Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 11354

 1                           Monday, 11 April, 2011

 2                           [Rule 98 bis]

 3                           [Open session]

 4                           [The accused entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone in and around this

 7     courtroom.  Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning,

 9     everyone in and around the courtroom.  This is case number IT-03-69-T.

10     The Prosecutor versus Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

12             Before I give an opportunity to the Prosecution to make its

13     submission in response to the 98 bis submissions of the Simatovic

14     Defence, I just put on the record that we've received a request by e-mail

15     to use slides.  Any objection against that?  I wouldn't expect any

16     objections.  Then apart from that table of confidential exhibits you'd

17     like to deal with briefly in private session, but you also would like to

18     have them marked for identification, is that ... ?

19             MR. GROOME:  That's correct, Your Honour, but I'm not sure we

20     need to go into private session to do that.  Ms. Marcus is prepared to

21     address it in open session.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, of course.  These are two new documents marked

23     for identification, although I do understand that the content is nothing

24     new, so just that we have a clear record of what you've used.  Is the

25     Defence informed about these documents, these tables to be marked for

Page 11355

 1     identification.

 2             MR. GROOME:  Yes, Your Honour, they received the same e-mail that

 3     was sent to the Chamber on Friday.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then perhaps an order to avoid any disturbance

 5     of the flow of submissions, would there be any objection against the

 6     documents the Prosecution indicated it wanted to have marked for

 7     identification?  I see a nodding no by the Stanisic Defence.  Mr. Bakrac,

 8     same for you?  Then we can proceed as scheduled.  The Prosecution now has

 9     an opportunity to make submissions in response to the 98 bis submissions

10     by the Simatovic Defence.

11             Ms. Marcus, you are the first.

12             MS. MARCUS:  Yes, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

14             MS. MARCUS:  Thank you.

15             Good morning, Your Honours, and everyone in the courtroom.  On

16     behalf of the Prosecution, we thank you for this opportunity to respond

17     to the 98 bis motion for acquittal made by the Simatovic Defence.  To

18     begin with, I will present to the Chamber some information regarding our

19     submissions today.  I will then formally commence our arguments.

20             On the screen before you is a table of contents of our oral

21     submissions.  Although each member of the team will address a discrete

22     area of evidence, the Prosecution response is intended as a single

23     response and much of the evidence described by one team member has

24     brought relevance to the entire Prosecution case.  I have a few

25     preliminary remarks for Your Honours, prior to the commencement of the

Page 11356

 1     substantive submissions.  First, the Prosecution's submissions will

 2     contain a overview of the evidence in support of the charges in the

 3     indictment in response to the Simatovic Defence 98 bis submissions, in

 4     particular, their assertion that the Prosecution has not presented

 5     evidence in relation to any of the counts in the indictment.

 6             Second, the Prosecution does not plan to present a separate

 7     segment on the legal standards.  Rather, our submissions will be focused

 8     upon the factual evidence in support of the charges and how that evidence

 9     could support a conviction on all counts by a reasonable Trial Chamber.

10     And thereby why the motion for acquittal should be denied.

11             Third, a motion for acquittal at this stage obliges the

12     Prosecution to marshal its evidence, to facilitate the Chamber's review

13     of the Prosecution evidence and to avoid lengthy recitations of exhibit

14     numbers and transcript references, the Prosecution will rely on a series

15     of demonstrative slides for this purpose.  These slides do not contain

16     argument and are not evidence in and of themselves.  It is our hope that

17     they will assist the Chamber as well as those transcribing our words.

18             In some cases we have included excerpts of documents and

19     testimony to facilitate the Chamber's review and expedite this process.

20     Also in this regard, although we will not give precise citations for

21     everything we say here, we are able to do so, should the Chamber so

22     request.  If there is something that we say which the Chamber would like

23     to have the precise references for, please indicate that and we will be

24     glad to do so.

25             Fourth, for the purpose of clarity the Prosecution will at all

Page 11357

 1     times refer to the third amended indictment in this case simply as the

 2     indictment.  Finally, Your Honours, before I commence, I would like to

 3     set out the manner in which the Prosecution plans to deal with

 4     confidential evidence, whether that be closed session or private session

 5     testimony or under-seal exhibits.  The Prosecution has reviewed its

 6     submissions fully and is confident that the manner in which the evidence

 7     will be presented will fully comply with the protective measures orders

 8     of the Chamber.  In many instances when it becomes necessary to refer to

 9     confidential evidence, the Prosecution rather than asking to go into

10     private session, will simply refer to a table of confidential evidence

11     which was just referred to by Mr. President.

12             This chart lists numbers which will be used by the Prosecution to

13     inform the Chamber which witness or which document was quoted or referred

14     to, without publicly revealing transcript page numbers for closed or

15     private session testimony, pseudonyms of protected witnesses, or the

16     contents of under-seal exhibits.  In this respect, Your Honours, I have a

17     brief motion to make.

18             In the filings in relation to Reynaud Theunens, we requested that

19     certain documents be kept under seal because they were pending in the

20     Serbia protective measures litigation.  There are -- since that time on

21     the 12th of April, 2010, there has been a motion filed by the government

22     of Serbia in which they explicitly stated that for some of the documents

23     in that we received in response to RFA 219, they do not seek any

24     protective measures.  Three of those documents will be referred to in our

25     submissions today.  Those three are P1078, P1188, and P1192.

Page 11358

 1             The first person to refer to those submissions will be

 2     Ms. Friedman, which you can see is section D.  We would respectfully

 3     request that if the Chamber is able to that we be granted leave to use

 4     those, to cite those documents in open session rather than going into

 5     private session.  But we are in the hands of the Chamber with that

 6     regard.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Any objection to the suggestions made by Ms. Marcus?

 8     Not.  Then, because officially the status has not been changed yet?

 9             MS. MARCUS:  That's correct, Your Honour.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  One second, please.

11                           [Trial Chamber confers]

12             JUDGE ORIE:  I am addressing the parties.  Apparently if there's

13     no objection against dealing in public with these exhibits, then may I

14     take it that there's no objection against changing their status into

15     public documents.  Apparently all the parties agree.  Therefore P1078,

16     P1188, and P1192, the status is changed from confidential into public.

17     Please proceed.

18             MS. MARCUS:  Thank you, Your Honour.  I will now commence the

19     Prosecution's submissions.

20             Rule 98 bis, as outlined by Mr. Bakrac, provides that at the

21     close of the Prosecutor's case, the Trial Chamber shall, by oral decision

22     and after hearing the oral submissions of the parties, enter a judgement

23     of acquittal on any count if there is no evidence capable of supporting a

24     conviction.  The test that has been consistently applied is that a

25     Rule 98 bis motion will succeed if there's no evidence supporting a

Page 11359

 1     particular count, or if the only relevant evidence is so incapable of

 2     belief that it could not properly sustain a conviction, even when the

 3     evidence is taken at its highest for the Prosecution.

 4             The Prosecution submits, Your Honours, contrary to the assertions

 5     of the Simatovic Defence, that it has presented evidence in support of

 6     each count in the indictment.  In fact, the Prosecution submits that with

 7     respect to all counts in the indictment, the Prosecution has not only met

 8     its burden at this stage of the proceedings, but has met its ultimate

 9     burden.  The Prosecution has presented relevant, probative, and

10     consistent evidence in support of each count in the indictment.

11     Therefore, Your Honours, the Prosecution submits that the Defence motion

12     for acquittal must fail.

13             I will now pass the floor to Mr. Travis Farr, who will address

14     Your Honours on the joint criminal enterprise on planning and ordering.

15             MR. FARR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  As Ms. Marcus has

16     indicated, I will focus my remarks on the joint criminal enterprise

17     alleged in the indictment.  And I will focus in particular on the

18     evidence of the common criminal purpose of that JCE.  This common

19     criminal purpose is set out in paragraph 13 of the indictment as "the

20     forcible and permanent removal of the majority of non-Serbs, principally

21     Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from large areas of Croatia

22     and B&H, through the commission of the crimes of persecution, murder,

23     deportations and inhumane acts, forcible transfers."

24             The Simatovic Defence denies the existence of this common

25     criminal purpose.  At transcript page 11334, they said, "The Defence

Page 11360

 1     points out that there is no evidence regarding a joint objective."

 2             In addition to challenging the existence of the common criminal

 3     purpose, the Simatovic Defence says that there is no evidence that

 4     Mr. Simatovic shared any common criminal purpose.  That's on the same

 5     page.

 6             There's been a great deal of evidence in this case that is

 7     relevant to JCE, in fact, it is probably not an exaggeration to say that

 8     most of the evidence led in this case is relevant to the issue of JCE in

 9     one way or another.  For the Chamber's reference, slide 3, on the screen

10     before you, contains some of the most important evidence of JCE in this

11     case, some of which will be referred to by my colleagues.

12             Obviously our time today doesn't allow me to discuss all or even

13     most of this evidence.  Accordingly, I plan to focus on a relatively

14     small number of pieces of evidence with a direct bearing on the existence

15     of the common criminal plan.  In doing so, I will take matters somewhat

16     out of chronological order for ease of presentation.  I'll begin with the

17     evidence related to Bosnia-Herzegovina, move on to the SAO Krajina and

18     conclude with the SAO SBWS.  Although we've organised our presentation

19     today based on these regions, I want to emphasise at the outset that this

20     case involves a single integrated criminal plan spanning all three

21     regions and several years.  We submit that Mr. Simatovic, and the other

22     members of the JCE, always viewed this as a single project and the

23     Chamber should as well.

24             One note about persecutory intent, the common criminal purpose of

25     this JCE involved the permanent forcible removal of non-Serbs.  This

Page 11361

 1     means that all of the JCE intent evidence that we discuss today is also

 2     relevant to persecutory intent.  Much of the evidence I discuss will also

 3     be relevant to the modes of liability of planning and ordering.

 4             Your Honours, before I begin with the evidence from Bosnia, a

 5     brief word about the relationship between the accused.  The most

 6     important relationship between JCE members in this case is the

 7     relationship between the two accused.  Throughout the indictment period,

 8     the accused had a close relationship of co-operation and trust, and this

 9     relationship is central to the Prosecution case with respect to both

10     accused.  This relationship is demonstrated by documentary evidence, such

11     as the official records admitted as P471, and it's reinforced by the many

12     witnesses such as Milan Babic and Dejan Sliskovic, who stated that

13     Mr. Simatovic was Mr. Stanisic's second in command.  Those references are

14     page 12918 and -- of P1878 and paragraph 41 of P441.  And Your Honours, I

15     would ask that we move briefly into private session.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  We move into private session.

17                           [Private session]

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 11362

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8                           [Open session]

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  We are in open session, Your Honours.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

11             MR. FARR:  The most vivid picture of the relationship between the

12     two accused comes from Dejan Sliskovic.  Sliskovic had the chance to

13     observe both of the accused's living and working arrangements up close

14     for a period of months during Operation Pauk.  He gave evidence that for

15     a period of several months, Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic shared an

16     office in the house that served as their command centre and living

17     quarters in Petrovo Gora.  That's paragraph 32 of P441.

18             Your Honours, under these circumstances, Mr. Stanisic and

19     Mr. Simatovic must have shared knowledge and discussed plans and

20     functioned as a single cohesive unit.  This is why, despite

21     Mr. Stanisic's having waived his right to make submissions under 98 bis,

22     we will refer to evidence which relates to him.  The two men were

23     inseparable and the evidence about their conduct is inextricable.

24             Your Honours, I'll now turn to evidence related to Bosnia.  On

25     the 13th and 14th of December, 1993, a critical meeting was taking place

Page 11363

 1     in Belgrade, attended by some of the most powerful men in the former

 2     Yugoslavia.  We know about this meeting thanks to an excerpt from one of

 3     Ratko Mladic's notebooks, which has been admitted into evidence as P2532,

 4     and this slide, number 4, shows an excerpt from the first page of that

 5     exhibit.

 6             Your Honours, in our submission, what happened at that meeting is

 7     a textbook illustration of joint criminal enterprise as defined by the

 8     law of this Tribunal.  The first element of JCE is a plurality of

 9     persons.  The plurality of persons at this meeting in Belgrade included

10     key leaders from Serbia and the Republika Srpska, many of whom were also

11     key members of the JCE charged in this case.  The names of JCE members

12     listed in paragraph 12 of the indictment are highlighted in red in the

13     excerpt before you.  They include political leaders like

14     Slobodan Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic, and Momcilo Krajisnik.  They

15     include military leaders like Ratko Mladic.  They include MUP leaders

16     like Mico Stanisic and Radovan Stojicic, aka Badza.  Of course

17     Jovica Stanisic was also present, and spoke first at that meeting.

18             Your Honours, as set out at transcript pages 11319, 11321, and

19     11325 to 326, it is the Simatovic Defence case that Arkan was closely

20     linked to Badza in 1991 and closely linked to Karadzic in 1995.  Here we

21     see both of these men at a meeting with Mr. Simatovic's close associate,

22     Jovica Stanisic, in 1993.  The second element of JCE is a common criminal

23     plan and the men at this meeting clearly shared a common criminal plan.

24     This is shown by the nature of the discussion, which is basically about

25     two things:  First, the extent to which Bosnian Serb forces have

Page 11364

 1     established exclusive control over large areas of Bosnia; and second, how

 2     that control can be consolidated.

 3             A common criminal plan, of course, must be common, and it must be

 4     criminal.  Jovica Stanisic speaks first at the meeting and his comments

 5     are shown on slide number 5.  He makes it clear that the goal is a common

 6     one when he says to the RS delegation, "We are meeting in order to

 7     improve your operational and tactical position and see about help from

 8     Serbia."

 9             Mr. Stanisic shares the goal of the RS delegation.  He wants to

10     know how he can help to achieve it.  Karadzic speaks immediately after

11     Mr. Stanisic.  He says, "Unification with Serbia is smiling upon us."

12     Karadzic's comments, which are shown in slide 6, also make it clear that

13     the goal of the group is the criminal goal of the permanent forcible

14     removal of non-Serbs from large parts of B&H.  He articulates the first

15     strategic objective of the Bosnian Serbs, that is, "to be separated from

16     the Muslims and Croats."

17             His other comments show that this strategic objective refers to

18     physical separation, not to institutional or organisational or cultural

19     separation or whatever other possibilities might be suggested.  This is

20     clear from his statement that Serbs are controlling 75 per cent of the

21     territory and controlling the most important parts of the territory.

22             Of course, the Chamber also has before it the evidence of

23     Dr. Ewa Tabeau, Dr. Tabeau's evidence shows the massive population

24     movements that occurred as a result of the pursuit of this goal.

25             Your Honours, we have a plurality of persons and we have a common

Page 11365

 1     criminal plan.  The next element is contribution.  Mladic's record of

 2     this meeting shows that Jovica Stanisic contributed to the achievement of

 3     this common criminal plan in two key ways.  First, he served as a channel

 4     of communication between the members of the JCE.  Second, he send armed

 5     men to help achieve the goal.  Mr. Stanisic's prominent role in presiding

 6     over this meeting in itself constitutes a contribution to the JCE.  This

 7     is a singularly clear example of him providing channels of communication

 8     between and among the core members of the JCE as alleged in paragraph

 9     15(a) of the indictment.

10             Of course, this exhibit indicates that Mr. Stanisic also

11     contributed to the JCE by sending armed men to help achieve the goal.  On

12     page 8 of the English translation of this exhibit, a portion of which we

13     see on slide number 7, Mr. Stanisic says, "We can spare 100 to 120 men."

14     And, "Our combat group is ready to set out tomorrow."

15             Your Honours, General Mladic's contemporaneous notes of this

16     meeting provide a snap-shot of the joint criminal enterprise as it

17     existed on those two days in late 1993.  We would submit that as a

18     starting point for analysing the JCE in this case, this meeting proves

19     convincingly that the JCE was alive and well and functioning as charged

20     in the indictment on 13 and 14 December 1993.

21             In other words, Your Honours, the question is not whether the JCE

22     ever existed as all, as the Simatovic Defence has suggested, but rather

23     when it began.

