Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 18547

 1                           Monday, 26 March 2012

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 12.24 p.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good afternoon to everyone.

 6             Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  This is case

 8     number IT-03-69-T, the Prosecutor versus Jovica Stanisic and

 9     Franko Simatovic.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

11             I was informed, Mr. Jordash, that you would like to address the

12     Chamber.  But before giving you an opportunity to do so, there may have

13     been some confusion about the time in which we would start today.  To the

14     extent the communication was not perfect and to the extent the Chamber

15     has played a role in that, we regret that confusion and hope that next

16     time communication will be better.

17             Mr. Jordash, I do not know what you want to raise, but if it's

18     about the next witness and all kind of limits and lines of questioning,

19     then I would suggest that we first move into private session.  If it's

20     about another matter, please --

21             MR. JORDASH:  No, it's about that matter.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  -- proceed.

23             Then we move into private session.

24                           [Private session]

25   (redacted)


Page 18548











11 Pages 18548-18560 redacted. Private session.
















Page 18561

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14                           [Open session]

15             THE REGISTRAR:  We are in open session, Your Honour.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

17             We are now back in open session.  Could I invite you,

18     Sir Ivor Roberts, to stand and to make a solemn declaration of which the

19     text will be handed out to you by the usher.

20             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

21     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

22                           WITNESS:  SIR IVOR ROBERTS

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Please be seated.

24             Mr. Jordash, we were scheduled to have a first session which, of

25     course, started late.  I suggest, unless the Registry has major


Page 18562

 1     objection, to continue now until 1.30.  You might not be finished by

 2     that, although please keep in mind that you introduced the witness as a

 3     92 bis witness which, of course, limits very much the time for

 4     examination-in-chief.

 5             MR. JORDASH:  Yes.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 7             Sir Ivor, you'll first be examined by Mr. Jordash.  Mr. Jordash

 8     is counsel for Mr. Stanisic.

 9             Please proceed, Mr. Jordash.

10             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you, Your Honour.

11                           Examination by Mr. Jordash:

12        Q.   Good afternoon, Sir Ivor.

13        A.   Good afternoon.

14        Q.   Please, would you give your full name and date of birth for the

15     record, please?

16        A.   Ivor Antony Roberts, 24 September 1946.

17             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you, could we have on the screen, please,

18     1D05474.

19        Q.   What you are going to see in front of you -- in fact, what you

20     have in front of you, I believe, is a copy of your statement; is that

21     correct?

22        A.   Yes.

23             MR. JORDASH:  With the parties' agreement, Sir Ivor would like to

24     look at a paper copy of his statement.

25             MR. FARR:  No objection, Your Honour.

Page 18563

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  No objections from the Simatovic Defence either.

 2     Please proceed.

 3             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you.

 4        Q.   I would just like to go through some formalities which are

 5     required before we can apply to tender your statement.  Would you please

 6     quickly look --

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Please slow down for the sake of the

 8     interpreters, please.

 9             MR. JORDASH:  I beg your pardon.

10        Q.   Would you please have a look at the front of the statement, and

11     if we could then move to the last page, please.  And would you confirm

12     that that's your signature and you were interviewed by the Defence and

13     signed this as your statement?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   Have you had an opportunity to review the statement and make any

16     amendments or clarifications that you wish to make?

17        A.   I've re-read it and I've no amendments to make.

18        Q.   Thank you.  And were the contents of the statement in accordance

19     with the truth?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   And if asked the same questions, would you in substance give the

22     same answers?

23        A.   Yes.

24             MR. JORDASH:  May I tender this as an exhibit, Your Honours,

25     please, with the underlaying document?

Page 18564

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Which under -- there --

 2             MR. JORDASH:  1D05475 and 1D04847.  1D04847, in fact, consists of

 3     a number of documents.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Related documents.

 5             Madam Registrar.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 1D5474 will receive number D779,

 7     Your Honours.  Document 1D5475 will receive number D780.  And document

 8     1D4847 will receive number D781, Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  No objections.

10             D779, D780, and D781 are admitted into evidence.

11             You may proceed, Mr. Jordash.

12             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you, Your Honours.

13        Q.   Sir Ivor, now the statement and the underlaying documents which

14     are footnoted in the statement are evidence before the Court.  So we do

15     not need to repeat the contents, but I would like to ask you about a

16     number of aspects of the statement just to seek further details or

17     clarifications.  Do you follow me?

18        A.   Yes, though I am not clear what the underlying documents are.

19        Q.   Perhaps if you look at the footnotes in your statement, they are

20     the underlying documents that I am referring to.

21        A.   Right.  Okay.

22        Q.   Just -- just for the record, you were provided with a copy of the

23     underlying documents at the time you completed the statement; is that

24     correct?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 18565

 1             MR. JORDASH:  If I could have on e-court, please, 1D04847, and

 2     e-court page 17.

 3        Q.   What I am asking to be called up to the screen is an interview

 4     you gave and an interview which was entitled by the interviewer, "Will

 5     bring back the Partisans to power."  I think you described that as a

 6     somewhat idiosyncratic title.  Do you recall the interview?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   And I want to ask you about the comments you made or the

 9     conversations you may have had with Lord Owen concerning his opinion and

10     his change of opinion concerning the punishment of the Serbs.  First of

11     all, would -- are you able to identify Lord Owen's change of view and

12     when it occurred approximately?

13        A.   Sorry, am I -- what am I looking at?

14        Q.   You're looking at a transcript of the interview you gave, the

15     interview which I referred to as being entitled: "We will bring back the

16     Partisans to Power."  And you were asked there, according to the

17     transcript of the interview, about whether you knew Lord Owen very well.

18        A.   Yes, I'm -- I see now.  Well, the change of opinion is referred

19     to -- that's in the question.

20        Q.   Let me -- let me ask you this, then.  The answer you gave appears

21     to be, in part, that Lord Owen's view at some point was that

22     President Milosevic, since the time he accepted the peace plan in 1993,

23     had been in favour of bringing about peace in Bosnia?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   And my first question is:  Are you able to identify with more

Page 18566

 1     precision when in 1993 that might be referring?

 2        A.   No, because I wasn't involved in Yugoslav affairs in 1993.  I

 3     didn't start at the embassy in Belgrade until March 1994.

 4        Q.   Did you have any conversations with Lord Owen or hear any public

 5     pronouncements he made on the subject?

 6        A.   You mean prior to arrival in Belgrade?

 7        Q.   Or after.  Either.

 8        A.   Well, many -- many conversations with Lord Owen after I arrived

 9     in Belgrade, but I suppose I saw him around Christmas of 1993 when he

10     briefed me on what he wanted me to do when I got to Belgrade.  We didn't

11     discuss his views prior to that time.  We talked entirely about how he

12     saw the situation now and how we were going to move on and bring the war

13     to an end.

14        Q.   And what was his view at the time you did speak to him about

15     these subjects?

16        A.   He thought that since Milosevic had accepted the Vance-Owen peace

17     plan, that he had now decided that he should work with the grain of the

18     international community and not against it.

19        Q.   Let me ask you to have a look at another document, P2358.  This

20     isn't one of your underlying documents.  This is a perspective exhibit.

21     It's a record of the Supreme Defence Council of the FRY held on the 30th

22     of August, 1994.  And I want to ask you about comments that were made in

23     that meeting.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Document is under seal, Your Honours.

25             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you.

Page 18567

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Therefore not to be shown to the public.

 2             MR. JORDASH:

 3        Q.   Before showing you the document, I -- can I -- can we presume

 4     that you are aware of the Supreme Defence Council during your time in the

 5     region and its essential role?

 6        A.   Well, I was aware that there was a Supreme Defence Council, but

 7     it all seemed faintly theoretical in that one knew that Milosevic decided

 8     what the outcome was usually before the council had met.

 9        Q.   Had you seen any Supreme Defence Council minutes before?

10        A.   No, never.

11        Q.   What I want to ask you about is a view expressed here concerning

12     that the view of the Serbs from Belgrade around August of 1994 concerning

13     their relationship with or concerns about the position taken by the

14     Bosnian Serbs.

15             MR. JORDASH:  Could we please go to page 48 -- sorry, page 5 of

16     the English and 4 of the B/C/S.  Perhaps we can go to page 3 of the

17     English so we can see the beginning of the meeting.

18        Q.   Just so you can orientate yourself, Sir Ivor, there is the

19     participants of this meeting.  And if we can then move to page 4 so we

20     can see the speaker or at least the person introducing the next speaker

21     that we will look at in a moment.  You can see there Momcilo Perisic.

22     And then if we go to the next page, page 5 of the English and B/C/S 4,

23     where Perisic introduces Colonel Krga; and then to page 6, and if you

24     would read through Krga's speech.  And I want to ask you about his view

25     and whether you have any comment to make, agreement or otherwise.  Please

Page 18568

 1     would you indicate when you finished the page.

 2        A.   Yeah.

 3             MR. JORDASH:  Please if we could keep moving through when

 4     Sir Ivor mentions he's finished until --

 5             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

 6             MR. JORDASH:  Next page, please.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  All right.

 8             MR. JORDASH:  Next page, please.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Yup.  Yeah.

10             MR. JORDASH:  Next page, please.

11             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  Yes.  Yes.  Yes.

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Can we have the B/C/S version as well.

13             MR. JORDASH:  So we're on page 11, which should be, I think,

14     B/C/S 7, I think.

15             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, could you -- yes, could you check

17     whether we are on the right page in B/C/S.

18             THE WITNESS:  Yup.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, I still have some doubts as to whether

20     we are on the right page in B/C/S.

21             MR. JORDASH:  I am doing -- I am just checking, Your Honour.

22             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  Yes.  Yes.

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We are still on the same

24     page in the B/C/S.

25             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

Page 18569

 1             MR. JORDASH:  I think -- I think the B/C/S should be page 10.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  I think we are on e-court page 9, lower part.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  I think we are now moving to page 10 in B/C/S.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

 7             MR. JORDASH:  Now it's correct, apparently, the B/C/S.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Both in B/C/S and English we have "the third

 9     phase" before us.

10             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  Yes.  Yes.  Yes.  Yes.

11             MR. JORDASH:  Should be on, I think, page 11.

12             MR. GROOME:  I see the break is nearly upon us.  The Prosecution

13     would have absolutely no objection to Sir Ivor being provided with any

14     documents Mr. Jordash would like him read over the break.  Perhaps it

15     might be more efficient after the break to proceed that way --

16             MR. JORDASH:  This is the longest portion I wanted Sir Ivor to

17     read.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, I wondered already why you had not changed the

19     sequence of your questions in such a way that we would not have been here

20     to see a witness read for close to 15 minutes now.  But I leave it in

21     your hands at this moment.

22             MR. JORDASH:  Just one more page, I think.  Sorry for the delay.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Let's finish that page and then have a look at the

24     timing of what then follows.

25             THE WITNESS:  Yup.  Yes.

Page 18570

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, I don't know whether you have more questions.

 2     If so, then we would first take a break, Mr. Jordash.

 3             But could you tell us how much time you would need after the

 4     break.  And you would agree with me that it would have been by far better

 5     to have this portion to be read by the witness during the break rather

 6     than for us observing how a witness reads.

 7             MR. JORDASH:  I accept it would.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 9             MR. JORDASH:  I would like an hour after the break.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  How much time would you need, Mr. Bakrac?

11             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, as matters stand now,

12     I do not think that I would have any questions for Sir Ivor Roberts.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Farr?

14             MR. FARR:  Two hours, Your Honours.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Two hours.  One second, please.

16             You have one hour after the break, Mr. Jordash, but I'll be very

17     strict.  One hour, not one minute more.  Apparently you have not dealt

18     with the summary -- of the 92 ter summary yet, but let's first see that

19     we hear the evidence of the witness rather than to start dealing with

20     other matters at this moment.

21             We take a break and resume at quarter past 2.00.

22                           --- Recess taken at 1.31 p.m.

23                           [The witness stands down]

24                           [The witness takes the stand]

25                           --- On resuming at 2.22 p.m.

Page 18571

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, you have until quarter past 3.00.  We

 2     had to wait for another while for something to be read, which -- I mean,

 3     we are not spending our days here on 35 people looking as to how a

 4     witness reads a document.  That's -- and you know that.

 5             So use your time efficiently.  Quarter past 3.00.  Please

 6     continue.

 7             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you.

 8        Q.   Sir Ivor, on page 6 that I asked you to read, the speaker states

 9     that relations have been severed with the leadership of the

10     Republika Srpska.  And I want to ask you to comment on that from your

11     experience from the 30th of August, 1994.  Was that something that you

12     observed and are able to comment on?

13        A.   Yes.  I was -- I was in Belgrade when it happened.  It appeared

14     in an interview which Milosevic gave to "Politika" which was an

15     extraordinarily unrestrained attack on the Bosnia Serb leadership in

16     language which had commentators who had been in Belgrade for many years,

17     quite literally, gasping.  They were quite surprised at the vehemence of

18     the language.  This announced the rupture between the Bosnian leadership

19     and the Serb leadership.  Milosevic said, from memory, something to the

20     effect that the policies of the Pale leadership was disastrous for the

21     Serbian people and, as a result, Serbia had the right to protect its own

22     interests and was going to impose a blockade across the Drina.  And then,

23     I think, in the same interview Milosevic also warned the Pale leadership

24     against holding any referendum on the matter.  This was a piece of advice

25     which the Pale leadership duly ignored and went ahead with a -- a

Page 18572

 1     referendum to reject the latest proposals of the international community.

 2     And so that led to the closure of the border, the arrival of observers,

 3     and the lifting of some minor sanctions against the Federal Republic of

 4     Yugoslavia.

 5        Q.   How long did the closure of the border -- well, when did the

 6     closure of the border take place and when did the observers arrive?  Are

 7     you able to place that in --

 8        A.   I can't remember any more the exact dates and times.  I am sure

 9     they are formally available to you much more than to me.  But it all

10     happened -- all happened quite quickly.  The observers arrived in stages.

11     It started off as quite a small observer force, from memory, but then

12     built up to quite a substantial one as -- as organised by and provided

13     for by Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, respectively the EU and the UN

14     negotiators.

15        Q.   And within the text that I asked you to read, one of the options

16     laid out by the speaker was option B which involved the international

17     community withdrawing from the former Yugoslavia to leave the parties to

18     effectively exhaust each other militarily.  And a consequence of that

19     expressed by the speaker was that there would be an uncontrolled influx

20     of mercenaries, weapons, and military equipment, and an uplifting of

21     combat operations.  Was that a serious consideration at the time?

22        A.   Well, I am not sure whether it was a serious consideration for

23     the leadership in Belgrade.  The problem for the international community

24     was to keep -- well, they -- their objective was to keep piling the

25     pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to force them to accept the international

Page 18573

 1     community's -- or the contact group's peace plan which would effectively

 2     bring the war to an end.  I don't think anyone in the international

 3     community thought it was a great idea simply to walk away and leave the

 4     two parties to exhaust themselves.  That was -- that was something that

 5     was never seriously considered, as far as I was aware.

 6        Q.   You mentioned that Milosevic saw the policies of the Pale

 7     leadership as disastrous for the Serbian people and for the interests of

 8     Serbia.  What interests did Milosevic express to you or to others at the

 9     time would be damaged by the Bosnian Serb approach?

