Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 3403

 1                           Thursday, 1 July 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning to everybody in the courtroom.  The

 6     witness should be brought in, please.

 7                           [The witness takes the stand]

 8                           WITNESS:  ROBERT FRANKEN [Resumed]

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please be seated.  Good morning, sir.

10             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, Your Honour.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I have to remind you that the affirmation to tell

12     the truth still applies, and Mr. Tolimir is continuing his

13     cross-examination.

14             Mr. Tolimir.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I would

16     like to greet everyone in the courtroom.  May the Lord bring peace to

17     this court, and I hope that today's proceedings will conclude in

18     compliance with divine providence and not according to my wishes.  And I

19     would like to wish the witness a nice and pleasant stay in The Hague.

20                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir:  [Continued]

21        Q.   [Interpretation] Yesterday we looked at the map and you drew a

22     triangle to which you were denied access.  Today let's continue the

23     problems that you faced with regard to the access that you were denied.

24             First of all, can you tell us first why were you forbidden to

25     move within the Bandera Triangle?

Page 3404

 1        A.   Well, that -- that was arranged with the DutchBat II.  They had a

 2     problem there.  The reports were that the VRS came forward in that area.

 3     Bravo, the observation post I showed you yesterday was not manned, and

 4     ABiH wanted DutchBat to man that OP.  CO of DutchBat II decided he was

 5     not able to do that due to the weather.  There was a hell of a lot of

 6     snow, and that was the trigger, in fact, that they said, Okay.  If you

 7     don't man it, then we'll man it ourselves and you're not allowed to come

 8     in that area.  That's, in short, the reason why there was no freedom of

 9     movement in that area.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell the Chamber, please, the date when this

11     blockade was imposed, and if you cannot remember the exact date, can you

12     just tell us the month.

13        A.   Yeah.  This would have been about a week after I arrived, so it

14     would have been the end of January.  More or less around the 20th or

15     25th of January, 1995.  And I take it that you refer to the blockade of

16     the patrols we spoke about yesterday.

17        Q.   That's right.  Thank you.  Let me remind you of an event, but I

18     would like you to tell us what you know about it.  Was that event related

19     to the activities that we discussed yesterday?

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] For that purpose can we please have

21     document 1D32 in e-court.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Can you give the number again?

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  It's

24     1D32, 1D32.  Thank you.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Registrar gave a number, but it was not heard.

Page 3405

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  This is Exhibit D16.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Can you please look at it and as soon as you see the English

 6     version, I'm going to read page 1.  It actually has only one page.  It

 7     was drafted on the 17th of February, which is after the date that you

 8     mentioned, that is after January, and it reads as follows, and I'm

 9     reading the first paragraph:

10             "According to intelligence information, the aggressor is grouping

11     forces and equipment around the demilitarised zones of Srebrenica and

12     Zepa, particularly in the sector of Milici and Vlasenica."

13             This is what you mentioned in your answer as reported to you.

14     This document was signed by Brigade General Enver Hadzihasanovic.

15             Second paragraph reads:

16             "We estimate that the aggressor will start offensive combat

17     operations with the aim of completely overpowering the Milici-Podravanje

18     road and then attempt to seize the territory of the demilitarised zones."

19             The second sentence in the second paragraph:

20             "On the 16th of February, 1995, the aggressor filed a request

21     with UNPROFOR to declare Zepa a non-demilitarised zone with the following

22     rationale:

23              "... helicopter flights have been registered, and I repeat,

24     helicopter flights have been registered.

25             "BH Army have been bringing in ammunition and weapons; secondly,

Page 3406

 1     movement of the BH Army have been registered in the Zepa sector.

 2             Then:

 3             "Accusing members of the Ukrainian Battalion, they're covering up

 4     for the activities and intentions of the BH Army, which is why they're no

 5     longer guaranteed safety."

 6             And the next bullet point:

 7             "On the night between 15th --" I repeat.  "On the night between

 8     15th and 16th February, 1995, our helicopters were seen flying over and

 9     that infantry fire was opened on them."

10             I'm going to skip the next paragraph, and I'll move to the next

11     one:

12             "On the basis of the aforementioned, the aggressor informed the

13     Sarajevo sector and UNPROFOR command that unless Zepa was declared a

14     demilitarised zone, they would start offensive combat operations within

15     seven days.  The ultimatum is for 23rd of February, 1995.

16             "According to report of the Ukrainian Battalion from Zepa, the

17     UNPROFOR BH command took the following actions:

18             "Helicopter reconnaissance of the protected Zepa zone was

19     scheduled for 17 February 1995, but the aggressor did not allow it.

20             "A visit by the Ukrainian Colonel Kozub, deputy commander of," I

21     repeat, "a visit by the Ukrainian Colonel Kozub, deputy commander of the

22     UNPROFOR Sarajevo sector, was announced for 18 February 1995."

23             And so on and so forth.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please scroll down so that

25     we can see what it reads.  Thank you.

Page 3407

 1             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Now, he's issuing an order as

 2     follows:

 3             "Units of the Operations Group 8," which was your zone, "are to

 4     be in full combat readiness enabling them to be fully prepared to resist

 5     a possible attack by the aggressor.

 6             "Units of OG 8 deployed in Srebrenica to be on standby for

 7     co-ordinated action with the 1st Zepa Light Brigade."

 8             We'll skip number 3 and go to number 4 which reads:

 9             "Until the helicopter is evacuated, take full measures for

10     camouflaging it, and security measures as ordered."

11             Number 5:

12             "Should the helicopter be found, in your contacts with UNPROFOR

13     representatives, take the position that its purpose was to transport

14     political representatives of Srebrenica and Zepa who were to take part in

15     the work of the political organs."  Full stop.

16             Thank you.  Now, I purposefully read out this order in order to

17     see that there is a connection between Srebrenica-Zepa, because some of

18     the measures pertain to one and some pertain to the other.  Were you

19     informed by the UNPROFOR command in Sarajevo that the VRS had requested

20     or wanted an ultimatum to seize and suspend all flights, otherwise combat

21     operations would be launched?  Thank you.

22        A.   I did not.  I was not informed.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Have you seen in this order that the forces deployed

24     in Srebrenica were tasked with launching a co-ordinated action in the

25     event of an attack?

Page 3408

 1        A.   Yes, I just read that.  That's correct.

 2        Q.   Can one infer from this order that the VRS did not lie when they

 3     said that supplies had been brought in by helicopters, because this

 4     helicopter crashed in the area of Zepa, and that there was also an

 5     instruction here to the effect of how to camouflage the helicopter.

 6        A.   Well, you can infer anything, but I did not know anything about

 7     that, so I can't really answer your request.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell me were there any helicopter flights

 9     from Tuzla to Srebrenica?  Thank you.

10        A.   I don't know the exact date, but there was a report of, if I

11     remember it correctly, OP Mike, by night there should have been passing a

12     helicopter.  We had been looking for that helicopter or that place where

13     it should have been landed.  We couldn't find it.  We searched the old

14     area directly eastly of Slatina.  It's a village at the western border of

15     the enclave.  But I don't know exactly the date anymore.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Please, can you tell us if there were any attacks, as

17     you said, by the VRS on the enclave which prompted you to set up your

18     OPs?  And I'm talking about the month in which blockade was imposed on

19     you.

20        A.   So we are talking about, say, January, and just for the record,

21     to set up my OPs, my OPs were all 24 hours, seven days a week

22     operational.  So there's no question of setup.

23             You could refer to an incident that took place in that period as

24     well, again a report that the VRS came forward opposed to the

25     Bandera Triangle, and we then sent in to the northern border of that

Page 3409

 1     Bandera Triangle because there is the location we were told that the VRS

 2     came into the enclave.  We made a blocking position with two APCs.

 3     Arriving there, nothing was seen.  There was no contact.  We left them

 4     there about two, three days and then withdrew it.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please now see document

 7     1D30, 1D30, in e-court.  Thank you.

 8             We can see the document in both languages.  I'm going to read it

 9     now.

10             "Due to the situation in the sector of Podgaj, created on the

11     9th of 1995, of which you were informed in a timely manner, the command

12     of the 8th Operations Group has restricted the movement of the UNPROFOR

13     forces in the wider region of Suceska and Podgaj.

14             "At 1100 hours today, the commander of the Dutch Battalion in

15     Srebrenica ordered his patrols to enter the movement restriction area in

16     co-ordination with the commander of the 8th Operations Group.  Respecting

17     the agreement reached with the UNPROFOR liaison officer after the warning

18     was issued not to move in the aforementioned area, the commander of the

19     281st Eastern Bosnia Light Brigade blocked all UNPROFOR controls and is

20     still keeping them blocked.  It was requested by the Dutch Battalion

21     commander that this area immediately be visited by the UNPROFOR commander

22     for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and representatives of the

23     Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Main Staff and the

24     2nd Corps command in order to find a peaceful solution to the situation

25     which has developed in the Podgaj village sector and the wider area of

Page 3410

 1     Suceska, i.e., the area of responsibility of the 281st Brigade.

 2             "We kindly ask that you immediately instruct us on further steps

 3     to take regarding UNPROFOR.

 4             "Commander, Naser Oric."

 5             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   This letter was drafted on the 28th of January, 1995, and my

 7     question is as follows:  Does this refer to the situation that you

 8     described yesterday when you were ordered to leave the triangle?

 9        A.   That's correct, that refers to the patrols I described yesterday.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us now how important that was for ABiH

11     army in Srebrenica, because it appealed to the highest authority in

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that they requested military structures to come

13     and solve this problem.  Why didn't they take up this problem with you?

14        A.   I do not know how important it was for the ABiH, because I think

15     you should ask them.  And they did take up the problem, because yesterday

16     I told you when I proposed my CO that I would go in more massively after

17     that I withdrew on OP Charlie, he said -- he told me to stay in place,

18     and he was negotiating with Naser Oric.  So they took it up with us, but

19     I understand now that he asked for instructions at his higher echelon as

20     well.

21        Q.   Thank you for this caution and recommendation.  At your level and

22     at the level of your commander, did you manage to solve this problem?

23        A.   Well, I was not a part in that negotiation, because I was

24     isolated on OP Charlie, of course, but my CO succeeded in the end to get

25     the freedom of movement for the blocked patrols, and the end of the story

Page 3411

 1     was that the freedom of movement in the Bandera Triangle, that is what is

 2     referred to in your document as the area Podgaj-Suceska, was not

 3     restored.  And as I told you yesterday, during that negotiations UN

 4     withdrew his order to restore that freedom of movement.  So we were back

 5     at the status quo before the patrol started.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us what do you mean when you say the

 7     "United Nations"?  Are you referring to your superior commander or maybe

 8     some higher echelons?

 9        A.   I'm referring to higher echelons.  And I'll try to define that:

10     In this case that was directly Sarajevo who was interfering, but normally

11     our next higher echelon was the HQ of Sector North-east in Tuzla, but

12     the -- Sarajevo oftenly took over from the Sector North-east decisions

13     and guidelines.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Since you were told not to enter the triangle

15     anymore, can you tell the Chamber who took this decision and who it was

16     that was entitled to order UNPROFOR not to carry out all its duties

17     within the area that they were deployed for the purpose of controlling

18     the BH Army?

19        A.   As I understood it, that decision was taken on high level, but

20     then again I don't know.  I suppose that it was in Sarajevo that they

21     accepted the lack of freedom of movement in that angle.  And if your

22     question is who was entitled to order UNPROFOR, in fact, nobody.  Only

23     UNPROFOR itself.

24        Q.   Thank you.  We are going to ask your superiors when they appear

25     here.

Page 3412

 1             Yesterday, you mentioned that you were unable to enter houses and

 2     other premises to seize weapons because in such instances you had to seek

 3     assistance from the police.  Can you describe in more detail to the

 4     Chamber how all this was carried out?

 5        A.   Yes.  I'll try to make it a short story.  We had patrols in the

 6     area and we discovered armed men.  We tried to stop them and confiscate

 7     their weapons.  In a couple of cases that we succeeded, but when they

 8     were succeeding in entering a house, we were not allowed to enter that

 9     house.  That were guidelines from the UN, and then again I'm probably

10     referring to Sarajevo.  So we blocked a house like that.  Then we had to

11     call in, and that means to send a car to Srebrenica, pick up some local

12     police who came to the house, then entered the house, searched it for

13     weapons, I was witness at two of these events, came out and reported,

14     "We couldn't find anything."  So when that happened again and again, we

15     in fact more or less stopped pursuing armed patrols when they were in the

16     neighbourhood of houses 'cause that was their tactic every time, and the

17     local police never found anything.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please tell us, did you reach that agreement

19     with the local authorities or with the OG Srebrenica command, or did you

20     receive instructions from your higher command to act in that manner when

21     you were searching for weapons?

22        A.   Of course we did not have any agreement on that subject, being

23     demilitarising personnel, with local authorities or the 8th OG.  We did

24     not receive instructions.  We reported that to our higher echelon, and,

25     well, they took it for granted more or less in a way when -- when it is

Page 3413

 1     impossible, yeah, okay, it's impossible.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Did you have information about the arrival of weapons

 3     for that period, 1995, when you were down there, how weapons and

 4     ammunition were coming in to the area under your control?  Thank you.