24             One piece of evidence that sheds some light on that question is

25     Mr. Simatovic's speech at the Kula camp awards ceremony in 1997.  In that

Page 11366

 1     speech, now admitted as part of P61, Mr. Simatovic states that the

 2     Special Operations Unit of the State Security Service was formed on 4 May

 3     1991.  Mr. Weber will address that exhibit further in his submissions.

 4             Another key piece of evidence regarding the evolution of JCE

 5     intent is Karadzic's speech before the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina in

 6     Sarajevo on 15 October 1991, now in evidence as P940.  An excerpt of that

 7     speech is on slide 8, before you now.  In that speech, Karadzic said:

 8             "This is the road that you want Bosnia and Herzegovina to take,

 9     the same highway of hell and suffering that Croatia and Slovenia went

10     through.  Don't think you won't take Bosnia and Herzegovina to hell and

11     the Muslim people in possible extinction.  Because, Muslim people will

12     not be able to defend itself, if it comes to war here."

13             Your Honours, a lawfully conducted war, no matter how terrible

14     for the combatants, could never result in the extinction of a people.

15     Therefore, Karadzic's statement before the Assembly of B&H was a threat

16     to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity.  Karadzic is saying, in

17     effect, give us the political solution we want or crimes will be the

18     result.  He makes this threat precisely by referring to events in Croatia

19     where crimes were already occurring.

20             Why is Karadzic's speech relevant to the intent of Mr. Simatovic

21     in this case?  Both of the accused were in touch with Karadzic in the

22     months after he gave his speech.  In one of those conversations,

23     Jovica Stanisic expressed almost exactly the same idea that Karadzic

24     expressed in his speech.  That conversation took place on the 22nd of

25     January, 1992, and that intercept is now in evidence as P690.  We see an

Page 11367

 1     excerpt from that intercept on slide 9 on our screens now.

 2             In this exchange, Karadzic and Stanisic are talking about what

 3     will happen if Serbs and Croats are unable to resolve their disagreements

 4     through negotiations.  Karadzic says that if the Serbs and Croats are not

 5     able to resolve all of their contentious issues, then "They are in for 30

 6     years of torture with blue helmets, with disagreements, with all sorts of

 7     things."  Mr. Stanisic replies, "With killings."  Karadzic says, "I beg

 8     your pardon."  And Stanisic repeats, "With killings."  Mr. Stanisic then

 9     says, "We'll then have to push them to go to Belgrade, you know."  And a

10     few seconds later continues by saying, "Or we'll exterminate them

11     completely, so let's see where we'll end up."

12             What does this conversation say about the existence of the common

13     criminal plan in January of 1992?  The context here is very important.

14     This conversation took place months after the war had started in Croatia,

15     after the fall of Vukovar, and after crimes on a massive scale had

16     already taken place.  Large-scale violence was not a theoretical

17     possibility but a present reality.

18             In this context, talk of killings and extermination was not idle

19     pre-war bravado, rather, Mr. Stanisic's statement that "we'll exterminate

20     them completely" was a statement that nothing would prevent the JCE

21     members from reaching their goals.  Stanisic's private statement to

22     Karadzic thus echoes Karadzic's public statement in his speech to the

23     Assembly of B&H and expresses the same idea:  If we don't get what we

24     want through political means, we will commit crimes to achieve it.

25             Shortly after this conversation, Karadzic also spoke to

Page 11368

 1     Mr. Simatovic.  P693 is an intercepted conversation between Karadzic and

 2     someone identifying himself as Frenki from 6 days after Stanisic and

 3     Karadzic had the conversation in which Mr. Stanisic mentioned

 4     extermination.  During this conversation, parts of which are on slide 10,

 5     Frenki tells Karadzic that he is behind him completely.  He also says to

 6     Karadzic, "You are the main man there, doctor, and that's how it stays."

 7     The two of them agree to meet soon.

 8             In light of the close relationship between Stanisic and

 9     Simatovic, and in light of the relationship between Stanisic and Karadzic

10     shown by the Belgrade meeting and their intercepted conversation, this

11     conversation between Simatovic and Karadzic confirms that all three men

12     were participants in a common project sharing a common goal.

13             Your Honours, I'll now turn to evidence related to Croatia,

14     beginning with the SAO Krajina.  Other than the accused, Milan Martic and

15     Ratko Mladic are the key JCE members from the SAO Krajina.  Martic in

16     particular played a prominent role in all of the events there and the

17     Prosecution case for the SAO Krajina depends significantly on his

18     relationship with the accused.  In that context, there is one key event

19     that clearly illuminates the relationship between Franko Simatovic and

20     Milan Martic and shows the criminal intent of both men.  That event is

21     the attack on Lovinac carried out by Mr. Simatovic, Martic, and others in

22     the summer of 1991.

23             Milan Babic discusses this event in his evidence, which is shown

24     on slide 11 and has been admitted as P1877 pursuant to Rule 92 quater.

25     Babic describes how he learned about the attack from Frenki himself.  In

Page 11369

 1     September of 1991, Babic heard Frenki bragging about the attack in a

 2     restaurant in Knin.  Describing this, Babic says:

 3             "I heard that together with Milan Martic and David Rastovic, and

 4     with a mortar platoon from Lapac, he," meaning Simatovic, "had fired at

 5     Lovinac, at the police station and at the village itself.  I heard from

 6     him after these events, I heard him bragging that they had razed it all."

 7             Your Honours, in our submission, this clearly shows Mr. Simatovic

 8     acting with the goal of forcing the Croat civilian population to leave

 9     the SAO Krajina.  To put it another way, it is clear evidence that

10     Simatovic intended the permanent forcible removal of Croat civilians.

11     The fact that he and Martic worked together in this attack just confirms

12     that they were working together towards this goal.

13             We would note that this evidence of Babic is corroborated and in

14     fact, in our submission, is greatly strengthened by the evidence set out

15     in the confidential evidence table at B1 through B3.

16             In addition to the Lovinac evidence, there has been significant

17     other evidence led regarding the SAO Krajina with a direct bearing on the

18     intents of the accused and Milan Martic.  A great deal of that evidence

19     was led in closed or private session or is under seal, so I would direct

20     the Chamber's attention to confidential evidence table at B4 through B11,

21     with respect to the JCE intent of Milan Martic, and B12 to B13, regarding

22     the JCE intent of Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic.

23             The evidence also shows that the accused both maintained

24     extremely close relationships with Milan Martic throughout the times

25     relevant to the indictment.  These relationships began before the

Page 11370

 1     indictment period and continued throughout it.  For example, Milan Babic

 2     indicates that he met Jovica Stanisic with Milan Martic near Golubic at

 3     the end of August 1990.  That's P1878 at page 12930.

 4             Babic also indicates that Mr. Stanisic, Mr. Simatovic, and

 5     Martic, among others, met at Karadzic's flat in Sarajevo in May 1991.

 6     There they were "discussing some maps where the Serbs were in control and

 7     areas where they should establish control, or rather, the SDS, Karadzic's

 8     party."  That's P1878 at page 13082.

 9             Other witnesses corroborate and strengthen the evidence of

10     regular meetings between the accused and Milan Martic before and

11     throughout the indictment period.  They also describe on-going support

12     for Milan Martic by the accused during this period.  I would direct the

13     Chamber's attention to the confidential evidence table at B14 to B19.

14             These witnesses' accounts of the close relationship between the

15     accused and Milan Martic are corroborated by numerous exhibits.  One of

16     these exhibits is a greeting telegram sent by Mr. Stanisic on 5 July 1994

17     for RSK security day, now admitted as P2667.  An excerpt of the text is

18     on slide 12 before you.  Mr. Stanisic writes:

19             "We are now entering the decisive phase of the fight to achieve

20     the common goals of all the Serbian lands, more determined and prepared

21     than ever before."

22             This, we submit, clearly shows that Mr. Stanisic saw himself as

23     being involved in a joint project with the security forces of the RSK at

24     a time when Milan Martic was president of the RSK.  This telegram wasn't

25     the first time that Jovica Stanisic formally acknowledged his

Page 11371

 1     relationship with the RSK security forces though.  The previous year,

 2     that is, in 1993, Mr. Stanisic actually attending the celebration of RSK

 3     security day in person.  The video admitted as P12 shows that

 4     Mr. Stanisic had a front row seat between Milan Babic and Goran Hadzic as

 5     Milan Martic addressed those assembled to mark the day.  We can see that

 6     from the still from that video on slide 13 before us now.  The Chamber

 7     will recognise Jovica Stanisic, marked with number 2, sitting between

 8     Babic, who is number 1, and Hadzic, who is number 3.  This still is in

 9     evidence as page 3 of P990.

10             The esteem between the RSK security forces and Mr. Stanisic was

11     clearly mutual.  P428, which is on slide 14, is a list of individuals who

12     are being awarded security service plaques on RSK security services day.

13     The first name on the list is Jovica Stanisic.  Your Honours, in light of

14     this long-standing relationship of support and co-operation between the

15     accused and Milan Martic, it comes as no surprise that Milan Martic would

16     send a new year's greeting letter to Jovica Stanisic.  An excerpt of that

17     letter, admitted as page 2 of P995 and on the screen before you now says:

18             "Last year, 1994, was marked by the effort to attain a common

19     stance in our joint effort - the creation of a unified Serbian state."

20             Similar greetings were sent to other members of the JCE,

21     including Karadzic and Krajisnik, two of the men who appear in the photo

22     with the accused that has been admitted as P391 and that is also shown on

23     slide 13.  Your Honours, the creation of a unified Serbian state is not

24     if itself a criminal goal, but the methods by which this "joint effort"

25     was pursued by the members of the JCE in this case, including both of the

Page 11372

 1     accused and Milan Martic, included forcible transfer, deportation,

 2     murder, and persecution on a scale not seen in Europe since World War II.

 3             I'll now turn to evidence concerning the SAO SBWS.  We've already

 4     discussed evidence of the accused's ties to Radovan Karadzic and

 5     Milan Martic.  Just as Karadzic was a key leader of the Bosnian Serbs and

 6     Milan Martic was a key leader of the Serbs in SAO Krajina, Goran Hadzic

 7     was a key leader of the Serbs in the SBWS.  And I would note that the

 8     Simatovic Defence highlighted the links between Hadzic and Arkan at

 9     T-11322.  Just like Karadzic and Martic, Goran Hadzic had extensive

10     contacts with Jovica Stanisic.  Borislav Bogunovic's evidence is that

11     Goran Hadzic went to Belgrade to meet with Jovica Stanisic and Slobodan

12     Milosevic about four times between May and August 1991 and that he would

13     return from these meetings with instructions about how to set up the

14     SAO SBWS government.  That's P554, paragraphs 14 to 15 and transcript

15     pages 5973 to 5975.

16             All of the available evidence indicates that Stanisic and Hadzic

17     were discussing the same three things at their meetings that Stanisic,

18     Karadzic, and the others had discussed at the meeting in Belgrade in

19     December 1993:  The territory to be brought under Serb control, the goal

20     of ethnic separation, and the means of achieving both.  Ms. Friedman will

21     provide additional details on this topic.

22             A key piece of evidence in this regard is Exhibit P403, which you

23     see on slide 16 now before you.  P403 is a map of the SAO SBWS prepared

24     with the assistance of a witness who was in a position to have insight

25     into the views of Goran Hadzic, as indicated at B23 and B24 of the

Page 11373

 1     confidential evidence table.  We submit that the areas labelled "Hadzic's

 2     plan" on this exhibit show the parts of the SAO SBWS that Goran Hadzic

 3     intended to be brought under control of Serb forces.  The portion of P403

 4     labelled "end result" shows the areas that eventually in fact did come

 5     under the control of Serb forces.

 6             These two areas are the areas outlined in different shades of

 7     blue, which are much clearer on the exhibit in e-court than they can be

 8     made in this slide.  I would observe though that the two areas are

 9     substantially the same.

10             Your Honours, this area was brought under the control of Serb

11     forces in the course of a campaign that began with the attack on Dalj in

12     early August 1991 and that was substantially complete with the fall of

13     Vukovar on 18 November 1991.  In the course of those attacks, the

14     Croat-controlled towns and villages shown on P403 fell to Serb forces.

15     One quick comment on Vukovar:  The indictment in this case no longer

16     charges murders related to the fall of Vukovar.  But Vukovar remains

17     relevant to the case in two ways.  First, the indictment still contains

18     charges related to persecution, forcible transfer, and deportation from

19     the entire area of the SAO SBWS.  Second, Vukovar was a key part of the

20     plan to establish Serb control over the SBWS.  For this reason,

21     understanding events related to Vukovar is important to understanding the

22     JCE in this case.

23             This Serb take-over of the SBWS resulted in population movement

24     on a truly massive scale.  In that regard, I would refer to the evidence

25     of Anna Maria Radic, particularly page 6 of Exhibit P552 and table 9 of

Page 11374

 1     P551.  The magnitude of these population movements, while massive, is not

 2     surprising in light of the evidence that non-Serbs were forcibly driven

 3     out.  Some of this evidence can be found in the confidential evidence

 4     table at B25 and B26.

 5             What was the accused's knowledge of, and role in, this take-over?

 6     We submit that the evidence makes it clear that they were aware of this

 7     take-over, that they knew precisely what was involved in it, that they

 8     supported it, and that they participated in it.  A key event in this

 9     regard is Jovica Stanisic's visit to Dalj in mid-September 1991.  JF-032

10     described this visit vividly at transcript pages 4659 to 4660.  He

11     testified that Stanisic arrived in front of the police station in Dalj in

12     a convoy of four or five vehicles with Belgrade licence plates.  He got

13     out of his vehicle and he asked those present where Goran Hadzic was.

14     When he was told that Hadzic was not at the police station, Mr. Stanisic

15     started shouting at those present, asking why Vukovar hadn't fallen yet.

16     He then told the people in front of the police station to find Hadzic and

17     to bring him to Dalj for a meeting.

18             This whole incident took just 40 or 50 seconds, but it speaks

19     volumes about the accused's knowledge of, intentions regarding, and

20     participation in, the events in the SAO SBWS.  First, it's significant

21     that Mr. Stanisic came to Dalj.  Croats had been forcibly driven out of

22     that very village just a month and a half previously.  Second, it's

23     significant that Mr. Stanisic was upset about Vukovar.  Vukovar, of

24     course, is a place that Croats would be forcibly driven out of, shortly

25     after Stanisic's visit to Dalj, and the last place in the SAO SBWS to

Page 11375

 1     fall to Serb forces.  Together, Mr. Stanisic's presence in Dalj and his

 2     preoccupation with Vukovar demonstrates that he and Mr. Simatovic shared

 3     the goals of Hadzic and others to consolidate control over the region

 4     outlined in P403.

 5             Perhaps most significant though is Mr. Stanisic's behaviour

 6     towards the people in Dalj.  When Mr. Stanisic got out of his car in

 7     Dalj, he acted like the boss.  He expected to be recognised, he expected

 8     to be obeyed, and in fact, he was obeyed.  Mr. Stanisic's behaviour shows

 9     that he was a man with authority in the SBWS.

10             JF-032's account of Mr. Stanisic's visit to Dalj shows that

11     Vukovar was an area of special concern for Mr. Stanisic.  How did he deal

12     with this problem?  Evidence related to Vukovar, and in particular to

13     Franko Simatovic's role there, is relevant to the Chamber's understanding

14     of the crimes charged.  I refer the Chamber to the confidential evidence

15     table at B27 to B29 for that evidence.

16             Your Honours, in light of the other evidence we've discussed

17     today, none of this is surprising.  It is not surprising that

18     Mr. Stanisic, the man who in 1993 was offering military assistance to

19     help Karadzic consolidate the Serb take-over and ethnic cleansing of

20     large parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, would be involved in exactly the same

21     matters in the SBWS in 1991.  Neither is it surprising that

22     Mr. Simatovic, who had personally participated in attack on a Croat

23     village in the Krajina a few months before and bragged about destroying

24     it completely, would now be involved in the attack on Vukovar.  Rather,

25     the events in Bosnia and the events in Croatia corroborate each other and

Page 11376

 1     show a clear and consistent pattern.  This pattern demonstrates that the

 2     events in Bosnia and Croatia were part of a single joint criminal

 3     enterprise spanning both republics and several years.  In light of this

 4     pattern, a Trial Chamber could reasonably conclude that Mr. Simatovic

 5     shared the common criminal plan to forcibly and permanently remove

 6     non-Serbs from large areas of Croatia and B&H through the commission of

 7     the crimes charged in the indictment.