10        A.   I think he -- well, there were two things.  I think politically

11     he felt that Serbia was coming under enormous pressure, rightly because

12     it was felt that Serbia having been largely responsible for the crisis in

13     the first place was being targeted by sanctions which probably impacted

14     on the people in Serbia, as opposed to the people in Republika Srpska,

15     far more heavily.  I think a large part of the community in -- the Serb

16     community in Republika Srpska were country folk, peasants, if that

17     doesn't sound too offensive a word, who lived very simply, who lived off

18     the land.  Sanctions had relatively little impact on the average farmer

19     in the Serbian territories in Bosnia; whereas, somewhere like Belgrade, a

20     cosmopolitan city was very badly hit by sanctions as I was able to see it

21     first-hand from the day I arrived.  I -- the currency had been destroyed

22     just before I arrived.  I think I am right in saying that inflation hit

23     352 trillion per cent which is something like 2 per cent a second or

24     something fantastical like that.  Two per cent a minute, maybe.  Anyway,

25     the economic situation was probably worse in Serbia and the

Page 18574

 1     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia than it was in Republika Srpska.

 2             So that was one consideration.  The other consideration was --

 3     so -- so Milosevic was obviously wanting to have sanctions lifted as soon

 4     as possible.  It was no help to him in his efforts to maintain himself in

 5     power to have a country that was effectively beggared by international

 6     sanctions, so he needed that lifted.  And the other consideration, I

 7     think, was the trend which was already perceptible then, for the military

 8     balance to shift away from the Bosnian Serbs.  And Milosevic's -- one of

 9     his concerns, I think, was that if the Bosnian Serb military leadership

10     looked as though they were completely collapsing, there would be enormous

11     pressure on Milosevic to intervene militarily himself in Bosnia which

12     would only make his international position hugely worse.

13        Q.   Was any concern expressed about what would happen to civilians if

14     the republic -- if the Bosnian Serb administration collapsed?

15        A.   The civilians where?

16        Q.   In the Republika Srpska.

17        A.   No.  I mean not -- I mean, I -- I -- I should qualify that.  No

18     concern was made -- was expressed to me that I can remember, but we are

19     talking about events over 15 years ago.  It's possible that I just don't

20     have any memory of it.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Option C was discussed in the Supreme Defence Council

22     by the speaker, and option C suggested an imposition of a peace plan by

23     the international community.  And at page 16, the speaker noted that

24     these events would be extremely detrimental to the security of the FRY

25     and would be reflected in, inter alia, an attempt to organise

Page 18575

 1     paramilitary units and send them to help Republika Srpska.  Was any --

 2     were you part of any discussions or did you hear about any discussions by

 3     the Serb leadership from Belgrade concerning their fear that unless the

 4     peace plan was accepted by the Bosnian Serbs that one of the problems

 5     might be a new attempt to organise paramilitary units in Serbia and send

 6     them to the Republika Srpska?

 7        A.   No.

 8        Q.   Now, moving on from that text.

 9             MR. JORDASH:  Could I ask, please, that we --

10        Q.   There will be much less for you to read in this instance,

11     Sir Ivor.

12             MR. JORDASH:  P258, again, please.  But this time, please,

13     page 51 of the English, and it's under seal.

14             Perhaps we can shortcut this.

15        Q.   While that's happening, Milosevic, in the same Supreme

16     Defence Council minute, discusses his view or his apparent view - this is

17     page 51 of the English and 34 of the B/C/S- - his view of the

18     consequences of a unification or an attempt to unify the RSK with the

19     Republika Srpska administrations.  And I want to ask you whether that was

20     anything -- a subject you discussed with him at any time.  If I can take

21     you to the bottom of the page.  Milosevic is speaking there.  And he

22     notes:

23             "Let me remind you that after Vance's plan was adopted, the

24     Republic of Serbian Krajina has decided to resolve its status through

25     negotiations, and not by war."

Page 18576

 1             And then over the page:

 2             "Any unification would instantly trigger a war between Croatia

 3     and Krajina, with Croatia enjoying the support of the whole world.  They

 4     would say that's an occupation.  A new territory has been created."

 5             Perhaps there Milosevic is discussing any perceived or possible

 6     reunification of the RSK with either the RS or with Serbia itself and

 7     rejecting that, at least in this session.  Was that something you

 8     discussed with Milosevic or were aware of?

 9        A.   There was, from time to time, talk of a unification between the

10     RSK and the RS, but it's not something I ever discussed with Milosevic.

11        Q.   Were you aware of what the official government position was, the

12     Serbian government's position in Belgrade?

13        A.   That they were against it.

14        Q.   I'm --

15        A.   This is a quote from Milosevic, is it?

16        Q.   Yes, I am -- but from --

17        A.   He's saying that would trigger a war in which Croatia enjoys the

18     support of the whole world; i.e., he doesn't think that's a great idea.

19        Q.   Was that something you were aware of at the time?

20        A.   Yeah.

21        Q.   Through conversations with who?

22        A.   I think it was more a reading of the official Belgrade press that

23     you could see that they were - and of course that was controlled by

24     Milosevic -- that they would report suggestions in this -- in that sense

25     in a negative way, but I don't recall ever discussing it with Milosevic

Page 18577

 1     himself.  I -- I am -- I inferred from the discussions -- or, I inferred

 2     from my reading of the official media that this wasn't an idea which he

 3     would support.

 4             MR. JORDASH:  Could I have on the screen please 1D05476.

 5        Q.   And I believe, Sir Ivor, that you have been given a copy.

 6        A.   5476.

 7        Q.   Yes.  It's a state security centre Valjevo, 7th of November,

 8     1994, an Official Note.  And it reports -- if you've had the opportunity

 9     to read it?

10        A.   I have read it quickly.  From -- what part of it do you want me

11     to look at?

12        Q.   Well, I want to try to shortcut things by summarising -- the

13     report seems to reflect a conversation had with the minister or the

14     former advisor to the minister for state security of Republika Srpska,

15     Slobodan Skipina?

16        A.   Skipina, yeah.

17        Q.   Who reports concerning a collegium.

18        A.   Yeah.

19        Q.   Where Karadzic and Krajisnik strongly attacked the leadership of

20     the Republic of Serbia and Serbia's State Security Service for meddling

21     into the affairs of the Republika Srpska DB service?

22        A.   Yeah.

23        Q.   And their demand that the minister sever all ties and contacts

24     with members of the state security of the Republic of Serbia.  And I just

25     wanted to ask if you had any knowledge of these conflicts and the view of

Page 18578

 1     the Karadzic at that time, November 1994, concerning Serbian state

 2     security?

 3        A.   Well, it was quite obvious that after the border was closed

 4     between Serbia and Republika Srpska that there were extraordinary

 5     tensions between the political leaderships in Belgrade and Pale, tensions

 6     which didn't necessarily exist between on one level the armies of the two

 7     states and at the other the security services of the two states.  They

 8     were, after all, not political rivals in the way that Milosevic saw

 9     Karadzic and Krajisnik.  I think I said in my witness statement that

10     Milosevic regarded Karadzic as Frankenstein's monster who had outgrown

11     his creator and didn't -- no longer took instructions from him.  So that

12     was the relationship between Milosevic and Karadzic, and indeed

13     Krajisnik.  But the relationships between the state security officials in

14     both RS and Yugoslavia were, I think, different.  And so they were

15     between the two armies.  I had some feeling for that at about the same

16     time that this is dated, November 1994.  And I seem to remember having a

17     meeting with General Perisic, the then head of the Yugoslav

18     General Staff, discussing the border closure with him.  And he made it

19     clear that while he was enforcing it, it was something with which he had

20     no sympathy and that he was -- his real sympathies lay with his brother

21     officer, General Mladic.

22        Q.   This document suggests that there was a conflict, at least, on

23     some level between the Serbian state security and, certainly, Karadzic

24     and Krajisnik.  Is that something you are able to comment on?

25        A.   No.  I think it's -- I think the -- what I get from this short

Page 18579

 1     minute is the feeling that Serbian state security was -- still regarded

 2     itself as the senior partner in its relationship with -- with the

 3     Bosnian Serbs and expected to be able to impose its will, and that

 4     Karadzic and Krajisnik were determined that they shouldn't impose their

 5     will and that there would be a flushing out of anyone who persisted in

 6     maintaining a close relationship with the state security of Yugoslavia or

 7     the Republic of Serbia.

 8        Q.   Just to be clear, are you commenting on your interpretation of

 9     the document or on any facts that you personally observed at the time?

10        A.   No, I couldn't say I'd had facts at my disposal.  That was the

11     impression one had for the reasons I was saying earlier, that while the

12     political leaderships were very much out of sympathy with each other, at

13     other levels conversations and understandings continued between state

14     security people and -- and the armies.

15        Q.   You mentioned a moment ago that Perisic was enforcing the border

16     even though his sentiments were somewhat against that.  How long was it

17     that he enforced the border?  Are you able to put that into some

18     time-frame?

19        A.   Well it was just other a year, as I remember, until the Dayton

20     peace accord.  I think the Dayton peace accord was November 1995, wasn't

21     it?  And the border was closed in September 1994 -- so we are talking

22     about -- I mean, I am talking very broad terms, but I just can't remember

23     the exact dates anymore.  We are talking about 14 months, I suppose.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Let me take you to 1D05477, please.  I hope that's a

25     document you had been given.

Page 18580

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   And it's -- it's, again, a state security report from this time

 3     the Uzice centre.  Did you have the opportunity to read this?

 4        A.   I hadn't quite finished it.  I got to about page 7 in the time I

 5     had available.

 6        Q.   Well, page 6 is the -- is the page I am particularly interested

 7     in, and it's page 3 of the B/C/S.  And the --

 8        A.   Sorry, what's the B/C/S?

 9        Q.   Sorry, this is for purposes of the B/C/S reader.

10        A.   I'm sorry, I don't know what --

11             JUDGE ORIE:  B/C/S might not be a known expression to you.

12     Instead of Serbo-Croatian, in the beginning of this Tribunal there was a

13     survey of the languages used in the former Yugoslavia which led us to

14     give the name Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian to the languages mainly spoken in

15     the former Yugoslavia, and that is what B/C/S stands for.

16             THE WITNESS:  Oh, I see.  Thank you.  B/C/S, of course, is one

17     language, it's just Serbo-Croatian.  It's just --

18             JUDGE ORIE:  I would invite you to read the reports.  What the

19     differences are, what the similarities are, but it comes down that

20     everyone from the former Yugoslavia is supposed to be able to understand

21     and to express itself in a language which we call, as a composite thing,

22     B/C/S, Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian.

23             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

24             MR. JORDASH:

25        Q.   The writer of the report, at page 6 of the English, notes what

Page 18581

 1     one -- I think five lines down, that Karadzic was pessimistic in his view

 2     of the situation in the Republika Srpska.  And just for the -- so we can

 3     orientate ourselves, this is April 1995.  And one of the reasons Karadzic

 4     had formed this pessimistic view was that the VRS was in a weaker

 5     situation and was losing its ability for maneuver through a shortage of

 6     fuel and ammunition.  I was wondering if you were able to comment on

 7     that -- that view?

 8        A.   I'm -- I read it with interest because, I mean, I haven't -- I

 9     didn't see -- I haven't seen Karadzic for probably getting on for a year

10     by then.  Maybe nine months.  And I was struck by the comment that he --

11     that he was so pessimistic.  I mean, I -- I think he had a very accurate

12     picture of why things were going badly for Republika Srpska and its army,

13     and I am -- but I'm -- I always had the impression of Karadzic, not that

14     I saw much of him, but when I did meet him that he was full of bluster

15     and overconfidence.  And it's interesting that he's accurately

16     pin-pointed the difficulties of his position and that impact that closure

17     of the border was having on the Vojna Republika Srpska, the Republika

18     Srpska army, shortage of fuel and ammunition.

19        Q.   Was there any reason why you were not seeing Karadzic on a

20     regular basis?

21        A.   Yes, a very simple one.  The border was shut.  The Bosnian Serb

22     leadership were forbidden to travel to Serbia.  And I was in Belgrade, so

23     it's as simple as that.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Let me move to a later subject, D00536.  I don't know

25     if you've been given that document.  I suspect you have.

Page 18582

 1        A.   Yes, but -- oh, sorry, I have read this one.  Yes --

 2        Q.   That's --

 3        A.   -- that's the June 1995.

 4        Q.   Statement by the president of the Security Council.

 5        A.   This is after the hostage crisis had just started, broken, hadn't

 6     it?  Wasn't it?

 7        Q.   Yes.

 8        A.   I've lost track of the exact dates.

 9        Q.   Yes, it is.  I think it's agreed at this point the hostage crisis

10     has developed.  And this should be under seal, I think.  It seems --

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, not to be broadcast to the public.  But I am a

12     bit surprised about Security Council statement by the president.  How

13     could that possibly be a confidential document?

14             MR. JORDASH:  I was surprised.  I didn't -- I assumed it wasn't

15     confidential, but then I saw the Madam Registrar responding.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, I would be -- Madam Registrar, any further

17     explanation as to why a statement by the president of the security

18     council would be under seal?

19                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

20             JUDGE ORIE:  It may well be a mistake.  There is no reason to

21     keep it away from the public.  It can be dealt with as a public document.

22             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you.

23                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Madam Registrar explains that it's possible

25     since the document is MFI'd only that it's part of a batch of documents

Page 18583

 1     which is under seal and then by mistake not take -- not made an exception

 2     to what --

 3                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  But whatever the status of the batch may be, this

 5     document cannot possibly be a confidential document.

 6             Please proceed.

 7             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you.

 8        Q.   At the time, were you aware that the hostage crisis included

 9     blockading of various UNPROFOR personnel?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   Do you agree with the contents of this statement from your

12     personal knowledge, that these -- this was the wider context of the

13     immediate hostage taking?

14        A.   Well, from personnel knowledge, no.  I wasn't in Bosnia, so I'm

15     simply aware of the reports coming out of the Bosnian of what had

16     happened.

17        Q.   And this is -- is this consistent with the reports you were

18     getting at the time?

19        A.   Broadly, as far as I can recall.  It's a long time ago.

20        Q.   What happened in terms of the peace negotiations as a result of

21     the hostage crisis, did they continue?

22        A.   Well, I would say they were put on one side, effectively, by the

23     hostage crisis.  The hostage crisis became the most urgent matter to deal

24     with, certainly as far as my government was concerned.

25        Q.   How long were they put aside for?

Page 18584

 1        A.   Some weeks until the hostage crisis was resolved.  I am not sure

 2     I quite understand your question.  The -- the -- the political attempts

 3     to find a political solution were technical always running, but that

 4     didn't mean that anything was actually happening.

 5        Q.   And in terms of events on the ground, what happened -- was there

 6     an impact upon military operations on the ground within Republika Srpska

 7     and Bosnia as a whole?

 8        A.   I couldn't answer.  I was in Serbia, apart from one visit to

 9     Bosnia at that time, which Milosevic had personally authorised because

10     the border was shut and when I went to see two of the Bosnian Serb

11     leaders to express my government's anger at what had happened to the

12     UNPROFOR hostages and to warn them that we regarded it as a matter of

13     prime national importance that they be released unharmed, and that

14     failure to do that would have severe consequences for the Bosnian Serbs.

