Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 4712

 1                           Wednesday, 1 September 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.22 a.m.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning to everybody.

 7             First of all, we have a delayed start because of technical

 8     problems.  They are still not resolved, so that we just start -- how it

 9     works, and we will find out the best way to deal with our problems this

10     morning.

11             First of all, I would like to go into a private session.

12                           [Private session]

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 4713











11 Pages 4713-4719 redacted. Private session.















Page 4720

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16                           [Open session]

17             THE REGISTRAR:  We are back in open session.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, please continue your

19     cross-examination.

20             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, and I

22     apologise.  I failed to turn the microphone on.

23             Could we please now pull up D60 in e-court.  That's Exhibit D60,

24     and it is not -- it doesn't mention this witness, so we can show it in

25     public.

Page 4721

 1                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]

 2        Q.   [Interpretation] While we are waiting for it to come up, let me

 3     just say that this is a letter that Alija Izetbegovic sent to

 4     General Delic on the 18th of July, 1995.

 5             We can now see it before us, and we can see that it reads as

 6     follows:

 7             "I have just been talking to General Smith."

 8             That's in the first paragraph:

 9             "I could have women, children, and the elderly evacuated from

10     Zepa by UNPROFOR, perhaps.  Would you accept this?"

11             That's what he's asking Delic.  Then under 2:

12             "Perhaps in this case we could insert a brigade (or battalion) of

13     soldiers to Zepa across the forest-path and thus continue the combat with

14     more success.  These men from Zepa say that they could find between 500

15     and 1.000 volunteers (Muderis is from Zepa)."

16             Under 3:

17             "Groups should also be inserted into Gorazde (over land).  This

18     would be of great encouragement.  There are people interested."

19             And under 4:

20             "An evacuation plan has been made here for the population of Zepa

21     in case items 1 and 2 above fail.  I'm sending it to you.  I expect your

22     answers to the above."

23             This was sent by Alija Izetbegovic on the 18th of July, 1995.

24             Now, for a moment, let's keep this document on the screens.  And,

25     Witness, I would like to ask you the following:  We see here that

Page 4722

 1     Alija Izetbegovic says that he had just talked to General Smith, and that

 2     perhaps he could have women, children and elderly evacuated from Zepa,

 3     and then he's asking Delic to tell him whether he would accept that.  So

 4     now my question for you:  In view of the fact that you were frequently in

 5     contact with high military officers, were you aware of the position of

 6     Alija Izetbegovic and General Delic and the entire military and political

 7     leadership, and even the UNPROFOR, as we can see here, on the evacuation

 8     of the civilian population?

 9        A.   Well, not the way it is stated here, because here we see that

10     this is a communication between the president of the Presidency,

11     Alija Izetbegovic, and General Delic.  The first time that I attended a

12     meeting where Mr. Alija Izetbegovic was present was on the 19th of July,

13     in the evening hours, which means the day after this, so that I really do

14     not remember that any of the members of the War Presidency told me

15     anything about these positions as stated here.  Maybe Mr. Hajric or

16     Colonel Palic were aware of this, but I don't remember that anyone told

17     me about it at the time.

18        Q.   Tell us, please -- we see that this letter arrived in Zepa on the

19     18th.  Actually, we saw that yesterday.  On the 18th, it was sent to

20     Delic, but it was also sent to Zepa, a letter of the same substance, the

21     one where it said "State Secret" and so on.  Now, because the content of

22     this communication was something that the military leadership in Zepa

23     knew about, was this information also available to the persons who

24     actually took part in the negotiations two days later on the 20th?

25        A.   Well, I really cannot say that with any certainty because, as

Page 4723

 1     I've just said, I was not aware of this.  But as far as I can remember,

 2     the position that we took, that the civilian population should be

 3     evacuated from Zepa -- or, rather, the population -- the entire

 4     population should be evacuated from Zepa, was a position that we, members

 5     of the Presidency of Zepa, actually formulated.  Now, whether some of the

 6     members of the War Presidency in Zepa were aware of this position, I

 7     don't know.  But even as I sit here all these years later, it is my

 8     impression still that the key issues were, for the most part, decisions

 9     taken by us because, as I've already said, it was about our lives and not

10     anybody else's.  And we see in this document, and also in the documents

11     we saw yesterday, that some individuals who drew up these plans in

12     Sarajevo did not really have a full picture of what was really happening

13     in Zepa, so that whatever did come from outside and whatever was proposed

14     whenever we concluded that it was not realistic, in view of the situation

15     on the ground, we would not accept it.

16        Q.   Thank you.  We saw that the Zepa leadership had access to the

17     information that we saw yesterday.  We also saw that the negotiating team

18     that came to meet with General Mladic at Boksanica both said -- both

19     members, two of them, said that they wanted the evacuation of Zepa.  One

20     member said that he wanted the surrender of arms; correct?

21        A.   Yes, we did see that yesterday.

22        Q.   Now, in view of that, and bearing in mind that one of the members

23     of the negotiating team, whom we saw yesterday speaking in the video

24     insert, who said that there were some people who wanted to stay, my

25     question is this:  Was there an instruction or order from Sarajevo that

Page 4724

 1     as many civilians as possible be evacuated from Zepa or that everyone be

 2     evacuated, as stated here, all women, children, and the elderly be

 3     evacuated from Zepa?  So to repeat my question:  Was there an order from

 4     Sarajevo that all civilians, in other words, those who are not of

 5     military age, be evacuated from Zepa?  Thank you.

 6        A.   I don't remember that, nor was that specific demand ever

 7     available to me.  I never heard of it.

 8             Now, as for the letter that General Delic sent to the president

 9     of the Presidency, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, especially the first item,

10     perhaps they were beginning to realise that this might be a form of

11     assistance to Zepa.  But that there was any direct demand or request from

12     the political leadership in Sarajevo for the evacuation, I don't remember

13     that there was any such thing.

14             And, again, I have to repeat that we took all such decisions,

15     depending on the situation on the ground at the local level, because the

16     lives of those people were at stake, and in such a situation you don't

17     really mind too much what anybody outside would tell you who was not

18     really fully aware of the situation on the ground as it was.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             Could we please now pull up Exhibit D54.

21             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   But let me just ask you, in the meantime:  Who is this person

23     Muderis mentioned in parenthesis in item 2?

24        A.   Yes.  Muderis was a Zepa man.  It is also a religious title that

25     would be used for a person who had graduated from that Cairo University

Page 4725

 1     Islamic Studies.  I believe his last name was Halilovic, but everyone

 2     always addressed him with Muderis.  And he was a person from Zepa, just

 3     like Mr. Heljic, the person whom we mentioned yesterday.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5             Now, we see this document before us.  And before I forget, could

 6     we please admit into evidence the Exhibit D60, unless it's already been

 7     admitted.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It is already an exhibit.  You see it from the

 9     number.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

11             So it is already an exhibit, and I've just been reminded by my

12     adviser -- legal adviser.

13             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Now, Witness, could you please take a look at this document, and

15     I will just read the first sentence -- the first line under number 2:

16             "Evacuation is possible only by land ..."

17             This is another letter sent by Mr. Izetbegovic -- or, rather,

18     Mr. Hajric, Mehmed, the president of Zepa -- or, rather, Mehmed Hajric

19     received this letter from Alija Izetbegovic, so let's see what it is that

20     he got on the 19th of July, 1995, on the day before the negotiations.

21             He says there:

22             "An evacuation is possible only by land under the supervision of

23     UNPROFOR."

24             That's what Alija Izetbegovic said.

25             Now, let's look at the third sentence, where he says:

Page 4726

 1             "The Chetniks are dragging out -- as their first condition, the

 2     Chetniks have asked that the men lay down their weapons and their

 3     investigation and so on ..."

 4             And now the third sentence in the third paragraph:

 5             "My plan, move out as many civilians as possible; all, if

 6     possible."

 7             And then in line 4, it says:

 8             "If we do not succeed in this, you try to push on on those roads,

 9     but now without the burden of women and children who would, in the

10     meantime, be taken out."

11             And then under item 4, it says:

12             "As for the international community, I think that all is not yet

13     lost.  They are wavering.  One thing in the morning, and then they say a

14     different thing in the evening.  The process of persuading them

15     continues, but our plans have to be laid as if they were not there."

16             This was written on the 19th of July, 1995.

17             My question is this:  Looking at this letter which

18     Alija Izetbegovic sent on the 19th of July, is it clear that his

19     intention was to try and pull out all the civilians, and especially those

20     who are not of military age, from Zepa?

21        A.   Well, that's clear.  There is nothing for me to add.

22        Q.   Can we see from that that his plan did not entail the soldiers,

23     because in the previous document he mentioned the breakthrough of the

24     brigade without the women and children?

25        A.   Yes, it does say so, although I must say that this is yet another

Page 4727

 1     plan which I see for the first time.

 2        Q.   Well, it apparently was received by the War Presidency, which

 3     accorded appropriate mandate to those negotiating?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   So did the negotiators have the mandate to negotiate the

 6     evacuation of all civilians, especially because we see that it was

 7     Alija Izetbegovic's position?

 8        A.   Well, I don't know whether Benjamin Kulovac had read this text.

 9     I didn't, in any case.  As for the negotiations on the 19th, we came

10     there with a clear plan.  It was said there that all civilians should

11     leave, and that's it.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Between the 13th of July, when the first round of

13     talks took place, until the end, when you were arrested, did you ever

14     receive any material assistance, or assistance in terms of manpower, from

15     Sarajevo?

16        A.   I don't recall whether there were any individual arrivals.  I

17     cannot exclude that possibility, but it was nothing extensive.  It

18     couldn't have changed the situation in any way.  Perhaps a group here or

19     there brought a bit of ammunition, but I can't confirm that and I

20     certainly do not recall it.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Since we still have this document on the screen, and

22     we saw another document yesterday where the evacuation of civilians and

23     the breakthrough of soldiers is mentioned, was this plan by

24     Alija Izetbegovic implemented, to have all the women and children

25     evacuated and the army breaking out without surrendering?  Is this what

Page 4728

 1     the final result was?

 2        A.   Yes, it turned out that way in the end.  The civilians left, the

 3     army stayed.  As for the rest, how things went with the army, it's not a

 4     topic of our current discussion.  In any case, the civilians were

 5     evacuated.  The army did not surrender, and later on some of them went to

 6     Serbia, while others broke through the forests to eventually reach the

 7     territory controlled by the Army of B and H.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  In this document sent to Mr. Hajric, the

 9     War Presidency president, it is stated as follows:  Heljic and his team

10     have this plan.  There seems to have been a plan by Dr. Heljic which

11     could include breaking out or, as it's put in here, a joint withdrawal

12     over the mountains, which General Delic found unrealistic.  My question

13     is this:  By giving up the agreement signed at Boksanica on the 19th,

14     does it mean that the War Presidency actually adopted the position of

15     Alija Izetbegovic, opting for less than a full implementation of the

16     agreement, in terms of some of its items; in other words, that the

17     civilians be evacuated, but that the army actually try to break out?

18        A.   A correction.  On the 19th, no document was officially signed.

19     There was a conversation, and notes were taken, in terms of the outcome

20     of that discussion.  As I said a number of times, there was no authority

21     which could order the army to surrender; not in Zepa, in any case, or

22     even beyond.  I don't know what the reaction coming, say, from the

23     General Staff of the army would have been.  On the 19th, we were fully

24     aware of everything.

