1 Wednesday, 7 December 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone.
6 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours.
8 This is case IT-03-69-T, the Prosecutor versus Jovica Stanisic
9 and Franko Simatovic.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
11 I was informed that there was a matter to be raised by the
12 Simatovic Defence. Mr. Petrovic.
13 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Just
14 briefly. My learned friend Jordash and myself have considered the topics
15 for the examination of the witness who is currently before the
16 Trial Chamber and we decided that some of our topics overlapped and that
17 is why we would like to suggest that the one hour that we requested
18 should be allocated to the Stanisic Defence. We would then need only one
19 hour and that would bring us to the total time requested for both Defence
20 teams. And if the Chamber finds this proposal acceptable, I would kindly
21 ask for these slight amendments to be made to the overall distribution of
22 our examination time.
23 JUDGE ORIE: First of all, can the witness be escorted into the
25 There were two hours left for you, Mr. Jordash. You were asking
1 for two hours, Mr. Petrovic. It's now 3:1.
2 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
3 [The witness takes the stand]
4 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning. Please be seated, Mr. Milovanovic.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning. Thank you.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Milovanovic, I'd like to remind you that the
7 solemn declaration you gave yesterday at the beginning of your testimony
8 is still binding. And Mr. Jordash will now continue his
10 Please proceed.
11 MR. JORDASH: Thank you.
12 WITNESS: MANOJLO MILOVANOVIC [Resumed]
13 [Witness answered through interpreter]
14 Further Cross-examination by Mr. Jordash: [Continued]
15 Q. And good morning, Mr. Milovanovic.
16 A. Good morning.
17 MR. JORDASH: Could we have on e-court, please, 5601.
18 65 ter 5601, page 46 of the English and 46 of the B/C/S, and 46 at the
19 top of the page.
20 Q. And I want to ask you about the entry, Tuesday, the
21 11th of August, 1992, and the entry concerning Bratunac and the
22 "Red Berets equalling 58, they have ambition to take power and they
23 operate under the patronage of the local priest."
24 Do you know anything about those Red Berets operating under the
25 patronage of the local priest?
1 A. At that time I only heard that somewhere between Bratunac and
2 Skelani a group of 26 of some Red Berets entered the area. People also
3 called them Seselj's Men. As for this number of 58, I wasn't aware of
4 that. We expelled that group of -- across the Drina very quickly because
5 they had not come to fight. They had come to loot abandoned houses, both
6 Muslim and Serb houses. They were thieves.
7 Q. Did that group then, that you expelled across the Drina, conduct
8 any military operations as far as you were aware?
9 A. No, they were not engaged in any military operations.
10 Q. You say that they had come to loot. Did they actually loot? And
11 if so, was the property taken across the Drina?
12 A. I don't know whether they took anything or not. They stole
13 little things, not furniture or any bigger things, but rather money,
14 small utensils, whatever they could carry in their hands. They did not
15 have any organised means of transport that would take them across the
17 Q. Thank you.
18 MR. JORDASH: Could we have, please, on the screen, 1D03595.
19 Q. What I'm going to have brought up to the screen, Mr. Milovanovic,
20 are Supreme Defence Council minutes from the FRY. I want to ask you
21 about something that's said during a meeting, during one of those
23 As we can see, this is minutes from -- these are minutes from the
24 5th Session of the Supreme Defence Council, 7th of August, 1992.
25 MR. JORDASH: And I want to turn, if we can, please, to page 18
1 of the English and 18 of the B/C/S.
2 Q. Mr. Milovanovic, were you aware of the Supreme Defence Council
3 and its usual makeup, the people who attended?
4 A. The Supreme Defence Councils in all countries are institutions
5 pertaining to Defence in peacetime, whereas in war time it would be
6 Supreme Commands. The head of that body is the president of the state.
7 There is also prime minister, minister of the interior, the defence
8 minister. And if the state is federal, which was also the case of FRY,
9 the president of the republics also attended.
10 Q. Thank you. I just want to direct your attention to the bottom of
11 the page where Pavle Bulatovic is speaking.
12 "Regarding these 350 pieces, I have information that the MUP of
13 Serbia is responsible for that. It is now possible that someone is
14 looking for an alibi in these ..."
15 MR. JORDASH: Let's go over the page in the English, please.
16 Q. "... in these stories just as they do in the General Staff. Ceko
17 says he's going to get a permit for his vehicle, which was probably
18 robbed and stolen somewhere in Bosnia through the General Staff. It is
19 possible that people are looking for an alibi. I showed two faxes to
20 minister Sokolovic, where Tikves and Ilok are mentioned, where a
21 commander, a Montenegrin, Zivojin Ivanovic, as a commander of a special
22 purposes units" --
23 THE INTERPRETER: Could the right B/C/S page be displayed,
25 MR. JORDASH: I think we need to go to the next page. Thank you.
1 Q. "... where a commander of a special purposes unit informs that a
2 group of twenty armed people are permitted to move across the territory
3 of Serbia and across the territory of Pljevlja. He signed as a commander
4 of some special unit. He has got a stamp, and he gives these
5 authorisations to himself, saying that his orders have to be executed. I
6 asked minister Sokolovic if he knew who this was and he said he's never
7 heard of him."
8 Then just moving down, to save time:
9 "We are going to have things like this happen as long as the
10 weapons are not collected from the people and stored somewhere. But I
11 think it will not be possible to realise this in an efficient way for the
12 next 15 years."
13 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter notes that the witness does not
14 have the correct B/C/S page in front of him.
15 MR. JORDASH: Could we go over the page then, please, in the
17 Q. Have you followed me so far, Mr. Milovanovic?
18 A. I did not see that text in front of me. What you were reading, I
19 didn't have that. Now I have a page. I don't know where you started.
20 My page starts with "In the media, the commander of White Eagles issues
21 an open address to President Bulatovic," I suppose that that was
22 Momir Bulatovic who was then either the president of the FRY government
23 or the prime minister of Montenegro, in any case, he was a member of the
24 Supreme Defence Council.
25 MR. JORDASH: May I just have a moment. Let's -- I'll come back
1 to that. I was told that the pages were exactly the same, but clearly
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome.
4 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, can I just note that the document
5 Mr. Jordash is now working with has been admitted as P2357.
6 MR. JORDASH: Thank you. I think we might have that on the
7 screen now. Let's come back to that. I do apologise, I'll find the
8 corresponding page.
9 Let's have on the screen instead then P-- sorry, 65 ter 5601.
10 And page 78 of the English and 78 of the B/C/S, 78 at the top of the
12 Q. This is dated the 18th of August, 1992, Pale. It's a meeting of
13 the -- at the SR Presidency. And on the screen we have J000-2253. I'm
14 interested in the suggestion or the -- what appears to be a suggestion by
15 "Colonel Dimitrija Sibalic (Bratunac): We have obtained two combat
16 Kragujs aircraft. We have a possibility to create a network of small
17 airports. They are asking to be under our jurisdiction for all
18 supplies," and so on.
19 Do you know anything about this colonel and this suggestion?
20 A. I don't know Sibalic by the name, but the family name Dimitrija
21 is known to me. He worked at the sports airport in Bratunac which was
22 refurbished to be able to accommodate Kraguj aircraft that can be armed
23 and used in combat. I'm not sure that I'm familiar with the family name
24 Sibalic. I've never heard that family name before.
25 Q. What about this suggestion of creating a network of small
1 airports, did that happen? Did he or anyone create, as far as you're
2 aware, a network of small airports outside of the control of the VRS?
3 A. I know nothing about that. Yesterday I spoke about some attempts
4 to create an improvised airfield in Podromanija at the foot of Romanija
5 mountain. The place was just marked, the plot was marked, and that was
6 it. That's where the work stopped.
7 Q. Sorry, just remind us: Who made that attempt?
8 A. The Presidency of Republika Srpska tasked the army with that and
9 the air force and the entire aircraft defence of Republika Srpska marked
10 the area where the airport would be, but that was it. The airport was
11 never built. The attempt to build an airport was a response to the
12 Muslims' project to build an airport somewhere in the area of Visoko.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 MR. JORDASH: Can we go, please, to 65 ter 5602. Same as we have
15 on the screen, but page 51 of the English, 51 of the B/C/S, and 51 at the
16 top of the page.
17 Q. And we are looking at an entry which is dated the
18 15th of September, 1992, and it's Bijeljina and it's a conference in the
19 Eastern Bosnian Corps. I'm interested in what the president of the
20 Kalesija SO Petar Jankovic appears to be reporting.
21 "There were 8.000 Serbs, genocide is being carried out for the
22 second time. 70 per cent of our men have been in the trenches since
23 May of 1992, we got out. Civilian government is made up of 5 people.
24 I'm disappointed in the Serbian people as a whole. 80 per cent of the
25 Serbs are fleeing. 2050 men (mostly elderly) are holding 25 kilometres
1 of the front."
2 Do you know anything about the situation described by Jankovic in
3 his municipality at this point in time?
4 A. There was a meeting in Bijeljina dealing with the military and
5 political issues. I did not attend. Some other generals headed by
6 General Mladic attended. In that part of Republika Srpska, which is
7 Posavina, Semberija, and Majevica region, throughout the war there were
8 conflicts, firstly between the civilian authorities, i.e., the municipal
9 authorities, and military authorities. And the reason was the fact that
10 the civilians did not assist the army.
11 Q. Assist the army in doing what?
12 A. In providing them with materiel and equipment and supplies.
13 Q. What was happening in that municipality in terms of combat; was
14 it a front line, was it a defensive area? What was it?
15 A. Kalesija was a so-called border-line municipality. During the
16 war, i.e., after the end of the war, it became part of the Federation.
17 During the war for a certain period of time it was in our hands. We can
18 see here that the president of the municipality complained of something
19 that was a commonplace occurrence along the border of Republika Srpska.
20 Those Serbs in Podrinje and in Semberija had a reserve homeland, as it
22 As I already told you, if people heard shots 20 kilometres away,
23 the Serbs immediately fled across the Drina into Serbia. He provides a
24 percentage here which is not realistic. He says that 70 per cent of the
25 Serbs, i.e., our people, are in trenches, but that's 70 per cent of those
1 who stayed behind in Kalesija. We have to take into account that 80 per
2 cent had already fled. He doesn't criticise anybody. He just complains
3 and he just -- he is fishing for sympathy. He wants people to understand
4 that he is in dire straits. That's all.
5 Q. Was this a Serbian-dominated municipality, or what was the ethnic
6 makeup before the war? Do you know?
7 A. I know the ethnic structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole but
8 not of individual municipalities. It's obvious that here Serbs were in
9 the minority, a very small minority.
10 Q. And were Serbs from that municipality eventually expelled?
11 A. Looking at what this president of municipality says, it seems
12 they were not expelled, that they fled. They left the municipality
13 themselves, because he mentions genocide here, but they were not
14 physically driven out by the Muslims. They ran for their lives, fearing
15 for their existence, their property, their survival.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 MR. JORDASH: Let's just go back quickly to page 40.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, the problems you earlier had, finding
19 what in the Supreme Defence Council minutes was found in page 18 and 19,
20 you find it in 22 of the B/C/S version.
21 MR. JORDASH: Thank you very much. Let's just go back -- oh, we
22 are on the page that I'm interested in. Page 40, English and B/C/S, 40
23 at the top of the page, J000-1181.
24 Q. You'll see this is an entry, Bijeljina, 15th of September, 1992.
25 It's the same conference that we've been looking at in the
1 Eastern Bosnian Corps. And we see there number 2 Special Brigade
2 Ljubica Savic referred to - that's Mauzer, isn't it, Mr. Milovanovic? -
3 and does that entry accord with your knowledge?
4 A. Under number 2 I see here the 2nd Posavina Brigade commanded by
5 Milad Berenja [phoen]. I don't see Ljubisa Savic Mauzer. I'm looking at
6 page 41 in B/C/S.
7 Q. You should be on page 40 in B/C/S.
8 A. It's still 41. I see "Ljubisa Savic" in the English version, but
9 I don't understand the rest.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Could we go to the place where the numbers usually
11 are written up to the top, or do we have the whole of the page now? So
12 apparently this is one. Yes, this is the right one. Let's proceed.
13 It's a different one from what we had a minute ago.
14 Mr. Groome.
15 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, just to avoid confusion, Mr. Jordash is
16 recorded as saying that he's working with page 1181, and I see 1170 on
17 the screen.
18 MR. JORDASH: Thank you. So it's J000-1170.
19 Q. You can see the entry there. It seems as though the commander of
20 the Eastern Bosnian Corps is reporting concerning Special Brigade
21 Ljubisa Savic. And my question was: That Ljubisa Savic is or was
22 Mauzer, and do the details there about his subordination and activities
23 accord with your knowledge?
24 A. It is Mauzer. It's about that brigade that I spoke about
25 yesterday, the Panthers or the Guards, as they call themselves. That
1 brigade was not established by Ljubisa Savic but by Major Pantelic, and
2 that's probably where the name Panthers comes from, from Pantelic. And
3 that's how the fighting men were named. It's a small unit that were set
4 up before the VRS. It's only 420 men, so it's not even a battalion, but
5 they call themselves a brigade to seek popularity. And it says that from
6 the beginning of the war he said -- it says they had 80 wounded and
7 20 dead. And that brigade commander was later succeeded by Mauzer.