15        Q.   Was there any discussion about what those consequences would be?

16        A.   They asked me what it meant by it, and I told them it would mean

17     military intervention by British forces to extract our forces and punish

18     those who had taken them.

19        Q.   Now, you've indicated that you were in Serbia at the time, but

20     were you privy to any discussions or information concerning whether there

21     had been a change in military operations, whether battles had stopped or

22     intensified or whatever?

23        A.   Well, there was so much going on that summer.  It was shortly

24     afterwards, I think, the Croatian forces attacked the main

25     Republika Srpska Krajina territory, and that resulted in several dozens

Page 18585

 1     of thousands of Serb refugees coming into Serbia.  So that was very

 2     visible to those of us living in Belgrade because you could see them on

 3     the motorway.  The effects of military action during the hostage crisis,

 4     that I can't recall, and I am not sure I would have been able to see that

 5     from where I was sitting in Belgrade.

 6             MR. JORDASH:  Could I have please on the screen 1D05433.

 7        Q.   Do you have that in front of you, Sir Ivor, please?

 8        A.   What's the reference again?

 9        Q.   1D05433.

10        A.   I don't think I do.  No.

11        Q.   Please could we -- could we have it on the screen, please.

12             And it's a documented dated the 20th of June, 1995.

13             MR. JORDASH:  And 5453.  I beg your pardon, it's -- I couldn't

14     read the writing.  1D05453.

15        Q.   It's a document dated the 20th of June, 1995, as you'll see in a

16     moment, federal ministry of foreign affairs, sector for multilateral

17     relations, and it's entitled, "Reactions to the Release of UN Peace Force

18     Personnel Taken Hostage by RS."  If you would just have a look at that,

19     please.

20        A.   Um-hm.

21             MR. JORDASH:  Next page, please.  And it's still the page 1 of

22     the B/C/S.

23        Q.   And the bit I am particularly interested in is the third

24     paragraph.

25        A.   Yup.

Page 18586

 1        Q.   Were you part of this anything -- were you anything to do with

 2     the delegation which, according to this document, expressed special

 3     gratitude to Jovica Stanisic for his role in the hand-over and release of

 4     the UNPROFOR members?

 5        A.   Well, I don't remember there being a delegation like this of

 6     France, Britain, Canada.  I was there first in every case.  I went to

 7     Novi Sad in the middle of the night on the time -- on the occasion of the

 8     first release of hostages on a hunch that that's where the UNPROFOR

 9     soldiers were going to be taken.  And I stayed there until I met the

10     soldiers.  There was nobody from France or Canada there.  I didn't see

11     anyone from the federal foreign ministry on that occasion.  And we had at

12     least another two rounds of meeting, and the -- of collecting our troops.

13     They came out in dribs and drabs.  At the end of the whole process, the

14     government asked me to express our gratitude to those involved in -- in

15     the release of the UNPROFOR soldiers.  But I personally have no memory of

16     doing it in the company of the French and the Canadian or, indeed, in the

17     presence of Vladislav Jovanovic.

18        Q.   Okay.  Can I ask you one more question, if I may.  In your

19     statement at paragraph 14 you note that Milosevic regarded Karadzic as a

20     major stumbling block to his efforts to bring the war in Bosnia to an

21     end, and, He regularly in my time in Belgrade looked for ways to force

22     Karadzic out of office?

23        A.   Yeah.

24        Q.   Are you aware of any role played by Stanisic in that eventual

25     removal of Karadzic from the political scene?

Page 18587

 1        A.   The -- there were many different ways that Milosevic tried to get

 2     rid of Karadzic.  He hoped at one stage to persuade a majority of the

 3     deputies in the Pale Assembly to simply vote Karadzic out of office, but

 4     that never worked.  He tried to encourage those whom he thought were more

 5     likely to dance to his tune, like Bosnian Serbian vice-president

 6     Nikola Koljevic, to take over, but Koljevic was too loyal to Karadzic

 7     whom he'd known for 30 or 40 years.  And he tried to engineer a situation

 8     where General Mladic would take over in a kind of military coup.  The

 9     answer to your question is that several of these maneuvers would have

10     been conducted by Stanisic because that's who Milosevic used to try to

11     execute his will in Bosnia when his own attempts had failed.

12        Q.   Do you know of any specifics, though, in relation to the eventual

13     removal of Karadzic and the role played by Stanisic?

14        A.   That goes on to, I think, the summer of 1996 when the

15     international community were determined to get rid of Karadzic from the

16     leadership of the SDS as an indicted war criminal, and that there was --

17     were many attempts and Karadzic typically would say that he was taking a

18     backseat or wasn't really involved anymore, but this was -- usually

19     turned out to be nonsense.  And, again, I think it was Jovica Stanisic

20     who was sent to make clear to Karadzic that he had to stand down.  That

21     was my understanding.  But I didn't physically see it happen, obviously,

22     but that was the message that I think was -- was coming through from --

23     from Milosevic.

24             MR. JORDASH:  Could I take instruction, please.  I think I might

25     have finished.

Page 18588

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Just let me ask for one clarification.

 2             Carefully listening to your last two questions, perhaps I should

 3     wait for a second so that Mr. Jordash is not missing either question or

 4     answer.

 5                           [Defence counsel confer with accused]

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, I waited for a second so you would hear

 7     the question and the answer.

 8             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Sir Ivor, it's not entirely clear to me.  In the

10     first question you say, well, more or less, this was the role of

11     Jovica Stanisic in these kind of matters.  Mr. Jordash then asked you

12     whether you had any specifics.  And now -- and the second is -- the

13     second question you answered:

14             "But I didn't physically see it happen, obviously, but that was

15     the message that I think was coming through from Milosevic."

16             Now, do you have any more precise recollection on -- was it that

17     Milosevic told you or was that someone said to you, Mr. Milosevic, talk

18     to me that I sent Stanisic.  Do you have any specific knowledge or is it

19     mainly on the basis of what you consider to be the division of labour

20     between Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Stanisic?

21             THE WITNESS:  I can't recall which of those it was.  It could

22     either have been -- very often these things were actually reported in the

23     press in clear terms, that Milosevic had sent Stanisic --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

25             THE WITNESS:  -- to see Karadzic in Pale.  It wasn't something


Page 18589

 1     that was necessarily kept as a state secret.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, it --

 3             THE WITNESS:  On other occasions it may have been that that was

 4     what he told me in the company of perhaps Carl Bildt at that time, or, to

 5     put it in its correct proportion, when I was accompanying Carl Bildt.

 6     That was the strong impression I had.  But if you said to me, Can you

 7     tell me how you inquired that piece of knowledge, I can't tell you at

 8     this distance of time.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Please proceed, Mr. Jordash.

10             MR. JORDASH:  I've finished.

11        Q.   Thank you, Sir Ivor.

12             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you, Your Honours.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Jordash.

14             Mr. Bakrac, still the same position?  No questions?

15             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  You're right.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

17             Mr. Farr, are you ready to start your cross-examination?

18             MR. FARR:  Yes, Your Honour.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Sir Ivor, you'll now be cross-examined by Mr. Farr.

20     Mr. Farr is counsel for the Prosecution.

21             Mr. Farr, you may proceed.

22                           Cross-examination by Mr. Farr:

23        Q.   Good afternoon, Sir Ivor.

24        A.   Good afternoon.

25        Q.   I'd like to start by clarifying a couple of things in your

Page 18590

 1     statement.  In paragraph 5 you discussed the time after your arrival FRY

 2     in 1994.  Then you say of Milosevic:

 3             "He had clearly given up his most ambitious plans."

 4             What were you referring to as Milosevic's most ambitious plans?

 5        A.   Well, this is my surmise because I didn't arrive in Yugoslavia

 6     until, as I said in my statement, early 1994.  I think the month was

 7     March.  My surmise was that Milosevic started off in his long ascent to

 8     power with the intention of becoming the new Tito in that he would have

 9     been in control of the SFRY.  I think he found that as the other

10     republics responded with extraordinary alarm to his behaviour, that they

11     had to -- that he had to scale down his ambition, and eventually wanted

12     to be top dog among the Serbs in the former Yugoslavia.

13        Q.   In paragraph 6 of your statement, you say:

14             "From this time, August 1994, when Milosevic decided to accept

15     the contact group plan and sever relations with the Bosnian Serbs until

16     they accepted the plan, Milosevic followed as far as one could detect a

17     path parallel to the international community in working to find a

18     solution to the problems of the region, most of which he had created."

19             Can you tell us which problems in particular you were referring

20     to that Milosevic had created?

21        A.   Well, the violent breakup of the SFRY.

22        Q.   And, in your view, how had Milosevic created those problems?

23        A.   By attempting to take over control of the whole country.  And

24     when that failed, to destabilise Croatia and then Bosnia by carving out,

25     with the assistance of local acolytes, Serb states.

Page 18591

 1        Q.   And you go on to say:

 2             "His support for the contact group plan was consistent.  The US,

 3     which had originally been skeptical, gradually came round to accepting

 4     our position, that Milosevic, having been the greater part of the

 5     problem, now needed to be part of the solution."

 6             And I am interested in the words "greater part of the problem."

 7     Greater part of the problem as compared to whom?

 8        A.   Tudjman.

 9        Q.   Anyone else you were referring to?

10        A.   Well, I think not many of the leaders of former Yugoslavia

11     emerged with great credit from the breakup.  Some had a particularly

12     malign influence, others less so, but I don't think anyone came away from

13     the -- from the whole process with their hands clean.

14        Q.   Going back to paragraph 5, you discussed the relationship between

15     Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs, and you say of the Bosnian Serbs:

16             "They proved, however, to be like Frankenstein's monster,

17     virtually out of control and disobedient when faced with their creator's

18     instructions."

19             What do you mean when you describe Milosevic as the creator of

20     the Bosnian Serbs?

21        A.   Well, it's a figure of speech.  He is obviously not their creator

22     in any physical sense.  I think he saw people like Karadzic and

23     Krajisnik, Plavsic, and Koljevic, and the other members of that crew as

24     being amenable work mates in his plans of carving out a Bosnian Serb

25     entity.

Page 18592

 1        Q.   It sounds as though you've describe co-operation.  To your

 2     knowledge, did it go beyond that?

 3        A.   Sorry, I'm not with you.

 4        Q.   In other words, did it go beyond co-operation to active support,

 5     and if so, of what kind?

 6        A.   Well, those go back to times when I wasn't there, so I wouldn't

 7     want to be categorical about modalities and events which I didn't witness

 8     or wasn't even present in the same regional space as.

 9        Q.   In paragraph 12 of your statement, you say:

10             "Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic started off from very different

11     political perspectives.  Karadzic was pursuing the old Chetnik path, an

12     unrepentant nationalist.  That had always been my impression when talking

13     to him.  There was a kind of obsession with the past, whereby Serbia, and

14     the Serbs in general, were comitted to fighting medieval wars in the

15     20th century, keeping the Muslim enemy at bay, the guardian at the gate."

16             Other than what I've just read to you, is there anything else

17     that you intended when you described Karadzic as an unrepentant

18     nationalist following the old Chetnik path?

19        A.   I don't think so.

20        Q.   Did being an unrepentant nationalist imply any particular vision

21     or goal as to what the map or the population of the Balkans should look

22     like?

23        A.   Well, it would be one in which Serbia has as great amount of

24     territory as possible.

25        Q.   And would that be territory that had been ethnically cleansed of

Page 18593

 1     non-Serbs?

 2        A.   It would.

 3             MR. FARR:  Could we please have 65 ter 1345.1 on the screen.

 4        Q.   Sir, this document is an excerpt from the 42nd session of the

 5     Republika Srpska National Assembly, which was held on the 18th and 19th

 6     of July, 1994.  The topic of discussion is the contact group plan, and

 7     I'd like to read you a quote of something that Dr. Karadzic said in that

 8     context --

 9             MR. FARR:  And, sorry, yes, if we could have page 2 in English

10     and page 2 in B/C/S, near the bottom of the page in both languages.

11        Q.   I'm going to read the sentence beginning wort words, "We know for

12     sure that we have to give something up," and this is Karadzic speaking.

13     He says:

14             "We know for sure we have to give something up.  That is clear

15     beyond a shadow of a doubt if we wish to achieve our primary strategic

16     aim which is to get rid of the enemies ..."

17             And then the next page in the B/C/S, please:

18             "... to get rid of the enemies in our house, the Croats and

19     Muslims, and not be in the same state with them anymore."

20             Sir, does that reflect Radovan Karadzic's goals as you understood

21     it at the time that you knew him?

22        A.   Sorry, I'm trying to find the space where it says this.

23        Q.   Yeah, the sentence is -- it begins with the words "We know for

24     sure ..."

25        A.   Ah there we are, yes.

Page 18594

 1        Q.   Yeah.

 2        A.   Sorry, what's the question again?

 3        Q.   The question is whether the quotation that I just read you, that

 4     is about getting rid of the enemies in our house, the Croats and Muslims,

 5     and not being in the same state with them any more, does that reflect

 6     Radovan Karadzic's goal as you understood it at the time you knew him?

 7        A.   Well, I think where he's using rather euphemistic language here

 8     when he says, Get rid of the enemies, not be in the same state with them

 9     anymore.  He's using language here which for public consumption is more

10     politically astute, if you like.  He's saying, We don't want to share the

11     same roof as these people.  He's not saying, This is our house and we

12     don't want any of you in it.  So -- but that's, I think, what he really

13     wanted.  Or at least he wanted it by covering as much territory as he

14     could reasonably hope to get away with.  By the time this -- he's talking

15     now in 1994, he realises that he's only going to get half the physical

16     land mass of Bosnia.

17             MR. FARR:  And, Your Honours, I would tender this excerpt as a

18     Prosecution exhibit.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 1345.1 will receive number P3115,

21     Your Honours.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

23             Mr. Farr, I see this is on page 72.  You have used half a page.

24     Do you expect the Chamber to read all the - how many are there? - 75 or

25     more pages?

Page 18595

 1             MR. FARR:  Your Honour, the document that we are looking at is

 2     three pages long.  It consists of the cover page, this page, and then the

 3     following page on which Dr. Karadzic's comments are continued.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Then my problem disappears.  P3115 is admitted into

 5     evidence.  Yes, so as a matter of fact, these -- it's just an excerpt of

 6     the minutes, because I do understand that the minutes cover 75 pages, but

 7     it's a small excerpt.

 8             MR. FARR:  Exactly, Your Honour.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Which always raises the issue whether any of the

10     other parties for contextualisation would like to have more than the

11     limited number of pages we find here.

12             MR. JORDASH:  I could --

13             JUDGE ORIE:  You may think about it if -- but I would then expect

14     you to come back to it by, let's say, not later than housekeeping session

15     later this week.

16             MR. JORDASH:  Yes, I am going to check if it's part of our bar

17     table.  It may well be.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  All 75 pages?

19             MR. JORDASH:  It might be.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Then we have to consider that as well.

