Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 7425

 1                           Tuesday, 9 November 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning to everybody.

 6             The witness should be brought in, please.

 7                           [The witness takes the stand]

 8                           WITNESS:  VINCENTIUS EGBERS [Resumed]

 9                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning, Mr. Egbers.  Please sit down.

11             Welcome back to the courtroom.  Thank you very much that you

12     could make it again.

13             And I should say to the interpreters, welcome to the Tribunal,

14     especially those who are interpreting into Dutch.

15             May I remind you that your affirmation to tell the truth still

16     applies.  And if I'm not mistaken, we are still in cross-examination.

17             Good morning, Mr. Tolimir.  Please continue your

18     cross-examination.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

20             Peace in this house.  I would like the day to end today just like

21     all days, in accordance with God's will and not as I will.

22                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]

23        Q.   [Interpretation] I would like to welcome Mr. Egbers, and I hope

24     today we will finish his cross-examination.

25             Mr. Egbers, last time we stopped when you were talking about how

Page 7426

 1     you were disarming Muslims when you noticed that they had weapons, and I

 2     quoted the statement by Mr. Franken where he said that you could not

 3     enter their homes without the agreement of the police.  Could you please

 4     explain the difference in the statements between you and Mr. Franken, and

 5     can you please tell the Trial Chamber what this difference actually was

 6     all about?  Thank you.

 7        A.   Yes, I can.

 8             Part of the statement by Major Franken was read by you, in which

 9     you said that he had a problem when our troops went after armed Muslims.

10     I said, after that, that in reality, in actual fact, our special forces

11     went after the people who at times fled into houses.  I don't see such a

12     big problem between what may happen and what did happen.  Have I answered

13     your question sufficiently?

14        Q.   Thank you, you answered my question.  If you can answer this

15     question too:  Were you able to enter the homes without the consent of

16     their Muslim owners in Srebrenica?  Thank you.

17        A.   I, myself, did not go after armed Muslims, but I know that our

18     special forces did do that and also went into a house.  I cannot say

19     whether formally it was done correctly, formally, but that it did happen

20     in the past.  These are questions that you should have asked Mr. Franken.

21        Q.   Thank you, that's correct.  I would just like to ask you this:

22     Did you ever see soldiers of the Dutch Battalion of UNPROFOR enter a

23     house, and did they ever bring back to their base a rifle or a weapon

24     that they had seized in the home of a Muslim civilian?  Thank you.

25        A.   I did not see that.  I only heard that in other units, not my own

Page 7427

 1     platoon, that it happened there.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please tell us if, before you came to the

 3     enclave, you were familiar with the historical events that had happened

 4     in the enclave, the ones that preceded the demilitarisation, and what

 5     happened in the process of demilitarisation?  Thank you.

 6        A.   We were trained to think differently and, instead of acting as a

 7     soldier, more as a peacekeeper.  It was also said to us which conflicts

 8     were in course in the Balkans.  But what exactly was happening before we

 9     came, in relation to demilitarisation, this was not known to me.

10        Q.   Thank you for your sincere answer.  Can you please tell me if you

11     knew what the provisions were of this demilitarisation agreement that

12     applied to the Srebrenica zone, what it implied, and what were the

13     obligations of UNPROFOR members in terms of that agreement?  Thank you.

14        A.   At the moment, as platoon commander, I was responsible for the

15     platoon of UNPROFOR soldiers.  We were manning the Alpha Observation

16     Post.  In walking in the area of OP -- there were patrols in the area of

17     OP Alpha.  If we were to come across armed Muslims in the enclave, then

18     our order was to seize the weapons.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please tell us this:  If the Muslims

20     prevented you from doing this, what did you do then?  Thank you.

21        A.   They could prevent me from disarming them by running away.  What

22     we then did was go after them.  But in general, it only happened rarely

23     that in the enclave, we saw Muslims openly carrying weapons.  This only

24     happened during the attack on the enclave.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please tell us why, then, you were not

Page 7428

 1     permitted to enter the Bandera Triangle?  How were you supposed to

 2     implement this demilitarisation if you were denied access?  Thank you.

