Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 4312

 1                           Tuesday, 24 August 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.20 p.m.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good afternoon to everybody.

 6             The next witness should be brought in, please.

 7                           [The witness entered court]

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good afternoon, sir.  Please wait a moment so

 9     that the screens could be opened.

10             Good afternoon, sir, again.  Would you please read aloud the

11     affirmation on the card to tell the truth, which is shown to you now.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

13     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

14                           WITNESS:  PW-076

15                           [The witness answered through interpreter]

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  Please sit down.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You know that there are still protective measures

19     in place for you, and Ms. Chittenden has some questions for you.

20             Ms. Chittenden.

21             MS. CHITTENDEN:  Thank you, Mr. President.

22             Good afternoon, Mr. President, Your Honours, everyone in the

23     courtroom.

24                           Examination by Ms. Chittenden:

25        Q.   Good afternoon, Witness.  We met on Sunday.  My name is

Page 4313

 1     Caitlin Chittenden, and I'll be asking you some questions today on behalf

 2     of the Office of the Prosecutor.

 3             MS. CHITTENDEN:  Please, could we have Exhibit P727 in e-court.

 4        Q.   Witness, you'll see something coming up on the screen in front of

 5     you now.  Please, could you read it to yourself and confirm that your

 6     name is written next to "PW-076."

 7             MS. CHITTENDEN:  And it should not be broadcast, please.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 9             MS. CHITTENDEN:  Your Honours, I would like to tender this as an

10     exhibit under seal.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received under seal.

12             MS. CHITTENDEN:

13        Q.   Witness, do you recall providing a statement via the telephone to

14     the Office of the Prosecutor on 30 June 2010?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Have you had the opportunity to review that draft witness

17     statement before coming here today?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Was your statement truthful and accurate?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   If you were asked the same questions again in court today, would

22     you answer in the same way?

23        A.   Yes.

24             MS. CHITTENDEN:  Your Honours, at this time I would like to offer

25     into evidence the witness's draft statement to the Office of the

Page 4314

 1     Prosecutor on 30 June 2010 as an exhibit under seal.  It is Exhibit P725.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

 3             MS. CHITTENDEN:

 4        Q.   Witness, did you finalise that draft witness statement when you

 5     met with the Office of the Prosecutor in person on 22 August 2010?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   Did you have that statement read back to you in your own

 8     language?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   Is that witness statement truthful and accurate?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   Did you sign that statement?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   If you were asked the same questions again in court today, would

15     you answer in the same way?

16        A.   Yes.

17             MS. CHITTENDEN:  Please, could we have Exhibit P726 in e-court,

18     in English and B/C/S, and this should not be broadcast, please.

19        Q.   Witness, if you take a look at the screen in front of you.

20     Please take a look at both the English and the B/C/S versions of the

21     document, which are on the screen.  On the English version, on the right,

22     at the bottom of the page, can you let me know if that's your signature?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Witness, is this the statement that you finalised and signed at

25     the offices of the Prosecutor when we met on Sunday, 22 August 2010?

Page 4315

 1        A.   Yes.

 2             MS. CHITTENDEN:  Your Honours, at this time I would also like to

 3     admit into evidence this signed version of the witness's statement, dated

 4     22 August 2010.  This is the signed version of the 30 June draft witness

 5     statement which was provisionally admitted pursuant to your oral ruling

 6     yesterday.  For your information, the signed statement is the same as the

 7     draft, except that it also includes the witness's review and confirmation

 8     of the six intercepts and a few short comments he made in relation to

 9     that and also in relation to his role as an intercept operator.  The

10     statement, the signed version, has disclosed to the accused in English

11     and in B/C/S on Sunday afternoon.  However -- sorry, and it was also

12     included on our proposed exhibit list.  However, if Your Honours do not

13     wish for the signed statement to be admitted at this time, I can lead the

14     witness on the additional information.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  In this case, because it appears to be -- to have

16     the same content as the previously admitted statement, we would like to

17     see the statement and if it contains a reference to the intercepts.

18             MS. CHITTENDEN:  Of course, yes.  I have -- we can look at the

19     version on the screen.  If you like, I have a hard copy, but I've put

20     some highlight on it.  But I might have a clean copy here.  Thank you.

21             If I could ask for the Court Usher.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The statement is in e-court?

23             MS. CHITTENDEN:  That's correct, yeah, and it's Exhibit P726.

24             The Court Usher has just handed you a draft and the final

25     version, just so you can have a look at both.

Page 4316

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I'm a little bit -- I don't understand why we

 2     receive now the hard copies of both the 22nd of August statement and the

 3     30th of June statement.

 4             MS. CHITTENDEN:  That's correct, just in case you wanted to look

 5     at both, but the one I'm proposing is the 22 August final statement --

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  If it's in e-court, then that's fine, and you

 7     should deal with that.

 8             MS. CHITTENDEN:  Okay.  Okay.  Thank you, Your Honours.

 9             Your Honours, I would now like to read a short summary of the

10     witness's draft and final statement, if I may.

11        Q.   Witness, after I've read out the summary, I'll have a few further

12     questions for you.

13             MS. CHITTENDEN:  Your Honours, if we may move into private

14     session for a moment, please.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Private.

16                           [Private session]

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 4317

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8                           [Open session]

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  We're back in open session.

10             MS. CHITTENDEN:  At the southern site, the witness's detachment

11     worked in shifts of six hours, followed by a break of twelve hours when

12     they were off duty.  The witness performed the duties of an intercept

13     operator.  He followed the established practice at the southern site for

14     intercepting, recording, and transcribing VRS communications into

15     note-books.  If the participants in an intercepted conversation were

16     unknown, they would be marked as X and Y.  If the witness was unable to

17     hear any part of a conversation clearly, he would consult his colleagues

18     and commander, and together they would listen to the conversation to try

19     to determine what was being said.  If they were unable to determine what

20     was said, the witness would put several dots or write "Unintelligible."

21     Once the conversation was transcribed, it would be forwarded to the

22     typist, who would type, date, and transmit reports of conversations to

23     the command.

24             The witness did not type up or transmit any recorded

25     conversations, and it was not the witness's duty, as an intercept

Page 4318

 1     operator, to date every intercept he recorded in the note-books.

 2             Your Honours, that concludes my summary.  I now have a few

 3     questions to ask the witness, if I may.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please carry on.

 5             MS. CHITTENDEN:

 6        Q.   Witness, I would like to show you a booklet of six intercepts

 7     that we have compiled.

 8             MS. CHITTENDEN:  If I can just ask for the assistance of the

 9     Court Usher to pass it to the witness.  For the record, these are

10     Exhibits P728A and B, through 733A and B.

11        Q.   Witness, can you take a moment to look through each of the six

12     tabs in this booklet, and let me know whether you recognise your

13     handwriting on the handwritten versions of the six intercepts.

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   Take your time and look through all six of them, just to make

16     sure.

17        A.   Yes, yes.

18        Q.   Witness, were you the operator who recorded and transcribed these

19     six intercepted conversations?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   Did you review these six intercepts before you testified today?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Did you also review the original note-books containing these six

24     intercepts?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 4319

 1        Q.   Do the copies of those six intercepts conform to the original

 2     note-books that you reviewed?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   Did you also review the print-out versions of these intercepts?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   And do the printed versions reflect the same conversations as the

 7     handwritten versions of the intercepts?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9             MS. CHITTENDEN:  Your Honours, at this time I would like to admit

10     into evidence the handwritten and print-out versions of these six

11     intercepts.  And for the record, these are P728 through P733.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  They will be received.

13             MS. CHITTENDEN:  I just now have a few brief questions for the

14     witness.

15        Q.   Witness, can you briefly describe for the Trial Chamber what your

16     duties were as an intercept operator at the southern site?

17        A.   As I did my job honestly, with earphones on my head, I was

18     supposed to transcribe the conversations and hand them over.  That was my

19     job.

20        Q.   Where did you transcribe these conversations?

21        A.   I used the note-books.

22        Q.   And you mentioned handing them over.  Who did you hand them over

23     to?

24        A.   To whoever was in charge and to whoever was duty-bound to forward

25     those note-books to an operator.

Page 4320

 1        Q.   Witness, do you know -- you mentioned handing them over to

 2     whoever was in charge or who was duty-bound to forward them.  Do you know

 3     what this person did with the information contained in the note-books

 4     once you had passed it over to them?

 5        A.   No.

 6        Q.   Witness, who put the date on the intercepted conversations?

 7        A.   The operator who typed them up.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  And is that the same operator you were just referring

 9     to before?

10        A.   Yes, yes, a person whose job that was.

11             MS. CHITTENDEN:  And just to clarify for the transcript, he was

12     referring to operator on page 8, lines 25, and page 9, lines 1.

13        Q.   Witness, what did you do if you couldn't hear any part of a

14     conversation?

15        A.   The commander would then listen to the tape again, together with

16     two other members of our team.

17        Q.   What would happen if no one could determine what was being said

18     in the conversation?

19        A.   It either remained unclear and noted as such or that portion of

20     the conversation was replaced by little dots.

21             MS. CHITTENDEN:  Thank you, Witness.

22             Your Honours, I have no further questions.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  As I have indicated earlier, we would like to see

24     the second statement of August 2010 on the screen.

25             MS. CHITTENDEN:  Okay.  If we could have P726 in e-court, please.

Page 4321

 1     And this should not be broadcast.  It's -- would you like to turn through

 2     the pages or what's the -- yes.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The content of the statement.

 4             MS. CHITTENDEN:  Pardon me?  Sorry.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The content of the statement is of interest

 6     because we saw only the previous one, and we have heard that you didn't

 7     intend to tender this document into evidence.  Therefore, I would like to

 8     see the difference of --

 9             MS. CHITTENDEN:  Of course.

10             So let's go to page 2, please, in e-court.  And I can

11     specifically tell you what's different.

12             In the English version, you can see paragraph 7, and the new

13     line -- sorry, there's two new sentences at the end:

14             "I did not analyse any conversations."

15             And:

16             "My duty was only to listen to, record, and transcribe

17     intercepted conversations into note-books."

18             That's new.

19             Paragraph 9, after the typist would put a date.  That is new, the

20     remainder of that paragraph.  And if we can go to the third page, the

21     main change or the main update of this statement is, as I referred to,

22     the six intercepts that were shown to the witness, and that is from

23     paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 15, and for the rest of the statement.  So you can

24     see the top, in paragraph 12, a list of the handwritten versions of the

25     intercepts, with the exhibit numbers on the left, and then paragraph 15,

Page 4322

 1     the printed versions, with the exhibit numbers on the left.  And for the

 2     record, those are the same exhibits I showed the witness in the booklet.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I ask you, the witness, if you recall to have

 4     signed this document.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, yes.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

 7             This document will be received as P726, under seal.

 8                           [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I suppose this concludes your

10     examination-in-chief.  Thank you very much.