 8             Your Honours, with the Chamber's leave, Mr. Weber will now

 9     address the Chamber on matters related to the SAO Krajina.

10             MR. WEBER:  Good morning, Your Honours.

11             My submissions will focus on the responsibility of the accused

12     for the crimes committed in the SAO Krajina in 1991.  During the course

13     of these submissions, the Prosecution will address the significant

14     contributions made by the accused to the JCE through the formation,

15     training, and direction of special units of the Serbian State Security

16     Service and will respond to the Defence assertions regarding the role of

17     these special units during combat operations.

18             The submissions on the special units of the Serbian DB and their

19     relationship to the JNA or VRS are relevant to all counts and

20     specifically to paragraphs 5 and 15 of the indictment.  This discussion

21     will involve certain aspects of the JCE in the Krajina and the

22     relationships between JCE members throughout the case.

23             The organisation, training, and support provided by the accused

24     through their direction of special units represented a substantial

25     contribution to the JCE in and of itself.  Special units of the State

Page 11377

 1     Security Service of Serbia existed between 1991 and 1995.  As for the

 2     Red Berets, they began as special purpose units of the Republic of Serbia

 3     MUP and were later formalised as the JA TD, then the JSO.  Initially,

 4     they were known in the Krajina as Knindze, and later were commonly known

 5     as the Red Berets.  This unit served as a key component in the formation

 6     and training of other Serb forces, as the term is defined in paragraph 6

 7     of the indictment, and as a highly skilled combat group engaged in

 8     operations in Croatia and Bosnia.

 9             The origin of special units of the Serbian DB dates to early

10     1991.  According to Exhibit P975, Slobodan Milosevic publicly declared on

11     the 16th of March, 1991:

12             "I ordered a mobilisation of the reserve police forces yesterday.

13     Further engagement and formation of new police forces is to follow, and

14     the government was tasked with preparing appropriate formations to

15     guarantee our security and make us capable of defending the interests of

16     our republic, and also the interests of the Serbian people outside Serbia

17     ..."

18             Shortly after this order, Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic

19     commenced a recruitment and organisation of special units.  This task

20     included the engagement of members of the Serbian DB in the formation of

21     new police forces in the SAO Krajina.  Evidence of this is reflected in

22     Mr. Simatovic's initial remarks during his Kula speech, which is on the

23     slide before the Chamber.  There are two important components of these

24     initial remarks by Mr. Simatovic.  First, is the Prosecution's case that

25     special units of the Serbian DB were formed as early as April 1991.

Page 11378

 1     Mr. Simatovic, in his speech, unambiguously states that the special units

 2     of the State Security Service were constituted on 4 May 1991.  Evidence

 3     that corroborates the formation of the unit in 1991 is listed on slide

 4     18.  Exhibit P1655 includes information which further corroborates the

 5     formation date at stated by Mr. Simatovic.

 6             Second, Mr. Simatovic's speech shows that the State Security

 7     Service of Serbia implemented the task of forming new police forces as

 8     described by Slobodan Milosevic.  The Prosecution points out one

 9     particular aspect of this task.  Milosevic stated that the government was

10     tasked with preparing appropriate formations that would be capable of

11     defending "the interests of the Serbian people outside Serbia."

12     Mr. Simatovic parallels this sentiment in the Kula ceremony and stated

13     "where the existence of the Serbian people was directly jeopardised

14     throughout its entire ethnic area."  These statements, by two members of

15     the JCE, illustrate in general terms the foundational purpose of the DB

16     special units in 1991.

17             At the inception of special units of the Serbian DB, the accused,

18     and other members of the unit, made a significant contribution to the JCE

19     through the financing, arming, and training of Martic's police, also

20     known as the Krajina Milicija.  According to the evidence of Milan Babic,

21     Exhibit P1877 at pages 1539 to 1545, Jovica Stanisic paid for the camp at

22     Golubic that was set up by the Secretary of the Interior of the Krajina,

23     Milan Martic, with the assistance of the State Security Service of

24     Serbia, in particular, Captain Dragan and Franko Simatovic.

25             For further evidence that relates to the material support and

Page 11379

 1     financing of Martic's police, the Prosecution refers the Chamber to

 2     confidential evidence table at C1 to C10.

 3             As part of their support of special units in the Krajina, the

 4     accused provided military training to members of Martic's police.  At

 5     Golubic, recruits came from all municipalities of the Krajina.  The

 6     trainees were equipped with uniforms and weapons, after receiving

 7     training provided by the accused and others with Serbian DB affiliations,

 8     the members of Martic's police would go back to their municipalities in

 9     order to form special units of the SAO Krajina.  This evidence

10     specifically addresses paragraphs 3 and 15 of the indictment.  Evidence

11     of the accused's involvement with the training of Martic's police at

12     Golubic is now before you on slide number 19.  The Prosecution also

13     refers the Chamber to the confidential evidence table at C9 to C14.

14             The early direct involvement of the accused in the formation and

15     training of Martic's police in the SAO Krajina is evident from evidence

16     pertaining to Dragan Vasiljkovic, also known as Captain Dragan and

17     Daniel Snedden.  Captain Dragan worked for the State Security Service in

18     Serbia in 1991 and evidence of his relationship with the State Security

19     Service is now before you on slide number 20.  This evidence shows how

20     Franko Simatovic, Captain Dragan and other officials of the MUP Serbia,

21     such as Dragoljub Filipovic, also known as Major Fica, played a leading

22     role in the training of the special police units in the Krajina.  For

23     further evidence that relates to the relationship between Captain Dragan

24     and the accused, the Prosecution refers to the Chamber to confidential

25     evidence table at C15 to C17.

Page 11380

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Kindly slow down when reading.  Thank you.

 2             MR. WEBER:  While the starting points of the Red Berets occurred

 3     at Golubic, the accused would continue to forge special units of the

 4     Serbian DB and mould other Serb forces at training centres throughout

 5     Croatia and Bosnia.  Mr. Simatovic references many of the training

 6     centres during his Kula speech, which is now before you on slide 21.  In

 7     particular, the Prosecution would note at this time the references to

 8     training centres at Golubic; Plitvice; Petrova Gora; Benkovac, which

 9     includes the village of Bruska; Lezimir, which is also referred to as

10     Fruska Gora in the trial record; Ilok, which has also been referred to as

11     Pajzos; Doboj; Samac; Bijeljina; and Ozren.  After being provided with

12     training and logistical support from the Serbian DB, special units

13     trained at these locations committed crimes.  For example, those

14     responsible for crimes in Saborsko were trained at Golubic.  This is the

15     evidence of Witness JF-006.

16             JF-047's evidence establishes that the perpetrators of crimes in

17     Bosanski Samac came from Ilok and Lezimir.  Similarly, perpetrators of

18     crimes in Doboj received training at Mount Ozren according to the

19     evidence of JF-005.  With respect to the special purpose units which

20     would become known as the Red Berets, the Prosecution presented a large

21     volume of testimonial and documentary evidence, including personnel and

22     payment records from the Serbian State Security Service and the evidence

23     of JF-005, JF-031, JF-047, and Dejan Sliskovic.  This evidence reflects

24     the composition and activities of the unit between 1991 and 1995, and

25     demonstrates the manner in which special units of the Serbian DB were

Page 11381

 1     directed by the accused.

 2             For example, Zivojin Ivanovic, also known as Zika Crnogorac.

 3     Ivanovic was one of the original members of the unit, and a trainer at

 4     Golubic, where he participated in the selection process of the recruits

 5     belonging to Martic's police.  After this initial assignment, Ivanovic

 6     would command units that participated in combat operations in the

 7     Krajina, SBWS, and Bosnia.  He also was assigned to the camp in Lezimir

 8     in March 1992, where members of the unit received training before combat

 9     operations in Bosanski Samac.  Evidence pertaining to Zivojin Ivanovic

10     can be found on slide 22.

11             Radojica "Raja" Bozovic, who has also been referred to as Kobac.

12     Bozovic was another original member of the unit in 1991.  After going to

13     Lezimir, Bozovic would command a Red Beret unit in Doboj in 1992.  He

14     would continue his service to the accused as the commander of reserve

15     units of the JA TD during Operation Pauk.  Bozovic also participated in

16     operations with Arkan in September 1995.  Further evidence pertaining to

17     Raja Bozovic can be found on slide 23.  Ms. Harbour will address

18     Mr. Bozovic's role in the crimes committed in Doboj.

19             The Defence argues in part the accused are not responsible for

20     the charged crimes because some of the perpetrators at the time of the

21     offences or at some other point were subordinated to an army, whether it

22     be the JNA or the VRS.  Put another way, the Defence is saying the

23     accused are not responsible for the conduct of units they formed,

24     trained, financed through the payment of salaries, armed, supplied

25     uniforms and equipment for, deployed across borders, and directed into

Page 11382

 1     combat, because at some particular point they were resubordinated to

 2     someone else.  This premise ignores the fact that the accused are charged

 3     as members of a JCE.  It is the Prosecution's case that from 1991 and

 4     continuing through 1995, particular units under the control of the

 5     Serbian DB operated in co-ordination with the JNA or VRS along with

 6     Territorial Defence units and paramilitary forces during attacks on

 7     municipalities in Croatia and Bosnia.

 8             These attacks were a part of a widespread and systematic campaign

 9     to remove the non-Serb population from these municipalities.  The

10     co-ordinated use of Serb forces under the control of different JCE

11     members not only shows the existence of a JCE, but also illustrates how

12     members of the JCE implemented their common plan.  As a means of

13     accomplishing this co-ordination, the JNA or VRS would form ad hoc joint

14     formations reflecting the combined use of units under the control of the

15     military, the accused and other members of the JCE.  The purpose of these

16     temporary formations was to coordinate the activities of different units.

17     As indicated in the testimony of expert Reynaud Theunens at pages 8059 to

18     8060, these ad hoc formations were established to carry out a specific

19     mission in a specific area during a specific time-period.  Accordingly,

20     tactical and operational groups referred to in reports as TGs or OGs,

21     were established because they consisted of several sub-units or elements,

22     which outside the framework of the specific mission do not necessarily

23     operate together.

24             The Theunens report further details materials relating to joint

25     combat operations involving ad hoc formations, including exhibits that

Page 11383

 1     discuss Tactical Group 2 in Saborsko in November 1991 at P1575, e-court

 2     pages 193 to 196; Tactical Group 17 in Bosanski Samac in mid-April 1992,

 3     at P1575, e-court pages 356 to 370; and Tactical Groups 2 and 3 during

 4     Operation Pauk at P1575, e-court pages 279 to 280.

 5             Your Honours, I don't know if this is a good time for a break, I

 6     can further continue if you like.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, it is the right moment.  I'm looking at the

 8     clock, you've used until now one-third of your time.  I also see that in

 9     terms of pages of your slides you are at page 12 whereas the total is 47.

10     Now, of course I do not know whether the other slides may take less time.

11     One thing is however certain, speeding up your speech is not the

12     solution.  We'll take a break and resume at quarter to 11.00.

13                           --- Recess taken at 10.19 a.m.

14                           --- On resuming at 10.58 a.m.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  The Chamber apologises for the late restart, but

16     there are sometimes other urgent matters to deal with that kept us busy

17     for ten minutes too much.  Please proceed, Mr. Weber.

18             MR. WEBER:  Yes, Your Honours.

19             From a command perspective, Milan Babic described how this

20     co-ordination operated during the fall of 1991 in the Krajina.  This

21     evidence is pound in Exhibits P1877, page 1567 and P1878, pages 13129 to

22     30.  According to Milan Babic, there were two clear chains of command

23     from August 1991 onwards.  Slobodan Milosevic was at the head of both.

24     One line went through the JNA.  The second line went through

25     Jovica Stanisic and the State Security Service of Serbia who would direct

Page 11384

 1     the police of the Krajina, special volunteer units and groups belonging

 2     to the State Security Service of Serbia.  During joint operations in the

 3     Krajina, the units belonging to these two command structures would

 4     co-ordinate and subordinate themselves on the ground while engaging in

 5     combat operations.  As further evidence of Martic's relation to

 6     Mr. Stanisic, the Prosecution references witness C-15, who stated on page

 7     1624 that Martic called Jovica Stanisic, "his only and first commander."

 8             The Prosecution also refers the Chamber to adjudicated fact 28

 9     from the 28 January 2010 decision in confidential evidence table at C18

10     to C25 for further evidence of the co-ordination between Martic's police

11     and the JNA.

12             Mr. Farr earlier discussed Exhibit P2532, an excerpt from the

13     Mladic notebooks.  There are additional reference to the significant

14     contributions made by the accused in the Mladic notebooks, including

15     Exhibit P2545.  An entry from 30 September 1995 documenting a meeting

16     between Mladic, General Perisic, and Mr. Stanisic in Belgrade.  During

17     this meeting, Mr. Stanisic references Arkan and discusses how the sending

18     of forces helped in Sanski Most.  On 15 November 1995, Ratko Mladic, more

19     directly references Arkan's relationship to the accused during a

20     conversation with Radovan Karadzic in Exhibit P2955.

21             Mladic states that:

22             "Arkan is ... pure MUP of Serbia."

23             Exhibit P2545 together with Mladic's statement about Arkan

24     clearly shows the co-ordination of forces under the control of different

25     JCE members, including Mr. Stanisic.  When viewed in conjunction with the

Page 11385

 1     evidence presented in relation to the Red Berets, Arkan's Tigers,

 2     Martic's police, or the Skorpions, it is apparent that the accused in the

 3     Serbian DB retained the ability to direct these units, and the temporary

 4     operational subordination of units in co-ordinated combat activities was

 5     to advance the JCE's common purpose to forcibly remove the non-Serb

 6     populations from areas in Croatia and Bosnia.

 7             It is through the co-ordinated use of Serb forces that the

 8     accused are responsible for crimes which were planned, ordered and

 9     committed in the SAO Krajina.  After Slobodan Milosevic's instructions to

10     his government to form new units, the government of the SAO Krajina

11     undertook a series of decisions between April and August 1991, which

12     facilitated the accused and Milan Martic in the recruitment and

13     organisation of special units.  These decisions are admitted and many are

14     subject of adjudicated facts.  The Prosecution notes a few of these key

15     legislative actions at this time on slide 25.  The practical effect of

16     these acts was to further consolidate control of Serb forces in the

17     Krajina under the authority of Milan Martic, which in turn allowed the

18     accused a greater ability to direct these forces that they trained and

19     equipped.

20             At the end of July 1991, Captain Dragan and other members of the

21     unit undertook the leading role in planned combat activities with

22     Martic's police and the Krajina TO.  In evidence are a number of reports

23     that document the participation of DB members, the Krajina TO, and

24     personnel from Golubic during the attack on Glina.  For example,

25     Exhibit P2658, now before the Chamber, is a report dated 26 July 1991.

Page 11386

 1     It is authored by Zivojin Ivanovic.  In this report, Ivanovic describes

 2     two important aspects of the relationship between the Serbian DB and SAO

 3     Krajina units.  First, the report states:

 4             "Following the instructions and orders that I received from the

 5     captain and the core personnel of the Glina Territorial Defence staff

 6     command."

 7             "The captain" is later identified this in this report is

 8     Captain Dragan.  This shows that officials from the Serbian DB directed

 9     units in the Krajina and co-ordinated their activities with the command

10     staff of the Krajina Territorial Defence.

11             Second, the report states Ivanovic "set off to carry out the task

12     with two squads."  In relation to the initial statement indicating the

13     receipt of orders, the second reference indicates that Ivanovic possessed

14     the ability to direct two squads under his command.  The Prosecution

15     would also reference the following reports with the accused Simatovic on

16     the addressee list.  These are P1121, P1122, and P2671 up to and

17     including P2682.

18             As indicated by expert Theunens at page 1894, such reports were

19     "sent to people who have a need to know the information in order to

20     prepare their decision-making and planning.  These people included

21     Franko Simatovic, Milan Babic and Milan Martic, among others."

22             The Prosecution refers the Chamber to confidential evidence table

23     at C23 to C25 for further evidence of Mr. Simatovic's participation in

24     combat activities in the Krajina.