8 Q. Thank you. Let's return now to the Supreme Defence Council
10 MR. JORDASH: 1D3595. Page 20 -- sorry, page 18 of the English
11 and 22 of the B/C/S.
12 Q. I'm interested in what Pavle Bulatovic, federal minister of the
13 interior, has to say concerning Ivanovic.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Could we move, in English, to the next page because
15 I finished those two lines by now.
16 MR. JORDASH:
17 Q. Please indicate when you finish the page, Mr. Milovanovic.
18 A. I've just finished reading this page.
19 MR. JORDASH: Let's go to the next page of the B/C/S, please.
20 Q. And read down to where Pavle Bulatovic picks up on what
21 Zivota Panic has said.
22 A. I've reached the reference to Momir Bulatovic.
23 Q. Thank you. Now, as we can see from this entry, there's obviously
24 a discussion about Ivanovic. And it appears that Bulatovic is
25 essentially accusing the army, Panic, of arming Ivanovic from the
1 Fourth of July Barracks and he's making that allegation on the basis that
2 Ivanovic had been, it seems, reported to have said he had been equipped
3 in the Fourth of July Barracks. Are you able to explain just very
4 briefly your understanding of the Fourth of July Barracks, what it was at
5 this point in time, August of 1992?
6 A. The action is taking place in the territory of Serbia,
7 Montenegro, and Kosovo. Republika Srpska has nothing to do with it.
8 It's their mutual settlement of accounts and accusations. Bulatovic it
9 blaming the Army of Yugoslavia that they had equipped this group and
10 Panic is denying it. So I can't play referee here. I don't know whether
11 it's accurate or not. I don't know this man Ivanovic.
12 Q. I'm not asking you to play referee. I'm asking you to explain
13 what the Fourth of July Barracks was as far as you're aware. If you
14 don't know, you don't know; but if you can assist, that would be great.
15 A. The Fourth of July Barracks is located in Belgrade. It housed
16 mostly guards units from the garrison in Belgrade.
17 Q. What is a guard unit?
18 A. Guard units in every army, and also in the Army of Yugoslavia,
19 are units that provide direct security to the Supreme Command, to the
20 president of the state, the General Staff. They're also parade units
21 used to -- for welcome ceremonies to foreign heads of state, et cetera.
22 Q. And as seems to be suggested by Bulatovic, the
23 Fourth July Barracks contained logistics and weapons; is that correct?
24 A. Every barracks where there are soldiers and COs and officers have
25 certain depots where equipment is stored, clothing, footwear, weapons,
1 some ammunition, and Bulatovic is probably referring to the fact that
2 those 1150 men in total were probably equipped from that depot, from the
4 MR. JORDASH: Can we go, please, to 65 ter 5596.
5 Q. Now, this is a Mladic notebook from November 1991 and it may be
6 that you cannot comment, but I'm going to give it a try.
7 MR. JORDASH: Please could we have page -- page 362 of the
8 English, 363 of the B/C/S, and 362 at the top of the page.
9 Q. And I wanted to see if you can -- this helps to clarify issues
10 relating to the Fourth of July Barracks. It's a Mladic entry, J000-2740,
11 and at the top of the page of the English, and I'm interested in the
12 section which begins:
13 "Vuksan Milovic from the staff of the Serbian Guard in Belgrade
14 received approval of Lieutenant-General Simovic that they got the
15 Fourth of July Barracks in Belgrade, Backa Palanka, Novi Sad. The Guard
16 will go there for training. They are preparing 2.500 men who will join
17 us there -- join us here. The Guards Staff will include 10 people -
18 officers which they will select - and 10 from the Serbian Republican
19 Staff of the TO. I will be in contact with Major-General Vukovic."
20 And do you know anything about this, the arming and training of
21 the Serbian Guard force at the Fourth of July Barracks in Belgrade in
22 November 1991?
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome.
24 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, for the clarity of the record,
25 J000-2740 is P2929 in evidence.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
2 MR. JORDASH: Thank you.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know anything about this.
4 At that time I was an operative officer at the command in Skopje.
5 MR. JORDASH:
6 Q. You do know who the Serbian Guard were though, don't you?
7 A. I don't know. I only know what I saw on TV, like any other
8 citizen, that some paramilitary units were coming into existence. I was
9 engaged at that time as an operative in charge of Kosovo and Macedonia,
10 and I know that some sort of paramilitary appeared at Skopska Gora in
11 Macedonia, but I believe they left very soon afterwards and they were
12 not, I believe, related to the Fourth of July Barracks. It was some sort
13 of popular party from Sremska Mitrovica ran by some man Jovic who had
14 formed six detachments bearing some traditional Serbian name such as
15 Sindjelic. They tried to penetrate into Macedonia. But I simply don't
16 know anything about the Fourth of July Barracks.
17 Q. Okay. Fair enough. Let's move on then.
18 MR. JORDASH: Sorry, could I just have a moment. Can we go back,
19 please, to 65 ter 50-- sorry, 5063. And page 253 of the English, 247 of
20 the B/C/S, and 246 at the top -- at the top of the page.
21 Q. Now, I'm interested in the entry which begins -- sorry, you don't
22 have yours yet, but as that's coming up, I'm interested in the entry that
23 begins: "Samac, 7th of December, 1992, Monday, 950 hours."
24 MR. JORDASH: And if we go over the page with the English to
25 page 254 of the English and 248, I think, of the B/C/S, I hope.
1 Q. And we're talking about a meeting with the leadership of the
2 Samac municipality. And Dr. Simic, president of the municipality, is
4 MR. JORDASH: And if we can move to page 256 of the English and
5 249 of the B/C/S.
6 Q. Are we there, Mr. Milovanovic, in the original, where it begins:
7 "Stevan Todorovic, SJB chief"?
8 A. No, I have page 249, the meeting with representatives from
9 Banja Luka.
10 Q. There isn't a number on the top of the page, that might be what's
11 difficult. But it should be, I think, 248. Or strangely on my copy it's
12 between 247 and 248.
13 A. Now I'm looking at 231.
14 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, if I may assist, the record is saying
15 5063 and I have found it under 65 ter 5603. That could be the cause of
16 the confusion.
17 MR. JORDASH: Yes, my mistake. I beg your pardon, 5603. I do
18 apologise to Madam Usher.
19 THE REGISTRAR: This is 5603, Your Honours.
20 MR. JORDASH: Oh, it is.
21 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, I suggest that you move on to a page
23 which is known to you. And would you please take care that your
24 apologies only will not already take a considerable time in court.
25 MR. JORDASH: I'm not sure I did anything wrong there. I gave
1 the numbers that I had, which are the right numbers.
2 JUDGE ORIE: But what's then --
3 MR. JORDASH: Well, I don't know what the B/C/S original page
4 number is, but I've given what the indication I --
5 JUDGE ORIE: You have to take care that you know the English page
6 numbers and the B/C/S page numbers. It's always possible -- if they're
7 okay now, then of course there's no problem. But it could well be, let
8 me have a look ... Is there any way that "Stevan Todorovic" appears at
9 the very end of this page, chief of the SJB? At least it looks, more or
10 less. And also the date of the 18th of April, 1992, seems to be
11 corresponding. I'm -- it's your exhibit, it's your witness, but that
12 seems to be.
13 MR. JORDASH: But that's the page numbers I've given, yeah.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. So that's correct now. So then put your
15 question. We have now -- at least I have a English page and a B/C/S page
16 which are corresponding. So why not ask a question?
17 MR. JORDASH: Thank you.
18 Q. Would you read the entry "Stevan Todorovic," please,
19 Mr. Milovanovic. Have you read it?
20 A. You want me to read this?
21 Q. Yeah, I'm putting my question as soon as I can, so please read
23 JUDGE ORIE: This is, of course, half an entry because it stops
24 in the middle of a line. I don't know whether you want us, whether in
25 B/C/S or in English, to read the whole of that line, but --
1 MR. JORDASH: Well, I'd like him to read the entry, I'd like
2 everyone to read the entry, then we'll go over the page to finish off
3 that entry, if we can.
4 Q. Are you there, Mr. Milovanovic? We can then move to the next
6 A. Yes. I've read the entire page, yes.
7 Q. Just for the avoidance of doubt, I'm interested in what Todorovic
8 is saying about the sending of men to Ilok for training and what happens
9 to them subsequently.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Could we now also, for the benefit of witness,
11 enlarge the top portion of the left page. A little bit more perhaps.
13 MR. JORDASH: For the record: J000-4672.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've come up to the 19th of May and
15 Colonel Stevan Nikolic who says that he has to go to Belgrade, which
16 means that I've read everything concerning Todorovic.
17 MR. JORDASH:
18 Q. Did you know about these men being sent by Colonel Jeremic and
19 General Bulic to Ilok for training?
20 A. I didn't know that. That was in April 1992 when I was still in
21 Nis. And I can see here the name Todorovic. I knew him, I spoke to him
22 several times on the phone. Stevan Todorovic had two nicknames, Steve
23 and Crni. Here he only brags that he sent some people for training in
24 Ilok, in Srem, which means that he sent them outside of the
25 Republika Srpska territory.
1 Q. Were you aware of a special battalion that had been formed under
2 the command of Crni and then subordinated to Colonel Nikolic in
3 operations in Sanski Samac?
4 A. I didn't know that.
5 Q. Did you know a Colonel Nikolic?
6 A. No, I did not.
7 Q. Okay. Let's move on then.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Just for my information, Mr. Milovanovic, in the
9 portion we just read we see that Dragan Djordjevic is -- has as a
10 nickname or is also known as Crni, and the same would be true for
11 Todorovic, they would both have the same nickname?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
14 MR. JORDASH: On that subject, could we please go to 65 ter 5600,
16 Q. And page 377 at the top, please. And you see the entry there -
17 this is J000-3551 - the entry which begins with:
18 "Divjak, his nickname is Crni, there are six of them with the
19 same nickname, three are stealing in order to discredit me."
20 Was Crni a common name? Is it a common name? Or was it a common
21 nickname, I should say, during the conflict?
22 A. Those people were self-styled Crni. That's the nickname six of
23 them adopted, because Crni amongst Serbs is a synonym for something
24 terrible and terrifying. And the Crni that we spoke about yesterday was
25 from Belica. He moved from Herzegovina. Wherever there were problems
1 amongst civilian authorities, where it was easy to loot and amass riches,
2 he appeared there. He got in touch with those who were of the same
3 problematic behaviour. As I was reading this, I found the materials in
4 the notebook, and in brackets there is the name and the family name of
5 that Crni from Belica. That's the same man who had been in Mladic's
6 office and Mladic sent him to me. Everything that he was saying was
7 aimed at preventing his detention, because he had killed a man, but his
8 story was that he had killed that man in order to protect the corps
9 commander or something to that effect.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Milovanovic, before we go through the details of
11 the behaviour of every Crni in the former Yugoslavia, I do understand
12 that Crni was a nickname which was used with some frequency and referred
13 to something terrible.
14 That's, I think, was the question, isn't it, Mr. Jordash?
15 MR. JORDASH: Your Honour, yes.
16 JUDGE ORIE: That question has been answered. Next question,
18 MR. JORDASH: Thank you.
19 Q. I want to return to something we touched on yesterday,
20 Mr. Milovanovic, because I think it's fair to give you an opportunity to
22 MR. JORDASH: Could we have P386 on the screen, please. This is
23 the combat readiness and activities of the Army of Republika Srpska in
24 1992 analysis, dated April 1993. And I'm interested in page 61 of the
25 English and 55 of the B/C/S.
1 Q. And as we can see we're dealing with a section of the report
2 which is looking back at the training within -- training and education
3 within the VRS. And I think we can start off with - if you could find in
4 the text - "The Main Problems That Arose Were," then we can lead off from
6 A. I've read about the main problems that arose in training.
7 Q. And do you see the section --
8 MR. JORDASH: Perhaps we need to go to B/C/S page 56 and
9 English 62.
10 Q. -- where it says:
11 "After these initial problems which occurred in most of our
12 units, the consequences of which were a large number of killed and
13 wounded officers and men in the unit, measures were taken in most units
14 to improve training and retrain the men and the officers."?
15 A. And your question is?
16 Q. Well, let's just go to one more reference, if you wouldn't mind.
17 MR. JORDASH: Page 64 of the English and B/C/S page 58.
18 Q. And it's under C, "The Training of Critical Skills," and you'll
19 see, in the English at least, it's about seven or more like ten lines
20 down, where it says:
21 "Lack of training is the main reason for the large number of dead
22 and wounded."
23 Do you see that?
24 A. I have read the first paragraph.
25 Q. So do you accept -- do you accept that training was problematic
1 and did lead -- the lack of training did lead to an increased number of
2 dead and wounded in 1992 at least?
3 A. I have a three-and-a-half-year long war experience, which tells
4 me that out of the number of dead 80 per cent were due to a human
5 mistake. I don't want to teach you about the international standards of
6 human losses, which is 8 per cent by the way. The Army of
7 Republika Srpska suffered total losses of between 7 and 8 per cent. And
8 when I said that 80 per cent of men are killed due to human mistake, I
9 primarily meant a lack of training. An officer cannot help a soldier to
10 shelter, to target well, to shoot well.
