Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 4539

 1                           Monday, 30 August 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning to everybody in the courtroom.

 7             Good morning to you, Witness.  I have to remind you again that

 8     the affirmation to tell the truth still applies.

 9                           WITNESS:  HAMDIJA TORLAK [Resumed]

10                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, please continue your

12     cross-examination.

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for Mr. Tolimir, please.

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please, for Mr. Tolimir.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             May God's will reign in this house.  May there be peace in this

17     house, and I wish that this trial be concluded according to God's wishes

18     and not necessarily mine.

19             Thank you, Mr. Presiding Judge.

20             Last time, we left it off when we discussed a topic concerning

21     the outbreak of hostilities in Zepa and Srebrenica.  I will have a few

22     questions of you about the War Presidency, the Executive Board, and the

23     president of the War Presidency, given that it was frequently mentioned

24     here and in your statement.

25                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]

Page 4540

 1        Q.   [Interpretation] Please clarify for the Chamber what the role of

 2     the president of the Presidency was.  Am I correct if I say that

 3     according to the then regulation, it should have been occupied by the

 4     municipal president?  Given that Zepa had not been a municipality,

 5     another solution had to be come up with.  Could you please explain who

 6     elected presidents of war presidencies and specifically the president in

 7     Zepa?

 8        A.   Good morning.

 9        Q.   Good morning to you as well.

10        A.   The answer is as follows:  You are correct when you say that

11     under the then legislation of the Socialist Federal Republic of

12     Yugoslavia, automatically, the municipal president in war conditions also

13     as the president of the War Presidency.  You also said that given that

14     Zepa had not enjoyed municipal status, it was only a part of a

15     municipality, I can tell you what I know about how presidents of war

16     presidencies were elected.

17             As far as I know, and from what I could gather later, the first

18     president of the War Presidency, I don't know whether he was appointed by

19     anyone or he was nominated by a group of prominent people in Zepa.  They

20     obviously believed that this person would be best suited to fill that

21     position.

22             As of 1993 onwards, presidents of the War Presidency were

23     appointed by Sarajevo.  I don't know whether it was the party who did

24     that or some other political body.  It is most likely that the party, the

25     SDA, appointed them, because they received the most votes among the

Page 4541

 1     Muslim population.  This is as far as my knowledge goes about any

 2     appointments and removals of presidents of war presidencies.

 3        Q.   Who was the first, the second, and the third president?

 4        A.   As far as I recall, and I said that in my previous testimony on

 5     Thursday, I believe, the first War Presidency president was

 6     Mr. Benjamin Kulovac.  The second, Ago Padzic, and the third,

 7     Mehmed Hajric.  If there were any other people in between, I can't recall

 8     them.  This is what I can remember, more or less.

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for Mr. Tolimir.  Could the witness

10     and the accused be reminded to pause between questions and answers.

11     Thank you.

12             THE WITNESS:  [No interpretation]

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We didn't receive interpretation of the last

14     portion of the witness's statement.

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Nor was the question heard, Your Honour,

16     because the microphone was off.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The question was whether all three

18     presidents of the War Presidency were members of the SDA.  I hope I

19     understood the question well.  My answer is that I am certain of the last

20     two, Ago Padzic and Mehmed Hajric, whereas I am not certain about

21     Mr. Benjamin Kulovac.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for Mr. Tolimir.

24             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   The appointment of war presidents in Zepa, was it done personally

Page 4542

 1     by the president of the republic, Alija Izetbegovic, or was it done by

 2     some other bodies of the government or any of the ministers?

 3        A.   I truly don't have that information.  We always used to refer to

 4     their appointments as coming from Sarajevo.  I was never a member of the

 5     party and I wasn't privy to any political processes, so I can't really

 6     respond to that.  It must have been someone from the political

 7     leadership.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  So you confirm that Mr. Hajric was also the chairman

 9     of the SDA in Zepa.  Did the SDA in Zepa include any members of other

10     ethnicities or political parties?

11        A.   I have a small correction.  I think the SDA chairman in Zepa was

12     not Mr. Hajric.  I think it was Ago Padzic.  When he was removed from the

13     position of president of War Presidency, I believe he remained in his

14     chairman SDA position.  This is what I can recall.

15             As regards the members of the War Presidency, I did not belong to

16     any political party, whereas for others, I don't know.  There was

17     Hurem Sakic there.  I don't know whether he was an SDA member or not.  I

18     truly cannot tell you anything precisely.  I don't think it was necessary

19     for one to be an SDA member, to be a member of the War Presidency.

20     However, most of the members were.

21        Q.   Thank you.  At page 4258, lines 7 to 10, of the 23rd of August,

22     you explained that Mr. Hajric was a "hodja," a cleric.  That was his

23     training.  At page 4259 of the same day, lines 10 to 13, you say that the

24     position of the president of the War Presidency was supposed to have been

25     held by the municipal speaker, the municipal president, who was

Page 4543

 1     Mehmed Hajric.  He was the person number one in Zepa.  Given that this is

 2     unclear, was he also both the municipal president and the president of

 3     the War Presidency?

 4        A.   I'll go back to the beginning.

 5             Given that there had been no municipal structures in existence,

 6     there were no other positions than the position of the president of the

 7     War Presidency, and he was only that.  There was no other person to fill

 8     the position of the mayor or the municipal president.  This was a joint

 9     function, a joint position.

10        Q.   Thank you.  When Mr. Hajric was elected president of the

11     War Presidency, given the fact that he was also a cleric, did this, as a

12     matter of fact, mean joining the clerical and laymen's or civil powers

13     together?

14        A.   As far as I know, Mr. Hajric, as you say, was not a cleric in

15     Zepa.  He was a "hodja," however, not a church leader.  Before the war,

16     he had worked in a different village.  In Zepa, there had been a "hodja,"

17     and he was there throughout the war as well performing that function.  As

18     far as I know, he had been a "hodja" in Podzeplje, and once the war broke

19     out, he ended up in Zepa, like I did.  In any case, he did not act as a

20     Zepa "hodja," because there was another person during the war doing the

21     same thing, and this was the same person who had been there before.

22     Hajric simply did not do that part of the work at the time.

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for Mr. Tolimir.

24             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   When he was president of the War Presidency, did he also act as

Page 4544

 1     "hodja"?

 2        A.   No, he never did.  This was his vocation, so to say, but he acted

 3     as "hodja" in a completely different place before 1992.  He had his own

 4     mosque.  When the war broke out, he arrived in Zepa, and there was

 5     another "hodja" in Zepa who remained in that position throughout the war.

 6     They only referred to Hajric as "hodja" because that was his vocation.

 7     However, during the war he was never a "hodja" in Zepa.  There was

 8     another person there who had been there for some 10 years prior to that.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Tell us this, please:  Did the president of the

10     War Presidency, Mr. Hajric, keep in touch with any UNPROFOR

11     representatives and other international organisations?  Did he also

12     perform that task, since you said as follows:  The War Presidency was

13     supposed to decide on all issues concerning the life in the enclave?

14     This is what you said in your testimony.

15        A.   Specifically concerning Mr. Hajric, I can tell you that as far as

16     I recall, he was in that position less than six months.  Namely, at that

17     time there was a problem concerning his appointment, and he did not want

18     to assume that position.  And for a month or two, Zepa did not have a

19     person acting in capacity of the War Presidency president.  A few months

20     before Zepa finally fell, he accepted the position, so he remained in it

21     only for a short period of time.  I basically don't even recall any of

22     his contacts with UNPROFOR, the military observers, or anyone else.  He

23     came in the end, a few months before the end, before Zepa fell.

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for Mr. Tolimir.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I was waiting for the transcript.

Page 4545

 1             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Let's clarify how mayors or presidents of the War Presidency were

 3     elected in Zepa.

 4             Could we please have 1D268.  It's a letter sent by the Assembly

 5     speaker of Zepa, sent to Alija Izetbegovic on the 31st of December, 1995.

 6             We are about to see it.  You are probably familiar with it.

 7        A.   Yes, I'd like to refresh my memory.

 8        Q.   I won't read it out loud.  You can remind yourself, and then I

 9     will have a few questions.

10             Please zoom in.  This is dated the 13th of December, 1995, sent

11     by the then speaker of the Assembly in Zepa, Mr. Cardakovic, to the

12     president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think this document is really illegible.  Is

14     there any way to make it more legible?  Mr. Tolimir.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

16             We have hard copies for the witness, and it's also on the screen.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

18             MR. THAYER:  Good morning, Mr. President.

19             Is there a translation available?  We just got the revised list

20     of cross-examination exhibits, I guess, about 10 minutes ago, so I

21     haven't had a chance to print anything out, look at anything.  If there's

22     a translation, it would be helpful for us.  We've had no notice.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I'm told that there is no translation yet.

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There is no translation.  I will

Page 4546

 1     read out a portion of the document.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think your proposal to hand over a hard copy of

 3     that document to the witness would be a helpful way.  That should be

 4     done.

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could Mr. Tolimir also be

 6     asked to read slowly.  Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes.  Please continue, but while reading, very

 9     slow, please.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             I'm reading from the second paragraph:

12             "The president of the War Presidency of Zepa municipality,

13     Efendija Hajric, Mehmed, is requested to do as follows:  At a meeting of

14     the Assembly of Zepa, held on the 30th of December, 1994, there was

15     discussion about a query sent to the president of the B and H Presidency,

16     Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, by the newly-appointed War Presidency president of

17     the municipality of Zepa, Hajric, Mehmed, who has still not assumed his

18     functions."

19             And there has been no reply to the query sent on the 6th of

20     November, 1994, comprising seven items.

21             Could we please scroll up.  Further down so we can see the last

22     portion.  Even more, please.  Thank you.

23             And then he continues to say, and I will now read the eighth

24     paragraph:

25             "... the exercise of the said function and the work of the organs

Page 4547

 1     of the municipality.  Therefore, we request that you reply to our queries

 2     earlier as soon as possible because the situation is very serious."

 3             And now I will read the third paragraph from the bottom:

 4             "We request that the competent service of the armed forces at the

 5     Communications Centre, and in particular General Enver Hasanovic [as

 6     interpreted], to forward this communication, together with a query,

 7     directly and personally to the president of the R BiH,

 8     Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, and to inform us thereof."

 9             Thank you.  And then we see this text.  It is signed

10     "C. Cardakovic."

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Now, you've just seen this text.  And could you tell us, please,

13     why this request was sent to Alija Izetbegovic?  Thank you.

14        A.   Well, I will just make a short introduction.

15             I do remember this particular incident.  That's what I've already

16     mentioned, and maybe I wasn't clear enough.

17             There was a problem with Mr. Mehmed Hajric accepting the role of

18     the presidents of the municipality, and as far as I recall, he actually

19     declined that offer.  And then what followed was all this, the letter

20     sent off.  And why they were sent to the president,

21     Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, I really don't know.  Maybe that was the practice

22     in those days.  I don't know if there were some other organs where these

23     were sent, as far as the political aspects were concerned, where

24     communications of this type would be sent.  So that's all I would have to

25     say.

Page 4548

 1             Now, as we can see in this particular letter, the problem

 2     surrounding the appointment of the president of the War Presidency was

 3     something that they felt they needed to inform the president of the

 4     Presidency, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Now, was he -- as president of the War Presidency of

 6     Bosnia and Herzegovina, was he authorised to appointment all other

 7     wartime presidencies of municipalities?  Thank you.

 8        A.   I don't know how it was -- how exactly it was done, but as far as

 9     this particular aspect is concerned, it was something that

10     Mr. Alija Izetbegovic actually did.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Now, was Mr. Hajrulahovic [as interpreted] therefore

12     appointed by the president, Mr. Izetbegovic?

13        A.   Well, I really don't know.  I've never seen any paper saying

14     that, and I can't really say, yes, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic did that.  But

15     that he did have influence over who was going to be appointed, yes, and I

16     believe that his decision was the final decision.  Of course, I assume

17     that somebody would have prepared all the documents and all elements that

18     were necessary for such a decision for the president, but he was the one

19     who would have made the decision.  But there must have been other people

20     who would actually prepare all of that in advance for the president.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

23             Let us have a look at the top of this document, please, on the

24     screen.  I note we see a date, 31st of December, 1994.  In the

25     transcript, on page 7, line 8, there's a reference to the 13th of

Page 4549

 1     December of the next year, 1995.  Perhaps Mr. Tolimir misspoke.

 2             Mr. Thayer.

 3             MR. THAYER:  Just one, I think, minor transcript correction.

 4     There's a reference, at LiveNote page 10, to a Mr. Hajrulahovic, who is a

 5     high-level officer within the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and I'm not

 6     sure that's to whom General Tolimir was referring.  I suspect it was

 7     either him misspeaking or just a problem with the transcript.  But if we

 8     could correct that just so there's no confusion later on.  The individual

 9     whose name is there is also known as Talijan, and I think we're talking

10     about two completely different people.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

12             Mr. Tolimir, you were referring, in line 8 of page 10, to

13     Mr. Hajrulahovic.  Was that the person you mentioned or did you refer to

14     another person in your question?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I can't really recall

16     whether I mentioned that name, but the reference here was to

17     Enver Hadzihasanovic, because we can see that name in the third paragraph

18     from the bottom of this document.  And we can see, from this decision,

19     that Hajric was actually waiting for his official appointment by

20     Alija Izetbegovic to this post of wartime president.  And I would

21     appreciate it if we -- I would like to tender this document into evidence

22     because it shows that he actually exercised the duties of wartime

23     president in an official capacity and formally.  Thank you.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

25             Mr. Thayer, does that clarify your concern about the transcript?

Page 4550

 1             MR. THAYER:  That does, Mr. President, and I hope my intervention

 2     didn't throw us off track from your question to the accused.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think both corrections are now on the

 4     transcript.

 5             Before we decide on the document, Judge Nyambe has a question.

 6             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Yes.  Just a clarification, actually.

 7             What's the difference between a cleric and a "hodja"?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In this particular case, we could

 9     equate them, actually.  Those two terms mean the same thing.  "Hodja" is

10     one of the titles for clerics, Muslim clerics.  That would be one of the

11     levels that you can reach in your career.  But in this particular case,

12     as far as I'm concerned, you can just equate these two terms.  They are

13     the same thing to me.

