Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 15403

 1                           Wednesday, 7 December 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone.

 6             Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.

 8             This is case IT-03-69-T, the Prosecutor versus Jovica Stanisic

 9     and Franko Simatovic.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

11             I was informed that there was a matter to be raised by the

12     Simatovic Defence.  Mr. Petrovic.

13             MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  Just

14     briefly.  My learned friend Jordash and myself have considered the topics

15     for the examination of the witness who is currently before the

16     Trial Chamber and we decided that some of our topics overlapped and that

17     is why we would like to suggest that the one hour that we requested

18     should be allocated to the Stanisic Defence.  We would then need only one

19     hour and that would bring us to the total time requested for both Defence

20     teams.  And if the Chamber finds this proposal acceptable, I would kindly

21     ask for these slight amendments to be made to the overall distribution of

22     our examination time.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  First of all, can the witness be escorted into the

24     courtroom.

25             There were two hours left for you, Mr. Jordash.  You were asking


Page 15404

 1     for two hours, Mr. Petrovic.  It's now 3:1.

 2             MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

 3                           [The witness takes the stand]

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning.  Please be seated, Mr. Milovanovic.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.  Thank you.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Milovanovic, I'd like to remind you that the

 7     solemn declaration you gave yesterday at the beginning of your testimony

 8     is still binding.  And Mr. Jordash will now continue his

 9     cross-examination.

10             Please proceed.

11             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you.

12                      WITNESS:  MANOJLO MILOVANOVIC [Resumed]

13                      [Witness answered through interpreter]

14                      Further Cross-examination by Mr. Jordash: [Continued]

15        Q.   And good morning, Mr. Milovanovic.

16        A.   Good morning.

17             MR. JORDASH:  Could we have on e-court, please, 5601.

18     65 ter 5601, page 46 of the English and 46 of the B/C/S, and 46 at the

19     top of the page.

20        Q.   And I want to ask you about the entry, Tuesday, the

21     11th of August, 1992, and the entry concerning Bratunac and the

22     "Red Berets equalling 58, they have ambition to take power and they

23     operate under the patronage of the local priest."

24             Do you know anything about those Red Berets operating under the

25     patronage of the local priest?

Page 15405

 1        A.   At that time I only heard that somewhere between Bratunac and

 2     Skelani a group of 26 of some Red Berets entered the area.  People also

 3     called them Seselj's Men.  As for this number of 58, I wasn't aware of

 4     that.  We expelled that group of -- across the Drina very quickly because

 5     they had not come to fight.  They had come to loot abandoned houses, both

 6     Muslim and Serb houses.  They were thieves.

 7        Q.   Did that group then, that you expelled across the Drina, conduct

 8     any military operations as far as you were aware?

 9        A.   No, they were not engaged in any military operations.

10        Q.   You say that they had come to loot.  Did they actually loot?  And

11     if so, was the property taken across the Drina?

12        A.   I don't know whether they took anything or not.  They stole

13     little things, not furniture or any bigger things, but rather money,

14     small utensils, whatever they could carry in their hands.  They did not

15     have any organised means of transport that would take them across the

16     Drina.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             MR. JORDASH:  Could we have, please, on the screen, 1D03595.

19        Q.   What I'm going to have brought up to the screen, Mr. Milovanovic,

20     are Supreme Defence Council minutes from the FRY.  I want to ask you

21     about something that's said during a meeting, during one of those

22     sessions.

23             As we can see, this is minutes from -- these are minutes from the

24     5th Session of the Supreme Defence Council, 7th of August, 1992.

25             MR. JORDASH:  And I want to turn, if we can, please, to page 18

Page 15406

 1     of the English and 18 of the B/C/S.

 2        Q.   Mr. Milovanovic, were you aware of the Supreme Defence Council

 3     and its usual makeup, the people who attended?

 4        A.   The Supreme Defence Councils in all countries are institutions

 5     pertaining to Defence in peacetime, whereas in war time it would be

 6     Supreme Commands.  The head of that body is the president of the state.

 7     There is also prime minister, minister of the interior, the defence

 8     minister.  And if the state is federal, which was also the case of FRY,

 9     the president of the republics also attended.

10        Q.   Thank you.  I just want to direct your attention to the bottom of

11     the page where Pavle Bulatovic is speaking.

12             "Regarding these 350 pieces, I have information that the MUP of

13     Serbia is responsible for that.  It is now possible that someone is

14     looking for an alibi in these ..."

15             MR. JORDASH:  Let's go over the page in the English, please.

16        Q.   "... in these stories just as they do in the General Staff.  Ceko

17     says he's going to get a permit for his vehicle, which was probably

18     robbed and stolen somewhere in Bosnia through the General Staff.  It is

19     possible that people are looking for an alibi.  I showed two faxes to

20     minister Sokolovic, where Tikves and Ilok are mentioned, where a

21     commander, a Montenegrin, Zivojin Ivanovic, as a commander of a special

22     purposes units" --

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the right B/C/S page be displayed,

24     please.

25             MR. JORDASH:  I think we need to go to the next page.  Thank you.

Page 15407

 1        Q.   "... where a commander of a special purposes unit informs that a

 2     group of twenty armed people are permitted to move across the territory

 3     of Serbia and across the territory of Pljevlja.  He signed as a commander

 4     of some special unit.  He has got a stamp, and he gives these

 5     authorisations to himself, saying that his orders have to be executed.  I

 6     asked minister Sokolovic if he knew who this was and he said he's never

 7     heard of him."

 8             Then just moving down, to save time:

 9             "We are going to have things like this happen as long as the

10     weapons are not collected from the people and stored somewhere.  But I

11     think it will not be possible to realise this in an efficient way for the

12     next 15 years."

13             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter notes that the witness does not

14     have the correct B/C/S page in front of him.

15             MR. JORDASH:  Could we go over the page then, please, in the

16     B/C/S.

17        Q.   Have you followed me so far, Mr. Milovanovic?

18        A.   I did not see that text in front of me.  What you were reading, I

19     didn't have that.  Now I have a page.  I don't know where you started.

20     My page starts with "In the media, the commander of White Eagles issues

21     an open address to President Bulatovic," I suppose that that was

22     Momir Bulatovic who was then either the president of the FRY government

23     or the prime minister of Montenegro, in any case, he was a member of the

24     Supreme Defence Council.

25             MR. JORDASH:  May I just have a moment.  Let's -- I'll come back

Page 15408

 1     to that.  I was told that the pages were exactly the same, but clearly

 2     not.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Groome.

 4             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, can I just note that the document

 5     Mr. Jordash is now working with has been admitted as P2357.

 6             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you.  I think we might have that on the

 7     screen now.  Let's come back to that.  I do apologise, I'll find the

 8     corresponding page.

 9             Let's have on the screen instead then P-- sorry, 65 ter 5601.

10     And page 78 of the English and 78 of the B/C/S, 78 at the top of the

11     page.

12        Q.   This is dated the 18th of August, 1992, Pale.  It's a meeting of

13     the -- at the SR Presidency.  And on the screen we have J000-2253.  I'm

14     interested in the suggestion or the -- what appears to be a suggestion by

15     "Colonel Dimitrija Sibalic (Bratunac):  We have obtained two combat

16     Kragujs aircraft.  We have a possibility to create a network of small

17     airports.  They are asking to be under our jurisdiction for all

18     supplies," and so on.

19             Do you know anything about this colonel and this suggestion?

20        A.   I don't know Sibalic by the name, but the family name Dimitrija

21     is known to me.  He worked at the sports airport in Bratunac which was

22     refurbished to be able to accommodate Kraguj aircraft that can be armed

23     and used in combat.  I'm not sure that I'm familiar with the family name

24     Sibalic.  I've never heard that family name before.

25        Q.   What about this suggestion of creating a network of small

Page 15409

 1     airports, did that happen?  Did he or anyone create, as far as you're

 2     aware, a network of small airports outside of the control of the VRS?

 3        A.   I know nothing about that.  Yesterday I spoke about some attempts

 4     to create an improvised airfield in Podromanija at the foot of Romanija

 5     mountain.  The place was just marked, the plot was marked, and that was

 6     it.  That's where the work stopped.

 7        Q.   Sorry, just remind us:  Who made that attempt?

 8        A.   The Presidency of Republika Srpska tasked the army with that and

 9     the air force and the entire aircraft defence of Republika Srpska marked

10     the area where the airport would be, but that was it.  The airport was

11     never built.  The attempt to build an airport was a response to the

12     Muslims' project to build an airport somewhere in the area of Visoko.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             MR. JORDASH:  Can we go, please, to 65 ter 5602.  Same as we have

15     on the screen, but page 51 of the English, 51 of the B/C/S, and 51 at the

16     top of the page.

17        Q.   And we are looking at an entry which is dated the

18     15th of September, 1992, and it's Bijeljina and it's a conference in the

19     Eastern Bosnian Corps.  I'm interested in what the president of the

20     Kalesija SO Petar Jankovic appears to be reporting.

21             "There were 8.000 Serbs, genocide is being carried out for the

22     second time.  70 per cent of our men have been in the trenches since

23     May of 1992, we got out.  Civilian government is made up of 5 people.

24     I'm disappointed in the Serbian people as a whole.  80 per cent of the

25     Serbs are fleeing.  2050 men (mostly elderly) are holding 25 kilometres

Page 15410

 1     of the front."

 2             Do you know anything about the situation described by Jankovic in

 3     his municipality at this point in time?

 4        A.   There was a meeting in Bijeljina dealing with the military and

 5     political issues.  I did not attend.  Some other generals headed by

 6     General Mladic attended.  In that part of Republika Srpska, which is

 7     Posavina, Semberija, and Majevica region, throughout the war there were

 8     conflicts, firstly between the civilian authorities, i.e., the municipal

 9     authorities, and military authorities.  And the reason was the fact that

10     the civilians did not assist the army.

11        Q.   Assist the army in doing what?

12        A.   In providing them with materiel and equipment and supplies.

13        Q.   What was happening in that municipality in terms of combat; was

14     it a front line, was it a defensive area?  What was it?

15        A.   Kalesija was a so-called border-line municipality.  During the

16     war, i.e., after the end of the war, it became part of the Federation.

17     During the war for a certain period of time it was in our hands.  We can

18     see here that the president of the municipality complained of something

19     that was a commonplace occurrence along the border of Republika Srpska.

20     Those Serbs in Podrinje and in Semberija had a reserve homeland, as it

21     were.

22             As I already told you, if people heard shots 20 kilometres away,

23     the Serbs immediately fled across the Drina into Serbia.  He provides a

24     percentage here which is not realistic.  He says that 70 per cent of the

25     Serbs, i.e., our people, are in trenches, but that's 70 per cent of those

Page 15411

 1     who stayed behind in Kalesija.  We have to take into account that 80 per

 2     cent had already fled.  He doesn't criticise anybody.  He just complains

 3     and he just -- he is fishing for sympathy.  He wants people to understand

 4     that he is in dire straits.  That's all.

 5        Q.   Was this a Serbian-dominated municipality, or what was the ethnic

 6     makeup before the war?  Do you know?

 7        A.   I know the ethnic structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole but

 8     not of individual municipalities.  It's obvious that here Serbs were in

 9     the minority, a very small minority.

10        Q.   And were Serbs from that municipality eventually expelled?

11        A.   Looking at what this president of municipality says, it seems

12     they were not expelled, that they fled.  They left the municipality

13     themselves, because he mentions genocide here, but they were not

14     physically driven out by the Muslims.  They ran for their lives, fearing

15     for their existence, their property, their survival.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             MR. JORDASH:  Let's just go back quickly to page 40.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, the problems you earlier had, finding

19     what in the Supreme Defence Council minutes was found in page 18 and 19,

20     you find it in 22 of the B/C/S version.

21             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you very much.  Let's just go back -- oh, we

22     are on the page that I'm interested in.  Page 40, English and B/C/S, 40

23     at the top of the page, J000-1181.

24        Q.   You'll see this is an entry, Bijeljina, 15th of September, 1992.

25     It's the same conference that we've been looking at in the

Page 15412

 1     Eastern Bosnian Corps.  And we see there number 2 Special Brigade

 2     Ljubica Savic referred to - that's Mauzer, isn't it, Mr. Milovanovic? -

 3     and does that entry accord with your knowledge?

 4        A.   Under number 2 I see here the 2nd Posavina Brigade commanded by

 5     Milad Berenja [phoen].  I don't see Ljubisa Savic Mauzer.  I'm looking at

 6     page 41 in B/C/S.

 7        Q.   You should be on page 40 in B/C/S.

 8        A.   It's still 41.  I see "Ljubisa Savic" in the English version, but

 9     I don't understand the rest.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Could we go to the place where the numbers usually

11     are written up to the top, or do we have the whole of the page now?  So

12     apparently this is one.  Yes, this is the right one.  Let's proceed.

13     It's a different one from what we had a minute ago.

14             Mr. Groome.

15             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, just to avoid confusion, Mr. Jordash is

16     recorded as saying that he's working with page 1181, and I see 1170 on

17     the screen.

18             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you.  So it's J000-1170.

19        Q.   You can see the entry there.  It seems as though the commander of

20     the Eastern Bosnian Corps is reporting concerning Special Brigade

21     Ljubisa Savic.  And my question was:  That Ljubisa Savic is or was

22     Mauzer, and do the details there about his subordination and activities

23     accord with your knowledge?

24        A.   It is Mauzer.  It's about that brigade that I spoke about

25     yesterday, the Panthers or the Guards, as they call themselves.  That

Page 15413

 1     brigade was not established by Ljubisa Savic but by Major Pantelic, and

 2     that's probably where the name Panthers comes from, from Pantelic.  And

 3     that's how the fighting men were named.  It's a small unit that were set

 4     up before the VRS.  It's only 420 men, so it's not even a battalion, but

 5     they call themselves a brigade to seek popularity.  And it says that from

 6     the beginning of the war he said -- it says they had 80 wounded and

 7     20 dead.  And that brigade commander was later succeeded by Mauzer.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Let's return now to the Supreme Defence Council

 9     minutes.