 3        A.   The whole question of the Bandera Triangle was, in January 1995,

 4     as you know, it was a reaction to the reduction in size of the enclave,

 5     which was happening continuously because of the BSA approaching.  When

 6     our -- when UNPROFOR's reaction, in the eyes of the Muslims, appeared not

 7     to be sufficient, they barred us access to the Bandera Triangle.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Are you saying that on the basis of information about

 9     your activities or on the basis of UNPROFOR information that Serbs were

10     attacking and reducing the size of the enclave in that area where you

11     were patrolling?  Thank you.

12        A.   This was the information that UNPROFOR command line, the chain of

13     command, received.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Did you check whether this was true or not?  Were the

15     Serbs attacking this part of the Bandera Triangle or were they ever in

16     this Bandera Triangle?

17        A.   I don't think that they were in the Bandera Triangle, but the

18     Serbians were shifting up towards the enclave, which made the life in

19     that part of the enclave more difficult because they could come under

20     direct fire from the Bosnian Serbs.  I was a lieutenant, a platoon

21     commander, and I did not have the possibility to see whether the Bosnian

22     Serbs had shifted in the direction of the enclave.  I have to base myself

23     on what the battalion leadership told me, what I heard from them.

24        Q.   Thank you.  This was something that the battalion commander told

25     you, but what I'm asking you is this:  Was there any kind of conflict

Page 7429

 1     waged between Serbs and Muslims in the Bandera Triangle and on the edges

 2     of the triangle up until that point in time when you were no longer

 3     permitted to patrol the Bandera area?

 4        A.   There were -- between Muslims inside the enclave and the Bosnian

 5     Serbs outside the enclave, between them there was constant conflict in

 6     the area of OP Alpha.  Nearly daily there was shooting in that area, both

 7     from inside the enclave and outside, so by Bosnian Serbs shooting at

 8     Muslims and sometimes from inside the enclave back to the Bosnian Serbs.

 9     It was a very restless part of the enclave.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Are you able to tell us if that was specifically the

11     reasons why the Serbs carried out the operation to separate the

12     Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, because the Muslims considered that area

13     safe and used it as a corridor in order to get supplies and weapons into

14     the enclave?  Thank you.

15        A.   The enclave of Zepa is in the south of Srebrenica, and the

16     Bandera Triangle is to the west of the enclave.  Therefore, if Muslims

17     from Srebrenica were to walk from Srebrenica to Zepa, it would be to the

18     south of the enclave, where UNPROFOR was.

19             Did I understand you correctly?

20        Q.   Thank you.  If that is so, then why would the Serbs fire into the

21     northern part of the enclave, which is called the Bandera Triangle, if

22     the Muslims were arming themselves from the south?  Are you able to

23     explain that to the Trial Chamber, or do you have a certain confirmation,

24     or are you only saying this on the basis of your thinking and your own

25     conclusions?  Thank you.

Page 7430

 1        A.   From the 6th of January, 1995, I was in the enclave, and it was

 2     always restless in the west part of the enclave.  It's not that there was

 3     complete peace there.  There was shooting, both shooting at UNPROFOR

 4     soldiers or above our heads, their heads, our heads.  Muslims reacted.

 5     This always was a restless part of the enclave, and that was in the west.

 6     This is what I can tell you.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Are you able to tell the Chamber, would the Muslims

 8     have driven you out of an area in which they were attacking Serbs, so

 9     that you wouldn't see that, and is it true that in the beginning --

10     later, they were driving you to go in front of them to wage battle

11     against the Serbs instead of them?  Does this sound logical at all to

12     you?  Thank you.

13        A.   Very little activity was observed in the Bandera Triangle.  Of

14     course, we were aware of shooting, and we reported on this.  You must

15     certainly have information on this or be able to find it.  But what

16     struck us is that OP Alpha, it was always restless around OP Alpha.  The

17     Bandera Triangle, which was just to the south of it, was less restless.

18             The second part of your question, you say that the Serbians

19     pushed us ahead of them in order to attack Bosnian Serbians?  Could you

20     please explain this more clearly?  I can't quite follow the logic here.

