Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 17685

 1                           Thursday, 23 February 2012

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone.

 7             Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.

 9             This is case IT-03-69-T, the Prosecutor versus Jovica Stanisic

10     and Franko Simatovic.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

12             Good morning to you, Mr. Karan.  I'd like to remind you that

13     you're still bound by the solemn declaration you've given at the

14     beginning of your testimony, that you'll speak the truth, the whole

15     truth, and nothing but the truth.

16             Mr. Bakrac, are you ready to continue?

17             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I'm ready, Your Honours.  Good

18     morning, Your Honours.  Good morning, everyone in the courtroom.

19                           WITNESS:  MLADEN KARAN [Resumed]

20                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

21                           Examination by Mr. Bakrac: [Continued]

22        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Karan.

23        A.   Good morning.

24        Q.   Mr. Karan, yesterday before we adjourned we were discussing your

25     arrival in the area of Kordun where the 21st Corps was of the


Page 17686

 1     Army of Republika Srpska Krajina.  Tell me, what was the situation in the

 2     area of Kordun and the area of Western Bosnia?  Was there some sort of

 3     province there; and if so, which?

 4        A.   I emphasized yesterday that I can only speak about the

 5     counterintelligence, security situation in my unit.  And in that sense I

 6     can also talk about the situation in the area adjacent to my unit, that

 7     is, Autonomous Region of Western Bosnia, and the area towards the

 8     Republic of Croatia.  At that time when I arrived in October 1993,

 9     civilian, military, and police authorities already existed in the

10     Autonomous Region of Western Bosnia and they were already in direct

11     combat contact with the forces of the 5th Corps.

12     Q.  Can you tell us who was at the head of the Autonomous Region Western

13     Bosnia and which ethnic community was in the majority in that area?

14        A.   The Autonomous Region Western Bosnia, which had a

15     Supreme Command, was headed by their president who was the supreme

16     commander, Fikret Abdic.  The majority population was Muslim and they

17     made up his forces.  There were a few Croats who had come from Kordun to

18     Velika Kladusa and a smaller number of Serbs who had lived there even

19     before the war while the SFRY still existed, but there were few.

20        Q.   You said they had their military forces.  How were they organised

21     militarily?

22        A.   They had units of brigade strength, and companies.  They were not

23     real brigades in the real military sense, but they called them brigades

24     because of the specific nature of the combat there, whereas our units

25     were battalions.  The level of manpower was higher.


Page 17687

 1        Q.   Mr. Karan, did these forces, the forces of Fikret Abdic, from the

 2     time you arrived onwards had fights with the Army of the Republic of

 3     Serbian Krajina or the VRS?

 4        A.   The forces of Fikret Abdic were in constant combat with [as

 5     interpreted] the units of the Army of Republic of Serbian Krajina, but

 6     not the VRS.

 7                           [Defence counsel confer]

 8             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'm sorry, I was

 9     consulting for a moment.

10        Q.   I'm looking at the translation, Mr. Karan.  Let's just make one

11     thing clear:  The forces of Fikret Abdic, what exactly did you say?

12     Did -- were they fighting the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina?

13        A.   No, they were not fighting us.  We had positions facing them, but

14     we were not fighting them ever.  They were in constant combat contact and

15     had occasional skirmishes only with the forces of the 5th Corps.

16        Q.   Mr. Karan, when you joined the Army of the Republic of

17     Serbian Krajina, were any meetings held with Fikret Abdic; and if so --

18     in fact, tell us first whether you had any meetings with Fikret Abdic.

19        A.   As I arrived there, although it's not because I arrived there but

20     simply at that time, a rapprochement occurred between Fikret Abdic and

21     our side.  Communication began and conditions were put in place for the

22     staff of the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina to meet with him.

23     Within 20 to 30 days of my arrival, I attended the first such meeting

24     between Fikret Abdic and our prime minister and the chief of the

25     Main Staff and some other officers, if you want me to tell you who


Page 17688

 1     exactly.

 2        Q.   When you say representatives of our government, tell us exactly

 3     who attended these meetings.

 4        A.   The first meeting I attended - and that was the first official

 5     meeting - took place in Maljevac village, two kilometres away from Velika

 6     Kladusa.  That meeting was attended by the prime minister of the Republic

 7     of Serbian Krajina, Borislav Mikelic; the commander of the Main Staff of

 8     the RSK, Major-General Mile Novakovic; the corps commander, commander of

 9     the 21st Corps, Cedomir Bulat.  I was there.  Also Irfan Saracevic, who I

10     believe was the army and police minister with Fikret Abdic.  And I

11     believe there was a person called Celeketic who was in charge of the

12     police.  And one from the defence ministry, I believe his name was Hasan

13     Hasib Hodzic.  Those were all the participants in the first meeting.

14        Q.   When you say "Celeketic" in charge of the police --

15        A.   No --

16        Q.   The transcript says --

17        A.   Celebic, Fikret Celebic.

18        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Karan.

19             Do you know, perhaps, at whose initiative this meeting was

20     organised?  Did other meetings follow?

21        A.   It was at the initiative of Fikret Abdic, and it was followed by

22     quite a few meetings later at the end of 1993 and especially in the

23     spring of 1994.

24        Q.   When you say it happened at the initiative of Fikret Abdic, how

25     do you know that?


Page 17689

 1        A.   I know because we had a check-point next to theirs on the road

 2     from Vojnic to Velika Kladusa, and people communicated between them.

 3     There was no fighting or hostile activity, so an invitation was made.

 4     The military and civilian police manned that check-point.

 5        Q.   Can you tell us what was discussed at that first meeting, what

 6     was the main topic?

 7        A.   The main topic was to show that we were not hostile to each

 8     other; economic and military rapprochement; and mutual, economic, and

 9     other assistance.  Fikret Abdic wanted a telephone line to be laid

10     between Kladusa and the corps command, and that was done very soon

11     afterwards.  The meeting was not long, about two hours.  And during one

12     break, Fikret Abdic told me - and I remember this very well - that he did

13     not choose us because he liked us more or less than the Croats, that it

14     was the circumstances and the territory and the military situation that

15     brought us together and in a position where we should help each other.

16        Q.   At that time, the end of 1993/early 1994, was the army of

17     Fikret Abdic fighting the 5th Army, as we said before, and did it suffer

18     certain losses?

19        A.   Yes, they did.  They were constantly involved in combat, in some

20     parts more, in other parts less.  That he had one brigade near Pecigrad

21     because the forces of the 5th Corps were better organised, better armed,

22     they manoeuvred better, and they were much stronger numerically.

23        Q.   We keep talking about the forces of the 5th Corps.  Let's just

24     define it.  To whom did the 5th Corps belong?

25        A.   To the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, if


Page 17690

 1     you mean the political leader.

 2        Q.   Witness, you spoke about some losses Pecigrad.

 3             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I'd like to see now an entry in

 4     General Mladic's diary, 65 ter 5607, and the transcript is page 35 in

 5     B/C/S, page 34 in English.  The date is 19 January 1994.

 6        Q.   Could we just see if that's what you just mentioned.  Is this

 7     entry consistent with --

 8             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] In fact, it's page 34 in B/C/S,

 9     page 33 in English.  The very end.

10        Q.   Look at the last paragraph:  BK of ABH has formed a TG.  How do

11     you understand this?

12        A.   The Bihac Corps of the BH army has formed tactical groups.

13        Q.   It says:  On Fikret's side the 5th Corps has crushed the

14     1st Brigade.

15             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we move to the next page in both

16     versions.

17        Q.   "And there are another four company-strong brigades.  Fikret has

18     lost Skokovi village and part of Pecigrad.  Smuggling channels from

19     Banija to the AP Western Bosnia are strong."

20             Is this entry of 19 January 1994 consistent with the situation

21     you just described?

22        A.   Yes.  But it's not the 1st Brigade of Fikret Abdic's forces, it's

23     the 4th Brigade.  It just refers to one brigade here, but I know that

24     this company-strong brigade held positions around Pecigrad, and on that

25     occasion the commander of that brigade got killed.  And for a very long


Page 17691

 1     time they were unable to organise that unit because the fighting men had

 2     been quite attached to that commander.  It's true that this is a

 3     reference precisely to this event.

 4        Q.   When you say the commander of the 4th Brigade of Fikret Abdic's

 5     army, what was his name?

 6        A.   I really can't remember.

 7        Q.   It doesn't really matter.

 8             Mr. Karan, when it comes to Fikret Abdic, did he address either

 9     the Government or the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina requesting

10     some sort of aid; and if that was the case, what was it about?

11        A.   I just mention that those meetings that started in mid-November,

12     there were several others and Boro Mikelic did not attend those meetings,

13     just Commander Novakovic attended them.  And some were attended by Bulat,

14     our corps commander.  And it was then agreed that Fikret Abdic's forces

15     should receive aid in materiel, ammunition, weapons, and other types of

16     equipment.