10             MR. JORDASH:  1D3595.  Page 20 -- sorry, page 18 of the English

11     and 22 of the B/C/S.

12        Q.   I'm interested in what Pavle Bulatovic, federal minister of the

13     interior, has to say concerning Ivanovic.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Could we move, in English, to the next page because

15     I finished those two lines by now.

16             MR. JORDASH:

17        Q.   Please indicate when you finish the page, Mr. Milovanovic.

18        A.   I've just finished reading this page.

19             MR. JORDASH:  Let's go to the next page of the B/C/S, please.

20        Q.   And read down to where Pavle Bulatovic picks up on what

21     Zivota Panic has said.

22        A.   I've reached the reference to Momir Bulatovic.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Now, as we can see from this entry, there's obviously

24     a discussion about Ivanovic.  And it appears that Bulatovic is

25     essentially accusing the army, Panic, of arming Ivanovic from the

Page 15414

 1     Fourth of July Barracks and he's making that allegation on the basis that

 2     Ivanovic had been, it seems, reported to have said he had been equipped

 3     in the Fourth of July Barracks.  Are you able to explain just very

 4     briefly your understanding of the Fourth of July Barracks, what it was at

 5     this point in time, August of 1992?

 6        A.   The action is taking place in the territory of Serbia,

 7     Montenegro, and Kosovo.  Republika Srpska has nothing to do with it.

 8     It's their mutual settlement of accounts and accusations.  Bulatovic it

 9     blaming the Army of Yugoslavia that they had equipped this group and

10     Panic is denying it.  So I can't play referee here.  I don't know whether

11     it's accurate or not.  I don't know this man Ivanovic.

12        Q.   I'm not asking you to play referee.  I'm asking you to explain

13     what the Fourth of July Barracks was as far as you're aware.  If you

14     don't know, you don't know; but if you can assist, that would be great.

15        A.   The Fourth of July Barracks is located in Belgrade.  It housed

16     mostly guards units from the garrison in Belgrade.

17        Q.   What is a guard unit?

18        A.   Guard units in every army, and also in the Army of Yugoslavia,

19     are units that provide direct security to the Supreme Command, to the

20     president of the state, the General Staff.  They're also parade units

21     used to -- for welcome ceremonies to foreign heads of state, et cetera.

22        Q.   And as seems to be suggested by Bulatovic, the

23     Fourth July Barracks contained logistics and weapons; is that correct?

24        A.   Every barracks where there are soldiers and COs and officers have

25     certain depots where equipment is stored, clothing, footwear, weapons,

Page 15415

 1     some ammunition, and Bulatovic is probably referring to the fact that

 2     those 1150 men in total were probably equipped from that depot, from the

 3     barracks.

 4             MR. JORDASH:  Can we go, please, to 65 ter 5596.

 5        Q.   Now, this is a Mladic notebook from November 1991 and it may be

 6     that you cannot comment, but I'm going to give it a try.

 7             MR. JORDASH:  Please could we have page -- page 362 of the

 8     English, 363 of the B/C/S, and 362 at the top of the page.

 9        Q.   And I wanted to see if you can -- this helps to clarify issues

10     relating to the Fourth of July Barracks.  It's a Mladic entry, J000-2740,

11     and at the top of the page of the English, and I'm interested in the

12     section which begins:

13             "Vuksan Milovic from the staff of the Serbian Guard in Belgrade

14     received approval of Lieutenant-General Simovic that they got the

15     Fourth of July Barracks in Belgrade, Backa Palanka, Novi Sad.  The Guard

16     will go there for training.  They are preparing 2.500 men who will join

17     us there -- join us here.  The Guards Staff will include 10 people -

18     officers which they will select - and 10 from the Serbian Republican

19     Staff of the TO.  I will be in contact with Major-General Vukovic."

20             And do you know anything about this, the arming and training of

21     the Serbian Guard force at the Fourth of July Barracks in Belgrade in

22     November 1991?

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Groome.

24             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, for the clarity of the record,

25     J000-2740 is P2929 in evidence.

Page 15416

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

 2             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know anything about this.

 4     At that time I was an operative officer at the command in Skopje.

 5             MR. JORDASH:

 6        Q.   You do know who the Serbian Guard were though, don't you?

 7        A.   I don't know.  I only know what I saw on TV, like any other

 8     citizen, that some paramilitary units were coming into existence.  I was

 9     engaged at that time as an operative in charge of Kosovo and Macedonia,

10     and I know that some sort of paramilitary appeared at Skopska Gora in

11     Macedonia, but I believe they left very soon afterwards and they were

12     not, I believe, related to the Fourth of July Barracks.  It was some sort

13     of popular party from Sremska Mitrovica ran by some man Jovic who had

14     formed six detachments bearing some traditional Serbian name such as

15     Sindjelic.  They tried to penetrate into Macedonia.  But I simply don't

16     know anything about the Fourth of July Barracks.

17        Q.   Okay.  Fair enough.  Let's move on then.

18             MR. JORDASH:  Sorry, could I just have a moment.  Can we go back,

19     please, to 65 ter 50-- sorry, 5063.  And page 253 of the English, 247 of

20     the B/C/S, and 246 at the top -- at the top of the page.

21        Q.   Now, I'm interested in the entry which begins -- sorry, you don't

22     have yours yet, but as that's coming up, I'm interested in the entry that

23     begins:  "Samac, 7th of December, 1992, Monday, 950 hours."

24             MR. JORDASH:  And if we go over the page with the English to

25     page 254 of the English and 248, I think, of the B/C/S, I hope.

Page 15417

 1        Q.   And we're talking about a meeting with the leadership of the

 2     Samac municipality.  And Dr. Simic, president of the municipality, is

 3     present.

 4             MR. JORDASH:  And if we can move to page 256 of the English and

 5     249 of the B/C/S.

 6        Q.   Are we there, Mr. Milovanovic, in the original, where it begins:

 7     "Stevan Todorovic, SJB chief"?

 8        A.   No, I have page 249, the meeting with representatives from

 9     Banja Luka.

10        Q.   There isn't a number on the top of the page, that might be what's

11     difficult.  But it should be, I think, 248.  Or strangely on my copy it's

12     between 247 and 248.

13        A.   Now I'm looking at 231.

14             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, if I may assist, the record is saying

15     5063 and I have found it under 65 ter 5603.  That could be the cause of

16     the confusion.

17             MR. JORDASH:  Yes, my mistake.  I beg your pardon, 5603.  I do

18     apologise to Madam Usher.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  This is 5603, Your Honours.

20             MR. JORDASH:  Oh, it is.

21                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, I suggest that you move on to a page

23     which is known to you.  And would you please take care that your

24     apologies only will not already take a considerable time in court.

25             MR. JORDASH:  I'm not sure I did anything wrong there.  I gave

Page 15418

 1     the numbers that I had, which are the right numbers.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  But what's then --

 3             MR. JORDASH:  Well, I don't know what the B/C/S original page

 4     number is, but I've given what the indication I --

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  You have to take care that you know the English page

 6     numbers and the B/C/S page numbers.  It's always possible -- if they're

 7     okay now, then of course there's no problem.  But it could well be, let

 8     me have a look ... Is there any way that "Stevan Todorovic" appears at

 9     the very end of this page, chief of the SJB?  At least it looks, more or

10     less.  And also the date of the 18th of April, 1992, seems to be

11     corresponding.  I'm -- it's your exhibit, it's your witness, but that

12     seems to be.

13             MR. JORDASH:  But that's the page numbers I've given, yeah.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  So that's correct now.  So then put your

15     question.  We have now -- at least I have a English page and a B/C/S page

16     which are corresponding.  So why not ask a question?

17             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you.

18        Q.   Would you read the entry "Stevan Todorovic," please,

19     Mr. Milovanovic.  Have you read it?

20        A.   You want me to read this?

21        Q.   Yeah, I'm putting my question as soon as I can, so please read

22     that.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  This is, of course, half an entry because it stops

24     in the middle of a line.  I don't know whether you want us, whether in

25     B/C/S or in English, to read the whole of that line, but --

Page 15419

 1             MR. JORDASH:  Well, I'd like him to read the entry, I'd like

 2     everyone to read the entry, then we'll go over the page to finish off

 3     that entry, if we can.

 4        Q.   Are you there, Mr. Milovanovic?  We can then move to the next

 5     page.

 6        A.   Yes.  I've read the entire page, yes.

 7        Q.   Just for the avoidance of doubt, I'm interested in what Todorovic

 8     is saying about the sending of men to Ilok for training and what happens

 9     to them subsequently.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Could we now also, for the benefit of witness,

11     enlarge the top portion of the left page.  A little bit more perhaps.

12     Yes.

13             MR. JORDASH:  For the record:  J000-4672.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've come up to the 19th of May and

15     Colonel Stevan Nikolic who says that he has to go to Belgrade, which

16     means that I've read everything concerning Todorovic.

17             MR. JORDASH:

18        Q.   Did you know about these men being sent by Colonel Jeremic and

19     General Bulic to Ilok for training?

20        A.   I didn't know that.  That was in April 1992 when I was still in

21     Nis.  And I can see here the name Todorovic.  I knew him, I spoke to him

22     several times on the phone.  Stevan Todorovic had two nicknames, Steve

23     and Crni.  Here he only brags that he sent some people for training in

24     Ilok, in Srem, which means that he sent them outside of the

25     Republika Srpska territory.

Page 15420

 1        Q.   Were you aware of a special battalion that had been formed under

 2     the command of Crni and then subordinated to Colonel Nikolic in

 3     operations in Sanski Samac?

 4        A.   I didn't know that.

 5        Q.   Did you know a Colonel Nikolic?

 6        A.   No, I did not.

 7        Q.   Okay.  Let's move on then.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Just for my information, Mr. Milovanovic, in the

 9     portion we just read we see that Dragan Djordjevic is -- has as a

10     nickname or is also known as Crni, and the same would be true for

11     Todorovic, they would both have the same nickname?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

14             MR. JORDASH:  On that subject, could we please go to 65 ter 5600,

15     please.

16        Q.   And page 377 at the top, please.  And you see the entry there -

17     this is J000-3551 - the entry which begins with:

18             "Divjak, his nickname is Crni, there are six of them with the

19     same nickname, three are stealing in order to discredit me."

20             Was Crni a common name?  Is it a common name?  Or was it a common

21     nickname, I should say, during the conflict?

22        A.   Those people were self-styled Crni.  That's the nickname six of

23     them adopted, because Crni amongst Serbs is a synonym for something

24     terrible and terrifying.  And the Crni that we spoke about yesterday was

25     from Belica.  He moved from Herzegovina.  Wherever there were problems

Page 15421

 1     amongst civilian authorities, where it was easy to loot and amass riches,

 2     he appeared there.  He got in touch with those who were of the same

 3     problematic behaviour.  As I was reading this, I found the materials in

 4     the notebook, and in brackets there is the name and the family name of

 5     that Crni from Belica.  That's the same man who had been in Mladic's

 6     office and Mladic sent him to me.  Everything that he was saying was

 7     aimed at preventing his detention, because he had killed a man, but his

 8     story was that he had killed that man in order to protect the corps

 9     commander or something to that effect.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Milovanovic, before we go through the details of

11     the behaviour of every Crni in the former Yugoslavia, I do understand

12     that Crni was a nickname which was used with some frequency and referred

13     to something terrible.

14             That's, I think, was the question, isn't it, Mr. Jordash?

15             MR. JORDASH:  Your Honour, yes.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  That question has been answered.  Next question,

17     please.

18             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you.

19        Q.   I want to return to something we touched on yesterday,

20     Mr. Milovanovic, because I think it's fair to give you an opportunity to

21     respond.

22             MR. JORDASH:  Could we have P386 on the screen, please.  This is

23     the combat readiness and activities of the Army of Republika Srpska in

24     1992 analysis, dated April 1993.  And I'm interested in page 61 of the

25     English and 55 of the B/C/S.

Page 15422

 1        Q.   And as we can see we're dealing with a section of the report

 2     which is looking back at the training within -- training and education

 3     within the VRS.  And I think we can start off with - if you could find in

 4     the text - "The Main Problems That Arose Were," then we can lead off from

 5     there.

 6        A.   I've read about the main problems that arose in training.

 7        Q.   And do you see the section --

 8             MR. JORDASH:  Perhaps we need to go to B/C/S page 56 and

 9     English 62.

10        Q.   -- where it says:

11             "After these initial problems which occurred in most of our

12     units, the consequences of which were a large number of killed and

13     wounded officers and men in the unit, measures were taken in most units

14     to improve training and retrain the men and the officers."?

15        A.   And your question is?

16        Q.   Well, let's just go to one more reference, if you wouldn't mind.

17             MR. JORDASH:  Page 64 of the English and B/C/S page 58.

18        Q.   And it's under C, "The Training of Critical Skills," and you'll

19     see, in the English at least, it's about seven or more like ten lines

20     down, where it says:

21             "Lack of training is the main reason for the large number of dead

22     and wounded."

23             Do you see that?

24        A.   I have read the first paragraph.

25        Q.   So do you accept -- do you accept that training was problematic

Page 15423

 1     and did lead -- the lack of training did lead to an increased number of

 2     dead and wounded in 1992 at least?

 3        A.   I have a three-and-a-half-year long war experience, which tells

 4     me that out of the number of dead 80 per cent were due to a human

 5     mistake.  I don't want to teach you about the international standards of

 6     human losses, which is 8 per cent by the way.  The Army of

 7     Republika Srpska suffered total losses of between 7 and 8 per cent.  And

 8     when I said that 80 per cent of men are killed due to human mistake, I

 9     primarily meant a lack of training.  An officer cannot help a soldier to

10     shelter, to target well, to shoot well.