21     Are you speaking about July 1995, the fall of the enclave?

22        Q.   Thank you.  I'm talking about a certain part of the enclave, and

23     I'm saying that the Muslims were placing you in front of them and making

24     you fight instead of them so that they could protect the enclave.

25     Perhaps you received the wrong interpretation.  I'm asking you whether

Page 7431

 1     the Muslims were driving you in certain areas in front of them to fight

 2     instead of them and were not allowing you access to the Bandera Triangle,

 3     where they actually were fighting the Serbs.  Thank you.

 4        A.   I cannot agree with the words used, that we were driven ahead by

 5     Bosnian Muslims in order to fight against the Serbs.  I simply cannot

 6     understand what you are trying -- where you are going with this.  Could

 7     you be more specific, please?

 8        Q.   Thank you.  I'm going to be more specific.  When you said that

 9     you went four kilometres ahead of the Muslims and that one of your patrol

10     leaders was captured when he was seeking the Serbs, that you had to go

11     there because the Muslims were telling you to go ahead after you left the

12     check-point, do you recall that part of your statement?  Thank you.  I

13     don't want to be quoting your statement back to you now.  Thank you.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

15             MR. THAYER:  Good morning, Mr. President.

16             I think it would be helpful for at least the record to reflect

17     whether General Tolimir is talking about the witness's OTP statement or

18     whether he's talking about prior testimony.  He refers here to a

19     statement, but I don't know whether he's, in fact, referring to some

20     other statement, whether it's an OTP statement or perhaps a debriefing

21     statement, and I think it would be helpful if whatever the source of this

22     question is is shown to the witness.  We've had a number of fairly vague

23     questions, in terms of time-period and location.  Colonel Egbers has

24     asked for some more specificity.  I think it would be helpful for the

25     record if we just had an idea of really what we're talking about here.

Page 7432

 1     And my recollection is, is that the portion -- whatever this is that

 2     General Tolimir is quoting from is not being quoted accurately.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, which statement do you mean when you

 4     were referring to a statement during your last - stop, please, I'm still

 5     talking - when you were saying, "I don't want to be quoting your

 6     statement back to you now"?  What do you mean?

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 8             I would like the Registry to show P1145, document P1145.  That is

 9     the statement of this witness, Mr. Egbers, that he gave on the

10     24th of October, 1995, to representatives of this Tribunal.

11             Can we now look at page 3 of that statement, paragraph 3,

12     lines 1, 2, 3 and 4 of paragraph 3.  Thank you.  In the Serbian, this is

13     probably one paragraph but last, on the same page in the English version.

14     Thank you.

15             I apologise that I have to go back to refresh the recollection of

16     what was already said and I'm wasting time, but it says here, in the

17     third paragraph, which is also the third paragraph in the English, it

18     says here:

19             "In Srebrenica, I saw many armed Muslims," "many armed Muslims,"

20     "many," "I recognised anti-tank weapons, RPG-7, and non-automatic

21     fire-arms as well as the AK-47.  Some pointed their weapons at us and, by

22     arm movements, made it clear to us that we should continue in a southerly

23     direction.  We drove to another four vehicles which belonged to us and

24     which were under the command of Captain Hageman."

25             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Page 7433

 1        Q.   I would now like to remind Mr. Thayer and the witness -- or I

 2     want to ask them whether you said this in your statement or not.  Thank

 3     you.

 4        A.   Now that this is clear, I understand what you mean.

 5             It is the case that at that market, on that day, many people were

 6     present who were in total panic and were doing everything they could to

 7     have the white UN vehicles stay at the market.  They did, indeed, attempt

 8     to keep me there at the market.  Is this what you mean?

 9        Q.   That's correct, I mentioned the market.  Thank you.  I said

10     "market."  I don't know how this was interpreted.  Thank you.

11        A.   Now I understand exactly what you mean.  I can talk about that

12     situation, should you have any questions about it.  Could you perhaps

13     repeat the question so that I know exactly what your question is?