 5        A.   Well, if I recollect correctly, somewhere in April and May we saw

 6     in the distance armed men, and our patrols reported that there were new

 7     weapons.  The problem was that if a patrol -- an ABiH patrol armed was

 8     about 4 or 500 metres away, we could only pursue them by foot and they

 9     ran just as hard, as fast as we could so that was quite a problem.  If we

10     had vehicles, we probably could have blocked them from entering houses

11     and we could have done our job better.  That's the only sign or the only

12     report to which we concluded that obviously there had been some new

13     weaponry in the enclave.  And sorry, how they came in we could only

14     guess.  It could be pony express or whatever.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have on e-court

17     Exhibit 1D31, page 1 both in English and in Serbian.  Thank you.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please don't remove this document from the

19     screen.  Judge Mindua has a question related to this document first.

20             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.  Thank you,

21     Your Honour.  I do have a question to put to the Defence.

22             The document which is currently on the screen, 1D30, dated the

23     28th of January, 1995, is not signed.  Do you have an explanation to give

24     us and why this document is not signed, and what is the source of this

25     document?  This is an extremely important document.

Page 3414

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Mindua -- could the document be

 2     moved slightly left on our screens so we can see the upper right-hand

 3     corner of that document, and then I'll answer your question after that's

 4     been done.  Thank you.

 5             We received the document from the database of the Prosecution, of

 6     the OTP, and the number is DA17-2418 there, so I can't tell you, because

 7     the document took over -- the Defence took over that document from the

 8     database of the OTP.  Thank you.  And it's probably not signed because

 9     this is an incoming document being sent by Paket radio link from

10     Srebrenica to the centre, where it says "Command Kakanj-Tuzla."  So they

11     got it from Tuzla and Kakanj, and that's why they don't -- it doesn't

12     have a signature, because you can't send a signature through Paket link

13     or encoded.  Thank you.

14             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes.  I understand now.  Thank you

15     very much.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.  You were asking

17     for another document.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's right, Mr. President.  I was

19     asking for document ...

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  1D31.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's right.  Thank you.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  For the record, 1D31.

23             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation]

24        Q.   We have the document in both languages on our screens.  This is

25     an order written -- or, rather, it's an interim report of the

Page 3415

 1     13th of July, 1995, sent to the 1st Corps command and forwarded to the

 2     president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Izetbegovic, and it

 3     was sent by the intelligence administration from Sarajevo, the department

 4     for electronic counter-measures section, et cetera, and I'm going to read

 5     the contents.

 6             "Dear Mr. President," it says.

 7             "In view of the situation of our enclaves during the preceding

 8     period, the army General Staff has undertaken a series of military

 9     activities and procedures to organise the members of the army in the

10     enclaves and prepare them for possible developments, primarily the

11     defence of the existing free territory and planned engagement and

12     preparations for future joint operations and planned operations.

13             "Specifically, the following has been done for Srebrenica and

14     Zepa."

15             And then he goes on to list what has been done.

16             "To start with, lethal assets and materiel and technical

17     equipment were brought in on foot in fairly small quantities."  That's

18     the first bullet point.

19             Secondly:

20             "Seventeen helicopter sorties were carried out, in each of which

21     a helicopter was hit.

22             "We sent another helicopter with engineers and mechanics for one

23     of the helicopters that was shot and had remained in Zepa and repaired it

24     successfully, and they both -- both helicopters, returned successfully.

25     The last sortie, unfortunately, ended tragically with the helicopter

Page 3416

 1     coming down near Zepa heliport, where we lost the crew of the helicopter,

 2     nine passengers and the helicopter itself.  Among the passengers of the

 3     four physicians killed, three were specialists.

 4             "That is how in this way we brought back a number of seriously

 5     wounded and brought in and took back 15 from Srebrenica and five from

 6     Zepa, men who had graduated from the Officers' War College.

 7             "In preparations for future operation --" let me repeat.  "In

 8     preparation for a future operation to link up the enclaves, we brought in

 9     and took back four brigade commanders, two brigade chiefs of staff, and

10     the 26th Division Chief of Staff.  The division commander who was meant

11     to go on the next helicopter flight did not return.

12             "After the final flight ended tragically, Naser remained."

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we turn to the next page,

15     please.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Sorry for interrupting you.  Your procedure to

17     read the whole document is very time-consuming.  Is there perhaps another

18     procedure which would shorten taking note of such a document?  If perhaps

19     you indicate which passage is relevant and then the witness could read it

20     in a shorter way, because it is not necessary to have every document as a

21     document and again the content on the screen.  It's only because of the

22     time you will lose for your cross-examination by reading the whole

23     document.  It's more important to get answers from the witness.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  Thank you, Mr. President.  I

25     have understood your guideline.  I'd just like us to look at page 2 where

Page 3417

 1     the assets are listed, the technical -- the materiel and technical

 2     equipment.  So could we look at the columns there, where it says "Zepa,"

 3     "Srebrenica," and then "Total" in the third column.

 4             In the first seven points we can see that what was coming in --

 5     that weapons were coming into Srebrenica and Zepa.

 6             May we see the whole of that document on page 3 of the English so

 7     that the witness can see everything listed.  So the first column is Zepa,

 8     the second is Srebrenica, and the third is the total.  And can we also

 9     have page 4 displayed, the last page where we can see the signature.

10     There's the signature.  "Commander, army General Rasim Delic."  Of course

11     there's no signature there because the document was sent out in encrypted

12     form from the Main Staff of Srebrenica, and they did not have any other

13     means of communication.

14             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Now, my question to you is this:  Does it follow from this

16     document that weapons did come in to Srebrenica where you exerted

17     control?  Thank you.

18        A.   What I see here is an amount of ammunition, et cetera, which is

19     said to be brought to the enclave of Srebrenica.  So yes.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Now, since the army commander is informing the head

21     of state that what we've just said -- seen, all this list, arrived in

22     Srebrenica and Zepa, could you tell us how this materiel came into Zepa

23     in the first place, and could that many weapons have been transported by

24     an individual or must it have been an organised form of supply?  Thank

25     you.

Page 3418

 1        A.   You are asking me how the materiel came into Zepa.  Well, I

 2     really don't know because I was in Srebrenica and did not have contact or

 3     any information from Zepa.  And if these are the real amounts that were

 4     resupplied, you can't do that.  You have to organise it.  It's quite

 5     clear.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  I said "Zepa," but I omitted to add the word

 7     "Srebrenica."  But you saw that there were two columns, Zepa and

 8     Srebrenica, which means that it arrived in both places, more to

 9     Srebrenica than to Zepa because they probably had more need of it.  Thank

10     you.

11             My next question is this, but --

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, first of all, I'd like to

13     have document 1D129 displayed, please.  Thank you.  Thank you.

14             This is the wrong document, but anyway, to save time we'll make

15     use of it.  Well, actually, we have the right document on our screens

16     now, and this is the first page of it.  Final analysis of the Srebrenica

17     and Zepa air-lift, and this analysis was carried out on the

18     17th of February, 1996, that's the date of it, in Zenica.  I apologise.

19     It's the 17th of February, 1995, not 6.  And this was later in the -- in

20     the communications centre where the date is different.

21             May we have page 2 of this document displayed?

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  For the record, we should -- can't do it.  In the

23     original version we have two different years on the first page, 1996, in

24     the heading of that page, and 1995 below this line.  Both 17th of

25     February.  And we have the same in the English translation.  Perhaps

Page 3419

 1     there is just a typo, but you could clarify that perhaps.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Most probably this

 3     document went to the communications centre of the command headquarters in

 4     Kakanj, where the people carrying out the intercepts and the department

 5     for analysis were -- it reached them.  So they might have put 1996

 6     instead of 1995, but we see that this was carried out on the

 7     17th of February, 1995, and that it was strictly confidential under the

 8     following number, from the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it was

 9     compiled by the representative of the commander, Colonel Edin Hrustic,

10     Edin Hrustic.  And when we turn to page 2, we shall see that it says

11     there:

12              "Between the 27th of February, 1993, and the 7th of May, 1995,

13     from the territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina there was an

14     air-lift to meet the needs of the enclave of Srebrenica, Zepa, and

15     Gorazde."

16             And now the third line:

17             "The main aim of introducing and maintaining the air-lift was to

18     transport and ensure combat equipment and the evacuation of the wounded."

19             I'm not going to quote from the document anymore.  So may we now

20     please have page 7 of this document called up.  Thank you.

21             And we see at the bottom down there -- or, rather, under (B), the

22     penultimate paragraph, it says:  10.025 hours of flight, 10.25; GMI fuel,

23     use approximately 8.000, et cetera, transported to Zepa UBS 17 tonnes,

24     [indiscernible] from Zepa, 46 passengers and five wounded.  So this is

25     from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Zepa.  That -- you might conclude that, but if

Page 3420

 1     we look at the document further down, or rather, on page -- let me just

 2     take a moment to find the page so that you can all see it.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 10.

 5             MR. THAYER:  Good morning, Mr. President.  Just a couple of

 6     observations about the document.  The first is, I think we have an answer

 7     as to whether this document was created in 1995 or 1996 based on the

 8     first page we just saw, which described the air-lift operation lasting

 9     through May of 1995.  So I hope the record's clear that we're not talking

10     about a document from 1995 but one that was created after the fall of

11     Srebrenica sometime in 1996 as part of an assessment of -- of what

12     happened.

13             I also note that the hours of flight, as I read it, is 10.25, not

14     a thousand hours of flight as the General suggested or at least was

15     interpreted on our LiveNote.

16             Thirdly, I don't know if there is a supplemental Defence exhibit

17     list for this witness, but I think this is about the fifth document in a

18     row which we've seen which is not on the list that we received.  It's not

19     a big deal.  We can follow along, but if there is a list, we'd appreciate

20     having it so that we know what's coming down the line.  I like to work

21     with hard copies myself.  It's a little bit more difficult to see one

22     page at a time.  So if there is a supplemental list, we'd appreciate

23     getting that because we haven't had any notice of the last four or five

24     documents.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, the Chamber is in the same position.

Page 3421

 1     I didn't find these documents we have seen on the screen in your Defence

 2     list of exhibits, and therefore we are a little bit lost as well.  We

 3     would appreciate to be informed in time about the exhibits you will use

 4     with the witness.

 5             Now please carry on, and indeed, we made the same observation

 6     about the time covered by this document until May 1995.

 7             Please carry on.  Especially put questions to the witness.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  For the record, this --

 9     let me say that this record was obtained from the database of the OTP and

10     we took it over as such, and so I'm now asking questions on the basis of

11     what we see here.  So on page 7, I said that the hours of flight was

12     10.25 hours.  The fuel consumed about 8 tonnes, 200 litres, and that it

13     was transport -- and that to Zepa there were 7 tonnes of lethal weapons

14     transported.  I apologise if I misspoke.

15             Now may we turn to page 10.  The ERN number is 10 -- 10185442.

16     It says here:  "Attachment 1, Flights to Srebrenica."  And now in the

17     final analysis it says, on the 17th of October, [indiscernible] in

18     flight, it says transported outgoing and incoming, lethal weapons, so

19     many tonnes and then 20 tonnes below that.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, we can't follow your citation

21     because we don't have such a date, 17th of October, on the screen.  You

22     should have a look on the screen yourself to find out if this is the

23     right document or right page number.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  That's why I read out

25     the ERN number of the page.  01854422 is the number.  And I read it from

Page 3422

 1     the document that we were provided with.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  On the left side on the screen, but there is no

 3     date of October.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we look at page 9 of the

 5     English, then, please.  Thank you.  It says:  "Attachment number 1,

 6     Flights to Srebrenica."  And it is enough for us to look at the lower

 7     column where it says that lethal weapons were transported, 10 outgoing,

 8     and then 20 tonnes underneath that.  So 10 and 20 tonnes.  The last

 9     column.  And on the way back, 10 tonnes, 20 wounded, and 29 passengers.

10     The total that was.

11             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Now, my question on the basis of that is as follows:  Do you

13     know -- are you aware this was -- that this was transported to Srebrenica

14     as it says in this attachment number 1 relating to materiel going into

15     Srebrenica?

16        A.   The only thing I am aware of is that -- sorry, we -- I described

17     that before.  On one occasion we got a report from Mike, and as I

18     recollect, we had couple of times, two or three times, reports of

19     overflying helicopters, but of course, I was not -- at least I did not

20     know what was in the helicopter, even not if it landed and if where.  One

21     occasion we suspected that to have landed east of Slatina, but I

22     described to you that before.  Problem again was we had to do approaches

23     like that by foot.  If we had vehicles, we could have been quick and

24     perhaps see or establish what happened with that helicopter, but if you

25     try to walk about 5, 6 miles through hilly territory and you try to find

Page 3423

 1     a helicopter just unloading and flying away, that is impossible because

 2     you're about two hours with full equipment on your way to get to the

 3     possible spot where the helicopter landed, and then the bloody thing is

 4     gone already, of course.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Witness, Mr. Tolimir was asking you about

 6     attachment 1.  The dates I see are from the 27th of February, 1993,

 7     through the 30th of March, 1993.  Can you explain anything about this

 8     time period?

 9             THE WITNESS:  About -- sorry, Your Honour?  I did not see that,

10     bit stupid, but no, about the period 1993, of course, I don't know

11     anything.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

13             Mr. Tolimir.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation]

16        Q.   So here we see the final analysis of flights resupplying the

17     enclaves, carrying lethal weapons, and we have the number of tonnes,

18     whenever the equipment was brought in.  And finally I just said and I

19     asked you to answer this:  Is it possible that part of the flights, the

20     17 that we read out earlier on, from Zepa, were bringing in materiel from

21     the federation to Zepa and that later on it was transported by convoy to

22     Sarajevo precisely where you were forbidden movement; right?

23        A.   Sorry, I'm a bit puzzled now.  Probably you mean that materiel

24     was brought to Zepa by helicopter and then by convoy on the ground to

25     Srebrenica, because you said Sarajevo.  And then you asked me would it

Page 3424

 1     have been possible that it came in the enclave through the

 2     Bandera Triangle.  Yes, it is possible, because as I stated before, I did

 3     not have any control over the area called Bandera Triangle.  So what

 4     happened there and what the possibilities were, I can't -- can't deny

 5     that it would have been possible.  That's correct.