25             Now, why was there no evacuation as early as the 19th, when

Page 4729

 1     civilians are in question?  I believe we expected -- or whether there had

 2     been an arrangement with Alija Izetbegovic reached after the meeting at

 3     Boksanica in the evening of the 19th, that the next day our side was

 4     expected to contact the Serb side, through UNPROFOR, to discuss the issue

 5     of an exchange "all for all," and probably that is the reason why we did

 6     not start evacuating the civilians as early as that.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  We will get to that exchange.  It's a separate topic.

 8     In this set of questions, though, I would ask you to look at D58 in

 9     e-court, and I will have a few questions of you.

10             This document was sent by the War Presidency president and

11     commander of the brigade to Alija Izetbegovic, Haris Silajdzic,

12     Rasim Delic, and Dr. Becir Heljic on the 19th.  Heljic was the club --

13     was the president of the club of the people of Zepa in the Parliament, as

14     we mentioned already.  It was sent on the 20th of July, at -- just after

15     midnight, it seems.

16             Perhaps we can zoom in.

17        A.   Yes, zoom in, please.  Zoom in on the text.  I know who sent it

18     to whom.

19        Q.   Yes, it does say "Zepa, the 19th of July."

20        A.   Well, it is difficult to read, but I'll do my best.

21        Q.   Read it to yourself first.  This document was sent to

22     Izetbegovic, Silajdzic, Delic, and Heljic.  Can you tell us why these

23     people were the addressees, why all four of them?

24        A.   It was our top priority at the time, and we believed that all key

25     personnel had to be informed.  At that time, it was the president of the

Page 4730

 1     Presidency, the prime minister, the army commander, and we also included

 2     Mr. Becir Heljic because he was obviously very involved in dealing with

 3     the problem in his attempts to help us.  How his name made it on the list

 4     is something I truly don't know.  Perhaps Colonel Palic suggested him.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  This is a de facto report of the negotiators who

 6     negotiated with the Serb side on the 19th.  It is a report to the central

 7     authorities in Sarajevo; is that correct?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The name of the witness appears in this document.

10     We can't see the full text in English.  But in that case, it should not

11     be broadcast.

12             Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I did

14     not mention the witness's name.  I only mentioned the negotiators.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, the name is in the document.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, everyone knows how it was,

17     but they don't know what is now.  In any case, I will abide by your

18     instructions, because I mean no harm to this witness.

19             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   In the document, it is stated that the Serb side put certain

21     condition in place, but there is no mention of you accepting any

22     agreement, as far as I can see; correct?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   We saw on the footage yesterday that both representatives

25     confirmed that they had the mandate to discuss any issue, including the

Page 4731

 1     surrender of weapons; is that correct?

 2        A.   Yes.  I cannot comment specifically on this report.  I did not

 3     write it.  It was probably written by Colonel Palic and the

 4     War Presidency president.  I believe the two of them signed it.

 5             I remember, that evening, that in addition to this official

 6     report about the talks, we also had a lengthy conversation with

 7     Mr. Alija Izetbegovic.  This is what I remember.  And I think the

 8     conversation lasted until 2.00 or 3.00 a.m. during the night between the

 9     19th and 20th of July.

10             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for Mr. Tolimir, please.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Before we move on to that conversation, tell us this, please:

13     Was this a realistic way of informing the central authorities in Sarajevo

14     about the results of the talks at the check-point when the agreement was

15     signed, or was something omitted, something of the essence, which is, for

16     example, that the weapons had to be handed over and that all civilians

17     would leave?

18        A.   Well, it's in item 4.

19        Q.   Was it mentioned that an agreement was reached?

20        A.   That is not mentioned.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Was it intentional that this information was not

22     passed on to Alija Izetbegovic that the negotiators actually consented to

23     the arms being handed over and all civilians be evacuated?  Was this

24     intentionally omitted from the report?

25        A.   It's difficult to say.  It is possible, though.  The logic

Page 4732

 1     dictates it.  I have to fall back on my memory again, because I had never

 2     seen this document before.  The main issue for us was the military-aged

 3     men.  I believe it was our attempt, and only an attempt, to deal with the

 4     military-aged men in a different way.

 5             As you can see from the text and from further discussions, we

 6     actually did not want them to surrender in Zepa, but to raise it to a

 7     higher level and arrange an all in all -- "all for all" exchange, in

 8     which case they would not be required to surrender to the VRS.  That was

 9     the gist of it.  This was probably a manoeuvring move on our part to gain

10     some time and to try to get the political and military leadership in

11     Sarajevo seriously involved, so as to force them to deal with the issue,

12     in a way.  That's the essence of the whole story.

13        Q.   Thank you.  In the last paragraph, it says:

14             "The fate of 7.000 people from Zepa, including 2.000 men fit for

15     military service, is at stake."

16             My question is this:  This last sentence, does it correspond to

17     the situation in the field?

18        A.   Yes, in general terms, although I believe there were somewhat

19     less than 7.000 people and less than 2.000 men fit for military service,

20     but perhaps there were 1800.  But, in general, this is correct.  I

21     apologise.  I don't think anyone knew precisely how many people fell in

22     the category of those fit for military service, but I believe this was a

23     realistic assessment.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Please tell us, what was your discussion during the

25     night with Alija Izetbegovic, and what impact did that have on the

Page 4733

 1     further activities of the War Presidency and the events which ensued?

 2        A.   As far as I recall, the key aspect of that conversation was to

 3     have Alija Izetbegovic help us to arrange the exchange "all for all,"

 4     including all men fit for military service.  The evacuation of civilians,

 5     in principle, had been arranged, and from that point on our key concern

 6     was the fate of military-aged men.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Since we have been mentioning that exchange, tell us

 8     this, please:  In paragraph 5, it says -- the exchange is mentioned yet

 9     again.  It is on page 2 of the document.  It is in item 5:

10             "According to Generals Mladic and Tolimir, our army is holding

11     some 400 Chetniks captive.  If an all-for-all exchange agreement is

12     reached, the Serbian side is prepared to transport the men fit for

13     military service directly to our free territory without stopping at the

14     holding centres.  They referred us to Amor Masovic, who deals with

15     exchanges on our side, and Muratovic, if our government was prepared to

16     turn over 400 of the aggressor's soldiers, whereby all the men from Zepa

17     fit for military service would be exchanged for the 400 of the

18     aggressor's soldiers."

19             My question is this:  Was this an "all for all" exchange,

20     including those fit for military service in Zepa, in exchange for the

21     400, or did this cover the whole of Bosnia?  Because a moment ago, you

22     said an exchange of all men fit for military service with the 400,

23     because here we see that something along those lines is mentioned.  Did

24     this include the exchange of all Zepa Brigade soldiers and the 400 Serb

25     soldiers?

Page 4734

 1        A.   Yes, this is what it says.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  As it says here, was this something also that you

 3     discussed with -- you, as the negotiating team, with General Mladic, at

 4     Boksanica, to the same effect?

 5        A.   Yes.  Well, I do not recall every detail, but I know that

 6     Benjamin asked -- put this question at the end to General Mladic, and

 7     this probably reflects the conversation -- or, rather, the position of

 8     the Serb side.  I have some recollection of it, and I do remember that

 9     this came up at the very end of the meeting on the 19th at Boksanica.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us, then, whether -- in those

11     negotiations with your side, whether we, too, understood that all

12     able-bodied men who had weapons would be exchanged for those 400 if that

13     was accepted by the BH Army?  Because that's what you say in the last

14     sentence here.  Is that how it was or not?

15        A.   Well, that's what it says there, and there's nothing that I could

16     really add to that.  That's what was reported on that day, and that was

17     probably reflective of the agreement reached on that day, or the promise.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Did you receive a response to this report of

19     yours - practically, that's what it is - on the outcome of the

20     negotiations for the exchange of the soldiers that had been in captivity?

21        A.   I don't recall that I saw anything on paper, but I think that I

22     was told that our minister, Mr. Muratovic, was supposed to or did talk to

23     the Serbian side, that there was no agreement reached.  So there was

24     something along those lines, very general, but I don't recall seeing any

25     document that specifically stated that.  But, generally, it was said that

Page 4735

 1     negotiations were ongoing and that whether -- because of the Serb side or

 2     some other reason, but something to the effect that there were ongoing

 3     negotiations, but that the agreement could not be reached because of some

 4     position of the Serb side, I think.  I can't quite recall it, but that's

 5     what I think.

 6        Q.   All right.  So you were told this, but was there an agreement

 7     between your delegation and ours that all able-bodied men who had weapons

 8     in Zepa be exchanged for the 400 prisoners of war, and that there were no

 9     other preconditions that we put forward?

10        A.   Yes, that's what it says here.  But your question related to a

11     later period, whether we received a reply or a response to our proposal

12     or report from that meeting.  That's what I was referring to.  But, of

13     course, this was something that we, at Zepa, could not really provide,

14     because these prisoners of war, the Serb prisoners of war, were not held

15     in Zepa.  They had been taken prisoner somewhere else and they were held

16     outside of Zepa, and that is why this had to go through the General Staff

17     of the army, and the Presidency, and the political authorities.

18             So my answer to your question was that I don't remember seeing a

19     document that came in reply to the document that we see before us on the

20     screens.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Let me be more precise.  Mladic and Tolimir asked

22     your negotiators that they ensure that the government in -- the Bosnian

23     government in Sarajevo provide 400 prisoners of war, and that in

24     exchange, all civilians could leave.  Was that -- was there any other

25     condition that we put forward to you?

Page 4736

 1        A.   No, we did not hear -- there were no other conditions set for us.

 2     But if those negotiations were held, and they were supposed to be held at

 3     the Sarajevo Airport, where normally these kinds of meetings were held,

 4     and I wasn't present, but what happened there, I don't know, because all

 5     we learned later on was that no agreement was reached.  And I believe

 6     that the position of our side was that the Serbs were coming up with some

 7     additional conditions, something to that effect.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 9             Could we now please see in e-court P494, Exhibit P494.  Thank

10     you.

11             Thank you.  Now we have the document before us.  That was the

12     document that I asked for.

13             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   It says here "Agreement on the disarming of Zepa."  I signed this

15     document as Major Zdravko Tolimir.  And in the sixth paragraph - can you

16     see it - it starts with the words:  "Our ..."

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  That's on the following

18     page in English.

19             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   "Our commissions are duty-bound -- are obliged to submit lists of

21     prisoners of war that we're asking for and to tell the negotiators that

22     everything else has to be negotiated by the Main Staff of the

23     Republika Srpska Army and the Zepa representatives."

24             My question is this:  Is it clear from this that we have no

25     additional requests or demands from you or from your side?  All that we

Page 4737

 1     wanted was to have a list of those 400 prisoners of war, and we were not

 2     asking you to sign those lists; we were guaranteeing that we would

 3     provide our war prisoners in exchange?

 4        A.   Well, I can't say anything in addition to what is stated here.

 5     Everything else is within the competence of the Main Staff of the VRS

 6     negotiators and representatives from Zepa, and I believe that that did

 7     not quite reflect the reality.  We were not competent, nor could we

 8     provide this.  Representatives from Zepa were not competent for this.

 9     Instead, it should say "the authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and

10     Herzegovina."

11        Q.   Thank you, but that's not what we said.  You were supposed to

12     provide those 400 prisoners of war, and we did not have any other

13     demands.  So if you look at this document, which is -- which was written

14     on the 25th of July, 1995, it clearly states what our delegation, our

15     negotiating team, was asking for.  There were no other conditions.