14        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Egbers.  I don't need you to speak again about the

15     situation that you already spoke about.  All I want to do is ask you

16     whether the Muslims forced you towards the south, in the direction of

17     where the Army of Republika Srpska was, or did they tell you to go in the

18     other direction?  Thank you.

19        A.   The only thing they did at that point in time was, the south of

20     the market, that big square, the only thing they did was keep us there,

21     detain us there.  So not leave them, to drive south.  No, precisely to

22     stay with them on the market square, and that was at the southern part of

23     the market square.

24        Q.   Thank you.  I am forced, then, to read out that whole part of

25     your statement so that you can be reminded.  I don't want to be playing

Page 7434

 1     here.

 2             I quote:

 3             "We drove to another four vehicles which belonged to us and which

 4     were under the command of Captain Hageman.  He told me over the radio

 5     that he was under fire by the local Muslim fighters and, therefore, he

 6     could not move his vehicles.  The Muslim population was panicking.

 7     People climbed into my vehicle.  I was driving an APC at that moment.  I

 8     decided to follow on behind the other vehicles so that I could offer some

 9     cover if there was an attack.

10             "We stayed there the whole night.  The promised air-strike did

11     not take place."

12             And so on, end of quote.

13             Did you stay at the market all night or did you stay at the

14     positions all night?  Can you please tell this to the Trial Chamber.

15     Thank you.

16        A.   I stayed in the market of Srebrenica all night.

17        Q.   So you were not looking for the Serbian Army, as you said the

18     last time, and you did not go to this place where a patrol was captured

19     which had been looking for the Serbs on the 9th and the 10th?  Thank you.

20        A.   I don't know exactly which patrol you're referring to.  What

21     I can tell you is that I drove on to the market, and during the day-time

22     I saw thousands of people there who tried to keep me at the market.  I

23     drove to the south of the market.  People stayed there during the evening

24     and the night.  Some people left.  I stayed there the entire night on the

25     square.  The next morning, I was ordered to drive to Bravo 1.  And behind

Page 7435

 1     the market, there were high hills towards the south.  I was never there.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Evidently, I need to remind you of another part of

 3     your statement from the time before, and it's quite a challenge to

 4     conduct a cross-examination after a break because you don't recall what

 5     happened the first time around.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us now look at page 2 in the

 7     e-court, paragraph 3.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

 9             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I know that Colonel Egbers is a grown

10     man and an experienced officer, but I just want to sort of set down a

11     marker from our position, that these kinds of comments are not helpful,

12     and I'd like to see them stop now, suggestions that the witness needs his

13     recollection refreshed after the break when, frankly, there hasn't been

14     any suggestion of that.  It's, frankly, the accused's misreading of these

15     statements that's causing this, and I think it should just stay there and

16     we don't need comments about the witness's memory.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, put your next question, please.

18             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19        Q.   Mr. Egbers, you said a moment ago that you were not driven toward

20     the south of the area, but, rather, to the south of the market.  I'd like

21     to read out for you what you said on page 2.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have it called up in

23     e-court.

24             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Paragraph 2 from the bottom:

Page 7436

 1             "The next day, Sunday, 9 July 1995, two British SASs arrived.

 2     They requested a Netherlands forward air control.  Sergeant Bosch and his

 3     crew drove to the southern part of the enclave to find out where the

 4     Bosnian Serbs were."

 5             My question is:  Were the Serbs in the south, and was that an

 6     area indicated to you by the Muslims as one where you should head to?

 7     Thank you.

 8        A.   This paragraph is about an observation that I had when I was at

 9     Blocking Position 1.  Blocking Position 1, as I told you last time, a

10     group which was led by Sergeant Bosch was instructed to go to the Swedish

11     shelter project, which is also in the south of the enclave, and this is

12     quite different from what happened on the market square.  Of course,

13     they're both in the south.  But this sergeant, with his soldiers, went to

14     the Swedish shelter project, which is much towards the south-west of the

15     enclave.