11 On the previous page we could read how people were recruited into
12 the JNA. They were of different ethnic groups. Serbs were mostly
13 recruited as infantry men, as quartermasters, men as drivers. When the
14 war started, we had artillery tanks, aeroplanes, all sorts of things, and
15 we had to retrain our -- those infantry men for various specialties. One
16 of the main causes of loss in the Army of Republika Srpska was the lack
17 of training.
18 The time was really short. As I told you yesterday, the first
19 eight months of training meant that we did not use young recruits in
20 combat. However, we inherited a large contingent of military conscripts
21 aged between 23, which is the age when they were no longer under the
22 obligation to serve in the army, until the age of 55. When they served
23 in the army, they were trained on obsolete weapons. In the meantime the
24 weapons were modernised and they didn't know how to use them.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, is there a lot of dispute about that; if
1 people are badly trained and the circumstances may not have allowed for
2 such perfect training, that this would have a negative impact on
3 casualties and wounded?
4 MR. GROOME: No, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, the document apparently says that this
6 was the situation.
7 MR. JORDASH: No, I was just getting to the real point.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Let's get to the real point.
9 MR. JORDASH: If we go to page 61 of the B/C/S and 68 of the
10 English, there's a section there which deals with final recommendations
11 concerning what should happen in 1993.
12 Q. And the first entry concerning what should be done is that the
13 Main Staff of the RS and the air force and the anti-aircraft defence must
14 devote greater attention to material training resources and teaching
15 aids, and the first entry is:
16 "The maintenance and guarding of training-grounds, drill grounds,
17 and durable and expendable teaching supplies."
18 Now, my question is -- do you have that, Mr. Milovanovic?
19 A. Yes, I do.
20 Q. My question is - and it's not a criticism, it's just a question:
21 Why was it that the VRS didn't open more training-grounds to deal with
22 this deficit?
23 A. We didn't have money. We used the training-grounds in Manjaca
24 and Kalinovik that we inherited from the JNA.
25 Q. Is there any reason why you didn't call on assistance from
1 Serbia, from the FRY, to assist you with training?
2 A. The FRY accepted to train officers and non-commissioned officers
3 following the regular peacetime curriculum, which means that their
4 training lasted for four years. That's why we had to establish our own
5 training centres to train our own officers and non-commissioned officers
6 in the duration of six months and one year respectively.
7 Q. So apart from this assistance in training officers and
8 non-commissioned officer, you, the VRS, did not receive assistance from
9 the FRY in terms of training recruits or non-officers; is that right, as
10 far as you are aware?
11 A. We did not ask for that kind of assistance because the FRY was
12 not supposed to be involved in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the first
13 place. We did not want the FRY to be a warring party in Bosnia and
14 Herzegovina in the same way the Republic of Croatia was.
15 Q. And just -- we'll come back to this shortly, but it was noted -
16 and we can turn to it if we need to - in this combat report that there
17 was good -- your assessment, the VRS assessment in April of 1993 was that
18 in 1992 there had been good co-operation between the military
19 intelligence services but in terms of co-operation between the VRS
20 intelligence service and the Serbian MUP intelligence service, that
21 co-operation was unsatisfactory in 1992; can you confirm that?
22 A. I'm afraid I didn't understand your question, especially within
23 the MUP context. What MUP did you have in mind? Who did not co-operate
24 with whom?
25 Q. Let me --
1 MR. JORDASH: Your Honour, I note the time. I can find the exact
2 piece of text I'm looking for in the meantime.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then perhaps we take a break first. But could
4 I seek some clarification of one of the last answers.
5 You said, Mr. Milovanovic: "The FRY accepted to train officers
6 and non-commissioned officers following the regular peacetime curriculum,
7 which means that their training lasted for four years." Does this mean
8 that this offer could not be accepted because it would have taken too
9 much time anyhow to have them trained in that way?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We accepted the offer and we did
11 sends our candidates for officers and non-commissioned officers for
12 training, but we had to wait for them to come back. The war had to stop,
13 and we were sure that we would win and that the VRS would continue
14 functioning and we would certainly benefit from those officers. But we
15 couldn't wait for the cycle to be over. We lost 17.400 men in combat.
16 38 per cent, 6.600 of them, were officers and non-commissioned officers.
17 I'm again repeating that the world norm is 8 per cent losses of the
18 overall loss and we suffered 38 per cent losses among our officer staff.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Whether it was reasonable or not reasonable what you
20 did and whether you had good reasons to do so is a different matter. I
21 just asked on whether it was -- the offer was accepted. I do, therefore,
22 understand that part of those to be trained as officers and
23 non-commissioned officers were not available because they were being
24 trained by the FRY. Is that well understood?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's correct, yes.
1 JUDGE ORIE: We take a break. And we resume at ten minutes to
3 --- Recess taken at 10.23 a.m.
4 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue: Mr. Jordash, you received
6 instructions from the Registry what you should provide in order to be
7 sure that the documents you would like to have on the screen would be on
8 the screen. Now, I do understand that you say you can't do that and that
9 you're referring to page numbers at the top of the page handwritten.
10 Let's make one thing perfectly clear. Whatever is handwritten in a
11 document or typed in a document or whatever is content of the document.
12 For a document to be on the screen, you can't start searching in the
13 content of a document. You need the e-court pages, references, what is
14 the document, what are the ...
15 Now, I do understand that although the Registry has again tried
16 again and again to assist you in this matter, if you say, "I can't give
17 you those references," you are missing an opportunity to put a document
18 to a witness. It's not just a matter of saying, "We need in this
19 document, which is 300 pages, we need a page which at the top there's a
20 handwritten reference of ..." especially if they are not in sequential
21 order. So the Registry will still try to assist you, but if you don't
22 come up with the e-court data needed in order to call them on the screen,
23 the consequence simply is that you don't have the document there to put
24 to the witness.
25 MR. JORDASH: The problem is that I didn't want to and didn't
1 plan to work from the original. That was Mr. Groome's idea. That idea
2 was adopted --
3 JUDGE ORIE: But --
4 MR. JORDASH: -- by the Chamber yesterday. We finished court at
5 7.00. With the best will in the world we couldn't go through the whole
6 of the diaries and find the page numbers overnight.
7 JUDGE ORIE: If you say, I could do that -- again, Mr. Jordash,
8 you're explaining to me what is problematic. What you should do is to
9 say, "I could solve the problem if you would allow me to go back to the
10 non-handwritten originals, but only to the B/C/S version," then we would
11 consider that and we would avoid the chaos. I think, as a matter of
12 fact, that there was never a ruling of the Chamber on that. What we
13 suggested was to have them both on the screen so that -- and that was a
14 suggestion. That was not an order. If you would have said, "But this
15 causes us problems, in giving the Registry the right information to get
16 them on the screen," we would have considered that.
17 MR. JORDASH: But yesterday there didn't seem to be a problem, so
18 I didn't think about this overnight because we didn't seem to have a
20 JUDGE ORIE: Well, we had problems today. And I do agree with
21 you that yesterday, where the Registry did it's utmost best to assist
22 you, that -- and they're still willing to do that, but if we end up --
23 and let's not forget that this morning we had a problem which was just
24 bad preparation. If you do not know that the B/C/S is found on page 22
25 and we start looking through page 18 and 19 for three or four minutes,
1 that's, of course, a waste of time. And that's a matter that in a well
2 organised preparation of the Defence should have been dealt with. And
3 it's not the first. And, again, I'm not going to -- I'm really solution
4 oriented, but the only thing I want to say is that if you want a document
5 on the screen and if you say -- and I should not talk too quickly. If
6 you say, "I can do it but unfortunately not on the handwritten ones,"
7 then you could have gone to Mr. Groome, you could have told him that
8 until now at no point in time reference was made to asterisks or to
9 specific matters in the handwriting.
10 We all, if we wish to, can have the originals on our screen. The
11 only thing is then that the witness doesn't see it. But any party seeing
12 any particulars on the handwritten version - and you have your computers
13 available to follow it, and Mr. Groome also has - then can say, "I would
14 like this page now to be shown, it's found on e-court page 256." Let's
15 try to always find ways to resolve existing problems.
16 Mr. Groome, you are on your feet.
17 MR. GROOME: Just two thing briefly, Your Honour. If it would
18 avoid confusion, I think it may be enough just to inform
19 General Milovanovic that any time he wishes to see the original, if that
20 would assist him, that's available. And secondly, the Prosecution has
21 been preparing a table which I will tender tomorrow which is simply the
22 reference, the J number, the transcript page reference number, and
23 hopefully the Chamber will admit that and that should allow at least a
24 clear record of what specific entries have been discussed in
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, that's what we need on the record. But
2 our first concern was how to get documents on the screen the Defence
3 wishes to have on the screen.
4 Mr. Jordash, has the guidance been sufficient? If you say
5 alternative ways will avoid a waste of time, then we would seriously
6 consider to proceed in that way.
7 MR. JORDASH: Well, the page numbers I have, and I'm now
8 confused, the page numbers I have are the ones which I've been
9 indicating, which are the B/C/S and the English and the top of the page.
10 They're the only page numbers I have --
11 JUDGE ORIE: No, but there --
12 MR. JORDASH: -- and there's nothing I can do to rectify that at
13 this point in time.
14 JUDGE ORIE: But you had prepared, before, isn't it? Before the
15 witness came.
16 MR. JORDASH: Yes, with those page numbers, the ones --
17 JUDGE ORIE: The handwritten page numbers at the top of the
18 pages? Mr. Jordash, we need e-court numbers. And if they are the same,
20 MR. JORDASH: Yes, that's right. I've been saying the e-court
21 numbers for the typed copies.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. For the typed copies. And there, apparently,
23 seems to be the problem, that Mr. Groome had suggested to use the
24 handwritten version, and that now apparently causes the problems in
25 calling the documents on the screen. And if this resolves it, then I
1 think Mr. Groome already said, Okay, let's then, if that resolves the
2 problem, Mr. Milovanovic is hereby informed that whenever he would like
3 to look at the handwritten version, that it is available but that we
4 start working from the transcribed original.
5 Now, Mr. Jordash, from now on, if you are talking about the
6 B/C/S, you are talking about the B/C/S typewritten transcript.
7 MR. JORDASH: Yes.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So that's that version of the original.
9 Madam Registrar, does that give sufficient guidance if you get
10 the e-court numbers?
11 THE REGISTRAR: Not exactly. I would need the number of the
12 document among three or five documents that are uploaded under the same
13 65 ter number. So which two documents are you using and which pages on
14 each document.
15 MR. JORDASH: So if I give the ERN number, does that assist?
16 THE REGISTRAR: For example, doc ID. So, yeah. Doc ID for --
17 you give me first 65 ter number, I open the document, there are five
18 documents uploaded under this number. So I need, for B/C/S, this doc ID;
19 English, this doc ID.
20 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand that for Madam Registrar part of the
21 problem is that documents are uploaded, are re-uploaded, sometimes are
22 already admitted into evidence, so therefore that ... but, let's get
23 started and let's see whether it works. And if not, Mr. Jordash, you're
24 invited to discuss the matter with Madam Registrar.
25 MR. JORDASH: Okay. Let's get back to --
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Milovanovic, you were witnessing, as a witness,
2 a procedural discussion which we hope to leave behind us at this moment.
3 Mr. Jordash will now continue.
4 MR. JORDASH: Let's return to P386, which is the combat readiness
5 and activities of the Army of the RS in 1992. And, please, could we have
6 on the screen page 83 of the English and 74 of the B/C/S. And we are
7 looking at the section dealing with intelligence and security support.
8 And this part is 5.1, intelligence support. And if we can then turn to
9 page 85 of the English and 76 of the B/C/S, please.
10 Q. And the paragraph I'm interested in begins:
11 "Co-operation and exchange of data with related services in the
12 territory of RS is generally satisfactory, as well as with the Main Staff
13 of the SVRSK. Of late, co-operation has also been intensified with the
14 intelligence and security organs of the Army of Yugoslavia, while with
15 the Ministry of the Interior, the Republic of Serbia, it is still at an
16 unsatisfactory level."
17 MR. JORDASH: Then if we can move, for completeness, to page 90
18 of the English and 80 of the B/C/S, dealing with security as opposed to
20 Q. Paragraph 10:
21 "Co-operation with related services in the territories of the RS,
22 the RSK and the FR Yugoslavia grew in proportion to the development of
23 the intelligence security system of the Army of RS and the MUP of RS. We
24 consider the co-operation with related services in the Serbian army, the
25 RS Krajina, and the National Security Service of Republika Srpska until
1 now to have been very good, professional, and untrammelled by any
2 subjective obstacles. Our co-operation with the MUP of Republika Srpska
3 and especially with the MUP of the Republic of Serbia and of the
4 FR Yugoslavia we consider to have been unsatisfactory. The main cause
5 being, in our opinion, the passivity of the organs mentioned and their
6 reluctance to expand co-operation with us."
7 Do you have that?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Is that your view? Was that your view?
10 A. The analysis of combat readiness was prepared in seven segments.
11 The one we looked at before was training and education, that's my segment
12 as Chief of Staff. This security and intelligence segment was prepared
13 by the security and intelligence sector, that is General Tolimir. I see
14 here two problems that Tolimir pointed out in this analysis. The first
15 problem is the mutual co-operation of intelligence services in the
16 environment. Under the law, intelligence services of friendly countries
17 are required to co-operate.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Milovanovic, the first question is - I do now
19 understand that this part was not authored by you or not prepared by you:
20 Is your view different from the one which is written down here?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My position is consistent with what
22 is written here.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. That answers the question, I take it,
24 Mr. Jordash.
25 MR. JORDASH: Thank you.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
2 MR. JORDASH:
3 Q. Was this lack of co-operation a discussion amongst the Main Staff
4 and the meetings that were held amongst the Main Staff?