16             Now, please take a look at this document.  Read it carefully, and

17     you will see that there were no additional conditions set by our side,

18     and that is why I was asking you about this.

19             Was it 400 prisoners of war for all able-bodied men from Zepa; is

20     that correct?

21        A.   Well, that's how it remained.  That's what we dealt with as --

22     we, the negotiators from Zepa.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Well, that would mean that only some third party

24     could have intervened and said that there were some additional demands or

25     conditions.  As for us, we did not set any new conditions.  Thank you.

Page 4738

 1             Now, can you please explain to this Trial Chamber what it would

 2     have meant for you, the War Presidency, had the government agreed to this

 3     proposal that these 400 prisoners of war be exchanged from all

 4     able-bodied men from Zepa?  Would that have resolved the matters and

 5     would that have actually avoided all the problems that ensued afterwards?

 6        A.   Well, as I've already said, our main objective was to ensure, in

 7     any manner possible, that all people be pulled out from Zepa, including

 8     able-bodied men.  And this was one of the options that had circulated for

 9     a while, but that, in the end, it didn't come to pass.  So that was a

10     goal that we had, and we kept making every effort to accomplish it, but

11     it didn't work.

12        Q.   Thank you.  So there was this objective, but for some reason it

13     didn't come to be.  And if General Mladic was not the one who set any

14     additional conditions, I really don't know who, then, would have been the

15     party who had set such additional conditions, the exchange of all

16     able-bodied men for those 400 prisoners of war kept in Bosnia prisons.

17        A.   Well, I can just briefly answer that that was our objective, and

18     this is how it was presented to us, because in the further negotiations

19     we had no say.  We did not take part, we from Zepa.  It was done in

20     Sarajevo, and I don't have any documents that would show what transpired

21     there.  And whether Serbs really had some additional demands or not, I

22     don't know, I leave that open but I can only say what our objective was

23     and what the purposes of those negotiations, as far as we were concerned

24     were.

25        Q.   Well, what Serbs were you referring to if General Mladic said

Page 4739

 1     that this could be done, that you could move over?

 2        A.   Well, maybe I was not precise enough.  I was referring to the

 3     Serb side, maybe, that was negotiating in Sarajevo, and maybe someone on

 4     the Bosniak side.  Maybe it was not General Mladic who negotiated in

 5     Sarajevo.  Maybe he had appointed someone else to do that.  And whether

 6     someone on behalf of the Serb side came up with these new demands, or

 7     whether it was the Bosniak side who had additional demands, I can't

 8     really say anything about that.  But we were officially informed that the

 9     Serb side was asking for additional demands, in addition to these 400

10     prisoners of war.  As for us, we were prepared to go with the 400

11     prisoners of war in exchange for all the other able-bodied men, and

12     I think that was around 1600 to 1800 men.  But I can't really comment any

13     further.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Is it possible that you were told something by

15     someone who did not really want this exchange to happen; in other words,

16     this exchange of 400 prisoners of war for all able-bodied men from Zepa?

17     Because from this document, we can also clearly see that our negotiating

18     team said that -- our negotiating team actually authorised this

19     commission to negotiate, because it says here clearly:

20             "Our commission's duty is to submit the list of war prisoners, we

21     are demanding -- and to tell Muslim commission that everything else comes

22     within the competence of the VRS Main Staff, negotiators, and

23     representatives from Zepa."

24             So is it possible that someone was just misleading you and

25     telling you that there were some additional demands which were beyond --

Page 4740

 1     went beyond what General Mladic said to your negotiating team at

 2     Boksanica?

 3        A.   Well, I can't really speculate.  Again, I can just say what the

 4     situation was, what we were told, and what our objective was, and I've

 5     repeated this a number of times here.  Anything is possible, but I don't

 6     have any information to confirm either way.  So, again, that was our

 7     objective.  The feedback that we received was this, but, generally

 8     speaking, anything is possible.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I don't want to

10     disclose your name because -- I want to use a document which mentions

11     your name, but I won't ask for it to be shown.  That's P439.  The

12     Prosecution may take a look at it as well.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Despite the fact that we started later because of

14     technical problems, we need our first break now, and it's, I think, a

15     convenient time because you want now to deal with another document.

16             So that we have now our first break, and we resume five minutes

17     past 11.00.

18                           --- Recess taken at 10.38 a.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 11.08 a.m.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Tolimir, now you may --

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

22             Because of the protective measures in place, I would kindly ask

23     to go to private session.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Private.

25                           [Private session]

Page 4741











11 Pages 4741-4742 redacted. Private session.















Page 4743

 1                           [Open session]

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  We are now in open session.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             As we can see, the date was the 25th of July on this document.

 5     It is clearly stated therein that at the airport, the Serb side did not

 6     put forth any additional conditions to the agreement signed at Boksanica.

 7             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Was there a possibility that the Muslim side, conditionally

 9     speaking, in the negotiations insisted that this agreement should not be

10     implemented because, as we can see here, they doubted the identity of

11     some people who participated in the negotiations?  It all seems like a

12     tactical move to stall, for reasons unbeknown to me.

13        A.   Well, I didn't take part in this, and, of course, I cannot have a

14     clear position on it.  It is clear, though, from the document that I was

15     not an official negotiator designated by the Bosnian side, and

16     Mr. Bulajic was accordingly informed.  I believe he was on the Serb side,

17     during the war, in charge of the exchanges.

18             As for the rest, there's nothing else for me to say.  As I said

19     previously, anything is possible.  In any case, I don't have sufficient

20     information to go either way.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             Could we next go to D55.  And you wanted to ask that it not be

23     broadcast.  We can remove this document now.  Thank you.

24             D55 is a large document with several pages.  We are interested in

25     page 25.  D55 should be entitled "The Fall of Zepa."  D55.  Perhaps my

Page 4744

 1     notes are incorrect.  Yes, here it is.  Page 25, please.  In the English,

 2     it is page 24, paragraph 94.  We can see it now.

 3             We'll have a look at the sentence in the third line:

 4             "In an attempt to seize UNPROFOR's weapons, on the 20th of July,

 5     the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina attacked the compound of the

 6     Ukrainian Company with heavy machine-gun fire and hand-grenades.  The

 7     second floor of the Ukrainian Company building was hit with a heavy

 8     weapon.  As fighting for the enclave continued, UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo

 9     described the situation in Zepa as of the 21st of July as 'critical.'

10     The Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina made threats to kill the Ukrainian

11     soldiers, while VRS continued shelling of Army B and H positions.  The

12     ABiH 285th Brigade Commander Palic emphasised that a delegation of BHC

13     Forward, Ukrainian Battalion, UNHCR, ICRC, and UNMO should get to Zepa by

14     all means.  He made repeated threats to kill Ukrainian soldiers if a

15     helicopter with UNPROFOR representatives did not arrive in Zepa.

16     Meanwhile, a UN team on the way to Zepa was blocked in Rogatica by

17     VRS ...," et cetera.

18             I will stop my quotation here.

19             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   My question regarding this is the following:  This passage which

21     refers to the 20th, was any of it known in Zepa?  Were you familiar with

22     any of these events of the 20th of July?

23        A.   I didn't know about this.  As far as I remember, on the 20th of

24     July I was on Mount Zepa.  I had left in the evening of the 19th.  As for

25     the compound of UNPROFOR being hit, that is something I'm completely

Page 4745

 1     unaware of.  Even after the war, I had never heard that from anyone in

 2     Zepa who was there at the time.

 3             Regarding the threats issued by Colonel Palic, I could only

 4     comment on them as follows, if true.  I don't know if they are, because

 5     on the 20th the situation in Zepa was very difficult.  It was probably a

 6     means or a way to indicate the gravity of the situation, in an attempt at

 7     receiving any type of aid.  I don't know anything about the first part.

 8     I can only confirm that I visited the UNPROFOR compound once, and on that

 9     occasion the compound was targeted by the Serb forces.  I could see that

10     myself.  As for what happened this day, I don't know, because I was up in

11     the mountains.

12             If Avdo actually issued these threats, saying that he would kill

13     the UNPROFOR soldiers if an UNPROFOR helicopter did not arrive in Zepa, I

14     believe it was a manoeuvre, a move aimed at securing help to save the

15     people of Zepa.  I'm certain -- I'm positive that he never had any

16     serious intentions of that sort.  And the same goes for anyone in Zepa.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Since we are nearing the end, we should try to stay

18     brief.  I just wanted to say that this was not written by the VRS.  This

19     was written by an UNPROFOR member.  He relied on some original documents,

20     and you can see them in the footnotes between 140 and 145, describing the

21     situation, as such.  Based on that, I can only ask you whether you know

22     where the UNPROFOR base was.  What building was it?

23        A.   Yes, it was in the center of Zepa, in the elementary school

24     building, the old elementary school, because across the street there was

25     the new elementary school.  It is in the very center of Zepa.

Page 4746

 1             Just a correction.  I didn't say this did not take place.  I just

 2     said I wasn't aware of it.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Since you are not aware of it, we'll leave it at

 4     that.  This document was created by an expert who worked for this

 5     Prosecution.

 6             Could we next have 1D276.  Thank you.  I'm trying to rush things

 7     a bit, and I would kindly ask you for concise answers.  They already are,

 8     but let's not repeat what has already been said.

 9             We see here 1D276.  It is a statement by the President of the

10     Security Council, dated 20th July 1995.  I quote:

11             "At the 3556th meeting of the Security Council, held on 20 July

12     1995 --"

13             Well, I'll read parts of the first paragraph:

14             "The Security Council attaches the utmost importance to the

15     safety and well being of the civilian population in Zepa.  It demands

16     that the Bosnian Serb forces refrain from any further action that

17     threatens the safety of that population, and that they respectfully the

18     rights of the civilian population and other persons protected under

19     International Humanitarian Law."

20             The second paragraph --

21             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could we please scroll up.

22             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] "The Security Council underlines

23     the importance it attaches to the fullest co-operation with UNHCR and

24     other international humanitarian organisations, and demands that they be

25     given unhindered freedom of movement and access to that area.  It further

Page 4747

 1     demands that the Bosnian Serb authorities co-operate with all efforts,

 2     including those of UNPROFOR, to ensure the safety of the civilian

 3     population, and in particular its most vulnerable members, including

 4     evacuation, as requested by the foreign minister of the Republic of

 5     Bosnia and Herzegovina in his letter of 17 July 1995."

 6        Q.   This is my question:  Did you know that as early as the 17th of

 7     July, the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina asked the Security Council to

 8     assist in the evacuation of civilians from Zepa?

 9        A.   I don't remember that, and I wasn't aware of it.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that on the 19th of July -- or, rather,

11     on the 20th, an agreement was reached?  So did you know that as early as

12     the 19th and 20th of July, before this statement of the Security Council

13     of the 20th of July, an agreement had been signed which was not being

14     implemented according to the requests put forth by the Security Council?

15        A.   I'm afraid I didn't quite understand the question or the

16     background.

17        Q.   Did all these provisions of the Security Council document find

18     their way into the agreement that was reached on the ground?

19        A.   If I understood the Security Council's statement well, they only

20     refer to the civilian population.  In any case, that was part of the

21     agreement signed on the 19th.

22        Q.   Thank you.  The agreement signed on the 19th, did the Serb side,

23     according to the agreement, try to resolve the situation by peaceful

24     means?