16             And your question was -- let me see.  Let me read it out, whether

17     Muslims had told us whether there were Serbs.  Well, from Blocking

18     Position 1, I had an excellent view of what was going on in the south.

19     And I told you earlier on about setting fire to houses and searching

20     houses in Pusmulici, and I saw tanks driving into the enclave and also

21     driving out of the enclave.  But the view of what was going on in the

22     Swedish shelter, we did not have a view of what was going on in the

23     Swedish shelter, which is why Captain Groen sent the people to

24     Sergeant Bosch to go to the Swedish shelter, which is another situation

25     than the situation you just described.

Page 7437

 1             Did I answer your question correctly or sufficiently?

 2        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Egbers.  I don't want to dwell on the issue

 3     anymore.  Let the Trial Chamber assess this point.  Let's move on.  We

 4     lost some time there.

 5             Did you know that there were no Serbs at all around the enclave

 6     shortly before the attack on the enclave, and that they did not pose a

 7     threat to the enclave at all, since they did not build up their forces

 8     there, until, that is, the Muslims started attacking Serb-controlled

 9     territory out of the enclave?

10        A.   You raised a number of questions in one go.

11             The first part of your question concerns the presence of Serbian

12     troops around the enclave.  I can tell you that they were always there

13     for as long as I was there.

14             The second part of your question, you say that they didn't pose a

15     threat to the enclave and that there was no build-up of troops.  Well,

16     indeed, I had no information on the build-up of Bosnian Serb troops in

17     the south of the enclave.  It was only afterwards, after the fall of the

18     enclave, that I talked to Major Zoran about this, and he told me that

19     with -- he had left Srebrenica with people from Sarajevo.

20             About the attack by Muslims on Serbian-controlled area outside

21     the enclave, the last part of your question, you will have to be a bit

22     more specific, because what do you mean, exactly?

23        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Egbers.  It is not my intention to go into the

24     territory that we've already covered.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now call up 1D323 in

Page 7438

 1     e-court.  Thank you.  Can we call up 1D323.  The document does not have

 2     an English translation, so I'll read it out for you.

 3             It's a document which, as you can see in the heading, it was

 4     drafted on the 28th of June by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and was

 5     sent to the 2nd Corps Command.  We will see that it was signed by the

 6     chief of the staff, Brigadier-General Enver, who reported on the

 7     information gathered by scouts around Srebrenica.  The title is

 8     "Intelligence."  It says:

 9             "Several members of the BH Army who had crossed over from the

10     Srebrenica territory moved along the Srebrenica-Zepa-Radava-Veliki Zep-

11     Mekote-Donja Medja-Visocnik-Pjenovac-Nevacka-Rjecice-Donja Brdo-Sokoline

12     route and across the Jezernica River to the tunnel in Kladanj.  On their

13     way, they did not spot any Chetnik formations or fire positions.

14     According to their information, there are no elite units or large

15     military formations around Srebrenica.  More than 50 per cent of trenches

16     stand empty and the lines are manned mostly by elderly men.  On the Han

17     Pijesak-Sarajevo road, on the 21st and 22nd June 1995, they observed very

18     intensive -- or busy traffic in both ways.

19             "In the night between the 21st and the 22nd of June, 1995, they

20     spotted a column of 12 trailer trucks covered in tarpaulin who -- which

21     was escorted by the military and civilian police details, apparently

22     carrying a large cargo in the direction of Sarajevo."

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   This was sent for the information to the 28th Division.  Since we

25     can see, based on this document, that there were no forces around

Page 7439

 1     Srebrenica and that apparently the Serbs at the time were shipping their

 2     forces towards Sarajevo, did UNPROFOR have information at the time about

 3     the build-up of forces around Srebrenica.  Thank you.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  For the sake of the record, I think after the

 5     word -- no need for correction.  Thank you very much.  It was already

 6     corrected.

 7             Mr. Thayer.

 8             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I'm just relying on the LiveNote

 9     translation, because we don't have an English translation of the

10     document, but I would ask that that question be corrected, because there

11     is, from the question -- or from the reading of the document, there is no

12     suggestion that there were no troops around the Srebrenica enclave, as

13     General Tolimir is trying to imply.

14             If we look at the route that's described here, and I don't think

15     there's going to be any dispute about this, we're talking about one

16     direction of travel by this group of scouts from the western part of the

17     enclave to the area of Zepa, and that is what this document is reporting.