14             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The document will be marked for identification,

16     pending translation.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter 1D268 will be Exhibit D93, marked for

18     identification.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And I would like to let the Defence know it would

20     be helpful for the other party, the Prosecution, to be informed a little

21     bit earlier about use of a document and not just before trial.

22             Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I

24     apologise, once again, for being late in disclosing these documents.  We

25     will do our best to avoid that in the future.

Page 4551

 1             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Now, during our conversation last week, we discussed the document

 3     on appointments of the presidents of war presidencies.  Now, could you

 4     tell us what that function entails?

 5        A.   Well, during my earlier testimony, I already spoke about that.

 6     As a matter of principle, the president of the Wartime Presidency is the

 7     most important individual in a certain town or area.  That is the person

 8     who co-ordinates the work of everyone else, individuals and

 9     organisations, the executive committee, the civilian police, the civilian

10     protection.  Next, that title meant that he would be the person

11     responsible for communications with international organisations and their

12     representatives and with UNPROFOR.  So, generally speaking, those would

13     be the main functions of the president of the Wartime Presidency.

14        Q.   Thank you.  You've just told us that this was the most important

15     official.  Now, could you tell us what his authorities were vis-a-vis the

16     army and military operations?  Thank you.

17        A.   In your -- in my answer, my earlier answer, you could see that I

18     did not make any mention of the army.  At this time, there was a dilemma

19     in Zepa, and this dilemma was never resolved.  The dilemma was the

20     following: whether the Wartime Presidency or, more specifically, its

21     president was also the most responsible person for the army or was the

22     army part of the overall military system, so that the civilian

23     authorities would have no effective influence over any decisions that

24     related to military matters.  Now, this matter was also something that

25     caused some personal misunderstandings between the individuals who were

Page 4552

 1     in these two positions, the commander of the army and the war

 2     president -- War Presidency president.

 3             Now, in this very small community, where the Wartime Presidency

 4     was in charge of organising the civilian aspects of life, but then, at

 5     least in the latter days in Zepa, there was a brigade that was part of

 6     other military structures and the chain of command was a different chain

 7     of command.  Again I have to restate this, this matter was never cleared

 8     up and it was never quite clear who actually had precedence, who the boss

 9     was, the leading individual.

10        Q.   Thank you.  In order to clarify this further, could you please

11     tell us the following:  When military decisions were made, where

12     Avdo Palic was not bound to act according to orders from the BH Army, did

13     he, himself, make those decisions, and were they made at sessions of the

14     War Presidency; in other words, even matters that related to military

15     issues?  Thank you.

16        A.   Well, it was like this:  Such instances were very few, or at

17     least I cannot recall them.  As of 1993 or up until 1993, the army was

18     nonexistent; at least formally, it did not exist.  And toward the end of

19     1994 and in early 1995, that is what happened then.  Now, as for the

20     decisions, I think -- I think that Colonel Palic, himself, was the person

21     who had the greatest influence when such decisions were concerned.  Now,

22     whether there were any other arrangements that I was not privy to, I

23     don't know.  But judging by some matters that occurred in 1995, I know

24     that Colonel Palic was almost exclusively the person who made decisions

25     on military issues.  So there was not any major influence from the

Page 4553

 1     president of the War Presidency.

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for Mr. Tolimir, please.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4        Q.   In that case, did the Wartime Presidency have any influence over

 5     the army?  And if so, what kind of influence was it?  And could you tell

 6     us, please, whether there were any -- whether there was any military

 7     presence in Zepa or not?  You've just told us that there wasn't, but

 8     let's talk about this as it was, actually, the realities of it.

 9        A.   Well, I will try to throw some further light on this.

10             Well, there was some influence, for sure, but not -- it wasn't

11     crucial.  And let me stress, once again, that as far as I can recall, as

12     of May 1993, up until the end of 1994, December of 1994, when I said

13     there was no military presence, what I meant was that there didn't exist

14     the real organised activities that are characteristic of army activities.

15     There were people who lived in Zepa, who were organised and perhaps

16     registered as members of the certain units, but there were no activities

17     of any kind.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Well, since we've now described, up to a point, the

19     relationship between the War Presidency and the military, my question is

20     this:  Was the Wartime Presidency duty-bound to implement the decision

21     that would be made by the president of the Presidency of Bosnia and

22     Herzegovina and its government?  Thank you.

23        A.   Well, that would be logical to assume, but I don't really

24     remember that there were many such orders.  But speaking within the legal

25     framework, yes, of course, there is no dilemma as to that.  If you are

Page 4554

 1     part of a system, then, of course, you have to implement the decision --

 2     the decisions that are made higher up.  But I tried to recall whether

 3     there was anything that we, as the Wartime Presidency, received from

 4     Sarajevo, as we used to put it, and I don't remember that there was

 5     anything like that.  But as for the general aspect, my answer would be

 6     yes.

 7        Q.   If the federal government issued a decision concerning the

 8     military in Zepa, was the War Presidency in charge of implementing it?

 9     Were there any dual chains that were followed or was it only the

10     War Presidency that was in charge?

11        A.   It's difficult for me to say because I can't rely on any

12     examples.  Anything related to the army arrived from the army.  I don't

13     recall a single case when we, as the War Presidency -- I think the

14     federation came into being in 1994.  When we received something, that

15     would be related to the army.  Had we received any such thing, we would

16     have probably -- dot, dot, dot.  I can tell you again that I don't

17     remember any such thing, but, within any case, in the system of

18     functioning, it would have been logical for us to implement the decisions

19     of our political authorities in Sarajevo.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Specifically, if a decision was made on a general

21     call-up in the federation by the minister, was Zepa also tasked with

22     implementing it; i.e., its War Presidency?

23        A.   My answer is, yes, Zepa was part of that political and

24     geographical hold.  There is nothing in dispute there.

25        Q.   Tell us, please, whether those in the War Presidency from the

Page 4555

 1     army, the police, and civil defence, as well as the executive board, were

 2     obliged to carry out the decisions of the Zepa War Presidency.

 3        A.   Look, in principle, yes, of course, although all of the decisions

 4     we made had been previously agreed upon.  And logically speaking, I'd say

 5     yes.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Was the War Presidency, in the spring of 1995,

 7     informed that there was a general offensive underway of the Army of

 8     Bosnia-Herzegovina?  And if so, did they undertake the necessary measures

 9     within the enclave to support that?

10        A.   I personally do not recall any such notification arriving from

11     the political structures in Sarajevo.  I remember what came from the

12     army, though.  As for any political structures from Sarajevo, I don't

13     recall ever receiving anything.  As for some military orders, I do

14     remember some.

15        Q.   Please, on page 20 of the 23rd of August this year, you said, I

16     quote:

17             "There were lines of communication.  The most important things

18     were also put before the War Presidency.  Still, some key issues, as well

19     as commands within the military organisations, that is something that

20     Commander Palic received through his own lines of command and not from

21     the War Presidency in Zepa."

22             Do you recall this?

23        A.   I do.

24        Q.   Thank you.  You seem to be saying that some things arrived

25     through the War Presidency and governmental organs and other things came

Page 4556

 1     through Palic.  Would they ever in contravention?

 2        A.   Probably, I wasn't precise enough when I said that.  As regards

 3     physical communication, there was only one way to do that, which was, so

 4     to say, owned by the army.  It provided direct links to the military and

 5     the political structures in Sarajevo.  When I said that, I had in mind a

 6     specific case.  I don't recall any special orders or instructions which

 7     we, as the War Presidency, received from Sarajevo that were sent by our

 8     political authorities.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Tell us this:  Did Avdo Palic inform the

10     War Presidency of some tasks he received where he needed to engage

11     civilians who, of course, fell under the competence of the

12     War Presidency?

13        A.   As far as I remember and as far as I think I already testified,

14     most of such activities, if Avdo had to do anything, Colonel Palic, that

15     is, he didn't frequently, if I may say so, inform the members of the

16     War Presidency.  He did on one occasion, though, in the spring of 1995.

17     It was the order to undertake certain military activities outside the

18     enclave.  I recall that.  As for any previous activities, as far as I

19     remember, such things were never on the agenda of the War Presidency.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             Could we please have 1D264 shown in e-court.  It is a letter by

22     Avdo Palic, sent to General Hadzihasanovic, brigadier-general, and to

23     Brigadier Naser Oric on the 13th of December, 1994.

24             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   We can see it on the screen.  I will quote, since it is rather

Page 4557

 1     illegible, and then you can confirm, perhaps:

 2             "Infantry Chetnik forces are kept under constant supervision

 3     along the entire line of the zone of responsibility.  Firing positions

 4     Vrtoce, Stoborani, and Rujiste, can intercept any sabotage incursions.  I

 5     would appreciate any effort made by the General Staff of the Army of

 6     Bosnia-Herzegovina on the planning of any activities.  What would be your

 7     suggestions if we took, by force, the weapons stored with UNPROFOR and

 8     engage in our own battle?  If there is no information forthcoming, I

 9     would be forced to seize any opportunity to use small groups to make as

10     many attacks -- carry out attacks against enemy axes."

11             He keeps referring to UNPROFOR in the rest of the letter.

12             My question to you is this:  He seemed to have a question for

13     Sarajevo.  He basically wanted to know whether he needed to await any

14     further UNPROFOR observer activities and whether they were informed of

15     the situation.  He also asked for further instruction.  The document is

16     signed by Avdo Palic.  What personal battles or incursions is he talking

17     about?

18        A.   I don't know whether I saw these documents three years ago when I

19     testified in another case.  There's nothing I can tell you about this.  I

20     simply don't know.  This was obviously an army matter.  It is possible

21     that in late 1994, there were military activities by the VRS and that the

22     situation was a bit tense, more than usual.  However, I don't recall that

23     there was any psychosis, the feeling of the final battle coming up.  This

24     is something we didn't have at that time.  This was simply a letter sent

25     by Mr. Palic to his superiors.  I see it for the first time.  I don't

Page 4558

 1     remember such ambiance, such atmosphere, at the time in late 1994.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

 3             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, just, again, to make sure the record

 4     is as clear as possible.  And I sense we're done with the document, but

 5     just when we go back in the future, the general's question referred to an

 6     inquiry of Sarajevo.  He may have misspoke, and I think it's clear that

 7     this document, itself - I don't have a translation - refers to, I

 8     believe, the General Staff which was based in Kakanj, which is consistent

 9     with what the witness has testified before, the military being based in

10     Kakanj, the political leadership being based in Sarajevo.  I just wanted

11     to clarify that for the record.  I don't think there will be any dispute

12     from the Defence about that, but I just wanted to make that clear for the

13     record.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

15             Could we go back to the top of this document.

16             And, Witness, would you confirm what the Prosecutor just said?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can.  The political centre

18     was in Sarajevo, and the Main Staff or the General Staff, whatever the

19     name was, of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina had its headquarters in

20     Kakanj.  This is what I mentioned previously.  And this is confirmed by

21     the letter, itself, because it was sent to the command post in Kakanj, I

22     believe.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't think I ever said anything

24     to the contrary.  We can see the heading, and we see therein who was at

25     what location.  Avdo Palic sent this to the Staff of the Supreme Command

Page 4559

 1     of the Armed Forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, their command post in Kakanj,

 2     Brigadier-General Enver Hadzihasanovic, who was the chief of staff of the

 3     Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to the Operational Group 8 Command of

 4     Srebrenica, Mr. Naser Oric, who was his immediate superior.  I never said

 5     anything otherwise.

 6             By your leave, I'd like to put the next question to the witness.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  One moment, please.

 8                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   While we are on this document, tell us this:  In December 1994,

13     when this letter was written, did the War Presidency consider the option

14     of seizing arms from UNPROFOR, and did Avdo Palic want to do this by

15     himself, without the knowledge of other members of the War Presidency, if

16     you know?

17        A.   I don't recall that.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Tell us this, please:  In December 1994, as is stated

19     here, did Avdo Palic carry out any consultations with the War Presidency,

20     and how did he inform the War Presidency that he was to send sabotage

21     groups towards Sokolac and other locations, because this must have had an

22     impact on other military activity in the enclave?

23        A.   I don't remember that either.  I don't know whether there are any

24     documents in existence to that effect.  In late 1994, I don't seem to

25     recall any official discussions at the War Presidency sessions about

Page 4560

 1     that.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know anything about the sending of sabotage

 3     groups towards Sokolac and Han Pijesak?

 4        A.   I know about the case I already testified about.  I'm trying to

 5     rewind to see whether I heard some things later, but this is the only

 6     case I can actually confirm.  It was in June or July 1995.  I don't know

 7     anything about this, though.

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for Mr. Tolimir.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have 1D266 next.

10             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   In it, on the 13th of December, 1994, Avdo Palic urgently sent a

12     request to the Operational Administration of the command post in Kakanj,

13     this letter.  He wanted information -- or, rather, he informed the

14     Operational Administration of the following:  He says:

15             "We are hereby sending information --"

16             We can see it well now.  This concerns the situation in the

17     brigade.  I will quote the second paragraph, staffing levels of the

18     brigade.  It says that they have 100 per cent staffing levels, in terms

19     of manpower.  Can you see that?

20        A.   I do.

21        Q.   He then follows it up by saying that 30 per cent of those carry

22     automatic weapons, and that they have 20.000 rounds, 2 mortars, 15

23     shells, 10 hand-held rocket-launchers, as well as 2 hand-held

24     rocket-launchers of a different type, and that every day there are 120

25     soldiers on the lines.  This was in December 1994.

Page 4561

 1             My question is this:  Concerning this information about the

 2     staffing levels of the brigade and its daily activities, was the

 3     War Presidency informed of it as well, because you were a member of it?

 4        A.   We were definitely not privy to these details.  We were never

 5     briefed about such issues by Colonel Palic during our sessions.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Tell us, please, did you know where the army was

 7     stationed and whether there were special facilities to house them?  In

 8     other words, when they were not on the front-line, where were they

 9     accommodated, where were they located, or was it the case that they

10     actually stayed at their own houses?  Thank you.