 6        Q.   Thank you for correcting me on that point.  You're quite right.

 7     Did the helicopters come from the federation to Zepa and then from Zepa,

 8     by convoy, lethal weapons taken to Srebrenica.  I misspoke if I said

 9     Sarajevo.  I meant Srebrenica.  You said it was possible, because you

10     weren't able to control the area.  So thank you for your answer.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd now like to ask the

12     Presiding Judge to admit these documents, 1D30, 1D32, 1D31, and the last

13     document that we're looking at now, that's on our screens, which was the

14     final analysis, and it was 1D129, which was marked for identification.

15     It was MFI'd as D63.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  That's correct.  It was identified -- marked for

17     identification because the previous witness couldn't say anything about

18     its content and source.

19             Don't you think that we are in the same position now, because

20     this witness is not able to say anything about this content of the time

21     period February and March 1993?  I don't see a background for now

22     tendering and admitting this document.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can you please look at

24     page number 10 in English, because you didn't allow me to show the whole

25     document to the witness.  But before that, can you please look at page 9.

Page 3425

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  To make it very clear, Mr. Tolimir, you say I

 2     didn't allow you to show the whole document.  Of course you are in the

 3     position, you have the right to show a document, the whole document, to

 4     the witness.  I was giving guidance not to read the whole document

 5     because it's time-consuming and you will lose your time for

 6     cross-examination.  Just to make that very clear.

 7             Let's have that page, yes, page 10 --

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you --

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  -- and the corresponding page in B/C/S.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We need the next page in B/C/S,

11     number 11, and the number 10 in English.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It's on the screen now.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We can see here from this survey

14     that the air-lift was in operation in 1995 as well.  We have 31st of

15     December, 1994; 11th of January, 1995; 6th February, 1995; 11th February

16     1995; 19th of April, 1995; 21st of April, 1995; 30th of April, 1995; and

17     7th of May, 1995.

18             And if we turn to next page and so on and so forth, we can see

19     what happened afterwards, but I think this will be sufficient to

20     demonstrate that the air-lift was in operation while the witness was

21     there.  That's why I asked him this question, was it possible that

22     helicopters provided supplies to Zepa and then that convoys carried them

23     to Srebrenica through the Bandera Triangle from which they were banned

24     from carrying out control.  And that was the reason why I wanted this

25     document to be tendered into evidence as an illustration of the

Page 3426

 1     activities that were taking place in the zone.  It's not my fault that

 2     they were unable to control everything.  All he said was they did notice

 3     something going on.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You repeated your question, but there is a

 5     certain omission.  You didn't repeat the answer of the witness.  The

 6     witness told us that he doesn't know anything about that and therefore he

 7     can't deny that it is possible, but I didn't hear that he has any

 8     personal knowledge about that.

 9             Could you tell us what is your personal knowledge about that.

10             THE WITNESS:  If we are referring to the possible move by foot

11     from Zepa into the Bandera Triangle in order to bring in ammo -- sorry,

12     ammunition or weapons, I wouldn't know.  The question was, is that

13     possible or would that have been possible, and that is where I said yes,

14     it would have been possible.  But do I not have knowledge of actual

15     weapon transports in the period I was in Srebrenica through the

16     Bandera Triangle.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And therefore again, Mr. Tolimir, what is the

18     basis of your move to admit this document through this witness?  You

19     should choose another occasion to do that.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I don't

21     need to enter this document into evidence at all.  I cannot get anyone

22     from the air force to confirm that, but the witness said that he was able

23     to see helicopters.  He also saw armed groups of men who would flee to

24     houses whenever they were spotted.  I only asked him about the supplies

25     arriving in the enclave, and I asserted that there was a particular area

Page 3427

 1     in the enclave that was off limits for this witness, and it should have

 2     been controlled under the agreement.  This is all I was asking for, but

 3     it's up to you to decide.  It's all the same to me.  But I think it's in

 4     the interests of all of us involved, including the witness, to arrive at

 5     the truth.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, what is the position of the

 7     Prosecution?

 8             MR. THAYER:  Your Honour, the position of the Prosecution remains

 9     the same.  This issue is not in dispute.  It has never been in dispute.

10     I can tell the Trial Chamber that if -- if General Tolimir wishes to

11     offer this document and any similar document in a bar table motion, for

12     example, the Prosecution will have absolutely no objection to that.  As I

13     stated a couple of days ago when we saw a similar document concerning the

14     helicopter air-lift, this is wasting time to go over and over this

15     material which is not in contest in this case, at least as far as the

16     Prosecution is concerned.  We don't have an objection to the document

17     coming in today, tomorrow, yesterday, or any other day.  We -- we just

18     don't care about it that much, because it is not in contest.

19             Again, as Your Honour has pointed out, it is General Tolimir's

20     decision how to conduct his cross-examination, but I'm appealing on

21     behalf of this witness and future witnesses that we are wasting time.  We

22     just spent 45 minutes on this issue.  He has received the answer that he

23     has received, and again perhaps this is best addressed in a bar table

24     motion or something to that effect, and again we have no objection to

25     this or similar documents.  It's not an issue that weapons were coming

Page 3428

 1     in.  They were coming in by helicopter, they were coming in by pony, they

 2     were coming in on foot to both enclaves.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 4                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Document D63, marked for identification, will now

 6     be admitted as an exhibit, D63.

 7             Could we have the other two documents or even three, 1D31.  It's

 8     for us a problem not to have your move for tendering them at the time it

 9     is on the screen.  So that we should have them back.  1D31, and then we

10     can make a decision.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can you please not

12     remove the document until I've finished my questions.

13             Thank you, Mr. Thayer, and I'm grateful to the witness as well.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, we have now to deal with your

15     request to admit the other documents, and we shall do that now.

16     Otherwise, we forget about that.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  [Previous translation continues] ...

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I had moved for three documents to

20     be admitted that we had previously on our screens.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Now -- yes, wait, please.  Wait, please.  Now I

22     would like to have the English translation.

23                           [Trial Chamber confers]

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D66.

Page 3429

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Now, please, 1D31.  This one will be received,

 2     but we take into account that there are some problems with the date, but

 3     it is referring to the time until May 1995.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  1D31 will be Exhibit D67.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And the third one was, if I remember correctly

 6     1D32.  Let's have it on the screen again, please.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  This is already in evidence as Exhibit D16.

 8                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think we have received your -- the documents

10     you tendered.  Please carry on now.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we please now --

12     D63 that we had on our screens a moment ago, and that -- I'd like to look

13     at page --

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the accused please repeat the number of

15     the page.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 5.  Thank you.

17             Thank you.  We see page 5 in Serbian.  Can we have the

18     corresponding page in English, please.  That's most probably page 6.

19     Thank you.

20             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation]

21        Q.   We see here note in English, which reads:

22             "The air-lift to Zepa was also used to supply the Srebrenica zone

23     and can be considered as an extension of the air-lift for Srebrenica."

24             Thank you.  My question is the following:  Since this is

25     indicated in the final analysis prepared by the ABiH army, the president

Page 3430

 1     of the War Presidency, can you tell us how it was possible that this

 2     should have been considered as an extension of the air-lift from Zepa to

 3     Srebrenica?  How was it possible for it to be used for a continuation of

 4     providing supplies to Srebrenica?

 5        A.   I take it that I, in fact, answered that before and that was when

 6     you asked me to the possibility that air-lift operations into Zepa with

 7     supplies for Srebrenica and then by foot coming in to Srebrenica, and

 8     then I said that that would have been possible, especially through the

 9     Bandera Triangle, because that was an area which I did not control.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please tell us was there a land corridor

11     connecting Zepa and Srebrenica and you were in the latter enclave?  What

12     do you know about that?

13        A.   What do you mean with a land corridor?  There was a land --

14     sorry, could you tell me what you mean with a land corridor.  Of course

15     there was land.  There was normal terrain between Zepa and Srebrenica.

16     If you mean, "Did you know about a certain route they took?"  Well, I

17     answered that before.  I do not, and the only thing is that we had once

18     or twice contact with a pony express coming into the enclave in the

19     south, and I pointed out on the map that that was the reason we

20     established OP Kilo and OP Delta.  I wanted another one but that wasn't

21     possible because we didn't have the material.

22             Is that an answer, sir?

23        Q.   Thank you.  You have answered my question.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at document D61,

25     please.

Page 3431

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Before this document will be removed,

 2     Judge Nyambe has a question for the witness.

 3             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Actually it's a

 4     clarification.  What is a pony express?

 5             THE WITNESS:  Sorry, I -- and I understand your question.  We

 6     discovered that the ABiH or arranged by the opstina, the civil so-called

 7     government of the enclave, there was more or less regularly a kind of

 8     supply convoy in the direction of Zepa and then after they -- it came

 9     back, and they used ponies to carry the load they had.  So we called that

10     the pony express.  I hope that answers your question, Your Honour.

11             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.  It does.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  [Microphone not activated] ... asked for.

13             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14        Q.   We can see document D61 on our screens, and can you please look

15     at paragraph 3.  I'm going to quote only portion of it.

16             The division command issued a strictly confidential order

17     01-33/95, on 18th of May, 1995, to the units that belonged to it.  They

18     were ordered to carry out specific combat tasks in the corridor between

19     Srebrenica and Zepa.  According to this order, the 282nd Mountain

20     Light Brigade, the 283rd, also Mountain Light Brigade, and the

21     285th Light Mountain Brigade shall carry out daily reconnaissance and

22     patrol activities in the corridor in order to protect the corridor from

23     being intersected by the aggressor.  This will be carried out by armed

24     patrols.

25             This order was drafted by the commander or the Chief of Staff,

Page 3432

 1     Ramiz Becirevic, who took over the duty of commander on the 27th of May,

 2     1995, and he sent it the command of the 285th Zepa Brigade.

 3             My question is:  Was the Zepa Brigade securing this corridor as

 4     far as the Bandera Triangle, and from then on it was taken over by the

 5     units from Srebrenica?  Although you didn't have access to this triangle,

 6     do you know in what way this triangle was secured?  And I'm asking for

 7     your opinion as an expert in these matters.

 8        A.   I do not know whether the Zepa Brigade was securing any corridor

 9     because I had no contact with that.  I take it that that brigade was

10     stationed in the Zepa enclave.  Again, again you say, asking my opinion

11     as an expert, that they would come in with that, with contraband and

12     weapons, et cetera, in the Bandera Triangle.  As an expert, I take that

13     highly not impossible but not very likeable because our OP Charlie and

14     the VRS positions were very close together in that area.  We had line of

15     sight in a small valley, and that meant that those transport had to pass

16     that valley.  Unless they came from the south, as I pointed out, one on

17     the many routes in the south, directly north of that mining area, and

18     entered there the Bandera Triangle out of southern direction, which, as

19     an expert, I think is more possible and -- and stop -- is a better

20     possibility.

21             Whether units from the 28th Division took over securing a

22     corridor, I do not know.  Problem is that we found out that they -- when

23     they moved out or in, they did that by night, and it was, by the UN and

24     then again probably Sarajevo, forbidden to us to operate in patrols by

25     night.  We had to stay home.  So I can't answer that in the sense that I

Page 3433

 1     do not know of units of the 28th Division securing any corridor between

 2     Zepa and Srebrenica in the area you meant.

 3        Q.   And you don't know that that was maintained during the daylight

 4     while you were on the ground, but as I said, do you know if that was

 5     going on during the night as well?  And if necessary, I can show you the

 6     map again.

 7        A.   No, I know the map so that wouldn't be necessary.  Sure it was

 8     maintained during the daylight, but we had no access to Serb territory,

 9     and the -- mentioned by you, corridor to Zepa was for us in Serb

10     territory.  So the only thing we could see was the line of sight out of

11     our OPs or what our patrols saw -- said.  And in the south it is a very

12     hilly territory, you know, so my line of sight was very short.  So if

13     they were there in that area, I wouldn't have noticed as long as there

14     was no fighting.

15        Q.   Thank you.  But why do you say that that was the Serb territory

16     of Zepa, because it was the Muslims who were passing through this area

17     trading goods and doing all other kinds of things.

18        A.   Well, then you misunderstood me.  I meant to say that the area

19     between the enclave of Srebrenica and the enclave of Zepa was

20     Bosnian Serb territory.  We were not allowed to patrol in that area, as

21     you know.  So that's why I said when they were busy there and did not

22     actually have fire contact, I wouldn't know because I couldn't see.  I

23     could not observe that area.

24        Q.   Thank you.  I understand what you told us about what you were

25     capable of doing.  I think that with this we have concluded the

Page 3434

 1     discussion about these two subjects.  Now we are going to move to another

 2     topic with which you are familiar.  So we have finished with the subject

 3     of the supplies coming into the demilitarised areas.  And we are going to

 4     conclude the subject of air-lift supplies of weapons for Srebrenica and

 5     Zepa.

 6             Can you tell me are you aware that the Main Staff was sending to

 7     UNPROFOR command in Sarajevo protest letters because of the helicopter

 8     flights that were going on, and against providing supplies to these

 9     zones, and I'm talking about the year of 1995, while you were there.

10        A.   I take it that you mean with the Main Staff, the Main Staff of

11     the VRS, and I am not aware or was not informed that protests like that

12     were sent.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Therefore, you were never told from Sarajevo about

14     the reasons that the VRS was alleging that these zones were not

15     demilitarised and why they were putting up ultimatums that they were

16     going to secure demilitarisation of these zones themselves.  So you are

17     saying that you know nothing about that.