21             Mr. Bakrac.

22             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I will consult

23     Mr. Jordash and then we will probably take the same position, but only

24     after we look at the matter together.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

Page 18596

 1             Then you may proceed, Mr. Farr.

 2             MR. FARR:

 3        Q.   Sir, in your statement you do note that Milosevic and Karadzic

 4     started off from very different political perspectives, but is it fair to

 5     say that Karadzic's views were no secret and that Milosevic would have

 6     known of them at the time that Milosevic was supporting or co-operating

 7     with Karadzic?

 8        A.   I couldn't say.  When he was co-operating with Karadzic was

 9     before he suffered the humiliation at Pale in 1993 when his support for

10     the Vance-Owen plan was rejected.  And that was a year or so before I

11     arrived in Bosnia -- in Serbia.

12        Q.   In paragraph 9 of your statement, you are discussing the period

13     after Dayton, and you say the following:

14             "Milosevic was keen at this stage to project himself, however

15     improbably, as the man who had helped to bring the wars in the region to

16     an end."

17             And I'm interested here, I guess, in the words "however

18     improbably."  Why do you express this scepticism about Milosevic's

19     portrayal of himself as a peacemaker?

20        A.   Well it was improbable because of his reputation before as the

21     man described as the butcher of the Balkans, someone who'd played a

22     cardinal role in unleashing the horrors of the wars in Croatia and

23     Bosnia, and there was, therefore, an element of suspension of belief

24     almost.  I have to accept the person who had caused so much of the

25     trouble to now be the man who is helping to bring the wars to an end.  I

Page 18597

 1     think in some writings I've done on this subject, I described

 2     Milosevic -- quoting a biographer of a Milosevic, as a pyromaniac

 3     fireman.  And I think that's what I'm trying to get over, however

 4     clumsily in this sentence, someone who goes around setting ablaze a whole

 5     nation and then comes around with lots of buckets of water to put them

 6     out and then claims the credit for it.  That's the point I am making.

 7     I'm not saying -- in other words, I'm making it -- I'm trying to make it

 8     clear that it was fair of him to say, Yes, I did power water on this

 9     problem to cool it down, but, of course, the bit he wants to leave out of

10     the equation is, Why did we have the configuration in the first place?

11     It was a bit like his attitude towards sanctions.

12             In the elections, and, again, you'll have to forgive my failure

13     to pin down exact dates, but in the elections towards the end of 1996,

14     Milosevic was able to claim credit for having achieved the full lifting

15     of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  And this was

16     trumpeted in the media as an absolute triumph.  But, of course, why were

17     the sanctions appointed in the first place?  That's if point I am really

18     making about the pyromaniac fireman.

19             MR. FARR:  Could we now please have 65 ter 6444 on the screen,

20     and I would note this is the same document that has been admitted as

21     D780.  I am using the version I have uploaded because I am sure of the

22     page numbers and because there is a B/C/S translation of the portion I am

23     interested in, so I think it will help the booths.

24        Q.   And sir, the document coming onto screen before you is a

25     transcript of the interview you gave for the British diplomatic oral

Page 18598

 1     history programme.  And as I mentioned, this the document that's cited in

 2     a number of footnotes to your statement.

 3             MR. FARR:  If we could have the top of page 26 in English, which

 4     is the middle of the page 3 in B/C/S.

 5        Q.   And at the very top of the page in English, you say:

 6             "I probably met with him 40 or 50 times over nearly four years."

 7             And that's, of course, what we see in paragraph 3 of your

 8     statement.  The interviewer then asks you:

 9             "Even so, that's a lot of meetings.  What did you think of him?"

10             Your answer was:

11             "I think he was a ruthless power broker who was responsible for

12     the deaths of thousands of people.  You couldn't think of him in other

13     than negative terms."

14             Now, I don't know whether you have had any legal training, and I

15     want to be clear that I am not asking you to make any legal conclusion,

16     but who are the thousands of people you are referring to whose deaths

17     Milosevic is responsible for?

18        A.   Well, I haven't had any legal training, so I am not quite sure

19     what you are asking me to --

20        Q.   Why is it that you said that was -- what was -- what was on your

21     mind when you said that Milosevic was responsible for the deaths of

22     thousands of people?

23        A.   Well, I think he played a key role in provoking the wars in

24     Croatia and Bosnia.

25        Q.   And just so we are clear, who are the thousands of people who you

Page 18599

 1     were referring to here?

 2        A.   Those who died in Croatia and Bosnia.

 3             MR. FARR:  And if we could now please have the bottom of page 23

 4     in English, which is the bottom of the first page in B/C/S.

 5        Q.   And at the very bottom of the page, you are discussing the

 6     hostage crisis.  And as indicated in paragraph 15 of your statement, you

 7     say that you went to see Milosevic and impressed upon him how much you

 8     needed the British soldiers out in one piece.  And then you talk about

 9     going to see the Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia.  And the interviewer asks you:

10             "Who are you dealing with?"

11             MR. FARR:  And then if we could go to the next page in both

12     languages, please.

13        Q.   At the top of the page we see your answer, which is:

14             "A whole range of war criminals, really; almost everyone I met

15     was an indicted war criminal:  Milosevic, Milutinovic, who was the

16     foreign minister for much of the time, and whose trial is going on now, I

17     think; Karadzic and Krajisnik also on trial now, I think."

18             Now, again, not asking for any legal conclusions, but why did you

19     describe these men as war criminals?

20        A.   Well I'm not a -- I'm not a lawyer, as I've readily conceded, but

21     all these people were, by that stage, by the time I gave the interview,

22     indicted war criminals.

23        Q.   And was it solely for that reason that you described them as war

24     criminals?

25        A.   Well, I'm not going to -- there seems to be some legal nuances

Page 18600

 1     you want me to get into here and I don't want to get into them because I

 2     am not a lawyer.  So I'll -- if you like, I was sloppy in having said a

 3     whole range of indicted war criminals.

 4        Q.   I wasn't trying to induce you to offer any sort of legal opinion.

 5     I was simply asking what it was, what facts in your knowledge -- what it

 6     was in your mind when you characterised them this way.  I think you've

 7     indicated that it was the fact that you knew them to be indicted war

 8     criminals.

 9             Now, further down in that same paragraph you say:

10             "Most of the people I've dealt with are either dead, some by

11     their own hand, in prison, or on the run.  Mladic, of course, I met him

12     once.  I thought he was actually deranged.  People say he's in Belgrade.

13     I don't know if that's accurate."

14             Can you just briefly describe for us the circumstances of your

15     meeting with Mladic?

16        A.   I -- I think it was -- I think it was a pressure on Bihac, but I

17     could be wrong.  It's certainly one of the safe areas.  I mean, I can

18     check this, but I'm -- I'm just giving you a very broad brush picture.  I

19     am sure there was particular pressure which was causing a great deal of

20     concern to my government and other western governments, and I was given

21     instructions to go and talk to Milosevic about him -- about it.  And he

22     said he'd done his best to try and rein in the Bosnian Serbs, but given

23     the circumstances where there was a clear division between the Bosnian

24     Serb leadership and the Yugoslav leadership, he would say then, They are

25     not listening to me.  And then he said, But, of course, you can make your

Page 18601

 1     points directly, if you like, to General Mladic.

 2             So -- so I did.  So I met Mladic and pointed out -- made the

 3     point -- same points I'd made to Milosevic about the -- the awful nature

 4     of what he was doing and in doing my best to persuade him to desist.  And

 5     then he went into a kind of obscure rant about Britain and its hostile

 6     attitude towards the Bosnian Serbs, and he said he was never going to buy

 7     British silk shirts again.  And naturally, I looked somewhat puzzled at

 8     this.  And then he explained that when he was a boy during the

 9     Second World War he had, when the allies had dropped supplies into

10     Bosnia, they had dropped them by parachute, and the parachutes were made

11     of silk.  And as a little boy he would take the parachutes back to his

12     mother who would make them into silk shirts.  And ever since then he

13     bought silk shirts from Britain, but now he wasn't going to buy silk

14     shirts from Britain anymore as a result of the unremitting hostility

15     towards the Bosnian Serbs.  That's what I said I thought he was actually

16     deranged.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Farr, I am looking at the clock.  You are

18     already a little bit over the time we usually -- when we usually take a

19     break.  Are you still sticking with your assessment that you would need

20     two hours, which would mean that you would have one hour and 35 minutes

21     left?

22             MR. FARR:  For the moment, yes, Your Honour.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Try to be very focused and try to keep the

24     witness as focused as well.

25             We take a break and will resume at 10 minutes past 4.00.

Page 18602

 1                           --- Recess taken at 3.40 p.m.

 2                           [The witness stands down]

 3                           [The witness takes the stand]

 4                           --- On resuming at 4.13 p.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Before we continue, Mr. Farr.

 6             Mr. Jordash, there was some confusion about a UN Security Council

 7     statement, president of Security Council statement, 1D05238, which is, by

 8     the way, MFI'd as D536.

 9             Now, there is a list, and this is not the only list where due to

10     the fact that there is a confidential chart involved that provisionally

11     all the documents appearing in that chart, provisionally placed under

12     seal - and I think this one specifically, which was introduced by the

13     Stanisic Defence - if I look at that list, there are many more, which I

14     hardly can imagine that they deserve to be confidential.  So therefore I

15     would like to invite the Stanisic Defence to go not only through this

16     list, which is found in an internal memorandum by our Court Officer of

17     the 29th of November, 2011, but also other lists still pending, to check

18     them on whether there is really any need to have these documents

19     confidential.

20             Then we move on.

21             Mr. Farr, are you ready to continue?

22             MR. FARR:  Yes, Your Honour.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Please do so.

24             MR. FARR:  Could we now please have 65 ter 6443 on the screen.

25        Q.   And sir, while that's coming up, this document that we are about

Page 18603

 1     to see is a piece from the "Sunday Independent" of Ireland originally

 2     published on 29 May 2011, and the title is, "My meeting with monster

 3     Mladic."  The subtitle is "Ivor Roberts is surprised that the psychotic

 4     Serbian leader allowed himself to be taken alive."  Do you recall writing

 5     this piece for the "Sunday Independent"?

 6        A.   Yes, I wrote the piece, though the headline was not mine.

 7        Q.   In this article after briefly describing your meeting with

 8     Mladic, you turn to the question of why Mladic was able to evade capture

 9     for so long, and then you cite opinion polls indicating a surprisingly

10     high level of support for Mladic among the Serbian public.  And if we

11     could just scroll down to the last two full paragraphs in English and the

12     bottom of the second page in B/C/S.

13        A.   Is it possible to make them a bit bigger?  It's just I'm having

14     some trouble.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  I take it that that could be possible.  Could the

16     portion that we are looking at be enlarged.  Second page, last two full

17     paragraphs.  It seems to be the first page.  No, let me just have a look.

18             MR. FARR:  It's the bottom of the first page in English --

19             JUDGE ORIE:  The first page.

20             MR. FARR:  -- and the bottom of the second page in B/C/S.  So I

21     think we have got the right -- the right stuff on the screen right now.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Could you also repeat when it was published because

23     that appears not on the document itself, is it, Mr. -- well.

24             MR. FARR:  Your Honour, the --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  It doesn't appear to the transcript clearly.

Page 18604

 1             MR. FARR:  Your Honour, the date does not appear on the piece

 2     itself.  When we got it from the internet it was indicated that it was

 3     the 29th of May, 2011.

 4        Q.   And perhaps, Sir Ivor, could you confirm that that was the

 5     approximate date on which it was published?

 6        A.   Well, I can't remember the date at all, except that it was

 7     shortly after Mladic was taken.  So if -- whatever the date of that was,

 8     it would be within a week or two of that.

 9        Q.   Okay.  I -- I'm going to read these last two paragraphs verbatim

10     and then ask you some questions about them.  We are starting with the

11     words, "So why is a mass murder ...,"  and the quote is:

12             "So why is a mass murder regarded as a hero in some Serb

13     quarters?  When multiethnic Bosnia declared itself independent of

14     Serb-dominated Yugoslav in early 1992 and the Bosnian war broke out, the

15     Yugoslav government led by Slobodan Milosevic fed the Serbs in both

16     Yugoslavia and Bosnia an unremitting diet of propaganda, arguing that the

17     Bosnian Serbs would be massacred in an independent Bosnia dominated by

18     the majority Muslims and Croats.

19             "The only answer, according to the propaganda line, was for the

20     Bosnian Serb army (helped by their Serbian brothers in arms) to conquer

21     as much of Bosnia as it could and ethnically cleanse those areas under

22     its control of Muslims and Croats.  The rest is bloody history.  So while

23     the rest of us saw Mladic as a key player in and executive of a criminal

24     enterprise, for many Serbs in Bosnia and Serbia he was defending the

25     Bosnian Serbs from genocide.  A propaganda success of which Goebbels

Page 18605

 1     would have been proud.  And it still has resonance today."

 2             Can you tell us first how you came to know about this propaganda

 3     campaign run by, as you say, the Yugoslav government led by

 4     Slobodan Milosevic?

 5        A.   Well, by my reading of the background to what had happened in

 6     Yugoslavia before I arrived there.

 7        Q.   You say that the only answer, according to the propaganda line,

 8     was for the Bosnia Serb army to conquer as much of Bosnia as it could and

 9     ethnically cleanse the areas under its control of Muslims and Croats.

10     Did you ever form a view as to the purpose of this propaganda?

11        A.   Well, to -- like all propaganda, it's to -- to persuade your

12     public that the line you're taking is supported by some objective which

13     you want your public to support and share.

14        Q.   Was the purpose to facility and encourage the conquest and ethnic

15     cleansing of Bosnia by the Bosnian Serbs?

16        A.   Well, to support it, not necessarily to facility it.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Farr, both I and my colleagues have wondered why

18     you would need to introduce this matter with the text with comparisons to

19     Nazis and to monsters, et cetera?  You could have introduced these

20     matters.  If you want to know about propaganda, ask the witness without

21     reading us major parts with highly suggestive language with -- there is

22     nothing wrong with that language if you want to publish it or if you want

23     to impress a public, but it -- it intervenes with the factual knowledge

24     this Chamber would like to receive from witnesses.  It mixes matters up.

25     So would you please -- if you want to find out what this witness knows

Page 18606

 1     about the propaganda, and we now learned that to some extent it was what

 2     he read before and formed an opinion about, which everyone is fully

 3     entitled to do.  But this Court, of course, is primarily interested in

 4     receiving knowledge of facts observed by the witness himself, and

 5     inevitable that in the position Sir Ivor has been in -- there may some

 6     judgements, some assessments be part of that as well.  But that could be

 7     introduced also without referring to monsters or references to Goebbels.

 8     Would you please keep that many find and --

 9             MR. FARR:  Yes, Your Honour.  I mean, my only observation is that

10     these are the witness's words.  These are not my words, but I will keep

11     your instruction in mind.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Isn't it -- I didn't say that these are not the

13     witness's words, apart from that there was not -- the only thing is that

14     until now is that that title was not his, whether is -- that the author

15     of it has not even been established by you --

16             MR. FARR:  Yes, Your Honour, he said he did write it.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  But apart from that, even if these are his words, I

18     may express myself in different circumstances while publishing -- while

19     doing whatever in terms which I would not use while I'm a witness, and

20     you should be aware of that.