25             The Serbian DB also played a central role in the establishment

Page 11387

 1     and organisation of command posts in a system of reporting in the very

 2     municipalities where crimes were later committed.  For example,

 3     Exhibit P1120 is a report dated 23 July 1991 from the Davor municipal war

 4     staff.  This report indicates that there was a meeting between the

 5     defence minister who was Milan Martic as of 29 May 1991, Captain Dragan,

 6     and the staff commanders from neighbouring municipalities including

 7     Kostajnica.  This report includes an assessment by Captain Dragan that

 8     "Unity had been established in the conduct of all operations in the

 9     area."  And concludes:  "A system of reporting to the competent organs of

10     the SAO Krajina and the Republic of Serbia have been agreed."  This

11     evidence further illustrates the level of co-ordination in the planning

12     of operations between Martic and the Serbian DB.

13             The accused continued to direct and provide logistical support to

14     Martic's police in the Krajina Territorial Defence throughout the fall of

15     1991.  These units, under the direction of the accused and Milan Martic,

16     committed crimes in the Krajina.  Franko Simatovic, in his own words at

17     the Kula ceremony, described the relationship between the Serbian DB and

18     the Krajina police in the fall of 1991:

19             "Mr. President, allow us to inform you briefly about the unit's

20     history, its combat record, present situation, and function.  When it was

21     formed, its core was made of up of members of our service, Republic of

22     Serbian Krajina police, and volunteers from Serbia.  The Second War

23     Service Intelligence Administration, which was also set up at the time,

24     included a special team for offensive and logistical support of the

25     special operations unit.  From 12 October 1991, in battles with armed

Page 11388

 1     Croatian police forces in the zones of Benkovac, Stari Gospic, Plitvice,

 2     Glina, Kostajnica and others, the unit provided important support in the

 3     liberation of all areas of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina.  Around

 4     5.000 soldiers were engaged in these battles and their actions were

 5     co-ordinated by the unit command and an intelligence team from the second

 6     administration."

 7             As members of a JCE, the accused are responsible for committing

 8     crimes in the municipalities of Kostajnica, Korenica, Ogulin, Benkovac

 9     and Zadar.  The horrific nature of these inhumane atrocities is evident

10     from the testimony of the Prosecution's witnesses.  The Prosecution notes

11     that many of the facts related to the commission of these crimes in the

12     Krajina are adjudicated.  These adjudicated facts are included for the

13     Chamber's reference on the following slides related to the crimes in the

14     specific municipalities.

15             With respect to the Kostajnica municipality, on 20 October 1991,

16     a truck bearing the insignia "Milicija SAO Krajina" brought elderly,

17     unarmed Croat civilians to the Hrvatska Dubica fire station.  In total

18     over 40 non-Serb civilians, mostly elderly, were brought to the fire

19     station that day.  The following day, 41 of the Croat civilians from the

20     fire station were killed, along with two Serbs.  Members of Martic's

21     police are among those responsible for these killings.  In the Korenica

22     and Ogulin municipalities near Plitvice, crimes were committed in the

23     villages of Vukovici and Saborsko as part of co-ordinated attacks by the

24     JNA, Krajina TO, and members of Martic's police in October and November

25     1991.

Page 11389

 1             According to the evidence of JF-031, Franko Simatovic and other

 2     members of the unit were involved in the participation of combat

 3     operations in this area as early as August 1991.  Franko Simatovic set up

 4     a command centre in the Korenica municipality.  This is in the evidence

 5     of Milan Babic in Exhibit P1878 at transcript page 13397.

 6     Radislav Maksic personally saw both Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic

 7     in the Korenica municipality during the fall of 1991.  The Prosecution

 8     refers the Chamber to confidential evidence table at C26 to C28 for

 9     further evidence.

10             On 7 November 1991, local Serb TO units and a special unit from

11     Nis entered the hamlet of Vukovici and killed 9 Croat civilians.  With

12     respect to Saborsko, prior to November 1991, at least 20 of the locals

13     from Saborsko went to Golubic and returned to the municipality.  They

14     called themselves Martic's police and wore the insignia of the police of

15     the SAO Krajina.  In November 1991, Saborsko was attacked by

16     Tactical Group 2, the joint formation of the JNA and SAO Krajina units

17     who included members of Martic's police.

18             In the Zadar municipality on 18 November 1991, the perpetrators

19     of crimes in Skabrnja included individuals who wore uniforms with the

20     words "SAO Krajina" on them.  Volunteers from Serbia who were joined to

21     the Benkovac Territorial Defence along with Goran Opacic, who was part of

22     the Benkovac SJB special unit, were present during the attack on 18

23     November 1991.  The Prosecution refers the Chamber to confidential

24     evidence table at C29 and C30 for further evidence.  After the crimes in

25     Skabrnja, Goran Opacic receives recognition on the RSK State Security

Page 11390

 1     Service day in 1994 along with Jovica Stanisic and Captain Dragan.  This

 2     Exhibit is P428, which was referenced by Mr. Farr earlier.  Further

 3     evidence relating to Goran Opacic, his training and relationship to the

 4     Serbian DB is included on slide 32.

 5             Now before the Chamber is the Prosecution's evidence in relation

 6     to the crimes committed in Bruska.  Armed men identifying themselves as

 7     Martic's men or Martic's Militia came to Bruska almost every day to scare

 8     the inhabitants of this village.  The armed men called the villagers

 9     Ustashas and said that Bruska would be part of a Greater Serbia.  One of

10     the hamlets in Bruska was Marinovici was comprised of eight houses.  In

11     1991, the Marinovici hamlet was inhabited by Croats.  The killings in

12     Bruska which occurred in the Marinovici hamlet on 21 December 1991 were

13     perpetrated by Martic's police.  The Prosecution provides the Chamber

14     with an overview slide with references to the significant contributions

15     made by the accused to the JCE in the Krajina as discussed during these

16     submissions.  This evidence directly pertains to paragraphs 3, 5, and 15

17     of the indictment and relevant to all counts.  Through the evidence

18     presented at trial, the Prosecution established that both accused bear

19     responsibility for the horrific events that transpired in the SAO Krajina

20     during the fall of 1991.  This evidence alone justifies the denial of the

21     Defence motion pursuant to Rule 98 bis.

22             At this time, Ms. Friedman will present the Prosecution's

23     submissions in response to the SBWS.

24             MS. FRIEDMAN:  Your Honours, the Prosecution has led credible and

25     reliable evidence that demonstrates the accused's role in planning,

Page 11391

 1     ordering and committing, through a JCE, the murders of over 60 people and

 2     the crimes of persecution, forcible transfer and deportation in the

 3     SAO SBWS or Serb Autonomous Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and

 4     Western Srem.  Since all counts are encompassed in these charges, the

 5     Defence's motion for acquittal should be denied based on the evidence for

 6     this region alone.

 7             Even before the charged start date of the JCE, Serbia's political

 8     leaders, including Mr. Stanisic, were shaping events in what would become

 9     the SAO SBWS.  Mr. Stanisic's role in planning the events and his

10     participation in a JCE in creating the Serb entity there is evidenced in

11     his meetings with Hadzic and his contribution to the local police force

12     and to arming Serb forces in the region.

13             Mr. Simatovic's role in the JCE is evidenced by his involvement

14     in setting up two camps in the region and the fact that he and his men

15     fought in Vukovar as seen in confidential evidence table B27.

16             Several witnesses have testified that Goran Hadzic met regularly

17     with Slobodan Milosevic and Jovica Stanisic.  Before the conflict, Hadzic

18     had been a warehouse clerk.  The meetings with Milosevic began as early

19     as May 1990, and continued every step of the way, with the formation of

20     the Serb National Council of SBWS in January 1991, the declaration of

21     sovereignty on 26 February 1991, and the formation of the SAO SBWS

22     government in August 1991.

23             Stanisic was present at approximately four meetings with

24     Milosevic and Hadzic between May 1991 when the conflict broke out in SBWS

25     and August 1991 when the take-over of Dalj, Erdut, and surrounding

Page 11392

 1     villages occurred.  He was also present at a meeting in Novi Sad in late

 2     October or early November 1991, after the Dalj murders had occurred and

 3     in the midst of the Erdut murders, to discuss with Hadzic and others the

 4     possibility of accommodating Serb refugees in the vacated houses of

 5     Croats from Ilok.  He clearly knew that the object of the JCE was being

 6     achieved.

 7             Hadzic would return from his meetings in Serbia with instructions

 8     which he would implement.  Hadzic conveyed that he had an agreement to

 9     establish the government in SBWS and the support of the Serbian

10     government.  According to Bogunovic, "The SAO SBWS was a virtual

11     government.  It existed in paper but in fact we could not do anything

12     without Serbia's support."  And that's at P554, paragraph 19.

13             In addition to advice, Hadzic and his government obtained

14     material assistance from Stanisic and other JCE members in establishing

15     and equipping the police and other Serb forces in the SBWS.  Hadzic went

16     to Novi Sad for uniforms, salaries, and advice about setting up police

17     stations.  Stanisic himself was at a meeting in late August 1991 where

18     Hadzic got uniforms for the police.  Hadzic also received funds for his

19     personal security unit, the SNB, from Serbia, which is seen at

20     Exhibit P504.  I will discuss the SNB in further detail later in my

21     submissions.

22             Stanisic also provided support to the SBWS police through a DB

23     operative named Radoslav Kostic.  Kostic was employed with the Serbian DB

24     from December 1990.  On this point, I refer the Chamber to the

25     confidential evidence table at D1.  Kostic issued orders regarding the

Page 11393

 1     establishment of the SBWS police, co-ordinated supplies, and was involved

 2     in appointing people to the local state security services in SBWS and

 3     ensuring that they would report to the Serbian DB in addition to the SBWS

 4     chain of command.  I refer the Chamber to information in the confidential

 5     evidence table at D2, D3, and D4.

 6             Jovica Stanisic, through his role as head of the DB, played a

 7     significant part in providing arms to the SBWS.  Firstly, Stanisic gave

 8     Ilija Kojic weapons to distribute in Vukovar around August of 1990.  You

 9     have heard this from Witness Savic at T-1758 to 1759.  Secondly, DB

10     operatives Radoslav Kostic and Lazar Sarac co-ordinated the transfer of

11     arms from Serbia across the Danube, to be stored in Borovo Selo and then

12     distributed prior to the take-over of Dalj as early as April 1991.  For

13     further corroboration of Sarac's employment in the DB, I refer the

14     Chamber to the confidential evidence table at D5.

15             The appointment of government ministers in SBWS is a telling

16     indicator of Milosevic and Stanisic's substantial influence over the

17     development of the SAO SBWS.  The list of the first ministers appointed

18     is contained in Exhibit P16 which appears on the slide before you.

19     Borislav Bogunovic is listed as the minister of interior, but he has

20     observed that despite this official function, the decisions regarding the

21     police force were taken in Belgrade by others.

22             Bogunovic further testified that when appointing ministers,

23     Hadzic came up with selections which were different from those proposed

24     by the other government members.  In some instances, he selected men who

25     were previously unknown to them.  Savic said that some of these men

Page 11394

 1     arrived in January 1991 from Novi Sad, representing themselves as

 2     official representatives of the Serbian government offering their

 3     services and assistance, spreading propaganda and discussing proposals

 4     for setting up the Serb National Council of SBWS.

 5             Hadzic stated that these men were important in order to establish

 6     the necessary links to Belgrade and Novi Sad.

 7             Returning now to the first person listed on this exhibit,

 8     Minister of Defence Ilija Kojic.  This is the same man who supplied arms

 9     provided by Stanisic and he was appointed to this role on Hadzic's

10     proposal.  In November 1991, Kojic was also officially employed by the

11     Serbian MUP while he continued to serve as defence minister in the SBWS

12     government.  Kojic's employment in the Serbian MUP is significant.  The

13     Defence has argued that the accused are not responsible for actions which

14     are attributed to the Serbian MUP public security as opposed to the

15     Serbian MUP state security.  The evidence about Kojic unequivocally

16     rebuts this assertion.  An official record suggests that Kojic was

17     employed in the public security and only transferred to the state

18     security in April 1993.  The Prosecution refers the Chamber to the

19     confidential evidence table at D6 on this point.

20             However, Ilija Kojic gave a statement to authorised officials of

21     the Republika Srpska MUP.  That's P1698.  In this statement, he

22     explicitly stated that when he worked in Vukovar, he was an operative of

23     the Republic of Serbia state security.  He explained that despite being

24     listed with public security, he was a DB operative, subordinated to the

25     head of the DB, Jovica Stanisic.

Page 11395

 1             The statement makes it clear that the distinction between the

 2     public security and state security did not prevent them from co-operating

 3     and did not prevent Stanisic from tasking at least some of the public

 4     security's personnel.  Moreover, Stanisic also used Radovan Stojicic,

 5     known as Badza, who was the chief of the public security service to

 6     achieve his goals.  Stanisic and Badza were both appointed to their post

 7     on the instructions of President Milosevic to the minister of interior,

 8     Zoran Sokolovic.  I refer Your Honours to the confidential evidence table

 9     at D7.

10             Further, General Milovanovic testified at T-4383 to 4386 that

11     Badza himself referred to Stanisic as his boss, and Bogunovic testified

12     at T-6061 that Hadzic saw Stanisic as the link between Milosevic and

13     Badza.  Stanisic relied on Badza to command the TO and on Arkan to fight

14     with the JNA in joint operations and to wreak havoc on the civilian

15     population.  I will discuss the role, the specific role of each man in

16     turn.

17             Badza, deputy minister of the interior, a JCE member and someone

18     who considered Stanisic to be his boss, was already present in the SBWS

19     when the take-over operations in Dalj and Erdut began.  He attended

20     government meetings, demanded to be informed of everything, and even gave

21     orders to the minister of interior.  Badza was sent in order to ensure

22     that actions were undertaken in accordance with the common plan, and in

23     fact, his title suggests that he had the authority to do just that.  His

24     official title was the commander of the TO of the SAO SBWS, as seen in a

25     certificate admitted at P54, but more significantly, he announced himself

Page 11396

 1     as, "the commander to one and all" to the local police forces and TO,

 2     according to the evidence noted at confidential evidence table D8.

 3             He made it clear that there would be no independent leadership

 4     among the local TO and police, that it would all be co-ordinated and

 5     monitored from the headquarters in Erdut.

 6             Badza's intent to be the central co-ordinator is also clear in

 7     subsequent events.  When Bogunovic, the minister of interior would not

 8     report daily to him and would not agree to closer contact with Badza than

 9     with the JNA, Badza influenced Hadzic to remove Bogunovic from office.

10     And that's at P553, paragraph 73.  Badza influenced the events in the

11     region in several key ways.  First, the meeting he held in Erdut, when he

12     announced himself as the commander, focused on sending SBWS forces to

13     Vukovar, which was envisioned at capital of the RSK, Republika Srpska

14     Krajina, which would be formed.  Second, he tasked his deputy, a man

15     named Miodrag Zavisic, with establishing police offices in villages.

16     Third, with him were about 60 to 70 men who were Special Police force

17     from Serbia.  C-15 testified that because Badza's men were trained for

18     special operations, they would be the ones to lead TO units into

19     operations.

20             Fourthly, he assisted in acquiring uniforms and equipment for the

21     SBWS police in Novi Sad.  And finally, he played a role in planning and

22     facilitating Arkan's crimes, as I will discuss in greater detail.

23             Stanisic sent Arkan, a JCE member, to the SBWS before the

24     take-overs and Arkan established his training centre and base in Erdut.