17        Q.   Was that implemented?  Did Fikret Abdic start receiving that aid?

18        A.   Yes.  That was regulated by an order issued by the commander of

19     the Main Staff, and I believe that that order was drafted sometime in

20     November or perhaps early December 1993.  The commander of the Main Staff

21     drafted this order and stipulated in the order how the equipment should

22     be delivered and at what prices they would be sold to Fikret Abdic.  In

23     other words, we sold equipment to him.

24        Q.   When you say that you effectively sold Fikret Abdic equipment and

25     materiel, can you please be more precise and tell us what you sold him?


Page 17692

 1        A.   We sold him also a calibre of ammunition, 7.9, 7.62 ammunition

 2     against armoured vehicles, mortar shells of all calibre, recoilless gun

 3     ammunition.  I'm talking about 76-millimetre guns.

 4        Q.   You said "sold."  How was that regulated?  How did you receive

 5     the money and where did that money end up?

 6        A.   It was regulated in a very simple way.  A representative of the

 7     National Defence of Western Bosnia would come to the command of the

 8     corps, he would bring his requirements for ammunition and other materiel,

 9     and then we would send that list by telegram to the Main Staff in Knin.

10     From there, we would receive a reply as to how much of what kind of

11     materiel could be delivered to them and at what price.  The materiel and

12     the moneys received from the sale was received by a commission of the

13     Main Staff of the Army of Republic -- the Republic of Serbian Krajina

14     from Knin that consisted of three colonels.  All that happened at the

15     command of the 21st Corps.

16        Q.   You mean in your corps command?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Sir, could you please look at a Prosecutor exhibit, P1285.  This

19     seems to be something that you mentioned yesterday in your evidence.

20     This is a note on the application of work methods.  The date on the

21     document is 30 June 1994.  While we're waiting for the document to

22     appear, let me ask you:  From the end of 1993 up to mid-1994, how often

23     did you sell materiel and technical equipment to the army of

24     Mr. Fikret Abdic?  How often were meetings held?

25        A.   I can't give you an exact number, but I can tell you that every


Page 17693

 1     10 to 15 days Fikret Abdic would send his request for help in ammunition

 2     and weaponry, and I can say that his request was not always met.  At

 3     least he did not receive everything that he requested.

 4        Q.   Mr. Karan, we have the document on the screen.  This is a note on

 5     the application of work methods.  We can see OB GS SVK Djuro Celic.  I

 6     believe the date is the 30th of June.  Did you see the front page, do you

 7     know who Djuro Celic was?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Who was he?

10        A.   Djuro Celic was the security organ in the Main Staff of the

11     Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, and later on he was the

12     commander of the police battalion in the Knin Corps.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we now go to the following page.

15     And please look at the first four paragraphs.

16             In English it would be page 3, Your Honours -- no, no, no, I

17     apologise.  We have the right page on the screen.

18        Q.   Mr. Karan, did you have a chance to look at the paragraphs in

19     question?  This seems to be information on what happened between the

20     14th and 29 June 1994.

21        A.   Yes, I've seen it.

22        Q.   Are you familiar with the persons who participated in the

23     meetings with representatives of the Army of the Republic of

24     Serbian Krajina?

25        A.   Yes, I know them all.


Page 17694

 1        Q.   Could you please tell us:  In June 1994 Borislav Djukic, what was

 2     he?  What was his position?

 3        A.   General Borislav Djukic was the Chief of Staff of the Main Staff

 4     of the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in Knin.

 5        Q.   What about Generals Novakovic and Mile Mrksic?

 6        A.   General Mile Mrksic was assistant minister in the

 7     Army of Yugoslavia at the time.  And General Novakovic, I believe that at

 8     that time he was still the commander of the Main Staff.

 9        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Karan.

10             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we go to the following page,

11     page 3 in B/C/S, and the following page in English as well.

12        Q.   Please look at the portion starting with paragraph 4, where it

13     says:

14             "At these meetings, Abdic accepted ..." and so on, until the

15     paragraph where all the materiel is listed.

16             Did you see it?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Sir, do you know that already in June 1994 Fikret Abdic had

19     meetings with the president of Serbia?

20        A.   According to what I know, he met with the president of Serbia

21     even before that.  I know that we provided Fikret Abdic with police

22     escorts.  We even provided him with temporary force ID bearing a Serbian

23     name so that he could cross the territory of Republika Srpska on his way

24     to Belgrade.  In other words, he met with President Milosevic in Belgrade

25     even earlier than that, and this is just one of the meetings, I suppose,


Page 17695

 1     where a final decision was adopted to help him.  Because we would have

 2     faced a major problem if the 5th Corps had come to our line that were --

 3     our lines that were held by Fikret Abdic.

 4        Q.   Mr. Karan, please look at the last paragraph before the list of

 5     the materiel that arrived.  It says:

 6             "In the command of the 22nd [as interpreted] Corps there was a

 7     dilemma as to whether everything should be handed over to the AP ZB or

 8     just a part of the weapons, as they never asked for more than 40 pieces

 9     of weapons.  However, having consulted with the Main Staff of the Serbian

10     army of Krajina, the president of the Government of the Serbian Krajina

11     and Lieutenant-General Mrksic and especially after the autonomous

12     province representatives said that that was their weapons, that they

13     would take everything or nothing and intervene with Milosevic, everything

14     was given to them, all the weapons and ammunition."

15             Do you know anything about this situation that happened in

16     mid-1994?  Do you know that at the command of the 21st Corps there were

17     discussions about not giving Abdic all the weapons that were finally

18     delivered to him?

19        A.   Yes, there were officers who were faced with that dilemma.  There

20     were constant discussions in our midst about family ties of

21     Irfan Saracevic and a lieutenant-colonel from the command of the

22     5th Corps who had a brother who was in a very high military position.

23     There was a dilemma with this regard as to whether everything should be

24     given to them.  However, in this case Fikret asked for more for the very

25     reason that perhaps a month before that we had transferred over 100 of


Page 17696

 1     his soldiers from the prison in Bijeljina.  Those people hailed from the

 2     territory under the control of Fikret Abdic, and they were members of the

 3     BiH army.  They were imprisoned and they expressed a desire to join

 4     Fikret Abdic's army.  I believe that that was in April or perhaps May.

 5     The chief of security of the 1st Corps, the chief of security of the

 6     Bijeljina Corps, and people from -- somebody from -- Colonel Salapura

 7     from the intelligence organ and I worked hard to have those people

 8     transferred from the prison in Bijeljina to the territory of

 9     Western Bosnia.

10             That activity was not public.  No other members of the command

11     knew about it.  The commander of our corps of course knew about that, and

12     we managed to transfer those individuals who had expressed a wish to come

13     to the territory of Western Bosnia and fight under Fikret Abdic, and that

14     was the reason why they requested more pieces than was customary up to

15     then.  Hence the dilemma among certain officers of our corps command.

16        Q.   Let us clarify some things.  You're saying that they were

17     released from prison.  They were not criminals who were serving in the

18     army?

19        A.   No, no.  They were members of the BiH army who had been captured

20     at some point in time and they were imprisoned in Bijeljina, and they all

21     hailed from the territory that was under the control of Fikret Abdic.

22        Q.   And when it comes to the weapons that Fikret Abdic requested, was

23     that paid?

24        A.   All the weapons that were delivered to Fikret Abdic were paid.

25     Even the artillery support he had in the spring of 1994, even that was


Page 17697

 1     paid.

 2        Q.   Mr. Karan, this background of reforming the Pauk command is

 3     important.

 4             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we look at 65 ter 5608, which

 5     is the diary of General Mladic.  Page 123 in the transcript and in

 6     English.  It's dated 9 June 1994, a meeting.

 7        Q.   This was said by Mihajlo Knezevic, allegedly.  Can you tell us,

 8     Who was Knezevic Mihajlo?

 9        A.   Colonel Mihajlo Knezevic was chief of the security organ of the

10     Main Staff of the Serbian army of Krajina in Knin.

11        Q.   Mr. Karan, look at the third paragraph from the top.  It says:

12             "FA is now weak enough.  He should be supported so that he can

13     prevail.  They want to present their weaknesses as our betrayal or

14     insufficient artillery support."

15             Are you aware of this situation in June, and did you in the

16     Army of Republic of Serbian Krajina provide Fikret Abdic with artillery

17     support against the 5th Corps already in spring 1994?

18        A.   Yes.  We provided him with support from early spring 1994 and

19     then later in April and in May, in keeping with the requests he made to

20     the command.  He would plan an operation, and before his forces attacked,

21     artillery support was provided by our forces using T-130 cannons, which

22     have a long range.

23        Q.   I'd like to show you another document, Mr. Karan, and then we

24     will discuss your knowledge about the establishment of the Pauk command.