11             On the previous page we could read how people were recruited into

12     the JNA.  They were of different ethnic groups.  Serbs were mostly

13     recruited as infantry men, as quartermasters, men as drivers.  When the

14     war started, we had artillery tanks, aeroplanes, all sorts of things, and

15     we had to retrain our -- those infantry men for various specialties.  One

16     of the main causes of loss in the Army of Republika Srpska was the lack

17     of training.

18             The time was really short.  As I told you yesterday, the first

19     eight months of training meant that we did not use young recruits in

20     combat.  However, we inherited a large contingent of military conscripts

21     aged between 23, which is the age when they were no longer under the

22     obligation to serve in the army, until the age of 55.  When they served

23     in the army, they were trained on obsolete weapons.  In the meantime the

24     weapons were modernised and they didn't know how to use them.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Groome, is there a lot of dispute about that; if

Page 15424

 1     people are badly trained and the circumstances may not have allowed for

 2     such perfect training, that this would have a negative impact on

 3     casualties and wounded?

 4             MR. GROOME:  No, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, the document apparently says that this

 6     was the situation.

 7             MR. JORDASH:  No, I was just getting to the real point.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  Let's get to the real point.

 9             MR. JORDASH:  If we go to page 61 of the B/C/S and 68 of the

10     English, there's a section there which deals with final recommendations

11     concerning what should happen in 1993.

12        Q.   And the first entry concerning what should be done is that the

13     Main Staff of the RS and the air force and the anti-aircraft defence must

14     devote greater attention to material training resources and teaching

15     aids, and the first entry is:

16             "The maintenance and guarding of training-grounds, drill grounds,

17     and durable and expendable teaching supplies."

18             Now, my question is -- do you have that, Mr. Milovanovic?

19        A.   Yes, I do.

20        Q.   My question is - and it's not a criticism, it's just a question:

21     Why was it that the VRS didn't open more training-grounds to deal with

22     this deficit?

23        A.   We didn't have money.  We used the training-grounds in Manjaca

24     and Kalinovik that we inherited from the JNA.

25        Q.   Is there any reason why you didn't call on assistance from

Page 15425

 1     Serbia, from the FRY, to assist you with training?

 2        A.   The FRY accepted to train officers and non-commissioned officers

 3     following the regular peacetime curriculum, which means that their

 4     training lasted for four years.  That's why we had to establish our own

 5     training centres to train our own officers and non-commissioned officers

 6     in the duration of six months and one year respectively.

 7        Q.   So apart from this assistance in training officers and

 8     non-commissioned officer, you, the VRS, did not receive assistance from

 9     the FRY in terms of training recruits or non-officers; is that right, as

10     far as you are aware?

11        A.   We did not ask for that kind of assistance because the FRY was

12     not supposed to be involved in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the first

13     place.  We did not want the FRY to be a warring party in Bosnia and

14     Herzegovina in the same way the Republic of Croatia was.

15        Q.   And just -- we'll come back to this shortly, but it was noted -

16     and we can turn to it if we need to - in this combat report that there

17     was good -- your assessment, the VRS assessment in April of 1993 was that

18     in 1992 there had been good co-operation between the military

19     intelligence services but in terms of co-operation between the VRS

20     intelligence service and the Serbian MUP intelligence service, that

21     co-operation was unsatisfactory in 1992; can you confirm that?

22        A.   I'm afraid I didn't understand your question, especially within

23     the MUP context.  What MUP did you have in mind?  Who did not co-operate

24     with whom?

25        Q.   Let me --

Page 15426

 1             MR. JORDASH:  Your Honour, I note the time.  I can find the exact

 2     piece of text I'm looking for in the meantime.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then perhaps we take a break first.  But could

 4     I seek some clarification of one of the last answers.

 5             You said, Mr. Milovanovic:  "The FRY accepted to train officers

 6     and non-commissioned officers following the regular peacetime curriculum,

 7     which means that their training lasted for four years."  Does this mean

 8     that this offer could not be accepted because it would have taken too

 9     much time anyhow to have them trained in that way?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We accepted the offer and we did

11     sends our candidates for officers and non-commissioned officers for

12     training, but we had to wait for them to come back.  The war had to stop,

13     and we were sure that we would win and that the VRS would continue

14     functioning and we would certainly benefit from those officers.  But we

15     couldn't wait for the cycle to be over.  We lost 17.400 men in combat.

16     38 per cent, 6.600 of them, were officers and non-commissioned officers.

17     I'm again repeating that the world norm is 8 per cent losses of the

18     overall loss and we suffered 38 per cent losses among our officer staff.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Whether it was reasonable or not reasonable what you

20     did and whether you had good reasons to do so is a different matter.  I

21     just asked on whether it was -- the offer was accepted.  I do, therefore,

22     understand that part of those to be trained as officers and

23     non-commissioned officers were not available because they were being

24     trained by the FRY.  Is that well understood?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's correct, yes.


Page 15427

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  We take a break.  And we resume at ten minutes to

 2     11.00

 3                           --- Recess taken at 10.23 a.m.

 4                           --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Before we continue:  Mr. Jordash, you received

 6     instructions from the Registry what you should provide in order to be

 7     sure that the documents you would like to have on the screen would be on

 8     the screen.  Now, I do understand that you say you can't do that and that

 9     you're referring to page numbers at the top of the page handwritten.

10     Let's make one thing perfectly clear.  Whatever is handwritten in a

11     document or typed in a document or whatever is content of the document.

12     For a document to be on the screen, you can't start searching in the

13     content of a document.  You need the e-court pages, references, what is

14     the document, what are the ...

15             Now, I do understand that although the Registry has again tried

16     again and again to assist you in this matter, if you say, "I can't give

17     you those references," you are missing an opportunity to put a document

18     to a witness.  It's not just a matter of saying, "We need in this

19     document, which is 300 pages, we need a page which at the top there's a

20     handwritten reference of ..." especially if they are not in sequential

21     order.  So the Registry will still try to assist you, but if you don't

22     come up with the e-court data needed in order to call them on the screen,

23     the consequence simply is that you don't have the document there to put

24     to the witness.

25             MR. JORDASH:  The problem is that I didn't want to and didn't

Page 15428

 1     plan to work from the original.  That was Mr. Groome's idea.  That idea

 2     was adopted --

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  But --

 4             MR. JORDASH:  -- by the Chamber yesterday.  We finished court at

 5     7.00.  With the best will in the world we couldn't go through the whole

 6     of the diaries and find the page numbers overnight.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  If you say, I could do that -- again, Mr. Jordash,

 8     you're explaining to me what is problematic.  What you should do is to

 9     say, "I could solve the problem if you would allow me to go back to the

10     non-handwritten originals, but only to the B/C/S version," then we would

11     consider that and we would avoid the chaos.  I think, as a matter of

12     fact, that there was never a ruling of the Chamber on that.  What we

13     suggested was to have them both on the screen so that -- and that was a

14     suggestion.  That was not an order.  If you would have said, "But this

15     causes us problems, in giving the Registry the right information to get

16     them on the screen," we would have considered that.

17             MR. JORDASH:  But yesterday there didn't seem to be a problem, so

18     I didn't think about this overnight because we didn't seem to have a

19     problem.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, we had problems today.  And I do agree with

21     you that yesterday, where the Registry did it's utmost best to assist

22     you, that -- and they're still willing to do that, but if we end up --

23     and let's not forget that this morning we had a problem which was just

24     bad preparation.  If you do not know that the B/C/S is found on page 22

25     and we start looking through page 18 and 19 for three or four minutes,

Page 15429

 1     that's, of course, a waste of time.  And that's a matter that in a well

 2     organised preparation of the Defence should have been dealt with.  And

 3     it's not the first.  And, again, I'm not going to -- I'm really solution

 4     oriented, but the only thing I want to say is that if you want a document

 5     on the screen and if you say -- and I should not talk too quickly.  If

 6     you say, "I can do it but unfortunately not on the handwritten ones,"

 7     then you could have gone to Mr. Groome, you could have told him that

 8     until now at no point in time reference was made to asterisks or to

 9     specific matters in the handwriting.

10             We all, if we wish to, can have the originals on our screen.  The

11     only thing is then that the witness doesn't see it.  But any party seeing

12     any particulars on the handwritten version - and you have your computers

13     available to follow it, and Mr. Groome also has - then can say, "I would

14     like this page now to be shown, it's found on e-court page 256."  Let's

15     try to always find ways to resolve existing problems.

16             Mr. Groome, you are on your feet.

17             MR. GROOME:  Just two thing briefly, Your Honour.  If it would

18     avoid confusion, I think it may be enough just to inform

19     General Milovanovic that any time he wishes to see the original, if that

20     would assist him, that's available.  And secondly, the Prosecution has

21     been preparing a table which I will tender tomorrow which is simply the

22     reference, the J number, the transcript page reference number, and

23     hopefully the Chamber will admit that and that should allow at least a

24     clear record of what specific entries have been discussed in

25     cross-examination.

Page 15430

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now, that's what we need on the record.  But

 2     our first concern was how to get documents on the screen the Defence

 3     wishes to have on the screen.

 4             Mr. Jordash, has the guidance been sufficient?  If you say

 5     alternative ways will avoid a waste of time, then we would seriously

 6     consider to proceed in that way.

 7             MR. JORDASH:  Well, the page numbers I have, and I'm now

 8     confused, the page numbers I have are the ones which I've been

 9     indicating, which are the B/C/S and the English and the top of the page.

10     They're the only page numbers I have --

11             JUDGE ORIE:  No, but there --

12             MR. JORDASH:  -- and there's nothing I can do to rectify that at

13     this point in time.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  But you had prepared, before, isn't it?  Before the

15     witness came.

16             MR. JORDASH:  Yes, with those page numbers, the ones --

17             JUDGE ORIE:  The handwritten page numbers at the top of the

18     pages?  Mr. Jordash, we need e-court numbers.  And if they are the same,

19     fine.

20             MR. JORDASH:  Yes, that's right.  I've been saying the e-court

21     numbers for the typed copies.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  For the typed copies.  And there, apparently,

23     seems to be the problem, that Mr. Groome had suggested to use the

24     handwritten version, and that now apparently causes the problems in

25     calling the documents on the screen.  And if this resolves it, then I

Page 15431

 1     think Mr. Groome already said, Okay, let's then, if that resolves the

 2     problem, Mr. Milovanovic is hereby informed that whenever he would like

 3     to look at the handwritten version, that it is available but that we

 4     start working from the transcribed original.

 5             Now, Mr. Jordash, from now on, if you are talking about the

 6     B/C/S, you are talking about the B/C/S typewritten transcript.

 7             MR. JORDASH:  Yes.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  So that's that version of the original.

 9             Madam Registrar, does that give sufficient guidance if you get

10     the e-court numbers?

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Not exactly.  I would need the number of the

12     document among three or five documents that are uploaded under the same

13     65 ter number.  So which two documents are you using and which pages on

14     each document.

15             MR. JORDASH:  So if I give the ERN number, does that assist?

16             THE REGISTRAR:  For example, doc ID.  So, yeah.  Doc ID for --

17     you give me first 65 ter number, I open the document, there are five

18     documents uploaded under this number.  So I need, for B/C/S, this doc ID;

19     English, this doc ID.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  I do understand that for Madam Registrar part of the

21     problem is that documents are uploaded, are re-uploaded, sometimes are

22     already admitted into evidence, so therefore that ... but, let's get

23     started and let's see whether it works.  And if not, Mr. Jordash, you're

24     invited to discuss the matter with Madam Registrar.

25             MR. JORDASH:  Okay.  Let's get back to --


Page 15432

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Milovanovic, you were witnessing, as a witness,

 2     a procedural discussion which we hope to leave behind us at this moment.

 3     Mr. Jordash will now continue.

 4             MR. JORDASH:  Let's return to P386, which is the combat readiness

 5     and activities of the Army of the RS in 1992.  And, please, could we have

 6     on the screen page 83 of the English and 74 of the B/C/S.  And we are

 7     looking at the section dealing with intelligence and security support.

 8     And this part is 5.1, intelligence support.  And if we can then turn to

 9     page 85 of the English and 76 of the B/C/S, please.

10        Q.   And the paragraph I'm interested in begins:

11             "Co-operation and exchange of data with related services in the

12     territory of RS is generally satisfactory, as well as with the Main Staff

13     of the SVRSK.  Of late, co-operation has also been intensified with the

14     intelligence and security organs of the Army of Yugoslavia, while with

15     the Ministry of the Interior, the Republic of Serbia, it is still at an

16     unsatisfactory level."

17             MR. JORDASH:  Then if we can move, for completeness, to page 90

18     of the English and 80 of the B/C/S, dealing with security as opposed to

19     intelligence.

20        Q.   Paragraph 10:

21             "Co-operation with related services in the territories of the RS,

22     the RSK and the FR Yugoslavia grew in proportion to the development of

23     the intelligence security system of the Army of RS and the MUP of RS.  We

24     consider the co-operation with related services in the Serbian army, the

25     RS Krajina, and the National Security Service of Republika Srpska until

Page 15433

 1     now to have been very good, professional, and untrammelled by any

 2     subjective obstacles.  Our co-operation with the MUP of Republika Srpska

 3     and especially with the MUP of the Republic of Serbia and of the

 4     FR Yugoslavia we consider to have been unsatisfactory.  The main cause

 5     being, in our opinion, the passivity of the organs mentioned and their

 6     reluctance to expand co-operation with us."

 7             Do you have that?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Is that your view?  Was that your view?

10        A.   The analysis of combat readiness was prepared in seven segments.

11     The one we looked at before was training and education, that's my segment

12     as Chief of Staff.  This security and intelligence segment was prepared

13     by the security and intelligence sector, that is General Tolimir.  I see

14     here two problems that Tolimir pointed out in this analysis.  The first

15     problem is the mutual co-operation of intelligence services in the

16     environment.  Under the law, intelligence services of friendly countries

17     are required to co-operate.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Milovanovic, the first question is - I do now

19     understand that this part was not authored by you or not prepared by you:

20     Is your view different from the one which is written down here?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My position is consistent with what

22     is written here.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  That answers the question, I take it,

24     Mr. Jordash.

25             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you.