25     He had 50 or 60 men at first, but eventually had about 2 to 300 men under

Page 11397

 1     his command.  The Defence have argued that Arkan was subordinated to the

 2     JNA and SBWS and that he was not connected to Stanisic and Simatovic.

 3     Your Honours, the Prosecution's case is that Arkan, like other units of

 4     the Serbian DB, did at times participate in operations under joint

 5     command of the JNA, and that these co-ordinated operations were in

 6     keeping with the intent of the JCE.  The evidence also demonstrates that

 7     Arkan acted separately from the JNA in committing the murders charged in

 8     Dalj and Erdut, and that these actions were also the intent of the JCE.

 9             In May 1991, Arkan himself openly stated that Jovica Stanisic was

10     his boss.  This was confirmed by Radmilo Bogdanovic, the minister of

11     interior of Serbia and another JCE member, who stated that they sent

12     Arkan to the region as a commander.  This evidence was provided by

13     Witness Savic.  Stanisic not only sent Arkan to the region, he also

14     supplied Arkan's training centre with weapons and ammunition as indicated

15     in Exhibit D31.  And ensured that Arkan could move around freely, as

16     announced by Badza at the meeting mentioned earlier, and described in

17     greater detail in the confidential evidence table at D9.

18             Further, Arkan's training centre, where he beat and killed many

19     civilians, was funded by the SBWS government, as Your Honours can find in

20     Exhibit P332 and P1187.  The evidence also demonstrates that the SBWS

21     government was itself heavily influenced and funded by Serbia, for

22     example, at P968.

23             Arkan engaged in a a widespread and systematic attack of violence

24     and terror on the civilian populations of Dalj and Erdut.  JF-032

25     described at T-4688 how Arkan's Men would do as they please and bring

Page 11398

 1     people to the training centre at will.  He referred to them as "the

 2     executioners."  Slide 40 identifies key evidence Your Honours have heard

 3     and admitted in relation to the crimes in Dalj.

 4             The first of the two mass executions charged in Dalj occurred on

 5     the night of the 21st of September, 1991.  On this night, Arkan and

 6     Hadzic arrived in the police building.  They removed the two men who had

 7     connections to prominent Serbs, and then Arkan's Men murdered the

 8     remaining non-Serb detainees.  The details of the crime were documented

 9     in a contemporaneous police report about the removal of the men from the

10     prison and has been admitted as P10.

11             The second mass execution charged in Dalj occurred on the night

12     of the 4th of October when Arkan and his men, including

13     Milorad Stricevic, shot the non-Serb civilians held in the Dalj police

14     building and dumped the bodies in the Danube.  Documentary evidence of

15     this incident includes both the contemporaneous police report, P11,

16     drafted by local policemen who eventually resigned, as well as a

17     certificate signed by Milorad Stricevic, stating that he had removed the

18     prisoners, P315.  One of the listed recipients of the seconds report was

19     Badza's deputy.

20             Following this incident, the local population demanded

21     accountability.  Arkan held a speech and took responsibility for the

22     crimes.  He said that no one could do anything to him and that he

23     operated with the policy "a tooth for a tooth and an eye for an eye."

24             The rest of the SAO SBWS murders were perpetrated in Erdut,

25     mostly at Arkan's training centre, and the bodies were dumped in mass

Page 11399

 1     graves or wells.  Slide 41 identifies the key evidence in relation to

 2     these crimes.  Between November 1991 and June 1992, Arkan's Men, along

 3     with the SBWS TO and local police rounded up Croats and ethnic Hungarians

 4     in Erdut, Dalj, and Klisa, bringing them to Arkan's training centre in

 5     Erdut, where they were interrogated, beaten, threatened and in many cases

 6     they were ultimately murdered.  The record is replete with firsthand

 7     evidence of civilians who suffered this brutality themselves and whose

 8     own families and neighbours were arrested and killed.

 9             The evidence has shown that the non-Serb population of Dalj,

10     Erdut and the SBWS region was deported and forcibly transferred by the

11     members of the JCE and the armed forces that they used as their tools.

12     Many civilians were literally put on buses and expelled, while others

13     fled due to the coercive and threatening circumstances.  The first

14     arrests and forcible transfer of non-Serbs began in July 1991 with

15     subsequent waves occurring after the take-over of Dalj and Erdut in

16     August 1991, the fall of Vukovar in November 1991, and in April 1992 when

17     Arkan's Men deported a number of elderly villagers who had remained in

18     Erdut.  Many of the villagers who initially stayed in their homes after

19     the take-over, such as Luka Sutalo and C-1118 were subjected to such

20     terrible conditions that eventually they too fled.  Sutalo described how

21     he feared for his life and applied for a permit to leave, which was

22     granted only after he had signed over his property to the village

23     council.  At T-3991, Sutalo described the searches and interrogations and

24     concluded by stating, "We had no rights, we weren't given any food, any

25     clothes and we realised we couldn't survive there, that we had to flee."

Page 11400

 1             Some of the villagers who fled when Dalj and Erdut were

 2     originally taken over returned, especially the small community of ethnic

 3     Hungarians from Dalj who believed that they could stay in their homes.

 4     However, once their family members disappeared, the fear and sorrow was

 5     too great and they too fled.  This is a pattern that Your Honours will

 6     hear Ms. Harbour and Ms. Marcus refer to in relation to events in Bosnia

 7     and Herzegovina.

 8             The facts clearly demonstrate the persecutory intent in the

 9     murders and forced displacements that took place in SBWS.  The vast

10     majority of those killed were non-Serbs and you've heard evidence from

11     JF-015, JF-021 and Sutalo that Serb detainees and detainees who had Serbs

12     intervene on their behalf were released.  I also refer Your Honours to

13     the confidential evidence table at D10 for evidence that lists were

14     generated for the purpose of ejecting non-Serbs.

15             The record further demonstrates that these crimes were part of a

16     widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population which

17     had a nexus to the armed conflict.  I refer Your Honours to the

18     confidential evidence table at D11 for a statement about the scale of the

19     crimes.

20             All of the crimes were perpetrated by a JCE member directly or

21     through physical perpetrators who were used as tools of a JCE member.  In

22     addition to Arkan's Men and the SBWS TO, another armed unit which would

23     participate in crimes together with Arkan's Men was known as the

24     Serb National Security or SNB, the SNB is among the Serb forces listed in

25     paragraph 6 of the indictment, it was a Special Police Unit formed by

Page 11401

 1     Hadzic to provide security for the government but which had broad

 2     authority to engage in other tasks.  Both C-15 and JF-035 have testified

 3     about this unit.  The evidence indicates that Hadzic met with the unit's

 4     commander, Stevo Bogic on a daily basis.  He received reports and

 5     provided instructions.  Bogic was also Hadzic's kum and a member in his

 6     government, as you saw in P16.  The SNB closely collaborated with Arkan's

 7     Men in the arrest, killing and looting of non-Serb civilians in and

 8     around Erdut.  The liability for three murders charged in paragraph 38,

 9     which were physically perpetrated solely by the SNB, is linked to the

10     accused both through Arkan whose men co-operated with the SNB and

11     requested that they kill the family, and through Hadzic who instructed

12     his men to co-operate with Arkan's Men in committing crimes.  Arkan's

13     crimes are crimes that were intended by the JCE.  The sources of

14     information were so plentiful that the only reasonable conclusion is that

15     the accused knew exactly what Arkan was doing it as he was doing it.  In

16     fact, the evidence leads to the conclusion that the JCE plan involved

17     sending Arkan to commit these crimes, precisely because he advanced the

18     JCE's purpose so effectively.

19             Arkan's criminal background was known to Jovica Stanisic, even

20     before he was sent to the SBWS.  The state security of Serbia essentially

21     did a background check on him, they received a full and detailed report

22     about his criminal charges already in January 1991, admitted as P1646.

23     Once Arkan was in the region, they knew that he was murdering prisoners

24     and civilians.  It was no secret.  Arkan even gave a television interview

25     in the autumn of 1991 stating that he does not take prisoners, which

Page 11402

 1     Your Honours have admitted as P326.  In addition, the JNA security organ

 2     wrote numerous reports about Arkan's crimes.  P1188 states that:

 3             "Arkan is engaged in the slaughter of the prisoners sent by the

 4     local territorial units."  P1076 recommends that the problems should be

 5     raised at the level of the federal organs and official organs of the

 6     Republic of Serbia.  Other such reports about Arkan's crimes are found in

 7     P327, P1647, and P1078.

 8             P1078 also states that:

 9             "It is known that Raznjatovic is openly supported by the MUP, TO

10     and MNO, Ministry of Defence, of the Republic of Serbia."

11             Additional reports --

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Kindly slow down when reading.  Thank you.

13             MS. FRIEDMAN:  Additional reports about the support and

14     co-operation between Arkan and the MUP and DB are contained in P327,

15     P1061, P1075, P1077, P1651, and D31.  Your Honours, I also refer you to

16     T-1999 to 2000 and P25, paragraph 9, for evidence from a witness who was

17     held in Arkan's training centre and heard Arkan say that he was awaiting

18     an order from Belgrade about what to do next.

19             The local police could not put a stop to Arkan's crimes because

20     the people with the most power in the SBWS were those who sent -- were

21     those who were sent by Serbia or under their control, namely Hadzic,

22     Badza, Kojic, Kostic, and Arkan himself.  Simply put, all roads led back

23     to the accused and the Serbian leadership.  The relationship and constant

24     co-ordination between the JCE members, Hadzic, Badza, and Arkan, as

25     described by many witnesses is further evidence of the implementation of

Page 11403

 1     the JCE.  In addition, the Prosecution directs the Chamber's attention to

 2     the confidential evidence table at D12 and D13.

 3             Rather than putting a stop to the crimes, quite the opposite, the

 4     accused took action to ensure that Arkan and the others could and would

 5     continue to commit them.  Stanisic had the ability to influence Hadzic in

 6     his actions, as clearly demonstrated by the abundance of evidence about

 7     Hadzic's meetings with Stanisic and Milosevic, and the material support

 8     he relied on.  Stanisic also had the ability to order Badza, who was in

 9     the command of the entire TO and police forces, to put a stop to Arkan's

10     crimes.  To the contrary, Badza and Hadzic provided forces to collaborate

11     with these men and as you've heard from Mr. Bakrac, Arkan was in fact

12     carrying out Badza's orders.  Throughout the years that followed, as

13     these armed men crossed in and out of Serbia, Stanisic and Simatovic, who

14     were in charge of the borders, did nothing to stop them and continued to

15     fund and arm them.  Slide 47 identifies some of the key evidence about

16     the contributions which the accused made to the JCE as implemented in the

17     SBWS in 1991 and 1992.  Much of the same evidence also supported findings

18     that the accused planned and ordered the crimes.

19             In addition to this evidence already discussed, there is yet

20     another component that demonstrates Stanisic and Simatovic's contribution

21     and their responsibility for planning subsequent crimes.  Stanisic and

22     Simatovic established two DB training camps in the region during that

23     period.  The first discussed by both JF-036 and C-15 was initially set up

24     by Captain Dragan in Tito's castle in Tikves in July or August 1991.

25     Your Honours have heard from Mr. Weber about Captain Dragan's

Page 11404

 1     relationship with the Serbian DB.  There is evidence that members of this

 2     unit killed five civilians from Grabovac, a nearby location also in SBWS

 3     in May 1992, causing their family members to flee.  The second camp

 4     discussed by Bogunovic was located in Ilok, also known as Pajzos.

 5     Mr. Simatovic set up the camp in Ilok in December 1991 and D33

 6     corroborates the existence of both camps.  The JCE's intent was to

 7     forcibly remove the non-Serb population from both Croatia and Bosnia.

 8     Subsequent developments in the region bear this out.  The SAO SBWS and

 9     SAO Krajina were successfully merged into the Republika Srpska Krajina or

10     RSK in February 1992.  Hadzic served as the first president, followed by

11     Milan Martic, who you've heard about from Mr. Weber.  This next step was

12     again implemented, in part by continued consultation between Milosevic,

13     Stanisic, Hadzic, and Martic.

14             According to JF-032, Kostic and Kojic, the DB operatives who were

15     so key in SAO SBWS were appointed as assistants to Martic in 1992 when he

16     became minister of interior of the RSK.  Further, as cited in the

17     confidential evidence table at D14, local RSK police initially received

18     payment from the Serbian MUP until the Krajina dinars came into effect

19     and they received letters stating that they were Serbian MUP employees.

20     In addition, you will hear from my colleagues that DB trained units and

21     instructors continued to engage in campaigns of ethnic cleansing in

22     Bosnia.  And Arkan's unit's relationship with the DB, clearly at play

23     already in SBWS, became formalised.

24             Your Honours, I will now hand over to Ms. Harbour who will

25     discuss the crimes perpetrated in Bosnia in 1992.

Page 11405

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

 2             MS. HARBOUR:  Thank you.  Your Honours, I will address the

 3     accused's liability for crimes in Bosnia in 1992.  Forcible transfer,

 4     deportation and persecution in Bijeljina, and these counts in addition to

 5     murder in Zvornik, Bosanski Samac and Doboj, all as part of a widespread

 6     and systematic attack against the civilian population during an armed

 7     conflict.  For any single one of these three operations, whether the

 8     operation in Zvornik and Bijeljina or in Bosanski Samac or in Doboj, the

 9     evidence is sufficient that Stanisic and Simatovic could be convicted on

10     all five counts of the indictment.

11             Before discussing their liability for these crimes through their

12     role in the JCE and by planning and ordering, I will discuss the context

13     in which these crimes were committed revealing why they were integral to

14     the JCE's common criminal plan.

15             In order to effectuate the common criminal plan in Bosnia, the

16     Bosnian Serb leadership made several policy decisions that would dictate

17     the focus of the JCE members' efforts.  On 19 December 1991, the SDS

18     leadership issued the Variant A and B instructions.  The objective was to

19     separate the ethnic Serbs from non-Serbs by organising Serb local

20     governments, police forces, and Territorial Defences.  This fed into the

21     Bosnian Serb leadership's six strategic goals.  Mr. Farr mentioned the

22     first goal, which in essence articulates the common plan: The separation

23     of the Serb people from the other two ethnic communities entailing the

24     permanent removal of a significant part of the non-Serb population.  The

25     crimes committed in Bosnia in the first half of 1992 targeted areas that

Page 11406

 1     would also further the second and third strategic goals, which together

 2     aimed to connect Serbia and the Serbian territories in Bosnia to the

 3     Serbian territories in Croatia by establishing control over the so-called

 4     Posavina corridor.

 5             The Serbs targeted Bijeljina, Zvornik, Bosanski Samac, and Doboj

 6     because of their location along the Posavina corridor.  By the time

 7     Karadzic officially articulated these goals on 12 May 1992, the accused

 8     and other members of the JCE had already significantly contributed to

 9     achieving them.

10             The Prosecution's case is that Stanisic and Simatovic, through

11     their leadership roles in the Serbian DB, planned the take-over of

12     Bijeljina and Zvornik intending to drive the non-Serb population out

13     through the crimes of forcible transfer, deportation, murder, and

14     persecution.  On the orders of Stanisic and Simatovic, Arkan co-ordinated

15     with other forces including Seselj's men, the JNA, local TOs, and Serb

16     paramilitaries to implement the common criminal plan.  And following the

17     take-over, Stanisic and Simatovic ordered their tool, Marko Pavlovic, as

18     Zvornik TO commander, to finish the job, co-ordinating mass deportations

19     through the Serbian MUP.

20             Before the attack on Bijeljina and Zvornik, the Serb leadership

21     was preparing for ethnic division, creating and implementing policies

22     that discriminated against the non-Serb population, listed at slide 49

23     and at E1 through E3 of the confidential evidence table.  From 1991,

24     sources in Serbia armed Zvornik's Serbs.  Zvornik received arms from the

25     police and JNA legally and illegally.  Radmilo Bogdanovic, a member of

Page 11407

 1     the JCE and Rade Kostic, who, as Ms. Friedman discussed, was responsible

 2     for arms distribution in SBWS, also armed the Serbs in Zvornik by

 3     organising weapons transfers from Croatia.  I refer Your Honours to the

 4     confidential evidence table at E4.

 5             At the end of March 1992, the Serbian DB under Stanisic's

 6     authority gave orders to take control over Bijeljina and Zvornik in rapid

 7     succession.  On 31 March, Arkan's Tigers entered Bijeljina and in

 8     co-ordination with the Bijeljina TO and paramilitaries took control of

 9     the town.  The Serb forces began a persecutory campaign of violence

10     targeting Bosnian Muslim civilians.  In this context, Muslim civilians

11     evacuated Bijeljina.  As one witness stated, whoever could leave, left.