18        A.   That's correct.  Just -- I have to add something, sorry.  In

19     the -- I take it it was the 10th or 11th of July, there was an ultimatum

20     from the -- to the -- sorry, from the VRS to DutchBat which started with

21     the verb:  "You did not demilitarise the zone, so we are taking up that,"

22     but that's the only time I was confronted with these words and they came

23     not from UN Sarajevo.  They came from the VRS, by radio, during the end

24     phase, so to say, in the enclave.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us, do you believe that combat

Page 3435

 1     operations were conducting there precisely by the army of the VRS in

 2     order to separate these two enclaves?  Can you also tell us in what way

 3     did you receive information from your command regarding reactions from

 4     the parties involved?

 5        A.   Just to be sure that I understand the question well, which period

 6     do you mean that these actions by the army or operations, combat

 7     operations, by the VRS in order to separate those two enclaves?  Do you

 8     refer to the period before the end of attack or do you refer to the

 9     attack?

10        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please answer the second part of my question.

11     In what way did you receive information about the response by the parties

12     involved to the activities in the zones under your control?  And I'm

13     talking about the protests that were being sent to your command in

14     Sarajevo.  Thank you.

15        A.   Again, I told you that I didn't know about the protests, so I was

16     not informed by my higher echelon, the UN, about protests.  And as a

17     consequence, I did not know what measures they took.  If the question

18     goes that far that you ask, "Did you get special guidelines about the

19     contents of protests," no, but again, I didn't hear about those protests.

20     Exchanged between Main Staff and UN Sarajevo, I mean.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Now, could you tell us whether the Dutch Battalion

22     had information about the fact that there was an imminent attack against

23     the enclave?

24        A.   In fact, no.  We got a report -- the only thing that pointed in

25     that direction was a report by UNHCR who came in pretty nervously with a

Page 3436

 1     convoy and told us that they saw three Tango 55s and some artillery

 2     moving along the road with amount of troops.  And that's the only thing I

 3     knew or, say, more or less warning I got.  We didn't get that far that,

 4     as a consequence of the movement of three main battle tanks and some

 5     artillery, we did not conclude that there was an attack imminent.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Does that mean that you didn't have a plan, or

 7     perhaps you did have a plan, in case there were to be an attack against

 8     the enclave?  Thank you.

 9        A.   There was a plan but not triggered by -- by any events.  Pretty

10     early we already made a plan where, for instance, the blocking positions

11     Bravo A1 till 4, we'll speak of that, I suppose, later, were reccy'd and

12     planned but that's about it.  Oh, no, there was a blocking position

13     planned at the north side, say, just north of the HQ of the DutchBat in

14     Potocari.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have on e-court D20,

17     page 17, paragraph 248.  Thank you.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I think this could be a convenient

19     time for the first break before we move to the next document.  If you

20     agree, we should have the first break now, but before we do that, I have

21     to correct myself.  My comment on different dates, on page 26, lines 9 to

22     10 was related to document D67, but that was a mistake.  It -- the

23     problem with the dates was in the document D63.

24             We have our first break now and resume at 11.00.

25                           --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

Page 3437

 1                           --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Tolimir.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I asked

 4     for a document on e-court.  D20 was the number, page 17, paragraph 2.48.

 5     It's a report on Srebrenica based on debriefing conducted in Assen in

 6     1995.  And there we have the paragraph, 2.48, and this is what it says:

 7             "The commander of the Dutch Battalion assumed that the BiH forces

 8     in the event of a large BiH offensive would try, when DutchBat left the

 9     observation posts, to confiscate weapons and vehicles with the use of

10     force if necessary.  He expressly requested the BH Army in the enclave,

11     after the aforementioned loss of the observation post, for sufficient

12     freedom of movement to be -- to implement DutchBat's operation plan in

13     the event of a BSA offensive.  The plan consisted of falling back to

14     blocking positions which were to seal off the access roads to the towns

15     of Srebrenica and Potocari.  These blocking positions, incidentally, were

16     only able to discourage the BSA and had scarcely any military import as

17     the white infantry fighting vehicles stood virtually in the middle of the

18     road without any other form of protection.

19             "Apart from an arrangement that the BiH would occupy positions

20     between the observation posts, no co-ordination took place between

21     DutchBat and the BiH regarding the response in the event of an offensive

22     by the BSA.  The aforementioned arrangement was to prevent the BiH from

23     taking up a position immediately in front of or behind an observation

24     post, thus attracting BSA fire and endangering the observation post."

25             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation]

Page 3438

 1        Q.   Now, my question to you is this:  From what we've just read out,

 2     from this paragraph, we can see that there was an operation plan on the

 3     part of the DutchBat if there were to be a BSA attack on the enclave.

 4     Can you tell us when this plan came into being, what period of time?

 5     Thank you.

 6        A.   If I -- as I stated before, that would have been made somewhere

 7     around March.  Not with the direct cause but just what you do is, in a

 8     situation like that, being a soldier, you look for eventualities and try

 9     to prepare a response on that.  And in that sense, one of the

10     eventualities was an attack by the VRS, and that's why we -- did --

11     sorry, did reconnaissance, the positions Bravo 1 till 4 and a position

12     north of the HQ as mentioned before.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Would you please tell us now whether during the

14     attack by the Army of Republika Srpska in Srebrenica, whether that

15     UNPROFOR operative plan was put into effect.  Thank you.

16        A.   In fact, it was.  At least we tried, but due to hostile fire we

17     had to adjust some positions.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Could you tell us now whether you had any knowledge

19     or tell us about what you knew then between the clashes between Muslim

20     armed formations amongst themselves, what you knew about that and if you

21     did, and whether there was any mention of that during the debriefings.

22     Thank you.

23        A.   To answer your first question, yes, I was aware, and I knew there

24     were clashes between Muslim armed formations and the VRS.  OPs reported

25     to me battle noise in different -- in several areas.  Personally, we

Page 3439

 1     could report or see artillery impacts, artillery firing, mortar firing.

 2     That was mentioned, as far as I know, during the debriefings, if you mean

 3     the debriefings that took place in Holland afterwards, after we returned

 4     from Bosnia.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 7             THE ACCUSED:  [Interpretation] May we now have page 38 displayed,

 8     please, of this same exhibit, D20, that we see on our screens.  Thank

 9     you.

10             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Before we deal with the next paragraph, just tell me this:  The

12     UNPROFOR command, with whom did it reach an agreement about this plan to

13     block the axes of attack from the Army of Republika Srpska?  Thank you.

14        A.   If you mean by the UNPROFOR command, the staff in Sarajevo, I

15     don't have a clue.  And I doubt whether there was an agreement with

16     anybody, because it was a battalion plan, and just in the -- in the

17     course of what we call contingency planning.  You -- as I said, you

18     considered possibilities or possible events and tried to plan and make a

19     reaction on that, whether they come, these events really will occur or

20     not, that's a normal military procedure.

21             And again to be clear, in that period I was, in fact, on an

22     island, away from any information or very little information.  So my --

23     my helicopter view, so to say, was very limited, limited to the area of

24     Srebrenica, and I don't have any idea what UNPROFOR staffs discussed with

25     whoever, VRS or even BiH.  I was not informed about that.  So again, it

Page 3440

 1     was contingency planning, and there was not an agreement with anybody

 2     about that.  It was an order within the battalion, and I don't have the

 3     custom of discussing that with half the world.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  I quoted the last portion of the paragraph we looked

 5     at a moment ago, and I needed that for me to be able to ask my question,

 6     and I'd like to repeat the following sentences:  Except for the

 7     arrangement for the BH Army to take up positions between the observation

 8     posts, between the DutchBat and the BH Army there was no co-ordination.

 9             So did I understand this correctly?  Was there an agreement

10     whereby they would occupy positions, and if so, who was the agreement

11     reached between, because that's what this seems to refer to?  Thank you.

12        A.   There was an agreement that they would take positions between the

13     OPs, and the agreement was between me, being the DCO of DutchBat by

14     consent of the CO, of course, and the Chief of Staff of the

15     28th Division, Mr. Ramiz.

16        Q.   Thank you.  It says here that there was no longer any

17     co-ordination as far as possible attacks against the enclaves existed,

18     that there was no co-ordination with the Muslims.  Is that right?

19        A.   The only thing we agreed upon was that in case of that attack,

20     they would take positions between our OPs, our observation posts, and the

21     very moment they would leave their positions they would inform the local

22     OP commander.  That's all.  Further co-ordination didn't take place.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have on e-court 1D29.

25     Thank you.  Thank you.  We can see it now.

Page 3441

 1             This is an order of the 4th of June, 1995, that is to say, a

 2     month before the events we're talking about took place, written by -- or

 3     signed by corps command -- the corps commander and sent to Srebrenica to

 4     the 28th Division, and I'm going to read its contents out.

 5             "I hereby command," point 1 -- "I hereby order:

 6             "Occupy the unoccupied and abandoned Dutch Battalion observation

 7     posts with our forces and establish defence lines behind them on the same

 8     level facing the aggressor forces."

 9             So that is linked to your observation post.  Now:

10             "2.  Monitor the Dutch-controlled observation posts and organise

11     elements of defence, combat formation, behind them in order to eliminate

12     potential negative consequences which might arise should the aggressor

13     take control of the observation posts.

14             "3.  Continuously monitor the activities of the aggressor and the

15     Dutch Battalion and immediately inform the 2nd Corps Command of any

16     changes or new intelligence.

17             "5.  The tasks shall be carried out immediately ..."

18             And the signature is Commander Brigadier Sead Delic.

19             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Now, my question is this:  Did you know, were you aware of the

21     fact that the agreement you had was in part contained in this order on

22     taking over your positions and observation posts by the BH Army?  Thank

23     you?

24        A.   I was not aware that they had ordered to occupy abandoned Dutch

25     observation posts, but in that time, the only observation post that was

Page 3442

 1     abandoned or was taken over by the VRS was, in fact, Echo, because the

 2     day before Echo fell.  More or less the agreement I had with the Chief of

 3     Staff of the 28th Division is contained in this order.  There's just one

 4     annoying detail that he orders them to take positions behind us while we

 5     co-ordinated they would have the positions on our flanks, so in the same

 6     line.

 7        Q.   In the second line of this point it says:

 8             "To set up a defence line behind or in the same line with -- on

 9     the same level facing the aggressor forces," at the level of your

10     observation posts.

11             Can you see that that is what it says there?  Thank you.

12        A.   Yes, I can.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender document

15     1D29.  Thank you.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D68.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Can you tell the Trial Chamber now if, on the same level as you

21     you have the BH Army forces, can the Army of Republika Srpska, at the

22     time of the attack, differentiate between you and members of the BH Army;

23     and how would it know what your intentions were and what the BH Army's

24     intention were?  Thank you.

25        A.   They could differentiate because there it was obvious that we

Page 3443

 1     were just confined to the location of the OP and that was obvious what

 2     was OP and not.  I described to you before that they were painted white,

 3     et cetera, and open and bare.  The trenches of the ABiH were not exactly

 4     next to the OPs.  There was always a space about 20, 50 metres, and

 5     sometimes they were behind us.  So I don't think it would be -- it would

 6     have been a big problem to see what is ABiH and what is an OP.  Whether

 7     they were aware of our intentions, as far as I know, the VRS knew that we

 8     would defend our OP in case of an attack.  I suppose that answers your

 9     question.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Just tell us, for the purposes of Trial Chamber and

11     the record, whether BH Army members were on the same level or same

12     defence line with your observation posts according to the plan that was

13     compiled in March, as early as March.

14        A.   That co-ordination about being in line with us was later than

15     March, and March was our contingency plan for the blocking positions,

16     just for the record.  On some spots they were on the same line, but for

17     instance, Echo and Foxtrot, they were not in the same line and not even

18     within 100 metres of the OP.  Echo, there was BiH position on the high

19     grounds directly left of the OP.  But then again, the ABiH fought out of

20     trenches and we did not.

21        Q.   Thank you.  I asked you this in view of the fact that your

22     operations plan provided for you to be in the middle.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, may we have 1D20 once again on

24     our screens, please.  Paragraph 13.  It's page 46 of this debriefing.

25             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the paragraph number be repeated.  Thank

Page 3444

 1     you.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  For the record, this is D20.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   You have -- you have been able to read this.  I'll read it for

 6     the record.

 7             "At 15 metres from -- BiH soldiers complete with blue caps or

 8     blue hats came within a distance of 15 metres from one of the observation

 9     posts.  Resembling UN personnel, they opened fire from the position in

10     the direction of the BCA [as interpreted] front line so that it seemed as

11     if the UN had opened fire.  In this way, they attempted to draw fire from

12     the BSA on the observation post and thus involve DutchBat in the combat

13     actions."

14             So this is from the debriefing report.  Could you now tell us

15     whether you have information on what observation post this is here.

16     Which one does it refer to, for the record?  Thank you.

17        A.   Yeah.  First the period was before, as far as I can see, because

18     I can't see that the contacts are not -- this is not given a time or a

19     period that it happened, but I think it refers to some incidents that

20     happened mostly at OP Alpha where, before the attack, the ABiH some -- at

21     some occasions did this trick.  I was witness of one -- one time that it

22     happened.  But as far as I know, this was before the attack.

23        Q.   Thank you.  And can you tell us roughly how many days before or

24     was it during combat action?  Why would they do this if there wasn't any

25     combat action?  There must have been some combat situation.  Can you

Page 3445

 1     remember anything about that?  Thank you.