25        A.   Well, up to that point, there were attacks.  And from that point

Page 4748

 1     on, there were attempts to stop fighting and to conclude the matter in a

 2     different way.  But I do have to say that, basically, the very next day,

 3     the 20th, there were attacks again because there was no evacuation of the

 4     population.  I've already explained the reasons for that.  We awaited an

 5     answer, in terms of the exchange of able-bodied men.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

 7             MR. THAYER:  Again, just to make a correction, and I believe the

 8     witness has, himself, made this correction on at least two occasions, and

 9     I don't want to burden him with having to do it every time, so I'm going

10     to do it, again, I think the testimony's been clear there was no written

11     agreement on the 19th of July at Boksanica.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Could that be part of your re-examination?

13             MR. THAYER:  It could, Your Honour, but it just saves some time.

14     We've been through this three times, so I just again want to put that on

15     the record so the witness doesn't have to take his time to do it.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

17             Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

18             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19        Q.   Sir, would you please answer?  Was the agreement, signed already

20     on the 24th, preceded by an oral agreement reached by the negotiating

21     parties on the 19th?

22        A.   Put that way, yes, there was an oral agreement on the 19th.  On

23     the 24th, the document that we had occasion to see here in my earlier

24     evidence was signed.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Tell us, please, do you remember, did all the

Page 4749

 1     negotiations come urged or prompted by the Serb sides, including all

 2     those phone conversations and the meetings?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   Does that also show that the Serb side was not really anxious to

 5     resolve this by military means, although it had the military resources at

 6     its disposal?

 7        A.   Well, yes, my earlier answer was affirmative, but the attacks did

 8     continue, and they continued whenever something that had been agreed was

 9     not put in place.  But I do have to make a reservation here.  On the

10     13th, when there had been no agreement whatsoever, the attacks resumed.

11     But on the 19th, there was an oral agreement, and I've already explained

12     why the evacuation of civilians did not begin, because we were waiting to

13     resolve this in one package because we were waiting for the response from

14     Sarajevo.  However, the Serb side did not have understanding for that.

15     They just continued their firing and shelling.  And then on the 24th, the

16     agreement -- an agreement was signed.

17        Q.   Thank you.  So there was an agreement -- in addition to the oral

18     one, there was this agreement on the 24th that was signed; correct?

19             Now, could we see P585, and I'll just say that this is an excerpt

20     from the diary of Colonel Fortin.  Could we see page 151 in B/C/S, and in

21     English that's 149.  Page 149 in English, 151 in B/C/S, Exhibit P585.

22             I don't see it yet.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, are you tendering the last document?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Yes.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

Page 4750

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter 1D276 will be Exhibit D107.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Now we have it before

 3     us.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

 5             MR. THAYER:  And, Mr. President, pursuant to the request from the

 6     provider of this document, it should not be broadcast, please.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes.

 8             Mr. Tolimir.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I did

10     say that when I asked for this document to be pulled up.  I said that we

11     should not public it -- we should not make it public.  So the document

12     should not be made public, but we can discuss it in public.

13             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Now, Witness, please take a look.  Witness, in the first

15     paragraph, it clearly says that Mr. Harland is warning his collocutor, a

16     representative of the BH government, because there hasn't been an

17     approval by the Bosnian government on the developments in Zepa.  Can you

18     see it?

19        A.   Yes.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please see the English

21     translation of the original document, page 149.  We don't have it before

22     us.  Thank you.

23             Do we have it now?  Thank you.

24             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   So we can see it in English here.  Mr. Muratovic -- we can also

Page 4751

 1     see what Harland said.  But Mr. Muratovic says that they want evacuation

 2     of the wounded and vulnerable from Zepa alone, and that this evacuation

 3     could only be carried out by helicopter.  And then we see the next

 4     paragraph, where his counterpart, Coiffet, says that that's a large

 5     number, hundreds of people, and that it is not realistic.  Therefore,

 6     Muratovic's response was that the civilians who negotiated with the

 7     Serbs, that their negotiation did not carry any weight, and that they

 8     were not authorised to negotiate, and that the Bosnian government was the

 9     one that was authorised to negotiate.

10             Now, what would your comment of this be?  Thank you.

11        A.   Well, look, from the point of view of the Bosnian government,

12     de jure, I had no competence and no authority whatsoever.  However,

13     de facto, the situation was quite different.  The situation in Zepa

14     changed from hour to hour, not from -- not even from day to day, so that

15     there was no time to wait for anyone from Sarajevo to convene a meeting

16     for the next day, or the day after, and then to reply.  It had to do with

17     our survival.  Therefore, the position here stated that the negotiators

18     were not competent.  Those same negotiators who are negotiating the fate

19     of their people is, to put it mildly, unfair.  We were in a different

20     position.  We were fighting for our survival.  Therefore, de jure, this

21     is all right, but, in fact, it isn't.

22        Q.   Thank you.  I'm waiting for the transcript.

23             Now, if we consider that Mr. Muratovic was a civilian in the

24     Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the roles of the civilians who

25     negotiated -- the civilians of Zepa who negotiated with the Serb side,

Page 4752

 1     could then it be legitimately pointed out by the Presidency that they

 2     were civilians and, therefore, were not authorised to negotiate, and

 3     thereby actually negating everything that they had already accomplished

 4     in their negotiations with the other side?  Thank you.

 5        A.   Well, look, in Zepa, itself, we were the legal representatives,

 6     and all the agreements that we reached and signed, for us they were

 7     legal.  Now, if you put this in a broader context, perhaps -- as I can

 8     see here the position of the Bosnian government, perhaps that was

 9     illegitimate or illegal and did not carry any weight.  But for us, this

10     was a legal situation, and I'm speaking of the community -- the small

11     community that this relates to.

12        Q.   Thank you.  But Muratovic here uses the phrase that the

13     negotiators from Zepa were civilians and their negotiations did not carry

14     any weight.  Now, you tell me -- we saw the document sent from the

15     Presidency to the minister of foreign affairs and others, so, tell me,

16     who was authorised to negotiate?  Tell us, in brief, what would the

17     Presidency have known about the situation?

18        A.   Well, I would answer yes to that question, because I'm sure that

19     the president knew that we were negotiating this deal, and I think that

20     he also knew the context and contents of the negotiations.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  In view of this alleged

22     discrepancy in the positions of -- the official government's position and

23     the negotiators' positions from Zepa, could we now please pull up

24     document P585, page 143.  Thank you.  I'm referring to this same

25     document, P585, page 143 in B/C/S and 140 in English.

Page 4753

 1             We again have the same document, the journal, and what we see

 2     here is a note on the meeting on the 21st of July between

 3     General Gobillard and Harland.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think we have the wrong page in B/C/S.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will repeat.  Page 143 in B/C/S.

 6     Could we pull that up.  Thank you.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It should have the same date, 21st of July, 1995.

 8     There it is.

 9             Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

10             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11        Q.   Here, we see paragraph 3 from the top.  It says:

12             "Silajdzic told the media and UNPROFOR that he wanted help in

13     protecting and evacuating the population from Zepa, but in reality he

14     wanted them to remain there so that the Serbs would have blood on their

15     hands by being obliged to take it over by force."

16             That is paragraph 3 where Silajdzic's name is mentioned; in the

17     English version as well.

18             Now, this is a report submitted by an assistant to

19     General Gobillard on his meeting with Muratovic.  Now, was the brigade in

20     Zepa capable to defend Zepa from attacks by the VRS Army, whose intention

21     it was to disarm them?  Thank you.

22        A.   Well, look, I've said this several times.  I pointed out that

23     Zepa, in view of the number of men that it had and the ammunition that it

24     had, was not able to defend itself.

25             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

Page 4754

 1             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Please tell us now whether the noncompliance with this agreement

 3     by the central authorities, who instructed you not to surrender, to

 4     continue fighting, that Serbs only wanted this or that - we've already

 5     said that - that, in fact, the Bosnian government wanted the Serbs to

 6     continue attacking the enclave, because in reality you never did get any

 7     material or any other kind of assistance?  So is this in line with the --

 8     with our view that they wanted the Serbs to continue attacking the

 9     enclave because they, themselves, were unable to defend themselves?

10        A.   Well, if you allow me, I wouldn't really wish to comment on this.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Was this desire of the central authorities reflected

12     in Zepa?  Did people in Zepa think along the same lines?

13        A.   Well, I'm not sure whether I understand your question clearly.

14     Do you mean whether in Zepa, people, too, wanted to keep fighting to the

15     last man, to defend themselves and so on?  And I've already said, no, it

16     was quite the opposite.  We were fully aware of the reality of the

17     situation, and all we wanted is to get out of Zepa alive.  And that was

18     the whole point of everything that I've said so far.  We just wanted to

19     get out of Zepa alive.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             Could we now please see Exhibit D51 in e-court, the agreement on

22     disarming the able-bodied population of Zepa.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, just a small remark.

24             The last document, P585, was not on the list we received of the

25     exhibits to be used during the cross-examination.  I tried to find it on

Page 4755

 1     the list, and perhaps I'm mistaken, but we should be very careful.

 2                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

 4             MR. THAYER:  I know how hard the job of the trial assistants is.

 5     And I did receive an e-mail, and I'm not sure if it was also copied to

 6     the Trial Chamber, but I did receive an e-mail from the case manager for

 7     the Defence telling us that this exhibit would be used.  So I just wanted

 8     to make sure the Court understood that.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  We were not aware of that.

10     We did not receive this information.  I think it was an e-mail of today.

11     This creates sometimes some problems.

12             Please carry on with the next document, Mr. Tolimir.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             Could we please pull up 1D248.  That is the witness -- this

15     witness's statement, and I would like to see page 7, please.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It should not be broadcast.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             Could we please pull up page 7, the last paragraph of this

19     document, 1D248, and then we will return to the earlier document, the

20     agreement I mentioned earlier.  Thank you.

21             Here, we see it before us.

22             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   You say here:

24             "Before I left Zepa, it was agreed that we would accept the

25     evacuation of civilians from Zepa."

Page 4756

 1             And then a few sentences on, you say, in the eighth section:

 2             "There was a demand that all weapons of able-bodied men be handed

 3     over.  I didn't want to agree to that, but I was not in a position to

 4     decline it."

 5             You probably recall your words here.  When you say "I was not in

 6     a position to decline this," does that mean that you accepted this

 7     condition?

 8        A.   Well, you see, I'll try to explain.

 9        Q.   No.  Please answer my question, and then we'll see if we need

10     your explanation.

11        A.   Yes, I did sign it, and there is no dispute about that.

12        Q.   Well, if you need to -- if you want to explain it, please go on.

13        A.   Well, I did explain it on a number of occasions already.  But to

14     answer your question, yes, I did sign this document.

15        Q.   Can you explain to us, did the document contain the conditions

16     because of that situation, the VRS was only 200 metres from Zepa and was

17     able to enter the town without any problems?  Did those conditions

18     reflect the situation you were in, and do you believe that -- given the

19     entire background and this balance of forces, do you believe the

20     conditions were fair?  Did the VRS guarantee both the civilians and

21     able-bodied men safe passage through the territory of the RS?

22        A.   Well, we had that document a moment ago on the screen.  I think

23     it mentions the disarmament and surrender of the soldiers in Zepa.  And

24     as I said a number of times, I had no effective control over the army.  I

25     clearly stated that when we signed the agreement to General Mladic.  And

Page 4757

 1     as far as I remember, the answer I received was that it should be passed

 2     on to Avdo Palic.  I did sign the document.  My primary goal, as

 3     negotiator, was to secure the start of the evacuation of civilians.  You

 4     know that full well.  The document, itself, reflects the military

 5     situation in Zepa as it was at that moment, especially the ratio of VRS

 6     forces vis-a-vis ABiH forces.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Did the agreement include certain details that were

 8     different to the verbal agreement reached on the 19th at Boksanica

 9     between Zepa representatives and the representatives of the VRS, and was

10     it imposed in any way, given the context, or was it a realistic

11     framework, because the VRS could have simply entered Zepa by using

12     military means, without ever having to resort to offering an agreement to

13     you?