25             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] 2D72 is the exhibit I would like to


Page 17698

 1     see next.

 2        Q.   I would appreciate your comments on two paragraphs.  While we're

 3     waiting, the letter-head says:  Main Staff of the VRS.  I believe the

 4     date is 2nd July, 1994.

 5             Look at item 2 first.  Have you read it?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   Mr. Karan, there's a reference to some directive dating back to

 8     11 November 1993 pursuant to an agreement between the Army of Yugoslavia,

 9     the Army of Republika Srpska, and the Army of the Republic of

10     Serbian Krajina, and the forces of AP Western Bosnia.  Do you know which

11     directive this is?

12        A.   I know the gist of that directive, although I've never read the

13     whole text.  I know it was about co-ordinated action between the forces

14     of the Army of Republika Srpska, the Army of the Republic of

15     Serbian Krajina, and the forces of Fikret Abdic.  Co-ordinated action in

16     time and place pursuant to agreements between unit commanders.  This was

17     a political decision.

18        Q.   Can you tell us who issued this directive of 11 November 1993?

19        A.   The supreme commander of the Army of Republika Srpska,

20     President Karadzic.

21        Q.   Are you aware of the plans that Republika Srpska should,

22     beginning with 10 July 1994, start an offensive towards the Una river,

23     tie-up as many forces of the BH army as it can, reach the other bank of

24     the Una river, and thus realise the plans of the forces of

25     AP Western Bosnia to capture the entire area of Cazin Krajina?  And then


Page 17699

 1     item 3 lists the task for the Serbian army of Krajina, to inflict losses

 2     on the 5th Corps of the BH army and to stretch it thin by attacking its

 3     flanks from Kordun and Banija.  Do you know about this?

 4        A.   This was supposed to be implemented by the 1st Corps of the VRS;

 5     the 15th, the 21st, and the 39th Corps of the Serbian army of Krajina;

 6     and the National Defence forces of Western Bosnia.

 7        Q.   This plan we are looking at in this document, has it been

 8     materialised?

 9        A.   Not fully.  It had begun, but for various reasons and because of

10     the strong resistance of the 5th Corps this order was never fully

11     executed, that is to say, the main objective was not attained, and that

12     was to neutralise the 5th Corps of the BH army.

13        Q.   Mr. Karan, could we now look at 65 ter, the Mladic diary, 65 ter

14     5608, page 188 in the transcript both in B/C/S and in English.  This

15     entry is from July 1994.

16             How good was the response and the readiness of the fighters of

17     your corps and the 39th Corps for participating in these combat

18     operations?

19        A.   It was rather poor.  Members of the 21st Corps, especially the

20     military complement, were reluctant to accept participation in these

21     tasks.

22        Q.   Look at the lower part of the text.  That's -- this is a meeting

23     with President Milosevic.  Those present were Milosevic, Perisic,

24     Stanisic, Martic, Mikelic, Djukic, and General Mladic.  And it says:

25             "Soldiers of the 39th and 21st Corps are not ready to carry out


Page 17700

 1     combat operations except two groups of 20 to 40 soldiers, and they only

 2     want to do it for money."

 3             Can you comment?

 4        A.   It's true that the main body of the troops were not ready to go

 5     into this combat.  I believe Djukic means the officers who would receive

 6     per diem for such activities, for the duration of such activities.  I

 7     don't think that any soldiers in our corps wanted to fight for

 8     Fikret Abdic for money.

 9        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Karan.  What was the result of that battle, and

10     what happened with Fikret Abdic's army after July 1994?

11        A.   After all these activities that were marked by a significant lack

12     of co-ordination and this Serbian offensive against the 5th Corps, the

13     5th Corps launched a counter-offensive and defeated the forces of

14     Fikret Abdic.  And then together with the civilian population his forces

15     moved to our area, the area of Kordun.

16             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, before I continue,

17     2D72 is a document that I would like to tender.  I've displayed it a

18     moment ago.

19             MS. MARCUS:  No objection.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar.

21             THE REGISTRAR: [Microphone not activated] The document 2D72 will

22     receive number D747, Your Honours.

23                           [B/C/S on English channel]

24             JUDGE ORIE:  B/C/S on English channel, it says.

25             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter's apology.


Page 17701

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar, could you please repeat what you

 2     just said because we didn't receive it in English translation.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour.  Document 2D72 will receive

 4     number D747, Your Honours.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

 6             And where I said "we didn't receive it in English translation,"

 7     of course I meant to say that we did not receive it in the original

 8     English.

 9             Please proceed.

10             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

11        Q.   Mr. Karan, could you tell us if an exodus occurred from the

12     Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, and how many people moved out?

13        A.   Yes.  All Fikret Abdic's units moved to our side together with

14     the civilians.  And Fikret Abdic also managed to organise the transport

15     of large amounts of materiel by truck, carrying goods from his

16     Agrokomerc company and trailer-trucks carrying fuel, so he left nothing

17     to the forces of the 5th Corps except the bare town.

18             There were between 15- and 16.000 refugees together with the

19     units of Fikret Abdic's army.  Some were put up in Batnoga, which is a

20     former large farm that used to be part of the agricultural complex

21     Agrokomerc that had been very successful and run by Fikret Abdic before,

22     and some were put up in Karlovac.

23        Q.   When did that happen, which month?

24        A.   I believe it happened in August 1994.  The heat was scorching.

25        Q.   To the best of your knowledge, did Fikret Abdic make any plans to


Page 17702

 1     return; and if so, with whom did he make those plans, and how do you know

 2     that?

 3        A.   It's unbelievable that all these people who had fled were

 4     extremely well organised.  And Fikret started making plans to return

 5     almost immediately.  He came to see me many times, asking him to enable

 6     him not only to assure free movement of some members of the

 7     Supreme Command and to help him organise the work in the refugee camp.

 8     You know that people get drunk and create disturbances, and my police

 9     intervened in such incidents.  In any way, we talked a lot and he

10     wanted -- he was dead set on going back to Velika Kladusa, and he also

11     travelled to Belgrade to see Milosevic and discuss this.

12        Q.   Mr. Karan, this problem with the refugees and the BH army in your

13     area, to what extent did it affect you in the tactical and any other

14     sense?

15        A.   It was a huge problem.  You see, our forces who were in the

16     reserve should have been on the front line facing the 5th Corps.  Behind

17     our lines Croatian forces were regrouping, so it posed a problem to the

18     military position of our corps and the entire population of the region.

19     Both for our military purposes and just for the survival of our people we

20     had to repel the 5th Corps, at least to the positions they held before,

21     and try to have Fikret Abdic's men go back.

22        Q.   You said Fikret Abdic went to have meetings with Milosevic.  Can

23     we look at another entry from Mladic's diary, 65 ter 5609, page 28 in the

24     B/C/S transcript and page 28 in English.

25             While we're waiting, Mr. Karan, it was a meeting in Karadjordjevo


Page 17703

 1     on 29 September 1994 attended by President Milosevic, Lilic, Bulatovic,

 2     and General Perisic.

 3             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we zoom in a bit.

 4        Q.   It says:  Concerning CK - I suppose that's Cazin Krajina - Abdic

 5     pulled out with all his weapons, enough to make two good camps in RSK,

 6     and his men are sufficient to set up two good brigades to be equipped.

 7     And with your help and Celeketic's help he could recover this territory.

 8             Do you know that President Milosevic had this meeting with Lilic,

 9     Bulatovic, and -- in fact, I don't want to lead you.  What do you know

10     about what is said in this entry concerning this meeting between

11     Milosevic and all the other participants?

12        A.   I'm in no position to know whether what I'm going to say happened

13     at that very meeting, but I know what Fikret Abdic told me.  He told me

14     that he did see Milosevic and that they had agreed that he had to return

15     to Kladusa at all costs and that we would have to help him with that.  He

16     was very serious at that moment, and determined.

17        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Karan.

18             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, can we now look at

19     another entry, 65 ter 5609, page 83 in B/C/S as well as in English.

20        Q.   Mr. Karan, were you based in Vojnic, I mean your command?

21        A.   If you mean the corps command, the 21st Corps, no.  It was in a

22     hunting lodge known as Muljeva [phoen] which was at the foot of

23     Petrova Gora hill.  My security section was in Vojnic in the culture

24     hall, a building adjacent to the police station in Vojnic.

25        Q.   Did you have any problems in October 1994 involving the president


Page 17704

 1     of the Vojnic Assembly?

 2        A.   He was my neighbour, Milos Uckovic [phoen].  Since I have to say

 3     that, he was an alcoholic.  He was extremely intelligent.  He was radical

 4     in every sense of the word, and it was impossible for him to remain in

 5     the position of the president of the municipality of Vojnic.  I knew him

 6     well from when we were children.