 2        A.   To answer your first question how many days, well, incidents like

 3     this happened in April and May, and the incident I described at OP Alpha

 4     would have been end of April, probably, but then again I do not remember

 5     the exact date.  And why they did that, I don't know.  Probably to -- to

 6     bring DutchBat in a bad position towards the VRS or what, but that is

 7     guessing.  I don't know.  Ask them.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  I'd like you to tell us whether there were persistent

 9     endeavours on the part of the BH Army in Srebrenica to involve UNPROFOR,

10     as you said a moment ago, in the conflict with the Army of Republika

11     Srpska.  Thank you.

12        A.   Well, the endeavours they did were creating incidents like this,

13     and there was not a pattern.  It happened once in awhile, but there was

14     not a clear pattern as far as the location where it happened or the

15     period or the amount of incidents.  It was random.

16        Q.   Since in battle death can occur within moments, can you tell us

17     what you did to prevent this from happening, and did you take any steps

18     to prevent it?  Thank you.

19        A.   Yes, of course, we protested at the staff of the 28th Division

20     with, as far as I could see, no result.  In the case I was witness of an

21     incident like that, I had one of my machine-guns open overhead fired from

22     a flank and they ran away.  The VRS did not respond on that, because

23     probably they could see what was happening.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have page 2478

Page 3446

 1     displayed, please.

 2             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Or, rather, I'd like to draw your attention to what I'm going to

 4     read out from page 278 from the Popovic trial, lines 19 to 23, and I'm

 5     going to quote what you said there in the transcript.

 6             "Foxtrot -- after the Foxtrot incident -- or, rather, the killing

 7     [Realtime transcript read in error "willing"] of one of my soldiers, we

 8     ordered the observation posts to -- and positions to withdraw only when

 9     given permission to do so.  Only if there were some sort of agreement

10     reached with the local Muslim commanders, because we wished to prevent

11     any more soldiers being shot by the Bosnian Army."

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think there is a correction needed in the

13     transcript on page 42, line 23, the first word should read "killing"

14     instead of "willing."

15             Please continue.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

17             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation]

18        Q.   My question was this:  When this was going on -- or, rather, when

19     did this happen?  Was it before or after the green order had been given?

20        A.   It was before the green order had been given.  Yes, the day

21     before.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Now, a moment ago, in that quotation I read out, you

23     said that some sort of agreement with the -- you mentioned some sort of

24     agreement with the local Muslims.  Did you mean to say that you had

25     co-ordination with them, that you co-ordinated your activities with

Page 3447

 1     theirs, and didn't you think that that might be suspect, this

 2     co-ordination of activities in the field?  Thank you.

 3        A.   Well, I meant to say exactly what I said.  After the event of the

 4     killing of one of my soldiers and immediately -- having experience with

 5     lack of discipline of commanders, local commanders, to obey orders from

 6     the 28th Division, I gave that order to the OP commander that if he, on

 7     that spot, on that very moment, could co-ordinate with the local BiH

 8     commander that he was starting to move, that was one of the conditions

 9     that he could get permission to withdraw.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11        A.   The transcript says, "this is one of the positions," the

12     "positions" must be "conditions."

13        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us if this movement on the battle-field

14     between you and the Muslims, if you are advancing, they're advancing, and

15     vice versa, could be perceived as if you were conducting a joint action

16     against the VRS and that the VRS was actually your target?

17        A.   First a remark.  The question is not advancing but withdrawing,

18     and, of course, it could have been seen as a joint action, and in case of

19     an attack by the VRS, don't let that be any misunderstanding, the VRS was

20     our target.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us this:  When this soldier of yours was

22     killed by the Muslims, how far was the killer from him?  Thank you.

23        A.   About 3, 4 metres, as was reported to me.  It happened when they

24     crossed the obstacles the Muslim forces had laid on that road, and the

25     Muslim soldiers were quite close next -- or standing at that barrier.

Page 3448

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please now look at paragraph 4.14.  Thank

 2     you.  It reads as follows:

 3             "It also transpired that the BiH soldiers were not always

 4     recognisable as military personnel.  Men who had previously been seen in

 5     uniform fighting in the southern section of the enclave were recognised

 6     by DutchBat personnel, when the former had mingled, in civilian clothing,

 7     among the refugees moving from Srebrenica to Potocari or when they were

 8     on the compound in Potocari.  Local women, known to be members of the

 9     BiH, were also seen later in civilian clothing."

10             Thank you.  Can you please explain to the Trial Chamber what kind

11     of difficulties you encountered because these individuals appeared in

12     your vicinity in civilian clothing, including women who were members of

13     the BH Army and who also appeared attired as civilians?  Can you tell us

14     something more about this situation?

15        A.   Yes.  Well, simply it is what the -- what the document says.  I

16     was reported by soldiers of B Company that men they saw before fighting

17     the VRS, they recognise -- in partial uniforms, they recognised them

18     in -- when the civilian people came to Potocari, they recognised them in

19     the crowd.  Then they were in civilian.  And as far as the women are

20     concerned, as I remember well, it concerned two young women who were seen

21     in uniform before and later on when, well, Srebrenica -- I'm sorry.  When

22     Srebrenica was -- had fallen, they were seen in civil clothes in the

23     crowd at the bus station.  So it's just what the document says.

24        Q.   Thank you.  We shall go back now to this event regarding

25     co-ordination and co-operation.  It is obvious that you were forced to

Page 3449

 1     co-ordinate and co-operate on the ground, and in that respect I would

 2     like us to look at paragraph 3.58.  It's on page 38.  Thank you.

 3             "On Monday, 10th of July, the commander of the OP M received

 4     orders from the C Company commander to co-ordinate with the BH.  That

 5     evening, fighting broke out amongst the BiH soldiers, resulting in dead

 6     and wounded.  At around noon on Tuesday, the 11th of July, a number of

 7     shells struck the area near the armoured vehicle.  The abandoned OP was

 8     also shelled.  Chaos prevailed among the BiH forces.  Internal fighting

 9     broke out once again.

10             "That evening, the OP crew were permitted to leave because they

11     were willing to take the wife and children of a local BH leader with

12     them.  When the two BiH soldiers with the antitank weapons attempted to

13     prevent their departure, they were shot in the head by the BH Army

14     leader.  This led once again to fighting between the BiH soldiers.

15             "On the route to Potocari, they picked up many refugees.  They

16     came under fire on two more occasions.  At 01.30 hours on Wednesday, the

17     12th of July, they arrived in Potocari where they joined the B Company

18     positions to the south of the compound."

19             After reading this paragraph, I will kindly ask you to tell me

20     what you know about this fighting which resulted in the killing of your

21     soldier and which was described in the debriefing report, based on what

22     you know about the incident?

23        A.   Well, it's exactly the text in that debriefing report.  That is

24     what I know about it.  That's the same content as was reported by

25     C Company commander to me.

Page 3450

 1             I have one remark.  Your conclusion was that it was necessary for

 2     me to co-ordinate and co-operate on the ground.  Just to be clear, that

 3     co-operation existed purely by an OP commander who saw or called the

 4     local BiH commander and said, "I want to go there.  Do you agree?"

 5     That's it.  So there's not a big meeting or -- just one remark or two

 6     questions of an OP commander.

 7             But again, back to your last question, I knew about this event

 8     and it was reported to me exactly as written down here.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Is it then true that the C Company commander

10     co-ordinated his activities on the battle-field and his movements in

11     agreement and with co-ordination with members of the ABiH?

12        A.   Now, again, the level of co-ordination is here the OP commander

13     of OP Mike, and to make clear why that happened, a period preliminary to

14     this event, the OP Mike was shelled by the VRS, and they got my

15     permission to withdraw about 4, 500 metres to the edge of the village, as

16     I remember well, in Jaglici.  And that is where this happened, because

17     C -- commander C Company wanted that APC on another position as it was,

18     but then he was not allowed in the beginning by the local BiH to do so

19     and threatened with the two antitank guns where the message speaks about.

20     So again, here it was a co-ordination.  A big word for just a question of

21     the OP commander to the local BiH commander, "I want to move down there.

22     Do you agree?"  Or just the message that, and then you saw the reaction

23     of the local BiH.

24        Q.   Thank you.  This might become clear if you look at a practical

25     example.

Page 3451

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please look at P567, page 2

 2     in English, last paragraph.  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, could you repeat the number, please.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  It's -- it's P607,

 5     P607.  Thank you.

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please switch on your microphone, Mr. Tolimir.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 9             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Can you please look at page 2.  Last paragraph in English, and

11     page 3 in Serbian, where you say as follows:

12             "The BH members threatened to shoot at our soldiers if they left

13     their observation post, which then happened.  That was how a Dutch

14     soldier came to be killed by the BH Army.  It happened with a dumdum

15     bullet.  I believe that shooting at UN personnel with a shotgun is a war

16     crime.  It was clearly proven what kind of ammunition was used in the

17     shooting of the soldier.  I gave the X-ray pictures to the military

18     police."

19             This is my question:  Was the Dutch Battalion exposed to threats

20     from the BH Army, and whether they used weapons, I mean BH Army members

21     used weapons in order to threaten lives of the UN personnel?

22        A.   On several occasions in the end phase where we tried to move our

23     APCs to positions we thought were correct, and one of the situations was

24     just described at Mike, OP Mike, we were threatened by the local BiH

25     soldiers with mostly an antitank weapon or with light weapons.  That is

Page 3452

 1     correct.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  When you speak here about dumdum bullets and after

 3     that about a shotgun, are you referring here to dumdum bullets whose use

 4     was prohibited by -- by the first Hague conference, 1899, because this is

 5     the bullets that disintegrate within a human body, or are you talking

 6     about something completely different?

 7        A.   No.  I'm talking about dumdum bullets.  And how the word

 8     "shotgun" came in, because shotgun is something else, I do not know.  I

 9     got reports from my dressing station, my hospital, when van Renssen died.

10     They made X-ray pictures, and their conclusion was that it had to be done

11     by not normal ammunition.  We looked at that and with a demolition

12     expert, and we came to the conclusion that they used dumdum bullets.

13             Being convinced of the fact that that should be considered as --

14     as a war crime, I handed the X-rays to the military police detachment.

15        Q.   Thank you for this clarification, because I didn't quite

16     understand what the correlation was here, but earlier on I asked you

17     about the green order.  Now I'm asking you was it you who issued this

18     order?

19        A.   Within the battalion it was, but the base of that order was the

20     order of the UN, being Sarajevo, to defend Srebrenica with all means.

21     And translating to my level, that order, the written green order to

22     B Company went out.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please tell the Trial Chamber whether the

24     issuing of the green order implies that UNPROFOR soldiers simply took

25     sides, and that is to say they took side with those who were defending

Page 3453

 1     Srebrenica.  Yes or no?

 2        A.   I did not take side.  I was ordered as a UN unit to defend the

 3     city, and there was a party that was doing the same, of course, but we

 4     didn't take side in the literal word or meaning of those words.  I had --

 5     I could not order the means of the ABiH or anything.  I had just my own

 6     means to defend the city according to the order of UN Sarajevo.  And

 7     that -- we had a common enemy, common, I mean the ABiH and the UN at that

 8     time, is correct.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Does that mean that UNPROFOR and ABiH fired each from

10     their own weapons at the VRS?

11        A.   That's correct.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Can you explain to the Trial Chamber, did the green

13     order mean that an engagement in combat operations should be undertaken

14     regardless of what was contained in blue, red, and other orders?

15        A.   I do not know whether I understand your question correctly, but

16     it meant that, for instance, the rules of engagement given to us before

17     as a UN unit, one of our problems we were only to use our weapons in

18     self-defence, were ruled out and we went back to the rules of engagement

19     of an army, any army, in combat.

20        Q.   Thank you for clarifying this.  Can you tell us now, please, were

21     you already a legitimate target of those whose lives you threatened

22     through these combat operations, as you described them?

23        A.   As of the issuing of the green order, we were in combat with the

24     VRS, and the VRS was a target for us, and in fact the opposite is -- is

25     realistic and true as well.

Page 3454

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please switch on your microphone, Mr. Tolimir.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Thank you.  You have explained this in a fair and correct way,

 5     meaning that one side is entitled to use weapons against the side

 6     threatening their lives.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please now tender

 8     Prosecution document 65 ter 104.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Let us know which document this is.  We have

10     another document on the screen.  Are you tendering that?

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 104, Prosecution document.

12     Thank you.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And what is it about?  I don't know if you have

14     it on the screen.  I have no idea.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I meant to have it on e-court.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You mean the document on the screen now?

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no.  Instead of this document,

18     can we now please have on e-court 65 ter 104.  Thank you.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  That was perhaps a misunderstanding

20     because you said, "I tender this document."

21             You have it now on the screen.  Please carry on.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation]

24        Q.   We have the document here, the document which was sent to the

25     Drina Corps -- or, rather, by the Drina Corps, on the 8th of July, to all

Page 3455

 1     its units that were engaged in operations in Srebrenica.  It reads:

 2             "The UNPROFOR command in Sarajevo has filed a protest note with

 3     the Main Staff over operations against UNPROFOR observation point 652808

 4     (UNPROFOR map, near Zeleni Jadar).  They emphasised that their point was

 5     captured by artillery and tank action.  The Main Staff of the VRS

 6     answered that the Drina Corps command had been informed that the Muslims

 7     were using six armoured personnel carriers painted white and bearing

 8     UNPROFOR markings and that the Muslims were -- had started offensive

 9     operations from Srebrenica in order to join up the enclaves of Srebrenica

10     and Zepa.