5 A. Yes. Before the analysis we read the whole analysis together and
6 that was an opportunity for people to make remarks to others, if they had
8 Q. But had General Tolimir raised this issue prior to the
9 compilation of this report during a Main Staff meeting? Had he come, for
10 example, and said, this is the issue, I'm reporting to you, reporting to
11 Mladic, this is the situation with the problems of co-operation with the
12 Serbian intelligence, civil intelligence service, the DB?
13 A. Yes, that was a continuous topic. And this is an analysis of the
14 annual performance of the VRS citing both good and bad things.
15 Q. And was there any indication during these discussions or at the
16 time this report was compiled which touched upon the reasons why the
17 Serbian DB was passive in relation to anticipated or hoped-for
19 A. This is about co-operation with the Ministry of the Interior, not
20 with the state security.
21 Q. But the Ministry of the Interior's intelligence service was the
22 State Security of Serbia, wasn't it?
23 A. Probably. I'm not so conversant with the structure of security
24 in Serbia. But our intelligence service was required to co-operate with
25 our Ministry of the Interior, that means the MUP of Republika Srpska.
1 The army was not required to co-operate with the Ministry of the Interior
2 of Serbia or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We were required to
3 co-operate with the intelligence service of the General Staff of
5 Q. Okay. Fair enough. In terms of co-operation with the
6 Serbian MUP in relation to other issues other than intelligence issues,
7 was that a discussion at the Main Staff?
8 A. It was discussed and Tolimir was always directed to co-operate
9 with the MUP of Serbia and to have this co-operation through the
10 General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia.
11 Q. Now, we're talking about this combat readiness report dated
12 April of 1993. Am I correct that Stanisic was not a subject for
13 discussion at the Main Staff, Stanisic's co-operation with the VRS, for
14 example? That wasn't something that was discussed.
15 A. In my last testimony I was directed by the president of the
16 Trial Chamber to study 54 reports by Tolimir, intelligence briefs that he
17 prepared and sent to various addresses. And he regularly wrote to them
18 that he sent them also to Jovica Stanisic, which he was not required to
19 do; and to me, although we were only two metres away from each other;
20 General Djukic, the minister - can somebody help me? it was not Sokolovic
21 at the time, it was somebody else - the Ministry of Internal Affairs of
22 Serbia, which he didn't have to do.
23 And I also wrote a manuscript to the Trial Chamber explaining
24 that Tolimir was doing that irregularly and unlawfully, aiming to present
25 himself as co-operating with various institutions in the Balkans. His
1 name -- Stanisic's name was used irregularly, and I'm apologizing to him
2 now that he was involved in something where he didn't belong. Tolimir
3 just put him of his own accord on his mailing list.
4 JUDGE ORIE: The question was whether Mr. Stanisic, and
5 Mr. Stanisic's co-operation with the VRS, whether that was something
6 discussed at meetings of the Main Staff. That was the question. Was it
7 or was it not?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was never any discussion
9 about Jovica Stanisic as chief of the State Security of Serbia.
10 MR. JORDASH:
11 Q. Thank you. Mr. Stanisic first appears in the diary -- sorry, in
12 the notebooks on the 2nd of July, 1993. So he doesn't appear in 1991 and
13 he doesn't appear in 1992, and neither is he mentioned. Does that
14 surprise you, from your interaction with Mladic, your conversations with
15 him, and so on?
16 A. It does not surprise me. I don't know in what context Jovica
17 appeared on the 2nd of July, 1992. I know that my first contact with him
18 was on the 22nd or 23rd January, 1993, at Mount Tara in the
19 Panorama Hotel.
20 Q. Sorry, just to be clear: He appears in the diary for the first
21 time on the 2nd of July, 1993. And just so you understand the situation,
22 his telephone number doesn't appear in the diaries from 1991 to 1995, the
23 notebooks. Does that surprise you?
24 A. Whose notes?
25 Q. Mladic's notes. Which contain, for your information, tens and
1 tens and tens of other telephone numbers.
2 A. You've got me confused now. In my last testimony, between two
3 breaks we discussed some meeting recorded in Mladic's diary, a meeting in
4 Slavonia, and the dilemma was whether Mladic is -- Mladic was talking to
5 Stanisic or he was writing down what Stanisic was saying at that meeting,
6 and we concluded in the end that Mladic was writing down Stanisic's
7 words. Because what was written there was that Stanisic had informed the
8 meeting that he had sent some eight men to Tenja. Tenja being a place in
9 Slavonia. So I don't think it's a correct version that Stanisic's name
10 was not mentioned in 1991 and 1992. And you also added throughout the
12 Q. Sorry, I think you've misunderstood the point I was making or
13 asking you about. What I was suggesting was that Stanisic's telephone
14 number doesn't appear in the notebooks and I was asking you whether that
15 is a surprise to you.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, isn't it true that you asked two
17 questions? The first whether it was a surprise that Mr. Stanisic appears
18 only in the 2nd of July, 1993, and the second is whether it's a surprise
19 that the telephone number of Mr. Stanisic ... So I think the witness
20 commented on the first question. And then to say that he didn't
21 understand the question, because you put both questions to him, isn't it?
22 MR. JORDASH: I didn't put both questions. I confirmed and
23 corrected the witness's understanding about the 2nd of July, 1992, and
24 then I moved on to the second question. But if it was confusing, then I
1 JUDGE ORIE: But then it's unclear to me what the answer is to
2 the first question. But if you move on, then --
3 MR. JORDASH: I'll move on, Your Honour.
4 Q. Let's go to the 2nd of July, 1993, meeting which Mr. Stanisic
5 attended. Before we do that, though, let me ask you something. At any
6 point in time are you aware of any centre established by the MUP of
7 Serbia in Pale in 1993 or 1994 or 1995, a centre for supplies?
8 A. I'm not aware of that.
9 Q. And the same question in relation to Herzegovina.
10 A. I'm not aware of Herzegovina either.
11 Q. Do you know a place called Talic in Bosnia, which was within, or
12 might have been within, VRS territory?
13 A. I know the last name Talic, such as General Momir Talic, but I'm
14 not aware of that place.
15 Q. Thank you. So it follows that you're not aware of any centre for
16 supplies in any place called Talic, which, I am in agreement with you,
17 we've not been able to find it on the map.
18 MR. JORDASH: Let's turn to -- let's go to P5 -- sorry, P2529.
19 English page 1, B/C/S page 1.
20 Q. This is the meeting Mr. Stanisic attended, and agrees he
21 attended, on 2nd of July, 1993. Just take a moment to read this.
22 A. I've read it up to number 1.
23 Q. Keep going then until we get to what Stanisic is alleged to have
25 MR. JORDASH: Perhaps on the English we can go to the next page.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I need it in B/C/S as well.
2 MR. JORDASH: Next page then, please.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't see Stanisic's name on this
4 page. I see Sainovic.
5 MR. JORDASH: Go one more page then in the B/C/S.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I now see Stanisic's name after
8 MR. JORDASH:
9 Q. And it should say:
10 "The majority of what we need should be issued by the MUP of
11 Serbia. The centres should be Pale, Herzegovina, and Talic."
12 JUDGE ORIE: I think we are now two pages ahead.
13 MR. JORDASH: Perhaps we can --
14 JUDGE ORIE: When the witness said he didn't see any page, we had
15 moved to the third page of this document, and there he doesn't appear,
16 and then the next page.
17 MR. JORDASH: I have the B/C/S pages in the typed copy but not in
18 this handwritten. Apparently they are the same though.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I now see the first page. "The
20 majority of what we need should be issued via the MUP of Serbia. The
21 centres should be Pale, Herzegovina, and Talic."
22 MR. JORDASH:
23 Q. Does that make any sense whatsoever to you?
24 A. This doesn't make any sense. I told you that I don't know
25 anything about the existence of this centre at Pale, Herzegovina. I also
1 don't know that man Talic.
2 Q. Thank you. Then we're in agreement on that issue. The meeting
3 begins, as we can see, with President Sainovic introducing -- or
4 somebody, probably Sainovic, introducing Badza and Stanisic and Sainovic
5 as the men who carry out things. Does it follow from what you've said so
6 far in your testimony that from your military experience in 1992 up until
7 this point Stanisic wasn't, for you, a man who carried out things for the
8 VRS or played a role in the military operations that you were conducting?
9 A. No.
10 Q. Now, we see there at page 3 of the English and 3 of the B/C/S
11 that Mladic takes Sainovic's telephone number but he doesn't appear to
12 take Stanisic's or Badza's. Were you aware that Mladic had taken a
13 number and then was in touch with Sainovic directly from this point
14 onwards, or is that not something you can testify to?
15 A. I can't confirm that. I never read Mladic's notes unless he
16 himself opened the notebook and read to me something that I, according to
17 him, needed to know.
18 Q. Fair enough. If we then read towards the end of this entry,
19 there is a discussion, it seems, about a group called the Black Hand and
20 Lukic. Could you confirm that in July of 1993 there was a good deal of
21 governmental concern from Serbia about the behaviour of Lukic and that
22 concern led to demands to the VRS, to Mladic, to arrest him and have him
23 dealt with? Can you confirm that?
24 A. I can't because I learned of Lukic and the Black Hand only when
25 the indictment was issued against Lukic.
1 Q. Fair enough. Let's go to the next meeting Stanisic is present
2 at, on the 8th of July, 1993, meeting with Milosevic.
3 MR. JORDASH: It's P2530. And if you would turn to page -- can
4 we turn, please, to page 5 of the English and 5 of the B/C/S, where
5 Stanisic is said to be speaking.
6 Q. And Stanisic is said to say:
7 "Our assessments have not been checked thoroughly, some might be
8 angered. Our assessment about the situation and the VRS and the RS are
9 not as they should be in view of our position. Some commanders can
10 jeopardise the system in Serbia - some can act as paramilitaries."
11 Are you able to confirm that at this point in time Stanisic was
12 complaining about men who were subordinated to the VRS in Bosnia
13 returning to Serbia and acting as paramilitaries?
14 A. I can't confirm this because I did not attend that meeting. I
15 only realised all that here in the courtroom as I'm reading notes in the
17 Q. Thank you.
18 MR. JORDASH: Let's go to page 6 of -- no, let's go to page 5 --
19 let's stay with page 5.
20 Q. Just if we could look at the original and see if you are able to
21 say anything about whether the comment under "Weaknesses" can be
22 attributed to Stanisic according to any indication you can see on the
23 document, i.e., are there any signs which enable you to say that?
24 A. No comment. I only saw the text yesterday evening and I'm
25 looking at it now again. I underline that I did not attend that meeting,
1 so I am in no position to know what the atmosphere was like.
2 Q. Okay. Let's go to the next page because there's a particular
3 point I'm interested in having you have a look at. Stanisic is said to
4 have said, or perhaps that might be one inference from this document:
5 "That we, from Serbia, take over the financing of the MUP as
6 well. That, with the assistance of the police, we helped Generals Mladic
7 and Novakovic achieve goals."
8 Do you see that?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Perhaps you know, perhaps you don't; are you able to confirm that
11 the Serbian MUP did not, as this comment suggests, finance the
12 Bosnian Serb MUP?
13 A. All I know is that the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia
14 financed about seven and a half thousand of officers of the Army of
15 Republika Srpska and it committed to finance 50.000 soldiers. The latter
16 never came through. I don't know that the MUP of Serbia financed the MUP
17 of Republika Srpska. I personally don't think that that was the case,
18 but I'm not sure.
19 Q. Why do you think that wasn't the case?
20 A. Because I know what hardships the MUP of Republika Srpska had to
21 go through. They were as poor as the army. This is not Stanisic's
22 decision. This is just a proposal that we from Serbia should take over
23 the financing of both MUP organisations in order to help Mladic and
24 Novakovic. Mladic and Novakovic were army commanders of Republika Srpska
25 and the Republic of Serbia Krajina respectively. What Mr. Stanisic meant
1 when he said that the financing of the MUP should be of assistance to the
2 militaries, I don't know. Maybe he just sought ways to relieve the
3 government budget in that way.
4 Q. Thank you for the answer.
5 MR. JORDASH: Let's turn to the 14th of December, 1993. And it's
6 P2532. Page 7 of the English and B/C/S. And this is the fourth -- or I
7 should say, it's the continuation of the fourth meeting that Stanisic
8 attended. And there's a mistake apparently in e-court. The English has
9 an extra page. The last page in English is not there for the B/C/S in
11 Q. Before we turn to the portion I'm interested in, did you know a
12 man called Karasic?
13 A. Yes. He was the Chief of the General Staff of the Army of
14 Yugoslavia. We were at school together.
15 Q. Wasn't Karasic -- the Karasic that I'm interested in was a police
16 officer. No? Did you know somebody called Karasic who was a member of
17 the Bosnian Serb MUP? Karisic [phoen]. Subordinated to Stupar during
18 operation Pancir-2. That might help.
19 A. I don't see the name of Karasic on this page. All I see is the
20 name of Krajisnik towards the bottom of the page. This may be a mistake
21 in translation. I attended that meeting. I don't remember that Karasic
22 attended it, and I know Karasic.