12     And this is E5 on the confidential evidence table.

13             By the time JCE member Biljana Plavsic came to Bijeljina on 4

14     April, Serb flags waved from two mosques.  Plavsic greeted Arkan with a

15     kiss.  For the evidence on Bijeljina, I refer the Chamber to slide 50 and

16     the confidential evidence table at E6.  Soon after, during a meeting of

17     the Zvornik Crisis Staff, Plavsic asked that Arkan be called to assist

18     Zvornik as well.  Through Radmilo Bogdanovic and Kostic, the Zvornik

19     police arranged to meet with Arkan who immediately sent his deputy and

20     around 20 of his Tigers to Zvornik.

21             Around 7 April Arkan met with the head of the Muslim police in

22     Zvornik.  In his own words:

23             "I gave them an ultimatum to surrender the town by 0800 hours;

24     otherwise I would destroy it.  That's how it was."

25             This is P1601, page 3.

Page 11408

 1             Asked who masterminded the Zvornik attack, JCE member Seselj

 2     said:  "It was key people of the State Security Service who thought it

 3     up, among them Franko Simatovic, Frenki.  He was also one of the key

 4     executors."

 5             This is from P18, page 29.

 6             Arkan's Men attacked Zvornik as the Serbian DB planned and

 7     ordered on 8 April.  Consistent with the JCE, Arkan's Tigers co-ordinated

 8     this effort with JNA units and Serb paramilitaries.  The JNA provided

 9     tanks, artillery, mortars to Arkan's Men.  Before attacking, JNA

10     General Jankovic received a letter from a private citizen describing

11     Arkan's ultimatum and foretelling "unprecedented massacre of the

12     unprotected and innocent population."  The letter pleaded with the JNA

13     not to align with the forces threatening the population, but instead to

14     defend the population.  This is P1380.

15             The JNA disregarded this plea, instead combining with Arkan's Men

16     and the paramilitaries to crush Zvornik's Muslim population.  As one

17     witness described, during and following the take-over, Arkan's unit, the

18     Serb Crisis Staff, and the JNA became aggressive and ethnically cleansed

19     the area in order to create territories inhabited by a majority of Serbs.

20     This is E7 on the confidential evidence table.

21             For evidence regarding the Zvornik attack, I refer Your Honours

22     to the evidence of JF-026, Theunens' expert report P1575 beginning at

23     e-court page 336, and E6 on the confidential evidence table.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Although we have not yet been here for 75 minutes, I

25     think it's a right time for a break.  We'll take a break and I'm looking

Page 11409

 1     at the Prosecution.  If we would restart at 12.30, would we be finished

 2     by quarter to 2.00, which would be another 75 minutes then?

 3             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, I believe we are very close to staying

 4     on schedule and finishing within that time-period.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Then we'll take a break and resume at 12.30.

 6                           --- Recess taken at 12.04 p.m.

 7                           --- On resuming at 12.33 p.m.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Harbour, please proceed and please keep in mind

 9     that while reading the speed of speech often goes up.

10             MS. HARBOUR:  The accused are charged with approximately 20

11     murders committed by Arkan's Men during the Zvornik attack.  And I refer

12     the Chamber to the confidential evidence table at E8 and the evidence of

13     JF-070.  Following Zvornik's take-over, the Zvornik TO under command of

14     Branko Popovic, also known as Marko Pavlovic, continued to persecute

15     non-Serbs.  Pavlovic was closely associated with the Serbian DB and

16     carried out their bidding.  He came to Zvornik with Kostic, the same

17     Kostic upon whose statue Stanisic placed a wreath in the Kula video,

18     which is P61.  Pavlovic referred to Kostic as boss.  On the confidential

19     evidence table, this is E9.

20             Locals in Zvornik municipality knew Pavlovic to be Serbian DB

21     sent from Belgrade to "fix the situation" or "control things" in Zvornik.

22     Those quotes are at E10 and E11 on the confidential evidence table.

23     Pavlovic had frequent contact with Stanisic's assistant, Tepavcevic, and

24     local members of and affiliates of the Serbian DB based just across the

25     river from Zvornik.  Sources for this are at E12 and E13 on the

Page 11410

 1     confidential evidence table.

 2             In a subordinate's application to the Captain Dragan fund, which

 3     Simatovic presented at the Red Berets' award ceremony as one of the

 4     Serbian DB unit's humanitarian activities, Pavlovic was listed as being

 5     the commander of a special military police unit.  And I refer

 6     Your Honours to slide 54.  Through his close connections to Kostic and

 7     the JNA, Pavlovic procured weapons for the Zvornik TO from Croatia and

 8     Serbia.  As evidence that this was part of the common plan, Mladic's

 9     military notebook reflects that Pavlovic reported at a meeting with

10     Karadzic and Mladic on 30 June 1992, that co-operation with the army

11     remained firm including for the purpose of supply.  And this is from

12     P2528, page 8.

13             As TO commander, Marko Pavlovic co-ordinated all of the armed

14     forces and paramilitaries operating in Zvornik.  He approved payroll

15     sheets authorising the Zvornik interim government to pay the various

16     paramilitary groups and JNA members under the Zvornik TO.  I refer

17     Your Honours to slide 55 for the relevant exhibits.

18             In the months following Zvornik's take-over, Serb forces

19     continued to persecute the Muslim civilian population through arbitrary

20     detentions, beatings, and other acts.  In this context, half of the

21     Bosniak village of Kozluk's predominantly Muslim population had fled

22     Kozluk by June 1992.  The Serb forces under Pavlovic's TO thus succeeded

23     in forcibly displacing the non-Serb population by creating the same

24     environment of fear that Serb forces employed in the Krajina and the

25     SBWS.

Page 11411

 1             In June, more than 20.000 Serb refugees came to Zvornik.  In

 2     order to implement the common plan and also to house Serb refugees, Serb

 3     forces rounded up 1800 Muslim civilians from Kozluk and the neighbouring

 4     Skocic and loaded them on to buses organised by the local Serb

 5     leadership.  Pavlovic signed deportation orders which are P2138 and

 6     P2139.

 7             The Bosnian Serb police transported the refugees under armed

 8     guard over the Bosnian border into Serbia and the Serbian police guarded

 9     their transport through Serbia to the Hungarian border.  There the

10     Serbian MUP supplied the convoy with passports to enter Hungary, as is

11     clear from the MUP stamp on the passports at P2141.  The Serbian MUP

12     contributed enormously to this elaborate forcible deportation process,

13     from allowing the initial crossing of 1800 people over Serbia's border to

14     co-ordinating local Serbian police to guard and transport the convoy

15     through the entire length of the Serbian territory, to finally issuing

16     hundreds of passports.  I refer the Chamber to the evidence on the

17     confidential evidence table at E14 and E15 regarding crimes in Zvornik

18     municipality after the take-over, including these mass deportations.

19             In his notebook, Mladic states that at a meeting on 30 June 1992,

20     among Mladic, Karadzic, and representatives of several municipalities,

21     the president of SDS Zvornik stated that:

22             "We have successfully implemented the president's decision to

23     settle Divic and Kozluk with our children."

24             And this is P2528, pages 4 to 5.  Marko Pavlovic then stated:

25     "We are most active in evicting the Muslims, we brought peace to Sepak,

Page 11412

 1     Divic, and Kozluk.  Some of them wanted to move out, while we demanded

 2     it.  We had to evict some of the people also for the sake of our 'heroes'

 3     who fled from Kovacevici."  And this is the same document at pages 8

 4     through 9.

 5             With the Muslim population of Zvornik drastically reduced through

 6     murders, forcible transfer and deportation, and persecution of ethnic

 7     Bosniaks, Pavlovic went on to report at this meeting that in Zvornik

 8     Arkan and Seselj's volunteer formations had "enjoyed exceptional

 9     success."  And this is page 7 of that exhibit.

10             A Serbian DB document from July 1992 characterised the situation

11     in Zvornik as "genocide committed in the Zvornik region by the SDG

12     volunteers and the volunteers from Loznica."  This is on the confidential

13     evidence table at E16.  The fact that Pavlovic reported to Mladic and

14     Karadzic, two JCE members, about the successful contributions of two

15     other JCE members to operations that a DB operative termed genocide,

16     indicates that the large-scale killing and forcible displacement of

17     non-Serb civilians in Zvornik and Bijeljina had intentionally targeted

18     non-Serbs exactly as the JCE members had envisioned.

19             As with the Zvornik-Bijeljina operation, the Prosecution's case

20     is that Stanisic and Simatovic planned the Bosanski Samac operation.

21     Through the Serbian DB, they trained and armed local Serbs at the

22     Ilok/Pajzos training camp.  Simatovic then personally ordered this

23     Red Beret unit to attack Bosanski Samac where they murdered, forcibly

24     transferred, deported and otherwise persecuted the municipality's

25     non-Serb population, in co-ordination with other Serb forces such as the

Page 11413

 1     JNA and local TO.

 2             Prior to the take-over, ethnic tensions were rising in

 3     Bosanski Samac, as local Serb leadership made a number of policy

 4     decisions that discriminated against non-Serbs, as indicated on slide 59.

 5     In late March 1992, a Serbian DB training camp near Ilok called Pajzos in

 6     Eastern Slavonia, which Ms. Friedman briefly discussed, began training

 7     recruits from Bosanski Samac.  The camp's instructors were members of the

 8     Serbian DB, most notably, Dragan Djordjevic, also known as Crni,

 9     Srecko Radovanovic, also known as Debeli, and Slobodan Miljkovic, also

10     known as Lugar.

11             Crni's membership in the Serbian DB is well established, in the

12     evidence of Todorovic and JF-047.  Todorovic, chief of the Bosanski Samac

13     police, recounted an incident from the summer of 1992 that exemplified

14     the close relationship between Crni and both accused.  Crni was arrested.

15     He asked Todorovic to talk to "his people" about getting him released.

16     Todorovic then went to the Serbian MUP in Belgrade in search of

17     Simatovic, but was instead directed to Stanisic.  Upon learning of Crni's

18     arrest, Stanisic said that those responsible had "touched into a hornet's

19     nest."  And he would tell them to release Crni immediately.  Sure enough,

20     Crni was released some ten days later.  This is from P1576 at pages 23475

21     through 77.

22             In addition, there's evidence that Crni joined the unit on

23     5 October 1991, that Stanisic was personally involved in recruiting him,

24     and that the Serbian DB was aware that Crni, like many other DB recruits,

25     had previously engaged in criminal activities.  Please refer to the

Page 11414

 1     confidential evidence table at E17 for this evidence.

 2             JF-047 and Todorovic have testified that Debeli and Lugar were

 3     also members of the Serbian DB subordinate to Crni.  A request for

 4     assistance that Lugar later wrote to the Serbian DB outlines his

 5     involvement in the DB, training at the Lezimir and Ilok/Pajzos camps,

 6     then commanding a unit in the Bosanski Samac attack, and this is P1425.

 7     The collaboration that resulted in the Ilok/Pajzos camp becoming involved

 8     in Bosanski Samac is itself evidence of the JCE.  Police and Defence at

 9     the local and Serbian levels devised the plan for the Serbian DB to train

10     Bosanski Samac locals.  Stevan Todorovic and Milos Bogdanovic, who as the

11     municipal secretariat of national defence, met in Belgrade with a member

12     of the federal Secretariat for National Defence and with Milan Prodanic

13     of the Serbian DB.  Prodanic later informed Milos Bogdanovic that he

14     would send men to give training at a camp organised by the Serbian MUP.

15     Together, Milos Bogdanovic and Todorovic recruited local men to undergo

16     military training at Ilok/Pajzos in March 1992.  This is from the

17     evidence of Todorovic, and Lugar's statement, which is P1428 at page 4,

18     corroborates Todorovic's involvement.

19             The camp at Ilok/Pajzos was set up to train special purpose units

20     of the Serbian MUP.  These came to be commonly known in Bosanski Samac as

21     the Red Berets or as the Grey Wolves, based on the recognisable grey wolf

22     insignia on their sleeves.  The non-Serb civilians whom they brutalised

23     knew them as the Specials.

24             As indicated on slide 61, the KDF applications of individuals who

25     trained at Ilok/Pajzos during this time characterised the unit as either

Page 11415

 1     the Special Unit of the MUP of Serbia or as Grey Wolves.  And these

 2     applications also demonstrate Debeli's and Lugar's role in the

 3     Bosanski Samac operations.

 4             According to JF-047, the Red Berets who were trained at

 5     Ilok/Pajzos in March 1992 knew Simatovic to be their commander.  There is

 6     also evidence of Stanisic's superiority to Simatovic and the Ilok/Pajzos

 7     Red Berets for which I refer the Chamber to the confidential evidence

 8     table at E18.  Ilok/Pajzos, like the other Serbian DB camps that my

 9     colleagues have discussed, was among the training camps that Simatovic

10     himself highlighted during the Red Beret's award ceremony in 1997.

11             One former Red Beret provided detailed evidence of the DB

12     training camp at Ilok/Pajzos, including the role of Simatovic, Bozovic,

13     Dragoslav Krsmanovic, Zvezdan Jovanovic, and Arkan.  And I refer the

14     Chamber to P523, pages 7 through 11 and to E19 on the confidential

15     evidence table.  Just before the take-over, Simatovic personally

16     instructed the Red Berets at the Ilok/Pajzos camp on the plan and

17     objective of the upcoming operation.  Fifty Red Berets including Crni,

18     Debeli, and Lugar, 30 men from Serbia and 20 local trainees arrived by

19     helicopter in Batkusa on 11 April 1992.  On the night between 16 and 17

20     April, these Red Berets, co-operating with the local police and TO,

21     secured the key facilities in town.  Once the Red Beret units secured the

22     important structures, the JNA took over and JF-047 gives extensive

23     evidence about Simatovic's briefing and the take-over.

24             Two days before the take-over, Crni had attending a meeting with

25     Todorovic, Blagoje Simic and others where they discussed including the

Page 11416

 1     Red Berets in the existing 17th Tactical Group of the JNA, which later

 2     became the VRS's 2nd Posavina Brigade.  This is Todorovic's evidence

 3     P1576 at page 23452.  During the Bosanski Samac operations, the

 4     Red Berets were in fact incorporated into TG-17.  Lieutenant-Colonel

 5     Nikolic, commander of the TG-17, held overall tactical and operational

 6     command of the units participating in the take-over.  This co-operation

 7     advanced the JCE's common purpose and reflected the shared intent among

 8     the JCE's members whose organisations were represented at this meeting.

 9     Namely, the Serbian DB, the JNA, the RS MUP, and Bosnian Serb political

10     leadership.

11             Nevertheless, the Red Berets functioned as a distinct unit.

12     Temporary subordination to the JNA did not affect the Red Berets

13     permanent chain of command.  JF-047 testified that orders came from Crni

14     through Debeli.  The Red Berets' victims easily discerned that they were

15     not JNA, but rather "attached to another command," said Tihic at

16     transcript page 3215.  The difference was apparent in their uniform,

17     behaviour, training, Serbian regional dialect, and their "assertion of

18     power."  This evidence is also from Tihic at page 3219 to 20 in the

19     transcript.

20             Nikolic endorsed the Red Berets as "a legal elite unit of Serbian

21     commandos, whose arrival had been legalized through the official organs

22     of the government and the army, both at the level of Samac municipality

23     and at the highest level in Serbia and Yugoslavia."  This is from P1418,

24     page 1.  Nikolic's description reflects the Red Berets' central role in

25     implementing the common criminal purpose and the shared intent of high

Page 11417

 1     level members of the JCE.

 2             As in other areas discussed today, the Serbian DB armed and

 3     equipped various Serb forces in Bosanski Samac and neighbouring areas.

 4     JF-047 testified that Vaso Mijovic, a known DB member, brought four to

 5     six truck-loads of ammunition from Belgrade to Brcko on an approximately

 6     weekly basis, giving a few cases to the small Red Berets unit and storing

 7     the rest in VRS hangars for VRS use.  The Serbian MUP also lent equipment

 8     to the VRS's 2nd Posavina Brigade as evidenced by P1523.