11             "The RS Main Staff demanded that UNPROFOR warn the Muslim forces

12     to withdraw to within the borders of the demilitarised zones and stay

13     marked on the map in accordance with the agreement, and disarm them in

14     accordance with the agreement.  The Main Staff also demanded that

15     UNPROFOR not set up observation points outside the marked demilitarised

16     zones.

17             "The Main Staff has ordered you not to attack UNPROFOR but to

18     prevent any possible surprises and stop the Muslims in their intention to

19     link up Srebrenica with Zepa.

20             "Good luck in war and best regards from General Tolimir."

21             This is a telegram of the Main Staff conveyed by General

22     Milenko Zivanovic to all units and signed by him.

23             Can you tell us whether you were aware of the fact that the

24     Main Staff had sent a protest note to UNPROFOR about the use by the

25     Muslims of vehicles painted white and bearing UNPROFOR markings?  Do you

Page 3456

 1     know anything about that?

 2        A.   No, I do not know anything about that protest.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  So you know nothing about the protest.  That means

 4     that from the sector command, because our headquarters had links with

 5     your command, I assume -- well, did they convey anything to you as

 6     observations made from the Main Staff of about the -- what was going on

 7     in the area that you controlled and their conduct?

 8        A.   If you mean our headquarters being the Main Staff, again I did

 9     not get any information that there -- of allegedly offensive of the ABiH

10     in the area south of the enclave, nor did I get any reports from my OPs

11     that could indicate that.

12        Q.   And can you tell us whether you knew anything at all or whether

13     any checks were carried out on your part to the effect that the

14     Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska was issuing warnings that the

15     Muslims were using six APCs painted white?

16        A.   I do not recollect that that incident within this -- this

17     framework.  I know that in -- anywhere in April, I got a report of one of

18     my OPs.  They reported two BTR-60s, being eight-wheeled APCs, painted

19     white, coming out of southern direction and driving into the enclave at

20     pretty high speed.  We tried to catch them but -- or to confirm that they

21     were there, but we -- afterwards we never found them again, and during

22     the attack we never ourselves saw that the ABiH used APCs.  But this

23     story about the, what was it, six APCs, armoured vehicles, is unknown to

24     me.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 3457

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have on e-court 1D207,

 2     please.  It's a document entitled "Interview with Franken," dated the

 3     31st of March, 1999.  The document exists only in English, and it was

 4     disclosed to the Defence by the Prosecution a few days ago.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, are you tendering the last document

 6     as an exhibit?

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Yes, I

 8     am tendering it.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D69.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  Please carry on.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's now see document 1D207,

13     please.  We have it on our screens.  Thank you.

14             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Now, since the document is in English and you were able to see

16     what it's about, I said it was your interview, can you tell me if you

17     remember having given that interview and, if so, to whom?  Thank you.

18        A.   I'm sorry, but I don't have the faintest idea.  I see here a

19     text, probably gave that interview, but be aware of the fact that when we

20     came back there were numerous committees, investigations, et cetera, so I

21     do not know - I can't see it on the document as well - to whom this

22     interview is given.  I see that the tape recording failed and the text is

23     a reconstruction of the discussed, but I'm sorry, I can't recollect to

24     whom this was.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Perhaps we can see the headline and the last page

Page 3458

 1     of it.

 2             THE WITNESS:  I can see the headline, and as far as I can see the

 3     first page until point 13.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That you.  That's sufficient for

 5     the Defence.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

 7             MR. THAYER:  I can provide some background to this document,

 8     Mr. President, and this was also clarified for the Defence when we sent

 9     it over.  Pursuant to a specific request from one of the accused in the

10     Popovic case, we undertook considerable effort to obtain various

11     interviews from the Dutch Institute for War Documentation.  You're heard

12     references to the NIOD report.  That's the acronym for the Dutch version

13     of the name I just stated.  So in connection with that specific request

14     in the last case, we obtained various statements that were disclosed to

15     us by NIOD.  NIOD went ahead and deleted certain sections of various

16     interviews based on their own criteria, and those interviews turned up

17     during the course of our regular database searches in preparation for the

18     witnesses so we turned that over.  But this is a NIOD apparently

19     conducted interview from March of 1999.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you for that clarification.

21             Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you to Mr. Thayer, and thanks

23     to the witness, because even before I asked my question, he said that he

24     did have some knowledge about these two transporters.  I'm not going to

25     debate the point, because he was sincere and frank in his answer.  But

Page 3459

 1     can we take a look at paragraph 1 now, please.

 2             It says here:

 3             "The BH Army smuggled two armoured transporters, armoured cars,

 4     BTR armoured cars, into the enclave via the north."

 5             It says "north" here.

 6             "There was notified by a Dutch OP, observation post.  They were

 7     never found, those two vehicles.  Later it became clear that the

 8     Ukrainians in Zepa were missing a total of five.  Bought or stolen by the

 9     BH Army?"

10             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Thank you.  Yes, I understand you.  I don't even have to ask the

12     question.  What you -- I'm sure you want to say something and comment on

13     it.  Thank you, go ahead.

14        A.   Well, as I found out that -- that because I see that this

15     reconstruction has some faults.  For instance, smuggled them not

16     allegedly through the north but through the south, of course.  And I saw

17     that the Ukrainian unit in Zepa, in a logistic report, because that's the

18     kind of information we got from the UN, reported the missing of five

19     armoured personnel carriers.  And the last remark is a cynical assumption

20     which I would not repeat in court.

21        Q.   Thank you.  I understand you, but this isn't a document

22     introduced by the Defence.  I'm just making use of it to look at certain

23     elements necessary here for us to learn what happened.  From this we can

24     see, and you yourself say that these vehicles were never found.  Is that

25     right?

Page 3460

 1        A.   That's correct.

 2        Q.   Were they white vehicles?  Thank you.

 3        A.   Yes.  They looked like -- no looked like.  They appeared to be

 4     UN vehicles.  So all white and the U and N letters on it.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 7             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   As you said that you'd seen them in Srebrenica and that they

 9     passed through at great speed --

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now look at P581, please.

11     Thank you.  Thank you.

12             We have here a note compiled by Louis Fortin on talks between

13     General Gobillard and General Gvero.  May we turn to page 2, because I'd

14     like us to look at a paragraph there that I'm interested in, and it reads

15     as follows.  Next page, please, page 2.

16             He claimed -- he claimed, General Gvero:

17             "That a large number of vehicles, UN vehicles, stolen by

18     BH troops, which were still painted white, were used against the Bosnian

19     Serb army.  He said he had no absolute knowledge of who the troops in the

20     vehicles belonged to but drew the general's attention to the BSA reliable

21     information that those were BH Army troops."

22             Thank you.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Now, from this note and from what you've already said and what we

25     read out in that first document, do we see that General Gvero pointed to

Page 3461

 1     what was happening on the ground, that is to say, five vehicles

 2     disappeared.  You said they appeared and that you saw two of them in

 3     Srebrenica, and that they had been painted white and had UN markings.  So

 4     is it possible that those vehicles went into action, as the BSA army

 5     claims, according to General Gvero, and that we had reliable information

 6     telling us that they were BH Army forces?  Thank you.

 7        A.   First, you concluded that I saw those vehicles in Srebrenica,

 8     which is incorrect.  My OP only saw them entering the enclave at the

 9     south border.  That is just a remark for the question before.

10             And I didn't get exactly when, in what period or where those

11     large number of vehicles, UN vehicles, were seen.  Is that referring to

12     the Srebrenica area or any other area?

13             Then again, we only saw two and never saw them again, but if you

14     ask me if anything is possible, I can confirm that.  In battle, anything

15     is possible.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Yes, you were right to correct me.  That's very

17     proper of you.  And when I said "you," I meant UNPROFOR, not you

18     personally.  So I'm grateful for you -- to you for pointing it out that

19     that was an observer who saw this.  But anyway, it was five vehicles

20     which the Army of Republika Srpska noticed and told UNPROFOR about it.

21     Now, were you ever asked to verify this, to check it out, by the UNPROFOR

22     command after these protest notes by General Gvero?

23        A.   No, did I not.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Document P581.  Oh, it's already an

25     exhibit I'm told.  Thank you.  So I don't need to tender it.  But now may

Page 3462

 1     we look at an earlier document that was on e-court before this one, which

 2     was 1D207.  Thank you.  Thank you.

 3             We have it here again.  Now, what we saw in the interview and the

 4     description of what was happening on the ground, without going into how

 5     they wrote this, that these APCs were bought or stolen from Zepa, and

 6     further down, in paragraph 6, they go on to say:

 7             "Weapons were regularly smuggled --" this is from your interview,

 8     "from Zepa straight through the Serbian lines and local BSA commanders

 9     were richly rewarded for this.  Occasionally, an ABiH smuggling team ran

10     into an ambush and several Muslim fighters were shot.  But after this,

11     the smuggling carried on as normal.  Horses were sometimes used for

12     this."

13             Thank you.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   My question on the basis of that is this:  Did the UNPROFOR

16     command in Srebrenica know about what you say here, that there was

17     smuggling going on from Zepa to Srebrenica, and that that was -- that

18     horses were used for that, horses and vehicles such as the two

19     transporters that passed by at great speed?  Thank you.

20        A.   We knew about that information that we got from -- out of our

21     personnel, and then I mean the local personnel.  We had quite some locals

22     working at our -- our camp site, at our HQ, and they were a good source

23     for information.  The horses I related to here is that so-called pony

24     express, which I explained to Your Honour what it was.

25             You said "vehicles."  I do not know of any vehicles, especially

Page 3463

 1     not those BTRs, being used for smuggling.  That's not what I said there

 2     as well.

 3             That probably will answer your question.  Is that correct, sir?

 4        Q.   Thank you.  They came from the south to the enclave, as you said.

 5     BTRs are combat vehicles; right?

 6        A.   Well -- sorry.  Not in the military sense of the word.  BTRs are

 7     APCs, armoured personnel carriers.  They're not fit to go in combat

 8     because they're too poorly armed and not armoured enough to see upon them

 9     as an infantry fighting vehicle.  That is a vehicle that you can bring in

10     fighting as well, but it is an armoured personnel carrier, yes, and there

11     is heavy machine-gun on the top of it.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you for that fair and correct answer.  Just

13     tell me this:  Did you send out information to your superior command in

14     Sarajevo about what was going on linked to this smuggling and the entry

15     of these vehicles that were observed at your observation posts?  Thank

16     you.

17        A.   Yes.  In fact, you're talking about two events.  The information

18     we had about smuggling and once in awhile confirmed by seeing that all

19     kind of things were offered at the black market in Srebrenica was

20     reported to the UN.  The fact that the pony express paid local BSA

21     commanders just for -- to let them through was reported to the UN.  And

22     the second case, the two vehicles, the two BTRs, was of course reported

23     to the UN.  That's correct.

24        Q.   Thank you.  You're quite right.  Now, on transcript page 2438,

25     lines 14 to 16, in the Popovic Defence case, you talk about the changes

Page 3464

 1     which took place in the enclaves in May 1995, and you say, I quote:

 2             "Suddenly we saw that members of the BH," Bosnia and Herzegovina,

 3     that is, "wore new uniforms and new combat uniforms."

 4             Now, my question is this:  Does that confirm that this was

 5     smuggled in or arrived into the enclaves in some other way?  Thank you.

 6        A.   It did arrive in some way, because I was not aware that there

 7     was -- they were capable of making them themselves.  So probably smuggled

 8     in or whatever.  They came into the enclave, and in May we saw them

 9     walking around in combat suits.

10        Q.   In paragraph 7 you say the following, and I quote:

11             "Weapons were also regularly brought into the enclave from

12     Tuzla."

13             And now paragraph 41.  May we turn to that, please.  Paragraph

14     41, quote -- it says that you said in your interview:

15             "Franken is certain that there were American weapons deliveries

16     to the BH Army.  These weapons were delivered in Tuzla and transported

17     further from there."

18             I went on to the next question, but let me stay with my first

19     observation.  Could I have your comments to that portion of your

20     interview to this agency?

21        A.   Concerning page [sic] 41, as I said before, they comprised

22     themselves, the taped one again, and I am certain, as it said here, that

23     means that I had proof for it.  It is an assumption that there were

24     weapons coming in through -- American weapons coming into the ABiH.  That

25     assumption was based on reports I got from my A Company, and our A

Page 3465

 1     Company was in the area of Tuzla and had a station on Tuzla, our

 2     3rd Company as a self-supporting detachment, about lending -- what do you

 3     call them?  Yeah, aircraft, but Hercules aircrafts [indiscernible]

 4     identified.  Pretty shortly after that, we saw that there, as reported

 5     before, there were new Kalashnikovs in the area.  So I did the assumption

 6     that that had a connection, these two, but again it is a personal

 7     opinion.  It is not proven.  I don't have proof of it, and I didn't have

 8     any evidence to show that did happen.  In this interview, I gave an

 9     opinion and I don't know exactly what I said, but I saw other points that

10     are absolutely not true, and that it wasn't said by us.  But they lost,

11     as I saw, the tape, and they made it themselves out of the memory.

12             The idiocy that UNHCR, in point 40, smuggled batteries for us is

13     in -- untrue, and I never said that, for instance.  And point 41 is a

14     personal opinion, but again an assumption, and I didn't have any proof or

15     evidence for that.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Now as far as this is concerned, for the Trial

17     Chamber and these proceedings, can you give us your analysis as to how it

18     was possible that weapons arrived from Tuzla to the enclave.  How was

19     that possible?