11             Now, Mr. Tolimir, it's your turn.  If you have cross-examination,

12     please do so.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

14             I would like to welcome everybody present.  May God's peace reign

15     in this house, and may God's will be done in these proceedings and not

16     necessarily mine.

17             I would like to welcome the witness and I wish him a pleasant

18     stay in our midst.

19             Can the Court please produce the witness's statement, P726.

20     Thank you.  Thank you.

21                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir:

22        Q.   [Interpretation] Can the witness please tell us how come he did

23     not sign the statement in his own mother tongue?  Is it possible that he

24     understands English so much better?  Thank you.

25        A.   It was never provided to me.  I was not provided with a statement

Page 4323

 1     in my own language.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  And now can you please tell us how come your

 3     statement was provided over the phone, and also who was it who approached

 4     you to ask for your statement?  Thank you.

 5        A.   Could you please repeat?

 6        Q.   Please tell us or tell the Trial Chamber how come you provided

 7     the statement over the phone on the 10th [as interpreted] of June, 2010,

 8     and who was it who approached you to ask you for your statement and who

 9     prepared you for the statement?

10        A.   People from the Tribunal.  I don't have a clue, really.  A lady

11     called Marija, I believe.

12        Q.   Thank you.  And can you tell the Trial Chamber whether before

13     that you had a discussion about that with somebody from the BiH Army, and

14     did you ask their permission to testify before the Court?

15        A.   No.

16        Q.   When you served in the JNA, was it in units for electronic

17     surveillance and anti-electronic intelligence, as you stated in your

18     statement?

19        A.   Yes, one part of my service entailed that.

20        Q.   And did you also work in the Electronic Interception Service?

21        A.   Yes.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the Court please produce the

23     second page of this statement, because my next few questions will concern

24     that part of his statement.  Thank you.

25             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 4324

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Your microphone.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Thank you,

 3     Mr. President.

 4             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Witness, in paragraph 4, line 2, you say that you joined the

 6     Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that you were a member of the

 7     121st Mountain Brigade.  Could you please tell us whether, as a member of

 8     that unit, you also belonged to a communications unit?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   Thank you.  In paragraph 4, line 3, you say that before joining

11     the team on the southern site, you had come directly from that unit.  Had

12     you undergone any training or education to work on radio intercept

13     equipment?

14        A.   Yes.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  For the record, it's paragraph 5 and not

16     paragraph 4, I think.  But paragraph 4 has only two lines.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, for the

18     correction.  You are absolutely right, it was paragraph 5.

19             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   In paragraph 6, you say about working in shifts -- you speak

21     about working in shifts.  Could you please tell us whether you were able

22     to perform all of your duties during one shift if there were only two of

23     you in one shift?  Could you perform all the duties and all your tasks?

24        A.   If the workload was more substantial, we were helped by other

25     team members.

Page 4325

 1        Q.   Thank you, Witness.  In paragraph 7, you described the procedure

 2     that you were involved in.  Could you please describe for the

 3     Trial Chamber what jobs did you do as a radio intercept operator?

 4        A.   It was very simple.  There was a frequency, there were

 5     headphones, there was a UHER for recording, and later on we copied

 6     everything, and that was all.  That's the long and the short of my job.

 7     And then before we gave our notes to somebody else.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  I'm not clear.  When you say "copy," can you explain

 9     for the Trial Chamber what you copied and where from?

10        A.   Everything was recorded on UHER, on cassettes, and from cassettes

11     we copied what we heard into note-books and forwarded them to somebody

12     else.

13        Q.   Did you use papers first and then copied those notes into

14     note-books or did you go directly from what you heard?

15        A.   We went directly with what we heard.  We noted it in the

16     note-books.  And then if we didn't understand that, we had to do it all

17     over again, we had to listen to the tapes again.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please tell us whether you have ever seen,

19     while you were in the unit, in A4 format, whether you have ever seen a

20     typed-up transcript of these intercepts that were being recorded, such as

21     the ones that were shown to us by Ms. Chittenden?  Thank you.

22        A.   No.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Could you tell us, please, when was it that you saw

24     typed-up transcripts for the first time, typed on A4 sheets of paper?

25        A.   Here in the courtroom.  Or, actually, on Saturday during -- or

Page 4326

 1     Sunday/Monday, during the proofing session.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Witness, in paragraph 8, you talk about how these

 3     intercepts were made during the times when there was good -- when you

 4     could hear them clearly or not.  And then you say that then you would

 5     decide to meet, a number of you, to discuss them.  Now, could you please

 6     tell us what it was -- or on the basis of what was it that you decided

 7     what was being said if you were unable to hear it properly?

 8        A.   Well, we would usually leave that it's indiscernible or we would

 9     put three dots.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please take a look at paragraph 8, line 4.

11     You say:

12             "We would listen to the transcript together in order to determine

13     what was said."

14             So tell us, did you actually determine what was said or did you

15     just put "unintelligible"?

16        A.   Well, in 80 per cent of the cases, we would just put

17     "unintelligible" or put three dots.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I remind both speakers to pause between

19     question and answer.  It is very difficult for the interpreters and the

20     record to catch everything what was said.  Please pause between question

21     and answer.  Thank you very much.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Witness, because we speak in the same language, please, let's

25     make a brief pause after our questions or answers.

Page 4327

 1             So you used the word "determine" what was being said.  On the

 2     basis of what, in those 20 per cent of the cases, did you determine what

 3     was being said?

 4        A.   Well, if we could determine what was being said and if all three

 5     of us would have the same opinion that it was that particular word, then

 6     we would determine that that's what it was.

 7        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Witness.  Would you now tell us, please, whether

 8     you entered or corrected errors in the logs, if later on you were able to

 9     verify or correct them, or would you just leave it as it was?  Thank you.

10        A.   Well, we would add "unclear" to that portion.

11        Q.   Thank you.  For instance, if you were to write down a word, and

12     then you realised that that was not the word used during the

13     conversation, the intercepted conversation, would you cross it out or

14     would you just leave "unclear" or "unintelligible" in brackets?  So if

15     later on you realised that it was not really unclear or unintelligible,

16     but that actually the intercept operator had made a mistake in hearing

17     it, what would you do?

18        A.   Well, yes --

19             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please repeat?  Could the

20     witness repeat the answer?  He was not very clear.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, the intercept operator and

22     two other members would later on look at the -- listen to the intercept

23     and look at the transcript.  They would put the word "unclear" if

24     something was unclear.

25             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Page 4328

 1        Q.   Thank you.  But please listen carefully.  Did it ever occur that

 2     you would write one word down, in one sense of the word that is used, and

 3     then later on it turns out that a speaker had said something else and

 4     this was confirmed by the other two persons who were listening to the

 5     intercept with you?  What would you have done in such cases?  Would you

 6     correct that word and put in the new word or would you just add this

 7     comment that it was not very intelligible and poor reception?

 8        A.   Poor reception and unintelligible.

 9        Q.   In these log-books that were shown to you by Ms. Caitlin, were

10     there any instances where you had written this down, where you had put

11     this note down, "unintelligible" or "unclear" or were there some

12     instances where some words were crossed out?

13        A.   Well, the log-books contained the note or remark "unclear" or

14     three dots.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You are very much overlapping, and it's very

17     clear and the interpreter has to ask for repetitions.  So please bear in

18     mind you need to pause, because you start answering or questioning.

19             Carry on, please, Mr. Tolimir.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

21             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Witness, the intercepts that you are testifying about here before

23     this Court, do they contain any corrections, or any crossed-out words, or

24     any words that would have the letter Y next to them?  Because you told us

25     that you have been able to review all these transcripts that you received

Page 4329

 1     on Sunday from Ms. Chittenden.  Thank you.

 2        A.   Well, I do believe that there was one error.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  You've said, and you say in paragraph 9, line 3, that

 4     the typist would put the date on or above the intercepted conversation

 5     that he would type over from the log-book.  So did I understand this

 6     correctly?  Is this true, that the typist actually was the one who

 7     established -- determined what the date was?

 8        A.   Well, no, he was not the one to determine it.  He had to just

 9     copy down what was written.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please take a look at paragraph 9, line 3,

11     and read it out.  Thank you.

12             Here we see it, it's on the first page.  We have the end of the

13     sentence.  It starts there, and then it goes on to the next page.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see page 3, please.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   So this typist would put a date, those last three words we had on

17     the previous page, and then if you look at the first line on this page,

18     it says:

19             "The intercepted conversations before transmitting them to the

20     command."

21             So my question is this:  Why was the typist the one who had to

22     date these intercepts?  Thank you.

23        A.   Well, probably he was ordered to do so.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Did the typist also have access to the tapes that you

25     made - thank you - the recordings?

Page 4330

 1        A.   The platoon commander and the typist.  To the platoon commander

 2     and to the typist.

 3        Q.   Well, I apologise, but for the transcript, could you please

 4     repeat your answer.  Did the typist also receive the tapes that you made

 5     during your intercepts?

 6        A.   Yes, to the typist and to the platoon commander.  These were sent

 7     to them.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Did the typist review or listen again to the

 9     intercepts and then make any corrections that you had possibly made while

10     you transcribed them?  Thank you.

11        A.   The typist was in another room, and I can't really say what he

12     did.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Please take a look at paragraph 10.  It will refresh

14     your memory, hopefully, and I will just remind you.  You said that you

15     recall one of these intercepted conversations between the president of

16     the republic, Radovan Karadzic, and a person that was on the other end of

17     the line.

18             And my question is this:  Do you recall any conversations that I

19     had with another person that you were able to intercept and record?

20     Thank you.

21        A.   Well, 15 years down the road, 15 years later, it's hard to

22     recall.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Now, you had occasion two days ago to review these

24     intercepts.  Were you able to find among them any intercepted

25     conversations that I had with anyone else, and do you recall that?

Page 4331

 1        A.   Well, the ones with the markings "X/Y" and the one where it's

 2     indicated that it's Zlatar and Palma, I don't recall.

 3        Q.   Well, thank you.  But if you put X and Y for some speaker, is

 4     that something that can be assigned to a person who is being tried by the

 5     person transcribing, or do you at least know what radio network was used?

 6        A.   Well, that was not my job.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Please tell us whether on Sunday, three days ago, you

 8     were shown by the Prosecutor any intercepts that you allegedly made of my

 9     conversations with people that I had conversations with.  Thank you.

10        A.   I looked and reviewed these transcripts.  I only looked at them

11     in the paper version.

12        Q.   Thank you.  After you have reviewed the transcripts, and based on

13     the paper trail, as you said, when you determined what the contents of

14     those transcripts were, were you able to locate any transcripts where

15     there were any conversations between me and some interlocutor?  Thank

16     you.