21             Please proceed.

22             MR. FARR:

23        Q.   Sir, based on your knowledge of the way that the Yugoslav

24     government functioned during your time in Belgrade, are you able to say

25     whether a campaign of this sort could have happened without the knowledge

Page 18607

 1     and approval of Slobodan Milosevic?

 2        A.   No, it could not have happened without the knowledge or approval.

 3     Are you talking about the propaganda line there?

 4        Q.   Yes.

 5        A.   Yeah.  No, it couldn't have happened without Milosevic's consent.

 6        Q.   A portion of the quote indicates that you saw Mladic as a key

 7     player in and executor of a criminal enterprise.  Can you tell us what

 8     facts within your knowledge led you to that conclusion?

 9        A.   Well, as His Honours has pointed out, this is language which I am

10     using in a newspaper article which is not the language I would use in a

11     court of law because I would need to have factual evidence based on my

12     own observation of those whom I was confident of.  So I'd rather not go

13     into that.

14        Q.   Okay.  I have finished with that document.

15             MR. FARR:  Can we now please have P2532 on the screen.

16        Q.   And, sir, just for your information, the document coming up on

17     your screen comes from a notebook kept by Ratko Mladic.  And the entry

18     that we are looking at is from 13 December 1993, although that's not

19     what's on our screen at the moment.

20        A.   It says July 1994, doesn't it?

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Farr will find the right pages, I take it.

22             MR. FARR:  I think what we need is P2532.

23        Q.   So this comes from a notebook kept by Ratko Mladic, and this

24     entry is from the 13th of December, 1993.  So this is still about three

25     months before your arrival in Belgrade.  It is just around the time of

Page 18608

 1     your meeting with Lord Owen that you described during your direct exam.

 2     And this records a meeting in Belgrade attended by two delegation:  One

 3     is from Serbia and one is from the RS.  From Serbia the attendees were:

 4     Milosevic, General Perisic, Sokolovic, Stanisic, Badza, Tepavcevic, and

 5     General Mrksic.  From the RS the attendees were Karadzic, Krajisnik,

 6     Mladic, Milovanovic, Cukic, Miletic, Maric, Salapura, Stanisic, and

 7     Kovac.  Jovica Stanisic speaks first at the meeting, and he says:

 8             "It is because of your initiative that we are meeting in order to

 9     improve your operational and tactical position and see about help from

10     Serbia."

11             Karadzic speaks next, and he says:

12             "We are moving towards the end of the conflict.  This moment is

13     the most favourable for us to end the war.  We are holding 75 per cent of

14     the territory and controlling the most important parts of the territory."

15             Are you able to confirm at the time of your arrival in Belgrade

16     in March 1994 that Bosnian Serbs were controlling about 75 per cent of

17     the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

18        A.   I would have thought the figure was slightly less, maybe 68,

19     70 per cent, I can't quite remember.  Seventy-five per cent seems rather

20     high, but I mean, I'm not saying it's wrong.  It just doesn't seem what

21     my memory tells me.

22        Q.   Karadzic continues saying:

23             "We have not achieved some of it in the Neretva valley and a

24     foothold on the coast which we could have achieve by political means.

25             "We have to return part of the territory because the MZ or

Page 18609

 1     international community will not agree to 31 per cent of the Serbs

 2     holding 75 per cent of the territory.

 3             "Unification with Serbia is smiling upon us."

 4             Now Mr. Karadzic is also correct here when he says that the

 5     international community was not willing to let the Bosnian Serbs keep

 6     75 per cent of the territory of Bosnia.  And, in fact, the exchange of

 7     territory for official recognition of the Republika Srpska was one of the

 8     key issues in the contact group plan; is that correct?

 9        A.   Yeah.

10        Q.   And then moving on to the bottom of the page, Karadzic says:

11             "What are our strategy objectives?

12             "1.  To be separated from the Muslims and Croats.

13             "2.  To establish territorial control in Posavina.

14             "3.  For the Drina not to be the border.

15             "4.  To take control of part of the Neretva valley.

16             "5.  To have a foothold on the coast.

17             "6.  To have our part of Sarajevo."

18             Were you aware of these six strategic goals of the Bosnian Serbs

19     and that they were published in the Official Gazette of the RS in May of

20     1992?

21        A.   No.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Farr, is there any dispute about the strategic

23     objectives or -- because it comes a bit as a surprise in this context.

24             MR. FARR:  Your Honour, the witness has knowledge of them.  It

25     may be relevant for his evidence about the negotiations or about the

Page 18610

 1     goals of the contact group plan.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  But apparently he is not aware of them.

 3             Please proceed.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Let me add that I wasn't aware of them as set out

 5     some two years before I arrived.  But it was quite clear that objective

 6     1, 2, 4 -- sorry, 5 and 6 were things that the Bosnian Serbs always went

 7     on about.  I take it that 3, for the Drina not to be the border, refers

 8     back to the line that you quoted two lines above, unification with Serbia

 9     is smiling upon us; i.e., that the Drina should not be a border between

10     Republika Srpska and Serbia proper.

11             MR. FARR:

12        Q.   Are you in a position to comment on the extent to which any of

13     these goals had been achieved in Bosnia by the time you arrived in

14     Belgrade in March of 1994?

15        A.   Well, it's hard to make such categorical statements, to be

16     separated from the Muslims and Croats?  Well, they were fighting each

17     other in two different camps, as it were.  Territorial control in

18     Posavina, that was being fought over; for the Drina not to be the border,

19     well, that's -- that was something that was never achieved; the Neretva

20     valley, I don't remember; have a foothold on the coast, no, they never

21     achieved that; to have their part of the Sarajevo, well they had their

22     part of Sarajevo and were bombing rest.

23        Q.   What follows in this meeting is a discussion of two potential

24     military operations; one at various elevations around Sarajevo, including

25     one called mount Zuc, and one in the Praca river valley.

Page 18611

 1             MR. FARR:  And if we could have the bottom of page 4 in both

 2     languages.

 3        Q.   I'd like to read Milosevic's conclusions.  He says:

 4             "1.  Do not plan and do not do Praca.

 5             "2.  Work out the Sarajevo operation.

 6             "3.  The SRK does not have its own forces.  They have to resolve

 7     this quickly and with assistance."

 8             And, sir, just so you know, it's our case that SRK is the

 9     Sarajevo Romanija Corps, the VRS Corps engaged in the siege of Sarajevo:

10             "4.  How to neutralise propaganda around Sarajevo ..."

11             MR. FARR:  If we could have the next page please in both

12     languages:

13        Q.   "5.  The world is interested only in what the Serbs do ...

14             "6.  Let the Muslims trample the Croats near Vitez, Busovaca,

15     Gornji Vakuf, and Kiseljak and Kresevo.

16             "7.  Work out the operation and define the strength of the

17     forces. "

18             And:

19             "8.  General Perisic will give everything that does not

20     jeopardize BG for combat readiness of units here."

21             Sir, were you aware that Slobodan Milosevic was involved in this

22     kind of discussion about an operation in Sarajevo with the Bosnian Serb

23     leaders at the time of your meeting with Lord Owen in December of 1993?

24        A.   No.

25        Q.   And is this kind of meeting and this kind of discussion

Page 18612

 1     consistent with the picture that Milosevic paint for you of his

 2     relationship with the Bosnian Serb leaders at the time you arrived in

 3     Belgrade in March 1994?

 4        A.   Well, I didn't meet Milosevic on my own, i.e., without a foreign

 5     office minister or one of the international negotiators until around

 6     December of that year.  So the line that would be taken in

 7     international -- in meetings with international negotiators or

 8     delegations was perforce a very one that was effective for public

 9     consumption and certainly wouldn't have the sort of language that Mladic

10     is recorded here.

11        Q.   I guess the question I am trying to get at is it seems to me -

12     and correct me if I'm wrong - that in your statement you paint a picture

13     of what you believe the relationship between Milosevic, on the one hand,

14     and the Bosnian Serbs, on the other hand, was at the time you arrived in

15     Belgrade in March 1994, and that is that it was a strained relationship

16     and that it had been a strained relationship since, let's say, May of

17     1993 when the Bosnian Serbs rejected the contact group plan.  Can you

18     tell me, first, am I understanding your evidence correctly?  Are you

19     indicating that in your view that was a strained relationship at the time

20     you arrived in March of 1994?

21        A.   It was certainly strained by the late summer of that year.  As

22     for earlier, it was very hard to say.  There is no specific indications.

23     But by the late summer, the contact group were actively trying to

24     encourage Milosevic, as indeed were Owen and Stoltenberg, in encouraging

25     Milosevic to formally to break with the Bosnian Serbs, which is what

Page 18613

 1     eventually happened as we discussed earlier today.

 2        Q.   Perhaps I can just ask this:  Are you surprised to see a record

 3     of a meeting of this kind happening in December of 1993?

 4        A.   December 1993, not particularly.  But I certainly would have been

 5     if it had been December 1994.

 6        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Now if we -- a bit further down the page we see

 7     the words, "Approved 30 T-34 tanks, ZIS field gun, shells for ZIS and

 8     B-1."

 9             Then getting close to the bottom of the page we see what appears

10     to be Mladic's suggestion for how to proceed with the discussions where

11     it says:

12             "My draft conclusion.

13             "Let us define forces, weapons, and time tomorrow, as well as the

14     team that will decide."

15             Then immediately after that, Milosevic says:

16             "I agree with General Mladic's proposal ..."

17             MR. FARR:  And if we could have the next page in both languages.

18        Q.   And there it says:

19             "But we should start the operation if the agreement is not signed

20     and if sanctions are not lifted.

21             "The operation is to be planned, prepared, and forces are to be

22     concentrated, but it should not be started until we hear the results of

23     the negotiations from Brussels."

24             Are you able to tell us what negotiations in Brussels Milosevic

25     is referring to here?

Page 18614

 1        A.   These Geneva Conventions -- in Brussels?  In Brussels?  That

 2     surprises me.  I would have thought they would have been in Geneva.  I

 3     don't know what negotiation in Brussels he would have been referring to

 4     because most of the meetings with Bosnian Serbs on accepting peace plans

 5     were held in Geneva.  I can't think of what results of negotiations in

 6     Brussels are, unless he is talking about internal European Union

 7     negotiations.  This is a particular moment of --

 8        Q.   Well, does --

 9        A.   Where sanctions are being discussed again.  I don't remember.

10        Q.   Does it assist if I indicate that apparently on the 10th and 11th

11     of December, 1993, the European Council met in Brussels for the first

12     time following the entry into force of the treaty on European Union.  One

13     of the things they did was to adopt a declaration on the former

14     Yugoslavia, which, among other things, invited the Serb, Bosnian, and

15     Croat leaders to in Brussels on 22nd December.  Does that --

16        A.   Yes, well, thank you.  Had you mentioned that to start with we

17     could have saved some time.

18        Q.   Are you at all surprised -- our position is that this document

19     shows that Milosevic is conditioning the -- or what he's saying is that

20     an operation around Sarajevo may be conditioned on the results of

21     negotiations in Brussels.  Does that surprise you?

22        A.   I mean, it's hard to be surprised by Milosevic.  He was a

23     constant master of tactics and surprises.  In that sense, most of them

24     turned out to be strategic flawed, but that wouldn't stop him thinking of

25     some tactical ploy which he thought might be helpful.  It's hard to put

Page 18615

 1     all this in context without my having been there at the time.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  I've finished with that document.  I'd now like to

 3     turn to the reasons that Mr. Milosevic supported the various peace plans.

 4     And I'd like to start just by telling you the Prosecution's position

 5     regarding the reasons for his support.

 6             We say that his support for the peace plans was not based on a --

 7     was not because he was a humanitarian or had interest in reducing human

 8     suffering or because he had any regret or concern about the ethnic

 9     cleansing that had taken place in Bosnia.  In fact, we say he, himself,

10     had supported both the war and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.  We say that

11     he supported the peace plans, at least in part, because the Serb side had

12     enjoyed phenomenal success early in the war, and, in Milosevic's view,

13     had achieved everything it could through war and violence.  The peace

14     plans provided an opportunity to consolidate a great portion of those

15     gains and make them permanent.

16             Milosevic was concerned that if the peace plans were not

17     accepted, the Bosnian Serbs could lose everything they had gained,

18     decreasing both their power and his.  In Milosevic's view, in other

19     words, the territory that had to be traded pursuant to the peace plans

20     was worth less than the official recognition and guarantees of Serb

21     rights that, in his view, were offered by the peace plans.

22             Are you able to comment on that?

23        A.   In other words, you're saying, if I've got this right - and I'm

24     just re-reading the transcript of what you helpfully read out - that he

25     felt that he ought to bank the gains that the Bosnian Serbs had made

Page 18616

 1     before things went awry and he would lose what had been gained.

 2        Q.   Precisely.

 3        A.   Well, I'd -- I think if we are talking about the time when he

 4     was -- when we were -- when I arrived, when we were discussing earlier

 5     whether he -- Serbia -- that the Bosnian Serbs occupied 68 or 70 or

 6     75 per cent of Bosnia, I don't think Milosevic agreed that that was

 7     sustainable and he knew that the international community would not agree

 8     that the Bosnian Serbs should have more than 49 per cent of Bosnia.  In

 9     fact, that was a point that I regularly made to the Bosnian Serbs, and I

10     remember Karadzic at one point saying that that was only his agreement,

11     to 49 per cent, 49:51 per cent split was only a one-day offer, and

12     because it hadn't been agreed -- it -- there hadn't been an agreement, it

13     was no longer on the table.  It was something that one kept coming back

14     to in negotiation with the Bosnian Serbs.

15             Karadzic, and Krajisnik in particular, would resolutely keep

16     pushing that away and saying that that was no longer acceptable.

17     Milosevic, however, did accept it, repeatedly accepted it, and in my

18     experience from, say, late 1994 till Dayton, consistently argued this.

19     And my impression was this was something -- this was partly what led to

20     the split between Belgrade and Pale was that he was determined -- he

21     accepted that 49:51 per cent was not negotiable.  I mean, what

22     constituted the 49 per cent was, of course, negotiable, but he wasn't

23     going to fight for the Bosnian Serbs for anything over 49 per cent.  He

24     wasn't going to be supporting them politically and he certainly wasn't

25     going to be supporting them anymore militarily.

Page 18617

 1        Q.   And you've actually anticipated my next question to a certain

 2     extent.  We say that the source of this disagreement was essentially

 3     that -- well, Milosevic wanted to cash out and go home, the Bosnian Serbs

 4     wanted to keep gambling, and in their view they could keep more land in

 5     the long run by rejecting the peace plans and continuing to fight.

 6     Therefore, the disagreement between Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs was

 7     not a disagreement over the fundamental goal of maximising the territory

 8     over which they exercised permanent control, it was simply a dispute

 9     about what was possible, what was that maximum territory, and the best

10     way to achieve that permanent control.  Do you have a comment on that?

11        A.   Well, I would quote -- I can't now remember whether it was

12     Richard Holbrooke, but it was probably, I think, Bob Fraser [phoen], who

13     said something to the effect, and I'm paraphrasing now, that Milosevic

14     was like a Chicago gangster who had decided that he was tired of his

15     criminal activities and was now going to, as it were, cash in his chips

16     and launder his money and live a quite life in Louisiana or somewhere and

17     put his gangster days behind him.  And that, I think, Fraser's

18     caricature, if you like, was actually quite close to the mark.