Page 15434

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

 2             MR. JORDASH:

 3        Q.   Was this lack of co-operation a discussion amongst the Main Staff

 4     and the meetings that were held amongst the Main Staff?

 5        A.   Yes.  Before the analysis we read the whole analysis together and

 6     that was an opportunity for people to make remarks to others, if they had

 7     any.

 8        Q.   But had General Tolimir raised this issue prior to the

 9     compilation of this report during a Main Staff meeting?  Had he come, for

10     example, and said, this is the issue, I'm reporting to you, reporting to

11     Mladic, this is the situation with the problems of co-operation with the

12     Serbian intelligence, civil intelligence service, the DB?

13        A.   Yes, that was a continuous topic.  And this is an analysis of the

14     annual performance of the VRS citing both good and bad things.

15        Q.   And was there any indication during these discussions or at the

16     time this report was compiled which touched upon the reasons why the

17     Serbian DB was passive in relation to anticipated or hoped-for

18     co-operation?

19        A.   This is about co-operation with the Ministry of the Interior, not

20     with the state security.

21        Q.   But the Ministry of the Interior's intelligence service was the

22     State Security of Serbia, wasn't it?

23        A.   Probably.  I'm not so conversant with the structure of security

24     in Serbia.  But our intelligence service was required to co-operate with

25     our Ministry of the Interior, that means the MUP of Republika Srpska.

Page 15435

 1     The army was not required to co-operate with the Ministry of the Interior

 2     of Serbia or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  We were required to

 3     co-operate with the intelligence service of the General Staff of

 4     Yugoslavia.

 5        Q.   Okay.  Fair enough.  In terms of co-operation with the

 6     Serbian MUP in relation to other issues other than intelligence issues,

 7     was that a discussion at the Main Staff?

 8        A.   It was discussed and Tolimir was always directed to co-operate

 9     with the MUP of Serbia and to have this co-operation through the

10     General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia.

11        Q.   Now, we're talking about this combat readiness report dated

12     April of 1993.  Am I correct that Stanisic was not a subject for

13     discussion at the Main Staff, Stanisic's co-operation with the VRS, for

14     example?  That wasn't something that was discussed.

15        A.   In my last testimony I was directed by the president of the

16     Trial Chamber to study 54 reports by Tolimir, intelligence briefs that he

17     prepared and sent to various addresses.  And he regularly wrote to them

18     that he sent them also to Jovica Stanisic, which he was not required to

19     do; and to me, although we were only two metres away from each other;

20     General Djukic, the minister - can somebody help me? it was not Sokolovic

21     at the time, it was somebody else - the Ministry of Internal Affairs of

22     Serbia, which he didn't have to do.

23             And I also wrote a manuscript to the Trial Chamber explaining

24     that Tolimir was doing that irregularly and unlawfully, aiming to present

25     himself as co-operating with various institutions in the Balkans.  His

Page 15436

 1     name -- Stanisic's name was used irregularly, and I'm apologizing to him

 2     now that he was involved in something where he didn't belong.  Tolimir

 3     just put him of his own accord on his mailing list.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  The question was whether Mr. Stanisic, and

 5     Mr. Stanisic's co-operation with the VRS, whether that was something

 6     discussed at meetings of the Main Staff.  That was the question.  Was it

 7     or was it not?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was never any discussion

 9     about Jovica Stanisic as chief of the State Security of Serbia.

10             MR. JORDASH:

11        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Stanisic first appears in the diary -- sorry, in

12     the notebooks on the 2nd of July, 1993.  So he doesn't appear in 1991 and

13     he doesn't appear in 1992, and neither is he mentioned.  Does that

14     surprise you, from your interaction with Mladic, your conversations with

15     him, and so on?

16        A.   It does not surprise me.  I don't know in what context Jovica

17     appeared on the 2nd of July, 1992.  I know that my first contact with him

18     was on the 22nd or 23rd January, 1993, at Mount Tara in the

19     Panorama Hotel.

20        Q.   Sorry, just to be clear:  He appears in the diary for the first

21     time on the 2nd of July, 1993.  And just so you understand the situation,

22     his telephone number doesn't appear in the diaries from 1991 to 1995, the

23     notebooks.  Does that surprise you?

24        A.   Whose notes?

25        Q.   Mladic's notes.  Which contain, for your information, tens and

Page 15437

 1     tens and tens of other telephone numbers.

 2        A.   You've got me confused now.  In my last testimony, between two

 3     breaks we discussed some meeting recorded in Mladic's diary, a meeting in

 4     Slavonia, and the dilemma was whether Mladic is -- Mladic was talking to

 5     Stanisic or he was writing down what Stanisic was saying at that meeting,

 6     and we concluded in the end that Mladic was writing down Stanisic's

 7     words.  Because what was written there was that Stanisic had informed the

 8     meeting that he had sent some eight men to Tenja.  Tenja being a place in

 9     Slavonia.  So I don't think it's a correct version that Stanisic's name

10     was not mentioned in 1991 and 1992.  And you also added throughout the

11     war.

12        Q.   Sorry, I think you've misunderstood the point I was making or

13     asking you about.  What I was suggesting was that Stanisic's telephone

14     number doesn't appear in the notebooks and I was asking you whether that

15     is a surprise to you.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, isn't it true that you asked two

17     questions?  The first whether it was a surprise that Mr. Stanisic appears

18     only in the 2nd of July, 1993, and the second is whether it's a surprise

19     that the telephone number of Mr. Stanisic ... So I think the witness

20     commented on the first question.  And then to say that he didn't

21     understand the question, because you put both questions to him, isn't it?

22             MR. JORDASH:  I didn't put both questions.  I confirmed and

23     corrected the witness's understanding about the 2nd of July, 1992, and

24     then I moved on to the second question.  But if it was confusing, then I

25     apologise.

Page 15438

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  But then it's unclear to me what the answer is to

 2     the first question.  But if you move on, then --

 3             MR. JORDASH:  I'll move on, Your Honour.

 4        Q.   Let's go to the 2nd of July, 1993, meeting which Mr. Stanisic

 5     attended.  Before we do that, though, let me ask you something.  At any

 6     point in time are you aware of any centre established by the MUP of

 7     Serbia in Pale in 1993 or 1994 or 1995, a centre for supplies?

 8        A.   I'm not aware of that.

 9        Q.   And the same question in relation to Herzegovina.

10        A.   I'm not aware of Herzegovina either.

11        Q.   Do you know a place called Talic in Bosnia, which was within, or

12     might have been within, VRS territory?

13        A.   I know the last name Talic, such as General Momir Talic, but I'm

14     not aware of that place.

15        Q.   Thank you.  So it follows that you're not aware of any centre for

16     supplies in any place called Talic, which, I am in agreement with you,

17     we've not been able to find it on the map.

18             MR. JORDASH:  Let's turn to -- let's go to P5 -- sorry, P2529.

19     English page 1, B/C/S page 1.

20        Q.   This is the meeting Mr. Stanisic attended, and agrees he

21     attended, on 2nd of July, 1993.  Just take a moment to read this.

22        A.   I've read it up to number 1.

23        Q.   Keep going then until we get to what Stanisic is alleged to have

24     said.

25             MR. JORDASH:  Perhaps on the English we can go to the next page.

Page 15439

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I need it in B/C/S as well.

 2             MR. JORDASH:  Next page then, please.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't see Stanisic's name on this

 4     page.  I see Sainovic.

 5             MR. JORDASH:  Go one more page then in the B/C/S.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I now see Stanisic's name after

 7     Sainovic's.

 8             MR. JORDASH:

 9        Q.   And it should say:

10             "The majority of what we need should be issued by the MUP of

11     Serbia.  The centres should be Pale, Herzegovina, and Talic."

12             JUDGE ORIE:  I think we are now two pages ahead.

13             MR. JORDASH:  Perhaps we can --

14             JUDGE ORIE:  When the witness said he didn't see any page, we had

15     moved to the third page of this document, and there he doesn't appear,

16     and then the next page.

17             MR. JORDASH:  I have the B/C/S pages in the typed copy but not in

18     this handwritten.  Apparently they are the same though.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I now see the first page.  "The

20     majority of what we need should be issued via the MUP of Serbia.  The

21     centres should be Pale, Herzegovina, and Talic."

22             MR. JORDASH:

23        Q.   Does that make any sense whatsoever to you?

24        A.   This doesn't make any sense.  I told you that I don't know

25     anything about the existence of this centre at Pale, Herzegovina.  I also

Page 15440

 1     don't know that man Talic.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Then we're in agreement on that issue.  The meeting

 3     begins, as we can see, with President Sainovic introducing -- or

 4     somebody, probably Sainovic, introducing Badza and Stanisic and Sainovic

 5     as the men who carry out things.  Does it follow from what you've said so

 6     far in your testimony that from your military experience in 1992 up until

 7     this point Stanisic wasn't, for you, a man who carried out things for the

 8     VRS or played a role in the military operations that you were conducting?

 9        A.   No.

10        Q.   Now, we see there at page 3 of the English and 3 of the B/C/S

11     that Mladic takes Sainovic's telephone number but he doesn't appear to

12     take Stanisic's or Badza's.  Were you aware that Mladic had taken a

13     number and then was in touch with Sainovic directly from this point

14     onwards, or is that not something you can testify to?

15        A.   I can't confirm that.  I never read Mladic's notes unless he

16     himself opened the notebook and read to me something that I, according to

17     him, needed to know.

18        Q.   Fair enough.  If we then read towards the end of this entry,

19     there is a discussion, it seems, about a group called the Black Hand and

20     Lukic.  Could you confirm that in July of 1993 there was a good deal of

21     governmental concern from Serbia about the behaviour of Lukic and that

22     concern led to demands to the VRS, to Mladic, to arrest him and have him

23     dealt with?  Can you confirm that?

24        A.   I can't because I learned of Lukic and the Black Hand only when

25     the indictment was issued against Lukic.

Page 15441

 1        Q.   Fair enough.  Let's go to the next meeting Stanisic is present

 2     at, on the 8th of July, 1993, meeting with Milosevic.

 3             MR. JORDASH:  It's P2530.  And if you would turn to page --  can

 4     we turn, please, to page 5 of the English and 5 of the B/C/S, where

 5     Stanisic is said to be speaking.

 6        Q.   And Stanisic is said to say:

 7             "Our assessments have not been checked thoroughly, some might be

 8     angered.  Our assessment about the situation and the VRS and the RS are

 9     not as they should be in view of our position.  Some commanders can

10     jeopardise the system in Serbia - some can act as paramilitaries."

11             Are you able to confirm that at this point in time Stanisic was

12     complaining about men who were subordinated to the VRS in Bosnia

13     returning to Serbia and acting as paramilitaries?

14        A.   I can't confirm this because I did not attend that meeting.  I

15     only realised all that here in the courtroom as I'm reading notes in the

16     notebook.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             MR. JORDASH:  Let's go to page 6 of -- no, let's go to page 5 --

19     let's stay with page 5.

20        Q.   Just if we could look at the original and see if you are able to

21     say anything about whether the comment under "Weaknesses" can be

22     attributed to Stanisic according to any indication you can see on the

23     document, i.e., are there any signs which enable you to say that?

24        A.   No comment.  I only saw the text yesterday evening and I'm

25     looking at it now again.  I underline that I did not attend that meeting,

Page 15442

 1     so I am in no position to know what the atmosphere was like.

 2        Q.   Okay.  Let's go to the next page because there's a particular

 3     point I'm interested in having you have a look at.  Stanisic is said to

 4     have said, or perhaps that might be one inference from this document:

 5             "That we, from Serbia, take over the financing of the MUP as

 6     well.  That, with the assistance of the police, we helped Generals Mladic

 7     and Novakovic achieve goals."

 8             Do you see that?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   Perhaps you know, perhaps you don't; are you able to confirm that

11     the Serbian MUP did not, as this comment suggests, finance the

12     Bosnian Serb MUP?

13        A.   All I know is that the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia

14     financed about seven and a half thousand of officers of the Army of

15     Republika Srpska and it committed to finance 50.000 soldiers.  The latter

16     never came through.  I don't know that the MUP of Serbia financed the MUP

17     of Republika Srpska.  I personally don't think that that was the case,

18     but I'm not sure.

19        Q.   Why do you think that wasn't the case?

20        A.   Because I know what hardships the MUP of Republika Srpska had to

21     go through.  They were as poor as the army.  This is not Stanisic's

22     decision.  This is just a proposal that we from Serbia should take over

23     the financing of both MUP organisations in order to help Mladic and

24     Novakovic.  Mladic and Novakovic were army commanders of Republika Srpska

25     and the Republic of Serbia Krajina respectively.  What Mr. Stanisic meant

Page 15443

 1     when he said that the financing of the MUP should be of assistance to the

 2     militaries, I don't know.  Maybe he just sought ways to relieve the

 3     government budget in that way.

 4        Q.   Thank you for the answer.

 5             MR. JORDASH:  Let's turn to the 14th of December, 1993.  And it's

 6     P2532.  Page 7 of the English and B/C/S.  And this is the fourth -- or I

 7     should say, it's the continuation of the fourth meeting that Stanisic

 8     attended.  And there's a mistake apparently in e-court.  The English has

 9     an extra page.  The last page in English is not there for the B/C/S in

10     e-court.

11        Q.   Before we turn to the portion I'm interested in, did you know a

12     man called Karasic?

13        A.   Yes.  He was the Chief of the General Staff of the Army of

14     Yugoslavia.  We were at school together.

15        Q.   Wasn't Karasic -- the Karasic that I'm interested in was a police

16     officer.  No?  Did you know somebody called Karasic who was a member of

17     the Bosnian Serb MUP?  Karisic [phoen].  Subordinated to Stupar during

18     operation Pancir-2.  That might help.

19        A.   I don't see the name of Karasic on this page.  All I see is the

20     name of Krajisnik towards the bottom of the page.  This may be a mistake

21     in translation.  I attended that meeting.  I don't remember that Karasic

22     attended it, and I know Karasic.