11        A.   As far as I know, there were no barracks in Zepa or that type of

12     military installation.  But Avdo did have two offices at his disposal.

13     They were at the same -- in the same building where the executive

14     committee was.  The building was in down-town Zepa.  And when the army

15     was engaged in operations we see here in late 1994, that it was engaged

16     on a daily basis on the front-lines, that there were 120 men sent to the

17     front-line every day.  I will not make any remarks regarding this.  But

18     once they were -- when they were not on the front-line, they would go

19     home.  So there was -- there were no facilities, no barracks or anything

20     of that sort.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  We may remove this

22     document.  Or, rather, scroll it up so that we can see the last two

23     paragraphs.  Thank you.

24             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   You can see here, in the paragraph before last, in line 3, "the

Page 4562

 1     defence of the free territory," and then it says:

 2             "We should use to the maximum the lay of the land by blocking the

 3     main communications that are passable by armoured and mechanised units of

 4     the enemy and, by using our main forces on those axes, prevent the enemy

 5     to breach the free territory.  In addition, by infiltrating smaller

 6     sabotage groups deep behind the enemy lines, we should caress enemy units

 7     and, at critical points, ask for co-ordination with part of units of the

 8     8th OG."

 9             And in the end, it says a number of units should be held at the

10     ready in order to take up the weapons -- or, rather, in order to

11     confiscate the weapons from the Ukrainian Company and in order to prevent

12     them from leaving Zepa.  Thank you.

13             Now, could you tell us, please, how are we to interpret this

14     letter of Avdo Palic's where he says that they should launch attacks from

15     the demilitarised zone and keep harassing enemy troops?  How did that --

16     what kind of effect did that have on the security of the base, of this

17     area, because this area had the status of a demilitarised zone, and is

18     there anything else that you can tell us about this decision of the

19     War Presidency?  Thank you.

20        A.   Well, I've told you already at the outset that this is the first

21     time that I have seen this document, and all I can say, in answer to your

22     questions, is this:  This was not something that was discussed at any

23     session of the War Presidency, and I think that the position of most

24     members of the War Presidency at the time was not in favour of -- or,

25     rather, the members of the Wartime Presidency were not in favour of these

Page 4563

 1     proposals that we see here by Avdo Palic, in other words, to send

 2     sabotage groups to infiltrate the enemy territory and so on, because that

 3     just exacerbated the situation.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  During your testimony on the 23rd of July [as

 5     interpreted], you said that in spring 1993, up until the spring of 1995,

 6     the enclave was shelled for reasons that had nothing to do with the

 7     enclave, itself.  On page 4285 of the transcript of 29th of July, 1995

 8     [as interpreted], you said the following, and I quote:

 9             "During that time, as far as I can recall, there were occasional

10     shellings of the Zepa enclave, and I believe that the shelling always

11     came as a response to some developments outside of the enclave, and what

12     I'm saying here is, according to what I can remember, there were no

13     attacks or any infantry advances at this time."

14             So we are discussing the period between the spring of 1993 and

15     the spring of 1995.  Did I quote your words correctly?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   Now, my next question:  Was it possible --

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I think we have to check whether the

19     dates you were referring to are correct.  You were referring to the

20     testimony of this witness of the 23rd of July.  If I recall correctly,

21     the witness was here on the 23rd of August, this month.  And then later

22     on you are referring to a transcript page of the 29th of July, 1995.

23     I think that could be a mistake as well.  Please check it and tell us the

24     exact reference.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  You're

Page 4564

 1     absolutely right, and I will repeat this portion for the transcript.

 2             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   During your testimony of 23rd of August, you said that in the

 4     period between the spring of 1993 and the spring of 1995, and also in

 5     your last sentence you said on page 4285 of the transcript of 23rd, and

 6     in place of "July" it should read "August," 1995 [as interpreted], you

 7     say the following --

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Sorry, stop.  Are you really referring to 1995?

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise.  That should be

10     "2010."  Thank you.  The testimony was in 2010.  Thank you.  I apologise.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Now we have it on the record.

12             Mr. Thayer.

13             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, while we have this little interlude,

14     it looks like we're moving on to other exhibits.  I'm just keeping my own

15     little list here.  I don't know if 1D264 and 1D266 were intended to be

16     tendered or not, but -- before we get too far afield.  Maybe I missed it,

17     but my list shows that they haven't been offered, and I just wanted to

18     point that out for the record.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  This is our recognition as well, they

20     were not tendered yet.

21             Mr. Tolimir.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Can the witness just answer this one question, and then we can go

25     back to that issue.  So my question was this:  Was it possible that the

Page 4565

 1     shelling came as a result of some reasons that you were not privy to, as

 2     a member of the War Presidency, because you were not informed on a daily

 3     basis by Avdo Palic on the activities of the Zepa Brigade?  Thank you.

 4        A.   Well, I do not exclude that possibility.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             Mr. President, if there are no objections, I would like to tender

 7     these documents into evidence.  Thank you.  That's 1D266 and 1D264.

 8     Thank you.  And then I will move on to a new topic.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, do you want --

10             MR. THAYER:  No objection, Mr. President.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

12             Both documents will be marked for identification, pending

13     translation.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter 1D264 will be Exhibit D94, marked for

15     identification.  65 ter 1D266 will be Exhibit D95, marked for

16     identification.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

18             Mr. Tolimir.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             Could we now please pull up in e-court D255.

21             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter correction:  D55, page 3 in the

22     English and B/C/S versions.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I repeat the number.  That's D55,

24     page 3 in B/C/S, or perhaps I've been misunderstood.  We need the

25     Exhibit D55, page 3 both in the English and B/C/S versions.  This is an

Page 4566

 1     expert report by Viktor Bezruchenko, and the title is "The Fall of Zepa."

 2     And we are reading from the part where it says "Military Narrative."

 3             Could we see paragraph 8, please, and I would like to refer you

 4     to the last sentence.  We have before us paragraph 4.  We need

 5     paragraph 8.  Thank you.  That's page 3, paragraph 3 [as interpreted].

 6     Thank you.  Perhaps the witness can read through paragraph 8.  This is a

 7     description of the Zepa situation and the situation within the Zepa

 8     Brigade, as described by the expert.

 9             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   I will now just refer you to this part:

11             "This strategy has shown absence of professional military

12     planning and it defied reality on the ground and military logic and,

13     therefore, was a harbinger of a coming disaster."

14             This is what this expert said about the situation in Zepa.

15             My question for the witness:  Was it necessary to be told about

16     this by a military expert or could you, yourself, actually see this for

17     yourself on the ground?

18        A.   Well, look, I don't know what strategy you're referring here.  I

19     believe the strategy that is referred to is what is written in fine print

20     there, in that portion.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Yes.  You may, if you like, read out that portion to

22     yourself.  That's where he speaks about infiltrating groups behind

23     enemy -- behind the Serb lines, and that's what I quoted earlier.

24        A.   Well, I've already said this in my earlier testimony.  Zepa was

25     completely surrounded, and if you look at the number of troops,

Page 4567

 1     ammunition available, and weapons that they had at their disposal, in

 2     other words, if there had been a serious organised attack, Zepa would not

 3     have been able to defend itself, Zepa, itself, if you take it out of

 4     context, Zepa, without any assistance from anywhere else.  So this, what

 5     we can read here, and what Colonel Palic said, although I'm no military

 6     expert, but it's all a question of what kind of resources you have.  Now,

 7     if you have a limited number of bullets, for instance, you can use them

 8     up in 15 minutes, for instance.  So if you don't have a normal supply

 9     line and logistics, I don't know what kind of military strategy could be

10     sufficient to defend Zepa, if that had to be done, only based on their

11     own internal forces.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Please tell us, was it necessary to launch attacks

13     from the Zepa enclave, attacks on a far stronger enemy, thereby

14     jeopardising the status of the enclave as a demilitarised zone?  Thank

15     you.

16        A.   Well, I said this during my testimony three and a half years ago,

17     and I said it a few days ago, that most members of the Presidency did not

18     agree with that tactic because it -- militarily, it could not produce any

19     effects.  And, in fact, by doing so, you were just providing an excuse

20     for the Serbian side so that it can open fire on the enclave.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Was that also unjustified because there were no

22     attacks, as you said a little earlier, in the period between the spring

23     of 1993 and the spring of 1995?  So you said that there were no attacks,

24     so was it necessary to launch attacks on the Serb positions?

25        A.   Well, I think I answered your question with my previous answer.

Page 4568

 1     There was no need for any such activities.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Is it possible that Avdo Palic, when he resorted to

 3     this type of strategy, relied and counted on NATO help, because no one

 4     would want to do things that would harm themselves?

 5        A.   Well, I don't know.  I cannot say either way.  But there were a

 6     few such actions, and they were not logical, to put it that way.

 7        Q.   Thank you for your answer.  During the examination-in-chief, you

 8     said that the War Presidency was against attacks being launched from

 9     within the enclave?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   Can you tell us a little more about that?  Thank you.

12        A.   Well, that was a reference to an order that had arrived, and

13     I think I was shown that order three and a half years ago when I

14     testified here.  I think it was a Defence exhibit.  It referred to the

15     period of June 1995, and I think that the situation was -- that the

16     situation was worsened at the time.  We received this order from the

17     War Presidency, and Avdo Palic actually did these things, although we

18     were against it.  And that's what I said, something to that effect.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Sir, during the examination-in-chief, you said on a

20     number of occasions that there were instances of supplying weapons by

21     helicopter, and ammunition, to Zepa.  This is something that you said on

22     pages 4277 and 4288 [as interpreted] of the transcript, and you said that

23     in response to Judge Nyambe's question on 4288 [as interpreted], in line

24     7 through 18 -- to 12.  You've said the following, I quote:

25             "These were BH Army helicopters, or, rather, the then BH Army.

Page 4569

 1     These deliveries of weapons and everything else were done by the BH Army,

 2     whereby they supplied their units in Zepa and Srebrenica."

 3             Thank you.  Did I quote your words correctly?

 4        A.   You did.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have D63 shown

 6     next.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, if you look at page 30 of today's

 8     transcript, line 17, there's a reference to pages 4277 and 4288.  I think

 9     that should be corrected.  I suppose you mean 4277 and 4278.  Is that

10     correct?

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Precisely, Mr. President.  I thank

12     you for your correction.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D63, please.  It is the final

15     analysis of the air-lift in Srebrenica and Zepa of the 17th of February,

16     1996, by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina Air Force.

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

18             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   You can see the document.  It says "Final Analysis of the

20     Srebrenica and Zepa Air-Lift."  It is stated that it was drafted by the

21     Department for Cryptographic Data Protection on the 17th of February,

22     1996, that is to say, after Zepa's fall.  Hence, we can say that you are

23     being shown now a document which was produced on the 17th of February,

24     1996, after Zepa's fall.  Since it was after Zepa's fall, could you

25     please comment, together with me, on the document?

Page 4570

 1        A.   May I say something?

 2        Q.   Go ahead, please.

 3        A.   In the heading, it says "the 17th of February, 1996," whereas

 4     just further down, it says "17 February 1995."  Is there a mistake

 5     somewhere?

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think we should blow up this part a little bit

 7     further so that we can check it.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Perhaps someone was wrong about the

 9     year.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  The date of production

11     probably is the 17th February 1995.  It says "Army of the Republic of

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina Command of the Air Force."  However, the

13     Communications Centre forwarded this document in 1996.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   You can see that it is divided by the line?

16        A.   Thank you, although it did strike me strange because exactly one

17     year happened between the two dates.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

19             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I thought we had agreed on what

20     I think we can conclude from looking at the charts, themselves, that this

21     document must have been created sometime after May of 1995, given that it

22     details at least one flight to Zepa of 7 May 1995.  So I thought we were

23     all in agreement that the document, itself, was probably created on 17

24     February 1996 and forwarded on the same date, and that as we all are want

25     to do when we're in a new year, we forget that we're in a new year and we

Page 4571

 1     put the old year's date.  But I don't want to testify, but I thought we

 2     sort of shared that understanding about the date disparity here.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This matches with my recollection.  But in

 4     February, you normally know you're in the new year.

 5             I think to clarify this also for the witness, we should have a

 6     look at that part you were referring to, Mr. Thayer, where there is

 7     mention of an occurrence of May 1995.

 8             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, that's page 10 of e-court in the

 9     English, and let me just count the pages for the B/C/S.  I think page 10

10     of the B/C/S as well.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  In B/C/S, it is obviously the wrong page, but --

12             MR. THAYER:  I beg your pardon.  Page 11 of the B/C/S,

13     Mr. President.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  Now it's clear what it's referring

15     to, an occurrence in May 1995.  So everybody agrees this document was

16     produced in 1996, in February.

17             Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

18             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19        Q.   As was just said, in this document, in attachment 2 on page 11 in

20     Serbian and page 10 in English, we have an overview of the sorties to

21     Zepa and the amount of supplies carried, as well as some other

22     information.  Please have a look.  You can see it on the screen, I

23     believe.

24        A.   Yes, I can.

25        Q.   In the right column -- sorry, in the second column, it says

Page 4572

 1     "Months," that is to say, in what month things were delivered or

 2     supplied.  Does this correspond to what you know about the helicopter

 3     flights coming from Tuzla or Kakanj or federation territory to Zepa; that

 4     is to say, the flights which took the helicopters across the territory of

 5     Republika Srpska and into the demilitarised zone?

 6        A.   As far as I know about the number of flights, I can tell you that

 7     this tallies.  There were about 10 flights before a helicopter was shot

 8     down.  As for the transfer of materiel and equipment, I can't tell you

 9     about quantities.  I do know that on a number of occasions, they also

10     carried some officers and people, as I can see here next to the column

11     identifying the amount of actual supplies.  I also remember that it was

12     in early May, and here I can see the date of the 7th of May when the

13     helicopter was shot down.  That was the last flight.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, would that be a convenient time for

15     the first break?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I

17     certainly do not object.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We must have our first break now, and we'll

19     resume at 11.00.