18     Again, I don't have an English translation, but simply based on the

19     reading of the document, that would seem to be what it indicates, that a

20     group of scouts moved west along this route from Srebrenica to Zepa, not

21     all the way around the enclave, and this document should, therefore, be

22     quoted correctly and not in a misleading manner to suggest what

23     General Tolimir tried to suggest.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, this is your position, but the

25     question is quite simple.  The question was:

Page 7440

 1             "Did UNPROFOR have information at the time about the build-up of

 2     forces around Srebrenica?"

 3             And I would like to ask the witness to answer this question.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At that point in time, as

 5     lieutenant and platoon command, I didn't have any information whatsoever

 6     regarding the build-up of troops around the enclave.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Egbers.

 9             Can we now show document D53 in e-court.  And can the earlier

10     document be admitted into evidence?  Thank you.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The document will be marked for identification,

12     pending translation.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D132, Your Honours, marked for

14     identification.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             Can we now show Exhibit D53.  Thank you.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   While we're waiting for it to appear:  It's a document which was

19     sent to the 28th Division in Srebrenica by the chief of the staff of the

20     2nd Corps, Dudakovic, Sulejman, on the 17th of June, 1995.  It is titled

21     "Preparations for Offensive Combat Activities:  Order."  And I quote:

22             "Pursuant to a verbal order issued by the commander of the

23     General Staff of the BH Army, Army General Rasim Delic, and on the

24     occasion of the great success achieved by units of the BH Army in the

25     wide area around Sarajevo and Gorazde, as well as on the basis of

Page 7441

 1     intelligence that the Command of the Protection Regiment in Han Pijesak

 2     is holding parts of its units in reserve to intervene in the event of an

 3     attack by our forces from Zepa, I hereby issue the following order:

 4             "1.  Execute all preparations in the Command of the 28th Land

 5     Army Division to execute offensive combat operations with a view to

 6     liberating the territory of BH --"

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You have to slow down.  It is impossible for the

 8     all interpreters to translate into different languages if you read at

 9     this speed.  Please slow down, and carry on.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

11             So I'll re-read item 1 for the sake of the interpreters:

12             "1.  Execute all preparations within the Command of the

13     28th Division of the ground forces to engage in offensive combat

14     operations with a view to liberating the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

15     with a view to over-extending the aggressor forces and inflicting losses

16     on them, engage in co-ordinated action with the BH Army forces carrying

17     out operations in the general Sarajevo area.

18             "2.  Plan realistic tasks which will assure certain success, on

19     the basis of an accurate assessment and the potential of our forces in

20     Srebrenica and Zepa.

21             "3.  The General Staff or the Main Staff of the BH Army will

22     regulate, by an order, the commencement of offensive combat activities in

23     the zone of responsibility of the 28th Army Division."

24             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   This is my question:  Does it follow from this document that the

Page 7442

 1     army general, Rasim Delic, both verbally and in writing through his

 2     subordinates, announced the commencement of offensive combat operations

 3     from Srebrenica and Zepa; yes or no?  Thank you.

 4        A.   This is the first time that I've seen this, and just like anyone

 5     else here in the courtroom, the answer that I could give to -- yeah, as

 6     you've read it, the only answer possible would be, yes, I've never seen

 7     this before.  I understand that you want to bring this in and want to

 8     involve me in this, but I can have nothing more to say about it.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Do forces engage in the defence effort or carry out

10     offensive combat activities, or is it done by those that have free forces

11     at their disposal to engage in attacks?  I'm asking you from the military

12     point of view, nothing else.

13        A.   Of course, it's possible to perform offensive activities within a

14     defensive activity or task in order to bind the troops, but this is a

15     remark purely as a military person.

16        Q.   Thank you.  The document we've just read out, does Rasim Delic

17     refer to the activities taking place in Sarajevo and the assistance that

18     ought to be provided to the forces in Sarajevo?  Thank you.