17        A.   Well, I just told you a few moments ago that after 15 years, I

18     can't really recall.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Do you have the tapes of these intercepts that you

20     are testifying about before this Trial Chamber?

21        A.   No, I don't have them.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Are these tapes kept within your unit or here in this

23     Tribunal so that we can determine what these intercepts were and who the

24     persons speaking were?

25        A.   Well, I don't know anything about that.

Page 4332

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us -- looking at the files that were

 2     provided to you by the Prosecutor, can you identify any words spoken by

 3     me in those transcripts that you are presenting to this Court as being

 4     the ones made by you?

 5        A.   Well, right now, no, I couldn't do it.  Had I been asked to do

 6     this in 1999 or 2000, maybe I would have been able to recall, but

 7     15 years later --

 8        Q.   Thank you, Witness.  But can you tell us, looking at the papers

 9     that you have before you, can you identify a single word spoken by me?

10     Thank you.  So I'm not asking you about 15 years ago.  I'm asking you

11     about a few days ago, since Sunday, because Ms. Chittenden asked you a

12     few moments ago whether you were able to review the transcripts of the

13     intercepts that you are testifying about and you said that you were given

14     that opportunity.

15        A.   Well, I reviewed these transcripts, but there are here also

16     speakers denoted as X, Y, Zlatar, and Palma.

17        Q.   Thank you, Witness.  Can you tell us, please, why, in

18     paragraphs 14 and 15 -- please take a look at them, they're before you.

19     Why is it noted there, where we have these six intercepts under

20     paragraph 15, that by error you typed the frequency number as one number

21     and that this was corrected here at the Tribunal?  Thank you.

22        A.   Well, no, this correction was made in the command, as far as I

23     could see from these papers, looking at the typewritten copies.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Ms. Chittenden.

Page 4333

 1             MS. CHITTENDEN:  Thank you.  I would just like to clarify for the

 2     record that that's paragraph 19 that we're talking about from the

 3     statement.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Could we have that on the screen, please.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Ms. Chittenden.

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   That is, indeed, in paragraph 19, where you mention that you

 8     wrote down, mistakenly, "Frequency 987," whereas the correct frequency

 9     was 897, as indicated and typed up in the intercept transcript.

10             My question is this:  A moment ago, when we discussed these

11     matters, you said that you saw these typed-up versions for the first time

12     here at the Tribunal.  And I asked you then who had made that correction

13     and on the basis of what, and you said that it was corrected at the corps

14     command.  Now, what was the basis for the corps command to correct this

15     error?  On the basis of what did they do this?

16        A.   I wouldn't know.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Is it standard practice that the person to whom a

18     telegraph is sent should enter any corrections in that text and correct

19     the words noted by the intercept operator?

20        A.   I don't know about that.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Maybe my question wasn't clear enough, so let me

22     rephrase it.

23             Should the original contain only what was noted in your log-book,

24     without the corrections being made, but rather with an additional remark

25     being added that this should be corrected to reflect so-and-so?  So

Page 4334

 1     wouldn't that be something to -- the right thing to do?

 2        A.   I have no idea.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Tell me, please, during your training, were you told

 4     what you were to do if you were to notice that there was an error

 5     subsequently, in other words, after had you already transcribed the

 6     intercept?  Thank you.

 7        A.   I can't really recall as I sit here.

 8        Q.   Please tell me, what kind of training did you undergo, excluding

 9     the period while you served in the JNA?  So what all different types of

10     training and where did you undergo?

11        A.   Well, in Tuzla.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Could you tell us, who was your instructor and what

13     were you taught there?

14        A.   Communications officers.

15        Q.   Thank you.  If the Trial Chamber were to give you some time now

16     to leaf through the transcripts that you have before you, would you be

17     able to point out any words that were spoken by me?  And if you were to

18     be given a tape, would you be able to recognise my voice?  Thank you.

19        A.   Well, 15 years is a long time, and I am not what I used to be.

20        Q.   Thank you.  But if my voice were to be recorded, taped, now,

21     would you recognise it?  Thank you.

22        A.   Well, the equipment is a bit different nowadays.

23        Q.   Well, thank you.  But would you agree with me that each person

24     has a very specific voice and that it's the -- the timbre of the voice is

25     recognisable as much as a finger-print?

Page 4335

 1        A.   Well, I -- I'm not -- I don't know anything about that.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.  I have no

 3     further questions for this witness.

 4             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Thank you, Witness, for your honest answers.  Thank you for

 6     coming here, and I wish you all the best in your future life.  And I have

 7     no further questions for you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And I would like to thank everyone

 9     who has helped me during this questioning, and I apologise to the

10     interpreters and to the court reporter for speaking too fast at times.

11             Your Honours, that's all I have to say.  Thank you.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much, Mr. Tolimir.

13             Ms. Chittenden, do you have re-examination?

14             MS. CHITTENDEN:  No, I don't, Mr. President.  I just had one

15     clarification on page 12, line 7.  I think it was an inadvertent

16     reference to the 10th of June instead of the 30th of June for the date of

17     the statement.  But no re-examination.

18                           Questioned by the Court:

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I'd like to ask the witness:  Do you recall the

20     date when you had this telephone conversation with a member of the

21     Prosecution?  Was it the 30th of June or the 10th of June ?

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please repeat the whole

23     answer.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please repeat your whole answer, because your

25     voice was very -- was not to be heard.

Page 4336

 1        A.   When was the first interview with me, me personally?

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, on the phone.

 3        A.   I can't remember the date.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 5             MS. CHITTENDEN:  Mr. President, sorry.  My clarification was

 6     actually in a question put to the witness, rather than the witness's

 7     answer.  That's what I -- sorry.  It said "10th of June" in the question.

 8     I apologise.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  That clarifies the situation.

10             Judge Mindua has a question for the witness.

11             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, I do have a question, a short

12     question.

13             I think we could go into closed session, because I would like to

14     ask the witness about his view on the matter.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Private.

16                           [Private session]

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 4337

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22                           [Open session]

23             THE REGISTRAR:  We're back in open session.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You will be pleased to know that you are now free

25     to leave the Tribunal to return to your normal activities.  The Chamber

Page 4338

 1     would like to thank you for your attendance here and for your patience to

 2     wait for your testimony.  Thank you, again, and all the best wishes for

 3     your future.

 4             The Court Officer will assist you while leaving the courtroom.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Ms. Chittenden and your colleagues, would that

 7     be, perhaps today, a convenient time for the first break in order to

 8     arrange everything for the next witness?

 9             MS. CHITTENDEN:  Yes, thank you, Mr. President.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Then we should do that.

11             We adjourn now, have our first break now, and resume 10 minutes

12     before 4.00.

13                           [The witness withdrew]

14                           --- Recess taken at 3.22 p.m.

15                           [The witness takes the stand]

16                           --- On resuming at 3.55 p.m.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good afternoon, sir.

18             May I remind you that the affirmation to tell the truth still

19     applies.

20                           WITNESS:  HAMDIJA TORLAK [Resumed]

21                           [The witness answered through interpreter]

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I suppose that Mr. Thayer has some additional

23     questions for you.

24             MR. THAYER:  I do, and thank you, Mr. President.

25             Good afternoon to you and to Your Honours.  Good afternoon to the

Page 4339

 1     Defence.  Good afternoon, everyone.

 2                           Examination by Mr. Thayer: [Continued]

 3        Q.   Good afternoon, Witness.

 4        A.   Good afternoon.

 5             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, before we continue, the Prosecution

 6     would tender Exhibit 1D00247.  It is the communication from the

 7     ABiH General Staff, General Hadzihasanovic, of the 13 July [Realtime

 8     transcript read in error "30th of July"] at 1050 hours.  It's a Defence

 9     exhibit in this case, as it was in the last case.  We used it yesterday

10     with the witness, and there's an English translation available in

11     e-court.  I'm not sure if its up-loaded yet.  Some of the Defence

12     exhibits were up-loaded as of this afternoon, but not all of them.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I'm trying to find it in your exhibit list.

14             MR. THAYER:  It was not on our exhibit list, as I stated

15     yesterday.  It wasn't one of the documents I'd intended to use with the

16     witness, but it came up spontaneously, as it were, during the

17     examination.  But as I said, it is a Defence exhibit in this case, so we

18     would tender it at this time.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The exhibit we have on the screen now?

20             MR. THAYER:  Correct, Mr. President.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You said -- but then, in that case, there must be

22     a mistake on the transcript.  Not the 30th of July, but the 13th of July.

23             MR. THAYER:  Yes.  I may have misspoken.  It is the 13th of July,

24     not the 30th of July, Mr. President.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  It will be received.

Page 4340

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P734.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please go ahead, Mr. Thayer.

 3             MR. THAYER:

 4        Q.   We left off yesterday, Witness, with the meeting at the Boksanica

 5     check-point ending and you returning.  Can you pick up from there,

 6     please?

 7        A.   After the meeting at the check-point number 2, manned by

 8     UNPROFOR, Mujo Omanovic and I returned to Zepa.  We travelled by

 9     UNPROFOR -- by an UNPROFOR vehicle.  As we arrived in Zepa, we briefed

10     other members of the War Presidency about the conditions or the ultimatum

11     given to us at the meeting with General Tolimir.

12             A meeting was held involving all War Presidency members.  I

13     believe that the meeting was quite long.  It lasted a couple of hours.

14     And at that meeting, we discussed the proposal we had heard, and the

15     general feeling or the general conclusion as a result of that meeting was

16     that we wouldn't accept the proposal and that we would not agree to all

17     of the population being evacuated from the Zepa enclave, including the

18     able-bodied men of Zepa.

19             According to the agreement we had reached at check-point 2 with

20     General Tolimir, we were supposed to convey our final decision to the

21     main commander of UNPROFOR in Zepa, Colonel Dudnjik, and that's what we

22     did.

23             Let me briefly go back to the reasons why such decision had been

24     made.  The main reason for such a decision was our fear for the lives of

25     able-bodied men or men between the ages of 18 and 55 or 60.  That was the

Page 4341

 1     main reason, that fear was the main reason.  And the decision was that we

 2     would not accept that proposal.  After we informed General Dudnjik -- and

 3     to be honest, I don't remember -- rather, I apologise, not

 4     General Dudnjik, but Colonel Dudnjik, and I don't remember whether we

 5     conveyed the information in a written form or just orally.  Pursuant to

 6     our previous agreement, Colonel Dudnjik was supposed to go back to

 7     check-point 2 and to convey our decision, or, rather, the decision of the

 8     War Presidency, to the Serb side.

 9             Speaking from memory, I can tell you that when Colonel Dudnjik

10     left, and probably after he had conveyed our decision to the Serbian

11     side, shelling started soon thereafter, the shelling of Zepa, or, rather,

12     that was the beginning of a military operation against Zepa.