20                           --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

21                           --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Tolimir.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

24             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   At page 4277 on the transcript of the 23rd August 2010, lines 6

Page 4573

 1     to 10, you say as follows:

 2             "These helicopters delivered supplies mainly at night.  The Serb

 3     side didn't take long to notice those helicopters' flight and begin

 4     opening fire at them, and the inhabitants of Zepa became familiar with

 5     what was being done."

 6             Given that even the inhabitants of Zepa, as well as the Serb

 7     side, were aware that there were helicopters flying about, did UNPROFOR

 8     know anything about them, as far as you know.

 9        A.   I think I already answered that in my testimony.  I truly don't

10     know.  I can repeat what I do know.  Avdo was in charge of all UNPROFOR

11     contact at the time.  The only thing I can say is that it would have been

12     illogical for them not to know.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Concerning these helicopter flights at night, did

14     UNPROFOR discuss this with anyone; say, the War Presidency?  Did they

15     ever protest with the War Presidency?

16        A.   I don't remember any discussions or protests made.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Were the inhabitants of Zepa concerned, once they

18     noticed these helicopters flying, because they could reasonably expect

19     that military activities would follow?

20        A.   It's difficult for me to recall what their reactions were,

21     although I did have contact with other inhabitants of Zepa.  In any case,

22     quantitatively speaking, these were not large deliveries.  If one looks

23     at it from a certain point of view, you could conclude that this could

24     have two sides to it.  One was the hope that Zepa would finally be able

25     to defend itself, and the second one could be a reason for concern

Page 4574

 1     because of the violation of the agreement that had been signed.  I don't

 2     remember any precise reactions by Zepa inhabitants.  It was quite a long

 3     time ago.  Please understand that.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  During examination-in-chief, you mentioned the

 5     helicopter that was shot down.

 6             Could we please have 1D251 shown.

 7             So that based on Avdo Palic's report, you could comment.  This is

 8     an information of the 6th of July -- sorry, between the 6th and the 7th

 9     of July --

10             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  Between the 6th and

11     the 7th of May, 1995.

12             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   This is when the helicopter was actually shot down.  Perhaps you

14     could have a look and then comment.

15        A.   I'll try to read it, although I can barely make it out.

16        Q.   We see, in the second paragraph, that:

17             "The following were killed in the helicopter accident"?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   It says "Azim Becirovic, Ramiz Becirovic, Ejub Golic,

20     Mehmet Alic, Samir Karic, Cebo Djeric [phoen]."

21        A.   Could we scroll up, please, in the B/C/S.  Thank you.

22        Q.   Numo Krluc, a certain Cardakovic?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Do you know of these people, and can you tell us who is

25     Ejub Golic, who is Ramiz Becirovic, et cetera?

Page 4575

 1        A.   We have some people from Zepa and Srebrenica here.  I know the

 2     people from Zepa, when I read the names on the list.  The ones I don't

 3     know are from Srebrenica.  If you wish, we can go one by one and I can

 4     tell you who is from Zepa.

 5        Q.   Let's start with the first wounded person, Ramiz Becirovic.

 6        A.   He's from Srebrenica.

 7        Q.   Any Ejub Golic?

 8        A.   Srebrenica.

 9        Q.   Hamed Malic?

10        A.   Srebrenica.

11        Q.   Mehmed Malic?

12        A.   Srebrenica.

13        Q.   Samir Karic?

14        A.   He might be from Zepa.

15        Q.   Emir Salihovic?

16        A.   Srebrenica.

17        Q.   Dzevad Dzananovic?

18        A.   That is the doctor who went from Tuzla to Srebrenica, so he was

19     not from Srebrenica, nor from Zepa.

20        Q.   Dzebo?

21        A.   From Zepa.

22        Q.   The next person?

23        A.   From Zepa.

24        Q.   Numo Krluc?

25        A.   Zepa.

Page 4576

 1        Q.   You also see the persons who were killed, and I believe they are

 2     also people from Srebrenica and Zepa.

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   Can you tell us how many were from Zepa and how many from

 5     Srebrenica?

 6        A.   I might not be precise, but I'll try.  The first three were the

 7     helicopter crew.  It just went off the screen.  I don't see the list

 8     anymore.  Could you please put this list back on?

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes.  We wanted to see the last names on the list

10     in B/C/S you were referring to.  And now we go back to the first page in

11     both languages, please.

12             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   My question was whether among those killed, were there any from

14     Srebrenica?

15        A.   Srebrenica or Zepa?

16        Q.   Srebrenica.

17        A.   Among those killed, if I look at the last names, there were one

18     or two from Zepa.  The rest were not from Zepa.  So there were three crew

19     members.  Then there were three doctors who went from Tuzla to

20     Srebrenica.  Then one or two people were returning to Zepa, and the

21     rest -- well, two or three could be from Zepa, I guess.  Homarac could be

22     from Zepa.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Given that we have people from both Zepa and

24     Srebrenica, as far as you know, why did they travel jointly to Tuzla and

25     going back together to Zepa and Srebrenica?

Page 4577

 1        A.   In early 1995, there was an initiative, I don't know whether from

 2     Srebrenica or from Zepa -- well, it was actually initiated by the

 3     General Staff, and a certain number of officers went to the Main Staff of

 4     the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina for training and retraining.  After a

 5     while, they returned to Srebrenica and Zepa.  I don't know whether there

 6     were also some civilians who were returning, but basically these were all

 7     officers who had undergone training with the Main Staff of the Army of

 8     the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Tolimir speak closely to the

10     microphone, please.  Thank you.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, could you please take the microphone

12     a little bit more into your direction.  Turn the microphone a little bit

13     towards you, please.  Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Tell us, please -- there were some individuals for Srebrenica,

17     and there were also some from Zepa.  Did they meet at the War Presidency,

18     and did the UNPROFOR know about their arrival there and whether they had

19     any contact with the UNPROFOR?

20        A.   Is your question whether these individuals from Srebrenica --

21        Q.   Well, yes, had a meeting with one of the members of the

22     War Presidency or some of the members.

23        A.   Well, I had a meeting with them.  At the time when they were

24     supposed to travel, I think this was in winter in early 1995, I had a

25     brief meeting with Naser Oric.  He was waiting for this flight, and he

Page 4578

 1     came to see me, asking for assistance to the civilians of Srebrenica.  He

 2     asked me whether we had some stocks of flour because the food situation

 3     in Srebrenica was very difficult.  So I recall that one meeting.  That

 4     was sometime before these people left.  The meeting was brief, perhaps 15

 5     minutes or so.  And that is what I can confirm.  Now, whether these

 6     people had a meeting with some other members of the War Presidency, I

 7     really don't know, but there was no official meeting with the

 8     War Presidency where these people would be attending as guests.  But I do

 9     confirm that I had a meeting with Naser Oric.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Where did these people stay while they were waiting

11     for the flight, and did the UNPROFOR know anything about the helicopter

12     flights or not?

13        A.   Well, you see, I don't even think they came to Zepa.  They were

14     in the mountains where the helipad was, a temporary helipad.  Whether the

15     UNPROFOR knew anything about it, I really don't know.  That's my answer.

16     I don't know if they knew about these people being there.  But as far as

17     I can remember, they had to wait some five to six days for the helicopter

18     to land because of the weather conditions and so on.  You know, the

19     conditions were very complex, and it was difficult to determine the time

20     of the helicopter flight.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             Could we now pull up D67, please, in e-court.  D67.  This is a

23     document dated 13 of July, 1997, by General Rasim Delic.  He's sending a

24     communication to General Hajrulahovic, and with a request that he forward

25     it to the president of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Page 4579

 1     Mr. Alija Izetbegovic.

 2             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Could you please take a look at this document.

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for Mr. Tolimir, please.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Before we go on, I would like to

 6     tender the previous document into evidence.  Thank you.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter 1D251 will be Exhibit D96.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now I would like the witness to

10     take a look at paragraph 6 of the document we have before us in e-court,

11     the paragraph which begins with the words:  "For training ..."  And I

12     will read it:

13             "Preparing for the future operation of joining the enclaves, we

14     brought back and returned for brigade commanders two chiefs of staffs of

15     brigades and the 26th Division chief of staff.  The division commander

16     who was meant to go on the next helicopter flight did not return after

17     the final flight ended tragically, Naser remained."

18             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Now, bearing in mind what we've just read, tell us, please, what

20     reference is this to an operation to link up the enclaves of Srebrenica

21     and Zepa, and did you, as a member of the Presidency, have any knowledge

22     about this?  Thank you.

23        A.   Well, pursuant to this document in paragraph 2, as far as that

24     period was concerned, this information here is incorrect.  There were not

25     17 helicopter flights, but 10 only, and only 1 of them was downed.

Page 4580

 1     That's just something that I would like to comment on just by perusing

 2     this document.

 3             Now, as for the operation to link up the enclaves, I don't know

 4     anything about that, nor did that make any sense, in military terms.

 5     I can give you my opinion on this, but I don't know whether the person

 6     who drafted this document -- I don't know whether it's an order or a

 7     report, but I don't know how well this person knew the situation.  The

 8     enclaves at that time were very small and close to each other and you

 9     could walk from one to the other, so there was no military sense in

10     trying to link them up.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             Now, could we just scroll the document up a little bit so that we

13     can see the bottom of it and the author of this document.  That's right.

14     Could you please go on a little further.  We just want the date to be

15     shown.  Could you please -- could you please scroll it up a bit.  Thank

16     you.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Now, here we see this document was drafted by the General Staff

19     of the Army, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the 13th of July,

20     which means after the fall of the enclave, and this is a report sent to

21     the commander, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, the president of the Presidency.

22             And now if we can look at the last page so we see who signed this

23     document.  Thank you.

24             Here, we see it was drafted by Army General Rasim Delic,

25     commander.  He reports on the deliveries that were made, all the things

Page 4581

 1     that we've seen in the previous document.  In other words, this document

 2     was signed by Army General Rasim Delic, and he reports to the president

 3     on the supplies provided to Zepa.

 4             Now, if he, as the army commander, mentions the link-up of the

 5     enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa, in military terms, does that mean,

 6     maybe, that militarily they had a plan of which you, members of the

 7     War Presidency, knew nothing about?

 8        A.   Well, if they did have any plan, I didn't know about it.  Now,

 9     again, if I think about it logically, I don't see what they could link

10     up.  Maybe this refers to some activities to expand or enlarge the

11     corridor.  But we, in any case, did not know anything about it.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             Could we see page 2 of the document.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   You can see all the supplies that arrived in Srebrenica.

16             Now let's take a look at page 2.  Yes, we have it now.  Can we

17     please just enlarge it a bit so the witness can read it.

18             Here, you can see the columns headed "Zepa" and "Srebrenica."

19     The first one is "Zepa," the second "Srebrenica," and the third says

20     "Totals."  So you can see, for instance, that 106 rifles were delivered,

21     RPG 7/8, 107 rockets, 12 pieces, and so on and so forth.  You can also

22     take a look at the next page to see the supplies that reached Zepa.  The

23     first column is Zepa.  There, you can see that all these items were

24     delivered.

25             Can you tell us whether this actually confirms that weapons and

Page 4582

 1     ammunition were sent to the enclave even after it was demilitarised?

 2        A.   Well, all I can say, of course, is that I know nothing about

 3     these quantities and whether the information contained therein is

 4     correct.  But as for the time when this -- these deliveries were made, we

 5     could see that it was in late 1994 and up until mid-May 1995, so that

 6     would be the period referred to therein.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             Could we please -- I would like to tender this into evidence.

 9     Thank you.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  [Microphone not activated]

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

12             Now I would like us to see 1D263.  This is a document dated the

13     9th of March, 1995, and the author of the document is Naser Oric, as we

14     can see from the document.  We would just like to take a look at the last

15     sentence, which reads as follows.  Now, the document is not very clear,

16     so I will read a portion:

17             "For the time being, I remain in Zepa, certain that you will

18     organise my transport to where you are very soon."

19             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Can you see that?

21        A.   Yes.  As you can see, this document is dated the 9th of March.

22        Q.   Yes, the 9th of March.  As you already mentioned, it was in

23     winter-time.  Now, do you know that Naser Oric was in Zepa at this time,

24     and do you know how long he had to stay in Zepa and how long he had to

25     wait for his transport to the territory of the federation, which was in

Page 4583

 1     Tuzla, where his command was?  Thank you.

 2        A.   As I said a moment ago, I had that brief meeting with Naser Oric.

 3     Whether he remained in the center of Zepa, he, himself, all that time, I

 4     don't know.  I do know that he was in the hills.  But I know that he had

 5     to wait for some seven days or so for the flight, and I know that this

 6     was something that he arranged with Avdo.  So I don't really know a lot

 7     about this whole affair.  I just know and can confirm that I met with

 8     Naser once.  We discussed the staple foods and flour that they needed,

 9     and that's all I know.  He was -- at that time, he was in the center of

10     Zepa.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

13             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Please tell us, do you know whether on that occasion he met with

15     the War Presidency and whether he attended any of the sessions of the

16     War Presidency in Zepa?

17        A.   I cannot recall any such instance where he was -- where he

18     attended any session of the War Presidency.  The meeting that I mentioned

19     was in my office.  There was no one else there, I think.  We just talked

20     about the flour and how best to deliver it.  So I don't remember that he

21     was at any meeting of the War Presidency.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             I would now like to tender this document into evidence, please.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be marked for identification, pending

25     translation.

Page 4584

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter 1D263 will be Exhibit D97, marked for

 2     identification.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             Could we now have document 1D252, please, 1D252.  We're waiting

 5     for it to come up.  Thank you.  There, now we have it.

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   This is a document sent by Avdo Palic to the brigadier,

 8     Enver Hasanovic [as interpreted], on the 28th of May, 1995, and it reads

 9     as follows, I quote, that's item 1:

10             "Measures have been taken to seal off the area controlled by

11     UNPROFOR and the direction of possible withdrawal.

12             "No signs were registered of the situation deteriorating or

13     anything that would indicate a possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR, except

14     for their fear, to an extent, of a possible Chetnik attack."

15             Paragraph 3:

16             "I agreed in principle, in case of an attack, on some sort of

17     co-ordinated action with UNPROFOR and requisitioning the weapons given to

18     them for safekeeping."