 7        Q.   Sir, we have an entry here where it says that Martic and Mikelic

 8     attended a meeting with Milosevic and that they agreed that radicals in

 9     Vojnic should be replaced and by somebody from Babic's party.  You have

10     just told us something about that.  And then the following entry speaks

11     about Abdic, and it says:

12             "Martic told me that he had agreed with Karadzic about that."

13             Do you know something about the agreement between Milosevic,

14     Martic, and Karadzic?  What was that about?

15        A.   That was about an absolute support of Fikret Abdic in every term,

16     especially in military terms, to help him to return to the territory of

17     Western Bosnia.  This is a political framework for something that the

18     army would have to do.

19        Q.   Mr. Karan, as a result of all that we have just seen, do you

20     know -- can you tell us what happened next in the autumn of 1994?

21        A.   I can tell you that the corps command was very busy in the area

22     involving the 5th Corps, the Croatian forces, the refugees.  As far as I

23     can remember, the corps commander, Veljko Bosanac, who was a colonel at

24     the time, told me that in order to learn about the situation in the enemy

25     territory, we were supposed to receive some electronic surveillance


Page 17705

 1     equipment from Serbia, and that they would be mounted on Petrova Gora in

 2     the facilities of the radio relay hub on the very top of Petrova Gora.

 3     And the name of that radio relay was known as Magarcevac, and it had

 4     belonged to the JNA.  It was also stated that the brigade commands and

 5     the soldiers would not be able to conduct in the same way they conducted

 6     in the month of July when there were no combats going on and they were

 7     not motivated to help Fikret Abdic.

 8        Q.   In military terms, was a command set up; and if that was the

 9     case, what command was that?

10        A.   Yes.  With this regard a special command was set up.  Its

11     code-name was Pauk.  People who were appointed to that command, besides

12     the commander, General Novakovic, and the Chief of Staff, Cedo Bulat, who

13     had already been removed from their respective positions, and they became

14     the commanders of the Pauk command, a lot of other highly ranking

15     officers from the corps command as well as some of the most capable

16     officers from the brigade commands [as interpreted].  I can give you

17     their names, if necessary.  I can tell you who they were as far as I can

18     remember.

19             I know that the Chief of Staff of our corps, of the

20     31st [as interpreted] Corps, joined the Pauk command,

21     Colonel Petar Trkulja, as well as Colonel Popaci Branko [phoen], who was

22     later replaced by one of his deputies, a captain.

23     Lieutenant-Colonel Tomasevic also joined.  He was the chief of the

24     artillery and rocket units from the corps command.  Also the commander of

25     the 19th Brigade, Major Curcija.  The commander of a battalion from the


Page 17706

 1     11th Brigade, Officer Basara.  I gave the chief of security of one of my

 2     detachments, Captain First Class Nikola Vuletic.  And I believe that the

 3     chief of armoured units, I'm sure that he was transferred, he was

 4     Colonel Bobic.  Those were the officers, very capable officers, that

 5     joined the Pauk command.

 6        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Karan.  You have just told us that from the corps

 7     command you received information that some equipment would arrive from

 8     Serbia and that would be used for radio electronic surveillance.

 9             I would like to look at another entry from General Mladic's

10     diary.  We have it on the screen, it's 5609.  I'm looking for page 115 in

11     B/C/S and 116 in English.

12             While we are waiting for this to appear, Mr. Karan, this seems to

13     be something that General Celeketic said at one of those meetings on the

14     13th of October, 1994.  Do you know what was General Celeketic's position

15     on that day, on the 13th of October, 1994?

16        A.   General Celeketic had replaced the commander of the

17     Serbian army of Krajina, Mile Novakovic.

18        Q.   Sir, look at the entry which starts with the following words:

19             "I was given the task to do as much as we could.

20             "Since the MUP of Serbia will not arrive, they're not sending any

21     MTS.  I will help in the direction of Kladusa."

22             First of all, tell me, what is -- does "MTS" stand for?

23        A.   Materiel and technical equipment, in military terms.  That means

24     weapons and everything that goes with it - ammunition, cannons, tanks.

25     I'm talking in military terms.  Also trucks as logistics support, lethal


Page 17707

 1     weapons.

 2        Q.   According to what you know, you weren't the intelligence officer

 3     in the 5th Corps -- I apologise, you were the security organ in the

 4     21st Corps, the so-called Kordun Corps.  Do you know that the

 5     MUP of Serbia in October 1994 or perhaps later ever sent any materiel and

 6     technical equipment that would be used in Operation Pauk?

 7        A.   I don't know if I was clear enough.  Materiel and technical

 8     equipment, when it comes to counter-intelligence, are not cannons or

 9     ammunition; those are some special-purpose equipment.  So when the

10     commander talks about MTS is one thing, and my MTS is a different thing.

11     Our MTS is not visible, whereas the materiel and equipment for command

12     and its units are lethal weapons.

13             I know that electronic surveillance equipment did arrive from

14     Serbia.  I didn't know at first who would be in charge of that, but we

15     suffered from the lack of information about the activities of our enemy.

16     Our intelligence organ, because of his own weakness and lack of

17     organisation, did not collect intelligence about the activity of the

18     enemies across the river Kupa [Realtime transcript read in error

19     "Krupa"].  Our reconnaissance units had never crossed the river Kupa.  So

20     I must say that what we received was of great value because we wanted to

21     collect intelligence by electronic means.

22        Q.   Since we're talking about that - and we will be talking about

23     that in greater detail later - did you receive electronic data that

24     poured into the place where the equipment was mounted or not?

25        A.   Of course not.  It is only natural that those involved in


Page 17708

 1     electronic surveillance and the elements of the received data never

 2     shares everything they receive in that way.  We did receive periodically,

 3     perhaps every two or three days, reports about the activities of the

 4     enemies, especially the Croatian forces and the forces of the 5th Corps.

 5     We received information that was relevant for us, for the 5th Corps --

 6     for the 21st Corps, in a nutshell.

 7             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'm looking at the

 8     clock.  Perhaps this is a good time for our first break.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  It is a good time for our first break.  We will

10     resume at quarter to 11.00.

11                           --- Recess taken at 10.14 a.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 10.51 a.m.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Bakrac, you may proceed, but before we do so,

14     the Chamber would like -- one second.

15                           [Trial Chamber confers]

16             JUDGE ORIE:  The Chamber has decided that it grants the three

17     weeks for the consolidated response to the bar table motion.  At the same

18     time, it is on the record that you will do your utmost best to inform the

19     Stanisic Defence as soon as possible on portions on which you have made

20     up your mind already.

21             Then we are still waiting, Mr. Jordash, for further information

22     about the availability of Mr. Brown and Mr. Roberts.

23             MR. JORDASH:  Your Honour, I'll, if I may, just check that and

24     get back to you today.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.


Page 17709

 1             I already announced to the parties that today we'll not continue

 2     until quarter to 2.00, but only until 1.30, so after the next break.

 3             Then, Mr. Bakrac, are you ready to continue?

 4             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Yes, I am, Your Honours.

 5     Thank you very much.

 6        Q.   Mr. Karan, before the break we discussed the Pauk command, and

 7     you told us in detail about all the persons who were in the Pauk command.

 8     Where was it based?

 9        A.   I'm sorry, I saw here on the screen that the translation at one

10     point is "Krupa" river, whereas the correct name is "Kupa" river.  There

11     is no river named Krupa in that area.  That's when I was talking about

12     the reconnaissance units of the 21st Corps and their activities.

13        Q.   That has been corrected now, Mr. Karan.

14             Do you know where the Pauk command was based?

15        A.   The Pauk command was based at the top of Petrova Gora called

16     Magarcevac.  It used to be a facility for the radio relay hub of the

17     former JNA, two or three kilometres from the command of the 21st Corps

18     uphill, because the 21st Corps command was at the foot of the same hill.

19        Q.   Was the Pauk command in the same building as the communications

20     centre, or a different building?

21        A.   This stationary communications centre with JNA radio relays had

22     one building, and about 30 metres away there was a facility where what

23     you just mentioned could be accommodated.  They were not in the same

24     building.

25        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Karan.  Could we now look at three short videos,


Page 17710

 1     and you will tell us what they are about.

 2             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] For your information, Your Honours,

 3     this is video material disclosed to us by the Prosecution, D000-5094.

 4     And these three video-clips are a sequel of P2160.

 5             Could we now look at 2D1207 from 01:27 minutes, 55 seconds, until

 6     1 hour, 28 minutes, 23 seconds.

 7                           [Video-clip played]

 8             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Mr. Karan, these three men you see in the trench, one of them has

10     a white armband with the letters "VP" on it.  Who are they, and what does

11     "VP" stand for?

12        A.   These are uniforms of the National Defence Army of Western

13     Bosnia.  And the one with the white armband is a member of the military

14     police of the National Defence Army of Western Bosnia.  It was a

15     battalion, about a hundred men in the military police.

16        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Karan.

17             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I tender this

18     video-clip, MFI until we burn a separate video.