23 Q. Sorry, so who was Karasic then? Was he subordinated to Stupar
24 during Operation Pancir-2?
25 A. He could not have been subordinated to Stupar. Karasic was in
1 the Republika Srpska MUP and he was responsible for those two brigades or
2 Special Police Units or combat units of the police.
3 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Petrovic.
5 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] With your leave, on several
6 occasions we have the name "Karasic" on the record, whereas the witness
7 is actually talking about a person named "Karisik." I believe that this
8 is what the witness is saying.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You want this to be verified.
10 The person you were describing, could you spell his last name.
11 That's the person responsible for the -- those two brigades or
12 Special Police Units, could you spell his last name.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] K-a-r-i-s-i-k. I believe that his
14 name was Milenko, but I'm not sure.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Now, do you know a person by the name Karasic? And
16 I'll spell that for you, K-a-r-a-s-i-c.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I don't.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Jordash.
19 MR. JORDASH: Thank you, Your Honour.
20 Q. The man in the Republika Srpska MUP responsible for the two
21 brigades or Special Police Units, who was he subordinated to?
22 A. He was subordinated to the minister of the interior of
23 Republika Srpska.
24 Q. Mico Stanisic?
25 A. I don't know who it was at that time. Mico Stanisic held that
1 office twice and I think that that was his second time in office.
2 Q. Thank you. Let's have a look at this meeting on the
3 14th of December, 1993. Can we go -- you're present, it seems; is that
5 A. Yes.
6 JUDGE ORIE: The document says 13th. Or is that a mistake,
7 Mr. Jordash?
8 MR. JORDASH: I think the excerpt contained both the 13th and the
9 14th, and the one I'm looking at --
10 JUDGE ORIE: Okay.
11 MR. JORDASH: -- says the 14th, on the English at least.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Yes.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That meeting started on the 13th
14 and ended on the 14th, which means that we continued working on the 14th.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 MR. JORDASH: And if we go to page 8 in the English and the
18 Q. Now, am I correct that this was a meeting which had been called
19 by Milosevic?
20 A. The meeting was chaired by Milosevic but the meeting was actually
21 called by Karadzic. You can see that on the 13th Karadzic was the first
22 speaker. He was the one who opened the meeting, and not Milosevic.
23 Q. Well, I think if we go back to the 13th of December --
24 MR. JORDASH: Let's go to page 1 of the English and 1 of the
1 Q. -- we'll see that Stanisic apparently opens the meeting. He
2 doesn't say anything else during -- well, he says one other thing
3 apparently, but he introduces the topic of the meeting. Do you recall
4 that or not?
5 A. The meeting was held in the state security building which is why
6 Stanisic opened the meeting, as the host, the head of that institution.
7 And Karadzic's was actually the keynote address.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 MR. JORDASH: Now, let's go back to page 8 of the English and 8
10 of the B/C/S.
11 Q. And according to the note Stanisic is supposed to have offered to
12 spare 120 men and Karisik. Does that make any sense to you?
13 A. It does not. Stanisic could not offer Karisik to us because
14 Karisik was ours. Maybe he meant that he could place the 120 men under
15 Karisik's command. He says, We can spare 100 to 120 men and Karisik. I
16 suppose that what he had in mind were Karisik's Special Forces.
17 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
19 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise. It seems to me that
20 in the document itself there is a problem with translation. It says we
21 can spare 100 to 100 [as interpreted] men together with Karisik. I
22 believe that the English translation does not reflect the original as
23 well as it should.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, then we'll have to check, first of all, from
25 what it is translated into English, is it from the original handwritten
1 version or is it from the transcribed version in B/C/S. Apparently a
2 matter to be verified. If the parties could agree on there possibly
3 being a mistake and agree on what it should be, then they are invited to
4 report this to the Chamber. If not, we'll have to ask a report from
6 Please proceed.
7 MR. JORDASH:
8 Q. Do you have a recollection of Stanisic speaking at this meeting?
9 A. Yes. I already stated that during my previous testimony.
10 Q. Well, I've missed that. Do you -- you recall him introducing the
11 meeting; do you recall that?
12 A. Believe me, I don't. That was my first arrival in Belgrade. I
13 must have been a bit confused. I really didn't understand why I was
14 invited to that meeting at all in view of the fact that the commander was
15 also there.
16 Q. Do you recall him saying anything concerning Karisik or the
17 contents of what is written there underneath his name?
18 A. I remember because the previous page reflects my discussion.
19 Because Karadzic wanted us to be on our own around Sarajevo. Actually,
20 that's what I wanted. I wanted us to act independently around Sarajevo.
21 I didn't want to -- the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to meddle. And I
22 hoped that everybody would accept my proposal; however, Jovica said what
23 he did.
24 Q. What did he say?
25 A. He said that the MUP of Serbia can spare 100 to 120 men together
1 with Karisik. And I would add to that: that he probably meant together
2 with Karisik's specials or his special units.
3 Q. And did that ever happen?
4 A. No, that never materialised. Instead of Stanisic's 100 to
5 120 men, the same number arrived from the 72nd Brigade of the corps of
6 Special Forces of the Army of Yugoslavia. And this happened unbeknownst
7 to me or General Mladic. Colonel Stupar took them directly to the
8 commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. They were defeated, and then
9 on the 28th of December I sent them packing. And I returned then to
10 Belgrade. They had had 13 dead, about 40 wounded, and 4 men had gone
11 missing and I don't think that they were ever found.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 MR. JORDASH: May I just consult with my colleagues, please.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so.
15 [Defence counsel confer]
16 MR. JORDASH:
17 Q. I'm reminded that these men from the 72nd Brigade wore red berets
18 and were known by that item; is that right?
19 Mr. Milovanovic, are you there?
20 The red -- the 72nd Brigade under Stupar, were they known for
21 wearing red berets? And were they known by some as the Red Berets?
22 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, that's two questions. If we could
23 separate those out.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash.
25 MR. JORDASH:
1 Q. Let's deal with the first question, Mr. Milovanovic. Did they
2 wear red berets?
3 A. The day after they suffered the disaster I found them sporting
4 red berets in front of the Park Hotel in Vogosca. Actually, they were
5 not wearing red berets, they had them in their back-packs. Yesterday we
6 spoke about the Red Berets and I told you that the only person I saw
7 wearing a red beret was Mr. Frenki. However, when we spoke about the
8 Red Berets yesterday, we were talking about the police and not about the
9 military. In conclusion, I would like to say that the soldiers from the
10 72nd Brigade did indeed have red berets.
11 Q. You've mentioned a few times about the fact that you don't know
12 any other Red Berets other than having seen Frenki, I think, in 1993.
13 Did you know somebody called Nenad Kajkut?
14 MR. JORDASH: Let me have on the screen 1D05283.
15 May we have a break, Your Honour, please.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we'll have a break, but I would like to deal
17 with the procedural matter for which we -- that's about bar table
18 matters, which I'd rather do at the end of this portion. There's no need
19 for the accused to be present.
20 If you insist on your presence, Mr. Stanisic, then of course we
21 would do it immediately after the break, but otherwise we could shorten
22 the break slightly.
23 So if you -- we'll ask the witness, any way, to already to leave
24 the courtroom. We'd like to see you back in approximately a half an
25 hour, Mr. Milovanovic, because we'll deal with a procedural matter with
1 which we'll not bother you.
2 Could the witness be escorted out of the courtroom.
3 [The witness stands down]
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. -- I would like to deal with a very technical
5 matter on bar table documents. That's ...
6 MR. JORDASH: Yes, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE ORIE: I don't know whether Mr. Stanisic, if he prefers to
8 leave already, then ...
9 MR. JORDASH: Yes, if he could, please.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And the same is true for Mr. Simatovic, but
11 we'll have a follow-up discussion, very briefly, on the bar table
12 submissions the Chamber is expecting. You are free to leave as you wish,
13 to do so. And if you insist to be present, then, of course, we would do
14 it after the break.
15 [The accused withdrew]
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, the matter I would like to raise with
17 you is the bar table motions which are expected to be filed. And I'm
18 not, at this moment, discussing the dead-lines. The Chamber is worried
19 about the numbers you've indicated for the first one, I think 600
20 documents; for the second one, 200 documents; and a third one yet
21 unspecified. The purpose of tendering documents through bar table
22 submissions is to give further details on well-known matters - let's keep
23 it short - to say that where a document is easily introduced without a
24 witness who can explain about the document.
25 Now, what is worrying us is that, that numbers where bar table
1 documents, exhibits, are expected to add something to well-known issues,
2 or -- that it would -- 600 plus 200 would by far double the whole body of
3 documentary evidence we have received until now by the -- during the
4 Defence case. I'm not saying that the number in itself causes, as such,
5 major problems, but the Chamber is a bit concerned.
6 If, for example -- let me just give an example: If you say, "We
7 want the Chamber to be aware of the operational combat activities between
8 the 1st of July and the 1st of December of a certain year, and our main
9 purpose is to establish that never Mr. Stanisic is mentioned," then that
10 is a clear project where it's clear what the documentation is about. Of
11 course, the next question would be, "If he never appears there, couldn't
12 you agree on that with the other party, which saves us to go through a
13 hundred or 150 or 200 documents?"
14 The Chamber is not only worried about the numbers. Again,
15 numbers in itself do not cause always problems. But where the
16 descriptions are not yet clear whether -- where you are still working
17 hard on it, the Chamber has some concern that finally we would end up
18 with the leftovers of 65 ter lists, unspecified, unorganized,
19 unstructured, and then finally it will be for the Chamber to find out
20 what it is all about.
21 Just to give you one example where it is -- where it was
22 accepted. I think it was in the Gotovina case that the Defence had a
23 specific interest in showing what had happened in the years before,
24 atrocities committed by the Serbs, as background information. Now, if
25 you then file ten or 15 or 20 or 30 or 40 or 50 reports describing that,
1 then it's perfectly clear what the purpose of it is, why it is also not
2 necessary to have them introduced by witnesses, but the numbers and
3 the -- until now, and I emphasise that, the total lack of knowledge about
4 structure, purpose, et cetera, causes quite some concerns to the Chamber.
5 MR. JORDASH: I mean, well, if I've given that impression that I
6 don't have an understanding of what is coming, then I apologise. I can
7 be quite clear: The first report is going to be a continuation of the
8 issue in relation -- sorry, the first bar table is going to be a
9 continuation of the issue relating to DB activities dismantling
10 paramilitaries. It will be clearly -- it will be clear to Your Honours
11 what the documents -- we've made a selection of the documents. We
12 haven't, by any means, put the majority into the bar table. We've made a
13 selection which we felt gave Your Honours a clear picture of the size and
14 magnitude of those activities. And included within that will be the
15 reports which deal with such things as training by other entities to
16 demonstrate the point that the DB was not involved in training.
17 The second bar table, and this is where there might be room for
18 new --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Let's see. For example, if you say the -- and I
20 just now first focus on the first category. DB activities dismantling
21 paramilitaries. If there are -- I don't know how many documents there
23 MR. JORDASH: I think in the region of 300.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. 300. Is there no way, if you have looked at
25 that, to agree on that the DB has shown activities in this and this and
1 this places to -- or at least that documentation exists indicating that
2 the DB was engaged in dismantling paramilitary organisations there and
3 there and there under the name so and so and so and so and so? Of
4 course, the issue is not, I take it, the documents, but whether what was
5 documented really happened and whether that was the only thing that
6 happened. I take it that that is -- are usually the issues. Therefore,
7 I'm really wondering whether we have to -- whether, if such documentation
8 exists, whether it could not be summarised in perhaps four or five or six
9 pages, saying, "Here, this, this, was reported by" and then that --
10 because the Chamber would also have to go through that in every single
12 What I would suggest to the parties is that where there is a lot
13 of confusion about how to prepare, what to prepare, timing, et cetera,
14 that you would meet together with Chamber staff and -- because we would
15 very much like to digest and to go through that documentation before the
16 judgement is rendered rather than after the judgement is rendered, and of
17 course we need time for it as well. I suggest that the parties meet with
18 Chamber staff to find out what is the most practical way in proceeding
19 with apparently relevant documentation which the Stanisic Defence is
20 seeking to have tendered -- to be tendered into evidence and to be
21 admitted into evidence. Would that be a suggestion?
22 MR. JORDASH: Well, it's a suggestion, and of course I'll do
23 exactly what Your Honours suggest. I wonder, though, whether, given the
24 Prosecution's position as led through Mr. Theunens in large part, the
25 DB's behaviour encouraged and intended to encourage the paramilitaries
1 within Bosnia and Croatia, it's difficult to concede from our perspective
2 too readily to any diminishing or summarising of evidence which
3 demonstrates, in our view, the complete opposite.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Well, of course I haven't seen that evidence so I
5 can't comment on it in any way, but sometimes I'm aware that proving that
6 A was done doesn't necessarily mean that B was not done, that doing A
7 doesn't prevent you from doing B at the same time. I'm not saying it
8 happened. But if you have a look at it and if the Prosecution would see
9 all the documentation, I would say, yes, yes, there's clear documentation
10 that efforts were made in that and that direction. Then --
11 MR. JORDASH: No, and, I mean, we're not -- we obviously don't
12 take the position that that -- what happened in Serbia demonstrates that
13 nothing happened outside of Serbia. We obviously don't take that
15 JUDGE ORIE: Okay, but, therefore, what you want to demonstrate
16 is that activities existed and that documentation exists on those
17 activities which tend in a different direction, in direction of
18 dismantling paramilitary organisations. And then you could see whether
19 it's limited to some or all known paramilitary organisations. Look at it
20 and see whether you can find common ground which would allow you perhaps
21 to diminish the number of documents to be -- to be bar tabled.