19             My question is this:  Why were measures taken to seal off the

20     area controlled by UNPROFOR, in view of the fact, as it says in this

21     report, itself, that there were no signs registered of the situation

22     deteriorating?  So do you know anything about why these measures were

23     taken?  Thank you.

24        A.   Well, I know absolutely nothing about any measures.  And looking

25     at this letter, perhaps it was really just talk.  I don't know that

Page 4585

 1     anything was done and whether Colonel Palic really took any action or did

 2     anything or just wrote about it to the command.  I really couldn't tell

 3     you.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Now, if Colonel Palic had to take some measures that

 5     involved UNPROFOR, was he obliged to inform thereof the General Staff of

 6     the army, because they were in charge of contacts with UNPROFOR?

 7        A.   Well, if we think about it, logic would command that that would

 8     be required, because the War Presidency would be responsible for giving

 9     their approval for this or at least to be informed of any such measures

10     or actions.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Now, we see that mention is made in this document of

12     some kind of general agreement with UNPROFOR.  So who would be the

13     competent person or institution to have these contacts with them?

14        A.   Did I understand your question correctly, who would be the

15     liaison person in UNPROFOR?  Is that correct?

16        Q.   Yes.

17        A.   Well, as far as I know, all the contacts went through

18     Sejmon Dudnjik.  So when Avdo says "UNPROFOR," I think he was really

19     referring to Colonel Sejmon Dudnjik, who was the commander of the Zepa

20     mission, the UNPROFOR Zepa mission.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

24     document into evidence, and I would also like to have document D16 before

25     us.

Page 4586

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  That will be received.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter 1D252 will be Exhibit D98.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  But before this document disappears from the

 4     screen, I would like to clarify one word with the witness.

 5             What is the correct understanding of the word "Chetnik"?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will do my best to explain that.

 7             Not going into the historical background, a Chetnik is really a

 8     pejorative term used by the BH Army, Army of the Republic of

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina, when referring to the Serb Army.  You may have

10     noticed, during some other -- or in some other exhibits, where even

11     General Mladic uses the term "Turks," which is a pejorative term --

12     derogatory term for Muslim soldiers.  They referred to them as Turks.  So

13     this was the wartime terminology that was bandied about.

14             Now, as for "Chetniks" in historical terms, that's something

15     else, and I'm just -- I was just making a reference to the use of these

16     terms in the last war.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

18             Now we should have D16 on the screen.

19             Mr. Tolimir.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

21             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   While we wait for this document to appear, could we first take a

23     look at the top of the document.  As we can see, this is a document

24     produced by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the General Staff of

25     the army, and then it says "The Command Post at Kakanj" of 17 February

Page 4587

 1     1992, and the title is "Taking Measures to Raise the Level of Combat

 2     Readiness."  And then it says "Order."  This order was issued to the

 3     Command of the 2nd Corps to the OG Srebrenica Command and the Command of

 4     the 1st Zepa Brigade.

 5        A.   Could we please scroll this document down in the B/C/S so I can

 6     just take a look at it?

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we do that, please, for the

 8     witness's sake?

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, could we just see the

10     document through to the very bottom.  How many items does this order

11     contain?

12             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Well, there are seven items or paragraphs on the first page under

14     "Order."  Now, we will go to the second paragraph, the paragraph

15     beginning with the words "The aggressor ...," in B/C/S.  In English, that

16     begins with the words:  "On 16 February ..."

17             So we can see in the seventh line from the top, and I quote.  It

18     says:

19             "On the 16th of February, 1995, the aggressor filed a request

20     with UNPROFOR to declare Zepa a 'non-demilitarised zone,' with the

21     following rationale:

22             "BH Army helicopter flights supplying weapons and ammunition have

23     been registered;

24             "Movements of the BH Army;

25             "Accusing members of the Ukrainian Battalion that they are

Page 4588

 1     covering up for the activities and intentions of the BH Army, which is

 2     why they no longer guarantee their safety."

 3             And also that:

 4             "On the night between 15 and 16 February 1995, our helicopters

 5     were seen flying over and the infantry fire was opened on them."

 6             Do you see this?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   So you see that your army actually submits this request, and it

 9     refers to a request from the Army of Republika Srpska that Zepa be

10     declared a non-demilitarised zone.  Now, my question for you:  Were you

11     aware of this letter where the Main Staff was asking for Zepa to be

12     declared a non-demilitarised zone, the Main Staff of your own army?

13        A.   Well, I can't recall that it was mentioned officially in any of

14     the War Presidency meetings in Zepa.  These types of letters would always

15     go to Avdo, to Colonel Palic, but whether it was actually ever put in

16     place, I can only say that it was never actually the subject of any

17     discussions at the War Presidency.  It wasn't on its agenda for any of

18     the meetings.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

20             MR. THAYER:  Again, just so we have a clear record in the future,

21     Mr. President, again I -- perhaps General Tolimir misspoke, but I think

22     it's clear, and I just want to see if there's any dispute on this issue,

23     because there's no dispute from the Prosecution, looking at this

24     document, that what it says is that the aggressor - here that would be

25     the VRS - filed a request with UNPROFOR to have Zepa declared a

Page 4589

 1     non-demilitarised zone.  I think we've seen this document before, and

 2     that's been the understanding.  I just note that in General Tolimir's

 3     last question, he referred to this request being from the Main Staff of

 4     the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and I just -- those are two entirely

 5     different things, meaning two entirely different things.  I don't think

 6     that's what the question meant to say, but I just want to clarify that

 7     for the record, because the document is quite clear and I think we've all

 8     shared that understanding.  But if there is a different question, then

 9     I think we should make that clear.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, I see, in page 50, line 2, a request

11     from the Army of Republika Srpska.

12             MR. THAYER:  Yes, Mr. President.  Then the problem is at the end

13     of the question:

14             "Now, my question for you:  Were you aware of this letter where

15     the Main Staff was asking for Zepa to be declared a non-demilitarised

16     zone, the Main Staff of your own army."

17             And that's where I think the lack of clarity may come to haunt us

18     if we don't take care of it now.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  Now it is clear, what you are

20     referring to.

21             Would you please clarify this?  Is Mr. Thayer right?  Was this

22     the right interpretation of your question?

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for Mr. Tolimir, please.

24             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   My question was this:  Did you know that the Main Staff of the

Page 4590

 1     VRS sent a protest letter to UNPROFOR, asking for Zepa to be declared a

 2     non-demilitarised zone because there were certain activities underway?

 3             I apologise if I misspoke.  Perhaps this should be corrected for

 4     the transcript.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It was only the problem of the words "the

 6     Main Staff of your own army," that obviously you're referring to the Army

 7     of the VRS.

 8             Now, Witness, could you please answer the question.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that the War Presidency of

10     Zepa was not familiar with any such requests.  If I can see it properly,

11     this document was produced by the Main Staff of the Army of the Republic

12     of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in one item mention is made of the request

13     of the VRS for Zepa to be pronounced a non-demilitarised zone.  Hence, my

14     answer is that we were not familiar with this, as the War Presidency of

15     Zepa.

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17        Q.   Is it customary -- or would it have been customary to inform the

18     War Presidency and the civilian structures about the new status of Zepa,

19     since there was a request on the table for it to be declared a

20     non-demilitarised zone?

21        A.   In principle, the War Presidency should have been informed.

22     Especially, it should have been informed of all matters which had to do

23     with the security and safety of the population in Zepa.  I believe this,

24     too, should have been discussed by the War Presidency, or at least it

25     should have been informed of -- in Zepa.  However, I must say that there

Page 4591

 1     was this key problem of communication here.  The only communication means

 2     were in the hands of Mr. Palic.  Therefore, he was free to select what he

 3     would and would not forward to anyone in the enclave.  So we did not have

 4     communication channels of our own.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Is there a possibility that Avdo Palic did not show

 6     this document to the War Presidency and that he did not share this

 7     information with any civilian authorities?

 8        A.   I really don't know.  There is such a possibility, of course.

 9     Perhaps he may have conveyed something orally to the president of the

10     War Presidency.  In any case, I don't remember this document or its

11     contents being on the agenda of any War Presidency sessions.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Please scroll up so that we could see the specific

13     items of this order.  It is page 2 in the English.  In the Serbian

14     version, all of the items are on page 1.

15             We see now item 1, where it says:

16             "Bring the units of OG 8 to full combat readiness, enabling them

17     to be fully prepared to resist a possible attack by the aggressor."

18             These units of OG 8, did this refer to the Zepa Brigade?

19        A.   OG 8?  What is the date of this document?

20        Q.   The 17th of February, 1995, produced by Chief of Staff Brigade

21     General Enver Hadzihasanovic.  He sent it to the 2nd Corps Command in

22     Tuzla and to the Command of OG 8 in Srebrenica, as well as to the Command

23     of the 1st Zepa Brigade.

24        A.   What is OG 8?  Well, is this part of some earlier military

25     structure?  I only know of the 285th Brigade in Zepa.  I don't understand

Page 4592

 1     this particular terminology.  I don't know what "OG 8" is.  Was that a

 2     new organisational entity within the existing system or --

 3        Q.   Thank you.  The 28th Division of Srebrenica, could that have been

 4     OG 8 when the superior command referred to it?

 5        A.   That may well be.  Before the final reorganisation when the 28th

 6     Division came into being, I think there were some operational groups that

 7     were part of the corps, but I'm surprised by the date of this document.

 8     I think by that time it should have been the 28th Division, Command of

 9     the 285th East Bosnia Brigade, et cetera, et cetera.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Please look at item 3.  I will quote for the record,

11     and then I have a question:

12             "Bringing units to full combat readiness and other measures must

13     be taken under strict secrecy in order to eliminate any grounds on the

14     aggressor's part for violations of the agreement on the demilitarised

15     zone (protected zone)."

16             My question is this:  Was the War Presidency supposed to

17     co-ordinate any activity with the Zepa Brigade when undertaking these

18     measures and with the Command in Srebrenica?  What was the correlation

19     between the Zepa War Presidency and that of Srebrenica, vis-a-vis the

20     units in Zepa and Srebrenica and their activities?

21        A.   Given the situation in Zepa, specifically, it would have been

22     logical for us to do it that way.  However, most of the communication and

23     most of those measures were undertaken without the approval or without

24     the War Presidency being informed of them.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 4593

 1             Could we please have D53 in e-court.  The title is "Preparation

 2     to Carry Out Offensive Combat Activities."  Thank you.

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please zoom in.

 5             It reads:

 6             "Pursuant to a verbal order," and I underscore "verbal order,

 7     issued by the commander of the General Staff of the BH Army, Army

 8     General Rasim Delic, and on the occasion of the great success achieved by

 9     units of the BH Army in the wide area around Sarajevo and Gorazde, as

10     well as on the basis of intelligence that the A/S Command of the

11     Protection Regiment in Han Pijesak is holding part of its units in

12     reserve to intervene in the event of an attack by our forces from Zepa, I

13     hereby issue the following order:

14             "Execute all preparations in the Command of the 28th Land/Army

15     Division to execute offensive operations with a view to liberating the

16     territory of BH, overextending the -- "A/S," I believe it means

17     "aggressor forces," "and inflicting losses on them, co-ordinating action

18     with the BH Army forces carrying out operations in the broader Sarajevo

19     area.

20             "2.  Plan realistic tasks which will assure certain success, on

21     the basis of an accurate assessment and the potential of our forces in

22     Srebrenica and Zepa.

23             "3.  The General Staff of the BH Army will regulate, by an order,

24     the commencement of offensive combat activities in the zone of

25     responsibility of the 28th Division."

Page 4594

 1             It was drafted by the chief of staff of the Army of B and H on

 2     the 17th of June, 1995, that is to say, one month prior to the events

 3     we've been discussing.  They sent this order to the Command of the 28th

 4     Division.  It was drafted by the chief of staff of the 2nd Corps,

 5     Brigadier Budakovic.  We see the addressees.  The second one is the

 6     28th -- 285th Light Brigade, Zepa.

 7             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   The order you mentioned, which arrived from Sarajevo --

 9        A.   I think this is the order.

10        Q.   Was that order discussed by the War Presidency?

11        A.   Yes, this is it.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  This order drafted by

13     the General Staff of the army, sent to the 28th Division -- oh, it is in

14     evidence already.  I apologise.

15             Could we next have Avdo Palic's letter of the 28th of June, 1995.

16     It is D62, the 28th of June, 1995.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   While we're waiting for this, please answer my question.  In that

19     period, in June, before the final activities in Zepa, were you, the

20     War Presidency, informed of any Sarajevo events?  And if so, how was that

21     information passed on to you?  What do you know about the military

22     activities in Sarajevo referred to in this report, in particular those

23     aimed at Srebrenica?

24        A.   At that time, as far as I recall, there was an operation by the

25     1st Corps of the Army of B and H.  It was an attempt at lifting the siege

Page 4595

 1     of Sarajevo.  We had no official information about that, but it was

 2     publicised and it was no secret.  One could hear it on the radio, TV, and

 3     in other media.  We knew that at that time the Army of the Republic of

 4     Bosnia-Herzegovina tried to lift the siege of Sarajevo by using military

 5     means.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Let's focus on this document.  This document was

 7     drafted by the 285th Brigade from Zepa.  The date is the 28th of June.

 8     It was signed by Avdo Palic, as you will see later.  It was sent to the

 9     2nd Corps Command, the chief of staff, Budakovic, and the Command of the

10     28th Division, to Major Ramiz Becirovic.  Before I put any questions to

11     you:  Do you know who Ramiz Becirovic was, and why did Palic send this

12     document to him?  What was his position?

13        A.   I know who he is.  At the time, he was the chief of staff of the

14     28th Division, given that the commander, Naser, was not in Srebrenica.

15     Therefore, he was in charge of the 28th Division in his absence.  It was

16     Mr. Becirovic at the time.  I don't know him personally, but I have

17     encountered his name in some documents and I know who he was.