 9             The Red Berets committed a string of atrocities targeting

10     non-Serb civilians in the wake of the Bosanski Samac take-over, and I

11     refer the Chamber to the evidence of witnesses Tihic, Lukac, JF-079 and

12     JF-012.  The accused are charged with the murders of at least 16 Muslim

13     and Croat civilians at Crkvina on 7 May, 1992, after Lugar and several

14     other Red Berets went on a shooting rampage.  There's evidence that Lugar

15     committed these murders on specific orders in the confidential evidence

16     table at E20.  For a full account of the Crkvina massacre, please see E21

17     and E22.

18             The Red Berets co-ordinated numerous forced exchanges,

19     transferring non-Serb civilians from Bosanski Samac to Croatia as shown

20     on slide 64.  The accused intended these crimes.  They recruited

21     Red Berets with criminal inclinations, then planned and ordered the

22     operation which went exactly as intended.  As Tihic testified, "Special

23     units that took part in the attack against Bosanski Samac, or who led the

24     attack against Bosanski Samac, were the masters.  I know full well that

25     nothing could have been decided without them afterwards.  You could see

Page 11418

 1     straightaway that these were persons who were prone to crime and that

 2     killing someone meant nothing to them."  This is from page 3120.  Tihic

 3     went on to state that "Crni was the commander of all.  He is the one who

 4     issued orders."  This is 3136 in the transcript.

 5             A report of the 2nd Posavina Brigade of the Bosanski Samac

 6     operations described the Red Berets "official role as war criminals in

 7     the area."  And went on to report that "criminals of a Yugoslav calibre

 8     were hiding among the Serbian commandos who had come to train the Serbian

 9     police.  With the blessing of those who had brought them in and those who

10     had sent them, they engaged in unheard of looting of private and socially

11     owned property.  The massive arrests and isolation of Croats and Muslims

12     followed without any criteria, and some of the prisoners were subjected

13     to measures such as abuse, torture, or even killing."  This is P1418,

14     pages 1 to 2.

15             The Doboj operation followed the same pattern as in

16     Bosanski Samac.  The Prosecution's case is that it was planned and

17     ordered by the accused and that it was committed through implementation

18     of the JCE.  As in Bosanski Samac, the Serbian DB trained and armed local

19     Serbs at the Mount Ozren Red Berets training camp led by Bozovic, a

20     prominent member of the Serbian DB.  Through Bozovic, the accused ordered

21     the Red Berets unit to attack Doboj where they murdered, forcibly

22     transferred, deported, and otherwise persecuted the municipality's

23     non-Serb population in co-ordination with other Serb forces including the

24     JNA, local TO, and local police.

25             Leading up to the take-over, the Serb leadership implemented a

Page 11419

 1     number of policies and laws to discriminate against the Bosniak and Croat

 2     population, indicated on slide 66.  In early 1992, Bozovic, a member of

 3     the DB who Mr. Weber has already introduced, established a Red Berets

 4     training camp at Mount Ozren.  According to JF-005, Simatovic visited the

 5     Mount Ozren camp and there's evidence that Stanisic ordered and approved

 6     weapon transfers from Serbia to the camp.  Please see the confidential

 7     evidence table at E23.

 8             As with the Ilok/Pajzos camp, Simatovic referred to Mount Ozren

 9     at the Red Berets award ceremony on 4 May 1997.  Bozovic was the

10     commander of this camp and of the special units in Doboj.  As one of the

11     Serbian DB special unit's original members, he was directly subordinate

12     to Stanisic and Simatovic.  He was a prominent figure in the Serbian DB,

13     as demonstrated by his introduction during the Red Berets award ceremony

14     as one of "the unit's veteran officers."  To which Milosevic responded

15     that he had personally read Bozovic's reports and this is P61, page 4.

16     E24 on the confidential evidence table has evidence that Mr. Stanisic was

17     directly involved in recruiting Bozovic.

18             Bozovic had a vicious reputation and Mladic considered him akin

19     to mafia, having established "deaths camps"  with Arkan.  And this is

20     from P2956.

21             Following the same pattern seen in Bosanski Samac, the local Serb

22     political and military leadership funneled local recruits to Mount Ozren

23     through training.  Together the president of the SDS Doboj Municipal

24     Board Milan Ninkovic and JNA commander, Milovan Stankovic ensured that

25     formations of the Doboj police, JNA and volunteers were sent for

Page 11420

 1     training.  The recruits received camouflage uniforms and red berets with

 2     insignias stating JSN, Special Purpose Unit, with a brown wolf.  They

 3     became known in Doboj as the Red Berets.

 4             On 3 May 1992, around 300 men in the Mount Ozren trained

 5     Red Berets unit, at Bozovic's order, took over Doboj by force.  The

 6     Red Berets secured important structures to prevent Muslims from entering.

 7     They forced people found in the buildings to declare their loyalty to the

 8     Serbs, which is evidence of their persecutory intent.  As in

 9     Bosanski Samac, and reflective of the joint nature of the JCE, the

10     Red Berets co-ordinated the take-over with the JNA and Serb

11     paramilitaries.  Stankovic had overall command of the Doboj operation

12     with Bozovic.  There's evidence that Stankovic received orders from

13     Stanisic through Bozovic.  Please see the confidential evidence table at

14     E25.

15             Officially, the Red Berets were under CSB Doboj, but in fact they

16     were under Bozovic, under the Serbian DB.  CSB Doboj's payment records

17     during that period, listed on slide 68, show that Bozovic's group was

18     paid as a special group.  Furthermore, several KDF applications, also on

19     the slide, indicate that Mount Ozren trainees joined Red Beret units or

20     MUP of Serbia units under the command of Bozovic and Frenki.

21             In July 1992, many of the Red Berets were integrated into the

22     military police.  JF-005 testified that Stankovic, who by this point was

23     TG Ozren's commander, continued co-ordinating with Bozovic.  The

24     Red Berets in the military police thus continued receiving orders from

25     Bozovic.  They were separated from their base unit and their commanders

Page 11421

 1     were not allowed to ask questions.

 2             During and following Doboj's take-over, the Red Berets pursued a

 3     campaign of violence and persecution targeting Doboj's Muslim and Croat

 4     population.  Bozovic ordered his men to torture non-Serb civilians and

 5     the victims recognised him as being in control of the Red Berets.  I

 6     refer Your Honours to the evidence of JF-008, JF-009, B-1115, Ahmetovic

 7     and Hadzovic for more details of this persecution and evidence of

 8     discriminatory intent.

 9             The accused are charged with at least 27 murders committed on 12

10     July 1992, after the Red Berets and other Serb forces used non-Serb

11     detainees as a human shield against the Bosnian forces.  And for this I

12     refer Your Honours to the evidence of JF-008, JF-009, and Hadzovic, and

13     P254 and P92.  As a result of the horrific crimes in Doboj and reports of

14     a similar pattern of attacks in other municipalities, thousands of

15     Muslims and Croats fled their homes in Doboj and many others were

16     detained and forcibly exchanged within Bosnia and across the Croatian

17     border.  And for this evidence, I refer the Chamber to the evidence of

18     Hadzovic, JF-005, B-1115, JF-008, JF-009, and Exhibits P93, P94, and

19     P1816.

20             The Red Berets' Doboj operations followed the same pattern as in

21     Bosanski Samac, entailed similar acts of violence, and achieved the same

22     results, emptying these municipalities of non-Serbs.  Having seen the

23     Red Berets' success in Bosanski Samac, Stanisic and Simatovic, through

24     their loyal subordinate Bozovic, repeated this pattern in Doboj because

25     it furthered the JCE's purpose.  Predictably, Doboj was just as

Page 11422

 1     successful.  The "Doboj experience" was later described as "an example of

 2     how a Serbian state should be created."  This is from P1435, page 3.

 3             I'll now turn the floor over to Ms. Marcus.

 4             MS. MARCUS:  Slobodan Medic, aka Boca and the Skorpions were

 5     deployed to the Serbian front to the Trnovo front for approximately one

 6     months to the end of June to the end of July 1995.  During their

 7     deployment to the Trnovo area, they were engaged in operations in

 8     co-ordination with the VRS and RS MUP forces.  This coordination

 9     culminated in the execution of six Bosnian Muslim men and boys who had

10     been captured in part of the attack by Serb forces on Srebrenica.

11             Evidence has been adduced showing that the Skorpions had been in

12     Djeletovci in SBWS since the end of 1991, or the beginning of 1992.

13     Djeletovci is located near other locations central to JCE operations

14     throughout the indictment period, including Tovarnik, Njemci, which is

15     near Ziriste and Ilok/Pajzos.  I refer the Chamber to the evidence of

16     JF-032, JF-024, JF-048, and Borivoje Savic.

17             Three co-ordinated operations in Bosnia in 1995 demonstrate the

18     implementation of the common criminal plan: Pauk, Trnovo, and

19     Sanski Most.  At the end of 1994, the Skorpions under Slobodan Medic were

20     deployed to joint field operations in conjunction with other Serb forces

21     in the Velika Kladusa Pauk operation.  For additional evidence in

22     relation to the Pauk operation, I refer the Chamber to P2146 and P235.

23             The Pauk Joint Command in which the Skorpions and Arkan's SDG

24     operated continued into May 1995.  At the same time, the accused not only

25     sent troops and support for Pauk, they were also present themselves with

Page 11423

 1     great regularity in Bosnia in May to June 1995.  Within ten days

 2     following the release of the last UN hostages, the Serbian MUP deployed

 3     their forces to join in operations at the Trnovo front in conjunction

 4     with the very same Bosnian Serb MUP and VRS forces who had been engaged

 5     at Pauk, who had taken UN troops hostage, and who at the time of

 6     deployment were preparing to take over Srebrenica.

 7             The Serbian MUP forces including the Skorpions and Arkan's Tigers

 8     engaged in operations at the Trnovo front throughout the month of July

 9     1995, during which time the Skorpions executed the six men and boys.

10     Following the pullout order conveyed by Vaso Mijovic, a DB agent, Serbian

11     MUP forces pulled out were the Trnovo front on the 24th of July, 1995.

12     Six weeks later, Arkan's Men were deployed to Sanski Most to carry out

13     operations there.  The proximity in time and the centralised

14     co-ordination involved in Pauk, Trnovo, and Sanski Most characterise the

15     last phase of the implementation of the common criminal plan.

16             The Skorpions and Arkan's Men had been deployed to participate in

17     the Pauk operation, Mr. Stanisic said on the 6th of April, 1995, "I sent

18     150 men from Slavonija through Pauk.  The crossing had to be done

19     quietly."

20             You can see this excerpt on slide 71.

21             At a meeting on the 30th of June, 1995 in Belgrade at which

22     Mladic, Milosevic, and Stanisic were talking with Fikret Abdic, Stanisic

23     is recorded as saying, "We have been supplying 100.000 men for six

24     months.  There is poor organisation in RS, they plundered us."

25             Milosevic suggested, "Jovica should resolve logistics problems,

Page 11424

 1     and let RS resolve this problem of holding up convoys."

 2             Mr. Stanisic stated, "I can find 120 perfect men who would come

 3     there in seven days.  They would be from the eastern sector.  That is

 4     support.  They should not be engaged (we gave 80 from Erdut, we gave 80

 5     from Djeletovci)."

 6             I refer the Chamber to the Pauk diary admitted at P235 and to

 7     P2149.

 8             It should be noted that in the Pauk diary which spans from

 9     November 1994 through to the end of May 1995, Jovica Stanisic is named

10     explicitly twice; Frenki, 15 times; Legija, 78 times; Bozovic, 37 times;

11     and Kobac, Rajo Bozovic's nickname, appears at least 120 times.

12             The Prosecution evidence has demonstrated that the deployment of

13     the Skorpions to Trnovo to assist in carrying out the Eastern Bosnia

14     portion of the common criminal plan was designed in the course of two

15     meetings which took place prior to that deployment and which were

16     attended by high-level DB officials and other central actors in the plan.

17             May I request private session, please.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  We are turn into private session.

19                           [Private session]

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 11425

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6                           [Open session]

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  We are in open session, Your Honours.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

 9             MS. MARCUS:  Following that first meeting, there was a second

10     meeting which took place in the building of the Serbian MUP in Belgrade

11     before the Skorpions left for Trnovo.  This meeting was attended by

12     individuals central to Serbian MUP and DB hierarchy including

13     Ilija Kojic, who worked directly for Mr. Stanisic, as Ms. Friedman has

14     already discussed.

15             Also attending this meeting were Milan Milanovic aka Mrgud,

16     Ljubo Miljevic, Arkan, Slobodan Medic aka Boca, Radovan Stojicic aka

17     Badza, and several others.  P1666, an excerpt of which appears on slide

18     74, describes this meeting including the location and the attendees.

19     Mr. Bakrac discussed this meeting in his submissions.  For corroboration,

20     I refer the Chamber to the confidential evidence table at F1.

21             At this meeting, according to the evidence led in this case,

22     Badza told those present that the RS was being attacked and that if

23     possible Arkan's unit, the Skorpions, and the Plavi unit should help the

24     VRS in Trnovo for a month.  I refer the Chamber to the confidential

25     evidence table at F2.

Page 11426

 1             Witness evidence confirmed that Frenki had arranged for the

 2     Tigers to take part in the Treskavica operation.  I refer the Chamber to

 3     the confidential evidence table at F3 and F4.

 4             Ilija Kojic's role was to organise deployment of these three

 5     units that made up the battalion sent to the war front in Trnovo.  Please

 6     refer to the confidential evidence table at F5.  Witnesses testified that

 7     Mrgud was the intermediary between Slobodan Medic and Milorad Ulemek, aka

 8     Legija, and the DB leadership in Belgrade.  One witness reported that

 9     Slobodan Medic himself had boasted that his orders came from Stanisic and

10     Simatovic.

11             Dejan Sliskovic testified that Slobodan Medic commanded the

12     Skorpions and during combat activities he was subordinated to the

13     Red Beret command staff.  Simatovic visited the Skorpion headquarters in

14     Djeletovci after the events in Trnovo.  I refer the Chamber to the

15     confidential evidence table at F6.

16             The Skorpions deployed to the Trnovo front at the end of June

17     1995.  According to his own notes, Mladic was at Jahorina on the 25th of

18     May, 1995.  I refer the Chamber to P394.  On the 23rd of June, 1995,

19     Mladic said in a meeting with Karadzic and others:

20             "We must conduct an operation near Trnovo."

21             On the 30th of June, 1995, the Serbian MUP's anti-terrorist unit

22     sent a telegram to Ratko Mladic and in response Mladic issued this urgent

23     order, P1454.  Mladic ordered on the 1st of July that helicopters be

24     provided for the evacuation of any men wounded at the Trnovo front and

25     that any such injuries be reported formally.  Serbian MUP hierarchy was

Page 11427

 1     informed of this.  This pattern of documentation suggests that the

 2     Serbian MUP were providing their pilots and possibly their helicopters

 3     for the purpose of assisting in the evacuation of wounded fighters at the

 4     Trnovo front.

 5             Serb forces on the ground issued regular reports which appear on

 6     slide 77.  These official military and police reports providing

 7     information on the wounded including Serbian MUP members span throughout

 8     July 1995.  For additional corroboration, I refer the Chamber to the

 9     transcript at 10059.

10             The Prosecution case that the Skorpions as a unit of the Serbian

11     MUP were deployed to the Trnovo front where they were subordinated to or

12     operated in co-ordination with other Serb forces, in this case, including

13     Arkan's Men, the RS MUP, and VRS forces.  The accused used their

14     authority to direct and organise the financing, logistical support, or

15     other substantial assistance or support to these special units and

16     continued to send forces and provide support to the Serbian MUP forces on

17     the ground at the Trnovo front over an extended period of time before,

18     during, and after the large-scale massacres at Srebrenica and Zepa and

19     the consequent execution of the Trnovo victims.

20             Evidence of the arming and provision of supplies and logistical

21     support to the Skorpions by the Serbian MUP was presented by JF-048 who

22     testified that the Skorpions came to the DB camp in Pajzos to obtain

23     ammunition from the warehouse.  The DB provided multiple licence plates

24     to the Skorpions for ease of movement, several different uniforms,

25     Serbian MUP badges once they deployed to Trnovo, higher salaries than

Page 11428

 1     other police work, according to one estimate higher by a multiple of

 2     seven, payment in newly printed dinars, training, communication via radio

 3     and telephone with Arkan's unit and with VRS forces during the operation.

