the

 5     transit or redistribution of these weapons.  That's what I was trying to

 6     say."

 7             Now, that is different to what you've been saying today, isn't

 8     it?  One cannot rule out is very different to a positive assertion that

 9     they did.

10        A.   I mean, I have, for example, in my report here P1048.  I've

11     mentioned it earlier.  I'm not sure whether I had -- I mean, at the time

12     I was testifying I remember that document, and my testimony is also a

13     reply to quite aggressive - I mean, what I would qualify aggressive -

14     questioning by Mr. Seselj -- yeah.  Otherwise, I don't see a difference.

15        Q.   Well, if you don't see a difference, that's fine.  We leave it on

16     the record as that.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, Mr. Theunens, let's be -- if you cannot rule

18     out something or if you positively establish something, I mean to say I

19     can't see the difference.  I think I would underestimate your

20     intelligence if I would accept that for an answer.  You know that there's

21     a difference.  Now, what your testimony today and what explains the

22     difference.  If you say, I was a bit intimidated at the time therefore I

23     was overcautious, that's one explanation.  Or if you'd say, Well, the

24     questions by Mr. Seselj were such that I had to adapt slightly my too

25     positive -- all possible explanations, but to say that you don't see the

Page 8358

 1     difference, that seems not to be something we'd like to accept at

 2     5 minutes to 7.00.

 3             THE WITNESS:  You're fully right, Your Honours.  I'm -- I'm

 4     trying to remember if I was aware of P1048 at the time or not, because

 5     P1048 for me is a quite strong document.  And, of course, the whole

 6     discussion with Mr. Seselj is also that he was very vocal in the early

 7     1990s and especially in particular after he broke with Mr. Seselj -- with

 8     Mr. Milosevic, and okay, once he was here in The Hague he came with

 9     different views.

10             MR. JORDASH:  Let's move on.  65 ter 1D1349, please, on e-court.

11     Page 1D01-8147.  If we go to the bottom of the page, please.

12        Q.   So let's read your answer to -- let's go further up the page.

13     Sorry.  You were asked the question now -- so -- Mr. Seselj asks you this

14     question:

15             "Mr. Theunens, we're talking about up to September, up to the

16     month of September, no a single volunteer of the Serbian Radical Party

17     was in Western Slavonia.  Isn't that right?  So don't mix things up

18     before September and after September, if you're able to do that.  Are you

19     able to do that?

20             "So up until September, the volunteers of the Serbian Radical

21     Party were defending certain villages called in by the local Serb

22     population to do so.  Now, do you know that those volunteers crossed over

23     into Slavonia, crossed the Danube or Srem, and they had to hide from the

24     authorities in Serbia to do that?"

25             Could we go up the page, please.

Page 8359

 1             "Your Honours, first of all, I would like comment on the fact --

 2     on the claim made by Mr. Seselj that these volunteers had been called by

 3     the local Serb population to come to the area.  I would like to refer you

 4     to English page 104 in page [sic] 2 of the report, where the activities

 5     of the Chetnik volunteer detachment that participated in the -- okay, the

 6     conflict in Borovo Selo on the 2nd of May has been discussed.  And

 7     according to 65 ter number 320, that Chetnik volunteer detachment had

 8     been established following a decision by the Central Homeland

 9     Administration of the Serbian Chetnik Movement and then dispatched to

10     Western Srem on the 2nd of April, 1991."

11             Can we go up, please.

12             "Now the circumstances of how these volunteers went from Serbia

13     to Croatia.  Indeed, articles of 'Velika Srbija' suggested the volunteers

14     did not use one of the three bridges over the Danube but that they

15     crossed --"

16             Can we turn, please.

17             "-- that they crossed the Danube by night using boats."

18             You stand by that answer?

19        A.   Of -- I mean the volunteers that participated in the Borovo Selo

20     incident -- yeah, clash, yes, I haven't come across other information, so

21     that's the best knowledge I have.

22        Q.   Well, you didn't say that in this case, did you, in your report

23     or in your evidence that the Seselj men were having to cross

24     surreptitiously because, for some reason, the Serbian authorities were

25     preventing them crossing use the three bridges.  Why didn't you say that?

Page 8360

 1        A.   No.  I mean, I confirmed that -- but that based on the

 2     information in "Velika Srbija" they crossed the Danube using barges, and

 3     okay, this is the situation in May 1991.  And you will see in my report,

 4     I mean the report in this case, that according to, for example,

 5     Branislav Vakic, he says that there is over time -- and Branislav Vakic

 6     was a senior SRS volunteer.  Over time there was a change in his view in

 7     the attitude of the Serbian authorities in relation to politically

 8     oriented volunteers.  And I can assure you, I mean, the SRS volunteers,

 9     again based on the information I have seen, who participated in the

10     operations in Vukovar after September 1991, they were bus -- they were

11     coming in by bus.

12        Q.   Well --

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash.

14             MR. JORDASH:  Your Honour, yes.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm looking at the clock.  I heard your sigh.  Isn't

16     it that Shakespeare says "a thousand thousand sighs to save," but perhaps

17     for tomorrow.

18             MR. JORDASH:  Yes, please.  Thank you.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Theunens, we'll continue tomorrow in the

20     afternoon, quarter past 2.00 in Courtroom I.

21             We adjourn until then unless you have some follow-up, Mr. --

22             MR. WEBER:  Your Honour, you requested information concerning

23     JF-52.  On the 7th of September, 2010, the Prosecution sent a

24     notification for this witness for the first week of November.  On the

25     15th of September, 2010, our notification indicated the 27th and 28th of

Page 8361

 1     October, 2010.  This witness was rescheduled then, and in our subsequent

 2     notice, JF-52 was scheduled for the 1st and 2nd of November, 2010.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Thank you for that information.  We'll further

 4     consider the request of Mr. Bakrac.  We'll adjourn for the day, and we'll

 5     resume tomorrow, the 28th [sic] of October, quarter past 2.00,

 6     Courtroom I.

 7                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.02,

 8                           to be reconvened on Friday, the 29th day of

 9                           October, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.