18        Q.   Thank you.  You can see what Avdo Palic put in this document.

19     Focus on the second paragraph, where he says:

20             "Upon receipt of the orders given to me by brigade commanders

21     Major Zulfo Tursunovic and Major Ibrahim Mandzic, and by the assistant

22     for intelligence in the division, Captain Ekrem Salihovic, I reviewed the

23     overall situation with respect to this kind of combat action, and, based

24     on earlier instructions issued to the chief of staff, Major Ramo

25     Cardakovic, by the chief of General Staff,

Page 4596

 1     Brigadier-General Enver Hadzihasanovic, I decided, together with

 2     Tursunovic and Mandzic, to proceed as follows:"

 3             This is, de facto, Avdo Palic's decision, and we can read out

 4     what he decided.

 5             The next paragraph reads:

 6             "Form a number of sabotage groups of between a squad to reinforce

 7     platoon strength, and dispatch them into the temporarily-occupied

 8     territory for the purpose of inflicting on the aggressor as great losses

 9     as possible, in terms of troops and equipment, and tying him down, with

10     the new forces he requires, on a line over 20 kilometres wide.  The

11     places of attacks and raids by the sabotage-reconnaissance platoon groups

12     were the following:"

13             And here we see what areas these attacks were carried out in:

14             "Group 1:  The area of Zljebovi-Pecnik (Han-Kram).

15             "Group 2:  The area of Rijeka.

16             "Group 3:  The area of Veliki Zep."

17             You know where it is:

18             "Group 4, the area of Solila.

19             "Group 5, the area of Crna Rijeka, where the Main Staff was.

20             "Group 6, the area of Banja Lucica.

21             "Group 7, the area of Crna Rijeka, Bojcino Brdo, close to the

22     Main Staff.

23             "Group 8, the area of Karaula.

24             "Group 9, the area of the village of Visenjica, attacking the

25     units there."

Page 4597

 1             Please scroll up in the Serbian.  We can see it now.  Can we

 2     please have page 2 in the English.

 3             We have read out the groups he sent -- we will only read out the

 4     following parts.  In the second paragraph, he said that all sabotage

 5     groups carried out their attacks, causing great losses to the enemy

 6     troops and equipment.  In the third paragraph, he says about 40 Chetniks

 7     were killed.

 8             Can you see that?

 9        A.   Yes, I can.

10        Q.   And dozens were wounded:

11             "A significant quantity of infantry weapons were seized (one M53

12     light machine-gun, six automatic rifles, one carbine, two radio

13     transmitters, 5.000 rounds and other soldier's equipment).  One aggressor

14     soldier was captured in the area of Vrana Kran [phoen].  He was lightly

15     wounded in the area of the chest.  His name is Velimir Merdjan, born

16     1975 ...

17             "He is now in Zepa, referring treatment," and so on and so forth.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

19             MR. THAYER:  Just two quick points, Mr. President.  The first is

20     obviously, and I know we're probably sounding like a broken record on

21     this, but there is no dispute from the Prosecution as to the attacks by

22     ABiH forces from within the enclave of Zepa towards the outside.  That,

23     again, is not in contest from the Prosecution, and not putting any

24     limitations on how General Tolimir wants to conduct his cross.  He's

25     entitled to take it wherever he pleases.  But I just want again to make

Page 4598

 1     that clear that that is not in dispute.

 2             And the second thing is just a minor, I think, correction for the

 3     record.  This is already in evidence, but as General Tolimir was reading

 4     through the paragraph, it's clear that some of these attacks were carried

 5     out, and some weren't.  And just for the record, if you want to go back,

 6     we can see here that numbers 5, 7, 8, 9, those targets were attacked,

 7     whereas targets 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 were not actually attacked.  Again,

 8     we're not interested in the ins and outs of these.  It's not a contested

 9     point.  But I think in his question, again, maybe General Tolimir

10     misspoke when he summarised this paragraph, but he did say all the

11     attacks were carried out, and it's clear that that is not the case.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

13             Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

15             I was referring to the activities that were envisaged.  And in

16     the cases where he was unsuccessful, he did not report on those, but he

17     did report on those activities where he was successful and where he even

18     captured some prisoners of war.  So he did not report on those where they

19     were unsuccessful.

20             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   So my question would be this:  Was it common practice for a

22     demilitarised zone to have prisoners of war, and is the reference here to

23     Velimir Merdjan, a prisoner of war, the same Merdjan that General Mladic

24     mentioned on the occasion of the signing of the evacuation?  Thank you.

25        A.   So I should answer two questions.

Page 4599

 1             First, I would like to confirm that it is, indeed, the same

 2     individual, the same soldier.  I just know that his name was Merdjan, his

 3     last name.  That was number 1.  And, number 2, of course, it was not

 4     logical for any prisoners of war to be held in a demilitarised zone.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  At the War Presidency sessions, did you ever discuss

 6     these issues of pulling out of Zepa and also the major successes that

 7     Colonel Palic makes a reference to here?

 8        A.   Well, you see, the document is dated the end of June, and the

 9     attacks on Srebrenica and Zepa began on the 6th of July.  There were no

10     analyses made, but there was, one could already sense in Zepa, a special

11     mood.  There was an atmosphere where people were expecting for something

12     to happen.  As for the situation itself, we were not informed by Avdo of

13     any of this.  This was a report for his superior command.  And very soon

14     thereafter, the final stages were in place and -- the end game was in

15     place, as it were.  We did not discuss any of this at the War Presidency.

16     I can just confirm that we did not discuss any of these matters at the

17     War Presidency, and that refers also to the order from the Presidency

18     that you mentioned earlier.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Bearing in mind that sabotage operations were

20     launched from Srebrenica and Zepa, behind the Serb lines - some of these

21     operations targeted civilians, others army facilities - were there any

22     discussions at the War Presidency that possibly the BH Army -- the Serb

23     Army would try and take counter-measures in order to prevent and preempt

24     such attacks from the demilitarised zones?  Thank you.

25        A.   Well, you see, when the War Presidency discussed at its session

Page 4600

 1     the order that it had received from the Command of the 285th Brigade --

 2     or, actually, the order for the 285th Brigade, the reason why most

 3     members of the War Presidency were opposed to such an order was precisely

 4     in their expectation that the Serb Army would respond by launching an

 5     attack -- military attacks on the Zepa enclave.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  We will now skip the warnings that General Mladic

 7     made the UNPROFOR aware of and his expectations what might happen.  But I

 8     would skip all that and just would like to discuss something else with

 9     you.

10             On page 14 of the transcript of the 23rd of August, you mentioned

11     the role of the board, of which you were a member of, and you said that

12     one of the roles was the distribution of humanitarian aid, and that is

13     the issue that I would like to discuss now.

14             Now, did Colonel Palic have any role in the distribution of

15     humanitarian aid?  Thank you.

16        A.   As far as I can remember, and I'm not absolutely certain that

17     this relates to June of 1995, but I vaguely seem to remember that maybe

18     certain quantities -- small quantities of humanitarian aid were also

19     allocated for the army.  I can't really say for sure.  But in any case,

20     the distribution of the humanitarian aid was done according to the list

21     of inhabitants.  And for every convoy of humanitarian aid that arrived,

22     the executive committee would take a decision on the amount of

23     humanitarian aid and items that would be distributed per inhabitant.

24             Now, as for the question relating to Avdo, I really don't

25     recall -- I don't have any clear recollection of that.  If you have a

Page 4601

 1     document to show me, maybe that would help.

 2        Q.   Very well, we'll do that.  But let me ask you:  Were there

 3     priorities set in the distribution of humanitarian aid, and what did

 4     those priorities actually relate to?

 5        A.   Well, I can't remember if we actually had a list of priorities in

 6     distributing humanitarian aid, but I seem to remember generally that all

 7     the distributions actually were meant and were envisaged for all

 8     inhabitants; in other words, for the civilian population according to the

 9     lists compiled.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Please tell us, how did the members of the Zepa

11     Brigade provide food for their brigade?  Did they receive food supplies

12     or did they -- so did they receive them from the civilian authorities,

13     the War Presidency and the Executive Board, or did they just go home and

14     eat?

15        A.   Well, generally speaking, there was no organised feeding of the

16     army, as it were.  Each member of the army reached humanitarian aid as an

17     inhabitant, a civilian of Zepa.  For instance, Mujo Mujic had a

18     four-member family, so that would mean that the family would get four

19     times, let's say, five kilos of flour.  They would get 20 kilos of flour

20     in total.  So that was the principle according to which the aid was

21     distributed.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             I would now like to see document 1D245 in e-court.  This is a

24     letter from Mehmed Hajric of the 5th of May, 1995.  He's sending a

25     request to the Government of the Republic of Federation of Bosnia and

Page 4602

 1     Herzegovina.

 2             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   We have before us what he wrote.  In line 13 from the top in the

 4     second paragraph, he says the following:

 5             "Since this would apply to about 150 such individuals, we wish to

 6     ask for your opinion on the validity of this position."

 7             And then he goes on.  So he mentions here an application for 150

 8     people.  Could you tell us what this refers to?

 9        A.   Well, yes.  As it says in the document, itself, most inhabitants,

10     then inhabitants of Zepa, over 60 per cent, were not people who were

11     born -- or had been born and lived in Zepa, they were refugees.  Now, he

12     discusses here the most difficult conditions, the people in the most

13     difficult conditions, and that they would need to be evacuated and then

14     taken back to their families and reunited with their families.  Some of

15     them were in Sarajevo or elsewhere.  And now your question was related to

16     that, his opinion and our opinion that these 150 people should be

17     evacuated from Zepa or relocated from Zepa.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Now, this is my question:  You said about 60 per cent

19     of the population in Zepa were refugees.  Did all those 60 per cent of

20     the people who were there -- were they all of the same opinion?  Did they

21     all want, like these 150 mentioned here, to be relocated and moved to the

22     territory of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

23        A.   Well, you see, most of them didn't have any family members

24     elsewhere.  Only these 150 people had members of family elsewhere.  As

25     for the rest, they were there -- entire families were there in Zepa.  And

Page 4603

 1     at this time, the situation in Zepa was very bad, and it was the

 2     prevailing opinion that Zepa was the worst possible solution for them and

 3     that they would be better off if they were someplace else.  That is true,

 4     that was the predominant feeling among most of the refugees.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Does that mean --

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 7             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   What was the opinion of the other 35 per cent?

 9        A.   Well, the others did not want to leave.  They were people who

10     lived there.  They had been born and lived there all their lives.  Now,

11     whether the percentage was 35 per cent, or 38, or 40, but generally that

12     was the ratio, 40 to 60.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Could you tell us, was there a lot of pressure from

14     the refugees who wanted to be relocated?  And what kind of pressure did

15     you feel within the Presidency, and what did you do about it, and did you

16     get any response from the central authorities?

17        A.   Well, you see the document that we still have before us, the then

18     president of the War Presidency had contacted Sarajevo.  I don't know

19     what their response was.  But this was something that we tried to resolve

20     this situation through a welfare evacuation, as it was called then.  I

21     don't even know if there was any response from the Government of the

22     Republic-Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Tell us, please -- he says here, in the last sentence

24     of his letter, the president of the municipal Assembly of Zepa:

25             "Please respond and give us your response, as soon as possible,

Page 4604

 1     to our communication."

 2             Now, my question is this:  Why this so important that he urgently

 3     requested that he be given a reply, and he referred to it as:

 4             "We kindly ask that you urgently give us the government position

 5     on these issues"?

 6             Now, were you given any kind of dead-line?

 7        A.   Well, no.  I'm sure it wasn't as dramatic as it appears.  Perhaps

 8     Mr. Hajric had a desire to help these people, but there was nothing else

 9     that was especially a burning issue at the time.  This trend or desire to

10     leave Zepa was something that was in evidence constantly, so it was

11     always something that the refugees were considering.  But I don't recall

12     that there was anything specific at this point in time that would have

13     called for a dramatic call, as presented here in this letter by

14     Mr. Mehmed Hajric.  In any case, we see from the document that there was

15     some discussion at the local level, with regard to this matter, with the

16     VRC [as interpreted] officer, Pecanac, I believe.  I'm not sure that I

17     recall this particular event.

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  VRS.

19             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Thank you.  While we still have this document before us, could

21     you please read what it reads under A:

22             "Is it possible at the present time to negotiate a welfare

23     evacuation from Zepa at the local level with Serbian officer

24     Milan Pecanac (negotiations proposed for 10 May 1995)."

25             And under B:

Page 4605

 1             "Would the welfare evacuation from Zepa be justified with regard

 2     to the current military and political situation in the Republic of

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina?"

 4             Thank you.  What can you tell us about this, and was this the

 5     position taken by the War Presidency?

 6        A.   Well, you see, in reference to A, maybe I do recall vaguely, but

 7     I am not sure whether these negotiations with Pecanac were held.  But if

 8     they were, an army officer would have had to be involved in this because,

 9     as far as I know, no civilians went to those negotiations or attended

10     those negotiations.  But, generally speaking, in wartime I don't know

11     what the position would be on these welfare evacuations.  I assume that

12     the response from Sarajevo would be that such evacuations should be

13     avoided.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Now, Hajric referred to this as welfare evacuation,

15     and he's requesting the government and informing the government of it,

16     and he says that he has sought contact with the Serb side.  And then he

17     says -- we can see here where he specifically says:

18             "Would a welfare evacuation from Zepa be justified with regard to

19     the military and political situation ..."

20             So my question to you is this:  Was this type of -- were these

21     types of communication generally sent to the Main Staff of the Army of

22     Bosnia and Herzegovina, and did you receive any response?

23        A.   Well, if we can just go back to the top of the document, and you

24     can see that everything did have to go through military channels.  As a

25     member of the War Presidency, I may have been informed of this orally,

Page 4606

 1     but I have never seen these documents before.  The only way of

 2     communicating was by means of the military Paket radio equipment.  It all

 3     depended on that.  Anything that had to be forwarded had to be decided on

 4     by Colonel Palic.  Any document could have been removed, because there

 5     was no possibility to check whether someone, indeed, sent it or not.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             I seek to tender the document on the screen into evidence.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D99.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have 1D246 on the

11     screen.  It is a letter of Captain First Class Salih to the Main Staff of

12     the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  He drafted it following his commander's

13     approval, that is to say, commander of the 2nd Corps.