23        Q.   Sorry, so who was Karasic then?  Was he subordinated to Stupar

24     during Operation Pancir-2?

25        A.   He could not have been subordinated to Stupar.  Karasic was in

Page 15444

 1     the Republika Srpska MUP and he was responsible for those two brigades or

 2     Special Police Units or combat units of the police.

 3             MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Petrovic.

 5             MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] With your leave, on several

 6     occasions we have the name "Karasic" on the record, whereas the witness

 7     is actually talking about a person named "Karisik."  I believe that this

 8     is what the witness is saying.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  You want this to be verified.

10             The person you were describing, could you spell his last name.

11     That's the person responsible for the -- those two brigades or

12     Special Police Units, could you spell his last name.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] K-a-r-i-s-i-k.  I believe that his

14     name was Milenko, but I'm not sure.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Now, do you know a person by the name Karasic?  And

16     I'll spell that for you, K-a-r-a-s-i-c.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I don't.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Jordash.

19             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you, Your Honour.

20        Q.   The man in the Republika Srpska MUP responsible for the two

21     brigades or Special Police Units, who was he subordinated to?

22        A.   He was subordinated to the minister of the interior of

23     Republika Srpska.

24        Q.   Mico Stanisic?

25        A.   I don't know who it was at that time.  Mico Stanisic held that

Page 15445

 1     office twice and I think that that was his second time in office.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Let's have a look at this meeting on the

 3     14th of December, 1993.  Can we go -- you're present, it seems; is that

 4     right?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  The document says 13th.  Or is that a mistake,

 7     Mr. Jordash?

 8             MR. JORDASH:  I think the excerpt contained both the 13th and the

 9     14th, and the one I'm looking at --

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.

11             MR. JORDASH:  -- says the 14th, on the English at least.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  Yes.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That meeting started on the 13th

14     and ended on the 14th, which means that we continued working on the 14th.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             MR. JORDASH:  And if we go to page 8 in the English and the

17     B/C/S.

18        Q.   Now, am I correct that this was a meeting which had been called

19     by Milosevic?

20        A.   The meeting was chaired by Milosevic but the meeting was actually

21     called by Karadzic.  You can see that on the 13th Karadzic was the first

22     speaker.  He was the one who opened the meeting, and not Milosevic.

23        Q.   Well, I think if we go back to the 13th of December --

24             MR. JORDASH:  Let's go to page 1 of the English and 1 of the

25     B/C/S.

Page 15446

 1        Q.   -- we'll see that Stanisic apparently opens the meeting.  He

 2     doesn't say anything else during -- well, he says one other thing

 3     apparently, but he introduces the topic of the meeting.  Do you recall

 4     that or not?

 5        A.   The meeting was held in the state security building which is why

 6     Stanisic opened the meeting, as the host, the head of that institution.

 7     And Karadzic's was actually the keynote address.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             MR. JORDASH:  Now, let's go back to page 8 of the English and 8

10     of the B/C/S.

11        Q.   And according to the note Stanisic is supposed to have offered to

12     spare 120 men and Karisik.  Does that make any sense to you?

13        A.   It does not.  Stanisic could not offer Karisik to us because

14     Karisik was ours.  Maybe he meant that he could place the 120 men under

15     Karisik's command.  He says, We can spare 100 to 120 men and Karisik.  I

16     suppose that what he had in mind were Karisik's Special Forces.

17             MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

19             MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise.  It seems to me that

20     in the document itself there is a problem with translation.  It says we

21     can spare 100 to 100 [as interpreted] men together with Karisik.  I

22     believe that the English translation does not reflect the original as

23     well as it should.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, then we'll have to check, first of all, from

25     what it is translated into English, is it from the original handwritten

Page 15447

 1     version or is it from the transcribed version in B/C/S.  Apparently a

 2     matter to be verified.  If the parties could agree on there possibly

 3     being a mistake and agree on what it should be, then they are invited to

 4     report this to the Chamber.  If not, we'll have to ask a report from

 5     CLSS.

 6             Please proceed.

 7             MR. JORDASH:

 8        Q.   Do you have a recollection of Stanisic speaking at this meeting?

 9        A.   Yes.  I already stated that during my previous testimony.

10        Q.   Well, I've missed that.  Do you -- you recall him introducing the

11     meeting; do you recall that?

12        A.   Believe me, I don't.  That was my first arrival in Belgrade.  I

13     must have been a bit confused.  I really didn't understand why I was

14     invited to that meeting at all in view of the fact that the commander was

15     also there.

16        Q.   Do you recall him saying anything concerning Karisik or the

17     contents of what is written there underneath his name?

18        A.   I remember because the previous page reflects my discussion.

19     Because Karadzic wanted us to be on our own around Sarajevo.  Actually,

20     that's what I wanted.  I wanted us to act independently around Sarajevo.

21     I didn't want to -- the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to meddle.  And I

22     hoped that everybody would accept my proposal; however, Jovica said what

23     he did.

24        Q.   What did he say?

25        A.   He said that the MUP of Serbia can spare 100 to 120 men together

Page 15448

 1     with Karisik.  And I would add to that: that he probably meant together

 2     with Karisik's specials or his special units.

 3        Q.   And did that ever happen?

 4        A.   No, that never materialised.  Instead of Stanisic's 100 to

 5     120 men, the same number arrived from the 72nd Brigade of the corps of

 6     Special Forces of the Army of Yugoslavia.  And this happened unbeknownst

 7     to me or General Mladic.  Colonel Stupar took them directly to the

 8     commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  They were defeated, and then

 9     on the 28th of December I sent them packing.  And I returned then to

10     Belgrade.  They had had 13 dead, about 40 wounded, and 4 men had gone

11     missing and I don't think that they were ever found.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             MR. JORDASH:  May I just consult with my colleagues, please.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Please do so.

15                           [Defence counsel confer]

16             MR. JORDASH:

17        Q.   I'm reminded that these men from the 72nd Brigade wore red berets

18     and were known by that item; is that right?

19             Mr. Milovanovic, are you there?

20             The red -- the 72nd Brigade under Stupar, were they known for

21     wearing red berets?  And were they known by some as the Red Berets?

22             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, that's two questions.  If we could

23     separate those out.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash.

25             MR. JORDASH:

Page 15449

 1        Q.   Let's deal with the first question, Mr. Milovanovic.  Did they

 2     wear red berets?

 3        A.   The day after they suffered the disaster I found them sporting

 4     red berets in front of the Park Hotel in Vogosca.  Actually, they were

 5     not wearing red berets, they had them in their back-packs.  Yesterday we

 6     spoke about the Red Berets and I told you that the only person I saw

 7     wearing a red beret was Mr. Frenki.  However, when we spoke about the

 8     Red Berets yesterday, we were talking about the police and not about the

 9     military.  In conclusion, I would like to say that the soldiers from the

10     72nd Brigade did indeed have red berets.

11        Q.   You've mentioned a few times about the fact that you don't know

12     any other Red Berets other than having seen Frenki, I think, in 1993.

13     Did you know somebody called Nenad Kajkut?

14             MR. JORDASH:  Let me have on the screen 1D05283.

15             May we have a break, Your Honour, please.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, we'll have a break, but I would like to deal

17     with the procedural matter for which we -- that's about bar table

18     matters, which I'd rather do at the end of this portion.  There's no need

19     for the accused to be present.

20             If you insist on your presence, Mr. Stanisic, then of course we

21     would do it immediately after the break, but otherwise we could shorten

22     the break slightly.

23             So if you -- we'll ask the witness, any way, to already to leave

24     the courtroom.  We'd like to see you back in approximately a half an

25     hour, Mr. Milovanovic, because we'll deal with a procedural matter with


Page 15450

 1     which we'll not bother you.

 2             Could the witness be escorted out of the courtroom.

 3                           [The witness stands down]

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. -- I would like to deal with a very technical

 5     matter on bar table documents.  That's ...

 6             MR. JORDASH:  Yes, Your Honour.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  I don't know whether Mr. Stanisic, if he prefers to

 8     leave already, then ...

 9             MR. JORDASH:  Yes, if he could, please.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And the same is true for Mr. Simatovic, but

11     we'll have a follow-up discussion, very briefly, on the bar table

12     submissions the Chamber is expecting.  You are free to leave as you wish,

13     to do so.  And if you insist to be present, then, of course, we would do

14     it after the break.

15                           [The accused withdrew]

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, the matter I would like to raise with

17     you is the bar table motions which are expected to be filed.  And I'm

18     not, at this moment, discussing the dead-lines.  The Chamber is worried

19     about the numbers you've indicated for the first one, I think 600

20     documents; for the second one, 200 documents; and a third one yet

21     unspecified.  The purpose of tendering documents through bar table

22     submissions is to give further details on well-known matters - let's keep

23     it short - to say that where a document is easily introduced without a

24     witness who can explain about the document.

25             Now, what is worrying us is that, that numbers where bar table

Page 15451

 1     documents, exhibits, are expected to add something to well-known issues,

 2     or -- that it would -- 600 plus 200 would by far double the whole body of

 3     documentary evidence we have received until now by the -- during the

 4     Defence case.  I'm not saying that the number in itself causes, as such,

 5     major problems, but the Chamber is a bit concerned.

 6             If, for example -- let me just give an example:  If you say, "We

 7     want the Chamber to be aware of the operational combat activities between

 8     the 1st of July and the 1st of December of a certain year, and our main

 9     purpose is to establish that never Mr. Stanisic is mentioned," then that

10     is a clear project where it's clear what the documentation is about.  Of

11     course, the next question would be, "If he never appears there, couldn't

12     you agree on that with the other party, which saves us to go through a

13     hundred or 150 or 200 documents?"

14             The Chamber is not only worried about the numbers.  Again,

15     numbers in itself do not cause always problems.  But where the

16     descriptions are not yet clear whether -- where you are still working

17     hard on it, the Chamber has some concern that finally we would end up

18     with the leftovers of 65 ter lists, unspecified, unorganized,

19     unstructured, and then finally it will be for the Chamber to find out

20     what it is all about.

21             Just to give you one example where it is -- where it was

22     accepted.  I think it was in the Gotovina case that the Defence had a

23     specific interest in showing what had happened in the years before,

24     atrocities committed by the Serbs, as background information.  Now, if

25     you then file ten or 15 or 20 or 30 or 40 or 50 reports describing that,

Page 15452

 1     then it's perfectly clear what the purpose of it is, why it is also not

 2     necessary to have them introduced by witnesses, but the numbers and

 3     the -- until now, and I emphasise that, the total lack of knowledge about

 4     structure, purpose, et cetera, causes quite some concerns to the Chamber.

 5             MR. JORDASH:  I mean, well, if I've given that impression that I

 6     don't have an understanding of what is coming, then I apologise.  I can

 7     be quite clear:  The first report is going to be a continuation of the

 8     issue in relation -- sorry, the first bar table is going to be a

 9     continuation of the issue relating to DB activities dismantling

10     paramilitaries.  It will be clearly -- it will be clear to Your Honours

11     what the documents -- we've made a selection of the documents.  We

12     haven't, by any means, put the majority into the bar table.  We've made a

13     selection which we felt gave Your Honours a clear picture of the size and

14     magnitude of those activities.  And included within that will be the

15     reports which deal with such things as training by other entities to

16     demonstrate the point that the DB was not involved in training.

17             The second bar table, and this is where there might be room for

18     new --

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Let's see.  For example, if you say the -- and I

20     just now first focus on the first category.  DB activities dismantling

21     paramilitaries.  If there are -- I don't know how many documents there

22     are.

23             MR. JORDASH:  I think in the region of 300.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  300.  Is there no way, if you have looked at

25     that, to agree on that the DB has shown activities in this and this and

Page 15453

 1     this places to -- or at least that documentation exists indicating that

 2     the DB was engaged in dismantling paramilitary organisations there and

 3     there and there under the name so and so and so and so and so?  Of

 4     course, the issue is not, I take it, the documents, but whether what was

 5     documented really happened and whether that was the only thing that

 6     happened.  I take it that that is -- are usually the issues.  Therefore,

 7     I'm really wondering whether we have to -- whether, if such documentation

 8     exists, whether it could not be summarised in perhaps four or five or six

 9     pages, saying, "Here, this, this, was reported by" and then that --

10     because the Chamber would also have to go through that in every single

11     detail.

12             What I would suggest to the parties is that where there is a lot

13     of confusion about how to prepare, what to prepare, timing, et cetera,

14     that you would meet together with Chamber staff and -- because we would

15     very much like to digest and to go through that documentation before the

16     judgement is rendered rather than after the judgement is rendered, and of

17     course we need time for it as well.  I suggest that the parties meet with

18     Chamber staff to find out what is the most practical way in proceeding

19     with apparently relevant documentation which the Stanisic Defence is

20     seeking to have tendered -- to be tendered into evidence and to be

21     admitted into evidence.  Would that be a suggestion?

22             MR. JORDASH:  Well, it's a suggestion, and of course I'll do

23     exactly what Your Honours suggest.  I wonder, though, whether, given the

24     Prosecution's position as led through Mr. Theunens in large part, the

25     DB's behaviour encouraged and intended to encourage the paramilitaries

Page 15454

 1     within Bosnia and Croatia, it's difficult to concede from our perspective

 2     too readily to any diminishing or summarising of evidence which

 3     demonstrates, in our view, the complete opposite.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, of course I haven't seen that evidence so I

 5     can't comment on it in any way, but sometimes I'm aware that proving that

 6     A was done doesn't necessarily mean that B was not done, that doing A

 7     doesn't prevent you from doing B at the same time.  I'm not saying it

 8     happened.  But if you have a look at it and if the Prosecution would see

 9     all the documentation, I would say, yes, yes, there's clear documentation

10     that efforts were made in that and that direction.  Then --

11             MR. JORDASH:  No, and, I mean, we're not -- we obviously don't

12     take the position that that -- what happened in Serbia demonstrates that

13     nothing happened outside of Serbia.  We obviously don't take that

14     position.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay, but, therefore, what you want to demonstrate

16     is that activities existed and that documentation exists on those

17     activities which tend in a different direction, in direction of

18     dismantling paramilitary organisations.  And then you could see whether

19     it's limited to some or all known paramilitary organisations.  Look at it

20     and see whether you can find common ground which would allow you perhaps

21     to diminish the number of documents to be -- to be bar tabled.