14        A.   Well, this contains a number of questions.  I'll start from the

15     last one.

16             The VRS could enter the center of Zepa, as I said a number of

17     times.  They stopped some 500 metres away from the center, as the crow

18     flies.  Up to the center of Zepa, there were no defensive lines of the

19     ABiH left.  Generally speaking, this agreement, signed on the 24th of

20     July, is what was conveyed to us on the 19th already.  Whether there is

21     small variations or not, I cannot say.  I don't have any notes of the

22     19th specifying the surrender of the army.  This is where discrepancies

23     could occur.  Perhaps on the 19th, it was said that they should surrender

24     to UNPROFOR, and on the 24th, it was said that they should surrender to

25     the VRS.  But generally speaking, this is it.

Page 4758

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Before the signing, did you have occasion to get

 2     acquainted in detail with the agreement, as you said during your

 3     examination-in-chief, and that you noticed a grammatical mistake in the

 4     draft, which was subsequently corrected?  Can you tell us what mistake it

 5     was?  Because we are about to show you that document.  You also said that

 6     you asked for the document to be retyped.  Can you please explain the

 7     whole situation to us?

 8             And can we please have D51 put up for the witness to answer.

 9        A.   I don't remember the grammatical error, but this is what I seem

10     to remember, although I don't know where the error was anymore.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise.  We should not

12     broadcast the bottom part of the document, where the signatures are.  I

13     apologise to the witness for interrupting.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know what the error was.  I

15     read the document, and before signing it, I repeated to General Mladic,

16     and maybe you remember that as well, that I was not competent to discuss

17     any points relating to the military and its surrender.  General Mladic

18     said, Well, acquaint Avdo with that, and I did sign the document.

19     Following that, we discussed the evacuation, itself.  We were told that

20     you were to come into the town the next day.  It was on the 24th of July.

21             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   When you were reviewing the text of the agreement, once you

23     noticed the grammatical error, did you ask for any other changes in the

24     document?

25        A.   I don't remember asking for anything else, for any other

Page 4759

 1     corrections.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Did Colonel Dudnjik say anything about what you said

 3     about you being not competent to discuss any military issues?

 4        A.   Well, I don't remember him doing anything.

 5        Q.   In your statement which we just saw, and I'd rather not go back

 6     to it unless you really want to, you say on page 7:

 7             "Upon my return --"

 8             I already quoted this once:

 9             "Upon my return to Zepa, we contacted Sarajevo and informed them

10     of the conditions of the agreement.  During the night between the 25th

11     and the 26th, we informed the population of the agreement we signed."

12             Is my quote correct, since I didn't show you the exact page?

13        A.   Yes, it is true, and I remember that.

14        Q.   Although I made a mistake.  It was the night between the 24th and

15     the 25th, actually.  I thank my assistant for correcting me.

16             This is the question for you:  In a situation -- or, rather, in

17     the only possible situation in which the enclave was besieged from all

18     sides by a strong military presence, and the population was in the middle

19     of that situation, how did you communicate with them?  How did you inform

20     them about the agreement that was signed on the 24th and the 25th?  How

21     did you contact all those people, because some of them were up in the

22     forests?

23        A.   Well, some information reached the people later on.  I don't

24     remember the details.  It was mainly in direct contact with them.

25     Perhaps a soldier who was present went from one family to the next.  It

Page 4760

 1     was a very primitive way of forwarding information.  We had no other

 2     means.  It was through direct contact only, and, of course, we didn't go

 3     to each and every house.

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  [Microphone not activated]

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 7             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   On a number of occasions during your testimony, you said that the

 9     goal was to have the population of Zepa evacuated.  Was it also your goal

10     to sign an agreement asking for the disarmament of the Zepa Brigade,

11     without your wish to actually implement that, trying to secure the

12     evacuation of civilians?

13        A.   Well, one can't look at the things that way.  I would have been

14     happiest if I had been able to sign only the agreement on population

15     evacuation.  Obviously, it wasn't possible.  As I said a number of times,

16     the surrender of soldiers is what everyone feared, and basically in that

17     shape and form it was out of the question.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             Could we please go back to the bottom of the page.  Sorry.

20     Actually, we don't want to see the signature broadcast.  Let's look at

21     item 7, in which it is stated that:

22             "In accordance with the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and

23     the Additional Protocols of 1977, the civilian population of Zepa shall

24     be given the freedom to choose their place of residence while hostilities

25     continue."

Page 4761

 1             I guess we all understand what it means.

 2             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Yesterday, on the footage you saw Kulovac say that there were

 4     around 10 families who wanted to stay; is that correct?

 5        A.   Yes.  It was on the 19th.

 6        Q.   Correct.  My question is this:  Was it justified, then, to

 7     include in the agreement the possibility of choice of place of residence

 8     until hostilities cease?  Was it a realistic option to have it inserted

 9     in the agreement?

10        A.   Well, when one drafts such agreements, it is logical to include

11     it.  In all of your offers, this was included.  However, the

12     implementation of it is a different thing.

13        Q.   Well, I'm only asking you about the drafting of the agreement.

14     Is it not logical to include everything that was discussed?  Because

15     Kulovac had asked for some 10 families to stay, Was it not logical to

16     have it in the agreement?

17        A.   Yes, it was.

18        Q.   Thank you.  I'm asking you this because during your

19     examination-in-chief it was implied that this portion was only inserted

20     for the international public to see.  However, the real situation

21     dictated that it be made part of the agreement; is that so?

22        A.   Yes, it should have been one of the provisions.  But I stress,

23     yet again, that the implementation of it, in the part referring to what

24     Kulovac said on the 25th, was not a realistic option, to put it

25     diplomatically.

Page 4762

 1        Q.   Are you saying that it was not realistic for them to stay?

 2        A.   I don't think it was realistic for them to stay.  No one dared

 3     stay.  They were afraid.  This is what I'm trying to stress.  It's all

 4     fine to include this in the agreement.  There's nothing in dispute there.

 5     And as I've said already, but one must view it from the point of those

 6     who are supposed to stay.

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 8             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Given that an UNPROFOR representative also signed the agreement,

10     and given that the Serb side guaranteed evacuation, the evacuation of

11     both able-bodied men and civilians, because Kulovac had said that the

12     soldiers were ready to surrender their weapons, was the central

13     government in Sarajevo informed of the provisions of that agreement?  Was

14     it forwarded to them?

15        A.   Yes, the central government in Sarajevo was officially informed

16     during the conversation between the 24th and the 25th of July, 1995.  As

17     far as I recall, President Alija Izetbegovic said something to the

18     extent, That's okay, just monitor that, and we'll see about the army.

19     But, in any case, they were informed of the evacuation of civilians.

20     They knew it was supposed to happen the next day, and they agreed with

21     it.

22        Q.   So the agreement is entitled "The Disarmament of Military-Aged

23     Men in Zepa," it was, of course, of interest to the military side because

24     it dictated the conditions of the agreement.  You, as the side to whom

25     this agreement was offered by the VRS, guaranteeing to meet its

Page 4763

 1     obligations, is there anything that you would have omitted from this

 2     agreement?

 3        A.   I think I said already is that the way this agreement suggests --

 4     is written suggests that Avdo Palic should have signed it, because he was

 5     the main commander of the forces in Zepa.  Perhaps the title is

 6     euphemistic because, let's face it, it's capitulation.  We lost, in

 7     military terms.  The victor put forth its conditions.

 8             I have to be fair and say that this agreement contains some quite

 9     standard things.  I'm trying to see it now as a citizen and not the then

10     member of the Presidency.  And if I try to see it as, say, a soldier of

11     Avdo Palic's brigade -- please bear with me.  I'm going through the text.

12     The disarmament, itself, is not disputed, but what was supposed to happen

13     with those people after that.

14        Q.   Thank you.  I will read it out.  It is item 8:

15             "The able-bodied population of Zepa shall be registered and

16     accommodated in a holding centre, which is to be under the control of the

17     ICRC, until the release of all captive VRS members and other Serbs who

18     are in prisons in territory controlled by the Army under the command of

19     Rasim Delic."

20        A.   Well, yes, this, too, is correct and there's nothing to add.  The

21     only lingering issue that remains is the question of security, and where

22     this holding centre would be, and where those men would be.  That was the

23     fear that people had.  That was the fear that dominated the whole

24     situation.

25        Q.   Thank you.  But doesn't it clearly say in this agreement that it

Page 4764

 1     wouldn't be under the control of the VRS, but under the control of the

 2     ICRC?

 3        A.   Well, yes, in the agreement, that's clearly stated.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  So does that mean that the Serbs actually complied

 5     with and -- actually, they met all of their obligations, regardless of

 6     what the other side -- how the other side reacted; yes or no?

 7        A.   Well, yes.  In this statement, yes.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 9             Could we now please pull up 1D247.  That's Alija Izetbegovic's

10     letter to the Security Council, the UN Security Council.  Thank you.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  For the record, this is Exhibit P734.

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

13             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   The agreement that we saw just a moment ago, written on the 24th,

15     was it sent to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina in its entirety?

16     Did you transmit it or send it via Paket communications?  Not you,

17     personally, but the War Staff.

18        A.   Well, I don't know.  I don't know if it was just paraphrased for

19     the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina or whether it had been sent

20     verbatim.  I really don't know.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I have to note -- [Overlapping speakers]

22             THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We don't have the letter of Mr. Izetbegovic to

24     the Security Council on the screen, as you indicated earlier.  Check that

25     again.

Page 4765

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Also, that's a different document.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             Your Honour, my assistant tells me it is document 1D247.

 4     Actually, it should be 1D274.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I believe this clarifies the situation.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could we please enlarge it.

 7             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8        Q.   Now, can you tell us, did anyone in Sarajevo know, on the 24th,

 9     that an agreement had been signed, and were they informed of the

10     conditions and demands forwarded by the Serbs?

11        A.   Yes, but in the evening.  On the 24th, in the evening.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Now, we see this letter, sent by Alija Izetbegovic,

13     is dated on the 25th of July; in other words, after the signing of the

14     agreement.  He addresses the Security Council and says the following, as

15     you can read here:

16             "The protected zone of Zepa continues to be subject to a brutal

17     attack.  Because of incessant shelling, the population is leaving the

18     town and has taken refuge in the surrounding woods.  I demand that the

19     Security Council order the safe evacuation of women, children, and sick

20     and wounded persons from Zepa, and I demand that the evacuation be

21     conducted under full control -- under full protection of the UN troops,

22     and that General Smith be ordered to be permitted to use any means,

23     including force, if the convoy of civilians is attacked."

24             This is sufficient for my purposes.

25             Tell me, Witness, can you please comment on this?  The

Page 4766

 1     discrepancy between what the negotiators agreed in the agreement and the

 2     words sent by President Izetbegovic to the Security Council on the very

 3     next day, can you explain it?

 4        A.   Well, I'm not really in a position to comment on this.  What we

 5     agreed, among other things, was the evacuation of civilians.  Now,

 6     whether this letter was written prompted by the information that came

 7     from Zepa on the 24th and the 25th, or by something else, I don't know.