19             I think Milosevic had, as I think I said earlier, I can't

20     remember if it was in response to you or your colleague across the

21     courtroom, that I think he -- well, I'll leave it at that, actually.

22             MR. FARR:  Could we please have 65 ter 1320 on the screen.  And

23     this document we are bringing up now is the minutes and a transcript of

24     the tape recording of the Republika Srpska's National Assembly's --

25     sorry.

Page 18618

 1             So 65 ter 1320, please.  I'm not sure this is the right document

 2     we are seeing on our screen.  Ah, that's it.  So this is the record of

 3     the 30th session of the Republika Srpska National Assembly from the 5th

 4     and 6th of May, 1993.  And this is the occasion that you referred to in

 5     your statement when Milosevic went to Pale to promote the Vance-Owen

 6     plan.  And if we could have the bottom of page 105 in English and in

 7     B/C/S ERN page 0215-0189, which is e-court page 76.  So at the bottom of

 8     the page in English we see the name of Slobodan Milosevic, which

 9     indicates that he is about to be the speaker.  And if we could go over to

10     the next page in English, about the middle of the page.

11        Q.   I'm going to read a portion beginning with the words, "But all

12     the testimonies about the horrors of war ..."  And it looks like that's

13     about five lines down in the English version.  So the quote is this:

14             "But all the testimonies about the horrors of war, concluding

15     with General Mladic's long presentation and the examples that he gave,

16     all can be unified in one claim, in one assertion - that the war needs

17     stop as soon as possible, that it needs to stop now.  However, let me

18     return to the question of today, which is not how great are the horrors

19     of war, because this nation felt it in their chests throughout its entire

20     history.  Today's question is whether to consolidate the already achieved

21     and then accomplish the rest of, what we call, the remaining 'open

22     questions' in a peaceful process, or to ruin the already achieved, with

23     huge losses.  That is the real alternative and that is the real question

24     on which this Assembly should decide.  I do not believe that the Assembly

25     should make such a tragic mistake in the interest of the people for whom

Page 18619

 1     it speaks.  And it would not be the first time in history that someone

 2     created evil by wishing the biggest good for one's people, lacking the

 3     measure of what is possible and what is achievable and what are the ways

 4     to acquire something."

 5             Sir, it's our position that this excerpt sets out exactly the

 6     basis of the conflict between Milosevic and the Bosnian Serb leaders.  It

 7     was a dispute about what was possible and what was achievable and the

 8     best way to acquire what they wanted.  It had nothing to do with any

 9     moral rejection by Milosevic of the crimes and ethnic cleansing that had

10     already taken place in Bosnia.  Can you comment on that?

11        A.   Well, I certainly would agree that there is nothing humanitarian

12     about his approach and his willingness or wish to bring the war to an

13     end, and nor did I ever hear him express a single word of regret in

14     private for anything that had happened.  The numbers who had died were of

15     no -- I never heard him express any concern about that at all.  I think

16     the -- the only gloss I would put on this, and given the fact that this

17     is effectively a statement to the Bosnian Serb people, is that I think

18     it's coming back to the original propaganda line, which I referred to in

19     the article I wrote about a year ago, that what is -- what -- what he's

20     effectively putting over is, We've saved you, or, You have saved yourself

21     with our help from the threat of being, first of all, separated from

22     Yugoslavia by Bosnian independents, which is not something that we

23     wanted, and we've also -- you have taken sufficient territory to make

24     sure you're not going to be overrun by the Muslim-Croat federation.

25     That's, I think, the subtext there.

Page 18620

 1             MR. FARR:  If we could have the middle of the next page, which is

 2     107, in English, and ERN page 0215-0190, e-court page 77, also the next

 3     page in B/C/S.

 4        Q.   I'll just read one more portion beginning with the words, "Don't

 5     say that the Serbs shall be unequal ..." And that's about halfway down

 6     the page in English.  The quote is:

 7             "Don't say that the Serb shall be unequal.  How can the Serbs be

 8     less sovereign than the Croats or than the Muslims in BiH that was

 9     conceived like this and based on such principles.  According to this,

10     45 per cent of the land belongs to the Serbs and 30 per cent to the

11     Muslims.  The Serbs get 50 per cent more of the territory, while the

12     Muslims are 50 per cent more numerous than the Serbs.  The Croats get

13     20 per cent and some territory.  So how, how, and where can one read in

14     Vance-Owen's plans that the Serbs shall be less sovereign than the Croats

15     or the Muslims."

16             Now here we see Milosevic expressing his support for the

17     Vance-Owen plan in explicitly national terms.  He supported the peace

18     plan because it gives Serbs essentially a good deal in terms of

19     territorial size compared with population size.  This represents, we say,

20     not a rejection of ethnic cleansing but an affirmation that the project

21     of ethnic cleansing has been successfully completed and a desire to make

22     those results permanent.  Are you able to comment on that?

23        A.   Sorry, what particularly do you want me to comment on?  I am not

24     quite clear.

25        Q.   Only if you are able to and if you wish to make a comment on

Page 18621

 1     that?

 2        A.   Well, I don't think -- the division that the international

 3     community came up with, 49 per cent to the Serbs and 51 for the Muslim

 4     Croats was not based on population.  It was based on the territorial --

 5     the areas of -- of respective control of territory going back to the land

 6     registers.  So if Milosevic is just trying to make a virtue out of a --

 7     out of the fact that at the end of the negotiation, that if the Pale

 8     Assembly accepts the Vance-Owen plan, they will get a substantial amount

 9     of land.  But, of course, before the war broke out, they already had a

10     substantial amount of land, and not based on population but on the fact

11     that by and large Serbs were farmers and Muslims lived in the cities.

12     It's just kind of as crude as that, if you like.  But, of course, there

13     is a big debate about the land registers and how up-to-date and authentic

14     they were.

15             But the 49:51 per cent deal was worked out with some

16     acknowledgment of the fact that Serbs, as the rural dwellers, were always

17     going to have more land than just the -- whatever it was, the 33 per cent

18     of the population that they represented.  I don't know whether that's

19     helpful to what you were trying to --

20        Q.   It's helpful to have your comment.  Absolutely.

21        A.   Thank you.

22             MR. FARR:  Your Honours, we have uploaded just the portions of

23     this document consisting of Milosevic's speech as 65 ter 1320.1.  And we

24     would tender that portion.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Any objections?  No objections.  Would you consider

Page 18622

 1     whether for contextualisation you would like to have more in, and we

 2     would then like to hear from you not later than this Wednesday.

 3             MR. JORDASH:  Yes.  And the same comment we'd make about the bar

 4     table.  It may well be in there.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 6             Madam Registrar, the number would be?

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 1320.1 will receive number P3116,

 8     Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

10             Please proceed.

11             MR. FARR:

12        Q.   I'd like to turn now to the issue of Milosevic's degree of

13     influence with the Bosnian Serbs.  Is it fair to say that Milosevic had

14     an interest in indicating to you that he had less influence over the

15     Bosnian Serbs than he may, in fact, have had?

16        A.   It depends who you mean by the Bosnian Serbs.  What -- what he

17     claimed at various points when I first came across him, when I started,

18     he would claim that, as shown in Pale in 1993, he couldn't snap his

19     fingers and get the Bosnian Serbs to comply with what he wanted.  And

20     part of his aim in that was to argue, Why am I subject to sanctions when

21     the people who are causing the problem and are being obstructive and are

22     out of my control are on the other side of the Drina.  That was part of

23     the argument.  But at some stage - and I couldn't put an exact date on

24     it - his position changed.  I suppose it would have been in early late

25     1994, early 1995, to one where he arrogated to himself more influence

Page 18623

 1     that I think he actually had.  He was constantly saying that he expected

 2     the Bosnian Serb Assembly to throw -- to overthrow Karadzic.  So you had

 3     a Janus-like Approach.  So I don't -- I can't agree with your

 4     characterisation because that's only one half of the Janus, if you like.

 5        Q.   I'd like to quote something from that same piece regarding a

 6     meeting with Mladic from May of 2011.  I am happy to have it on the

 7     screen, if you'd like to see it.  I am happy just to read the quote to

 8     you as well.  Perhaps I will read the quote and then you can tell me

 9     whether you would like to see it.  The quote is this, and this is from

10     the very beginning:

11             "While none of the meetings I had with Serbian leaders during the

12     Bosnian war could be described as pleasurable, some were less unpleasant

13     than others.  My only meeting with Ratko Mladic was, however, as grim and

14     uncomfortable as it got.  I was running the British embassy in Belgrade

15     at this time, early 1995, and at a meeting with Slobodan Milosevic, had

16     urged him to use his undoubted influence in Bosnian to rein in the

17     Bosnian Serb army."

18             What did you mean when you referred to Slobodan Milosevic's

19     undoubted influence in Bosnia in early 1995?

20        A.   1995.  Well, Milosevic -- as I was saying earlier, Milosevic was

21     keen to portray himself as -- at that time, as having influence with

22     deputies from the Pale assembly whom he saw as a means of getting rid of

23     Karadzic.

24        Q.   Does your use of the word "undoubted influence" in that context

25     indicate that you, yourself, believe that he had at least some influence

Page 18624

 1     in Bosnia, even in early 1995?

 2        A.   Yes, but not comparable to the influence he had at the outset of

 3     the crisis.

 4             MR. FARR:  I'd like to turn to the -- some issues dealing with

 5     the hostage crisis.  Could we please have D781 on the screen, which was

 6     1D4847.

 7        Q.   This is a package of documents received by the Stanisic Defence

 8     from the UK government.  I don't know whether there is any reason to deal

 9     with this in private session now.  Apparently not.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  There seems to be no condition of confidentiality

11     found.

12             But, Mr. Jordash, it's a letter which was addressed to then lead

13     council for Mr. Stanisic.  Any need to deal with it confidentiality?

14             MR. JORDASH:  No.  As far as I am aware, no.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Then please proceed, Mr. Farr.

16             MR. FARR:  If we could have page 5 in English.  And I believe

17     there is only an English version at the moment.  So page 5, then.

18        Q.   And, sir, this is Belgrade telegram number 335.  It's dated

19     6th June 1995.

20             MR. FARR:  And if we could have the next page in English.

21        Q.   Down at the bottom we see that it's, in fact, a cable from you.

22     And I'd just like to read paragraph 6 which falls under the heading,

23     "Comment":

24             "While the release of some hostages may be imminent, it is

25     unlikely that the Bosnian Serbs will let them all go without a struggle.

Page 18625

 1     This is their trump card; once played, their hand will be virtually

 2     empty."

 3             Sir, doesn't the simple fact that the Bosnian Serbs would give up

 4     their trump card at the behest of Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Stanisic indicate

 5     that the Belgrade leadership retained a significant degree of influence

 6     with the Pale leadership, even in the summer of 1995?

 7        A.   I don't think it indicates that particularly.

 8        Q.   And why don't you think that it indicates that?  I mean,

 9     presumably giving up one's trump card is something that's not done --

10        A.   Well, I think trump card in the context of this particular saga.

11     It wasn't the trump card of their whole position in the war.  I think

12     that's -- perhaps you're reading a more general comment into it than

13     something that's quite a small -- it's not of small significance, but it

14     relates to one small part of the whole Bosnian war.

15        Q.   Earlier today, at page 40, you said -- the answer to your

16     question -- this was in the context of getting Karadzic to resign from

17     politics.  And you said:

18             "The answer to your question is that several of these maneuvers

19     would have been conducted by Stanisic because that's who Milosevic used

20     to try and execute his will in Bosnian when his own attempts had failed."

21             Now, it seems to me that the hostage crisis would be one example

22     of that; getting Karadzic to resign from politics might be another.  Are

23     there any other examples that you are aware of when Milosevic used

24     Stanisic to execute his will in Bosnia when Milosevic's attempts had

25     failed.

Page 18626

 1        A.   None that I can think of in my time.

 2             MR. FARR:  And can we now have page 35 of the document on the

 3     screen in English.

 4        Q.   Now here, as you can see, we've jumped ahead to November of 1995.

 5     And this is Belgrade telegram number 772.  It's obviously been heavily

 6     redacted, but we can see that the subject is "Dayton Peace Agreement,

 7     Serb Reactions."  And if we could now go forward two pages, to page 37.

 8             At the bottom of the page I'll just read out paragraph 14.  It

 9     says:

10             "While that may be the formal position, I suspect that there may

11     need to be some dirty work at the crossroads to ensure Bosnian Serb

12     acquiescence.  The split within the Banja Luka and Pale elements of the

13     leadership will be an obvious focus of Milosevic's attention.  It may

14     well be that the cuddly Mr. Stanisic, the secret police chief, will be

15     dispatched to Pale with his tried and tested (during the hostage crisis)

16     mixture of death threats, blackmail, and bribery."

17             Sir, the name of the author of this cable is redacted, but I'm

18     assuming that it's you; is that correct?

19        A.   It could have been.  But it could have been my deputy because he

20     would have signed the telegram in my -- if I wasn't in town, for

21     instance.

22        Q.   All right.  I -- I'd would just like to go through these items in

23     order starting with the death threats.  In paragraph 15 of your

24     statement, you say that Milosevic told you that he had had -- that he had

25     threatened to have Karadzic killed if the Bosnian Serbs would not release

Page 18627

 1     the UN hostages.  And you also say that this message was delivered to

 2     Karadzic by Stanisic.  Is it fair to say that Mr. Stanisic was an

 3     appropriate messenger for a death threat because he was a feared figure?

 4        A.   Yes, I think that was -- that was certainly what Milosevic told

 5     me.

 6        Q.   Other than Milosevic, did you have any other source for viewing

 7     Stanisic as a feared figure?

 8        A.   Not that would stand up to your legal scrutiny.

 9        Q.   And according to Milosevic, who was it that feared Stanisic?

10        A.   Karadzic.

11        Q.   And why did Karadzic fear Stanisic?

12        A.   I have no idea, but I presume that -- well -- I think it has to

13     be said that secret police chiefs are not normally known as particularly

14     warm and genial figures, and certainly not in Serbia.  The history of

15     them for going back to Rankovic in Tito's time was not to one for the

16     squeamish.  So I think if you receive a call from your erstwhile patron

17     and now somewhat strained patron as police chief who tells you that

18     Mr. Milosevic plans to have you killed if you don't let the hostages go,

19     you're -- you're -- it will at least focus your attention.

20        Q.   Moving on to the -- the second point, blackmail.  Is it also fair

21     to say that Mr. Stanisic was someone perceived to know a great many

22     secrets and who, therefore, might be in a position to blackmail others?

23        A.   I think one of the documents we looked at earlier said as much in

24     the document about the splits between the Serbian security service and

25     the Bosnian Serb security service, if I'm -- my memory serves me.  One of

Page 18628

 1     the reasons for Karadzic and Krajisnik's unhappiness was precisely that

 2     they saw the Serbian security people meddling and able to use their

 3     knowledge of the corruption of the -- of the Bosnian Serb leadership to

 4     effectively blackmail them to comply with their -- with their, in this

 5     case -- Milosevic's wishes.