22 Mr. Groome, you are on your feet as well.
23 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour, I stood to say that the
24 Prosecution would welcome an opportunity to discuss whether some of the
25 facts that Mr. Jordash is seeking to establish with these documents could
1 not be the subject of agreement. I stood up when he said the number 300
2 because I'm guessing - I haven't seen these document - that they're
3 probably police reports and maybe judicial opinions about individual
4 paramilitary groups. It seems to me that we -- it's likely that after
5 having an opportunity to review all those police reports the Prosecution
6 would agree that certain people were arrested on certain days and there
7 was an ultimate disposition of their case, and that would, I think, end
8 up in a one- or two-page chart, rather than 300 individual documents.
9 And we're willing to undergo that process with Mr. Jordash. And I think
10 in the end it would save all of us an awful lot of work.
11 MR. JORDASH: And I welcome any chance to diminish our work, so
12 I'm happy to sit down with Mr. Groome and do as Your Honours suggest.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Would you be assisted -- would you first sit
14 together with Mr. Groome alone, coffee or tea, I leave it to you, and
15 then with -- then to report to Chamber staff? Or would you prefer
16 already to start with Chamber staff? And, again, when I say Chamber
17 staff, that is in order for the Chamber not to be directly involved in
18 evidentiary matters before they are before the Chamber. That's -- or
19 make that the first point of your discussion.
20 MR. JORDASH: Yes, but what might also be useful, I don't know if
21 this is a useful suggestion, is if Your Honours have any particular
22 concerns beyond the quantity, i.e., the issues, then that might --
23 JUDGE ORIE: Well, it depends. The quantity in itself doesn't
24 worry me automatically. More important is whether there's a clear
25 structure of what this documentation is establishing. And then if
1 it's -- if that's clear on a factual basis - I'm not talking about any
2 inferences to be made from that - then of course if there's documentary
3 evidence, the first question is, Couldn't you agree on what the
4 documentary evidence says without the Chamber staff going through every
5 footnote or whatever in those 300 documents?
6 MR. JORDASH: I mean, the -- I mean, I have to say, I mean, I
7 completely agree that we can sit down and it can be useful, but I have to
8 say, for the record, that the case led by Theunens was not pled on the
9 indictment, it wasn't pled in the pre-trial brief, which means that we
10 are somewhat trying to hit a constantly moving target. That's why we've
11 gone large, because we don't know what the Prosecution intend to say
12 about that and we don't know what Your Honours will find in relation to
13 whether notice was sufficient or not, given the absence of whether it's
14 cured in not being in the pre-trial brief and the indictment. So it
15 might help if the Prosecution also indicated whether they intend to rely
16 upon that belated allegation.
17 JUDGE ORIE: I suggest that you meet on short notice and that to
18 the extent you think it would be useful that you invite Chamber staff,
19 that is, Mr. Nilsson, and perhaps it would even be better that you start
20 a exchanging with Mr. Nilsson what the Chamber's concerns are, and then
21 perhaps in a follow-up meeting, once you may have exchanged suggestions
22 on how to meet those concerns and how to reduce the number of documents,
23 to see whether you can make any progress.
24 So I would suggest to start with Mr. Nilsson then perhaps to
25 remove him and ...
1 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, can I just say that I think from the
2 Prosecution's point of view a meeting with Chamber staff would not be
3 productive unless we had the list of all of the documents that are sought
4 to be tendered plus some indication of what the relevance is so that we
5 could form a view, otherwise we would just be sitting at the Chamber
6 staff reading documents for the first time and --
7 JUDGE ORIE: No, not reading document, but what -- first of all,
8 Chamber staff would, I think, explain further what our concerns are.
9 I've been very brief on it at this very moment. And perhaps to talk
10 about possible solutions of it. And I think during this short
11 conversation we already -- I already noticed that Mr. Jordash said, We
12 have 300 documents and we want to establish this and this and this. Now,
13 first of all, that -- then, of course, we would have to know whether
14 these are all police reports or what's the origin of these documents.
15 And if we have two or three origins then we can more or less structure
16 the issues which are addressed by the bar table motion. And then, of
17 course, the next step is whether we really then need a bar table motion
18 or whether we could address those matters in other ways such as by
19 agreeing on what is factually found.
20 But for the Chamber to receive notice that the parties agree that
21 in July 1994 this unit arrested A, B, or C, or 25 members of paramilitary
22 group so and so, and that they have been detained and that they were
23 brought before the court or they were released after 30 days, that is for
24 the Chamber easier to handle than to get one document of 80 pages in
25 which a lot of other matters are discussed as well and where we have to
1 find out what exactly in those documents you want to bring to our
2 attention. That's, of course, the kind of concerns we have.
3 I suggest that to -- or to discuss the general issues that you
4 invite Mr. Nilsson for the first meeting, not yet going through the
5 documents themselves but just to see where the real problem for the
6 Chamber is. And, of course, the Chamber finally, if it's flooded by
7 documents which were not introduced in a normal way, of course we, at a
8 certain moment, we may also use our discretion in what to admit and what
9 not to admit. That's a matter. We have limits, of course, to our
10 capacity as well.
11 MR. JORDASH: Yes.
12 JUDGE ORIE: If that is understood.
13 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, the Prosecution accepts that proposal.
14 I have one brief issue related to this witness if I might raise
15 now so people can think about it over the break. There is a -- in my
16 re-direct examination there's a matter that's been raised by Mr. Jordash
17 that there is an audiotape that was also recovered with the Mladic
18 notebooks that I would like the witness to listen to. I only seek to
19 deal with a short portion of it, but it's 30 minutes long. So what I'm
20 proposing is the following: Have Mr. Laugel preparing the audio file, I
21 will present my colleagues with the transcript, and I'm asking everyone
22 to consider the propriety of allowing the witness to listen to the
23 30 minute tape overnight so that I can take him directly to the portion
24 that I want to. And he has a sense of the entire context of the -- or
25 the context of the entire conversation.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, Mr. Petrovic.
2 MR. JORDASH: I'd like to see the transcript first, if I may,
3 before making a decision.
4 MR. GROOME: That will be here before the -- sometime during the
6 MR. JORDASH: Thank you.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And then we'll hear from you later today,
9 We'll take a break. And we resume at ten minutes -- no, no, we
10 can take the shorter break - quarter to 1.00.
11 --- Recess taken at 12.19 p.m.
12 [The accused entered court]
13 [The witness takes the stand]
14 --- On resuming at 12.48 p.m.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash.
16 MR. JORDASH: Thank you, Your Honour. I just want to -- we don't
17 have a B/C/S version of 1D05283, but if that could be brought up to the
19 Q. I want to ask you about Nenad Kajkut. And before I do, I want to
20 correct something that I said earlier, which was that your sighting of
21 Simatovic as a Red Beret wasn't in 1993, it was in 1994; that's right,
22 isn't it?
23 A. In 1995. I believe it was on the 22nd of February somewhere near
24 Velika Kladusa.
25 Q. Okay. Thank you. Nenad Kajkut gave an interview to the OTP in
1 October 2007, and this, it relates, Mr. Milovanovic, to the testimony
2 you've given about the lack of Red Berets, and Kajkut says -- told the
4 MR. JORDASH: If we turn to page 3 of this document and the
5 bottom of the page.
6 Q. He says that at the end of September he -- in 1991 he received a
7 draft for mobilisation, he became a military policeman in the
8 5th Krajina Corps, which later became the 1st Krajina Corps, and then --
10 MR. JORDASH: Mr. Groome is on his feet.
11 MR. GROOME: Your Honours, I'm just looking at this document. It
12 doesn't appear to be an Office of the Prosecutor document. It doesn't
13 have an ERN, doesn't have a memo form. It doesn't identify the person
14 who spoke to this person. It's a person whose name I've never heard of
15 before. Could I ask for some information before we make representations
16 that it's an OTP interview? I'd like an opportunity to be able to check
18 MR. JORDASH: Actually, I think I've made an error. It's not to
19 the Prosecution. It's a statement he gave, I think, to the Defence.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, we all know that if statements are taken
21 for the purposes of this Tribunal, Mr. Jordash, that in order to be
22 admitted as evidence it should be -- it should be introduced under
23 Rule 92 bis, ter, quater, or quinquies. Apparently this statement has
24 been taken for those purpose, so therefore I think it would be preferable
25 first to ask the witness about the subject matter you would like to deal
1 with. And if you then want to -- if there's any reason to do so, if you
2 then want to put to him what someone else said, you can do that. But the
3 statement in itself seems not to be very suitable for admission.
4 MR. JORDASH: Let -- Your Honour, okay, yes, I'll move on.
5 Q. Let me put it directly because I'm also running out of time,
6 Mr. Milovanovic.
7 But Nenad Kajkut, I suggest, belonged to or was the commander of
8 a group of Red Berets in Banja Luka subordinated to the CSB of Banja
9 Luka. Do you know that?
10 A. I don't. I was in Macedonia in 1991.
11 Q. And he had this group, I suggest, which existed in Banja Luka or
12 in that and around that terrain until 1995 at least? Is that
13 something --
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, shouldn't we first ask: Do you know a
15 person by the name of Nenad Kajkut?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm familiar with a family name. I
17 know some people by that name from around Banja Luka, but I've never
18 heard of Nenad Kajkut before. I don't know who he is.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Jordash.
20 MR. JORDASH: Can I have on the screen, please, P2531.
21 Q. And I return now to the Mladic diary and a meeting on the
22 9th of November, 1993, in which it's said that Milosevic, Lilic,
23 Sainovic, Perisic, Sokolovic, Stojsic, Stanisic, Karadzic, Krajisnik, and
24 Mladic, Hadzic, Begovic, Martic, Novakovic, and Rakic took part. And
25 Milosevic, in the first -- this is page 19 of the -- sorry, this is
1 page 1 of the English. And Milosevic makes the comment that at the first
2 heading: "We co-ordinate based on the army line, Mladic, Perisic, and
4 Would you agree with Milosevic's assessment of the co-ordination
5 between the VRS and the Government of Serbia?
6 A. I did not attend that meeting, so I didn't know what was
7 discussed. Therefore, I don't know what I should agree with.
8 Q. Well, from your experience in the VRS and the Main Staff and the
9 supplies from the Serbian government and the military activities in
10 Bosnia under the auspices of the VRS, would you agree that the
11 co-ordination was based on the army line as opposed to other lines such
12 as the Ministry of the Interior?
13 A. Sir, I would kindly ask you to separate two things. Are you
14 asking me about the co-ordination of the armies of the neighbouring
15 states, the coordination of the MUP organisations, or the coordination
16 between the MUP and the army? I really don't know what to deal with
18 Q. Well, what I'm getting at is this: That you, the VRS, were not
19 co-ordinating with the Ministry of Interior of Serbia in relation to
20 combat activities.
21 A. There was no co-ordination with the Ministry of the Interior of
22 Serbia. There was no co-ordination with the Ministry of the Interior of
23 Republika Srpska either. If the supreme commander attached a unit to us,
24 for example, a special police unit or specials, that unit had to be
25 placed under the command of the local commander of the army of
1 Republika Srpska. There was no need for any co-ordination between the
2 Ministry of the Interior and the army commander.
3 Q. If we move to page 8 of this document, we can see a suggestion by
4 Sokolovic in November of 1993, at number 16, where Sokolovic suggests or
5 he notes that the president has said that: "There is a feeling of empty
6 space in the RS MUP, a specific man with his obligations should be
8 Were you aware of the feeling of discontent that the Serbian MUP
9 was still not co-ordinating and the suggestion that the Serbian MUP
10 should, therefore, have somebody placed within the RS MUP?
11 A. I did not understand your question.
12 Q. Looking at the entry by Sokolovic, and I'm suggesting that there
13 was content -- discontent at this late stage, November 1993, that the
14 Serbian MUP was not playing any role with the RS MUP and so Sokolovic
15 made a suggestion that the Serbian MUP place a specific man within the
16 RS MUP, and I'm asking if you are aware of that.
17 A. I don't know whether that person was ever appointed. I was at
18 the meeting so I suppose I should have heard that, but I don't remember.
19 This is what I'm reading, and there's no reason why I should not believe
20 words on paper, but I don't really know whether that person was ever
21 appointed. As far as I know, he wasn't.
22 Q. And at this point in time --
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, shouldn't we first -- the text is
24 rather ambiguous, isn't it? "There is a feeling of empty space in the
25 Republika Srpska MUP. A specific man with his obligations should be
1 there." Whose obligations we are talking about seems to be unclear from
2 the text itself. What these obligations are seems to be unclear as well.
3 From where he should come seems to be unclear as well. So to say that we
4 do not know whether he have [sic] ever appointed requires that we have at
5 least an understanding of what this line is about.
6 Could you give us or could you confirm what the -- the
7 understanding you had about the text which appears before us, a text
8 which was spoken, at least that's how it is reported by Mr. Sokolovic.