22             Mr. Groome, you are on your feet as well.

23             MR. GROOME:  Yes, Your Honour, I stood to say that the

24     Prosecution would welcome an opportunity to discuss whether some of the

25     facts that Mr. Jordash is seeking to establish with these documents could

Page 15455

 1     not be the subject of agreement.  I stood up when he said the number 300

 2     because I'm guessing - I haven't seen these document - that they're

 3     probably police reports and maybe judicial opinions about individual

 4     paramilitary groups.  It seems to me that we -- it's likely that after

 5     having an opportunity to review all those police reports the Prosecution

 6     would agree that certain people were arrested on certain days and there

 7     was an ultimate disposition of their case, and that would, I think, end

 8     up in a one- or two-page chart, rather than 300 individual documents.

 9     And we're willing to undergo that process with Mr. Jordash.  And I think

10     in the end it would save all of us an awful lot of work.

11             MR. JORDASH:  And I welcome any chance to diminish our work, so

12     I'm happy to sit down with Mr. Groome and do as Your Honours suggest.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Would you be assisted -- would you first sit

14     together with Mr. Groome alone, coffee or tea, I leave it to you, and

15     then with -- then to report to Chamber staff?  Or would you prefer

16     already to start with Chamber staff?  And, again, when I say Chamber

17     staff, that is in order for the Chamber not to be directly involved in

18     evidentiary matters before they are before the Chamber.  That's -- or

19     make that the first point of your discussion.

20             MR. JORDASH:  Yes, but what might also be useful, I don't know if

21     this is a useful suggestion, is if Your Honours have any particular

22     concerns beyond the quantity, i.e., the issues, then that might --

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, it depends.  The quantity in itself doesn't

24     worry me automatically.  More important is whether there's a clear

25     structure of what this documentation is establishing.  And then if

Page 15456

 1     it's -- if that's clear on a factual basis - I'm not talking about any

 2     inferences to be made from that - then of course if there's documentary

 3     evidence, the first question is, Couldn't you agree on what the

 4     documentary evidence says without the Chamber staff going through every

 5     footnote or whatever in those 300 documents?

 6             MR. JORDASH:  I mean, the -- I mean, I have to say, I mean, I

 7     completely agree that we can sit down and it can be useful, but I have to

 8     say, for the record, that the case led by Theunens was not pled on the

 9     indictment, it wasn't pled in the pre-trial brief, which means that we

10     are somewhat trying to hit a constantly moving target.  That's why we've

11     gone large, because we don't know what the Prosecution intend to say

12     about that and we don't know what Your Honours will find in relation to

13     whether notice was sufficient or not, given the absence of whether it's

14     cured in not being in the pre-trial brief and the indictment.  So it

15     might help if the Prosecution also indicated whether they intend to rely

16     upon that belated allegation.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  I suggest that you meet on short notice and that to

18     the extent you think it would be useful that you invite Chamber staff,

19     that is, Mr. Nilsson, and perhaps it would even be better that you start

20     a exchanging with Mr. Nilsson what the Chamber's concerns are, and then

21     perhaps in a follow-up meeting, once you may have exchanged suggestions

22     on how to meet those concerns and how to reduce the number of documents,

23     to see whether you can make any progress.

24             So I would suggest to start with Mr. Nilsson then perhaps to

25     remove him and ...

Page 15457

 1             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, can I just say that I think from the

 2     Prosecution's point of view a meeting with Chamber staff would not be

 3     productive unless we had the list of all of the documents that are sought

 4     to be tendered plus some indication of what the relevance is so that we

 5     could form a view, otherwise we would just be sitting at the Chamber

 6     staff reading documents for the first time and --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  No, not reading document, but what -- first of all,

 8     Chamber staff would, I think, explain further what our concerns are.

 9     I've been very brief on it at this very moment.  And perhaps to talk

10     about possible solutions of it.  And I think during this short

11     conversation we already -- I already noticed that Mr. Jordash said, We

12     have 300 documents and we want to establish this and this and this.  Now,

13     first of all, that -- then, of course, we would have to know whether

14     these are all police reports or what's the origin of these documents.

15     And if we have two or three origins then we can more or less structure

16     the issues which are addressed by the bar table motion.  And then, of

17     course, the next step is whether we really then need a bar table motion

18     or whether we could address those matters in other ways such as by

19     agreeing on what is factually found.

20             But for the Chamber to receive notice that the parties agree that

21     in July 1994 this unit arrested A, B, or C, or 25 members of paramilitary

22     group so and so, and that they have been detained and that they were

23     brought before the court or they were released after 30 days, that is for

24     the Chamber easier to handle than to get one document of 80 pages in

25     which a lot of other matters are discussed as well and where we have to

Page 15458

 1     find out what exactly in those documents you want to bring to our

 2     attention.  That's, of course, the kind of concerns we have.

 3             I suggest that to -- or to discuss the general issues that you

 4     invite Mr. Nilsson for the first meeting, not yet going through the

 5     documents themselves but just to see where the real problem for the

 6     Chamber is.  And, of course, the Chamber finally, if it's flooded by

 7     documents which were not introduced in a normal way, of course we, at a

 8     certain moment, we may also use our discretion in what to admit and what

 9     not to admit.  That's a matter.  We have limits, of course, to our

10     capacity as well.

11             MR. JORDASH:  Yes.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  If that is understood.

13             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, the Prosecution accepts that proposal.

14             I have one brief issue related to this witness if I might raise

15     now so people can think about it over the break.  There is a -- in my

16     re-direct examination there's a matter that's been raised by Mr. Jordash

17     that there is an audiotape that was also recovered with the Mladic

18     notebooks that I would like the witness to listen to.  I only seek to

19     deal with a short portion of it, but it's 30 minutes long.  So what I'm

20     proposing is the following:  Have Mr. Laugel preparing the audio file, I

21     will present my colleagues with the transcript, and I'm asking everyone

22     to consider the propriety of allowing the witness to listen to the

23     30 minute tape overnight so that I can take him directly to the portion

24     that I want to.  And he has a sense of the entire context of the -- or

25     the context of the entire conversation.


Page 15459

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, Mr. Petrovic.

 2             MR. JORDASH:  I'd like to see the transcript first, if I may,

 3     before making a decision.

 4             MR. GROOME:  That will be here before the -- sometime during the

 5     break.

 6             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And then we'll hear from you later today,

 8     that.

 9             We'll take a break.  And we resume at ten minutes -- no, no, we

10     can take the shorter break - quarter to 1.00.

11                           --- Recess taken at 12.19 p.m.

12                           [The accused entered court]

13                           [The witness takes the stand]

14                           --- On resuming at 12.48 p.m.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash.

16             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you, Your Honour.  I just want to -- we don't

17     have a B/C/S version of 1D05283, but if that could be brought up to the

18     screen.

19        Q.   I want to ask you about Nenad Kajkut.  And before I do, I want to

20     correct something that I said earlier, which was that your sighting of

21     Simatovic as a Red Beret wasn't in 1993, it was in 1994; that's right,

22     isn't it?

23        A.   In 1995.  I believe it was on the 22nd of February somewhere near

24     Velika Kladusa.

25        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  Nenad Kajkut gave an interview to the OTP in

Page 15460

 1     October 2007, and this, it relates, Mr. Milovanovic, to the testimony

 2     you've given about the lack of Red Berets, and Kajkut says -- told the

 3     Prosecution.

 4             MR. JORDASH:  If we turn to page 3 of this document and the

 5     bottom of the page.

 6        Q.   He says that at the end of September he -- in 1991 he received a

 7     draft for mobilisation, he became a military policeman in the

 8     5th Krajina Corps, which later became the 1st Krajina Corps, and then --

 9     sorry.

10             MR. JORDASH:  Mr. Groome is on his feet.

11             MR. GROOME:  Your Honours, I'm just looking at this document.  It

12     doesn't appear to be an Office of the Prosecutor document.  It doesn't

13     have an ERN, doesn't have a memo form.  It doesn't identify the person

14     who spoke to this person.  It's a person whose name I've never heard of

15     before.  Could I ask for some information before we make representations

16     that it's an OTP interview?  I'd like an opportunity to be able to check

17     that.

18             MR. JORDASH:  Actually, I think I've made an error.  It's not to

19     the Prosecution.  It's a statement he gave, I think, to the Defence.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now, we all know that if statements are taken

21     for the purposes of this Tribunal, Mr. Jordash, that in order to be

22     admitted as evidence it should be -- it should be introduced under

23     Rule 92 bis, ter, quater, or quinquies.  Apparently this statement has

24     been taken for those purpose, so therefore I think it would be preferable

25     first to ask the witness about the subject matter you would like to deal

Page 15461

 1     with.  And if you then want to -- if there's any reason to do so, if you

 2     then want to put to him what someone else said, you can do that.  But the

 3     statement in itself seems not to be very suitable for admission.

 4             MR. JORDASH:  Let -- Your Honour, okay, yes, I'll move on.

 5        Q.   Let me put it directly because I'm also running out of time,

 6     Mr. Milovanovic.

 7             But Nenad Kajkut, I suggest, belonged to or was the commander of

 8     a group of Red Berets in Banja Luka subordinated to the CSB of Banja

 9     Luka.  Do you know that?

10        A.   I don't.  I was in Macedonia in 1991.

11        Q.   And he had this group, I suggest, which existed in Banja Luka or

12     in that and around that terrain until 1995 at least?  Is that

13     something --

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, shouldn't we first ask:  Do you know a

15     person by the name of Nenad Kajkut?

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm familiar with a family name.  I

17     know some people by that name from around Banja Luka, but I've never

18     heard of Nenad Kajkut before.  I don't know who he is.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Jordash.

20             MR. JORDASH:  Can I have on the screen, please, P2531.

21        Q.   And I return now to the Mladic diary and a meeting on the

22     9th of November, 1993, in which it's said that Milosevic, Lilic,

23     Sainovic, Perisic, Sokolovic, Stojsic, Stanisic, Karadzic, Krajisnik, and

24     Mladic, Hadzic, Begovic, Martic, Novakovic, and Rakic took part.  And

25     Milosevic, in the first -- this is page 19 of the -- sorry, this is

Page 15462

 1     page 1 of the English.  And Milosevic makes the comment that at the first

 2     heading:  "We co-ordinate based on the army line, Mladic, Perisic, and

 3     Novakovic."

 4             Would you agree with Milosevic's assessment of the co-ordination

 5     between the VRS and the Government of Serbia?

 6        A.   I did not attend that meeting, so I didn't know what was

 7     discussed.  Therefore, I don't know what I should agree with.

 8        Q.   Well, from your experience in the VRS and the Main Staff and the

 9     supplies from the Serbian government and the military activities in

10     Bosnia under the auspices of the VRS, would you agree that the

11     co-ordination was based on the army line as opposed to other lines such

12     as the Ministry of the Interior?

13        A.   Sir, I would kindly ask you to separate two things.  Are you

14     asking me about the co-ordination of the armies of the neighbouring

15     states, the coordination of the MUP organisations, or the coordination

16     between the MUP and the army?  I really don't know what to deal with

17     first.

18        Q.   Well, what I'm getting at is this:  That you, the VRS, were not

19     co-ordinating with the Ministry of Interior of Serbia in relation to

20     combat activities.

21        A.   There was no co-ordination with the Ministry of the Interior of

22     Serbia.  There was no co-ordination with the Ministry of the Interior of

23     Republika Srpska either.  If the supreme commander attached a unit to us,

24     for example, a special police unit or specials, that unit had to be

25     placed under the command of the local commander of the army of

Page 15463

 1     Republika Srpska.  There was no need for any co-ordination between the

 2     Ministry of the Interior and the army commander.

 3        Q.   If we move to page 8 of this document, we can see a suggestion by

 4     Sokolovic in November of 1993, at number 16, where Sokolovic suggests or

 5     he notes that the president has said that:  "There is a feeling of empty

 6     space in the RS MUP, a specific man with his obligations should be

 7     there."

 8             Were you aware of the feeling of discontent that the Serbian MUP

 9     was still not co-ordinating and the suggestion that the Serbian MUP

10     should, therefore, have somebody placed within the RS MUP?

11        A.   I did not understand your question.

12        Q.   Looking at the entry by Sokolovic, and I'm suggesting that there

13     was content -- discontent at this late stage, November 1993, that the

14     Serbian MUP was not playing any role with the RS MUP and so Sokolovic

15     made a suggestion that the Serbian MUP place a specific man within the

16     RS MUP, and I'm asking if you are aware of that.

17        A.   I don't know whether that person was ever appointed.  I was at

18     the meeting so I suppose I should have heard that, but I don't remember.

19     This is what I'm reading, and there's no reason why I should not believe

20     words on paper, but I don't really know whether that person was ever

21     appointed.  As far as I know, he wasn't.

22        Q.   And at this point in time --

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, shouldn't we first -- the text is

24     rather ambiguous, isn't it?  "There is a feeling of empty space in the

25     Republika Srpska MUP.  A specific man with his obligations should be

Page 15464

 1     there."  Whose obligations we are talking about seems to be unclear from

 2     the text itself.  What these obligations are seems to be unclear as well.

 3     From where he should come seems to be unclear as well.  So to say that we

 4     do not know whether he have [sic] ever appointed requires that we have at

 5     least an understanding of what this line is about.

 6             Could you give us or could you confirm what the -- the

 7     understanding you had about the text which appears before us, a text

 8     which was spoken, at least that's how it is reported by Mr. Sokolovic.