 6        Q.   And moving on to the third point, bribery.  Are you aware of any

 7     reason that Stanisic would be in a position to -- to offer bribes or

 8     incentives to the Bosnian Serb leaders in order to get them to do what

 9     Milosevic wanted?

10        A.   It was said after the event - and again, I can't quite remember

11     the locus - that Milosevic had supplied in contravention of his own

12     self-imposed embargo some spare parts for the Bosnia Serb army.

13        Q.   At the time of the hostage crisis?

14        A.   Yes.  In -- as a bribe to release the hostages.

15        Q.   Sir Ivor, thank you for answering my questions today.

16             MR. FARR:  Your Honours, no further questions.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Farr.

18             Mr. Bakrac, position still the same?

19             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I have no questions, Your Honour.

20     Thank you.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, do you have any further questions in

22     re-examination for the witness, and how much time would that

23     approximately take?

24             MR. JORDASH:  I do have approximately 15 minutes of questions.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Fifteen minutes, which -- I'm also looking at you


Page 18629

 1     because we -- we started almost quarter past 4.00.

 2             MR. JORDASH:  I would also -- sorry to interrupt, Your Honour.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 4             MR. JORDASH:  I would also like to address you for five minutes

 5     on an issue which arose during my learned friend's cross-examination.  In

 6     the absence of the witness is probably wisest.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  And then to do that before you re-examine the

 8     witness?

 9             MR. JORDASH:  Yes.  I --

10             JUDGE ORIE:  We could do that.  I think what would be the most

11     logical way of proceeding would be that we already give a break to the

12     witness, that you address the Chamber during five minutes.  We then take

13     a break and resume at most likely approximately five minutes to 6.00.

14             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you, Your Honour.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Sir Ivor, the Stanisic Defence would like to address

16     the Chamber in your absence, so you get the early break today.  Would you

17     please follow the usher and we will continue in a little bit over half an

18     hour, and then it will not take very long any more.

19                           [The witness stands down]

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash.

21             MR. JORDASH:  I am trying to find the place in the transcript,

22     because the -- the -- the issue is this:  That it's been put quite

23     clearly to the witness - and I will find it in the transcript shortly -

24     but it's been put very clearly to the witness two things which are of

25     significance -- of huge significance for the case.

Page 18630

 1             First of all, that ethnic transfer had been completed by, I

 2     think, 1993 or 1994.  And secondly, and related to that, that Milosevic

 3     was acting to, at that point -- I want to be careful here so I don't

 4     misquote --

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, are you referring to page 73, lines 12

 6     and following, where Mr. Farr in his question suggests an interpretation

 7     of the words of Mr. Milosevic?

 8             MR. JORDASH:  Well, yes, although it's not an interpretation of

 9     Mr. -- no, sorry, that was the context in which the Prosecution asked the

10     question --

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

12             MR. JORDASH:  -- but Mr. Farr clearly said "this represents, we

13     say, affirmation that the project of ethnic cleansing had been

14     completed." --

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

16             MR. JORDASH:  And that's of huge significance because we say that

17     ethnic cleansing had been completed and Sanski Most and Trnovo in 1995

18     had nothing to do with that, and the criminal enterprise, if it existed,

19     had ended, and that seems to be consistent with what the Prosecution put

20     to the witness.

21             Earlier in that -- I begged your pardon.  I'd hoped to have the

22     transcript on paper, but I think there -- the point -- the ancillary

23     point is that the Prosecution appeared to -- to accept to a significant

24     degree the Defence position that Milosevic was, as this witness has

25     confirmed, supporting the peace agreement, the motives behind it

Page 18631

 1     obviously in dispute, but that again is something which Mr. Farr made

 2     clear.

 3             And what I would respectfully ask is that the Prosecution make

 4     that position clear, to put to a witness these fundamental points which

 5     appear to agree with the Defence position ought to be made explicit, in

 6     our submission, and we ought to know at this side of the room and

 7     Your Honours ought to know whether that is the Prosecution case.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm read reading what you said, Mr. Jordash.

 9             Now, correct me when I'm wrong.  Mr. Farr, in your question you

10     linked, although the text of the quote didn't seem to give a direct --

11     such a direct link - you said, Well, this whole discussion about

12     accepting 49:51 per cent, look, isn't this a clear expression of

13     Mr. Milosevic doing that, ethnic cleansing being completed.

14             Whereas the quote you gave doesn't say anything about ethnic

15     cleansing.  It was -- you introduced that.  And as a matter of fact, I

16     noticed, not only now, but already at the time, that whatever the witness

17     said about ambition of getting more or less or -- but he left the whole

18     ethnic cleansing out of his answer, so to that extent I do not find him

19     to confirm in any way the direct link, as you suggested, with the ethnic

20     cleansing.

21             Let me first try to verify whether this is a -- an accurate

22     understanding of both your question and the answer, and I'm looking both

23     to you, Mr. Farr, and to you as well, Mr. Jordash.

24             MR. JORDASH:  Yes.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  And now -- Mr. Farr.

Page 18632

 1             MR. FARR:  Your Honour, I was putting our -- putting our case to

 2     the witness, but I -- I think what this highlights is -- the purpose of

 3     putting the case to the witness is so that the witness is not confused.

 4     It's not a way for the Prosecution to amend its pleadings by sloppy

 5     wording.  And I didn't intend to do that.  Of course, we continue to rely

 6     on the indictment.  We rely on the pre-trial brief.

 7             My goal was to make sure that if the witness had something that

 8     he wanted to say about that, that would be useful for the Trial Chamber,

 9     the Trial Chamber would have an opportunity to hear that.  Of course,

10     it's not our case that the criminal plan ended in May 1993.  That's clear

11     from the indictment.  We say it lasted until December of 1995.

12             Your Honour, may I confer?

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Please do.

14                           [Prosecution Counsel Confer]

15             MR. FARR:  And I think -- the one thing that I think I can say is

16     that we don't contest Milosevic's support for the peace plans.  What's

17     disputed about that is the motivation for it, and in particular the

18     Defence argument set out in the pre-trial brief -- in their pre-trial

19     brief at paragraph 245 and 249 that Stanisic's support for these peace

20     plans somehow demonstrate that he could not have the criminal intent

21     required for the JCE.  In other words, their case is that support for the

22     peace plan necessarily means that one -- never in one's life intended the

23     forcible permanent removal of non-Serbs from large portions of Bosnia

24     Croatia.

25             Our case on that point is that if one's support for peace plans

Page 18633

 1     is designed to lock in the degree of ethnic cleansing that has already

 2     bene achieved and has already been completed, then it does no such thing.

 3     In fact, it tends to make the opposite point, that, in fact, it

 4     demonstrates a desire to consolidate those results.  Again, to say that

 5     it was completed at that point was sloppy wording, and wasn't intended as

 6     a modification of the indictment.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, I would ask you the following.  You may

 8     comment on what Mr. Farr said.  If you say, Well, his answer doesn't

 9     satisfy me, then tell us in very practical terms what you expect Mr. Farr

10     to tell the witness?  Try to phrase, help him, assist him, in what he

11     should put to the witness so that I fully understand what you think is

12     missing in the way in which the Prosecution presents it case to the

13     witness.  Apart from I am not at this moment yet anticipating on any

14     duty -- I'd first like to know from you that you say what you should put

15     to the witness, A, B or c, because that apparently -- and then we have

16     two matters.  First, whether that is the position of the Prosecution, and

17     we had a bit of a discussion about what exactly their position is.  And

18     the second is to what extent they are under an obligation to put it in

19     that kind of terms to the witness.

20             MR. JORDASH:  Unlike our usual submissions, in some senses I am

21     not suggesting that my learned friend should have put any particular

22     thing to the witness.  I'm -- I'm submitting that my learned friend

23     should not have put something to the witness --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Is that the --

25             MR. JORDASH:  -- if that is not part of their case.

Page 18634

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Is that the completion of the ethnic cleansing.

 2             MR. JORDASH:  That is, as I understand the Prosecution case, the

 3     ethnic cleansing continue through 1995.  And that -- the pursuit --

 4     that's the criminal object which was being pursued until 1995, I

 5     understood because it hasn't been qualified any differently it's best

 6     that -- that actually meant --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Let me then stop you there for one second.  Talking

 8     about whether or not the ethnic cleansing was completed, yes or no.  The

 9     witness in his answer more or less ignored it.  Would Mr. Farr then have

10     to repeat it again and say, But I told you -- or is that --

11             MR. JORDASH:  No, because the witness hasn't -- I didn't seek to

12     elicit from the witness the factual situation on the ground, whether

13     ethnic cleansing had been completed by 1995 and --

14             JUDGE ORIE:  So whether it was a misleading presentation of the

15     Prosecution's position, it has had no effect because the witness didn't

16     even touch upon it, unless you say that's the bad result of

17     misrepresenting your own case, but I didn't gain that impression.  But am

18     I wrong?

19             MR. JORDASH:  Yeah, I agree.  I'm not suggesting --

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.

21             MR. JORDASH:  -- that anything fresh should be put to the

22     witness.  I am just making an inquiry of the Prosecution, if you like,

23     through Your Honours, if -- because if that's the -- I wanted to know the

24     answer to the question because I wanted to be sure when re-examining the

25     witness that I'm doing so on [overlapping speakers] basis.

Page 18635

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Proper understanding of the Prosecution's case.

 2     Anything else at this moment you would suggest, or do you say with these

 3     answers I can continue after the break?  Because that's my --

 4             MR. JORDASH:  Yes, I -- I -- I am not sure I understand the

 5     Prosecution's position entirely.  I am not sure that it's clear whether

 6     they do say the ethnic cleansing was completed or not --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  I -- I did understand it.  But please correct me

 8     when I'm wrong, Mr. Farr, that I would say, consolidating your position,

 9     that you would consider that not to be without a link to the ethnic

10     cleansing which was performed until then?  Is that a right understanding?

11             MR. FARR:  I am not sure I understood what Your Honour was saying

12     just then.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, if ethnic cleansing is complete, that means

14     it's done, nothing has to be done anymore if you want to ethnically

15     cleanse an area.  I did understand where you linked the speech of

16     Mr. Milosevic to the ethnic cleansing being completed, that you intended

17     to say that, well, taking advantage of the ethnic cleansing to the extent

18     it has taken place already.  Is that your --

19             MR. FARR:  Precisely, Your Honour.  Precisely.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, that is how I understand it and that's

21     how apparently Mr. Farr intended it, although not very neatly formulated.

22     Is this sufficient for you to consider after the --

23             MR. JORDASH:  Well, in some ways it's not.  I -- I don't want to

24     be difficult, but if there is -- and the jurisprudence of this Tribunal

25     suggests that there had been ethnic cleansing and it occurred and

Page 18636

 1     continued and had pretty much been completed by 1992.  I'm referring, for

 2     example, to the Krajisnik judgement, they're not -- the further one gets

 3     away from the actual ethnic cleansing, the less the Prosecution's

 4     submission has weight.  What I mean by that is if Mr. Stanisic is

 5     supporting a peace plan in the beginning of 1993, one can easily say,

 6     Well, how could that possibly impact upon or remove the inference that he

 7     intended forcible displacement one month before.  It's clear that the

 8     Prosecution's submission would have more weight, that Mr. Stanisic could

 9     be said to be trying to consolidate those gains.

10             When one moves then to 1995, the inference that one can draw -

11     that the Prosecution will seek to have you draw - gets, I think, less and

12     less strong.  And that's why it's important to us to know whether the

13     Prosecution accept that the majority of the ethnic cleansing had been

14     completed by 1992 or 1993.  Things that happen in 1995 are significantly

15     some distance away from that -- those actual factual events on the

16     ground.  We will say that the further one gets away, the less one can

17     infer criminal intent.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Farr, any --

19             MR. FARR:  Your Honour, the only thing I would say is that

20     neither the Defence nor the Court should ever assume that we have

21     attempted to modify our indictment by a badly written question that was

22     written late at night.  And again, just to return, the purpose of putting

23     the case is to make sure that the witness is not confused.  I think that

24     the question served that purse.  It certainly wasn't intended to do

25     anything with respect to the charges.  It wasn't intended to change the


Page 18637

 1     allegation in the indictment, and we would just say that if we intend to

 2     do that we will make it clear.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Meaning that the forcible removal was still on the

 4     agenda apart from what the position was during these peace negotiations

 5     and apart from the extent to which it had already been achieved or was

 6     still to be achieved?

 7             MR. FARR:  Correct.  Until the end of the -- end of the alleged

 8     joint criminal enterprise.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

10                           [Trial Chamber confers]

11             JUDGE ORIE:  The Chamber considers that the matter has been

12     sufficiently clarified by the Prosecution for the Defence to be able to

13     re-examine the witness after the break, and we'll have a break until five

14     minutes past 6.00.

15                           --- Recess taken at 5.36 p.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 6.09 p.m.

17                           [The witness takes the stand]

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, are you ready to re-examine the

19     witness?

20             MR. JORDASH:  Yes, please.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Please do so.

22                           Re-examination by Mr. Jordash:

23        Q.   I just have very questions left, Sir Ivor.

24             MR. JORDASH:  Please, could we have on the screen P2358.

25        Q.   We return to the Supreme Defence Council minutes.  You were asked

Page 18638

 1     questions by my learned friend from the Prosecution about Mr. Milosevic's

 2     motivations, and I just want to clarify some issues.

 3             MR. JORDASH:  Could we have please page 39 of the -- sorry, no,

 4     page 48 of the English and 32 of the B/C/S.  And this is a continuation

 5     of a speech by Milosevic that we looked at earlier.  It should be P2358.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  And the document is under seal.

 7             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you.  So we should have page 48 of the

 8     English and 32 of the B/C/S.  And the section I am interested in is the

 9     last paragraph, where Milosevic says:

10             "This nation shall not be slaughtered because of the three hot

11     heads from Pale.  And our towns full of young people shall no be bombed

12     because someone wishes to take more than half of the territory of Bosnia

13     and Herzegovina since one half is not sufficient, even though they don't

14     have a enough population to inhabitant it."

15             And then over the page, please, to page 49 of the English and 33

16     of the B/C/S:

17             "As for our domestic public, it is for peace.  Seselj does not

18     represent the domestic public.  And mark my words, the opposition's

19     paramilitary formations have gone down the drain a long time ago.  They

20     are just a small and pathetic bunch that doesn't have nickels to rub

21     together.  The army should not be concerned with their paramilitary

22     formations.  The police here are quite capable of dealing with them,

23     wherever they dare to show their face.

24             "The second great danger that we had faced was the introduction

25     of more severe sanctions.  As I said, the first danger was the drawing of

Page 18639

 1     Yugoslavia into the war."

 2        Q.   As we can see, Sir Ivor, there is a number of concerns Milosevic

 3     expresses.  Does this or not reflect the type of conversations you were

 4     having with Milosevic concerning his concerns?

 5        A.   Yes, they would be broadly in line with these sort of concerns he

 6     would be expressing.

 7        Q.   And the reference to the opposition's paramilitary formations.

 8     Are you able to offer any insight into what Milosevic was concerned about

 9     there?