20        A.   Well, in fact we discussed that before, and in any way brought

21     in, being by, on some occasions, the -- signalled by us a helicopter or

22     through Zepa and through the south by foot.  They are the most obvious

23     possibilities.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us whether you had any knowledge of the

25     fact that in humanitarian convoys weapons were being brought into the

Page 3466

 1     enclave for the Muslims to use?  Thank you.

 2        A.   No.  And if I would have, I would have taken them out.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Now in paragraph 29, which we can't see on our

 4     screens at the moment, paragraph 29, your relations with Charlie Brantz

 5     were mentioned.  Can you tell the Trial Chamber whether you know who that

 6     man is, the one referred to in paragraph 29, Charlie Brantz.  Thank you.

 7        A.   I see a paragraph 29 now in front of me where the colonel Brantz

 8     is not mentioned, but ...

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Yes.  That was my mistake.  Not 29 but paragraph 10.

10     Thank you.  Charlie Brantz.

11        A.   Charlie Brantz, you want me to describe who he was and what my

12     relationship with him was or what?

13        Q.   Well, we can narrow that question down.  I'm not interested in

14     your relation with him.  All I'm interested in is what he could have had

15     to do with Zepa and Srebrenica and the people from Zepa and Srebrenica?

16     Thank you.

17        A.   Okay.  Charlie Brantz was a colonel, a Dutch colonel, being one

18     of the chief of staffs of the command in Sector North-east.  So he was,

19     in fact, our next higher echelon, Chief of Staff of the unit that was our

20     next higher echelon, and because we knew each other out of Holland,

21     former times, it was easy or easier to discuss or to speak with him than

22     with unknown international staff.  Does that answer your question?

23        Q.   Thank you.

24        A.   Sorry.  In the transcript it said Dutch colonel being one of the

25     staff commands, must be Chief of Staff in Sector North-east.

Page 3467

 1        Q.   Yes.  Thank you.  Would you now take a look at paragraph 12 of

 2     your 31st of March statement, 2010.  It's not very clear, so if I may,

 3     I'm going to read it out because I wasn't able to fully understand it.

 4     It is this witness's statement -- or, rather, the previous witness's

 5     statement that we quoted earlier on.  P607 is the document number.

 6             In the statement you gave to the Tribunal, here's what you say:

 7             "When Franken required air support in Tuzla --"

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Would you please give the page or paragraph

 9     number in English and B/C/S so that we can follow.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It was the previous document.  P --

11     what number?  207.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I was referring to P607.  You asked for that.  Or

13     to 1D207.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D207.  Thank you.  Thank you.  We

15     have paragraph 12 on our screens now, of your 31st of March 210 [as

16     interpreted] statement.  I'll read it out and you can clarify what you

17     meant.

18             "When Franken requested air support in Tuzla, he got through to a

19     Pakistani officer who repeatedly insisted that Observation Post Mike and

20     OP Echo were not on his map.  In other words, there could be no air

21     support because the BSA could not carry out attacks on OPs which did not

22     exist.  Franken then asked if he could speak to the superior of the

23     Pakistani.  This turned out to be another Pakistani, and he also

24     repeatedly insisted that the OPs in question were not on his map in

25     Tuzla.  In short, the BSA could not attack OPs which did not exist.  As a

Page 3468

 1     result, the request for air support was flat-out rejected by the two

 2     Pakistanis."

 3             Thank you.  Have I read that out correctly and is what it says

 4     here correct?  And what can you say to explain all this to us, because it

 5     doesn't seem to be very clear.

 6        A.   Well, to me it's quite clear.  You read it correctly.  It's

 7     exactly what it said.  The first officer I got on the radio was the

 8     acting chief OPS room of the Sector North-east, and because I, let's say,

 9     almost lost my temper, I asked for his superior, which was the G-3 head

10     of the section, G-3 head of the section operations of the Sector

11     North-east in Tuzla.  But he also stated that I didn't have these OPs,

12     et cetera, et cetera.  So what is mentioned there, what is written down

13     there is correct.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Is that perhaps a convenient time for the second

16     break?  We are over time already.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Then we will have our second break now, and

19     resume at 1.00.  Perhaps before we rise, could you indicate if you could

20     conclude your cross-examination today of is it not possible?

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I

22     believe that we shall have to continue tomorrow, because I still have

23     some questions to ask.  That is to say, we'll continue on the next

24     working day.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  That is next week.  We resume at 1.00.

Page 3469

 1                           --- Recess taken at 12.36 p.m.

 2                           --- On resuming at 1.04 p.m.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Tolimir.  Please proceed.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 5             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Based on what we saw a while ago in e-court, I would like to ask

 7     you this:  Did you, as the deputy battalion commander of UNPROFOR in

 8     Srebrenica, have the right to request air support?

 9        A.   As a deputy commander, I would have had when the commander was

10     not present, but as being the acting S3, which means operations officer,

11     of the battalion, I had.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Was the battalion the level that decided on air

13     support or did they -- that have to be decided by some other command

14     level in UNPROFOR?

15        A.   No.  The battalion was a level that asked for it because they

16     needed it and the decision whether it was given or not is a higher level

17     within UNPROFOR.

18        Q.   Thank you.  How much time elapsed between your request and the

19     decision to launch air-strikes against the forces that you had requested?

20        A.   In the UN situation, at least hours, because this decision had to

21     be made on very high level.  I understood that even the Secretary-General

22     had to give his opinion or his consent.  So that took at least hours

23     before there was a consent for air support.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, I apologise.  I didn't see you

25     earlier.

Page 3470

 1             MR. THAYER:  That's quite all right, Mr. President.  I was just

 2     going to suggest if these types of questions proceed further along this

 3     line, then perhaps a reference to a particular occasion might be more

 4     helpful.  I understand the last question may have been general and

 5     generated a general answer, but as we've heard, there were several

 6     requests for close air support during the course of these events.  So if

 7     we're going to go further, I would just suggest that maybe the Colonel's

 8     attention be pointed towards a specific request.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Thayer.

10             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation]

11        Q.   In compliance with the request by the Prosecution can you tell us

12     when was the first time when you requested close air support and on which

13     targets was it directed specifically?

14        A.   First time we requested air support was during the attack of the

15     VRS on OP Echo, the observation post in the south that fell on the

16     3rd of June.  Target was the main battle tank and the infantry then more

17     or less gathered in the -- in the wood factory and the surroundings of

18     OP Echo.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Did you ask for support on the 3rd, and did that

20     occur on that same day or did that happen later?

21        A.   Of course I asked for the support on the 3rd, the very moment

22     that attack showed or occurred.  That's an answer to your question, I

23     suppose.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Was there an immediate air support against those

25     mortars?  Again, I'm asking you how long was it between your request and

Page 3471

 1     the air-strikes that ensued?

 2        A.   If you're referring again to the situation on OP Echo, there was

 3     no air support.  It was denied.  And in general, I could say the only

 4     time that it was we got air support was much later, on the 11th of July,

 5     in the area of the city of Srebrenica.  Every request we did before was

 6     denied with various reasons.

 7        Q.   Let us now move to the one that wasn't denied.  At what time did

 8     you file this request on the 11th?

 9        A.   The -- I must stretch my answer a bit.  On the 10th we got the

10     message that we would be supported by massive air support on the 11th.  I

11     then had my ops officer make a request for an air-strike on the 11th.

12     Air-strike is what I pointed out before.  Not one target but trying to --

13     to fight all known targets in one time.

14             The first message was that we would get that air-strike supported

15     by 44 aeroplanes.  Then the very moment that it would be effective,

16     0600 hours in the morning of the 11th, they didn't come.  The close air

17     support that was, as far as I recollect, on the 11th, about 1300 hours,

18     that came in, was the remains of that manned air-strike.  So I didn't

19     specifically ask for that close air support mission, but we found out,

20     and that's the procedure, our forward air controller got contact with two

21     F16s and led him -- led them to the target on the ground.  Is that an

22     answer?

23        Q.   Can you tell us now, what was the reason for not using on a great

24     scale the aircraft starting at 0600 hours?

25        A.   I do not have the faintest idea.  It was announced to us.  We

Page 3472

 1     took measures to support that, to facilitate that, and then they didn't

 2     come.  The message we got, mission aborted.  That's a technical --

 3     military technical word, but that meant the order to all the planes to

 4     return home.  And how later on those two Dutch F16 fighters did come in

 5     and did one CAS mission, close air support mission, I didn't know, but we

 6     were happy with it.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Please -- can you please tell us, was that pursuant

 8     to your request that the operation would start at 0600 hours, or was it

 9     something that they decided?  And I'm talking about this time line.

10        A.   On my request was ASAP, that means as soon as possible, because

11     our modern means can perform actions like that by night as well.  And

12     they, meaning higher command UN, made the deadline 600 hours.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Did you ask for specific targets to be stricken or

14     did you just ask for a blanket support?

15        A.   On the risk that it is getting technical, but we did both, in

16     fact.  We gave all the hardware -- sorry, all the known targets being

17     guns and artillery and mortars and tanks, et cetera, we put them on the

18     list and gave them a free-for-all, a killing zone, so to say, directly

19     south of Srebrenica, and that is the area between the city of Srebrenica

20     and generally Zeleni Jadar.

21        Q.   Thank you.  This means that it did not pertain to the then

22     current situation, but you wanted massive strikes against the targets

23     that you perceived as being dangerous for you.

24        A.   Well, that was not in contradiction with the current situation.

25     My aim with the targets I gave with the air-strikes is to take out all

Page 3473

 1     known VRS artillery and tanks positions, and being the approach from the

 2     south, the main approach, the main effort of the VRS in our direction,

 3     that's why I gave that area to the planes, just to fight and destroy

 4     anything they found there.  Does that answer your question?

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Tell me, when did you issue the green order?

 6        A.   That must have been the evening of the 9th of July.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Does that mean that, from then on, your soldiers had

 8     no restrictions with respect to the use of the weapons that they had at

 9     their disposal?

10        A.   That's correct.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Did you inform the Muslims that you had issued such

12     an order on the 9th and that your army was to be engaged alongside them

13     in the defence of Srebrenica?

14        A.   We did inform the Muslims that we would take or would start

15     actually to defend Srebrenica.  And the second remark, that our army was

16     engaged alongside them in the defence of Srebrenica, was not said to

17     them.  The CO of DutchBat had a meeting with the staff of the

18     28th Division that night and he informed them, not only about our

19     defending the city but as well about the air-strike who, in our opinion,

20     was evident.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Starting from the evening of the 9th onwards, you

22     acted alongside them against the same targets; is that correct?

23        A.   We acted occasionally alongside them, but we acted against the

24     same targets, yes, that's correct.

25        Q.   Thank you.  In that period until the 11th, when the first

Page 3474

 1     air-strikes occurred, did you suffer any losses in the activities

 2     launched by the VRS in self-defence?  And I'm talking about the period

 3     between the 9th and the 11th.

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Can you be more specific with regard to the losses?

 6        A.   Yeah.  Well, we had several injured, lightly injured.  We had, as

 7     I recollect well, three APCs not operationable anymore by fire, and as I

 8     recollect well, about two light vehicles destroyed.  Or destroyed is the

 9     wrong way.  Damaged in a way that they were not usable anymore.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Apart from those lightly injured and the damaged

11     vehicles, were any losses incurred by you by the VRS between the 9th and

12     the 11th, when the first air-strikes were launched and when you issued

13     the green order?

14        A.   If I understand the question correctly is whether I have

15     knowledge of losses at the side of the VRS in that period.  I do not.

16        Q.   No.  I didn't ask you about the losses incurred by the VRS.  I'm

17     asking about your losses in the period between the 9th when you issued

18     the green order and NATO strikes against the Army of Republika Srpska.

19     Thank you.

20        A.   No.  As I stated before, I had some injured men, but I had no

21     deadly losses, if that is the question.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Thank God that that is what happened, because you

23     were engaged fighting the VRS for the whole of two days; is that right?

24        A.   Yeah.  That's correct.  We were lucky.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us whether the UNPROFOR forces became a

Page 3475

 1     legitimate target starting from the 9th?  Were they entitled, did they

 2     have the right to shoot at you?  Did you realise that you would become a

 3     legitimate target once you opened fire on them together with the Muslim

 4     army?

 5        A.   Sorry, you said "were they entitled, did they have the right to

 6     shoot at you?"  I'm a very happy guy.  UNPROFOR didn't shoot at me, but

 7     you mean probably the right to shoot at the VRS.

 8             Well, I stated that before.  Yes, we were in a state of war

 9     towards the VRS, and we opened fire together with the Muslim army.

10     You're saying that again and again.  The Muslims were fighting the VRS as

11     well, but this supposes some kind of co-ordination on any level, and

12     again there was no such co-ordination otherwise as the initial

13     appointment we made -- agreement we made in March.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Did you realise at that point that the VRS had issued

15     an order not to shoot at UNPROFOR?  Did you know that that was the case

16     before you issued your order, and that is to say that they had issued

17     their order on the 8th?

18        A.   No, I did -- I do not realise that, and I must say that not

19     everybody followed that order.  That's clear.  And I mean, not everyone

20     followed the -- not all the of the VRS followed that order, if it was

21     given.

22        Q.   Thank you.  That's possible, but did you know that

23     General Gobillard talked to the Main Staff, and was information provided

24     by the Main Staff to Gobillard to you, passed on to you, and that the

25     Main Staff asked our forces to describe those locations and that they

Page 3476

 1     were told to target them --

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the accused please repeat the question?

 3     It was not clear to the interpreters.  Thank you.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, you were asked by the interpreters

 5     to repeat your question because it was not clear to them, for proper

 6     translation.