 9     Could you tell us:  What kind of a person are we talking about?  Would

10     that be a Republic of Serbia MUP men?  Or do you have any recollection of

11     the context which could remove some of the ambiguities of this text,

12     Mr. Milovanovic?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That text, especially the second

14     sentence, doesn't make sense to me because Sokolovic is neither

15     suggesting nor providing a solution.  He is only invoking a statement by

16     the president, and he probably means Milosevic, that one should have a

17     personal vision of what the president put forward.  Now, who should have

18     that personal vision, whether he or me or the other participants of the

19     meeting or the MUP of the Republic of Serbia or Republika Srpska, I

20     really can't see.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Jordash.

22             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you, Your Honour.

23        Q.   Let's move to another topic.  I was going to take you through the

24     diaries in relation to Operation Breza.  But to save time I just want to

25     have you explain what Operation Breza was, please.

Page 15465

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, I think it would assist the witness if

 2     you would ask him first of all when the operation took place, where the

 3     operation took place, what the purpose of the operation was, so that we

 4     can work focussed.

 5             MR. JORDASH:

 6        Q.   Are you aware of --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Otherwise we might have a historical explanation of

 8     operations in general and then in specific terms.

 9             MR. JORDASH:

10        Q.   When -- are you aware of Operation Breza, Mr. Milovanovic?

11        A.   I know about Breza 94 operation.  It was carried out in

12     September 1994.

13        Q.   How long did it go on for?

14        A.   It was a failed operation by the VRS.  I don't think it lasted

15     even ten days.

16        Q.   What was its objective, please?

17        A.   The purpose of the operation was for the VRS to cross the Una

18     river between Novi Grad and Krupa to take Cazin, or, rather, to take

19     Bihac from the east.  It was a personnel operation designed without any

20     plan by General Mladic who started to implement it under the command of

21     General Talic of the 1st Krajina Corps.  It became a failure as soon as

22     it started actually.  On the first day around Novi Grad in just one night

23     we lost 92 men, several vehicles, mainly commander vehicles, of the

24     Main Staff were captured, as well as vehicles of the 1st Krajina Corps,

25     and the operation was cut short.

Page 15466

 1        Q.   When you say personal operation, or personnel operation, what do

 2     you mean by that?

 3        A.   I apologise to the president of the Trial Chamber but I have to

 4     take a couple of minutes to explain how this operation occurred.

 5             The Main Staff was supposed to carry out an inspection of various

 6     corps, and General Mladic took it upon himself to inspect the 1st and

 7     2nd Krajina Corps in the west of Republika Srpska.  My job was to inspect

 8     the eastern part, or, rather, the corps on the eastern front, the

 9     Herzegovina Corps and the Eastern Bosnia Corps.  We set out each in his

10     own way, and one evening Mladic called me in Bijeljina and ordered me to

11     come back to the command post.

12        Q.   I need to just cut you short, I'm sorry, but I need to move

13     swiftly.  Who supplied Operation Breza -- and I think it was actually

14     called Operation Breza 1994 - who supplied Operation Breza with

15     logistics, ammunition, weapons?

16        A.   I said at the outset that the troops went into offensive

17     unprepared, what we in the army call straight from the trenches.  It was

18     an idea of General Mladic.  He went into it with what he had on the front

19     line, and he reckoned that I would send him the guard brigade from the

20     Main Staff and I was supposed to take three units from around Sarajevo

21     and around Treskavica and send them to Krajina, which was impossible.

22        Q.   Did you receive for that operation any logistics or weapons or

23     ammunitions supply from the FRY?

24        A.   To my knowledge nothing was requested and nothing was supplied.

25     General Mladic wanted it to be a surprise attack against the

Page 15467

 1     5th Corps of the BH Army.

 2        Q.   Would you agree that the strategic objective of that operation

 3     was to assist Abdic to return his people, the refugees, back to Bihac?

 4        A.   I think that General Mladic was not thinking about that during

 5     those days because a couple of days earlier Abdic's army had been

 6     defeated and the population had been crammed into collection centres and

 7     camps.  He wasn't trying to get Abdic back into power.

 8             But almost a year before that General Talic kept talking him into

 9     the idea that the 1st Corps has enough resources to deal with the

10     problems of the Cazin Krajina on its own.  The Cazin Krajina is an area

11     facing Croatia, bordering on Croatia, and it was never within the sphere

12     of interests of Republika Srpska.

13             At the Assembly session that we discussed yesterday of the

14     12th of May, the boundaries were defined loosely as the Una river, the

15     Sava river, the Drina River, and the Neretva river.  So if Mladic had

16     succeeded, we would have had to bring back the army as we had brought it

17     back later from Bjelasnica and Igman.  But Mladic went into this

18     offensive of his own accord and it ended the way it ended.  Nobody, not

19     Mladic and not Talic, knew that the Muslim army had not complied with a

20     decision of the UN Security Council, I don't know which number, which

21     proclaimed the Bihac region a protected area.  UNPROFOR notified us that

22     the 5th Corps had been disarmed.  However, in those 18 months that corps

23     was not only disarmed, it was resupplied and it became a big corps of

24     2.000 men with state-of-the-art equipment.  And they even had the

25     so-called Singapore rifles, the dream of every soldier.

Page 15468

 1        Q.   You said it was not in the sphere of interest of

 2     Republika Srpska.  What did you mean by that?

 3        A.   The Assembly of Republika Srpska defined the borders of the

 4     then-Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina along those four rivers I

 5     named, Una, Sava, Drina, and Neretva.  Anything beyond those lines would

 6     mean aggression.

 7        Q.   So this, then, operation was outside of the strategic objectives

 8     of the VRS; is that what you're saying?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   What, then, motivated Mladic?

11        A.   I don't know.

12        Q.   Was Operation Breza 94 a kind of precursor to Pauk?

13        A.   No.  It was a consequence of the Pauk operation.

14        Q.   But Operation Breza 94 came before Pauk, didn't it?  Are you

15     saying Pauk was a consequence of Breza?

16        A.   Correct.  Pauk was the consequence of the Breza operation.  I

17     misspoke, sorry.

18        Q.   So, again, Pauk, then, do you categor-- characterise that in the

19     same way you would Breza, which is that it was an operation outside of

20     the strategic objectives of the VRS?

21        A.   No.  Something else happened in the meantime.  When I said that

22     Pauk was a consequence of the Breza operation, Breza was caused by the

23     5th Muslim Corps and it was decided that they were a failure.  And the

24     very next month, on the 23rd of October, that corps aggressed

25     Republika Srpska by crossing Mount Grmec.  They crossed Una river and

Page 15469

 1     with seven days occupied around 250.000 square kilometres of the

 2     territory of Republika Srpska.  So the VRS had to take that land back,

 3     that is, to mount that famous counter-attack against Bihac that I was

 4     unlucky enough to lead.

 5             The counter-strike took 16 days of offensive.  We pushed back the

 6     Muslims to the other side of the Una river and that was taken advantage

 7     of by the Serbian Army of Krajina so they took offensive actions against

 8     the 5th Corps again, and we meant to crush that corps by joint effort.  I

 9     drew that conclusion on the 8th of November, of which I spoke in my last

10     testimony, when I was tricked into coming to Plitvice where they tried to

11     persuade me to co-operate with the Serbian Army of Krajina with part of

12     my forces to revive for a while the army of Fikret Abdic.  I did not have

13     authorisation from the Main Staff or the Supreme Command to be involved

14     in those negotiations and even less did I have authorisation to give them

15     I don't know how many men and 5.000 rifles.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Petrovic.

18             MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, with your leave, at

19     the beginning of this answer there's one explanation missing provided by

20     the General about the motivation of the commander of the 5th Corps to

21     take the action that he had taken.  Just the first few lines are

22     incomplete.  And I believe what's missing is important.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Could you give us the transcript page and line,

24     Mr. Petrovic?

25             MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, page 65, lines 1

Page 15470

 1     and 2.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 3             Witness, you were asked whether you could categorise Pauk in the

 4     same way as you would categorize Breza in that it was an operation

 5     outside of the strategic objectives of the VRS.  Now, for us the answer

 6     starts with:  "No.  Something else happened in the meantime."

 7             And it follows then, Mr. Petrovic?  Or is it ...

 8             MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, that's the bit.  That's the

 9     passage that's incomplete.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, and then you apparently added something, where

11     our transcript reads: "When I said that Pauk was a consequence of the

12     Breza operation, Breza was caused by the 5th Muslim corps," et cetera.

13     But apparently something is missing from your answer.  Could you very

14     briefly indicate what may be missing here.  And apparently it has to do

15     something with the motivation of the commander of the 5th Corps to take

16     the action he had taken.  Could you please repeat what you said in that

17     context.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can.  I'll try to be brief.

19             The 5th Corps crushed, from 19 to the 21st of August, the army of

20     Fikret Abdic.  General Mladic thought that he could punish the 5th Corps,

21     not because they crushed Fikret Abdic, but because they had armed

22     themselves; whereas they were supposed to be disarmed, under the decision

23     of the UN Security Council.  Neither general evaluated properly the

24     strength of the 5th Corps, and they failed.  And then the 5th Corps

25     mounted Grmec 94 to punish VRS and to take these 250.000 square

Page 15471

 1     kilometres.  Before that, throughout the war, they had fought in

 2     encirclement.  But they broke out of that encirclement and faced the VRS.

 3     The VRS mounted a counter-strike.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  I'll stop you here.  Exceptionally I'll invite

 5     Mr. Petrovic to ask a question of the following kind:  "Did I hear you

 6     say ..." and then you repeat what you heard the witness said and which

 7     doesn't appear on the transcript.

 8             MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

 9             General, did I hear you say that the commander of the 5th Corps

10     thought and felt that the VRS was weak in that area and moved into

11     offensive action into the territory held at that time by the VRS?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

13             MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Thank you,

14     Your Honour.  Thank you, General.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  That's then now on the record.

16             Mr. Jordash, you certainly are aware that in 15 minutes from now

17     you've used six hours.  That is the five hours plus the one granted by

18     Mr. --

19             MR. JORDASH:  And I'll finish in 15 minutes.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Please.

21             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you.  Could we turn, please, to 65 ter 1413,

22     Supreme Defence Council minutes, 28th Session, held on the

23     2nd of November, 1994.  Could we have page 5 of the English and 4 of the

24     B/C/S.

25        Q.   And just to orientate ourselves, perhaps we should just look at

Page 15472

 1     the first page, sorry, the second page, where we get a list of those who

 2     attended this session.  Which, to speed things up:  Lilic, Milosevic,

 3     Momir Bulatovic, Kontic, Perisic, Krivosija.  And at page 5 of the

 4     English and 4 of the B/C/S we have, it seems, a discussion about Bosnia

 5     by Perisic.  And just to -- just to -- just to orientate ourselves,

 6     November 1994 was when Pauk began; correct?

 7        A.   No, that's not correct.  Operation Pauk was only being discussed

 8     on the 8th of November, and this session was on the 2nd of November.  On

 9     November 3rd I went into that attack across Mount Grmec.

10        Q.   So Pauk started, then, in December of 1994?  It was at the end of

11     1994, wasn't it?

12        A.   Right.  Sometime in mid-1994, a couple of days before the

13     conclusion of so-called Carter's cease-fire, on 23rd December Pauk was

14     cut short and continued again only in the spring of 1995.

15        Q.   Now, if you look at what Perisic is talking about in relation to

16     Bosnia, a third of the way down the page, when he announces:

17             "Gentlemen presidents, I would like to briefly introduce you to

18     the situation in Bosnia.  The Muslim Croatian forces have started a

19     general offensive, aiming at cutting off the western part of the

20     Republika Srpska in the Bihac Bugojno direction."

21             Just a bit further down:

22             "Therefore they have started with the offensive.  They have

23     started with the offensive in the direction Bjelasnica-Gorazde and

24     vice versa so that they merge and make passage in this enclave.

25     Furthermore, they are significantly progressing towards the corridor.  So

Page 15473

 1     far they have occupied 843 square kilometres since September the 1st.  In

 2     total, the Serbs had to evacuate around 15.750 citizens from that area."

 3             Do you agree with that assessment.

 4        A.   I'm seeing this evaluation for the first time and I don't agree

 5     with it.

 6        Q.   What do you disagree with?

 7        A.   First of all, I don't agree with the evaluation about the Muslim

 8     offensive from Mount Igman and Mount Bjelasnica towards Gorazde and from

 9     Gorazde towards Sarajevo because between these two features there is the

10     city of Sarajevo.  Second, there was no need for the Muslims to attack

11     from Gorazde towards Sarajevo because they had got a corridor between

12     Sarajevo and Gorazde through Carter's cease-fire, and that corridor of

13     120 square kilometres still exists to date.

14             Now, where Perisic took these figures on losses, I don't know.

15     But I said that a date later I mounted my counter-attack across

16     Mount Grmec towards Bihac.  So I think this evaluation by Perisic is

17     irrelevant to that time-period.

18        Q.   What about the beginning of that paragraph where he talks of a

19     general offensive aimed at cutting off the western part of

20     Republika Srpska and Bihac; is that what you're saying didn't exist?

21        A.   That part of the evaluation is all right.  The offensive of the

22     5th Corps and the Croatian army from the Bihac region towards Bugojno,

23     and the Muslims were also preparing an offensive of their 7th Corps, I

24     believe, from the wider area of Bugojno towards Bihac, they wanted to

25     link up those forces so that the 5th Corps would finally break out of

Page 15474

 1     encirclement.  And there was a strategic Muslim idea throughout the war

 2     to create a green transversal across Sandzak, Sarajevo, Bugojno, and

 3     Bihac.  Now, I don't have to explain what the green transversal is.  It's

 4     a historical fact.