19             MS. MARCUS:  No objection.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Could we be provided with some information as to

21     where this is, what this is?  I mean, to hear a witness say that "VP"

22     stands for ... that's nice.  If that's the only thing you want us to

23     know, then of course it's accepted.  But if you want us to understand

24     this in a specific context, we would like to hear about that context or

25     at least be informed about it.


Page 17711

 1             Ms. Marcus.

 2             MS. MARCUS:  Yes, Your Honour.  Sorry, could I just clarify,

 3     because I said we had no objection:  I thought, when you said it's -- is

 4     it part of that same video, P2160? because that's already just another

 5     part of the full video.  That was the -- that's probably what I should

 6     have said, instead of "no objection," that it's actually part of the same

 7     video.  But when you said it was a sequel, I wasn't -- now I'm doubting

 8     whether it is part of the same video.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Is this a part which is already in evidence?  Or ...

10     then we don't have to tender it.

11             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  And if you think that my memory is so good that just

13     by saying it's a sequel to P2160 that I would know immediately what it

14     is, then I admire your optimism.

15             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Although I know you keep a lot in

16     your head, it's not my intention.  I just didn't want to waste time and

17     avoid leading the witness.  It's P2106 [as interpreted] is the video

18     material of which this is a part, and from this material the Prosecution

19     singled out a clip showing Legija, Boca Medic, and Ulemek in the trench.

20     After that come the clips that we want to tender.  It's the same trench

21     that the Prosecution showed, Ulemek, Legija, and Boca Medic in the

22     trench, and we want to show the rest of that clip and what else there is

23     in that trench.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, that's fine.  And the time and place, anything

25     that you could help us with?


Page 17712

 1             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, my Case Manager should

 2     check this before I inform you.  In this video material he should

 3     pin-point the time.  It's around Velika Kladusa, the time of the Pauk

 4     operation, but we need a specific time reference.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then, in the transcript, once we see "P2160"

 6     and then a couple of lines further down on page 26 we find "2106."  May I

 7     take it that 2160 is the right reference?

 8             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, P2160.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

10             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11        Q.   Witness, we will now pick up where we left off.  Can I call-up

12     video-clip 2D1208, from one hour, 28 minutes, 23 seconds, to one hour,

13     28 minutes, 35 seconds.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Is that again part of --

15             MR. BAKRAC:  Yes.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  -- P2160?  Then, for those who will do the follow-up

17     exercises, if there will be any, it's easier to have the reference to the

18     exhibit number.  So P2160 --

19             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, perhaps I was not

20     clear enough.  A film two hours long was disclosed to us.  The

21     Prosecution tendered one part of that film, where we can see Ulemek,

22     Legija, and Boca Medic, and that's just one part of that video.  It was

23     admitted as P2160.  We are now trying to tender the rest of that film,

24     where you can see other persons in that trench.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  What matters is whether the portions shown are


Page 17713

 1     already in evidence, yes or no.  Do I understand that the previous clip

 2     shown a minute ago is not yet part of P2160?

 3             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] No.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  And the clip to be played now --

 5             MR. BAKRAC: [No interpretation]

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  -- also not?  And the next clip also not?

 7             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] No.  And again no.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  So then we need a number for the previous clip, to

 9     start with.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that clip will be D748.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  And is --

12             MS. MARCUS:  Sorry, Your Honour, before I stood, I wanted to

13     double-check.  As far as I know, we tendered the whole thing.  It's about

14     two hours and 19 minutes.  It's ERN V000-5094.  Unless I'm mistaken, I

15     believe that we've tendered the whole thing.  That was certainly our

16     intention, and I think the surrogate sheet confirms that there's no

17     excerpts that was tendered, but rather, the whole thing.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Would the parties please check whether these

19     portions are already -- will -- D748 will be vacated for the time being.

20     Could this please be checked as quickly as possible.

21             Madam Registrar, D748 is vacated, and we'll find out whether it

22     needs to be re-installed at a later stage.

23             Please proceed.

24             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  I

25     apologise.


Page 17714

 1             Could we now see an excerpt from the same material: one hour,

 2     28 minutes, 23 seconds, until one hour, 28 minutes, 35 seconds.  I'd like

 3     to view it.

 4                           [Video-clip played]

 5             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Witness, we now stopped the film at one hour, 28 minutes,

 7     35 seconds.  Can you recognise this person in the foreground, who is

 8     that?

 9        A.   Yes, I know the man leaning on the trench.  It's Milorad Ulemek,

10     Legija.

11        Q.   To his left you can see a man with a moustache.  Who is it?

12        A.   The one bareheaded is Colonel Nikola Bobic, head of the armoured

13     mechanised units who transferred to the Pauk command.

14             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] From the same material,

15     Your Honours, could we see one hour, 30 minutes, 40 seconds, to one hour,

16     31 minutes, 2 seconds.

17                           [Video-clip played]

18             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   In this film, do you recognise the person without any head-gear

20     wearing a uniform?  That's just before we froze the movie.

21        A.   Yes, it's Major-General Mile Novakovic, commander of the Pauk

22     command at the time.

23        Q.   I believe we just got the answer to the time-reference question.

24     This was filmed on 6 April 1995, around 12.00.

25             MS. MARCUS:  Your Honours, I can confirm that this is the -- all


Page 17715

 1     in evidence.  It's -- the whole entire video was admitted.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  So no need to tender or to admit it any further.

 3             Please proceed.

 4             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5             Thank you, Your Honour.

 6        Q.   Witness, sir, could you please tell us, How often did you go to

 7     the Pauk command on Petrova Gora?

 8        A.   Not even during the former JNA you could often enter the

 9     communication -- any communications centre.  There was a limited number

10     of people who could do that.  I went there perhaps two or three times.  I

11     went to the Pauk command perhaps two or three times.

12        Q.   My first question:  Before the operation, did you know

13     Franko Simatovic?

14        A.   No, I didn't know him personally, but I knew of him.  I knew that

15     he was employed with the state security department of Serbia and I knew

16     that he was involved with intelligence affairs in that department.

17        Q.   Did you have an occasion to see Mr. Franko Simatovic on

18     Petrova Gora when you went there?

19        A.   Yes.  On one occasion when I went to our base near the

20     Petrova Gora monument to fetch some uniforms, and that base is very close

21     to the headquarters of the Pauk command, I visited my friend,

22     Major Korkut [phoen].  He was employed at the communications centre.  He

23     was an excellent engineer with a lot of experience who maintained the

24     communications centre.  As I was talking to him, I also spotted

25     Mr. Franko Simatovic in that centre that had already been established.


Page 17716

 1        Q.   Did you know what duties Mr. Simatovic discharged at that time?

 2        A.   I knew that he had gathered a group of engineers and technicians

 3     that were involved in electronic surveillance.  He headed that group.  He

 4     co-ordinated their work.  And that's all I knew and all I needed to know,

 5     for that matter.

 6        Q.   How did you learn that?

 7        A.   Well, that was very simple.  I even saw him sporting headphones

 8     on his head.  The antennas had already been mounted on the facility.  He

 9     even had an auxiliary manoeuvre device that could have been sent to

10     various locations, so I realised that he was in charge and that he --

11     what was done there were electronic surveillance operations carried out

12     beyond our area of responsibility, and we on our part really needed that

13     kind of information.

14        Q.   When you said that he had an auxiliary device, what did you mean?

15        A.   I meant a vehicle that was parked next to the facility.  The

16     other intelligence organs in the former JNA had similar vehicles, but not

17     as well equipped as that vehicle that I saw on that day.

18        Q.   Mr. Karan, thank you.  In addition to that one time, did you see

19     Mr. Simatovic any other time on Petrova Gora?

20        A.   I did not need to go there often.  I saw him perhaps two more

21     times in passing, but we never talked.  I know that he was not there all

22     the time.  I know that he went to some other locations, that he -- where

23     he also established the system of electronic surveillance.

24        Q.   Do you know, besides Magarcevac, were there any other locations

25     that was suitable and lended itself as a radio relay hub where radio


Page 17717

 1     surveillance activities were carried out?

 2        A.   I know there was another radio relay hub on Pljesevica on a

 3     hilltop called Celavac.  That was the elevation where that facility was

 4     located.  There is optical visibility between Celavac and Magarcevac, and

 5     Celavac was a former JNA radio relay hub.  There were constant radio

 6     relay communications between the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina,

 7     Knin, the 21st Corps, the 39th Corps, and so on and so forth.

 8        Q.   When it comes to electronic surveillance, did you receive all

 9     information from them, or was the number of those pieces of information

10     limited?

11        A.   I've already told you that we received only those things that

12     were of some relevance for our area of responsibility.  I'm referring to

13     the movements of the enemy side, of the Croatian army in this case, in

14     the area of responsibility of the 19th, the 11th, and the 13th Brigades.