13             Should I continue?

14        Q.   Just a couple of brief follow-ups, sir.

15             Before the shelling began, did you or any of the members of the

16     War Presidency have any contact with Colonel Dudnjik after he had

17     conveyed the decision or the position of the Muslim authorities to the

18     Serbs?

19        A.   I believe that when it comes to our decision being conveyed to

20     Dudnjik, I believe that Colonel Palic was in charge of that, and if I

21     remember correctly, I believe that Colonel Palic told us that Dudnjik had

22     been quite apprehensive about our decision.  During that period, I did

23     not have any contacts with Colonel Dudnjik after he returned to Zepa.

24        Q.   And did Colonel Palic give you any sense of why Colonel Dudnjik

25     was so apprehensive about your decision, sir?

Page 4342

 1        A.   I can't remember much of the detail of that.  Most probably,

 2     Dudnjik believed, which later on proved to be correct, that Zepa didn't

 3     stand a chance and that it could not defend itself.  He was of the

 4     opinion that we should have accepted the offer that had been made to us.

 5        Q.   Please tell the Trial Chamber what was struck by the shelling

 6     that followed.  What were the targets?

 7        A.   Again, I can't remember everything.  I believe that the main

 8     targets were the center of Zepa and the surrounding villages, but,

 9     really, I can't provide you with any more details.  I'm sure that the

10     center of Zepa was targeted.  I'm positive of that.

11        Q.   Were civilian homes or buildings targeted, sir?

12        A.   I think so.  As the situation developed and as attacks ensued,

13     civilian homes and buildings were often targeted.

14        Q.   Was there armed resistance by the ABiH fighters in Zepa?

15        A.   Yes.  The War Presidency held a meeting.  After that, Avdo went

16     to organise the resistance.  I believe that on that same evening, a

17     defence line was set up on the southern side facing Boksanica.

18        Q.   And just generally speaking, sir, can you give the Trial Chamber

19     an idea of what kind of a fight the ABiH forces in Zepa were able to put

20     up, and for how long, and with what means?

21        A.   Well, as I said yesterday during my testimony, based on the

22     information that I had at the time, I would say that 600 men had weapons,

23     mostly light infantry weapons, mostly AK-47, the famous Kalashnikov

24     rifles.  As far as I can remember, there was some anti-armour weaponry.

25     I believe that those were rocket-launchers known as Red Arrow, if my

Page 4343

 1     memory serves me correctly.  That's what had been air-dropped by

 2     helicopters.  There were not that many of those weapons.  I believe that

 3     Zepa had four pieces altogether.  Again, speaking from memory, we didn't

 4     have any mortars, we didn't have any mortar shells in any case.  Again,

 5     according to what I knew at the time, that was the armament that the

 6     BiH Army had at its disposal at the time in Zepa.

 7             The VRS attacks continued.  As far as I can remember, in addition

 8     to the axis along the southern side in the direction of Rogatica, serious

 9     attacks came from the direction of the village of Godjenje.  I would say

10     that's the south-western side of the enclave.  Lines were set up, and

11     they were maintained.  I don't know whether any of the lines were moved

12     at places near the village of Godjenje or the line on the south-western

13     side.  It is possible that the VRS did make certain advances, but that

14     was still not the key development leading to the fall of Zepa.

15             I would like to go back and say that the ammunition for the light

16     infantry weapons existed in very limited quantities, of course, and that

17     was actually what was the main limitation, in view of the time of

18     defence.

19             The attacks continued.  The lines -- the defence lines were not

20     moved, as far as I can remember, up to the 19th of July, 1995.  On the

21     19th of July, VRS attacks stopped.  There was a lull.  What ensued was a

22     new invitation via UNPROFOR for a new round of talks at check-point 2 in

23     Boksanica.

24             I would like to point out one more thing at this time.  At that

25     time, we had very frequent contacts with our military and political

Page 4344

 1     leaderships in Sarajevo.  We never received a clear answer as to what

 2     could be done in order to save Zepa.  Thus, we realised that the matter

 3     was in our hands and that we were left to our own means.  There was no

 4     other way, there was no other possibility.  We couldn't expect help from

 5     anybody.

 6        Q.   Now, before we move into the events of the 19th of July, Witness,

 7     and again recognising that you're not a military man, but you clearly

 8     have a very good memory for these events, as you were there during the

 9     time and were very much involved as a part of the civilian authority, can

10     you give the Trial Chamber an idea, please, of whether the terrain of

11     Zepa affected the ABiH's ability to resist the attack up until the 19th,

12     for example?

13        A.   Well, yes, the terrain and the geographical location of Zepa were

14     two key factors which determined, in my view, the length of resistance

15     against the VRS.  And the VRS was much better armed.  They had at their

16     disposal all sorts of means and equipment.  And that's what I already

17     said at the very outset.  Zepa has very well-delineated natural borders

18     and a natural configuration which is conducive to an efficient defence,

19     even with very little means available.  And I'm talking about defence

20     from military attacks.  That means that all of the entrances into Zepa

21     are naturally defined entrances in two or three points, and those points

22     could be easily controlled.  Tanks could not enter Zepa easily.  Zepa is

23     not in a low-lying land which would have been conducive to an easy

24     advance of tanks, and that is the main reason, in my view, why Zepa was

25     able to defend itself for such a long time.

Page 4345

 1        Q.   And, sir, did you learn at some point during the attack that

 2     Muslim fighters had over-run or, for lack of a better word, robbed

 3     weapons and equipment, ammunition, from some of the Ukrainian

 4     check-points?

 5        A.   I believe that on the 13th -- or, rather, I can say no to your

 6     question, because I didn't know that.  I'm not claiming that things like

 7     that didn't happen, but while those things were happening, I didn't know

 8     anything about them.  But I know that Avdo Palic had gotten in touch with

 9     the Ukrainian Battalion, asking them to hand over the weapons that had

10     been surrendered during the process of demilitarisation.  I really don't

11     know whether that happened, whether that materialised or not; if it did,

12     who was in charge.  Whatever I told you at this point, I would only be

13     speculating, but I know that there was an idea of the kind.  And as to

14     whether the Ukrainian soldiers were robbed of their own weapons, whether

15     any such thing happened, whether any of the check-points were over-run by

16     BiH soldiers, I don't know.

17        Q.   Okay.  You brought us up to the 19th of July.  You said that you

18     received, through UNPROFOR, another, to use your word, invitation.  Who

19     or what party, again, sir, originated or initiated this invitation to the

20     Zepa authorities?

21        A.   As far as I can recall, I believe that Avdo received that

22     invitation, in other words, Colonel Palic from the Ukrainian Battalion,

23     and that the invitation was sent from check-point 2 by General Mladic.

24        Q.   So from Mladic through Dudnjik or some Ukrainian to Palic,

25     ultimately to you; is that how it went?

Page 4346

 1        A.   Well, that's how it went, that's correct.  But I forgot to

 2     mention that on the 13th, after he left, Colonel Dudnjik did not return

 3     to the mission command in down-town Zepa, the UNPROFOR command.  He

 4     remained at check-point 2.  And as far as I can recall, and I can't

 5     remember the name of the person, but the main commander in Zepa of the

 6     Zepa mission was a younger officer, I believe a lieutenant, and it was

 7     via him that that invitation arrived.  I believe that Palic and I --

 8     Colonel Palic and I went to the UNPROFOR headquarters in Zepa, where,

 9     with the help of the radio, we talked with General Mladic, who was at

10     check-point 2 at the time.  After that radio communication, and we had

11     already agreed earlier to go to check-point 3 one more time, and when

12     discussing the request of General Mladic, we agreed that our

13     representatives would go on that same day, in the afternoon, to

14     check-point 2 at Boksanica.

15             After some additional consultation at the War Presidency -- in

16     fact, we didn't even have a meeting.  The decision had been made

17     immediately.  It was decided, in other words, that I should go to

18     check-point 2, the UNPROFOR check-point 2 at Boksanica, to meet with

19     General Mladic, and that was for continuity purposes, because after

20     July 12th and the events of July 12th, I was actually put in charge of

21     contacts with the UNPROFOR and the Serb side, as well as

22     Mr. Benjamin Kulovac.  This was in late afternoon, I believe, perhaps

23     around 3.00 p.m. or so.  I can't really recall.

24             We set off in an UNPROFOR vehicle to check-point 2.  When we

25     arrived at Boksanica, we were met by General Mladic.  And if I'm not

Page 4347

 1     mistaken, I believe General Tolimir was there too.  On the Serb side, and

 2     I'm not absolutely certain about this, but I think that

 3     Colonel Rajko Kusic was there too, and Colonel Dudnjik was there as an

 4     UNPROFOR representative.  We sat around the table, which was outside, and

 5     General Mladic insisted that the evacuation of the population should

 6     start immediately.  He dictated the demands, and as far as I can recall,

 7     they were as follows:  First, the wounded would be evacuated, followed by

 8     women, children.  And as for able-bodied men, they were to surrender

 9     their weapons to UNPROFOR.  And then I can't recall exactly the phrasing

10     of what followed, that they should be registered by the Red Cross or

11     something to that effect, and, if I'm not mistaken, that there should

12     then ensue an exchange on the principle of "all for all."

13             Mr. Benjamin Kulovac and I -- and I apologise, but I would like

14     to go back to the meeting and just say a few more things about the

15     meeting there.

16             The only person who spoke at the meeting was General Mladic.  I

17     jotted down his words, the words that Mladic dictated.  And

18     Benjamin Kulovac and I then went back to Zepa in the UNPROFOR vehicle.

19             If I'm not mistaken, General Mladic's demand was that on the very

20     next day, on the 20th, early in the morning, the evacuation should begin.

21             That evening, I think we got in touch with the political

22     leadership in Sarajevo again, and we conveyed the demands by the Serb

23     side, or, more specifically, General Mladic's demand.  At that point in

24     time -- or, rather, at that time, as of the 13th and then onwards, the

25     major problem that we were facing was what to do about the able-bodied

Page 4348

 1     men, men of military age, between 18 and 50 to 60 years of age.  Our idea

 2     was to have all able-bodied men exchanged with the Serb side along the

 3     principle "all for all," provided that they were not surrendered or

 4     handed over to anyone, because we feared for their lives.  I think that

 5     the reply we received from Sarajevo was something to the effect that

 6     there would be negotiations at the airport and so on to that effect.  And

 7     the Serb side again interpreted this as our refusal, and the military

 8     attacks renewed on the 20th of July, 1995.