 5             MR. JORDASH:  Let's move on as swiftly as we can to page 6 of the

 6     English and 5 of the B/C/S, and it's Milosevic speaking.  Sorry, it's

 7     not, it's Perisic speaking again.  And if we then go over the page in the

 8     English to 7 and B/C/S 6.

 9        Q.   And I'm interested in the section where Perisic talks, halfway

10     down the page of the English.  And he starts to talk about the impact on

11     the FRY safety as a result of the continuation of war by the Bosnian

12     Serbs by the VRS.  And he -- if you would read the section where it

13     starts off with saying:  "Firstly the situation in the FRY army."

14        A.   Yes, I can see that.

15        Q.   Were you aware of these discussions happening in the -- in

16     Belgrade amongst the Serbian government about basically the disastrous

17     consequences of the continuation of the war in Bosnia by the

18     Bosnian Serbs?

19        A.   I didn't know and I was not interested at the time what was going

20     on at Pale.  I said that I launched my counter-attack against

21     22.000 Muslim fighters, having already lost 6.000 of my fighters.  I read

22     Perisic's evaluation on the previous page with a reference to the

23     7th Corps, and that is in keeping with my previous claim that the 5th and

24     the 7th Corps were supposed to link up their forces in the western part

25     of Herzegovina.

Page 15475

 1             MR. JORDASH:  Let's go to page 23 of the English and page 22 of

 2     the B/C/S.

 3        Q.   And it's Slobodan Milosevic.  He's presenting his view about the

 4     current situation in Bosnia.  And he notes:

 5             [As read] "The fact that the worst situation is there is

 6     unfortunately the best argument that a disastrous mistake was made when

 7     the peace accord was rejected.  It is a direct consequence.  That night

 8     when we talked with them in Dobanovci for the last time, Momir is here,

 9     Momcilo is here, we precisely pointed out such tendency and presented

10     what would happen.  They proved that the peace accord should not have

11     been accepted.  Unfortunately, that proof costs now, 3.000.  No way, that

12     is not true.  It is much more.  No one should have died in Gorazde, not

13     in Gorazde, not in the corridor, not in Nisic Plateau, not in Grabez or

14     the Una valley, Kupres, et cetera.  But if the price for proving the

15     decision of the Pale leadership to reject the peace accord to be right is

16     to have so many people get killed, and unfortunately which resulted in

17     losing the territory and not conquering it, then I really do not know

18     what the logic means, what the justice means.  What is a smart thing to

19     do?"

20             And then if we go over the page to page 24 of the English and

21     stay with page 22 of the B/C/S, Milosevic says:

22             "The peace accord is still on the table luckily.  If the map

23     changes due to the significant combat activities of the Muslim-Croatian

24     coalition, they will not accept that plan."

25             Were you aware that Milosevic and the Serb leadership took the

Page 15476

 1     view, at this point in time onwards, that if you, the Bosnian Serbs, lost

 2     territory it would mean that the peace agreement would continue to be

 3     rejected by the Bosnian Serbs?

 4        A.   And your question is?

 5        Q.   Were you aware that the Serbian government's official policy, and

 6     we see, I suggest, it expressed through Milosevic at that point, were you

 7     aware that they took the view that the loss of territory by the Bosnian

 8     Serbs would mean that they would not accept the peace agreement which was

 9     on the table?

10        A.   I was not aware of that.  But I agree and I understand why the

11     leadership of Republika Srpska did not accept that accord, because that

12     would confirm the status quo.  And we have to bear in mind that in the

13     short space of seven days we had lost 250.000 square kilometres of our

14     territory.

15        Q.   And causing a massive refugee crisis; is that correct?

16        A.   That refugee crisis was particularly prominent on Mount Grmec.

17     But for 57 days we managed to have the population return.  They returned

18     to destroyed homes, but they did return.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, two minutes left.

20             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you.

21        Q.   One last part of this and then I'll finish there,

22     Mr. Milovanovic.

23             MR. JORDASH:  Page 33 of the English and 30 of the B/C/S.

24        Q.   And Milosevic expresses his view once again, noting that:

25             [As read] "And all that happens after so much suffering.  We

Page 15477

 1     endured everything, we went through all the sanctions, and we came to the

 2     point where the entire international community says, All right, you are

 3     not the aggressors.  Half of Bosnia and Herzegovina is yours and you have

 4     the right to merge with Serbia and Montenegro.  They say no we will --

 5     and we will take even more by force.  We will prolong the war.  That is

 6     what I call complete madness."

 7             And Bulatovic then notes:  "They have already lost 850 square

 8     kilometres of the territory."

 9             Was that view communicated to you through Mladic or any other

10     Bosnian Serb leader at the time?

11        A.   Are we still talking about the 2nd November, 1994?

12        Q.   Yes.

13        A.   No, nobody communicated anything to me.  Karadzic told me

14     sometime in mid-December that Jimmy Carter should arrive and that I

15     should be prepared for defence, because I discussed the issue of Bihac

16     with him and whether I should enter Bihac or not, because the issue of

17     Bihac was a political rather than a military issue.  As a soldier, I had

18     every right to enter Bihac and to attack the 5th Corps.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, I think the witness, by the first line, has

20     answered your question.

21             MR. JORDASH:  I've got nothing further.  Thank you,

22     Mr. Milovanovic.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Then, Mr. Petrovic, are you ready to

24     start your further cross-examination?

25             MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.


Page 15478

 1                           Further Cross-examination by Mr. Petrovic:

 2        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, General, sir.

 3        A.   Good afternoon.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Milovanovic, Mr. Petrovic is counsel for

 5     Mr. Simatovic.

 6             Please proceed.

 7             MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

 8        Q.   Let's try and use the remaining time to clarify some things, to

 9     shed some light on your previous testimony.

10             First of all, just awhile ago we talked about the beginning of

11     the Operation Pauk and it says on page 68 that that happened sometime in

12     mid-1994.  Can you please repeat and tell us when the Operation Pauk

13     actually started.

14        A.   Operation Pauk had a different name.  Its original name was

15     Stit 1994.  Sometime in mid-December, on the eve of Jimmy Carter's

16     arrival, after the four-month peace accord was signed, Operation Pauk was

17     shelved.  However, on the 13th of January, 1995, the 1st Corps violated

18     the peace accord that was supposed to last for four months.  It launched

19     another attack on the VRS and the Serbian Army of Krajina.  I'm not sure

20     about the latter.  Operation Pauk was rekindled sometime in mid-February

21     or, to be more precise, on the 12th or the 13th February.  At least

22     according to the information I received from Nikola Koljevic, the deputy

23     prime minister of Republika Srpska.

24        Q.   General, sir, on the record on page 74, line 9, it says that the

25     1st Corps violated the peace accord.  Could you please shed some light on

Page 15479

 1     that.  Who was it who violated the peace accord?

 2        A.   The peace accord that was supposed to last for four months, is

 3     that what you're asking me?  The peace accord was violated by

 4     General Atif Dudakovic on the eve of the Orthodox new year which was on

 5     the 13th of January.  He slaughtered four of our fighters in a bunker.

 6     They had sent several of our fighters to congratulate the Orthodox new

 7     year to the Serbs.  I suppose that they had been drinking together and

 8     then they slaughtered them.

 9        Q.   Witness, sir, just tell me who Dudakovic was; was he the

10     commander of a corps?

11        A.   Yes.  Of the 5th Corps of the so-called Army of

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

13        Q.   Thank you, General, sir.  Earlier today and yesterday you

14     mentioned the airfield at Ravna Romanija, i.e., an attempt to build an

15     airport there.  Are you referring to the attempts to build an airfield

16     near Sokolac at the foot of Mount Romanija?

17        A.   Yes.  Close to the cross-road -- cross-roads of

18     Sokolac-Rogatica-Pale roads, in the so-called Glasinac [phoen] field.

19        Q.   Thank you, General, sir.  Earlier today and yesterday you spoke

20     about the basic training of recruits in the VRS.  You said that it lasted

21     for three months and then for the first eight months no single recruit

22     would be allowed to go to the front line and be engaged in combat.  You

23     said that that training would last for at least eight months before they

24     had the necessary skills.

25        A.   Yes, that's correct.  There was something else that I should have

Page 15480

 1     added and that is that they could have been engaged if they were

 2     attacked.

 3        Q.   General, sir, as a soldier with years of experience would you be

 4     able to tell us whether a soldier can be trained within the scope of,

 5     let's say, a fortnight?  What such training be adequate?  Would it make

 6     any sense?

 7        A.   Such a short training would be a crime against such a soldier.

 8     Basic training should not last less than three and a half months.  Within

 9     a fortnight you can only teach him how to fire a bullet, but not how to

10     aim at a target or defend himself.

11        Q.   Thank you, witness.  As for those recruits who served in the

12     army, how long did it take for them to renew the skills that they had

13     acquired during their compulsory military service?  I'm talking about

14     your experience and the experience of warfare.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Petrovic, we are spending ages and ages on what

16     seems to be training not at an adequate level.  Should we know exactly

17     what you would have learned or how much time it would take to regain your

18     skills, et cetera, whether that would be handling rifles or mortars or

19     tanks or airplanes, and then to go in all those details; or do you want

20     to address our attention to the fact that this witness, as supported by

21     some of the documents, is of the opinion that training of recruits was

22     inadequate due to the circumstances?  If that is what you want to draw

23     our attention to, then I think you together with Mr. Jordash have been

24     very effective already.

25             MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  I note


Page 15481

 1     the time.  Should I continue or should we break now and resume tomorrow,

 2     Your Honour?

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  I think we should -- we should adjourn.  But I'd

 4     first like the witness to be escorted out of the courtroom.

 5             Mr. Milovanovic, the same instruction applies as I gave you

 6     yesterday, that is, that you should not speak or communicate with anyone

 7     about your testimony either already given now or in past or still to be

 8     given in the days to come.  And we'll further discuss how and when we'll

 9     be able to conclude your examination.

10             Would you please follow the usher.  Yes.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise, I have two questions

12     actually.  First of all --

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When do we continue tomorrow?

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Tomorrow morning at 9.00.  Yes, I should have told

16     you.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And, secondly, am I supposed to go

18     on reading and finish reading the third binder of documents?

19             JUDGE ORIE:  No, I do not know what Mr. Petrovic would like you

20     to further read.  What I do know is that the Prosecution would like to

21     give you a transcript of an audio recording.

22             And that was how many pages, Mr. Groome?

23             MR. GROOME:  I believe it's about seven pages, Your Honour.  Ten

24     pages.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Groome has 7 -- a 10-page document for you.

Page 15482

 1             Mr. Petrovic, any wishes?

 2             MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, no.  I'll try and

 3     deal with all the documents and parts thereof here in the courtroom.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  So, Mr. Milovanovic, you have some time to recover,

 5     only ten pages to deal with, at least if you're willing to assist the

 6     Prosecution by reading them.

 7             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, and a 30-minute audiotape of the

 8     transcript of the pages is what I proposed earlier.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But I thought there was a transcript of that

10     audio.

11             MR. GROOME:  There is a transcript, Your Honour, but I don't know

12     whether the Chamber wants me to address my proposed questions for the

13     witness in his hearing.  I don't think there's anything that's going

14     prejudice his listening to the tape.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  No, I have no problems.  So what you say is you have

16     10 pages of transcripts and you have an audio attached to the same

17     matter?

18             MR. GROOME:  Yes, Your Honour.  And it's an audiotape recovered

19     from the Mladic home.  And when the witness listens to it, if he could

20     assist us in identifying the voices, approximate the time that this may

21     be, and there's a reference or several references to a Manojlo, whether

22     he can tell us whether that's a reference to him.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

24             Mr. Milovanovic, apart from reading the ten pages, you're also

25     invited --

Page 15483

 1             And I take it, Mr. Groome, that you provide the equipment

 2     necessary for listening?

 3             MR. GROOME:  I have it here in court, Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  You have it here in court, yes.

 5             You're also invited to listen to a 30-minutes' audio recording,

 6     and some specific questions were already mentioned by Mr. Groome.  While

 7     listening could you try to identify who is speaking; could you try to

 8     identify what is -- will be the approximate time of recording; and where

 9     reference is made to Manojlo, could you please see whether you can tell

10     us whether that is a reference to you.

11             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, so the record is complete:  This is

12     ERN number T001-2432, and it is side A of a two-sided cassette tape.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Side A is the side you are expected to listen to.

14     Is that clear, Mr. Milovanovic?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is clear.  Maybe I could listen

16     to the tape now?  Maybe I don't even have to go to the hotel and then

17     return from the hotel to listen to the tape.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  I am -- no, but I think you will be provided with

19     all the --

20             MR. GROOME:  I have it.  And if VWS doesn't mind allowing him to

21     listen to it in their office, the Prosecution would have no objection to

22     that.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But, I mean, there's recorder on which the

24     tape can be played?

25             MR. GROOME: [Microphone not activated] Yes.

Page 15484

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 2             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, I have the recorder and the headset

 3     here, as well as the transcript.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  You can have everything, you can take it to

 5     your hotel, you don't have to come back to listen to it because you get

 6     all the equipment you need.  But if you prefer to listen to it now,

 7     that's fine as well.  Then please ask VWS to give you a place where to

 8     listen.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

11             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Then would you please follow the usher, and the

13     usher would provide you with the text and the equipment.

14                           [The witness stands down]

15             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm trying to verify whether there's any way that we

16     conclude the testimony of this witness before the weekend.

17             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, if Mr. Petrovic still abides by his

18     one-hour limit, I think we can -- we will certainly finish before the

19     weekend, if there are no procedural matters that would delay us.  I think

20     I would use about two hours --

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Two hours.

22             MR. GROOME:  -- at this stage.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  That's considerably less than the four or five hours

24     you indicated before.

25             So then we'll try -- Mr. Petrovic, we'll be rather strict on your


Page 15485

 1     time tomorrow, that is, 53 minutes left, and then two hours for the

 2     Prosecution, which leaves some time for further questions.  I urge the

 3     parties to see whether we really can finish by a quarter to 2.00.

 4             Then we adjourn.  And we will resume tomorrow, Thursday, the

 5     8th of December, at 9.00 in the morning, Courtroom II.

 6                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.51 p.m.,

 7                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 8th day

 8                           of December, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.