9 Could you tell us: What kind of a person are we talking about? Would
10 that be a Republic of Serbia MUP men? Or do you have any recollection of
11 the context which could remove some of the ambiguities of this text,
12 Mr. Milovanovic?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That text, especially the second
14 sentence, doesn't make sense to me because Sokolovic is neither
15 suggesting nor providing a solution. He is only invoking a statement by
16 the president, and he probably means Milosevic, that one should have a
17 personal vision of what the president put forward. Now, who should have
18 that personal vision, whether he or me or the other participants of the
19 meeting or the MUP of the Republic of Serbia or Republika Srpska, I
20 really can't see.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Jordash.
22 MR. JORDASH: Thank you, Your Honour.
23 Q. Let's move to another topic. I was going to take you through the
24 diaries in relation to Operation Breza. But to save time I just want to
25 have you explain what Operation Breza was, please.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, I think it would assist the witness if
2 you would ask him first of all when the operation took place, where the
3 operation took place, what the purpose of the operation was, so that we
4 can work focussed.
5 MR. JORDASH:
6 Q. Are you aware of --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Otherwise we might have a historical explanation of
8 operations in general and then in specific terms.
9 MR. JORDASH:
10 Q. When -- are you aware of Operation Breza, Mr. Milovanovic?
11 A. I know about Breza 94 operation. It was carried out in
12 September 1994.
13 Q. How long did it go on for?
14 A. It was a failed operation by the VRS. I don't think it lasted
15 even ten days.
16 Q. What was its objective, please?
17 A. The purpose of the operation was for the VRS to cross the Una
18 river between Novi Grad and Krupa to take Cazin, or, rather, to take
19 Bihac from the east. It was a personnel operation designed without any
20 plan by General Mladic who started to implement it under the command of
21 General Talic of the 1st Krajina Corps. It became a failure as soon as
22 it started actually. On the first day around Novi Grad in just one night
23 we lost 92 men, several vehicles, mainly commander vehicles, of the
24 Main Staff were captured, as well as vehicles of the 1st Krajina Corps,
25 and the operation was cut short.
1 Q. When you say personal operation, or personnel operation, what do
2 you mean by that?
3 A. I apologise to the president of the Trial Chamber but I have to
4 take a couple of minutes to explain how this operation occurred.
5 The Main Staff was supposed to carry out an inspection of various
6 corps, and General Mladic took it upon himself to inspect the 1st and
7 2nd Krajina Corps in the west of Republika Srpska. My job was to inspect
8 the eastern part, or, rather, the corps on the eastern front, the
9 Herzegovina Corps and the Eastern Bosnia Corps. We set out each in his
10 own way, and one evening Mladic called me in Bijeljina and ordered me to
11 come back to the command post.
12 Q. I need to just cut you short, I'm sorry, but I need to move
13 swiftly. Who supplied Operation Breza -- and I think it was actually
14 called Operation Breza 1994 - who supplied Operation Breza with
15 logistics, ammunition, weapons?
16 A. I said at the outset that the troops went into offensive
17 unprepared, what we in the army call straight from the trenches. It was
18 an idea of General Mladic. He went into it with what he had on the front
19 line, and he reckoned that I would send him the guard brigade from the
20 Main Staff and I was supposed to take three units from around Sarajevo
21 and around Treskavica and send them to Krajina, which was impossible.
22 Q. Did you receive for that operation any logistics or weapons or
23 ammunitions supply from the FRY?
24 A. To my knowledge nothing was requested and nothing was supplied.
25 General Mladic wanted it to be a surprise attack against the
1 5th Corps of the BH Army.
2 Q. Would you agree that the strategic objective of that operation
3 was to assist Abdic to return his people, the refugees, back to Bihac?
4 A. I think that General Mladic was not thinking about that during
5 those days because a couple of days earlier Abdic's army had been
6 defeated and the population had been crammed into collection centres and
7 camps. He wasn't trying to get Abdic back into power.
8 But almost a year before that General Talic kept talking him into
9 the idea that the 1st Corps has enough resources to deal with the
10 problems of the Cazin Krajina on its own. The Cazin Krajina is an area
11 facing Croatia, bordering on Croatia, and it was never within the sphere
12 of interests of Republika Srpska.
13 At the Assembly session that we discussed yesterday of the
14 12th of May, the boundaries were defined loosely as the Una river, the
15 Sava river, the Drina River, and the Neretva river. So if Mladic had
16 succeeded, we would have had to bring back the army as we had brought it
17 back later from Bjelasnica and Igman. But Mladic went into this
18 offensive of his own accord and it ended the way it ended. Nobody, not
19 Mladic and not Talic, knew that the Muslim army had not complied with a
20 decision of the UN Security Council, I don't know which number, which
21 proclaimed the Bihac region a protected area. UNPROFOR notified us that
22 the 5th Corps had been disarmed. However, in those 18 months that corps
23 was not only disarmed, it was resupplied and it became a big corps of
24 2.000 men with state-of-the-art equipment. And they even had the
25 so-called Singapore rifles, the dream of every soldier.
1 Q. You said it was not in the sphere of interest of
2 Republika Srpska. What did you mean by that?
3 A. The Assembly of Republika Srpska defined the borders of the
4 then-Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina along those four rivers I
5 named, Una, Sava, Drina, and Neretva. Anything beyond those lines would
6 mean aggression.
7 Q. So this, then, operation was outside of the strategic objectives
8 of the VRS; is that what you're saying?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. What, then, motivated Mladic?
11 A. I don't know.
12 Q. Was Operation Breza 94 a kind of precursor to Pauk?
13 A. No. It was a consequence of the Pauk operation.
14 Q. But Operation Breza 94 came before Pauk, didn't it? Are you
15 saying Pauk was a consequence of Breza?
16 A. Correct. Pauk was the consequence of the Breza operation. I
17 misspoke, sorry.
18 Q. So, again, Pauk, then, do you categor-- characterise that in the
19 same way you would Breza, which is that it was an operation outside of
20 the strategic objectives of the VRS?
21 A. No. Something else happened in the meantime. When I said that
22 Pauk was a consequence of the Breza operation, Breza was caused by the
23 5th Muslim Corps and it was decided that they were a failure. And the
24 very next month, on the 23rd of October, that corps aggressed
25 Republika Srpska by crossing Mount Grmec. They crossed Una river and
1 with seven days occupied around 250.000 square kilometres of the
2 territory of Republika Srpska. So the VRS had to take that land back,
3 that is, to mount that famous counter-attack against Bihac that I was
4 unlucky enough to lead.
5 The counter-strike took 16 days of offensive. We pushed back the
6 Muslims to the other side of the Una river and that was taken advantage
7 of by the Serbian Army of Krajina so they took offensive actions against
8 the 5th Corps again, and we meant to crush that corps by joint effort. I
9 drew that conclusion on the 8th of November, of which I spoke in my last
10 testimony, when I was tricked into coming to Plitvice where they tried to
11 persuade me to co-operate with the Serbian Army of Krajina with part of
12 my forces to revive for a while the army of Fikret Abdic. I did not have
13 authorisation from the Main Staff or the Supreme Command to be involved
14 in those negotiations and even less did I have authorisation to give them
15 I don't know how many men and 5.000 rifles.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Petrovic.
18 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, with your leave, at
19 the beginning of this answer there's one explanation missing provided by
20 the General about the motivation of the commander of the 5th Corps to
21 take the action that he had taken. Just the first few lines are
22 incomplete. And I believe what's missing is important.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Could you give us the transcript page and line,
24 Mr. Petrovic?
25 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, page 65, lines 1
1 and 2.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
3 Witness, you were asked whether you could categorise Pauk in the
4 same way as you would categorize Breza in that it was an operation
5 outside of the strategic objectives of the VRS. Now, for us the answer
6 starts with: "No. Something else happened in the meantime."
7 And it follows then, Mr. Petrovic? Or is it ...
8 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, that's the bit. That's the
9 passage that's incomplete.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and then you apparently added something, where
11 our transcript reads: "When I said that Pauk was a consequence of the
12 Breza operation, Breza was caused by the 5th Muslim corps," et cetera.
13 But apparently something is missing from your answer. Could you very
14 briefly indicate what may be missing here. And apparently it has to do
15 something with the motivation of the commander of the 5th Corps to take
16 the action he had taken. Could you please repeat what you said in that
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can. I'll try to be brief.
19 The 5th Corps crushed, from 19 to the 21st of August, the army of
20 Fikret Abdic. General Mladic thought that he could punish the 5th Corps,
21 not because they crushed Fikret Abdic, but because they had armed
22 themselves; whereas they were supposed to be disarmed, under the decision
23 of the UN Security Council. Neither general evaluated properly the
24 strength of the 5th Corps, and they failed. And then the 5th Corps
25 mounted Grmec 94 to punish VRS and to take these 250.000 square
1 kilometres. Before that, throughout the war, they had fought in
2 encirclement. But they broke out of that encirclement and faced the VRS.
3 The VRS mounted a counter-strike.
4 JUDGE ORIE: I'll stop you here. Exceptionally I'll invite
5 Mr. Petrovic to ask a question of the following kind: "Did I hear you
6 say ..." and then you repeat what you heard the witness said and which
7 doesn't appear on the transcript.
8 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
9 General, did I hear you say that the commander of the 5th Corps
10 thought and felt that the VRS was weak in that area and moved into
11 offensive action into the territory held at that time by the VRS?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
13 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you,
14 Your Honour. Thank you, General.
15 JUDGE ORIE: That's then now on the record.
16 Mr. Jordash, you certainly are aware that in 15 minutes from now
17 you've used six hours. That is the five hours plus the one granted by
18 Mr. --
19 MR. JORDASH: And I'll finish in 15 minutes.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please.
21 MR. JORDASH: Thank you. Could we turn, please, to 65 ter 1413,
22 Supreme Defence Council minutes, 28th Session, held on the
23 2nd of November, 1994. Could we have page 5 of the English and 4 of the
25 Q. And just to orientate ourselves, perhaps we should just look at
1 the first page, sorry, the second page, where we get a list of those who
2 attended this session. Which, to speed things up: Lilic, Milosevic,
3 Momir Bulatovic, Kontic, Perisic, Krivosija. And at page 5 of the
4 English and 4 of the B/C/S we have, it seems, a discussion about Bosnia
5 by Perisic. And just to -- just to -- just to orientate ourselves,
6 November 1994 was when Pauk began; correct?
7 A. No, that's not correct. Operation Pauk was only being discussed
8 on the 8th of November, and this session was on the 2nd of November. On
9 November 3rd I went into that attack across Mount Grmec.
10 Q. So Pauk started, then, in December of 1994? It was at the end of
11 1994, wasn't it?
12 A. Right. Sometime in mid-1994, a couple of days before the
13 conclusion of so-called Carter's cease-fire, on 23rd December Pauk was
14 cut short and continued again only in the spring of 1995.
15 Q. Now, if you look at what Perisic is talking about in relation to
16 Bosnia, a third of the way down the page, when he announces:
17 "Gentlemen presidents, I would like to briefly introduce you to
18 the situation in Bosnia. The Muslim Croatian forces have started a
19 general offensive, aiming at cutting off the western part of the
20 Republika Srpska in the Bihac Bugojno direction."
21 Just a bit further down:
22 "Therefore they have started with the offensive. They have
23 started with the offensive in the direction Bjelasnica-Gorazde and
24 vice versa so that they merge and make passage in this enclave.
25 Furthermore, they are significantly progressing towards the corridor. So
1 far they have occupied 843 square kilometres since September the 1st. In
2 total, the Serbs had to evacuate around 15.750 citizens from that area."
3 Do you agree with that assessment.
4 A. I'm seeing this evaluation for the first time and I don't agree
5 with it.
6 Q. What do you disagree with?
7 A. First of all, I don't agree with the evaluation about the Muslim
8 offensive from Mount Igman and Mount Bjelasnica towards Gorazde and from
9 Gorazde towards Sarajevo because between these two features there is the
10 city of Sarajevo. Second, there was no need for the Muslims to attack
11 from Gorazde towards Sarajevo because they had got a corridor between
12 Sarajevo and Gorazde through Carter's cease-fire, and that corridor of
13 120 square kilometres still exists to date.
14 Now, where Perisic took these figures on losses, I don't know.
15 But I said that a date later I mounted my counter-attack across
16 Mount Grmec towards Bihac. So I think this evaluation by Perisic is
17 irrelevant to that time-period.
18 Q. What about the beginning of that paragraph where he talks of a
19 general offensive aimed at cutting off the western part of
20 Republika Srpska and Bihac; is that what you're saying didn't exist?
21 A. That part of the evaluation is all right. The offensive of the
22 5th Corps and the Croatian army from the Bihac region towards Bugojno,
23 and the Muslims were also preparing an offensive of their 7th Corps, I
24 believe, from the wider area of Bugojno towards Bihac, they wanted to
25 link up those forces so that the 5th Corps would finally break out of
1 encirclement. And there was a strategic Muslim idea throughout the war
2 to create a green transversal across Sandzak, Sarajevo, Bugojno, and
3 Bihac. Now, I don't have to explain what the green transversal is. It's
4 a historical fact.
5 MR. JORDASH: Let's move on as swiftly as we can to page 6 of the
6 English and 5 of the B/C/S, and it's Milosevic speaking. Sorry, it's
7 not, it's Perisic speaking again. And if we then go over the page in the
8 English to 7 and B/C/S 6.
9 Q. And I'm interested in the section where Perisic talks, halfway
10 down the page of the English. And he starts to talk about the impact on
11 the FRY safety as a result of the continuation of war by the Bosnian
12 Serbs by the VRS. And he -- if you would read the section where it
13 starts off with saying: "Firstly the situation in the FRY army."