 9             Let me just note that at this time, in other words, after the

10     13th, some people began arriving from Srebrenica, people who had tried to

11     cross over, bringing with them the stories of all that they had been

12     through, which further instilled fear in the hearts of the Zepa people,

13     so that the situation at this time was very difficult.  Fear was the

14     predominant emotion that the people there had.

15        Q.   Let me interrupt you for a moment, sir.  One quick question.

16             You mentioned a colonel, and I think it came out as "Pusic."  Is

17     that the correct name or was -- is it a different name?

18        A.   No, it should read "Kusic," K instead of P.  And I said that as

19     far as I could recall, I believe that Colonel Kusic, Rajko Kusic, also

20     attended that meeting.

21        Q.   And during this meeting on 19 July, sir, were you aware that it

22     was being video-recorded?

23        A.   Yes, we were aware of that, because as soon as we arrived, there

24     was a reporter or a cameraman - I believe he was with the army of

25     Bosnian Serbs - and he was there throughout the conversations and

Page 4349

 1     throughout the meeting there, and we were aware that this was being

 2     video-recorded.

 3        Q.   You told us a couple of moments ago that the reports that began

 4     to arrive in Zepa from people who had survived or had knowledge of what

 5     happened following the fall of Srebrenica, to use your words, and I

 6     quote, "further instilled fear" in the population of Zepa.  Now,

 7     presumably shelling would instill fear in anyone, but can you tell the

 8     Trial Chamber why the Zepa population was further instilled with fear?

 9     What were they afraid of?  Please share that with the Trial Chamber.

10        A.   Well, when I said that people began coming from Srebrenica, if we

11     think of the dates, these could only have been those people who had tried

12     to cross over to the territory under the control of the BH Army and who

13     did not succeed in that, but they managed to pull out and come back to

14     the Zepa territory, going through some villages in the Srebrenica area

15     and so on.  So these were stories and reports by those people who were in

16     the column; not the ones who went from Potocari, but others who tried to

17     cross over and who were unsuccessful, but who managed to come back.  So

18     the stories came from those people.

19             As for the shelling, I will now be a bit, well -- I'll use some

20     grim humour or joke.  But shelling was a daily occurrence at the time, so

21     that did not cause any fear anymore.  And I'd like to repeat that as of

22     the 13th and onwards, the main fear was how all this was going to end.

23     It was clear that Zepa had to fall.  We were perfectly clear on that, and

24     we were just looking for ways to save lives.  All our activities and

25     efforts were directed toward that goal.

Page 4350

 1             We wanted, and we tried as much as we could, to keep the

 2     situation under control.  What did that mean?  Well, that meant that we

 3     tried to always be in touch -- in contact with the UNPROFOR, to maintain

 4     contact with the Serb side, and so on, because the center of Zepa was

 5     where the UNPROFOR headquarters were.  The brunt of the attack of the

 6     Serb forces came from the south, and people from all the villages on the

 7     southern side, south to south of the Zepa River, had already evacuated

 8     and moved into the hills, so there was the fear that if everyone were to

 9     withdraw and we lost contact with the UNPROFOR, that then the entire

10     population of Zepa would find itself in a very difficult situation.

11        Q.   Now, from the period of 13 July up until these reports started

12     coming in about Srebrenica, you just told us that you were already afraid

13     for the fate of the military-aged men of Zepa even before the reports

14     started coming in.  Please tell the Trial Chamber why you were so afraid

15     for the fate of the military-aged men of Zepa even before you began

16     getting reports about what happened after the fall of Srebrenica.

17        A.   Well, look.  At the time, and it was wartime, the fear for the

18     fate of military -- for the fate of people was widespread because, in

19     Zepa, we knew about a lot of what had happened, especially in view of the

20     reports from Eastern Bosnia, reports by the people who had survived, so

21     it was a general belief that if one were to fall into the hands of Serbs,

22     if they were to be taken prisoner, that they would not survive, that they

23     would be killed.  So this was what the fear of the able-bodied men rested

24     on.  This fear, of course, grew over the past three or four years, and it

25     was a general view held by all able-bodied men, or most of them.

Page 4351

 1        Q.   And, again, even before the reports about what happened following

 2     the fall of Srebrenica came in to Zepa, referring now to the elderly, the

 3     young, the children, the women of Zepa, based on your experience, and

 4     tell us what -- your state of mind and the state of mind of those you

 5     knew in Zepa at the time, what kind of life did you -- could you expect

 6     for those people had they tried to stay in Zepa following the Serb

 7     attack?

 8        A.   Could you please clarify which group of people you're referring

 9     to, which group, what part of the population?

10        Q.   Again, I'm referring to the Muslim women, children, elderly,

11     non-able-bodied men, sir.  Focusing on that group of the population, the

12     question is:  Even before these reports about what happened following the

13     fall of Srebrenica came in, what kind of life did you or could you expect

14     they faced had they remained in Zepa following the VRS take-over of Zepa

15     which you expected would be certain, would be inevitable?

16        A.   Well, you see, that option, to remain in Zepa, was not even

17     entertained, probably because of the fear and the general sense of

18     insecurity and the fact that some 90 [as interpreted] per cent of the

19     population in Zepa were refugees, so this was not their home.

20     60 per cent, I said, not 90 per cent.  So that this option, the option to

21     remain there, was not even entertained.  There was fear.  Zepa had to be

22     evacuated and territory exchanged, and whoever was there at the time

23     could very well understand the fear that prevailed at the time.

24             And I would like to stress one more time that to remain in Zepa

25     at that time, especially after the 20th, was not a realistic option, and

Page 4352

 1     no one actually considered it.  Everyone was aware of the fact that Zepa

 2     had to be evacuated.

 3        Q.   So please pick up, sir, where you left off.  I believe you had

 4     returned to Zepa with Mr. Kulovac.  And if you could just finish off with

 5     the events of the 19th of July, and then we'll look at some video

 6     footage.

 7        A.   Well, I believe that I said all there was to say about that

 8     story, but I will try to go back.

 9             So after this meeting at Boksanica, where General Mladic was in

10     attendance as well, where he dictated his demands regarding the

11     evacuation of the civilians and the surrender of able-bodied men or

12     soldiers, we returned to Zepa that afternoon.  As far as I can remember,

13     we got in touch with the political leadership in Sarajevo that same

14     afternoon, asking them to try and agree with the Serb side on the

15     exchange of military-aged men from Zepa along the principle "all for

16     all," so that they should be exchanged for all Serb prisoners of war.

17     And I believe that the answer was something to the effect that there was

18     to be a meeting on the next day or the day after.

19             The Republika Srpska Army continued their attack on the next day,

20     the 20th of July, 1995.

21        Q.   Now -- sorry, Witness.  If you had something to add about the

22     events of the 19th, please do.  What I'd like to do, if you're -- if you

23     have nothing further to add, is to show some video.

24             I see you shaking your head no.  Okay.

25             Before we --

Page 4353

 1        A.   No, I have nothing to add.

 2             MR. THAYER:  Before we look at some video, Mr. President, if we

 3     could just go into private session for one question that will, I think,

 4     enable us to watch the entire video in open session.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Private.

 6                           [Private session]

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 4354

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10                           [Open session]

11             THE REGISTRAR:  We're back in open session.

12             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, Ms. Stewart will play one portion of

13     the compilation tape that we've listed on our exhibit list, and this is

14     from 65 ter 6417.  I believe it picks up at 2 minutes and I think it's

15     46 seconds of the compilation, just for the record, for the future, so we

16     know where to start.  We do have English and B/C/S transcripts which have

17     been up-loaded into e-court.

18                           [Video-clip played]

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't see a thing.

20                           [Video-clip played]

21             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "If General Smith or anyone from

22     UNPROFOR comes by, I will tell them that it's me, and they will already

23     be there.  A jeep is already waiting for me in Zepa, actually."

24             MR. THAYER:

25        Q.   Sir, we've paused at 3 minutes and 29 seconds of the video.  Do

Page 4355

 1     you recognise the individual at the far right of this still here?

 2        A.   Yes, that's General Mladic on the very right.

 3        Q.   And do you recognise the individual in the blue helmet?

 4        A.   Yes.  That's Colonel Dudnjik.

 5             MR. THAYER:  Okay.  Please continue.

 6             And, Mr. President, I --

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:

 8                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, please carry on.

10             MR. THAYER:  Just having a technology discussion, Mr. President,

11     with the Court's indulgence.

12             Okay.  Can we continue, please.

13                           [Video-clip played]

14             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Black Sea.  I will visit the

15     Black Sea."

16             "Good.  Your wife and children ..."

17             "Finish the war here.  Come on."

18             "I will visit you."

19             "Could we try the old --"

20             "I didn't understand."

21             "Come on."

22             MR. THAYER:

23        Q.   Sir, we've paused at 4 minutes and 32.9 seconds.  Do you

24     recognise the individual pictured here with the cigarette in his hand?

25        A.   Colonel Dudnjik, Sejmon Dudnjik.

Page 4356

 1             MR. THAYER:  Thank you.  Please continue.

 2                           [Video-clip played]

 3             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "General Mladic, I'm listening.

 4             "General Mladic speaking.  General Mladic speaking.  Let me talk

 5     to Avdo Palic.  General Mladic speaking, General Mladic speaking.  Let me

 6     talk to Avdo Palic."

 7             "Dudnjik?  Here's Dudnjik."

 8             "Avdo, this is General Mladic speaking.  Do you read me?  Copy?

 9     You can rest assured.  Take your deputy or any UNPROFOR officer, take any

10     of your associates and one woman, and come here to the UNPROFOR

11     check-point so that we can agree on further rescue of the entire

12     population and safe evacuation.  Do you understand me?  Over."

13             "Mr. Palic, I decide about the venue and the people I will talk

14     to, not you.  I can give you my word, as an officer and a general, that

15     you are completely safe.  Come with one of your associates, the one you

16     choose, one woman that you choose, and an UNPROFOR officer of your

17     choice.  Whether it's going to be Dudnjik's deputy or not, that's up to

18     you.  I had talks and I saved civilian population, and everyone who

19     listened to me from Srebrenica, and I talked to Mr. Nesib Mandzic,

20     UNPROFOR commander, and a certain Mrs. Camilla.  I give you my word as an

21     officer that the passage is free.  Come here and we will agree on all the

22     details.  Do you understand me?  Over."

23             "Mr. Palic, I am not interested in Rasim Delic or

24     Alija Izetbegovic or Karadzic.  I'm interested in the fate of the people

25     who have been misled, and I don't want the innocent to suffer.  I want to

Page 4357

 1     resolve this, and I want to give you a chance.  There's no need for you

 2     or the people to die.  You have a chance.  Come and take it.  You will

 3     not get it again.  Make no mistake.  Do you understand me?  Over."