15     And we also received information about the movements of the 5th Corps

16     troops.  There was no need for any other, really, information.

17        Q.   With this regard, Mr. Karan, I would like to ask you something.

18     We heard evidence, and we will give you some more details later on - do

19     you remember a specific event with a drone, and can you tell me what

20     happened?

21        A.   Yes.  A drone was in our territory.  None of us from the 22nd --

22     21st Corps saw it.  It was grounded on -- in the general sector of Glina.

23     My colleague - and I'm referring to the chief of security of the

24     39th Corps, Lieutenant-Colonel Gledic [phoen] - together with his

25     military policemen secured the location, collected the remains of the


Page 17718

 1     drone, and, after having received an order of the commander of the

 2     39th Corps, Colonel Stanko Letic, he was supposed to hand over the

 3     remains of the drone to the Pauk command.  However, I learned later that

 4     Lieutenant-Colonel Gledic did not hand over the most important part of

 5     the drone, and that was the photo and optical surveillance equipment.

 6     The most essential part of the drone was not handed over to the Pauk

 7     command.  They got only the tin and metal parts.  He did not hand over

 8     those things that showed what the drone had documented and recorded up to

 9     then.

10        Q.   Let me interrupt you here, Mr. Karan.  First let me ask you this:

11     Do you know how the drone was detected?

12        A.   I've already told you that none of us spotted it.  I'm sure that

13     this was a result of electronic surveillance.  And then an order was

14     given to shoot it down.

15        Q.   Can you tell us what transpired with the equipment that

16     Colonel Gledic kept, as you have told us?

17        A.   He was lieutenant-colonel.  I know that he himself is quite

18     interested in all things electronic.  He tried to cover up, he tried to

19     hide the most important part of the drone; however, the engineers at the

20     Pauk command established that that was missing.  And then a subsequent

21     order was issued by the chief of the security sector of the Main Staff

22     for Colonel Gledic to hand this over to the Pauk command, and eventually

23     he did that.

24        Q.   Do you know, witness, whether other aircraft flew over your

25     territory at the time?

 


Page 17719

 1        A.   Well, our aircraft took off from Ponikve airport.  And there were

 2     fly-overs by helicopters which belonged to UNPROFOR, and even those

 3     helicopters that belonged to the BiH army.  They used pilots from other

 4     states, in particular from Ukraine.

 5        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Karan.  We don't have much time left to go into

 6     the details of all that.

 7             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask for P468 to be

 8     exhibited, page 15.  While we are waiting, Your Honours, let me remind

 9     you:  These are per diems, the document is confidential, and I think that

10     it should not be broadcast.  And I would also like the Court to move into

11     private session.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  We move into private session.

13                           [Private session]

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)


Page 17720

 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

10

11 Pages 17720-17727 redacted. Private session.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

 


Page 17728

 1                           [Open session]

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honour.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

 4             Please proceed, Mr. Bakrac.

 5             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6        Q.   Under number 8 we see Cedo Bulat.  Who was he at the command?

 7        A.   Chief of Staff of the Pauk command.

 8        Q.   Can you identify anyone else from this list of people to be

 9     admitted?

10        A.   Yes, I see the nickname Legija.  I recognise number 15, that's

11     Stanko Curcija, a major who to be commander of the 19th Brigade of the

12     21st Corps, and he went to the Pauk command.  I recognise Basara.  It's

13     Dusan Basara, an exceptional commander, battalion commander from the

14     11th Brigade of the 21st Corps.

15        Q.   We see TG-2.  I suppose that's Tactical Group 2?

16        A.   Correct.

17        Q.   Were they members of the Army of the RSK?

18        A.   Yes.

19             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we now see 2D131.

20        Q.   And while waiting for that document, be so kind, Mr. Karan, and

21     tell us if you know who Milan Milanovic, Mrgud, was.

22        A.   Milan Milanovic, Mrgud, was assistant defence minister of the RSK

23     for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem.  And while SAO,

24     Eastern Slavonia, existed, he was defence minister of that territory.

25        Q.   This is an article from 9 June 2005.  The question is who the


Page 17729

 1     Skorpions belonged to.  And here Mrgud says the defence of Krajina --

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Bakrac please repeat.

 3             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] In English that's page 2,

 4     Your Honours, I apologise.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Bakrac.

 6             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   He says:

 8             "The defence of the SBO was built on five brigades:  Tenja,

 9     Vukovar, Mirkovac, Beli Manastir, and Dalj.  We also had two separate

10     battalions:  Arkan's Serbian Volunteer Guard and the Skorpions.

11     Officially, they were all under the command of the 11th Corps of the RSK

12     army, which for a time was under the command of Bogdan Sladojevic and

13     then Dusan Loncar."

14             Now, since you were in the RSK army from 1993, do you believe

15     this is accurate?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   Can you tell us about the 11th Corps made up of these two fire

18     brigades?  In fact, these five brigades and these two battalions, to

19     which corps did they belong?

20        A.   They belonged to the 11th Eastern Slavonia Corps.

21        Q.   Who commanded the corps and how many men did it have?

22        A.   The commander was General Dusan Loncar.  Its strength was about

23     20-plus thousand people.

24             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, before I move on I

25     would like to tender this document into evidence.


Page 17730

 1             MS. MARCUS:  Your Honours, 2D131 was admitted as D660 on the

 2     25th of January at transcript page 16415, but it doesn't appear to be

 3     updated in e-court.

 4             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  I would like to

 5     thank my learned friend.  I found this strange.  I already exhibited this

 6     document and I was not able to find it among the exhibits.  Perhaps it

 7     could be again given the same number, D660, or maybe a new one.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, we'll first try to find out if it was admitted

 9     under a certain number, then of course that should be reflected in

10     e-court, before we take any further action.

11                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Before we take any action, as suggested by you,

13     Mr. Bakrac, we'll first verify what happened in e-court.

14             Please proceed.

15             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

16        Q.   Witness, and now I will tackle my last topic.

17             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] With your leave, Your Honours,

18     according to our schedule I think I could complete my cross-examination

19     within the next 15 or 20 minutes.  I don't know whether you would agree

20     with that, whether the Stanisic Defence would agree with that.  And I

21     correct myself:  I meant my examination-in-chief.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  We'll have a look at the time you have spent until

23     now.  Please proceed for the time being, but we'll not continue until --

24     for the next 20 minutes, we'll take a break anyhow.  So you'll not be

25     able to finish before the break, if only because the Judges have a


Page 17731

 1     meeting during the break and that is scheduled for 12.00.

 2             MR. JORDASH:  I was going to ask for a break just now, but --

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  We can take -- we can take the break even a bit

 4     earlier.

 5             Mr. Bakrac, we'll then now take a break.  We'll resume at

 6     25 minutes past 12.00 or slightly later depending on concluding the

 7     meeting.  And after that, then we'll continue until 1.30, not 1.45.

 8                           --- Recess taken at 11.54 a.m.

 9                           --- On resuming at 12.57 p.m.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  The Chamber expresses its regret that it could not

11     start any earlier.  And it's only in exceptional circumstances that we

12     choose that what we have to do out of court is at that moment more

13     important than what we have to do in court, however important the latter

14     is.

15             Mr. Bakrac.

16             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

17        Q.   Mr. Karan, before we tackle my last subject, let me repeat:  We

18     spoke about some individuals from the 72nd Special Brigade of the

19     Army of Yugoslavia.  When it comes to the members of that unit, what kind

20     of berets did they sport on their heads, do you know that?

21        A.   I can't remember.  In any case, I believe that they wore the same

22     kind of grey caps that we did.  Their uniforms were similar to ours.

23        Q.   Well, if you can't remember, that's okay.  Let us move on.

24             Mr. Karan, I'm going to show you an exhibit, P239.

25             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I believe that we can


Page 17732

 1     broadcast it in open session, that it is not under seal.

 2        Q.   Witness, I will invite your comments.  The exhibit was drafted by

 3     a witness who testified in open court.  While we're waiting for the

 4     document to appear on the screen, let me ask you:  Do you know a person

 5     whose name is Slobodan Lazarevic?

 6        A.   Yes, I do.

 7        Q.   Was Slobodan Lazarevic ever in the territory of the Kordun Corps,

 8     particularly when you arrived there in September 1993?

 9        A.   Yes, he was.

10        Q.   Can you please tell us, What was his position when you found him

11     there?

12        A.   He was an interpreter.  He interpreted for Colonel Bulat, who met

13     with representatives of the Sector North of UNPROFOR, most commonly the

14     Commander Essenburg [phoen] and others.

15        Q.   At any point in time was he a member of the Army of the Republic

16     of Serbian Krajina, the Army of Yugoslavia, or a member of your

17     21st Corps?

18        A.   I must say that when I first saw him I found him interesting

19     because he was dressed differently.  He was full of patches and badges.