14             Could we please zoom in for the witness.

15             We see here that he says:

16             "We have unverified information that in the near future, a

17     certain number of people will make an unauthorised and illegal exit from

18     the Zepa zone, leaving through the forest towards the free territories of

19     the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Kladanj, Olovo)."

20             The second paragraph:

21             "We will undertake the necessary measures to prevent this from

22     occurring."

23             Third paragraph:

24             "We therefore inform you of this and request that you bring this

25     information to the attention of the commands of units whose zone of

Page 4607

 1     responsibility is in those parts of the republic, so that the members and

 2     commands of those units will know how to handle any people who may be

 3     deserters, should they not have documents issued by the command of this

 4     unit, and so that they can promptly inform us ..."

 5             It was drafted by Assistant Commander for Intelligence

 6     Salih Hasanovic, sending it to the chief of staff,

 7     General Enver Hadzihasanovic, on the 25th of May.  Could this letter

 8     contain the answer that was never sent to Hajric, when he was never

 9     explained how to treat those people who wished to exit, and it was

10     basically 65 per cent of the people that were in the enclave who did not

11     have their homes there.

12        A.   Well, obviously this document indicates that there were

13     activities underway aimed at leaving the enclave of Zepa, although this

14     does seem a bit exaggerated when these officers referred to it.  The

15     territory of Zepa could independently be left only by those who had arms

16     and those who were fit the most.  Only those members of the army could

17     leave who knew where the free passage route was.  Women and children

18     could not make that trip.  It would include 40 kilometres of terrain

19     crossing two lines of defence.  Women and children couldn't do that.

20     Only the best-equipped and trained members of the army could leave the

21     enclave in this way.

22             As for whether the wish to leave existed at the time, yes,

23     indeed, it was the case, much as the case was with Sarajevo.  People

24     wanted to leave because they were under a siege.  It's only natural they

25     wanted to leave.

Page 4608

 1        Q.   This request sent by the commander first class, on his

 2     commander's orders, to the Main Staff, was it aimed at preventing any

 3     departures and people leaving the enclave?  Did any authorities work on

 4     preventing the civilians to leave for other areas?

 5        A.   Of course, army bodies wanted to prevent any able-bodied men to

 6     leave.  It would mean deserting your unit.  As for the civilians, in

 7     particular women and children, in principle, it wasn't their job to do

 8     that.  They had nothing to do with the civilians.  As for the army, that

 9     is correct.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document,

11     1D246, and then I will move on to the next topic.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This document will be received.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D100.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, before you move to another topic, we

15     must have our second break now, and we will resume at 1.00.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17                           --- Recess taken at 12.31 p.m.

18                           --- On resuming at 1.01 p.m.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Tolimir, please proceed.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

21             Could we please have P123 shown in e-court.  It is dated 13 July

22     1995.  It was sent to General Mladic and the command of the Drina Corps,

23     General Krstic, to the Protection Regiment and to the

24     Communications Regiment.  It discusses the situation in Zepa, and I

25     signed it.  We can see it here.

Page 4609

 1             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   I would like to quote you first.  At page 4289, line 25, to

 3     page 4290, line 3, you say as following:

 4             "After Srebrenica fell on the 12th of July, 1995, on the same day

 5     the War Presidency of Zepa, via UNPROFOR and Colonel Sejmon Dudnjik,

 6     received a request or an invitation for talks with the other side."

 7             My question is this:  Was all that communication going through

 8     Dudnjik and UNPROFOR?

 9        A.   As far as I know, yes.

10        Q.   Thank you.  As it is stated in paragraph 1, was there an

11     agreement for a meeting to take place at 2100 hours?  It was drafted on

12     the 13th of July, in the afternoon, and it says:

13             "We have established planned contacts with representatives from

14     Zepa, Toplak [as interpreted] and Imamovic.  It was arranged previously

15     to meet around 9:00 p.m.  We were advised by UNPROFOR that during the

16     day, they were busy consulting with the inhabitants about the conditions

17     of moving out of Zepa and that they were forced to do that due to the

18     decision made by the government in Sarajevo, which stated that they

19     should not move.  They advised most of the population and soldiers that

20     they would be granted safe passage or stay in the area of Zepa if they

21     surrendered their weapon and recognised the Serb authority."

22             Is it true that you were unable to attend that meeting because of

23     the activity specified herein?

24        A.   Well, first of all, I wouldn't say that there was an arrangement

25     made.  Rather, it was requested by your side that the meeting took place

Page 4610

 1     around 9.00 p.m.  As I said before, first we sought approval from our

 2     political and military leadership to be granted leave to talk to you at

 3     the local level.  I believe during my testimony here, I said that

 4     clearly.  I said that the request or query was sent to our political and

 5     military leadership, asking whether we were allowed to engage in any

 6     talks with the Serb side at the local level.

 7             I must also say that at the meeting of the War Presidency in

 8     Zepa, we did not discuss the things specified in this report, as far as I

 9     remember, such as that the population of Zepa should be removed

10     immediately, if they wished to do so, transferred elsewhere.  What I

11     remember was that we had a lengthy War Presidency meeting, and at the

12     very beginning we forwarded that question to our political leadership to

13     see whether we were allowed to engage in any talks.  Later on, we were

14     discussing things such as who was to go, et cetera.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Since you said that there was no meeting that evening

16     because you were busy with other talks, making decisions you mentioned,

17     was it also discussed at that meeting who was to attend those talks and

18     whether it was approved by the War Presidency?

19        A.   Could we please go back to the document first.  I just noticed

20     the date, July 13.  On that day, we did have a meeting with your side.

21     On that day, there was a meeting with you at check-point number 2.

22        Q.   Thank you.  To clarify that, let's scroll up so as to see the top

23     of the document.  Go further down the page in the Serbian.  Further down.

24             It says:  "Delivered at 9.50."  It means that this was done by

25     the person typing it.  So it wasn't up to me to put the date on the

Page 4611

 1     document.

 2        A.   I just wanted to reiterate that there was a meeting on the 13th.

 3     On the 12th of July, in the evening, we had held the lengthy

 4     War Presidency meeting.  There was another meeting on the 13th, in the

 5     evening or later in the afternoon.

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for Mr. Tolimir.

 7             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Do you recall when, on the 12th, you received this invitation,

 9     through UNPROFOR, to attend a meeting?

10        A.   I think the invitation was received by Colonel Avdo Palic.  As

11     far as I remember, it was in the afternoon, perhaps around 2.00 or 3.00

12     in the afternoon.  I know that we gathered in the evening and spent most

13     of the night between the 12th and the 13th at that War Presidency

14     session.  This is what I recall in particular, and I speak from memory,

15     of course.

16        Q.   Let's look at the document, the second paragraph.  It reads:

17             "We were notified, through UNPROFOR, that during the day they

18     were busy informing the population about the conditions of moving out of

19     Zepa, and that they were forced to undertake such activities because of

20     the Sarajevo government decision which stated that they shouldn't move.

21     They want to secure the support of most of the population for the

22     decision that was already made."

23             Do you remember having conveyed this information to our

24     representatives at Boksanica?

25        A.   I don't remember.  I cannot exclude the possibility that

Page 4612

 1     somebody, say a member of the War Presidency, did that.  But, personally,

 2     I did not have any contact with Dudnjik at the time.  As far as I know,

 3     Colonel Palic was in contact with him.

 4        Q.   Could he have informed them of this?

 5        A.   I don't know.  I cannot exclude that, but as far as I remember,

 6     Colonel Palic on that day was in touch with Colonel Dudnjik.

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for Mr. Tolimir.

 8             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Look at para 4 next.  Actually, para 5, where it says they

10     informed most of the population and soldiers that they will all be

11     granted free passage or that they would be allowed to stay in Zepa if

12     they surrendered their weapons and recognised Serb authorities.  Is it

13     possible that this, too, was conveyed by Avdo Palic, that he told this

14     to -- told Dudnjik about this, and that he passed it on to us?

15        A.   Again, I speak from memory.  All contact with Dudnjik that day

16     was through Colonel Palic.  The overall situation and the feel at the

17     War Presidency session that day does not reflect this information, at

18     least how it was put in your report; for example, the fact that by that

19     time there had already been a decision in place to move the entire

20     population of Zepa.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Please look at lines 16 and 17, as well as further

22     down the page.  It is the fifth paragraph:

23             "We informed the Zepa leadership, through UNPROFOR, that the

24     process of evacuation and weapons surrender has to start at 900 hours on

25     15 July 1995.  We are expecting their contacts and the decision."

Page 4613

 1             During that day, did you receive any information to this effect

 2     conveyed to him by the Serb side?

 3        A.   I don't recall that.  Whoever was in touch with Dudnjik probably

 4     forwarded this information to our side, if you had originally sent it to

 5     Dudnjik.  However, I cannot recall this particular information, though.

 6     I don't think it was discussed, as such, at the War Presidency session.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Please tell us this:  Did Avdo Palic attend this

 8     Presidency session that lasted all night, and what were his positions and

 9     what did he inform you of?  Is it possible that he might have conveyed

10     all this information?

11        A.   Colonel Palic was present at the session, and I believe that he

12     was the one who conveyed the demands of the Serb side.  But I don't

13     remember it being in this shape and form.  A discussion ensued regarding

14     what that would mean for us, and then again the issue arose of what to do

15     with the able-bodied men, and we immediately received those demands, and

16     there was discussion on whether we should negotiate or not.  But

17     Colonel Palic did attend that meeting, as far as I can recall.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Please tell me, were you told, via UNPROFOR, that you

19     would have the option to either stay in Zepa or leave Zepa and

20     surrender -- on condition that you surrender the weapons to the VRS?

21        A.   I cannot remember every detail, but I tend to think that there

22     were no such demands, or at least not formulated in that way.  Now,

23     whether Colonel Palic received all the details and perhaps then presented

24     them to us in a somewhat different form, I don't know, but I don't recall

25     that on the night of the 12th, going on the 13th, there were explicit

Page 4614

 1     demands, as shown here.  I don't remember any of that.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Did you discuss the fifth paragraph, where it says

 3     that:

 4             "A number of wealthy Muslims inquire, through the UNPROFOR, about

 5     the possibility to move out to the territory of the FRY or third

 6     countries with their movable property.  They wanted to avoid mobilisation

 7     in the so-called ABiH."

 8             Now, this was relayed to us via UNPROFOR.  Now, whether he had

 9     actually said this to UNPROFOR or not, can you tell us something about

10     that?

11        A.   Well, I can't remember any of these details.  As I've already

12     said, I did not take part in these negotiations or these exchanges of

13     messages, so I can't really say either way.  But as far as I remember, it

14     was not presented to the War Presidency at the meeting held on the night

15     of the 12th and 13th of June [as interpreted], 1995, in this form.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please tell --

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

18             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

19             Just to nip this one in the bud, I think we have our familiar

20     month issue, if you look at the transcript.  At least on mine, at

21     page 75, line 24, there's a reference to the 12th and 13th of June, 1995.

22     I think we've had this before.  I just want to clarify that now.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think Mr. Tolimir has misspoken.  It must be

24     July.

25             Please carry on.

Page 4615

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  It was

 2     July, indeed, and I thank Mr. Thayer.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   My next question:  Do you have any knowledge about whether part

 5     of the population really wanted to move out, via the territory of the

 6     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to third countries so they would avoid

 7     joining fighting; for instance, to the US or other places?

 8        A.   Well, I do not rule out the possibility that there was talk to

 9     that effect and that some of the wealthy inhabitants of Zepa maybe voiced

10     their positions in that respect.  But I don't recall that as coming to

11     the War Presidency as a specific request.  If that was the case and if

12     they did actually send such a request to someone, that is something that

13     I cannot rule out.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please tell the Trial Chamber about the way

15     that the discussion proceeded on the meeting that night on the 12th,

16     going on the 13th of July?  How did that evolve; do you remember?

17        A.   Well, I remember the following:  I think Colonel Palic briefed us

18     and said that he had received from Colonel Dudnjik, the UNPROFOR

19     commander in Zepa, a request of the Serb side for negotiations.  That was

20     the major -- that was the gist of what Colonel Palic conveyed to us.

21     Now, whether he also mentioned some of the details that you showed us in

22     this report, I can't really recall.  But as I've already said before, he

23     did not convey most of these details to the War Presidency.  Our overall

24     concern at this meeting was -- or, actually, focused on two major areas.

25     The first one was whether we were authorised and competent to actually

Page 4616

 1     negotiate, to enter these negotiations, and in that sense we submitted

 2     that request to the civilian and military authorities of Bosnia and

 3     Herzegovina, asking for their opinion on whether we had the authority to

 4     negotiate at the local level.  That was the first area.  The second area

 5     that was in our focus was probably conjectures and guessing as to what

 6     kind of demands we would be presented from the Serb side, because that

 7     was the day when Srebrenica fell.  We could only assume what those

 8     demands might entail.  The entire discussion that whole night on the

 9     night of the 12th and 13th revolved around these two major issues.  As

10     for these details and the specific demands that the Serb side presented,

11     I can't recall any of that.

12             We also discussed at length the option where we would receive a

13     negative response from Sarajevo or Tuzla, if they were to say that we

14     were not allowed to negotiate at the local level.  But then the position

15     prevailed that we should try and see how best to deal with this, because

16     in the end it was our fate and our skins that we had to consider.  But

17     whatever somebody on the side would have to say in the final analysis,

18     their lives were not at stake because they were not in Zepa.  So that was

19     the prevailing tone of all the discussions at this session of the

20     War Presidency in Zepa.

21        Q.   Now I would like to move on to the meeting of 13th July 1995.

22             In examination-in-chief, when asked by the Prosecutor when you

23     left from Zepa to Boksanica, which was check-point 2 of UNPROFOR, you

24     said you couldn't remember because it was a long time ago and that you

25     didn't take any notes at the time.  This was on page 4293, lines 6 and 7

Page 4617

 1     on the transcript.  My question is this:  At the meeting in Boksanica,

 2     did you take any notes, did you write anything down, or was it the same

 3     as what you said of the 12th of July, that you did not take any notes?