 8     But the way I see it, thinking of it now, is that perhaps this was a way

 9     to additionally ensure and secure the guarantees by international

10     organisations for civilians during their evacuation and relocation from

11     Zepa.  That is one of the thing that comes to -- one of the things that

12     comes to mind as I look at it.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Now, tell us this:  Had the evacuation already begun

14     on the very same day, on the 25th, and was Tolimir in Zepa on that day,

15     and had the wounded already arrived there?

16        A.   Well, in short, Tolimir was present on that day in Zepa.  The

17     evacuation did start on that day, and on that evening the first convoy of

18     wounded arrived in Sarajevo.

19        Q.   Thank you.  During his stay in Zepa, both in the morning or in

20     the afternoon and generally, did Zdravko Tolimir put any kinds of

21     objections or did he react in any way when soldiers came to wish farewell

22     and say goodbye to their family members?  Did he in any way interfere or

23     try to prevent that?

24        A.   Well, no, as far as I know.  You were present.  You did see

25     soldiers coming to see their family members off.  There was no reaction

Page 4767

 1     and no contact with them.  It was just as you describe it.  You were

 2     there, and you just observed what was happening, without any interference

 3     or any kind of disruption on your part.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  If you wish, we can show the video-clip, but we don't

 5     have to, bearing in mind what was said at the beginning of today's

 6     session.  But I will quote from the video.

 7             We saw here in the courtroom page of the transcript 34, lines 26

 8     through 29, and it says:

 9             "Well, there are quite a number of able-bodied men on the bus?"

10             And your answer is:

11             "Well, not too many."

12             Now, my question was:  At this time when Mladic said this, did he

13     pull off the bus these able-bodied men or did he let them leave with the

14     convoys?

15        A.   No, all these convoys were allowed through.  Now, I don't know

16     why I reacted the way I did, but I don't think that there was anyone on

17     the convoys on that day who did not actually fall within the category

18     that was mentioned; up until the age of 55, I believe.

19        Q.   Well, thank you.  We know what "able-bodied" means under the

20     legal description that is provide -- that was set forth in the

21     federation.  But, in any case, General Mladic did not try to stop anyone,

22     any of those people, from getting off the bus and getting out?

23        A.   Yes, that's correct.  We've seen that.

24        Q.   Did we see any people here in -- did you see me in civilian

25     clothes on that day?  Do you recall that?

Page 4768

 1        A.   Well, I can't really recall exactly what was happening on that

 2     day, on the 24th, I believe was when you were there.  I can't recall

 3     seeing you in civilian clothes.  I can't even recall you being there at

 4     all.  I did see the video-clip where you were wearing civilian clothes,

 5     but everything else is a blur from those days.  I can just -- the only

 6     thing that is clearly etched in my mind was General Mladic.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Now, we saw in this video-clip that Tolimir was

 8     dressed in civilian clothes.  Now, my question for you is this:  Is a

 9     subordinate -- is it common practice for a subordinate to be sitting

10     dressed in civilian clothes while his commander is in uniform?  Is that

11     standard practice?

12        A.   Well, I can tell you this:  I can't really recall this, whether

13     this was a meeting you attended with some members of international

14     organisations or whatever, but I can't recall the details or what you had

15     on.

16        Q.   But can -- can what was being said in this video, can that help

17     refresh your memory, whether this was from the meeting in Boksanica or

18     some other place?

19        A.   Well, I can't even remember that conversation, and I'm not even

20     sure that it was shown here as an exhibit.

21        Q.   Thank you.  It was shown here, and that was at 35:39:49, 35

22     hours, 39 minutes and 49 seconds, and we did not have the audio.  That's

23     why I was putting this question to you.  You said that you were shown

24     some additional video-clips while you were being prepped for this

25     session.

Page 4769

 1             Now, did you see any other video-clips where you could actually

 2     hear what was being said?  Thank you.

 3        A.   Well, I can't really remember any of that now.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please try and recall and tell us - can you

 5     make an effort - whether while you were proofed you could hear the audio

 6     when shown the video-clip, because we did not hear any audio here in the

 7     courtroom?  But was that normal for me, as a subordinate, to be sitting

 8     there dressed in civilian clothes, while my commander was in uniform?

 9        A.   Well, whether there was audio accompanying the video-clip during

10     my proofing, perhaps the Prosecutor can help us.  I can't really recall.

11     I do recall that there were some problems, but I can't even recall if

12     shown the transcript.  Maybe the Prosecutor can be of assistance here,

13     because he proofed me and he showed me the video-clip.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Well, the Prosecutor is free to assist you, if he so

15     chooses, later on.

16             But can you just explain to the Trial Chamber whether this would

17     be something that you could see in reality or whether this video-clip was

18     doctored?  Now, do you remember -- and whether you remember whether there

19     was an audio with the video-clip?

20        A.   Well, I can't recall that there was any audio or whether there

21     was a transcript that I saw, which I just saw this briefly.  We did not

22     dwell on it, and I can't really recollect anything.  It was very brief,

23     so I can't remember; not even from the proofing session.

24        Q.   Thank you.  While you're trying to refresh your memory, I would

25     like to show you 1D265.

Page 4770

 1             Could we please pull up 1D265.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, this is Exhibit D92.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   We've already seen this document, and I quoted some portions that

 5     I wanted to refer you to.

 6             Now, please take a look.  This is a criminal report, and there's

 7     a list of persons there who were identified.  Let's just read the first

 8     name.  We don't have to read the rest.

 9        A.   "Mehmedalija Cavcic."

10        Q.   And so on and so forth.  There is information and personal

11     details for all the people on the list.

12             Now, please, can we see the end of this list, or, rather, can we

13     just scroll it so that the witness can read through it and whether he can

14     then confirm for us whether all these individuals were local people from

15     Zepa.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When you say -- when we say "Zepa,"

17     we imply two municipalities, Han Pijesak and Rogatica.  In the beginning,

18     they were separate, but only after the take-over of all of the villages,

19     for all practical purposes, in Han Pijesak municipality, and those people

20     then moved to Zepa, only then did it become one thing, Zepa.  And those

21     are individuals from the Zepa enclave.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's correct.

23             Now, can we move on to the next page, please, when the witness

24     indicates.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could we now move to the next page,

Page 4771

 1     please.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Next page, please.

 4             Can we move on?  Next page.  Next page, please.  Next page,

 5     please, if there are any more pages.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I think this will

 7     suffice.

 8             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   So who are these individuals?  These individuals were included in

10     the criminal report against those individuals in the Zepa enclave who

11     were identified as perpetrators when 43 soldiers were killed and others

12     taken prisoner.

13             Could we now please see 1D267.

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the usher please give this

16     hard copy to the witness, because it is a handwritten document, so that

17     he can take a look at 1D267.  And we will have it on our screens, but

18     it's hard to read from it.  And then perhaps the witness can tell us

19     whether all these individuals were members of the Zepa Brigade or the

20     brigade of the Zepa enclave.

21             And I will tell you where this list comes from.  This list was

22     received from the Yugoslav Army, and it shows members of the Zepa Brigade

23     who crossed over to the Yugoslav territory and then moved on to third

24     countries, in agreement with the International Red Cross, which provided

25     guarantees for their movement -- freedom of movement and settlement.

Page 4772

 1             Now, could we please see pages 234 and 5 for the benefit of the

 2     Trial Chamber, because the witness has the hard copy and he can easily

 3     leaf through it.  Thank you.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  For the record, the hard copy was shown to the

 5     Chamber first, and now the witness has the opportunity to look at it.

 6     And later on, it should be forwarded to the Prosecution as well.

 7             Mr. Thayer.

 8             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 9             I have a copy of -- a hard copy already.  Thank you.  But I do

10     want to raise an issue with respect to this document and with respect to

11     1D00274, which we saw earlier, the letter from Alija Izetbegovic to the

12     UN in New York.  It's the same query I had with respect to the document

13     we saw yesterday that bore no ERN and we have no information about the

14     source of this document, its pedigree, so to speak, or where it emanates

15     from.  All we've heard is that it's a list, allegedly, of brigade

16     members.  We don't have a translation.  I note that it -- my rudimentary

17     understanding of the language suggests that some of these people listed

18     here as civilians.  So if we could have some proffer as to, again, where

19     this document comes from, how it was provided, because it bears no ERN,

20     no -- it certainly didn't come from us, as far as I know.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I would suggest that you prepare some additional

22     information we would like to hear after the second break.  It is now the

23     time for the second break, and you should consider this request by

24     Mr. Thayer during the break.

25             We adjourn, and resume at 1.00.

Page 4773

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I just ask this:  Perhaps the

 2     witness can keep this hard copy so that he can leaf through it during the

 3     break.  Would that be all right?  That's all I have to ask.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This is no problem.  It will save time.

 5             We adjourn.

 6                           --- Recess taken at 12.33 p.m.

 7                           --- On resuming at 1.06 p.m.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Our apologies for the delay.

 9             Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             I have a question for the witness.  I provided him with a list of

12     the soldiers from Zepa who moved to Serbia under the auspices of the

13     ICRC.  Before that, we saw the criminal report containing 149 names, so

14     that he would be able to see whether the people were from Zepa.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Based on the criminal report list of 149, can you tell us whether

17     you saw anyone there who was not from Zepa?  And on the paper copy I gave

18     you containing that list there, were there any people there who were not

19     from Zepa and who crossed over into Serbia?

20        A.   This is two questions, I believe.

21             The first list I saw on the screen contains the names of people

22     from Zepa.  The other list I received in hard copy also includes the

23     names of people from the enclave of Zepa, although I saw that a few of

24     them were born in Srebrenica.  I must say, though, that two villages

25     surrounding Srebrenica belonged to the municipality of Zepa.  They

Page 4774

 1     received humanitarian assistance from us.  So I would say that these

 2     people were from the enclave of Zepa.

 3        Q.   On the first list of 149, we saw that Benjamin Kulovac was also

 4     included, and the report was submitted against him as well.  Did you see

 5     that?

 6        A.   I did.

 7        Q.   Do you remember why the Prosecutor asked you why Benjamin Kulovac

 8     was afraid to appear at another meeting, and could that be the reason why

 9     he ended up on the list?

10        A.   I don't know whether he knew at all at the time.  Well, this

11     criminal report was submitted by Serb authorities, and what we had in our

12     hands there was a military conflict.  It's a legal matter, and I don't

13     know whether that can fall under the -- under a criminal report.  In any

14     case, Benjamin Kulovac was not aware of any criminal reports being

15     submitted against him at that time.  He was afraid, though, but I don't

16     know why.  Perhaps you should ask him.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Irrespective of everything that happened, did he join

18     those wounded on their way to Sarajevo?  Was he let to pass through by

19     the Serbs?

20        A.   Yes.  He joined the first convoy with the wounded.  He was let

21     through by the Serb side and reached Sarajevo.

22        Q.   Let us go back to that part where you spoke about your arrest.

23     We can see that all these people were from the enclave of Zepa.

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Let me ask you this:  Could one of the reasons for the fear be

Page 4775

 1     the issue of the 43 Serbs who were killed?  Was that, perhaps, one of the

 2     reasons for the fear of the soldiers, due to which they wouldn't

 3     surrender or cross RS territory?