14 A. Yes, I can see that.
15 Q. Were you aware of these discussions happening in the -- in
16 Belgrade amongst the Serbian government about basically the disastrous
17 consequences of the continuation of the war in Bosnia by the
18 Bosnian Serbs?
19 A. I didn't know and I was not interested at the time what was going
20 on at Pale. I said that I launched my counter-attack against
21 22.000 Muslim fighters, having already lost 6.000 of my fighters. I read
22 Perisic's evaluation on the previous page with a reference to the
23 7th Corps, and that is in keeping with my previous claim that the 5th and
24 the 7th Corps were supposed to link up their forces in the western part
25 of Herzegovina.
1 MR. JORDASH: Let's go to page 23 of the English and page 22 of
2 the B/C/S.
3 Q. And it's Slobodan Milosevic. He's presenting his view about the
4 current situation in Bosnia. And he notes:
5 [As read] "The fact that the worst situation is there is
6 unfortunately the best argument that a disastrous mistake was made when
7 the peace accord was rejected. It is a direct consequence. That night
8 when we talked with them in Dobanovci for the last time, Momir is here,
9 Momcilo is here, we precisely pointed out such tendency and presented
10 what would happen. They proved that the peace accord should not have
11 been accepted. Unfortunately, that proof costs now, 3.000. No way, that
12 is not true. It is much more. No one should have died in Gorazde, not
13 in Gorazde, not in the corridor, not in Nisic Plateau, not in Grabez or
14 the Una valley, Kupres, et cetera. But if the price for proving the
15 decision of the Pale leadership to reject the peace accord to be right is
16 to have so many people get killed, and unfortunately which resulted in
17 losing the territory and not conquering it, then I really do not know
18 what the logic means, what the justice means. What is a smart thing to
20 And then if we go over the page to page 24 of the English and
21 stay with page 22 of the B/C/S, Milosevic says:
22 "The peace accord is still on the table luckily. If the map
23 changes due to the significant combat activities of the Muslim-Croatian
24 coalition, they will not accept that plan."
25 Were you aware that Milosevic and the Serb leadership took the
1 view, at this point in time onwards, that if you, the Bosnian Serbs, lost
2 territory it would mean that the peace agreement would continue to be
3 rejected by the Bosnian Serbs?
4 A. And your question is?
5 Q. Were you aware that the Serbian government's official policy, and
6 we see, I suggest, it expressed through Milosevic at that point, were you
7 aware that they took the view that the loss of territory by the Bosnian
8 Serbs would mean that they would not accept the peace agreement which was
9 on the table?
10 A. I was not aware of that. But I agree and I understand why the
11 leadership of Republika Srpska did not accept that accord, because that
12 would confirm the status quo. And we have to bear in mind that in the
13 short space of seven days we had lost 250.000 square kilometres of our
15 Q. And causing a massive refugee crisis; is that correct?
16 A. That refugee crisis was particularly prominent on Mount Grmec.
17 But for 57 days we managed to have the population return. They returned
18 to destroyed homes, but they did return.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, two minutes left.
20 MR. JORDASH: Thank you.
21 Q. One last part of this and then I'll finish there,
22 Mr. Milovanovic.
23 MR. JORDASH: Page 33 of the English and 30 of the B/C/S.
24 Q. And Milosevic expresses his view once again, noting that:
25 [As read] "And all that happens after so much suffering. We
1 endured everything, we went through all the sanctions, and we came to the
2 point where the entire international community says, All right, you are
3 not the aggressors. Half of Bosnia and Herzegovina is yours and you have
4 the right to merge with Serbia and Montenegro. They say no we will --
5 and we will take even more by force. We will prolong the war. That is
6 what I call complete madness."
7 And Bulatovic then notes: "They have already lost 850 square
8 kilometres of the territory."
9 Was that view communicated to you through Mladic or any other
10 Bosnian Serb leader at the time?
11 A. Are we still talking about the 2nd November, 1994?
12 Q. Yes.
13 A. No, nobody communicated anything to me. Karadzic told me
14 sometime in mid-December that Jimmy Carter should arrive and that I
15 should be prepared for defence, because I discussed the issue of Bihac
16 with him and whether I should enter Bihac or not, because the issue of
17 Bihac was a political rather than a military issue. As a soldier, I had
18 every right to enter Bihac and to attack the 5th Corps.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I think the witness, by the first line, has
20 answered your question.
21 MR. JORDASH: I've got nothing further. Thank you,
22 Mr. Milovanovic.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Then, Mr. Petrovic, are you ready to
24 start your further cross-examination?
25 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
1 Further Cross-examination by Mr. Petrovic:
2 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, General, sir.
3 A. Good afternoon.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Milovanovic, Mr. Petrovic is counsel for
5 Mr. Simatovic.
6 Please proceed.
7 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
8 Q. Let's try and use the remaining time to clarify some things, to
9 shed some light on your previous testimony.
10 First of all, just awhile ago we talked about the beginning of
11 the Operation Pauk and it says on page 68 that that happened sometime in
12 mid-1994. Can you please repeat and tell us when the Operation Pauk
13 actually started.
14 A. Operation Pauk had a different name. Its original name was
15 Stit 1994. Sometime in mid-December, on the eve of Jimmy Carter's
16 arrival, after the four-month peace accord was signed, Operation Pauk was
17 shelved. However, on the 13th of January, 1995, the 1st Corps violated
18 the peace accord that was supposed to last for four months. It launched
19 another attack on the VRS and the Serbian Army of Krajina. I'm not sure
20 about the latter. Operation Pauk was rekindled sometime in mid-February
21 or, to be more precise, on the 12th or the 13th February. At least
22 according to the information I received from Nikola Koljevic, the deputy
23 prime minister of Republika Srpska.
24 Q. General, sir, on the record on page 74, line 9, it says that the
25 1st Corps violated the peace accord. Could you please shed some light on
1 that. Who was it who violated the peace accord?
2 A. The peace accord that was supposed to last for four months, is
3 that what you're asking me? The peace accord was violated by
4 General Atif Dudakovic on the eve of the Orthodox new year which was on
5 the 13th of January. He slaughtered four of our fighters in a bunker.
6 They had sent several of our fighters to congratulate the Orthodox new
7 year to the Serbs. I suppose that they had been drinking together and
8 then they slaughtered them.
9 Q. Witness, sir, just tell me who Dudakovic was; was he the
10 commander of a corps?
11 A. Yes. Of the 5th Corps of the so-called Army of
13 Q. Thank you, General, sir. Earlier today and yesterday you
14 mentioned the airfield at Ravna Romanija, i.e., an attempt to build an
15 airport there. Are you referring to the attempts to build an airfield
16 near Sokolac at the foot of Mount Romanija?
17 A. Yes. Close to the cross-road -- cross-roads of
18 Sokolac-Rogatica-Pale roads, in the so-called Glasinac [phoen] field.
19 Q. Thank you, General, sir. Earlier today and yesterday you spoke
20 about the basic training of recruits in the VRS. You said that it lasted
21 for three months and then for the first eight months no single recruit
22 would be allowed to go to the front line and be engaged in combat. You
23 said that that training would last for at least eight months before they
24 had the necessary skills.
25 A. Yes, that's correct. There was something else that I should have
1 added and that is that they could have been engaged if they were
3 Q. General, sir, as a soldier with years of experience would you be
4 able to tell us whether a soldier can be trained within the scope of,
5 let's say, a fortnight? What such training be adequate? Would it make
6 any sense?
7 A. Such a short training would be a crime against such a soldier.
8 Basic training should not last less than three and a half months. Within
9 a fortnight you can only teach him how to fire a bullet, but not how to
10 aim at a target or defend himself.
11 Q. Thank you, witness. As for those recruits who served in the
12 army, how long did it take for them to renew the skills that they had
13 acquired during their compulsory military service? I'm talking about
14 your experience and the experience of warfare.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Petrovic, we are spending ages and ages on what
16 seems to be training not at an adequate level. Should we know exactly
17 what you would have learned or how much time it would take to regain your
18 skills, et cetera, whether that would be handling rifles or mortars or
19 tanks or airplanes, and then to go in all those details; or do you want
20 to address our attention to the fact that this witness, as supported by
21 some of the documents, is of the opinion that training of recruits was
22 inadequate due to the circumstances? If that is what you want to draw
23 our attention to, then I think you together with Mr. Jordash have been
24 very effective already.
25 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I note
1 the time. Should I continue or should we break now and resume tomorrow,
2 Your Honour?
3 JUDGE ORIE: I think we should -- we should adjourn. But I'd
4 first like the witness to be escorted out of the courtroom.
5 Mr. Milovanovic, the same instruction applies as I gave you
6 yesterday, that is, that you should not speak or communicate with anyone
7 about your testimony either already given now or in past or still to be
8 given in the days to come. And we'll further discuss how and when we'll
9 be able to conclude your examination.
10 Would you please follow the usher. Yes.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise, I have two questions
12 actually. First of all --
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When do we continue tomorrow?
15 JUDGE ORIE: Tomorrow morning at 9.00. Yes, I should have told
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And, secondly, am I supposed to go
18 on reading and finish reading the third binder of documents?
19 JUDGE ORIE: No, I do not know what Mr. Petrovic would like you
20 to further read. What I do know is that the Prosecution would like to
21 give you a transcript of an audio recording.
22 And that was how many pages, Mr. Groome?
23 MR. GROOME: I believe it's about seven pages, Your Honour. Ten
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome has 7 -- a 10-page document for you.
1 Mr. Petrovic, any wishes?
2 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, no. I'll try and
3 deal with all the documents and parts thereof here in the courtroom.
4 JUDGE ORIE: So, Mr. Milovanovic, you have some time to recover,
5 only ten pages to deal with, at least if you're willing to assist the
6 Prosecution by reading them.
7 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, and a 30-minute audiotape of the
8 transcript of the pages is what I proposed earlier.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But I thought there was a transcript of that
11 MR. GROOME: There is a transcript, Your Honour, but I don't know
12 whether the Chamber wants me to address my proposed questions for the
13 witness in his hearing. I don't think there's anything that's going
14 prejudice his listening to the tape.
15 JUDGE ORIE: No, I have no problems. So what you say is you have
16 10 pages of transcripts and you have an audio attached to the same
18 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour. And it's an audiotape recovered
19 from the Mladic home. And when the witness listens to it, if he could
20 assist us in identifying the voices, approximate the time that this may
21 be, and there's a reference or several references to a Manojlo, whether
22 he can tell us whether that's a reference to him.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
24 Mr. Milovanovic, apart from reading the ten pages, you're also
25 invited --
1 And I take it, Mr. Groome, that you provide the equipment
2 necessary for listening?
3 MR. GROOME: I have it here in court, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ORIE: You have it here in court, yes.
5 You're also invited to listen to a 30-minutes' audio recording,
6 and some specific questions were already mentioned by Mr. Groome. While
7 listening could you try to identify who is speaking; could you try to
8 identify what is -- will be the approximate time of recording; and where
9 reference is made to Manojlo, could you please see whether you can tell
10 us whether that is a reference to you.
11 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, so the record is complete: This is
12 ERN number T001-2432, and it is side A of a two-sided cassette tape.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Side A is the side you are expected to listen to.
14 Is that clear, Mr. Milovanovic?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is clear. Maybe I could listen
16 to the tape now? Maybe I don't even have to go to the hotel and then
17 return from the hotel to listen to the tape.
18 JUDGE ORIE: I am -- no, but I think you will be provided with
19 all the --
20 MR. GROOME: I have it. And if VWS doesn't mind allowing him to
21 listen to it in their office, the Prosecution would have no objection to
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But, I mean, there's recorder on which the
24 tape can be played?
25 MR. GROOME: [Microphone not activated] Yes.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
2 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I have the recorder and the headset
3 here, as well as the transcript.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You can have everything, you can take it to
5 your hotel, you don't have to come back to listen to it because you get
6 all the equipment you need. But if you prefer to listen to it now,
7 that's fine as well. Then please ask VWS to give you a place where to
9 THE WITNESS: Okay.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
11 THE WITNESS: Okay.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Then would you please follow the usher, and the
13 usher would provide you with the text and the equipment.
14 [The witness stands down]
15 JUDGE ORIE: I'm trying to verify whether there's any way that we
16 conclude the testimony of this witness before the weekend.
17 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, if Mr. Petrovic still abides by his
18 one-hour limit, I think we can -- we will certainly finish before the
19 weekend, if there are no procedural matters that would delay us. I think
20 I would use about two hours --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Two hours.
22 MR. GROOME: -- at this stage.
23 JUDGE ORIE: That's considerably less than the four or five hours
24 you indicated before.
25 So then we'll try -- Mr. Petrovic, we'll be rather strict on your
1 time tomorrow, that is, 53 minutes left, and then two hours for the
2 Prosecution, which leaves some time for further questions. I urge the
3 parties to see whether we really can finish by a quarter to 2.00.
4 Then we adjourn. And we will resume tomorrow, Thursday, the
5 8th of December, at 9.00 in the morning, Courtroom II.
6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.51 p.m.,
7 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 8th day
8 of December, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.