20     He had a rank; he was lieutenant-colonel.  And with that regard I went to

21     the corps command, because I knew that he also introduces himself to the

22     population as the assistant commander for relations with UNPROFOR.  I

23     went to the personnel division of the command and I checked that.  I was

24     able to establish that Mr. Lazarevic, first of all, was never even

25     mobilised.  Second of all, he was a civilian; he was not a


Page 17733

 1     lieutenant-colonel.  And third of all, in the command -- in the corps

 2     command there was no establishment post for an assistant commander for

 3     public relations and relations with UNPROFOR.

 4             That is why in my security organ we carried out a very complex

 5     analysis of the gentleman's conduct and movements.  We decided that we

 6     didn't need him for any operational work, that he's no more valuable than

 7     any other inhabitant of Kordun, and that we had better positions in the

 8     command Sector North than he could obtain for us.  He -- for me he was a

 9     civilian who was an interpreter.  I didn't want to get too much involved

10     in the relationship between Bulat and himself.  They were friends, that's

11     why he interpreted for Bulat whenever he met with somebody from the

12     command of Sector North.

13        Q.   Just to make sure that we understand each other:  You said that

14     you went to the personnel and you checked and realised that he was a

15     civilian.  You said that he was a civilian in your eyes.  Was it only --

16     in your eyes only or did you check that at the personnel?

17        A.   At the personnel division he was not registered as ever having

18     been mobilised as a member of the 21st Corps.  He was not registered as

19     having a rank.  He was not registered as taking the position as an

20     assistant commander in a position which didn't exist.  There was

21     assistant for morale, guidance, and political affairs.  He was also in

22     charge of public relations.

23        Q.   Mr. Karan, please look at the table, look on the right-hand side.

24     It was Mr. Lazarevic who actually drafted this schematic, and you can see

25     the JNA, the VJ, General Staff, General Momcilo Perisic.  And underneath


Page 17734

 1     there is a block where it says KOS command Belgrade.  From 1991 to 1995

 2     was there an KOS command in Belgrade?

 3        A.   No.  I've never heard of such an interpretation before.  Things

 4     were completely different.  There was a security administration of the

 5     National Defence, but no command.  And KOS, that didn't exist either.

 6     KOS existed up to the 1950s, after the Second World War.  It was the

 7     counter-intelligence service.  And after that, no, it was abolished and

 8     it didn't exist at this time.

 9        Q.   Mr. Karan, you said the KOS did not exist.  And let me ask you:

10     Is there an internal security and an external security, or, rather, in

11     1992 did that division exist?

12        A.   I'm looking at this schematic and I can tell you that this didn't

13     exist.  There was the security administration of the federal defence that

14     was involved in counter-intelligence and there was a completely separate

15     organ tied to the chief of sector which was intelligence administration

16     and had nothing whatsoever to do with the security of the

17     National Defence.  So this is an incorrect schematic.  This is just an

18     arbitrary interpretation provided by somebody who obviously was not

19     familiar with the situation at all.

20        Q.   Mr. Karan, and let's now look on the left-hand side, it says

21     Colonel Petar Surla.  Between 1992 and 1993 I believe that he was in the

22     21st Corps, and then Colonel Mladjo Karan from 1993 to 1995.  You already

23     testified about having replaced Petar Surla.  Was he colonel in 1992 and

24     1993?

25        A.   He was a lieutenant-colonel and I was a major.


Page 17735

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness and the counsel please slow

 2     down.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I became lieutenant-colonel in

 4     April 1994.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I ask you to slow down because the

 6     interpreters have difficulties in following you.

 7             MR. BAKRAC:  Okay.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Bakrac, if you take a break now and then --

 9             MR. BAKRAC:  Okay.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  -- a pause, that's good as well.

11             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I'll do my best, Your Honour.  I'm

12     trying to finish in time before the end of business today.  But let's not

13     waste time.

14        Q.   Mr. Karan, when did you become colonel?

15        A.   In 2002 [as interpreted].  It was in the Army of Yugoslavia.

16        Q.   Mr. Karan, on the right-hand side there is a block where it says:

17     external security Colonel Nikola Zimonja.  Was there such a thing as

18     external security, and do you know Colonel Nikola Zimonja?

19        A.   External security within KOS, it never existed.  But as I've

20     already told you, there was the intelligence administration of the

21     General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia.  I know Colonel Nikola Zimonja,

22     and he was a member of the intelligence administration in Belgrade.  He

23     was a desk officer.  He was not in a leading position, in a managerial

24     position, as it were.

25        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Karan.  And now moving down we see the Main Staff


Page 17736

 1     Knin, the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, and it says

 2     General Celeketic and General Mile Mrksic.  Is there something missing

 3     here according to you?

 4        A.   Yes, the previous commander, if that is of any importance.

 5     General Mile Novakovic is not there.

 6        Q.   Up to then was General Mile Novakovic the commander of the

 7     Main Staff there?

 8        A.   He -- when I arrived in 1993, and he was then removed in 1994,

 9     sometime in the middle of that year, General Celeketic replaced him.

10     Perhaps it was even before.  And then General Mrksic replaced

11     General Celeketic sometime in May, the beginning of May or mid-May 1995,

12     if I'm not mistaken.

13        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Karan.  And now let us look further down.  We'll

14     see the 21st Corps, commander Colonel Cedo Bulat.  And below that is a

15     designation, and I'm going to ask you whether in the 21st Corps you had a

16     position for a communications officer?

17        A.   No.

18        Q.   Mr. Karan, in the 21st Corps did you have an anti-terrorist unit

19     at all?

20        A.   We had a sabotage and reconnaissance detachment, if we're talking

21     about Sinisa Martic who was a member of that detachment.  But it was not

22     an independent anti-terrorist unit.

23        Q.   Do you know who Colonel Pero Ajdinovic is?  Was he ever in

24     command of that reconnaissance and sabotage detachment?

25        A.   Pero Ajdinovic was never a colonel.  At that time he was


Page 17737

 1     lieutenant-colonel.  And when I arrived in 1993 he was not in the area of

 2     the 21st Corps.  He had left the area in 1992 and he was under the

 3     command of the security administration of the National Defence in

 4     Belgrade.  And the security organ could certainly not be in command of

 5     any unit.  That never happened.  That has never happened.

 6        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Karan.

 7        A.   If it's of any relevance for the Trial Chamber, the commander of

 8     that sabotage and reconnaissance unit of the 21st Corps was somebody

 9     else, Captain Nikola Torbica.  And in professional terms, he was linked

10     to the intelligence organ of the 21st Corps and not to the security organ

11     of the 21st Corps.  In professional terms, only the military police is

12     linked to the latter.

13        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Karan.  And now please look at Pauk Bosnia staff,

14     and it says Major-General Mile Novakovic.  And below that it says

15     Fikret Abdic's forces subordinated to the 21st Corps under Novakovic.

16     When Mr. Novakovic became the commander of Pauk, who was the commander of

17     the 21st Corps?

18        A.   The commander of the 21st Corps was Colonel Veljko Bosanac.

19        Q.   Can you tell me, please, one more thing:  Were Fikret Abdic's

20     forces ever subordinated to yours, to the 21st Corps?

21        A.   No.

22        Q.   Mr. Karan, and now can we please look at Exhibit D19.  This is a

23     document which was admitted into evidence.  It was provided by

24     Slobodan Lazarevic to the OTP.  Let me just ask you to look at it and

25     tell me whether this reflects -- the document was not signed, but it was


Page 17738

 1     drafted on the 28th of April.  And here it says:

 2             "I am kindly asking the proper body in the command to take my

 3     application regarding admission of civilian person into the JNA service

 4     in consideration."

 5             My first question:  Is it true that he was a civilian at the time

 6     when you joined the Kordun Corps?

 7        A.   Yes, he was a civilian.  When you say "a civilian," you imply a

 8     non-uniformed person employed by the military.  That's a civilian

 9     employed by the military.

10        Q.   Now look at the second paragraph, where it says:

11             "I have been working as an interpreter all this time, whereas

12     over the last month I have been working as an independent communications

13     officer ..."

14             You have already told us that he was an interpreter.  My question

15     is this:  After having served as an interpreter, did he ever become an

16     independent communications officer?

17        A.   [No interpretation]

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please repeat the answer.

19             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Mr. Karan --

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Could you please repeat your answer to the last

22     question.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, that did not exist.

24             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Mr. Karan, and now let's very quickly look at P234.  And while


Page 17739

 1     we're waiting for the document to be displayed, my question is this:  Are

 2     you familiar with the existence of the 40th Personnel Centre in Belgrade?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   From when to when did that centre exist?

 5        A.   That centre was established sometime after I left for the

 6     Republic of Serbian Krajina, some month later, because I know I didn't go

 7     with any documents, just the papers I received from my superior in the

 8     security section of the minister's office.  I never saw any order for my

 9     assignment to the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

10        Q.   So, after September 1993?

11        A.   Yes, some month later.  It could have been in October or November

12     that the 40th Personnel Centre was established.