10        A.   I think he is talking about people like -- about Vojislav Seselj.

11        Q.   And Seselj's impact where?

12        A.   In paramilitaries in Bosnia.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             MR. JORDASH:  And then if we can turn, please, to 1D3612.  Again

15     Supreme Defence Council minutes, this time held on the

16     2nd of November, 1994.  I think this should be under seal too, please.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  I apologise.  I am confused with the transcript.

18     Is it 1D3612, I see indicated in the transcript?  Or ...

19             MR. JORDASH:  Yes, it is.  Yes.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  1D -- yeah.  This document is not e-court.

21             MR. JORDASH:  Actually, I am happy to leave that point.

22        Q.   Let me just finish then, Sir Ivor, if I may, with a couple of

23     other questions.  First of all, was there a provision in the Dayton peace

24     agreement concerning refugees or displaced people?

25        A.   Yes, I am sure there was.  I can't remember the details now, I'm

Page 18640

 1     afraid.

 2        Q.   Well, perhaps we can deal with that then by tendering at a later

 3     stage the Dayton peace agreement.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Or agree on the matter, Mr. Jordash.  I take it that

 5     the content of the Dayton peace agreement could -- well, I would be

 6     optimistic to expect the parties to agree on that.  That's --

 7             MR. JORDASH:  I think the --

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  I hope it's not over optimistic.

 9             MR. JORDASH:  I think that might be one thing we could agree on,

10     but I won't detain Sir Ivor with that for the moment.

11        Q.   You left with region when, Sir Ivor?

12        A.   I formally left in the beginning of November 1997, and I

13     subsequently went back as the foreign secretary's secret representative

14     on two occasions in 1998.  This was when Mr. Robin Cook was the British

15     foreign secretary.

16        Q.   When you back in 1998, do you know if Mr. Stanisic was still in

17     the position of chief of state security?

18        A.   I believe so.  But I would think you would know better than me.

19        Q.   I am not sure anybody is interested in my view.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, if you agree with the Prosecution, everyone

21     would be happy, Mr. Jordash.  It's, again, seems not to be a matter which

22     is really in dispute, is it?

23             MR. JORDASH:  No, I was leading to the next question, which is --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  Then put that next question to the witness.

25             MR. JORDASH:  -- whether the witness is aware of Mr. Stanisic

Page 18641

 1     leaving his position at that time and the circumstances.

 2             THE WITNESS:  No, neither of my two visits which were entirely

 3     focused on Kosovo was there ever any mention of Mr. Stanisic that I can

 4     recall in my long meetings which took place in I think March and July,

 5     from memory, 1998.

 6             MR. JORDASH:

 7        Q.   Did you meet Milosevic during those?

 8        A.   Yes, that was the purpose of my visit.

 9             MR. JORDASH:  May just have a moment, please.

10                           [Defence counsel confer with accused]

11             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you very much.

12        Q.   Thank you, Sir Ivor.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Farr, any further questions for the witness?

14             MR. FARR:  No, Your Honour.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

16                           [Trial Chamber confers]

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Sir Ivor, since the Bench has also no further

18     questions for you, I'd like to thank you very much for coming to

19     The Hague and for answering the questions that were put to you by the

20     parties, and only a few by the Bench.  You are excused.  You may follow

21     the usher, and I wish you a safe return to wherever you came from.

22             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

23                           [The witness withdrew]

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, you're on your feet.

25             MR. JORDASH:  Yes, just to tender -- or apply to tender, please,


Page 18642

 1     some documents.

 2             May I apply to tender 1D05453, 1D05476, and 1D05477, which were

 3     documents I used during the examination.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Farr.

 5             MR. FARR:  I believe that the Defence has indicated that 1D05453

 6     was received pursuant to an RFA.  If they can confirm that on the record,

 7     then no objection to that.  With respect to the other two, we don't have

 8     any origin information.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash.

10             MR. JORDASH:  In relation to 1D05453, yes, it was received

11     pursuant to an RFA.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  And the other two?

13             MR. JORDASH:  Apologies.  Could we MFI those two.  We need to

14     check on provenance.  We think it's the same RFA.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And then we can add two MFIs to our list for

16     this Wednesday and hope to resolve it on that same day.

17             MR. JORDASH:  I'll --

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Bakrac, apparently no observations on behalf of

19     the Stanisic Defence.

20             1D05453, Madam Registrar ...

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Will receive number D782, Your Honours.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  D782 is admitted into evidence.  1D5467,

23     Madam Registrar, would receive number --

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Will receive number D783, Your Honours.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  And is marked for identification --

Page 18643

 1             MR. JORDASH:  Sorry, it's 76, Your Honour.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  76, I'm sorry, I mission spoke.  Then we are talking

 3     about 1D05476 is marked for identification under D783.  Last one 1D05477?

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Will receive number D784, Your Honours.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  And is marked for identification under that number

 6     as well.

 7             MR. JORDASH:  Those two documents we have just discovered were

 8     disclosed by the OTP.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Farr, does that change your position?

10             MR. FARR:  Your Honour, as far as I recall, I didn't see an OTP

11     ERN on them.  That is usually the way that we figure out what the origin

12     is for a document disclosed by us.  Perhaps we could chat after court and

13     try to --

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

15             MR. FARR:  -- sort this out.

16             MR. JORDASH:  Yes, certainly.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Then the status remains as it was before.

18             Mr. Jordash, have you prepared a 92 summary for this witness.

19             MR. JORDASH:  Yes.  And there are a couple of other things, if I

20     may, with the exhibit.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Okay.  Then we first deal with the exhibits.

22             MR. JORDASH:  Your Honours asked whether we wanted 65 ter 1320,

23     whether we wanted pages to contextualise.  First of all, it's not on our

24     bar table and we are content with the Prosecution exhibiting the portion

25     they did.

Page 18644

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now, it meanwhile, of course, has received a

 2     Prosecution exhibit number, but since, apparently, nothing has to be

 3     changed --

 4             MR. JORDASH:  That's correct.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  -- we can leave it to that.  There was another one

 6     of a similar kind, isn't it?

 7             MR. JORDASH:  That was 65 ter 1345 and it is on our bar table,

 8     the whole document.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  The whole document.  And on the bar table, the -- on

10     the chart is clear what specifically we're supposed to look at?

11             MR. JORDASH:  Well, I haven't read the Prosecution response yet,

12     so I don't know what the position is, but we thought it was clear enough.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Since that -- since bar table document is

14     largely, is broader, I think it might be wise to withdraw the document,

15     and that was given what number, Madam Registrar?  The last one which is

16     on the record is 73415, but ...

17                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, could you repeat the number, whether

19     document ID or the number assigned to it for the one you said is now part

20     of a -- was already part of your -- was that P3116, document

21     65 ter 1320.1?

22             MR. JORDASH:  The one on our bar table was 65 ter 1345.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  .1, which appears to be P3115.  The suggestion would

24     then be, Mr. Farr, to vacate the excerpt found in 65 ter 1345.1 and then

25     to ...

Page 18645

 1             MR. FARR:  Your Honour, one potential concern is that that may

 2     affect the references in the witness testimony where I am referring to

 3     particular pages of the document.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 5             MR. FARR:  It was only a three- or four-page excerpt.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  It was only three or four pages -- actually --

 7             MR. FARR:  I'm mindful that it could result in some duplication,

 8     but I think it would be perhaps a smaller burden than --

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, perhaps it's more practical to leave it as it

10     is, even if we have a couple of pages as a double in the system,

11     Mr. Jordash.

12             MR. JORDASH:  Your Honour, yes.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Any further?

14             MR. JORDASH:  Nope, that's fine.  Thank you.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Then you have prepared a 92 ter summary.

16             MR. JORDASH:  Yes.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Would you please read it into the record.

18             MR. JORDASH:  Sir Ivor Roberts entered the diplomatic service in

19     1968.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  And when reading, could you already slow down.

21             MR. JORDASH:  Certainly.

22             And until his requirement in 2006 was posted to serve in various

23     positions in London, Lebanon, Paris, Canberra, Vanuatu, Madrid, Belgrade,

24     Dublin, and Rome.  In Belgrade, the witness served as British charges

25     d'affaires, then ambassador.  In this role, he had the opportunity to

Page 18646

 1     meet often with Slobodan Milosevic 40 to 50 times over nearly four years.

 2             At the time the witness arrived to the FRY in early 1994,

 3     Milosevic was still smarting 6 c from the Bosnian Serb's rejection of the

 4     Vance-Owen plan.  It was the witness's opinion that Milosevic worked to

 5     bring the Bosnian Serbs under control.  After various fruitless attempts

 6     to get the Bosnian Serbs to accept the contact group's plan, Milosevic

 7     lost patience with the Pale leadership, and reacting from pressure from

 8     the international negotiators, Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, he

 9     ordered the closure of the border between the FRY and Bosnia.

10             The witness further mentioned that Lord Owen had a complex

11     relationship with Milosevic.  He and the witness believed that Milosevic,

12     since accepting the Vance-Owen peace plan, had been engaged in a policy

13     of trying to bring the war in Bosnia to a close and that he was actively

14     looking for a solution to the problems.

15             In his statement the witness notes that Milosevic and Karadzic

16     did not have a good relationship during his time in Belgrade.  Milosevic

17     was humiliated in Pale in 1993 when he tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade

18     the Bosnian Serbs to agree to the Vance-Owen peace plan.  The witness

19     notes that he regard Karadzic as a major stumbling block to his efforts

20     to bring the war in Bosnia to an end, and Milosevic was trying force him

21     from office.

22             The witness also discusses the UN hostage crisis in his

23     statement.  When the witness learned about this matter, he immediately

24     went to see Milosevic and impressed upon him how much he needed the

25     British soldiers out in one piece.  Milosevic assured him that he would


Page 18647

 1     do what he could do get them released.  Later, Milosevic told the witness

 2     that he was sending Stanisic to Bosnia to see Karadzic about resolving

 3     the hostage crisis.

 4             The witness also describes his own experience during the hostage

 5     crisis and the contributions he made to its resolution.  Throughout the

 6     UN hostage crisis, the witness had no meetings with Stanisic; although,

 7     his deputy met him once at a briefing he gave.  More generally, the

 8     witness has only met Mr. Stanisic once.  This meeting involved no more

 9     than a handshake and took place in November/December 1995 at the Belgrade

10     military airport Batajnica.

11             Thank you, Your Honours.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Jordash.

13             I'd like to briefly go into private session.

14                           [Private session]

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 18648











11 Pages 18648-18650 redacted. Private session.
















Page 18651

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15                           [Open session]

16             THE REGISTRAR:  We are in open session, Your Honours.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

18             Ms. Marcus, please proceed.  We are discussing at this moment

19     proposals for more efficient housekeeping session.

20             MS. MARCUS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

21             Yes.  What our proposal essentially was with respect to this --

22     the instant housekeeping session, we made other proposals for in the

23     future how we move forward, suggestions.  But respect to this one we --we

24     prepared a chart as a spread sheet.  We circulated the word version on

25     Wednesday at the same day that we filed the housekeeping submission, and


Page 18652

 1     that was on the 21st of March.  The chart has an empty column for the

 2     Defence to provide their position.  We have included in that chart every

 3     MFI, both Prosecution and Defence, and a few other pending matters that

 4     are not MFI related of which we were aware.  It certainly may exclude a

 5     few -- a few issues, but in my view it's quite extensive.

 6             We have also inputted, since the Defence made a submission last

 7     Wednesday.  We responded on Friday, we've since then inputted into this

 8     chart as well the Defence's position.  But it's quite substantial,

 9     Your Honours.  It's about 100 pages of issues.  But in our -- in the

10     Prosecution's submission, a lot of these issues have been discussed

11     previously, the positions of the parties have already been put on the

12     record numerous times, and it's our view that if this -- if the Defence

13     can either confirm what we've put in there, we've -- if the Defence have

14     put their position, it's in the chart, if they have additional points,

15     they can add it into the chart.  It's very similar to our bar table

16     procedure.  So we left that -- we took that model.

17             And then, Your Honours, our submission is that we would only need

18     to discuss on Wednesday any additional matters for which we haven't

19     already made submissions.  So for these matters which are still pending

20     from the 24th November housekeeping or from the 12th December submission

21     that the Prosecution made, all of those matters can be, in our view,

22     dealt with in correspondence, with the Chamber's leave, before -- before

23     Wednesday, and Wednesday could simply be used for the Chamber to -- to

24     put those -- its -- its decisions on the record, for I would say maybe

25     two-thirds or even three quarters of the issues on the chart --

Page 18653

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Hs the Chamber -- has the Chamber been provided with

 2     a copy of the chart --

 3             MS. MARCUS:  Yes.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  -- with your comments.  Then I'm a bit -- well,

 5     perhaps I'm not totally surprised that they haven't seen it because --

 6     for all kind of reasons.  Is the Defence comment already in it or is

 7     there a new copy to be expected with the Defence comments in it?

 8             MS. MARCUS:  We have not received any response from the Defence.

 9     What we have done is for those issues, which they raised in their filing,

10     we have noted that in our copy --

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

12             MS. MARCUS:  -- because we offered to tender the joint

13     position -- to provide it, not tender it maybe, but to provide it to the

14     Chamber afterwards.  So we have running version that we've kept.  We've

15     inputted what they've said in their submissions, but that only covered

16     maybe 15 or 20 of the documents and the rest are all remaining there.

17     This is just are a proposal, Your Honours, to save us court time.  I

18     don't think it's really necessary to go through it on the record,

19     Your Honour.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Now, whatever the final outcome will be, is the

21     Defence willing to prepare the housekeeping session on the basis of the

22     chart prepared by the Prosecution?

23             MR. JORDASH:  I feel a bit hurt that we haven't been asked if we

24     have done our homework, and we are doing our homework.  It's just a

25     98-page document and we are finalising it, and we will have it filled in

Page 18654

 1     by tomorrow.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  I think we have a common experience what it takes to

 3     go through MFI lists.  That is true for the parties but for the Bench as

 4     well.  When do you think it could be ready?

 5             MR. JORDASH:  I think it should be ready by the end of tomorrow.

 6     I --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Which would leave me the night to further prepare --

 8             MR. JORDASH:  Homework for you, Your Honour.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, yes, yes.  No, I'm just establishing the

10     practical consequences.  If you -- if you have -- would have done half

11     the work, would you be willing already to share the half of that work

12     with us?

13             MR. JORDASH:  Yes.  I mean, what I will do is if I've -- what

14     I've just been told is it's coming to me by early tomorrow morning, so I

15     will undertake to get it to everybody by lunch, if that's satisfactory.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  That would certainly assist, and we'll include this

17     in our preparations for the housekeeping session.

18             Ms. Marcus, did you ever have such a quick success in your

19     initiatives?

20             MS. MARCUS:  I don't think so, Your Honour.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  [Overlapping speakers]  Yes, yes.  I don't expect a

22     serious answer to that.

23             Then we adjourn for the day and we resume Wednesday, the 28th of

24     March, at 9.00 in the morning, in this same Courtroom II where a

25     housekeeping session will be held.

Page 18655

 1                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.48 p.m.,

 2                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 28th day

 3                           of March, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.