 7             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Were you, as members in -- of UNPROFOR in Srebrenica, informed by

 9     your Sarajevo command that the Main Staff was claiming that their

10     soldiers were being shot at from UNPROFOR vehicles and from observation

11     posts of UNPROFOR?  Thank you.

12        A.   No, I was not.  I was not informed that way.  But they didn't

13     have to inform me, because I knew.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us what was it that you knew.

15        A.   Well, a situation like that, your command radio only gives you a

16     tactical information.  So if the company, B Company, for instance, gave

17     the message, "We have contact at position whatever," that meant that

18     there was fire contact not only with the VRS but in probably in any or

19     many or all cases, which I didn't know of because I wasn't present on

20     every spot, fire was responded by us.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Since we heard from you earlier, as you said

22     yourself, you were at war with the VRS starting from the 9th of July

23     until the withdrawal to Potocari, and you said that the only losses you

24     incurred was a number of lightly injures -- injured soldiers and that two

25     armoured vehicles and three light vehicles were damaged.  So after that

Page 3477

 1     period, were you informed by your Sarajevo command and General Gobillard,

 2     who maintained communication with the Main Staff of the VRS, about the

 3     guarantees given by the VRS that they would not be targeting you any

 4     longer?

 5        A.   No.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  And did you see an order that we looked at a moment

 7     ago which Ivanovic directly forwarded to all the units, which I wrote, to

 8     tell them not to shoot at UNPROFOR members?  So did you see that the Army

 9     of Republika Srpska issued such orders?  Thank you.

10        A.   Yes.  That's one of the documents I saw before, but then again

11     obviously not everybody obeyed those orders.

12        Q.   Thank you.  And did we have -- did you have reports from your

13     observation posts that they were being -- that they weren't targeting

14     them despite your green order on the 9th, 10th and 11th?

15        A.   You mean that my observation posts or positions reported that

16     while being under fire of the VRS they didn't reply -- respond that fire?

17     Is that your question?

18        Q.   You issued an order, and you said that it was a state of war.

19     However, what I'm asking you is whether there were any cases, specific

20     cases, whereby you received reports from the OPs that the Army of

21     Republika Srpska wasn't killing them, wasn't shooting at them, but was

22     passing by and leaving them behind their own positions because they

23     didn't want to kill them or inflict losses.  That's what I'm asking.

24     Thank you.

25        A.   Okay.  I understand the question now.  Yeah, there were several

Page 3478

 1     reports that OPs, without knowing that the ABiH left their positions,

 2     were amidst the VRS forces, and then the situation came that they

 3     surrendered to the VRS.  And there was in those cases not an attempt to

 4     kill them or shoot at them, because they were outmanoeuvred and, in fact,

 5     militarily seen, useless, and they became POW.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Tell us now whether the VRS took them -- captured

 7     them when they surrendered or were they allowed to go to the base at

 8     Potocari?

 9        A.   No.  They were not allowed to go to Potocari.  They were taken,

10     escorted by the VRS to the area of Bratunac in most cases.  Couple of

11     other crews were held in the mining area, and then through -- as far as I

12     know, through Milici to Bratunac.  But they were not free to go.  The

13     only event where that happened was at OP Foxtrot, when they were

14     surrounded and they tried -- they waited for a pause in the firing to

15     withdraw.  They were too late and they were surrounded by VRS, and then

16     they said, We want to go back.  And they had to leave their light weapons

17     and could return, and that's when, in their return, the killing of

18     soldier van Renssen took place.  But the rest all was escorted to

19     Bratunac or another location.

20        Q.   Thank you.  For the record, could you just tell us -- well, you

21     said the killing of soldiers.  Who killed them, the BH Army or the VRS?

22        A.   I referred to the -- the killing of soldier van Renssen, being a

23     member of the crew of OP Foxtrot who was shot by the ABiH in -- during

24     the retreat to the camp in Srebrenica.  We spoke about that before.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Now, the Army of Republika Srpska, did it demand that

Page 3479

 1     any UNPROFOR members who were there from the 9th, when you issued the

 2     green order, to the end in the conflict with the army, did they ask that

 3     they be prisoners of war or not?

 4        A.   Sorry, the question is that -- whether the VRS asked to whom,

 5     whether those crews of the OPs in Bratunac were POWs; is that correct?

 6     Is that your question?

 7        Q.   My question was this:  Did the Army of Republika Srpska demand of

 8     UNPROFOR that these soldiers in Bratunac that were excluded from the

 9     fighting should be held accountable as prisoners of war for the losses

10     they inflicted in their actions on the 9th, 10th and 11th to the Army of

11     Republika Srpska?

12        A.   You can't account or -- sorry.  You can't hold a POW accountable

13     for the losses he inflicted on you.  So I don't understand what that

14     question should be.  And they were declared POW literally by the VRS in

15     one of their ultimatums after the air attack on the 11th.  They

16     themselves declared them POW.  And "they themselves," I mean the VRS.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Is it logical for you to exclude somebody from combat

18     so that they could not incur losses and to proclaim them prisoners of

19     war?  Was that legitimate?  Or should they have freed them and allowed

20     them to go back to their positions and back into combat and do some more

21     shooting?  That's my question and I'd like your answer.

22        A.   Okay.  Of course a POW, you keep them and you don't send them

23     back to your opponent.  So it's legitimate to declare them POW and keep

24     them in custody according to the rules like Geneva Convention, et cetera.

25     There's no question about that.

Page 3480

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Could you just tell me this, please:  When those

 2     air-strikes occurred on the 11th, and when the Dutch planes went into

 3     action, those that set out at 6.00, were they in the air?

 4        A.   I did not have contact with them, but I understood that somewhere

 5     in the morning afterwards, when I was back in Holland and had my own

 6     debrief with the air force, I understood that during the morning the rest

 7     of the planes were aborted mission.  That meant they had to return to

 8     their original airfields.  So the other planes were, as far as I know,

 9     not in the air.  And again, it was not -- that action was not an

10     air-strike, but just for the record, that is a close air support mission

11     of those two fighters.

12        Q.   Thank you.  So those are the two Dutch planes.  But when there

13     were mass strikes, they said -- you said they gave up and returned.  When

14     they returned, it means they went back to base, to the destinations they

15     were located in to begin with.  Do you know anything about that?  Thank

16     you.

17        A.   No, I don't know exactly where they went, but that is the normal

18     procedure.  Just to be sure to be clear for the Court as well, if you

19     plan an air-strikes, you plan a holding area.  All the planes committed

20     in that air-strike gather there.  They're flying around, in fact.  And

21     then on command or on the time ordered, they leave that holding area and

22     perform or execute that action.

23             During the stay in the holding area of those 44 planes, I

24     understood the order was given to those planes abort mission.  That means

25     that they flew out of the holding area and went back to their respective

Page 3481

 1     airfields where they came from.

 2             If the next question is why those two F16s stayed and performed

 3     that close air support mission, I really don't know.  I was happy with

 4     it, but I don't know why they stayed, whether that was on order.  It must

 5     have been.  I don't know.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Could you now tell us, because we're drawing to a

 7     close, the end of the working day and this session, that had there been

 8     mass support by planes, as you put it, would you then consider that

 9     UNPROFOR, honing positions in Srebrenica, Zepa and other places, had

10     taken sides, and would that have violated the mandate you were given?

11     Thank you.

12        A.   I tried to make that clear before.  The fact that I was ordered

13     to defend the city of Srebrenica and that area, in fact, has nothing to

14     do with taking a side.  If I had that order to defend it to the ABiH, I

15     would have done that as well.  The eventuality that the ABiH in this case

16     had the same enemy is as it is.  So if those air-strikes were performed

17     as planned and as asked for by me, the only result would have been that I

18     think that I would have been able to defend the city of Srebrenica at

19     least longer as I could now.  Is that an answer?

20        Q.   Thank you.  Now, during your mandate, did you have the task of

21     defending one of the parties in the conflict?  Thank you.

22        A.   No.  My original orders were to deter any party for military

23     action by presence and so on, facilitate the work of -- facilitate

24     humanitarian air -- aid, et cetera, improve the condition within the

25     enclave.  So that was my original order.

Page 3482

 1        Q.   Thank you.  During the trial so far, we were told that it -- that

 2     the Muslim army was given to understand in Srebrenica that there would be

 3     a mass aeroplane operation and that they should clear out a certain area.

 4     Can you tell us more about that?

 5        A.   The exact words I do not know, because that was given to them,

 6     told to them by my CO, Colonel Karremans, at night, somewhere in the city

 7     of Srebrenica itself, and he did.  That is what I know --

 8        Q.   Give us the date, please.

 9        A.   That must have been the late evening of the 10th that he was

10     there and that he informed them about the air-strike situation.  And I

11     presume, but it is a presumption, that he informed them that they better

12     had to be away from the killing zone, and pointed out to them, otherwise,

13     they would have a problem.

14        Q.   Can you tell us whether that was co-ordination and co-operation

15     between your command and commanders with the forces of one of the parties

16     to the conflict?  Thank you.

17        A.   I see it more as information about things to happen.  We did

18     not -- or did he not suggest or make mutual plans, so plans for both

19     parties, to cope with the problem we were both facing, being the VRS.

20     Then it, in my view, would be co-ordination, co-operation.  He just

21     informed them what UNPROFOR was -- sorry, what our battalion was doing --

22     was going to do, and informed them about the air support and consequences

23     for the killing zone, and it wouldn't be wise to be there.

24        Q.   Thank you.  As they were told that, after you issued the green

25     order and when you became involved in the war conflict with one of the

Page 3483

 1     sides, can that then be considered to be co-ordination and harmonisation

 2     of action in the air and on the ground?  Thank you.

 3        A.   Well, it's more or less the same case that you put in your former

 4     question.  No.  We informed them that we are going to defend the city of

 5     Srebrenica, and as far is there any co-ordination or whatever, it's only

 6     the consequence of the agreement we made in March.  At that very moment,

 7     there hasn't been any military co-ordination, because that would mean,

 8     for instance, that on the ground -- I'm getting technical now, but on the

 9     ground we would say, okay, this house is the left border of our defence.

10     You take the next house.  That is your sector where -- in which you fire.

11     This is my sector, et cetera.  You got antitank weapons.  Okay.

12     Concentrate them on that road.  That is co-ordination.  The simple fact

13     that we informed them that we are going or we were ordered to defend the

14     city of Srebrenica has nothing to do with co-operation or co-ordination

15     in my view.

16        Q.   Very well.  Thank you.  And before we conclude, I have one more

17     question.  One of your mandates was to disarm the BH Army.  Just give me

18     a short answer, please.  The BH Army in Srebrenica that is.  Yes or no.

19     Thank you.

20        A.   That was one of my missions, and we failed to do that, to be

21     complete.

22        Q.   Thank you.  And was it within your mandate to destroy the weapons

23     of the Army of Republika Srpska and to go to war with the VRS after the

24     green order had been issued?  Thank you.

25        A.   No, not within the mandate, but then again, my mandate was

Page 3484

 1     changed significantly the very moment the UN ordered me to defend

 2     Srebrenica, and that was the cause why I gave that green order in that

 3     sequence it was.  So there's a period of mandate being till the order of

 4     the UN to my battalion to defend the city, and after that, the rules of

 5     engagement, et cetera, all restrictions on the use of weapons, were gone

 6     because that goes with the order to defend something.  I can't defend

 7     something by sweetly talking with everybody and standing -- just standing

 8     there.  I had to use and was authorised to use my weapons.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us whether that mandate was changed by

10     the United Nations in the Security Council giving you the right to go

11     into action against one of the parties to the conflict?  Thank you.  And

12     was that verified by any Resolution that followed?  Thank you.

13        A.   I do not know, and to say bluntly, I don't care.  I got my

14     orders.  I am a soldier.  I'm on the ground.  I got orders from my next

15     higher echelon.  Obviously legitimate orders, and then I follow my

16     orders.  And whether the Security Council or whoever wants to speak about

17     it, discuss it or whatever, I did not care in that very moment.  Simply,

18     soldier follow orders.  As long as the orders doesn't, for me, obvious,

19     make me -- in any way make me doing criminal acts, I followed those

20     orders and I perform them as best I can.  It is as difficult and as

21     simple as that.

22        Q.   Thank you for that answer.  As a number of acts were committed,

23     some people were killed, some suffered in another way and so on and so

24     forth, does that imply that this must have been backed up by somebody

25     having given a verification, corroboration?  I understand you.  You went

Page 3485

 1     into action, as you said, because you were in a conflict of war with the

 2     VRS, and it's commendable that as an officer you carried out our orders.

 3     But I would like to know who it is who was responsible for issuing the

 4     order and for the fact that UNPROFOR was placed or took sides, that

 5     UNPROFOR took sides and went into action together with one side against

 6     another side?  Thank you.

 7        A.   Again, I do not agree with you concerning your conclusion that

 8     UNPROFOR took side, as far as my battalion is concerned.  I explained

 9     that again and again that I don't think what we did was taking a side.

10     And I do not know what level or who did initiate the order to DutchBat to

11     defend the city.  The only thing I know is that my next higher echelon

12     ordered me to do so, et cetera, et cetera.  I explained how I think about

13     that before to you.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  In order to prevent a repetition of these

15     questions again, at least today, we are running out of time and we have

16     to adjourn, Mr. Tolimir and everybody else.

17             We will adjourn and resume next week on Tuesday, in the

18     afternoon, in this courtroom, 2.15.

19             I would like to remind you again not to contact the parties on

20     the content of your testimony.  Thank you very much.

21             THE WITNESS:  You're welcome, Your Honour.

22                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.51 p.m.,

23                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 6th day

24                           of July, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.