 4             "Mr. Palic, I call the shots and I say who's coming.  I am

 5     General Mladic.  You have half an hour, starting now.  Call me if you

 6     want to negotiate, and this is your last chance.  We will not talk again.

 7     In that case, you have signed a death sentence for everyone in the

 8     territory controlled by you.  Do you --"

 9             MR. THAYER:

10        Q.   Sir, just to set a little bit of the context here, from what

11     location is General Mladic speaking here, just to leave no doubt for the

12     record?

13        A.   I believe -- and not only do I believe, but I know that this is

14     check-point 2, manned by UNPROFOR, at Boksanica.

15        Q.   And where was Mr. -- or Colonel Palic located during this

16     conversation?

17        A.   Colonel Palic, on the other side, was in Zepa, in the elementary

18     school in Zepa which housed the UNPROFOR base for Zepa.

19        Q.   And how do you know he was there during this conversation?

20        A.   I was with him during that conversation.

21             MR. THAYER:  And for the record, we've paused at 10 minutes

22     12.7 seconds.

23             Please continue, Ms. Stewart.  Thank you.

24                           [Video-clip played]

25             THE INTERPRETER:  [Voiceover] "Do you understand?  Over."

Page 4358

 1             "Mr. Avdo, you report to whoever you want.  I have another

 2     obligation as a human being and as a general.  Let me talk to someone

 3     more sensible than yourself, because you are fighting for your life and

 4     you are capable of sacrificing the people for your sake and the sake of

 5     your own ass.  Let me talk to that woman and the other guy who is with

 6     you.  I cannot talk to you.  If you want, come and I will listen to you,

 7     so that I can see what you want and if we can resolve the problem.

 8     Whether I have the authority or you do, we should leave that for others

 9     to judge.  I am giving you a chance to settle this as men, because you

10     have shed enough blood here, you and your followers.  And I'm telling you

11     you should put this lady on the phone so I can talk to her, as a woman,

12     because women are more sensible than you, who are misguided by ideology.

13     And I did not come here to argue with you.  I came here to give you and

14     your people a chance.  Do you understand me?  Over."

15             "Avdo, I'm trying to understand you.  There's no need for people

16     to suffer because of you and your skin.  I guarantee you full freedom,

17     and I will go where -- you will go where you want me -- where you want to

18     go, but try and help stop the bloodshed.  Did you get that?  If you're

19     not capable of that and you can't do it, put one of your associates on,

20     let me talk to somebody else, so that I have clear conscience with regard

21     to what I intend to do if you continue being unreasonable.  Over."

22             "I think I sent you one litre of brandy from Rogatica, and I

23     signed a box of cigarettes for you.  To tell you the truth, it was a long

24     time ago, but I know that I sent all that.  I believe that it was a box

25     of Drava cigarettes or something like that.  Believe me, Avdo, I'm giving

Page 4359

 1     you a chance, both to you and your people.  I want to keep my humanity

 2     when all this is over, and, trust me, you have to trust me.  You will

 3     return to your people, and let us cut this Gordian knot in a nice and

 4     human way."

 5             "Avdo, did you get that?  Over."

 6             "Listen, this is Hamdija Torlak, a representative of the Zepa

 7     municipality."

 8             "Mr. Torlak, greetings to you, and I am inviting you and

 9     Mr. Avdo Palic, and bring a woman with you or someone else if you need

10     them.  Bring an UNPROFOR officer and come to this check-point at

11     Boksanica.  I will receive you with my associates to resolve the issue,

12     so that the people in the territory do not suffer.  I guarantee you full

13     freedom both on the way there and on the way back.  Do you understand me?

14     Over."

15             "You are controlling -- I don't know.  Well --"

16             "Mr. Torlak, if you want, take four APCs, UNPROFOR APCs, or one,

17     just let me know and I will give an order for the passage to be freed,

18     and you will arrive here completely safe.  Do you understand?  Over."

19             "I understand completely.  If you could --"

20             "Do not delay so much.  I don't have the time to wait for you for

21     hours.  The night's falling.  I'm giving you 30 minutes.  You have until

22     1700 hours.  That's enough.  Discuss it and let me know.  And then there

23     is also enough time for me to tell my men whether you are coming and how,

24     to order the road to be cleaned for your safe passage.  Do you

25     understand?  Over."

Page 4360

 1             "I do.  So we will talk again at 1700."

 2             "Okay, I agree.  I will order my men to be ready to let you

 3     through from 1700 on.  First of all, you will help your people greatly,

 4     but me as well, because I don't wish to have anybody on my conscience.

 5     I'm here to help you.  I'm the only one who can help you at this moment.

 6     You can be sure of this.  And I can help you only with your help.  There

 7     is no need to turn this terrain into a venue of tragedy of both mine and

 8     your people.  Okay, thank you, and bring a woman with you, if possible."

 9             "Well, I will check.  You know how it is.  I --"

10             "Okay, I will talk to you at 1700 hours.  I will order my men to

11     ensure the passage from Zepa to Boksanica, to this check-point.  You will

12     just tell me the names of the delegation members, you will tell me who

13     the UNPROFOR officers and soldiers are."

14             "Okay."

15             "We will see.  If there are barricades, we will remove them."

16             "Okay, I'll talk to you at 1700, General."

17             "Good luck.  We'll talk at 1700 hours."

18             MR. THAYER:

19        Q.   Sir, when, in relation to your -- the meeting you described, when

20     you sat down with Generals Mladic and Tolimir, did the conversation we

21     just heard take place, approximately?  We don't need a specific time, if

22     you can't recall.  But approximately what time did that conversation

23     occur?

24        A.   In the afternoon, in the second half of the day.  The meeting

25     wasn't long.  According to my estimate, it was not longer than 30 to

Page 4361

 1     40 minutes.  And the conversation took place at check-point 2 in

 2     Boksanica.

 3             MR. THAYER:  Okay.  Before we go to the next portion of this

 4     video, I note, again, we do have both English and B/C/S transcripts

 5     available in e-court linked to this exhibit, if that helps the

 6     interpreters at all.  We also have hard copies of the B/C/S transcript,

 7     if that will assist the interpreters.  Again, the video is subtitled, but

 8     we do have the transcripts available, electronically and hard copy, to

 9     hopefully make the job a little easier for the interpreters.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  They should be given to the interpreters to be of

11     assistance for them, or was that already provided?

12             MR. THAYER:  Just available in e-court, Mr. President.  But we do

13     have hard copies, if they prefer hard copies, and we can hand that up

14     right now.

15             And for the record, we'll be starting at page 8 of the B/C/S

16     transcript.  And we'll continue at 18 minutes 15.5 seconds.

17                           [Video-clip played]

18             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "They told you already yesterday,

19     the day before yesterday, to surrender your weapons, surrender your

20     ammunition.  You said, We will die.  They were waiting the whole night to

21     attack us, and they will wait during the whole night for the Muslims to

22     attack."

23             [No interpretation]

24             "Srna, Srna, Srna, this is Panorama 01.  Respond.  Over.  Give me

25     Srna, personally."

Page 4362

 1             "Andric, I'm at Kusic's.  I'll wait for you at the check-point.

 2     I'm waiting for the Turks to come and negotiate."

 3             MR. THAYER:

 4        Q.   Sir, we've paused at 21 minutes 29.8 seconds.  Do you recognise

 5     anybody in this still, starting from left -- I beg your pardon -- from

 6     right to left?

 7        A.   Is that a question for me?

 8        Q.   Yes.

 9        A.   I apologise.  On the far right we see General Tolimir.  Centrally

10     is General Mladic.  And on the far left, I believe this is Kosoric, an

11     officer of the Republika Srpska Army.

12             MR. THAYER:  Thank you.

13             We can continue, please.

14                           [Video-clip played]

15             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "General, it was here where we

16     brought -- and from here, it was a clearing, because like this you

17     cannot -- you cannot with Zolja."

18             "He comes to this curve in the road and cannot -- when we brought

19     in our forces from here --"

20             "We are here now, right now."

21             "How do you say 'boring' in Ukrainian?"

22             "Which gate?  That's another gate."

23             "What kind of question is that?"

24             "So the dog won't bite them."

25             "No, he won't.  He's quiet."

Page 4363

 1             "Here it is.  Now, we came to try to arrange one thing."

 2             MR. THAYER:

 3        Q.   Sir, we've paused at 26 minutes 25.3 seconds.  There is an

 4     individual seated with his back to the camera, wearing a military cap.

 5     Can you identify who that is for the record, please?

 6        A.   That's General Zdravko Tolimir.

 7             MR. THAYER:  Thank you.

 8             Please continue.

 9                           [Video-clip played]

10             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We cannot hear the

11     speakers at all.  That is why we are not reading the transcript.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We don't hear the speakers neither, but we see

13     the subtitles.

14             MR. THAYER:  Yes.  We experienced this problem --

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  How do you want to proceed?

16             MR. THAYER:  We experience this problem from time to time,

17     Mr. President.  For some reason, the audio just stays way down.  I think

18     we had that problem the other day.  I think we can continue.  The video

19     is subtitled.  It is based on, obviously, prior reviews where you

20     can listen to the -- or you do have the audio high enough.  My proposal

21     would be simply to follow along with the subtitling as it is.

22             Again, for anybody that wants to follow along with the B/C/S

23     transcript, it is in e-court, and we have made the Word versions of those

24     transcripts available to the Defence for some time.  We can certainly get

25     by just by watching the video with the subtitling, Mr. President.

Page 4364

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The English text of the transcript should be

 2     available, anyway.  Perhaps you can up-load it into e-court as well, if

 3     it is not done yet.

 4             MR. THAYER:  It is already up-loaded, Mr. President.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please carry on.

 6                           [Video-clip played]

 7             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "I'm not going to use the term which

 8     you --"

 9             "Well, they should just inform them that we cannot establish

10     communications with them, only through the UNPROFOR communications."

11             "There are children and some women."

12             MR. THAYER:  We've paused at 27 minutes 42.1 seconds.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you that you are pausing.  At the moment,

14     we have to discuss the matter of the audio and the recognition of the

15     voice.  Just a moment.

16                           [Trial Chamber confers]

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, you should continue, although the

18     voices are not to be heard in a proper way.  But we have another problem.

19     We should have our break.  On technical reasons, it's not possible to

20     extend it too much.  What do you think?  How much time will it take to

21     finish this video?

22             MR. THAYER:  This clip, I think, has about eight minutes left,

23     Mr. President, so it's no problem to pause it here.  We may even be able

24     to resolve the technical glitch in the meantime, and we'll liaise with

25     the booth about that as well.  Thank you.

Page 4365

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  In fact, we have already interrupted this video

 2     because of our technical discussion, so that I think it is appreciated

 3     that we have now our second break.  And we will resume at 6.00, and

 4     hopefully it will be possible to resolve the technical problem with the

 5     voices to be heard.