 4        A.   Well, it is possible.  It could have been one of the reasons.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have the witness's

 6     statement, which is 1D248.  Please, do not broadcast the cover page or

 7     the witness's name.  We can immediately go to page 8, paragraph 5, the

 8     last three lines.  Thank you.  Please do not broadcast this page

 9     publicly.  Let us go to page 8, paragraph 5, the last three lines.  Thank

10     you.  We can see it in the Serbian.  It is the next page in the English.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   I will start with the second line from the bottom:

13             "In the meantime, the Serb soldiers enter the center of Zepa.

14     Amir Imamovic, who was brought in together with Hajric, was another

15     Presidency member.  They asked us to exercise much greater pressure so

16     that the able-bodied men would surrender.  Hajric was ordered to go to

17     the mountains, where the headquarters of our army was, to ask them to

18     surrender."

19             It is page 9, the first two lines of the second paragraph.

20        A.   I still don't have it in front of me.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have that.  It

22     further reads:

23             "They asked us to exercise much greater pressure so that the

24     able-bodied men would surrender.  Hajric was told to go to the mountains,

25     where our headquarters were, to ask them to surrender."

Page 4776

 1             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   This was in your statement.  Do you recall it?

 3        A.   I do.

 4        Q.   Since this concerns members of the War Presidency, and since we

 5     discussed the agreement and its signing, the agreement on the disarmament

 6     of the soldiers, which was a precondition for the implementation of all

 7     the other provisions, was it not only logical that the War Presidency

 8     members who signed the agreement, to sign also the decision invoked here

 9     by the OTP of the 27th?

10        A.   I do remember that decision, and I said that it was signed under

11     pressure.  I repeat that even such a signed decision had no effective

12     power over any military decisions.  This is what I continually stress.

13     All these members of the Presidency, all three of us, who signed under

14     pressure, I assert, could not exercise any control.  It had no value.  It

15     wasn't able to be implemented.

16        Q.   Was it not normal for three men to decide on something that would

17     follow the items of the agreement, rather than sending the whole of the

18     VRS up Mount Zepa to kill off all the soldiers there?  What would have

19     been better, that two members of the War Presidency go and visit the Army

20     of B and H soldiers or to continue fighting?

21        A.   Well, the way you put your question begs me to say yes.  But none

22     of these War Presidency members, and I don't know whether you knew that,

23     could have done anything about it.  We could sign anything you wanted,

24     but we couldn't implement it, and that's the essence of it.  The way you

25     put your question, whether it would have been better, yes, it would have,

Page 4777

 1     but it was not viable.  All three of us who were there had no effective

 2     control over that issue.  And in my view, no one else in Zepa did on the

 3     27th of July.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Will you agree with me that the party included in

 5     negotiations, drafting an agreement, cannot know what the scope of your

 6     authority is over any soldiers?  Are you honest when you say that?  We

 7     couldn't have known whether you had any influence or not.

 8        A.   Well, legally and formally speaking, that is so, but let me go

 9     back to the agreement I signed.  I said orally that as regards the army,

10     I do not have the legitimacy or authority necessary.  I could guarantee

11     only the implementation pertaining to civilians.  You, as the Serb side,

12     could have said, Well, thank you very much, we're not interested in that.

13     In that case, there probably would have not been any evacuation of

14     civilians.  But it was logical of you to expect that on the other end of

15     the table you would have someone who could cover all of the issues.

16        Q.   Was it not a more peaceful option to have the War Presidency

17     draft a decision of the 27th and show it to the soldiers in Zepa for

18     their acceptance?  If they don't want to, they can go on fighting.  Was

19     it not a peaceful option, or should have been for the armed option from

20     the outset?

21        A.   Well, it's always best to avoid any conflict, but I know how

22     people reasoned.  There was this fear, and that was what prevented the

23     implementation of that decision.

24        Q.   But was it necessary to disarm the civil population, in

25     particular the able-bodied men, in the demilitarised zone, in keeping

Page 4778

 1     with the agreement, and that's why the decision was made?  We all know

 2     what the fate of the soldiers was.

 3        A.   I don't know whether it was necessary to lay down arms, to have

 4     it a weapon-free zone.

 5        Q.   In order to implement the agreement on the disarmament of the

 6     soldiers, we needed a previous decision to have been made?

 7        A.   I'm sorry, I wasn't following.

 8        Q.   Can you recall the title of the agreement?

 9        A.   "Agreement on the Disarmament of Soldiers," I believe.

10        Q.   No, "Able-Bodied Men."  Was it not logical that the

11     War Presidency should issue a decision on disarmament in order to

12     implement the agreement?

13        A.   Yes, it would be logical.

14        Q.   Thank you.  You, when you were arrested, were you arrested for

15     not implementing the agreement and for failing to implement your party's

16     obligations, including disarmament?

17        A.   I don't know whether it was expressly stated, but it was my

18     assessment that I was arrested because we did not secure the disarmament

19     of able-bodied men in Zepa, and I was one of the signatories.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Let's go to page 9, paragraph 2.  We will read out

21     the first four lines for your benefit, because we need to refresh your

22     memory:

23             "On the 27th of July, Imamovic and I, who were held in the same

24     room.  An hour and a half after the last convoy was allowed to proceed,

25     Serb military police entered the UNPROFOR house with a Serb officer, and

Page 4779

 1     they informed us that we were arrested for noncompliance of paragraph 8

 2     of the agreement."

 3        A.   Yes.  This statement was made rather early on, so I can confirm

 4     it.

 5        Q.   So you were told that you were arrested for noncompliance with

 6     the agreement; yes or no?

 7        A.   Yes, if I go by my statement, it appears to be the case.

 8        Q.   Were any civilians held there who were on the last bus because of

 9     this noncompliance with the agreement about the evacuation of civilians

10     and able-bodied men?

11        A.   I know they were taken off the bus and held there, but I don't

12     know what the reason was.  I hear it from you, what the reason may have

13     been.

14        Q.   Thank you.  I asked you last time, and perhaps we needn't go back

15     to the document because you also said that in your statement -- you said

16     that General Mladic let all the buses pass, except the last one, when the

17     passengers were held there, and you were arrested?

18        A.   That is correct.

19        Q.   Were you registered the next day, on the 28th, by the ICRC?

20        A.   Not on the 28th.  I think it was either the 30th of July or the

21     1st of August, and it was in Rogatica.

22        Q.   The next paragraph, line 4, you say:

23             "The next day, we were registered by the Red Cross."

24             And just above that, in the previous paragraph, you mention the

25     27th?

Page 4780

 1        A.   Yes, but before that I say I don't know whether on the 30th or

 2     the 31st of July we were transferred to Rogatica.  Upon my arrival there,

 3     the next day we were registered.  So it wasn't on the 28th.  You should

 4     read the paragraph preceding that one, its last sentence.

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, please switch on your microphone.

 7             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8        Q.   "In Rogatica, they took us to a facility used as a prison.  There

 9     was some 40 people there who were taken off the bus in the last convoy."

10             And then you say that you were registered by the Red Cross.  Did

11     they register these 40 people as well?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   In order to be fair, in a part of your statement you said that

14     Rajko Pusic was the prison commander.  I don't think you meant that.

15     Perhaps this was a mistake, because the brigade commander could not have

16     been acting as prison warden.  It was probably one of his subordinates.

17        A.   I don't know how this made its way into the statement, but he was

18     not the prison warden.  It was another gentleman, a Neskovic, I believe.

19        Q.   It doesn't matter.  In any case, they may have been his

20     subordinates from the brigade.  Were they all from Rogatica or from some

21     other level?

22        A.   No, it was the Rogatica Military Police that secured the prison.

23        Q.   I will not now go to the supplemental statement, because it says

24     "Draft Version" across it.  But just tell us, please, why was it

25     necessary for you to provide this supplemental draft version?

Page 4781

 1        A.   I can barely remember that.  Do you mean the supplement to this

 2     statement?

 3        Q.   Yes.  It is appended to this statement.  It contains nine

 4     paragraphs, and it also includes photographs where you identified certain

 5     individuals.  Do you remember that?

 6        A.   Yes, I believe that was in the additional interview conducted by

 7     the investigator, and I don't know how all of that transpired.  But it

 8     was about 10 years ago.  That was when they brought all those photos for

 9     me to identify the individuals depicted on them.  That's where that other

10     statement comes from.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             Could -- I would like to move and tender 1D273 and 65 ter 06417

13     into evidence, although I did not want to show them here today, both in

14     order to save some time and also because of the measures that were here

15     in place for this witness.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I'm a little bit confused.  I saw

17     that you used three documents, 1D248, and this is the OTP statement of

18     the witness, 1D274 and not 3, 1D267.  Now you are referring to other

19     numbers.  I have no idea what these are.  Could you explain this, please?

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             1D273 and 65 ter 06417, these are video-clips that I'm proposing

22     to move into evidence.  And then, after that, we will discuss these other

23     documents.  Thank you.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

25             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, let me take the second exhibit first,

Page 4782

 1     65 ter 06417.  That is a proposed Prosecution exhibit which is a

 2     compilation video based on several other separate videos which contain

 3     extended footage of these meetings, some of which the Trial Chamber has

 4     already seen.  Parts of those videos have yet to be played.  What we did

 5     was instead of having each individual video in its entirety played before

 6     the Trial Chamber, we combined portions of those videos into what we have

 7     called the Zepa compilation video, and that's why we gave it a separate

 8     65 ter number.  We showed some -- as the Court remembers, some portions

 9     of 6417, but we haven't shown the entire thing.  That's why we did not

10     tender 6417, since it includes portions which have yet to be played

11     before the Trial Chamber.

12             So I'm not sure which portion of 6417 General Tolimir is

13     intending to tender at this point because I, frankly, can't remember --

14     I think some portions may have been played, but I just don't know right

15     now.  So --

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, can you help us?

17                           [Defence counsel confer]

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

19             Can we then see this video compilation that was shown here to all

20     of us so that we can use it with other witnesses as well, because it was

21     publicly shown and it's also in the transcript?  So that's what we are

22     asking and seeking to tender, whatever was shown here, and what is in the

23     video, and what was recorded in the transcript.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It's now a little bit difficult just to play the

25     video again, to identify numbers and -- 65 ter numbers, and to decide

Page 4783

 1     about the admission of this video.

 2             I'm not sure, Mr. Thayer.  Perhaps you can help us.  Did you

 3     tender this compilation of videos?

 4             MR. THAYER:  No, we did not, Mr. President, for the reasons I've

 5     explained.  Perhaps what we can do is maintain it MFI'd, and when the

 6     Defence is able to identify the time codes, then we can note that for the

 7     record, rather than introducing it twice or introducing a separate clip

 8     of it, which just unnecessarily creates exhibits, when we've got the

 9     whole thing in evidence already.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think this is a good proposal, Mr. Thayer.

11             65 ter 6417 will be marked for identification, and I would invite

12     both parties to discuss which parts of it should be, at the end of the

13     day, really admitted into evidence.  Both parties should use it with

14     other witnesses as well.

15             MR. THAYER:  And I'm confident that the entire compilation video

16     will be played to witnesses and ultimately will be tendered, so I think

17     it's, at the end of the day, a moot issue.

18             Now, with respect to the other --

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  One moment, please.  We would like to have it

20     MFI'd.

21                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  First we have to decide will it be -- will it

23     have a P number or a D number?  It was produced by the Prosecution, who

24     we think will tender it one day.  If you don't object to that, it should

25     get a P number.  And it is necessary to give the DVD to the Registry so

Page 4784

 1     that we have a clear record of that.