13        Q.   Do you know how long the centre existed, until when?

14        A.   It existed until 1996, until various issues related to the status

15     of the troops of the RSK army transferring to the VJ were resolved.

16        Q.   Who was the chief?

17        A.   Ljubomir Lalic, who was a colonel.

18        Q.   Mr. Karan, look at this document and tell me:  Do you know if

19     Colonel Cedomir Bulat was the head or occupied any other position in the

20     40th Personnel Centre?

21        A.   No.

22        Q.   Do we see here a certificate issued by Colonel Cedomir Bulat

23     under the stamp of the 40th Personnel Centre?  And this certificate is to

24     the effect that VP, that is, military post office 9104 confirms that

25     reserve Lieutenant Slobodan Lazarevic spent the period from


Page 17740

 1     21st September [as interpreted] 1991 to 14 August 1995 at the front line

 2     as a member of the 21st Corps.

 3             Do you know when the 21st Corps ceased to exist?

 4        A.   9 August 1995 when Colonel Cedomir Bulat turned -- or, rather,

 5     surrendered to the Croatian forces Captain Ivetic.

 6        Q.   Do you know about subsequent activities of Cedomir Bulat.  When

 7     the personnel centre -- sorry, when the 21st Corps ceased to exist, were

 8     their stamps handed over?

 9        A.   Yes, I turned them in to the General Staff of the

10     Army of Yugoslavia, and they were destroyed before a panel.  I recognise

11     the signature of Cedomir Bulat, but I don't know how he was able to affix

12     the stamp of the personnel centre when he was not a member of it.  And

13     this -- these dates concerning the tenure in the corps are not accurate.

14        Q.   Mr. Karan, do you have any knowledge, did you learn later, that

15     the stamps of the 21st Corps that were destroyed before a commission

16     started appearing on some certificates issued later?

17        A.   Yes.  There were quite a few cases before Belgrade courts for

18     indemnity, financial and otherwise, for members of the RSK army after

19     that time at 20th April when the corps ceased to exist, when the army

20     withdrew.  And these stamps appeared on documents signed by Cedomir Bulat

21     and other persons.  And of course these people filing these lawsuits lost

22     these cases.  It was a criminal offence.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Just tell me, how do you know that?

24        A.   The military judiciary was under my counter-intelligence

25     jurisdiction at the time, and no single application or lawsuit for


Page 17741

 1     damages could pass us by.  And of course I had insight into all these

 2     applications.

 3        Q.   Could you just look at the map now.  I'm trying to finish my

 4     examination-in-chief by 1.30.

 5             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we call up CB-03, which is a

 6     map.

 7        Q.   And while waiting for that map, Mr. Karan, you will be asked to

 8     mark certain territories on the screen to clarify your evidence, and

 9     after that I will have a few questions concerning the testimony of

10     Mr. Lazarevic.

11             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we zoom in a bit on the left

12     top part.  Thank you.

13        Q.   Mr. Karan -- could the usher help us and give you a pen to put a

14     circle around the area of responsibility of the 39th Banija Corps.

15        A.   The 39th Banija Corps covered the municipality of Glina, Dvor,

16     parts of Petrinja, not all of them, just up to the Sava river --

17        Q.   We have no time, Mr. Karan.  Just put a circle.

18        A.   [Marks]

19        Q.   Could you put number 39K inside that circle.

20        A.   [Marks]

21        Q.   Now the area of responsibility of your 21st Kordun Corps.

22        A.   The municipalities of Vrginmost, Vojnic, and the territory of

23     Slunj municipality, which is the right-hand part of the Korana river

24     alongside Velika Kladusa and up to Glina, which was the boundary between

25     the 21st and the 39th Corps.


Page 17742

 1        Q.   Now the area of responsibility of the 15th Lika Corps.

 2        A.   The 15th Lika Corps covered Titova Korenica municipality.  It

 3     goes further down.  We need to raise this map a bit.  I can't reach down

 4     far enough.

 5             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I don't know, is it technically

 6     possible to now move the map?

 7        Q.   It will be complicated, Mr. Karan.  Just draw further.  This

 8     lower part doesn't matter.

 9        A.   So it was Titova Korenica municipality, Donji Lapac, and further

10     on towards Gracac.

11        Q.   Use a different colour if possible.  Where is the Bihac pocket?

12        A.   Somewhere here.

13        Q.   Put number 1 there.

14        A.   [Marks]

15        Q.   And now, show us, Where was the 5th Corps of the BH army?

16        A.   If we accept the municipalities Bosanska Krupa, Cazin, part of

17     Bosanski Novi all the way up to the Una river, that area there.

18        Q.   Could you write "5th Corps ABH."

19        A.   [Marks]

20        Q.   Witness, before I tender this:  Did the 39th Banija Corps ever

21     have the ability to penetrate through the positions of the 5th Corps of

22     the ABH to reach the Bihac pocket?

23        A.   No.  They would simply have been cut off in the middle by the

24     5th Corps, and it would have been their victory.

25        Q.   Did you ever hear that members of the 39th Banija Corps made an


Page 17743

 1     incursion into the Bihac pocket, losing 100 men who were later to be

 2     exchanged for 100 dead Muslims?

 3        A.   No, that simply never happened.  The 39th Corps was never

 4     involved in any operations in the Bihac pocket.  It would physically have

 5     been almost unfeasible, and it never happened.  Because if we see that

 6     they found it difficult to go even to Velika Kladusa, can you imagine a

 7     150-kilometre march to reach the Bihac pocket?  It never happened.

 8        Q.   Did Slobodan Lazarevic ever come to you asking for six to ten

 9     dead bodies for an exchange, whereupon you sent him to Petrova Gora to

10     collect them?

11        A.   First of all, that was not my job; and second, it never happened.

12        Q.   And you mention 100 dead.

13        A.   That also never happened.  We never had losses of that order, in

14     no attack.  If we had lost 100 men in one go, everybody would have been

15     replaced and things would have taken a completely different course.  We

16     never had a loss of 100 men and why would anybody come to me to arrange

17     an exchange.

18             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I see the clock.  From

19     what I know, I've spent two and a half hours approximately.  I need only

20     five more minutes, and I would like to tender this map.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, whether we give you these five more minutes on

22     Tuesday.  But before the break you said you would need 15 to 20 minutes.

23     Now you took 32 minutes after the break and you say you're not finished.

24     You stayed over all within your time-limits, but for organising and

25     scheduling a court hearing it's not of great assistance to -- because I

 


Page 17744

 1     noticed nothing really happened in that half an hour that was so

 2     unforeseeable that it would justify.  Now, those five minutes, as far as

 3     I'm concerned, you can have them on Tuesday, but please be a bit more

 4     accurate in your estimates of time.  That would certainly make my job a

 5     bit easier as well.

 6             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  I announced that we would stop earlier, and that's

 8     what we're going to do.

 9             Witness, I'd like to give you the same instruction as I gave to

10     you yesterday, that is, that you should not speak or communicate in

11     whatever way with anyone about your testimony.

12             We will resume an Tuesday, the 28th of February, quarter past

13     2.00 in this same courtroom, II.

14             But could I already hear from the Prosecution how much time they

15     would need and whether that any estimate has changed?

16             MS. MARCUS:  Your Honour, we will aim to use the same time that

17     was used by Mr. Bakrac, whatever that ends up to be.  The original

18     estimate was three and a half hours --

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, that's --

20             MS. MARCUS:  -- that was my original estimate.  I will try to cut

21     it down to the amount that Mr. Bakrac used.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash.

23             MR. JORDASH:  One hour, 15 minutes would be --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, therefore it's likely that we'll not finish on

25     the 28th of February.  It's for that reason that the Chamber organised


Page 17745

 1     another day, the 29th of February, to have some additional time this year

 2     to hear the evidence of this witness.  So there's a fair chance that

 3     we'll then conclude the testimony, your testimony, on the

 4     29th of February.

 5             We stand -- yes, Mr. Bakrac, you want another day, the

 6     30th of February?

 7             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour.  Just to inform you

 8     that we have made efforts to secure the next witness as scheduled, acting

 9     on your instructions, and I have agreed with Mrs. Marcus that as we

10     review the documents we will send them to her immediately.  We won't wait

11     to gather them all.  But you should know that we have managed to secure

12     the witness for next week.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, may I take it that you'll find ways to

14     inform Chamber staff about the availability of the two outstanding

15     witnesses.

16             MR. JORDASH:  Certainly today.  I'm sorry for the delay.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

18             We adjourn.  And we resume on the 28th of February at 2.15 in the

19     afternoon.

20                           [The witness stands down]

21                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.33 p.m.,

22                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 28th day

23                           of February, 2012, at 2.15 p.m.

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