 6             We adjourn and resume at 6.00.

 7                           --- Recess taken at 5.33 p.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 6.03 p.m.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Thayer.

10             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I think we've solved the technical

11     problems that we had earlier.  We will -- instead of playing this off the

12     Sanction system, we'll play it from a CD.  And we've done some test runs,

13     and it seems like the audio is much better now.

14             What I propose to do is begin at the portion where we actually

15     see the events preceding and then during the meeting at Boksanica.  The

16     portion where we saw General Mladic speaking with Colonel Palic, I think

17     was sufficiently audible for our purposes.  The audibility of

18     Colonel Palic during that conversation is very poor, so I don't think

19     any -- there's much enhancement we can do to get that so that we can hear

20     it, for example.  I think you can make it out if you're a B/C/S speaker

21     and you listen to it carefully.  So I propose that we start with the

22     events at the UN check-point in Boksanica, when General Tolimir and

23     Colonel Kosoric arrive.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Very well.  Very well.  Please proceed.

25             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 4366

 1             Let's roll the video, please.

 2                           [Video-clip played]

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We don't have interpretation.

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  The video is in Russian.  We do not interpret

 5     from Russian.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Why don't we start with the beginning of the

 7     meeting.

 8             MR. THAYER:  We'll do that, Mr. President.

 9             And in light of the proceedings thus far, because we have the

10     subtitles and because everything, I believe, will be sufficiently audible

11     for all the parties, I propose that we can suspend the

12     double-interpretation, as it were, and just listen to the events and

13     follow along for the English speakers on the subtitles, and for the B/C/S

14     speakers it will all be in the native language, anyway, and we can go

15     directly to the meeting.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I was told, for the sake of the record, that

17     everything that was audible or readable was translated into B/C/S for the

18     accused.  If that is the case, I think we can proceed in that way.

19             MR. THAYER:  And for the record, we're at 23:46 of the CD video,

20     and we have a -- there's a seven-second difference between the time of

21     the video that we're showing from the CD and the time that is up-loaded

22     into e-court.  So just for the future purposes, if we're going back to

23     look at the record, we just have to take that into account, in terms of

24     locating positions on the video.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We should have the video in evidence as well.

Page 4367

 1     The CD, yes, I'm sorry.

 2             MR. THAYER:  We can do that, Mr. President.

 3             Okay, let's roll the video, please.

 4                           [Video-clip played]

 5             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, we're pausing at 27 minutes

 6     36 seconds.  I just wanted to ask the witness a question about this

 7     passage right here.

 8        Q.   There's a reference, sir, to wounded, and some of them being

 9     women and some children.  How were they wounded, sir?

10        A.   Well, the women and children must have been wounded in the

11     shelling.  And as for the men, they might have been wounded either on the

12     front-line or also during the shelling.

13             MR. THAYER:  Please continue with the video.

14                           [Video-clip played]

15             MR. THAYER:  We're pausing at 31 minutes 43 seconds of the video.

16     Just a couple of questions, sir.

17        Q.   Most recently in the video, General Mladic referred to a Merdjan

18     or a Mrdjo.  Do you know about whom he is speaking there?

19        A.   I believe that was a Republika Srpska Army soldier who was

20     wounded or lightly wounded in an operation conducted by the BH Army to

21     the north-west of the enclave, somewhere on the Serb territory.  That

22     soldier was in Zepa since that time, the time of that operation.  Later

23     on, I learned that he had been taken to the check-point and handed over

24     to Republika Srpska Army.  I did not take part in that exchange.  I only

25     heard of it later.  That's all.

Page 4368

 1        Q.   Do you recall approximately when, during these events, this

 2     VRS soldier who had been captured by the ABiH was returned to the Serbs?

 3        A.   Well, what we saw here was the 19th of July, so I think that that

 4     must have been on the 20th or the 21st at the latest.  So it would have

 5     been on the following two days, in my assessment.

 6        Q.   And to your knowledge, was anyone actually exchanged for this

 7     VRS soldier or was he simply turned over to the Serbs?

 8        A.   No, he wasn't exchanged.  He was just turned over to the Serbs.

 9        Q.   And, finally, there was -- there were a couple of references to a

10     location called Brezova Ravan.  Can you tell the Trial Chamber what that

11     location is and what its significance was at the time?

12        A.   Well, Brezova Ravan is a locality.  It is not a settled -- it's

13     not a settlement.  It's on the road between Zepa and Boksanica.  It's in

14     a dominant position so that it commands the view of Zepa, and it's

15     possible to control Zepa -- the center of Zepa from there.  The

16     Brezova Ravan was also the place where the first line of defence of Zepa

17     was.  At this time on 19th of July, the BH Army soldiers were still on

18     Brezova Ravan, in that location.

19        Q.   And during July of 1995, sir, if one wanted to drive from the

20     center of Zepa up to Boksanica, would one necessarily have to pass

21     through Brezova Ravan?

22        A.   Yes.  I don't know any other road that could take you to

23     Boksanica up there.

24             MR. THAYER:  Okay.  Let's continue playing the video, please.

25                           [Video-clip played]

Page 4369

 1             MR. THAYER:  We're pausing at 34 minutes 46 seconds.

 2        Q.   Can you identify the man who's in the center of the frame here,

 3     please?

 4        A.   That's Colonel Sejmon Dudnjik.

 5             MR. THAYER:  Thank you.

 6             Let's continue with the video, please.

 7                           [Video-clip played]

 8             MR. THAYER:  Sir, we're pausing at 35 minutes 10 seconds.

 9        Q.   Of the men in uniform, can you identify any of them, moving from

10     left to right on the screen?

11        A.   From left to right, the first one is General Mladic.  Then comes

12     General Tolimir, then an officer of Republika Srpska Army whom I recall.

13     I recall his face, but I don't know his name.  I don't know the next

14     person either.  And then I believe this is Colonel Kosoric, if I am not

15     mistaken, but I can't really say that with certainty.

16        Q.   And just for the record, the man you believe is Colonel Kosoric,

17     is he clean-shaven?

18        A.   He has a moustache.

19             MR. THAYER:  Okay.  Let's continue playing the video, please.

20     Thank you.

21                           [Video-clip played]

22             MR. THAYER:

23        Q.   When we left off before showing the video, you had brought us

24     basically to 20 July.  Did the military or civilian authorities from Zepa

25     respond to the demands that you told us General Mladic made at this

Page 4370

 1     meeting?  And if not, can you describe, please, for the Trial Chamber

 2     what happened then, starting with the 20th of July forward?

 3        A.   As far as I recall -- I would just like to briefly comment on

 4     this video-clip that we've just seen.  I believe that a portion was cut

 5     out where we hear the conditions that General Mladic dictated, and it

 6     relates to what it is -- what was to be done with the able-bodied men.  I

 7     believe that he said there that they should surrender their weapons, that

 8     they should go to the UNPROFOR, be registered for an exchange "all for

 9     all."  As far as I can recall the meeting of the 19th, it should have

10     been there.  That portion is missing.

11             And now I can return to your question as to what happened after

12     this meeting.

13        Q.   And just to clarify, sir, have you ever seen video footage of

14     what you are telling us you recall General Mladic saying?  Have you ever

15     actually seen that on video footage at all?

16        A.   Do you mean in reference to what I've just said, according to my

17     recollection, what was missing on this video footage?  Well, I can't

18     really confirm that.  I can't say that I've seen the video footage

19     before, although it is possible to obtain it.  And I think I did see it a

20     long time ago.  But why did I say this?  Well, in further developments,

21     we returned to Zepa, me and Benjamin Kulovac, where the evacuation of the

22     civilian population was no longer questionable.  We were certain that it

23     would proceed as planned, that there wouldn't be any problems.  However,

24     the problem remained of what was going to happen to the men, the

25     able-bodied men, men of military age, between ages of 18 and 55 to

Page 4371

 1     60 years of age.

 2             You could all see in this video-clip that General Mladic, or

 3     maybe someone else, said that the dead-line was 10.00 on the

 4     20th of July, when the first group or the wounded should be there to be

 5     evacuated.

 6             When we returned to Zepa, I think that the entire War Presidency

 7     went to the Communications Centre on Zepa Mountain on the 19th, in the

 8     evening, and this was the only link -- the only communication line open

 9     with Sarajevo.  And I believe that on that evening, we talked to

10     Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, then the president of the Presidency of Bosnia and

11     Herzegovina, in which we asked that Minister Muratovic, and I believe he

12     was the minister who was to liaise with the UNPROFOR and international

13     organisations, so we asked that he urgently establish contact with the

14     Serb side in order to ensure that an exchange be implemented on the

15     principles of "all for all."  In other words, all able-bodied men from

16     Zepa to be exchanged for all prisoners of war taken by the BH Army, Serb

17     prisoners of war.

18             I don't know exactly and I can't recall whether we received a

19     promise -- a firm promise to that effect, but on the next day, on the

20     20th of June, we did not proceed to evacuate the population because that

21     issue remained unsolved.  We tried again.  I believe that in the morning

22     already, we continued this communication, but I wasn't there.  But I know

23     that people did not come there, they did not gather to be evacuated.  And

24     I believe that on that day, the attacks by the Serb Army on Zepa

25     continued, and I believe that they were even fiercer than so far, than

Page 4372

 1     earlier.  Those attacks -- let me just briefly go back to something.

 2             So on the 20th, as far as I can recall, I spent that whole day on

 3     Zepa Mountain, and I believe that on that day this soldier - I believe

 4     his name was Merdjan - was taken to the UNPROFOR check-point and handed

 5     over to the Serb side.  I did not participate in that, but I believe that

 6     Benjamin Kulovac told me about it.

 7             So the attacks resumed.  The situation was getting more and more

 8     unpredictable for us.  And I believe that at this time, the civilian

 9     population from the southern parts, the hills on the southern parts, had

10     already moved to Zepa Mountain.  And then on the 24th, or maybe the 23rd,

11     the 23rd of July, the key elevation, key for the defence of Zepa from the

12     south, Brezova Ravan, had fallen.  I'm sorry, I think this was on the

13     24th, in the morning, that -- in other words, on the 24th of June, 1995,

14     Brezova Ravan, as the key elevation, the key position for the defence of

15     Zepa, for the defence of the center of Zepa, fell.

16        Q.   Sir, I just wanted to interrupt you quickly --

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, just a moment.  Judge Mindua has a

18     question for the witness.

19             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] This is not a question, but I just

20     wanted to check something out.

21             On page 60, line 16 of the transcript, the 24th of June is

22     mentioned.  Line 25, again, the 20th.  We don't know if it's June or

23     July.  And on page 61, line 9, the 23rd of July is mentioned.  Further

24     down, line 11, the 24th of June.  So what is this about?  What month are

25     we talking about?