 4             For additional evidence of the contributions by the accused, I

 5     refer the Chamber to the confidential evidence table at F7 and to slide

 6     number 78.

 7             In addition to the pattern of reports on the wounded, the

 8     Prosecution has presented a pattern of official police and military

 9     reports from the front describing the day-to-day activities in and around

10     the Trnovo front involving the Skorpions/Serbian MUP forces throughout

11     July 1995.  The documents are listed on slides 79 and 80.  P1452 dated

12     the 1st of July, 1995, "Activities commenced the previous day were

13     continued at the Trnovo battle-field on the 30th of June 1995.  The

14     combat group was described as including the Skorpions Serbian MUP."

15             P1455 from the 3rd of July and P1458 from the 7th of July

16     further described the joint operations of the MUP forces of the RS,

17     Serbia and RSK along with the VRS at the Trnovo front.

18             P1459, the 7th of July lists the numerical strength of the police

19     engaged at the Trnovo front including "the Republic of Serbia and the

20     Republic of Serbian Krajina special unit 350 policemen."  By the 10th of

21     July 1995, the reports describe the advance of the forces at Srebrenica.

22     On that same day, as further evidence of the co-ordination on the ground

23     as a broader part of the Srebrenica offensive, Mladic issued P1462, a

24     dispatch appearing before you, to all SDBs and all police stations on

25     behalf of the "supreme commander of the Republika Srpska Armed Forces and

Page 11429

 1     in order to crush the enemy offensive from the Srebrenica protected

 2     zone."

 3             He ordered the singling out of a mixed company of joint MUP

 4     forces of the RSK, Serbia, and Republika Srpska to send to the Srebrenica

 5     sector on the 11th of July, 1995.

 6             We know that Vaso Mijovic was a person in a leadership role in

 7     the DB during the Trnovo campaign.  I refer the Chamber to the

 8     confidential evidence table at F8.  The Prosecution has presented a

 9     compelling body of evidence demonstrating the deployment of the Skorpions

10     to Trnovo by the end of July 1995.  The co-operation and co-ordination

11     amongst these forces throughout the month of July 1995 and concluding

12     with the Skorpions being pulled out at the end of July 1995.  Operations

13     at the Trnovo front are a perfect example of the type of joint operations

14     which epitomised the way the JCE functioned.

15             In addition to deploying their forces, the evidence demonstrates

16     that the accused went themselves to the region.  During the end of May

17     and until the middle of June 1995, Stanisic and Simatovic were in Bosnia

18     during the negotiations for the release of the UN hostages.  Throughout

19     this time, as stated by Stanisic himself, the accused were both in direct

20     contact with the highest level Serb and Bosnian Serb authorities

21     including Slobodan Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic, and Ratko Mladic, all JCE

22     members.  The Prosecution refers the Chamber to Exhibits P48.17, D142,

23     transcript at page T-430 to 433.  We also refer the Chamber to the

24     transcript at page 2064 to 2067.

25             The accused contributed forces and their personal presence, as

Page 11430

 1     well as other extensive logistical and operational support to the VRS and

 2     RS MUP forces on the ground in Pauk, then in Trnovo, and finally in

 3     Sanski Most.  The Skorpions, as a unit of the Serbian MUP, provided the

 4     ultimate participation in their acts in furtherance of the common

 5     criminal plan, the execution of six men and boys captured from

 6     Srebrenica.  Vaso Mijovic, a DB official, informed the Skorpions that

 7     they had been ordered to pull out of Trnovo and within a few days after

 8     that order, Milan Milanovic, aka Mrgud travelled to Trnovo to retrieve

 9     the DB forces from the field.  Six weeks later, the DB deployed Arkan's

10     Men to Sanski Most, as part of the co-ordinated widespread and systematic

11     attack against the non-Serb civilian population.

12             On the 16th of April, 1992, Sanski Most was attacked by Serb

13     forces.  Ultimately those non-Serbs who did not flee due to the killings

14     and other acts of violence were forced to leave due to the coercive and

15     oppressive environment.  Those who remained until 1995 endured continual

16     discriminatory treatment.  I refer the Chamber to the transcript at page

17     3028.  The Sasina and Trnovo village executions were part of this

18     widespread and systematic attack upon the non-Serb civilian population in

19     Sanski Most and bore a nexus to the armed conflict.

20             Arkan and his men, as explained by my colleagues, were an

21     effective choice for the carrying out of operations in furtherance of the

22     common criminal plan.  They were well trained for such persecutory

23     operations.  I refer the Chamber to the confidential evidence table at

24     F9.

25             Witness evidence is that Arkan's Tigers were operating in

Page 11431

 1     Sanski Most in co-ordination with the local TO.  I refer the Chamber now

 2     to the confidential evidence table at F10.  Arkan's Men were operating in

 3     the Sanski Most area at least between the 22nd of September and the 10th

 4     of October in conjunction with other Serb forces including police from

 5     Serbia, military police, and members of the VRS.  Please refer to the

 6     confidential evidence table at F11.

 7             In P284, excerpted on slide 86, Arkan's own words provide

 8     additional evidence of his persecutory intent.  I also refer the Chamber

 9     to P282 and P283.  Financial support from the DB provided additional

10     means for Arkan's Men to operate and in some cases even to recruit

11     additional fighters.  P289, appearing on slide 87, dated the 23rd of

12     September, 1995, is a letter signed by Ratko Mladic reporting on the

13     activities of Arkan and his men in Sanski Most.  The document reads:

14             "Members of the SDG paramilitary units forcibly induct into their

15     ranks or recruit VRS members promising them a salary of 600 dinars,

16     10.000 dinars compensation if they are wounded, unemployment, and health

17     insurance through the MUP of the Republic of Serbia."

18             According to this document, Arkan was operating under the

19     official approval of Radovan Karadzic while identifying himself as "a

20     mountain brigade of the MUP of Serbia and RS."  The SDG members were paid

21     directly in freshly printed money by the DB, at times individual SDG

22     members would go to the DB offices directly to pick up the money for

23     salaries and at other times, the money would be sent in bags to the SDG

24     office.  The largest amount of payment by the DB to the SDG was

25     reportedly received after the Banja Luka operations, including Sanski

Page 11432

 1     Most in September 1995.  I refer the Chamber to P1616 and 1619 and to

 2     P440 and P441.

 3             The Prosecution has tendered into evidence in this case official

 4     DB payment records spanning at least from the end of 1993 onward into the

 5     postwar period.  Listed on these payment records fully corroborating

 6     witness testimony are numerous known members of Arkan's Tigers, the SDG,

 7     whose monthly payments by the DB were officially recorded throughout the

 8     latter part of 1994 and through 1995, covering the time-period during

 9     which the Sanski Most crimes were committed.  I refer the Chamber to the

10     transcript at page 8886 and 7.

11             On one DB payment record, which I request not to be broadcast to

12     the public, please, P454, page 19, the first name on that list is

13     Milorad Ulemek, aka Legija, and there are at least 15 SDG members

14     officially documented as having been paid by the DB directly that month,

15     including Mile, Mihajlo Ulemek and Jugoslav Gluscevic, combined on the

16     same list with several SDB members who were paid simultaneously with the

17     Tigers.  I refer the Chamber to the confidential evidence table at F12

18     and to the transcript at page 8892 and 3.

19             P454 is only one example.  Next slide, also please not to be

20     broadcast.  It is the Prosecution's case that numerous payment records on

21     which known SDG members and DB members are listed bear the signature of

22     Franko Simatovic.  The Prosecution refers the Chamber as additional

23     examples to P456, P457, P458, and for corroboration to P1080.  A former

24     SDG member confirmed during his testimony that Rajo Bozovic received his

25     payment from the same place that Arkan's Men did.  This assertion is

Page 11433

 1     borne out on the payment records.  I refer the Chamber to P465, a DB

 2     payment record that Bozovic and other DB members, as well as numerous SDG

 3     members are listed.  This payment record is also signed by

 4     Franko Simatovic.

 5             One witness had was a former member of Arkan's SDG and who

 6     participated in the Pauk joint operation in Velika Kladusa gave evidence

 7     that Legija addressed Frenki "with the title, boss."  P59 is a video of a

 8     parade in Bijeljina at which Karadzic thanks and congratulates Arkan and

 9     his SDG.  This public display of praise and approval from the RS

10     President Karadzic took place just following the attack on Sanski Most.

11     The discriminatory intent is clear from both words and actions.

12             The DB provided communication and ensured the reliability of the

13     paths of communication between Frenki and Arkan as JCE members.  The DB

14     created a direct telephone line from the Erdut camp, which Arkan used as

15     his base, as well as a direct radio link from Arkan's office in Belgrade

16     to the Erdut camp.  I refer the Chamber to P1615, 1616, and 1619.  Arkan

17     visited Frenki in his office for meetings frequently during the time from

18     the end of 1994 into the summer of 1995.  I refer the Chamber to P1619,

19     P1615, and to the confidential evidence table at F13.  For additional

20     evidence corroborating Arkan's co-ordination with the DB, I refer the

21     Chamber to the confidential evidence table at F14, and F15.

22             P1192 is a report from a DB operative from Novi Sad regarding the

23     activities of Arkan in the territory of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and

24     Western Srem where Arkan's Erdut training centre was located.  The

25     document explains that following the fall of the western part of the RSK

Page 11434

 1     in August 1995, the MUP of Serbia sent members of the SVK, who had fled

 2     the FRY to Arkan's training centre in Erdut.  There, these members of the

 3     SVK were trained for five to ten days in Arkan's training centre and

 4     subsequently sent to the front line.  The intelligence source reports

 5     that "Arkan is in" -- Your Honours, I'm conscious of the time, I have

 6     about five minutes left.  I've truly tried to trim it back and Mr. Groome

 7     has three minutes.  I apologise.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  I saw Mr. Groome is last on the list.  What does

 9     that mean?  Mr. Groome.

10             MS. MARCUS:  That means that Mr. Groome will be delivering a few

11     minutes of conclusions.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, I need two minutes, really not more, for

13     procedural matters.  Ms. Marcus, you said five minutes, a couple of more

14     minutes for Mr. Groome, I expect you to finish at 10 minutes to 2.00, if

15     the interpreters and others assisting us would have no major problems

16     with that.  I don't hear yet of major problems, let's proceed as quickly

17     as possible, not by speeding up.

18             MS. MARCUS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

19             In this document, P1192, Arkan announced that his task was to

20     "immediately establish peace, order and strict discipline among

21     civilians.  Two to three civilians are to be killed.  That specifically

22     applied to the village of Sodelovci, in order to cause fear among the

23     people."

24             Just as in Pauk and in Trnovo, in Sanski Most the Serbian MUP

25     provided multiple licence plates and ensured movement across borders.  A

Page 11435

 1     witness corroborated this, explaining that the MUP Serbian licence plates

 2     were authentic and issued by the MUP of Serbia to the SDG.  I refer the

 3     Chamber to the confidential evidence table at F16.

 4             An example of the benefit of multiple licence plates and

 5     facilitation to cross borders occurred on the occasion of the filming of

 6     the video, P59, of the parade in Bijeljina.  Prior to this event, a call

 7     was placed to the Serbian MUP on a direct emergency telephone line which

 8     had been provided to the SDG by the MUP authorities.  That call to the

 9     Serbian MUP facilitated Arkan's movement across the border into Bosnia

10     from Serbia across the Raca crossing.  I refer the Chamber to the

11     confidential evidence table at F17.

12             Just as in Velika Kladusa, in Trnovo, and now in Sanski Most, the

13     accused participated in the implementation of the common criminal plan

14     and designed and ordered the crimes charged through the same pattern of

15     mechanisms which as high level MUP officials in a JCE network they were

16     uniquely placed to provide.  Co-ordination and deployment; visits to the

17     field, in person or via agents; ammunition and weapons; transportation

18     buses from Serbia; training; ensuring border crossings; multiple licence

19     plates; direct salary and per diem payments; a variety of uniforms;

20     communication through radio and telephone; and other logistical support

21     just as Milosevic said, Jovica will resolve the logistical problems.

22             I will conclude with some excerpts from General Ratko Mladic's

23     diary.  First is Exhibit P2543, quoting General Gvero as saying, "The

24     municipality of Sanski Most is controlled by many wearing Arkan's

25     uniform."

Page 11436

 1             General Milovanovic at the same meeting is noted by Mladic as

 2     stating:

 3             "300 Arkan's volunteers arrived and were put into the RS MUP.

 4     They were reportedly meant to be behind the lines and arrest all those

 5     who are fleeing from the front."

 6             In an entry just a few days later, the 29th of September, 1995,

 7     Mladic records President Karadzic as saying:

 8             "Jovica Stanisic is angry about something.  He gave 300 of his

 9     men and the US is begrudging us for having advertised Arkan."

10             And finally in notes taken of a meeting involving General Perisic

11     and the accused Jovica Stanisic on the 30th of September, 1995,

12     General Mladic quotes Jovica Stanisic as saying:

13             "Arkan is embedded there, we sent 400 people.  As far as I have

14     been informed, this helped at Sanski Most and Novi Grad."

15             Your Honours, I will now turn the floor over to Mr. Groome.

16     Thank you.

17             MR. GROOME:  Your Honours, I had one observation that I believe

18     will be equally appropriate in sur-rebuttal, so I will just say at this

19     stage that this completes the Prosecution's submissions on each of the

20     major areas of the indictment.  It is the Prosecution's position that

21     each individual body of evidence presented to you today, as sections C

22     through F, individually establishes a basis upon which Mr. Simatovic's

23     application should be denied.  Taken together, the Prosecution has

24     clearly met its burden at this stage of the proceedings.  With that,

25     Your Honour, we conclude our submissions.  I would ask that the

Page 11437

 1     PowerPoint and table of confidential exhibits be assigned Exhibit numbers

 2     and marked for identification.  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you Mr. Groome.  I just asked Madam Registrar

 4     whether they had been uploaded, she had not received an answer to that

 5     yet.

 6             MS. MARCUS:  Your Honours, they will be uploaded as soon as

 7     possible.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Now, I notice that of course the confidential, the

 9     table of confidential evidence should be marked for identification

10     confidentially.  How about the slides?  Apart from 88 and 89, perhaps,

11     but ...

12             MS. MARCUS:  Right, those are the two, yes, Your Honour, those

13     are the two that would have to be under seal, those two slides.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, but are you not -- do you want to have them

15     marked for identification individually or are you uploading one series

16     without 88 and 89 and then in addition to that, one consisting of 88 and

17     89?

18             MS. MARCUS:  That's a good suggestion, Your Honour.  We will

19     upload one version without those two slides and then as Your Honour sees

20     fit -- that one can be public.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And then the two remaining slides in a

22     separate --

23             MS. MARCUS:  Separate document, yes.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar, could you already perhaps preassign

25     numbers.  The first for the series of slides without slides 88 and 89.

Page 11438

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  This would be P2973, Your Honours.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  And that would be public.  Then slides 88 and 89

 3     would receive number ... ?

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Number P2974, Your Honours.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  And then finally the table of references to

 6     confidential evidence would receive?

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Number P2975, Your Honours.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  And that would also be confidential, therefore under

 9     seal.

10             One very quick question, the Simatovic Defence has filed a

11     request for certification to appeal the Scheduling Order and a decision

12     on Defence requests for adjustment of Scheduling Order of the 16th of

13     February.  Does the Stanisic Defence want to respond or to make

14     submissions on that request?

15             MR. JORDASH:  No, thank you.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  And may I take it that the Prosecution wishes to do

17     so?

18             MR. GROOME:  Yes, Your Honour.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  And could we have an expedited filing.

20             MR. GROOME:  End of the week suit the Chamber?

21                           [Trial Chamber confers]

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, end of the week would be then the time-limits

23     on which we have agreed by now.  Yes.  Then, there being no other

24     procedural matters on my agenda, we adjourn for the day and we'll resume

25     and hear further submissions tomorrow, Tuesday, the 12th of April,

Page 11439

 1     quarter past 2.00 in this same Courtroom II.

 2                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.55 p.m.

 3                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 12th day of April,

 4                           2011 at 2.15 p.m.