 4        A.   Are you referring to the meeting of the 13th of July?

 5        Q.   Yes, that's what I'm referring to.  And is that correct?

 6        A.   Well, I really don't remember whether I took any notes or not on

 7     that day, the 13th.  And if I did, they would have been lost.  So

 8     everything I said about that meeting and everything that is in my

 9     statement is really -- are things that I can just recollect.

10        Q.   Well, since you can't recall this, I will remind you of what you

11     said during the examination-in-chief.  And if some of it is not correct,

12     just say so.

13             You said the following, and I quote:

14             "As far as I can recall at this meeting, the Serb side was

15     represented by Colonel Zdravko Tolimir, UNPROFOR was represented by

16     Colonel Sejmon Dudnjik, and I was there, and Mujo Imamovic.  At the very

17     beginning of the meeting, General Tolimir said something to the effect of

18     this, Srebrenica has fallen, now it is Zepa's turn.  We have two options

19     here.  We are offering the following:  You should all -- you can all

20     leave Zepa, be evacuated, board buses, and leave.  And then I asked him

21     whether that meant that people who were 35 years old could join their

22     families and move out to the territories of the BH Army, and

23     General Tolimir said, Yes, of course.  And then if we decided to refuse

24     the first option, the second option would be -- or the second alternative

25     would be the military option; in other words, the military occupation of

Page 4618

 1     Zepa."

 2             And then you said the meeting did not last long and so on.  I

 3     believe that my translators translated this properly and conveyed your

 4     words correctly.  This is on transcript page 4294, lines 8 through 21.  I

 5     tried to quote what you said.

 6        A.   Well, yes, that's exactly what I said.  They translated that

 7     properly.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Now, here we are talking of events 15 years ago.

 9     This event is significant for me and for you; for me, because I'm the

10     accused in these proceedings, and for you, because you had to make

11     decisions about the Srebrenica civilian population.  Now, my question is

12     this:  Before you came to testify here, did you check and go through any

13     of the documents relating to the meeting of the 13th of July or is

14     everything that you have said here actually reconstruction based on your

15     recollection?

16        A.   Well, everything I said here was based on what I could remember.

17     I had no notes of any kind, and I didn't read up on this subject before I

18     came to testify here.

19        Q.   Thank you.  My next question:  At this meeting, as well as the

20     ones that followed with General Mladic, was the key issue, in fact, the

21     surrender of weapons of the BH Army in Zepa and the surrender of the

22     weapons that the able-bodied men had?  Thank you.

23        A.   As far as I can recall, the talks always involved a whole package

24     deal, if I can put it that way.  So it was they involved the evacuation

25     of the civilians and the surrender of weapons and able-bodied men.  At

Page 4619

 1     times, they would have to surrender these to the UNPROFOR, at other times

 2     to the VRS.  But, in any case, it was always a package deal, if I can

 3     define it that way.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5             Could we now please pull up 1D261.  That is a document that is,

 6     in fact, part of the diary of Mr. Fortin.  The Defence recently

 7     established, comparing this document with the diary, that the pagination

 8     is different, and in the electronic disclosure suite, the name of this

 9     colonel was not mentioned by Ms. Carolyn Edgerton.

10             And could we have D585, page 60 in English.  And I hope, when

11     discussing this excerpt, that it does not fall under Rule 70 and that we

12     may show it in public.  On the 65 ter list disclosed to the Defence on

13     the 5th of September in 2008, this document appears under number 751.

14     And the Defence also referred to this document in its pre-trial brief

15     which, again, is a public document.  Could we please have page 2 in both

16     the B/C/S and English versions.  We would like to see paragraph 8, which

17     reads as follows -- well, first of all, let the witness read through this

18     document, and then I will read it out.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, we have some problems with the

20     numbers.  You were mentioning 1D268, and then later on D589, but there is

21     no document with the number D589.  We have just reached D100.  Can you

22     help us?

23             Mr. Thayer.

24             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I may be able to offer a more direct

25     solution.  If I understand what General Tolimir wants to show the

Page 4620

 1     Trial Chamber, it is a report of a meeting that was held by

 2     Lieutenant-Colonel Indjic on the 13th of July, in the afternoon, and I

 3     believe what he is showing us here is a summary of that meeting that's

 4     contained in Colonel Fortin's diary.  And as I think the Trial Chamber

 5     has already seen through Colonel Fortin's testimony, what he did was,

 6     basically, cut and paste some of the reports that he participated in into

 7     his diary, in addition to providing his own contemporaneous recollection.

 8     We actually have a copy of the actual report that this excerpt from the

 9     diary is reproducing, except without the actual formatting of the report.

10     That report is already in evidence as P596, so we can go directly to P596

11     without having to go through the circuitous route of putting up

12     Colonel Fortin's summary of it or reproduction of it.  So if it's all the

13     same to the Defence, we can look at the real McCoy, as it were, P596, and

14     look at the actual report, itself.  And that did come in through

15     Colonel Fortin, himself, originally, this report.  So I just offer that

16     instead of having to deal with all the translation issues that we had for

17     Colonel Fortin's diary; for example, it's in French, it's in B/C/S, it's

18     in English.  There were three different versions of it that we need to

19     juggle, and we can just go directly to 596.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

21             Mr. Tolimir, what do you think of this proposal of Mr. Thayer's?

22     Is that helpful for your examination?

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to thank Mr. Thayer.  We

24     wanted to see 1D261.  It's all there.  This should save me some time and

25     enable me to put a few more questions.  I have no idea what is in the

Page 4621

 1     documents offered by the Prosecution.

 2             Let's look at page 2 in Serbian, and it will all be crystal

 3     clear.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I'm not sure if we have the same document on the

 5     screen now.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We do.  Paragraph 8, which reads --

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] "The CO of the Rogatica Brigade,

 9     accompanied by General Tolimir and local Bosnian authorities, met at

10     Ukrainian check-point 2 at noon today.  The Serbs asked the Bosnians in

11     the Zepa pocket to drop their weapons, after which the civilian

12     population may either leave or stay.  The Bosnian authorities were due to

13     meet immediately after in the village to discuss their options.  The

14     Serbs gave them until 3.30 p.m. to decide.  At 6.30 p.m., an answer was

15     still awaited.  The Bosnians indicated they needed until noon tomorrow."

16             That's all I wanted to quote from this document.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   This is a report of the Ukrainian Battalion commander sent to

19     General Gobillard in Sarajevo.  That was in the period of time when you

20     were there.  He mentions the choice given to civilians to leave or stay.

21     If I recollect correctly, he based this on a document.  Am I right in

22     assuming this?

23        A.   What do you want me to answer, exactly, the choice between

24     leaving or staying, or what is your question?

25        Q.   The question is this:  In this Ukrainian Battalion commander's

Page 4622

 1     report, does it not read that the civilians would be either allowed to

 2     either leave or stay?  Does it say so?

 3        A.   Yes, it's in there in paragraph 8.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Since Dudnjik kept notes, did he accurately inform

 5     his command, and would you allow for the possibility that this report is

 6     more accurate than yours or my recollection?

 7        A.   Well, if he kept notes, then that's it, although I don't know

 8     what exactly he wrote down.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

10             MR. THAYER:  And if there is evidence that Colonel Dudnjik kept

11     notes, we'd appreciate knowing what that is.  That's, I think, the first

12     we've heard of Colonel Dudnjik allegedly having notes.  If there is a

13     basis for that statement in the record, we'd like to know what the basis

14     is.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

16             We've heard that the Prosecution wants to raise a procedural

17     matter before we adjourn today.  Perhaps we can leave it at this point

18     for today and continue with this document and the matter mentioned in

19     this document for tomorrow.  Is that possible?  Then you could think

20     about which part or which kind of document you would use for continuation

21     of your examination.  We have only three minutes left for today.  Do you

22     agree?

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

24             I just wanted to put the last question for today.

25             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Page 4623

 1        Q.   Did Dudnjik participate in that conversation on the 13th?

 2        A.   I think he did.

 3        Q.   Did you see him taking any notes?

 4        A.   I truly cannot remember.  However, he was there and he did

 5     comment on the situation.

 6        Q.   Did he send this report to his command, the report I just read

 7     out?

 8        A.   I don't know.  If there is a document in existence to that

 9     effect, if it's an official document, then there you go, but I don't know

10     what he sent to his superiors.  On the right-hand side in the English

11     version, I see that it's supposed to be a report, but I can't know what

12     he wrote.  Yes, he was at a meeting.  Yes, he participated.  But as for

13     whether he kept notes, I don't remember that.

14        Q.   My last question:  Did he report from the meeting that I offered

15     that civilians may either leave or go following the surrender of weapons?

16     Did he report this to his command in Sarajevo?

17        A.   Well, if it's in the report, he did.  I have no documents to rely

18     on any of this.  I cannot confirm this or deny.  If it's in the report, I

19     have no doubt that he wrote it.

20        Q.   So this was merely an offer of his?  Actually, he's discussing my

21     offer, where I said that they could either leave or stay.  Is that

22     correct or not?

23        A.   As I said, I didn't keep notes, I don't remember that, but I

24     cannot deny that.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I will stop now and

Page 4624

 1     resume tomorrow.  Tomorrow, we'll have time enough to discuss all of

 2     UNPROFOR's reports, discussing these matters.  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you, Mr. Tolimir.

 4             This last question was, in fact, an interesting set of questions.

 5     That concludes your examination for today.  We have to continue tomorrow.

 6             Will you address the Chamber with your procedure matter in the

 7     presence of the witness or --

 8             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, if the witness could be excused.

 9     There is no reason for him to be subjected to this.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Okay.  Then, again, thank you very much for

11     today's attendance, and we will continue tomorrow in the afternoon.

12                           [The witness stands down]

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

14             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

15             The three matters are:

16             First, with respect to the Prosecution's ongoing compliance with

17     the Trial Chamber's 92 bis decision generating the proper lists,

18     delineating which categories the various exhibits fall into, the

19     Trial Chamber granted us an additional 30 days on top of the 30 days the

20     Trial Chamber had originally ordered.  We have been working to comply.

21     I can tell the Trial Chamber it is taking a lot longer than we even

22     thought when we first asked for the additional 30 days.  The process is

23     extremely time-consuming to be able to identify the documents and then go

24     through the entire transcripts to make sure that we've caught all of the

25     exhibits and categorised them correctly.  We will have a troche ready to

Page 4625

 1     go to Registry by this Friday.  However, it will fall far short of the

 2     approximately 120 92 bis witnesses that were subject to the

 3     Trial Chamber's decision, about half of which were 92 bis straight and

 4     the other half of the 92 bis with cross.  I can just tell the

 5     Trial Chamber that there's just no way that we're going to be able to

 6     finish this project in the near future, much less by this Friday.  I can

 7     tell the Court it's going to require weekend time, which is not a problem

 8     because we're always working on the weekend anyway, but we're working on

 9     the weekend to get ready for our witnesses.  So we're going to do what we

10     can.

11             What I propose is that we, every week, provide the Trial Chamber

12     and Registry with a minimum of five packages -- five witnesses ready to

13     go to the Registry so the Registry can make sure all the proper P numbers

14     are assigned.  The first troche that we'll have this Friday, I think,

15     will number approximately a dozen witnesses.  Doing the math, that's

16     going to be another probably four months, at a rate of a minimum of five

17     a week, before we can complete that project:  I think we'll be able to do

18     more than five a week, frankly, but some of these witnesses are extremely

19     extensive, days and days of testimony, which is time-consuming, and

20     unfortunately we do not have unlimited resources to do that.  It's work

21     that needs to be done, ultimately, with attorneys who have handled these

22     witnesses overseeing and actually involved in the process, in addition to

23     Ms. Stewart and some other members of the staff.

24             So I would ask the Trial Chamber for the flexibility to allow us

25     to proceed along that schedule, a minimum of five a week.  I'm sure we

Page 4626

 1     can do better than five, but I'd hate to promise something and not be

 2     able to deliver, particularly how it's looking so far.

 3             So I spring that on the Trial Chamber, but I wanted to give the

 4     Trial Chamber a heads-up relatively in advance of this Friday's

 5     dead-line.  That's item 1.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I ask you:  You mentioned, more or less, 12,

 7     a dozen, witnesses.  Are they covered by the list of witnesses calling

 8     for September?

 9             MR. THAYER:  Yes.  What we have done is we have tried to at least

10     prioritise the witnesses who are coming who are 92 bis with cross.  There

11     are a couple who are listed for September, some of the experts, for

12     example, who are among that dozen.  So, certainly, we've tried to

13     prioritise those witnesses.  And I should have added, the straight 92 bis

14     witnesses, naturally, I think, would be towards the tail end, because we

15     want to focus on the witnesses that are coming before the Trial Chamber,

16     and that's how we've approached the project thus far, so that's where --

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think that is appreciated, and the Chamber will

18     consider your submission, and we'll come back to that tomorrow.

19             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

20             And if I could go into private session very briefly for the other

21     two matters.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Private.

23                           [Private session]

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 4627











11 Page 4627 redacted. Private session.















Page 4628

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 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18                           [Open session]

19             THE REGISTRAR:  We're back in open session.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We have to adjourn for the day.  We will

21     resume -- Mr. Tolimir.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just a brief administrative matter,

23     Your Honours.

24             This accused, that is, me, has been, for over 1.145 days, working

25     here, and this affects my ability to actually work properly, and I would

Page 4629

 1     really appreciate it if you could see to it that the Detention Unit

 2     authorities no longer apply those measures.

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could the witness please

 4     repeat what exactly it was that was being done in the Detention Unit?

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, you were, I think, referring to the

 6     nightly checks.  Is that correct?

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am referring to the fact that in

 8     24 hours, I am being checked on a number of occasions --

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Sorry, we are running out of time.  And we have

10     discussed that earlier, and you know our decision of last week.  We will

11     proceed with that problem, and you know our decision.

12             We have to adjourn now.  We can't go further.  And we will resume

13     tomorrow in the afternoon at 2.15 in Courtroom I.

14                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.52 p.m.,

15                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 31st day of

16                           August, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.