Page 4373

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I would have to see the

 2     context in order to determine the month, and I don't have any context

 3     here.

 4             MR. THAYER:  If I -- if I may, with the Trial Chamber's

 5     permission.  His Honour Judge Mindua anticipated my intervention,

 6     actually.  That was the same question I had.

 7        Q.   There were two references to June of 1995 in your prior answers.

 8     One was, I believe, 24 June, and the other one was 20 June.  During the

 9     course of your testimony for the last 10 minutes, were you ever referring

10     to June of any year or were you referring to July?

11        A.   All those things were happening in July, so there has to be

12     "July" everywhere.  However, I believe that I used the right name of the

13     month.  There must have been a mistake in the interpretation, I suppose.

14        Q.   No biggie.  Please continue.

15        A.   On the 24th of July, the key elevation for the defence of Zepa,

16     the so-called Brezova Ravan elevation, fell, and the Army of

17     Republika Srpska established new lines and approached Zepa to some 500

18     and -- or 60 metres as the crow flies from the center of Zepa.  That was

19     the closest distance that they reached and that's where they stopped.

20     What ensued was another invitation delivered by the same means, which

21     means that we received information from UNPROFOR.  And I believe that the

22     invitation was issued by General Mladic, who was at check-point 2, and he

23     again requested to talk to us at another meeting.

24             The situation in Zepa was quite dramatic, bordering on chaotic.

25     People were scared, on the brink of panic.

Page 4374

 1             To the best of my recollection, Benjamin Kulovac and I

 2     communicated via radio and discussed our options.  I believe that

 3     Mr. Benjamin did not agree to go, to use that term.  I told him, I'm

 4     going, because we have a problem on our hands and we have to deal with

 5     it.

 6             At the UNPROFOR check-point, I went there in an UNPROFOR vehicle,

 7     escorted by two foot-soldiers, two privates.  I believe that some captain

 8     was supposed to be with us, but he had found a good reason not to go.  We

 9     went there in the afternoon, late afternoon, on the 24th of July.  Even

10     before Brezova Ravan, we encountered a VRS check-point.  To the best of

11     my recollection, I remember that the car we were travelling in, the

12     UNPROFOR car, had a problem.  That's why we had to pull over at

13     Brezova Ravan.  And the car remained behind, and that's why we proceeded

14     towards Boksanica, to check-point 2, in a VRS vehicle.  And the two

15     UNPROFOR soldiers were also with me in the car.

16             And when we arrived at the same place where the meeting on the

17     19th of July had taken place, we found General Mladic there, and perhaps

18     even General Tolimir.  But I'm speaking from memory, and I can't be sure

19     of that without any corroborative materials.  And some other VRS soldiers

20     that I'd seen before.  I believe that Dudnjik was there, representing

21     UNPROFOR.

22             I arrived on my own.  Mladic was very angry.  At the very outset,

23     he handed me a paper to sign.  To be honest, I had expected a

24     different forum, a different format of the agreement.  However, that was

25     an agreement on the disarmament of the army, and in the text of the

Page 4375

 1     agreement one of the points was also the evacuation of the civilian

 2     population.  I said to General Mladic that I was not authorised to cover

 3     the military or deal with any military issue, but the answer was that for

 4     the evacuation of the civilian population to start, the agreement had to

 5     be signed and that I could then convey all of the messages to

 6     Colonel Avdo Palic.  And in that situation, I remember that I even

 7     spotted a grammatical error that was subsequently corrected in that

 8     document.  I signed the document, and I returned to Zepa.

 9             Let me just point out that us members of the inner War Presidency

10     had agreed before I departed that all of those things had to be accepted

11     and agreed to, because most of the civilian population had already

12     arrived in Zepa Mountain, north of Zepa, which means that the southern

13     part of the enclave had already fallen.  And if everybody had withdrawn

14     to Mountain Zepa, then we would have lost contact with both -- with

15     UNPROFOR, and the complete population, primarily the women, children and

16     elderly, would have been put in a very difficult position.

17             As I returned to Zepa, I was awaited there, of course, by

18     Benjamin Kulovac, and I suppose that Avdo Palic was also there,

19     Colonel Palic.  Mehmed Hajric, the president of the War Presidency as

20     well.  And together, we went to Zepa Mountain again, because we wanted to

21     inform our political and military leaderships about what had been signed.

22     And when I say "our," I mean Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, who represented the

23     political leadership, and General Rasim Delic, who was the commander of

24     the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

25             I remember that we stayed on line for some hour or even

Page 4376

 1     two hours, and as far as I remember, what was said was, Okay, let the

 2     women and children go.  And we kept on insisting that we should find a

 3     solution for the able-bodied men.  However, no concrete or clear signal,

 4     response, or promise was given to us, as far as I can remember.

 5             On the following morning, which was on the 25th of July, 1995 --

 6     and before I continue this sentence, let me just briefly go back to my

 7     last meeting which took place on the 24th July at Boksanica.  Amongst

 8     other things, what was agreed on that day was some details of the

 9     evacuation.  That implied that the International Red Cross teams would

10     arrive in Zepa, and some others, perhaps, and that they would be all

11     escorted by UNPROFOR, and so on and so forth.  I don't remember whether

12     it was said clearly at that point that the evacuation from Zepa should be

13     led by General Tolimir.

14             And on the following day, I remember, sometime in the morning,

15     not very early, though, a team of the International Red Cross came.

16     General Tolimir came with his escorts.  Colonel Palic was also there, I

17     was there, and some other members of the War Presidency.

18             Should I proceed?

19        Q.   Sir, let me just interrupt you right there and dwell a little bit

20     longer on the events prior to 25 July, and follow up a little bit.

21             You described a little while ago that after the meeting on the

22     19th, when there was effectively no response from the Zepa authorities to

23     the VRS, you described that the attack became fiercer, more intense.  Can

24     you describe for the Trial Chamber what you mean by that and what was

25     being targeted?

Page 4377

 1        A.   Well, the line of defence came under the most fierce attack, and

 2     the shelling of Zepa also intensified.  I remember that I could no longer

 3     approach the building where I worked, and that was a building in the

 4     center of Zepa.  This is what I remember clearly.  The defence lines,

 5     especially the one facing Brezova Ravan, came under heavy shelling.  And

 6     I also heard that the attack had been launched from the south-western

 7     side and that it was stepped up.  Throughout all that time, the center of

 8     Zepa was being shelled and targeted.  As far as I can remember, I was at

 9     the UNPROFOR base there, and I remember that even the UNPROFOR base came

10     under attack, that it became a target of shelling.  That's what I meant

11     when I said that the attacks became fiercer.

12        Q.   And were there any targets - let's focus on the center of

13     Zepa - that you would characterise as military targets?

14        A.   In the center of Zepa, there are no military targets.  We're

15     talking about five or six buildings altogether.  There is nothing that,

16     in my view, could be proclaimed a military target.  There are two

17     schools, elementary schools - one is old, one's new - a residential

18     building for the teachers, the building that we used as our headquarters,

19     the executive board and the police.  I don't think that those can be

20     qualified as militaries targets.  There was also a residential building

21     for the police officers, and there was a mosque.  So those buildings

22     constituted the center of Zepa at the time.

23        Q.   And how about elsewhere within the enclave during this

24     intensified period of shelling from the 19th through the 24th of July?

25     Were there strictly military targets that were being shelled or were

Page 4378

 1     there other targets as well?

 2        A.   Well, I spent most of the time in the center of Zepa, and that's

 3     what I could observe.  But let me just say that we're talking about

 4     villages with nothing but residential dwellings.  There's no other type

 5     of buildings at all.  There are no military targets, as such, something

 6     that could qualify as a legitimate military target.  And I'm talking

 7     about all of the villages around Zepa.  That applies to all of them.

 8        Q.   Tell the Trial Chamber why Mr. Kulovac did not want to attend the

 9     meeting on the 24th of July.

10        A.   I believe that he feared for his personal safety, that he feared

11     that something bad would happen to him.  His personal safety was at

12     stake, I believe, and that's why he was afraid.

13        Q.   When you signed this agreement on the 24th of July, would you

14     describe for the Trial Chamber what choice you had?  If you could explain

15     a little bit further why you signed that agreement and the choice that

16     you felt you had in signing that.

17        A.   Well, first of all, let me tell you something about my own

18     feelings.  I was a bit distracted.  Let me not even mention that I was

19     afraid.  But, actually, I was not even afraid any longer.  Fear was

20     not -- no longer part of my emotions.

21             And as far as our choices went, well, we didn't have any.  We

22     were forced to sign whatever text they served us.  As long as it ensured

23     the beginning of the evacuation, whatever it may have been, I would have

24     signed it.  That's how we decided before I left Zepa.  There was no

25     alternative.

Page 4379

 1        Q.   And a little while ago in your testimony, sir, you referred to

 2     the women, children, and elderly who were fleeing to Zepa Mountain, and

 3     you said that they would have been in a -- in the words you used,

 4     "difficult position."  Can you again please elaborate a little bit?

 5     Explain, and you can be as undiplomatic with me as you like, sir, what

 6     you mean by that, please.

 7        A.   Look, this is what I mean:  Somebody who left their home could

 8     carry only a limited quantity of food or anything else, clothes or I

 9     don't know what.  They left, and they found shelter in some make-shift

10     buildings, as I later heard.  Furthermore, all of that could have gone on

11     for days.  If somebody was sick, they could not be provided with any

12     medical assistance.  And, finally, what next?  Zepa Mountain is just a

13     plateau, an elevation, where the entire population of Zepa would have

14     moved, including the military.  I'm sure that the VRS had already started

15     encircling the entire plateau, so there will be civilians which could not

16     live for longer than four or five days.  The area is very narrow, there's

17     limited space.  It would have been a catastrophe, and I'm sure that even

18     more fierce attacks on the part of the VRS would have ensued.

19             So when I said that the situation would have been difficult, I

20     meant that the situation was extremely dramatic.  Well, picture this:

21     For example, somebody with a young child goes to a forest.  Of course,

22     they cannot organise their life properly.  And you have to know that

23     there was shelling going on, no conditions for a normal life in place.

24     That's what I meant when I used the term.

25             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, sir.

Page 4380

 1             I see we're out of time for the day.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

 3             Sir, you have to realise we have to adjourn now, but we will

 4     resume tomorrow in the afternoon again, and your examination-in-chief and

 5     later on the cross-examination will continue.  Let me remind you again

 6     that you shall not talk to either party about the content of your

 7     testimony.

 8             We adjourn and resume tomorrow in the afternoon.

 9                           [The witness stands down]

10                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.03 p.m.,

11                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 25th day of

12                           August, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.