 2             MR. THAYER:  Yes, Mr. President.  Not to be too possessive, but

 3     it is our compilation.  We worked hard on it, so that would be fine.

 4             The Defence has been supplied with a copy of that DVD, with an

 5     explanation of the underlying videos.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 7             Do you agree, Mr. Tolimir, with this procedure?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 9             Yes, we absolutely agree with your ruling, and I think it is in

10     both our interests.

11             I have a few more questions for the witness, if you allow me.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  No, just a moment.

13                           [Defence counsel confer]

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I do have this request.  1D273

15     is our video that was shown here.  If you recall, we provided the

16     transcript for it, and we would appreciate this video being marked for

17     identification or admitted into evidence.  And I will just remind you

18     that this was from the negotiations, the words pronounced.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  65 ter 6417 will be marked for identification

20     with a P number.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter 6417 will be Exhibit P740, marked for

22     identification.

23                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, to avoid any misunderstandings and

25     confusion during the trial, I was told that 1D273 is part of the document

Page 4785

 1     we just have marked as P740.

 2             Mr. Gajic, you don't agree.  Please explain it.

 3             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the compilation video

 4     does not contain the excerpt from the meeting of 19th of July, 1995.  We

 5     showed the portion to the witness that is not included in the compilation

 6     video tendered by the Prosecution, and that is why we are seeking to

 7     tender it as a separate exhibit.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This will be marked for identification as well

 9     with a D number.  Yes, we would like to receive the D number, and then we

10     can proceed.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  1D273 will be Exhibit D18, marked for

12     identification.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

14             MR. THAYER:  Two issues with respect to that exhibit,

15     Mr. President.

16             The first is:  That footage that was shown actually is already in

17     evidence as P593 that also has a transcript for it.  We saw the Defence

18     put together their own B/C/S transcript.  I don't think it was translated

19     into English.  But P593, which came in through, I believe,

20     Colonel Fortin, does have a transcript.

21             My second query is:  With respect to 1D273, we don't have an

22     objection to it.  It is superfluous, but we don't know where -- what the

23     source of that footage is.  It looks the same, but I notice that there

24     were some inter-spliced images that don't appear anywhere else in the

25     footage that we've seen over the years.  The Trial Chamber may recall we

Page 4786

 1     see the scene of the meeting at the table, and all of a sudden there are

 2     a bunch of soldiers sitting on a tank or something, and that raises, in

 3     my mind, the question of, again, what's the provenance of the video.

 4             No objection, but we want to know where it came from, because

 5     that's footage that comes in with no explanation or context.  It may be a

 6     compilation of their own or taken from a news source, and so that may

 7     explain it, but we've got no idea.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Gajic.

 9             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] In the surrogate sheet with that

10     video, Mr. President, it is clearly indicated what the provenance of this

11     video is.  There is an ERN number.  In other words, it is a Prosecution

12     video.  And this video, too, was used by the Prosecution for their

13     compilation video.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I see there is disagreement, but it is not

15     necessary to discuss it further at this point in time.

16             I would like to ask the Defence:  Are you tendering 1D248?  This

17     is the OTP statement of the witness.  You used it yesterday and today.

18             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President, we would like to

19     tender it.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Thank you, Your Honour.

22             First, a correction for the record.  65 ter 1D273 is

23     Exhibit D108, marked for identification.

24             65 ter 1D248 will be Exhibit D109.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  And, Mr. Tolimir --

Page 4787

 1                           [Defence counsel confer]

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Perhaps you're all a little confused now.  I

 3     would like to deal with 1D274 and 1D267.  I think these were the

 4     documents Mr. Thayer asked for further clarification about the source,

 5     and where it comes from, and so on.  I would like to know if you are

 6     tendering these two documents.  If you will do that, we will only mark

 7     them for identification, and we would like, like we did with another

 8     document yesterday, to ask for a written submission with a clear

 9     definition where these documents come from and what is the background of

10     it.

11             Mr. Gajic.

12             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, as for 65 ter

13     documents 1D274 and 1D269, these, in fact, are in the book of

14     Sefer Halilovic's entitled "State Secret."  This book was published in

15     2005, and it contains a wealth of documents.  I contacted the Prosecutor

16     yesterday and was provided a batch of documents from the BH Army, and it

17     was explained to me that those documents were attached to this book.  And

18     that is why across this document there is this marking which says "State

19     Secret."  And as for Samir Halilovic, he was the son of

20     General Halilovic, Sefer Halilovic, who was the commander of the BH Army.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

22             MR. THAYER:  I'm not sure which prosecutor we're talking about.

23     It's not an OTP Prosecutor.  Maybe a prosecutor from Serbia.  But we have

24     no knowledge about this, just to clarify.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And I would like to clarify.  Are you talking

Page 4788

 1     about 1D267 or 1D269?

 2             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] I apologise.  I have to say that

 3     there was an error in the transcript, or in the translation, actually.  I

 4     never mentioned the Prosecution.  I mentioned the source; in other words,

 5     the person who provided these documents to me.

 6             We are referring to 1D274.  This is a letter from

 7     Alija Izetbegovic to the UN Security Council.  And the second document is

 8     D102, marked for identification, which relates to the general

 9     mobilisation call-up in Zepa.  And these documents were, in fact,

10     attachments in the book of Samir Halilovic entitled "State Secret."

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you for this information.  I'm not sure if

12     this is sufficient, but we can't continue in this way.  Yesterday, I

13     asked you for a written submission and explanation so that we can receive

14     comment by the OTP as well.

15             The second one was marked for identification.  Now you are asking

16     for 1D -- again the number, please.  1D74 --

17             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] 1D274.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be marked for identification, and we

19     would like to receive a written explanation about the source.

20             And if I'm not mistaken, you used 1D267 just before the last

21     break.  Are you tendering this?

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, we're tendering that document.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   And I will just ask the witness, and I'm referring to the hard

25     copy that he has:  Is any of those individuals that you say are from

Page 4789

 1     Zepa -- was any of those persons killed in the Zepa fighting or in the

 2     mountains around Zepa?

 3        A.   Do you mean the people from this list?  Well, there were some

 4     members of the BH Army who were killed during the military attacks on

 5     Zepa.  As far as I know, of all these people who crossed over to Serbia

 6     from the list, only one young man - I think he tried to escape - he was

 7     shot.  And as for the rest, they all moved on to third countries, as far

 8     as I know.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Now, were there any able-bodied men killed by the VRS

10     after they surrendered, with the exclusion of Avdo Palic, Amir Imamovic,

11     and --

12             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not hear the third name.

13             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   -- who were killed, and you can tell us when and how and whether

15     they, too, were killed in some war operations or after the war

16     operations?

17        A.   Well, you asked me several questions, so I'll try to go one by

18     one.

19             I don't know who was killed in military operations.  Now, after

20     August 25th, from what I learned later on, most of these people from this

21     list here moved to Serbia or crossed over to Serbia, except for one man.

22     I heard that he panicked, tried to run, and he was shot.  As for the

23     rest, some of them tried to cross over and then were either killed,

24     because they had to go through -- they had to cross the front-line.  I

25     don't know how many people were killed.  Most of them did cross over near

Page 4790

 1     Kladanj.  As for those who were taken prisoner, they were taken away and

 2     later killed.  They were Mehmed Hajric, Amir Imamovic, and later on I

 3     heard also that the same was the case with Colonel Avdo Palic.  And to

 4     the best of my knowledge, there was another man.  I don't know if he was

 5     a member of the army, but he was an elderly man who was held in Rogatica,

 6     in detention, and was taken away by someone.  To this day, his remains

 7     have not been recovered.  And from what I could read in our press, I

 8     assume that Lukic from Visegrad took him away and nothing more was known

 9     about him.

10        Q.   What's his name?  Can you tell us?

11        A.   If I'm not mistaken, his last name was Cocalic, but I can't say

12     with any certainty.  I only heard about this.  In any case, it is known

13     that his body was never found.

14        Q.   Save for these four people you mentioned as having been killed

15     outside combat later on in August and September, were there any others

16     killed outside combat who actually had come from Zepa and who were men of

17     military age?

18        A.   I don't know everything, because I spent six months in prison.  I

19     don't know whether someone was caught and killed trying to cross over.

20     I can neither deny nor confirm that.  This is the extent of information I

21     have.  As for any others who may have been captured by the VRS and later

22     on killed, that is something I can say nothing about.  I cannot say that

23     there were any or that there weren't.

24        Q.   Thank you.  While I was in Zepa, while we negotiated?

25        A.   No.  In that period, there weren't any.

Page 4791

 1        Q.   When did you hear of Avdo Palic being killed?

 2        A.   When I was released from prison.  It was in January 1996.  At

 3     that time, he was considered a missing person.  I presume a missing

 4     person is anyone whose body has never been found.  And I heard stories

 5     about his capture.  It lasted between 1996 and 2005.

 6        Q.   Do you have any knowledge when -- about when he was killed?

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Your answer, please, and then no further

 8     question, please.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could you repeat your question,

10     please?

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Do you have information when Avdo Palic and the other two were

13     killed?

14        A.   Much later, in Bosnia and Sarajevo, it was the main topic when

15     Colonel Palic's disappearance was discussed.  According to the final

16     journalistic reports, it appears that Avdo Palic had been killed in early

17     September 1995.  They based that conclusion on the examination of his

18     remains.  The other two men, there is a witness statement regarding their

19     death.  I confirm that they were taken around mid-July, and, according to

20     that witness's statement -- sorry, they were taken in mid-August, and the

21     witness states that in late August they were taken out of the room where

22     they were held captive together with him.  It is presumed that they were

23     killed then.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

25             I just seek to tender D267 into evidence so as to reflect the

Page 4792

 1     fact that there were no men of military age who were killed out of those

 2     on the list.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We are six minutes over time.  It's exactly the

 4     same amount of time we were delayed when we started, so that you had the

 5     full session.

 6             Both exhibits will be marked for identification.  That means

 7     1D274, I pronounced that already.  And 1D267, the list in hard copy shown

 8     to the witness, marked for identification, but only admitted at a later

 9     stage, after having received additional information about the source, as

10     requested by the OTP.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  1D274 will be Exhibit D110, marked for

12     identification.  1D267 will be Exhibit D111, marked for identification.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, have you any indication how much

14     time you need for finishing your cross-examination tomorrow?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, if the witness must

16     leave, I'm ready to thank him for his time already now.  We discussed

17     most of the topics covered in examination-in-chief.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Sorry, you misunderstand.  I just want to know

19     how much time you need.  You know the Prosecution used more time than

20     indicated in the examination-in-chief.  Therefore, no time pressure on

21     you.  I just want to know.  And the witness can't leave today because the

22     OTP has some re-examination, I suppose.

23             What is your estimation of the time you still need for

24     cross-examination tomorrow?

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 4793

 1             I will conclude my cross-examination during the first session

 2     tomorrow.  Therefore, I have five or six questions left.

 3             I would like to thank the witness for his co-operation and the

 4     answers he provided, as well as all those who assisted us in bringing

 5     this testimony to a close.  I'd like to thank you and the interpreters as

 6     well on behalf of the Defence.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

 8             Witness, you are in the bad position that you have to return to

 9     court tomorrow again.  We are sitting in the morning, if I'm not

10     mistaken, in this courtroom.  And we thank you for your patience you have

11     with the parties and with the Chamber.

12             We adjourn and resume tomorrow.

13                           [The witness stands down]

14                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.56 p.m.,

15                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 2nd day of

16                           September, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.