19        A.   You're presenting a document to me that I've never seen before,

20     never studied, and you're asking me substantive questions about this

21     document.  Am I the right person to be answering such questions or should

22     you speak to the person who wrote this document, this order?

23        Q.   Thank you.  Whenever you're unable to answer, just say so.  I'm

24     not able to answer this because I didn't author the document, and I won't

25     mind.

Page 7443

 1             Do you know that the Muslims around Sarajevo, at the time this

 2     document was written, engaged in offensive combat activities; yes or no?

 3     Thank you.

 4        A.   There's nothing I can say about this, because after 15 years,

 5     it's not completely clear to me.  I don't know.  I would have to look it

 6     up.  I can imagine that it's the case.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  No, there's no need for you to answer that if you

 8     can't.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have D52 shown up in

10     e-court, please.

11             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We don't have D52 on our screens

13     yet.

14             Now we have it.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   It's a memo from the BH Army, its 2nd Corps Command, dated the

17     8th of July, 1995.  In other words, it was written after the order for

18     offensive combat activities.  This document was signed by

19     Commander Sead Delic from Tuzla.  He says:

20             "Information or report on combat results of the units and

21     commands of the 28th Division of the 2nd Corps of the BH Army."

22             He goes on to say, and I'm quoting:

23             "The soldiers of the 28th Division of the army, stationed in

24     Srebrenica and Zepa, although completely encircled and confronting huge

25     problems relating to survival and the obligation to protect the free

Page 7444

 1     territory, committed to contributing, as far as possible, to the struggle

 2     against the aggressor, stepped up their activities in the depth of the

 3     temporarily occupied territory.  An additional motivation for the

 4     activities of the members of the 28th Division was the need to prevent

 5     the enemy forces from sending in reinforcements from the area around

 6     Srebrenica and Zepa to the Sarajevo battle-field by causing losses,

 7     primarily those of troops, which will force the aggressor to tie up their

 8     troops in the general area of Srebrenica and Zepa.

 9             "With this aim, a series of successful sabotage actions were

10     carried out deep in the temporarily occupied territory, where the

11     following results were achieved:"

12             Now I'll just read the first bullet point:

13             "Sixty Chetniks were liquidated, and according to unconfirmed

14     reports, the aggressor suffered even greater losses and had many

15     wounded."

16             The text goes on to talk about the items captured and so on.

17             Then the next paragraph says:

18             "In the village of Visnjica, large quantities of ammunition were

19     seized, but the soldiers were exhausted and could not pull those out, so

20     the ammunition was destroyed, as were all the facilities that the

21     aggressor might use for military purposes."

22             This is my question:  Does the 2nd Corps commander, Sead Delic,

23     speak in this report of the successful actions conducted by the defence

24     forces of Srebrenica and Zepa in destroying the surrounding villages and

25     causing civilian losses, with a view to making sure that the troops

Page 7445

 1     deployed in that area would not be redeployed to the Sarajevo front-line?

 2     Thank you.

 3        A.   Yes, he is talking about Chetniks, uses the term.  Bosnian Serbs

 4     are meant by this, clearly.  And --

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  I'm sorry, the interpreter could not hear what

 6     was just said.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Egbers, a part of your answer was not

 9     interpreted into English.  Could you perhaps repeat it?  We've only

10     received a translation of:

11             "Yes, he is talking about Chetniks, he uses the term.  Bosnian

12     Serbs are meant by this, clearly.  And ..."

13             The rest was not translated.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What I said was that the -- my

15     answer to the rest of the question is, Yes.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

17             Mr. Tolimir.

18             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19        Q.   Does the 2nd Corps commander of the BH Army speak of the

20     offensive carried out of the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa?  Thank you.

21        A.   That's correct.

22        Q.   These losses that were inflicted, were they huge?  There are

23     other documents where they speak of the losses inflicted, in terms of 15,

24     20.  Here, they refer to the number 60, and it's a document dated the

25     8th of July.  And I chose this document deliberately because it

Page 7446

 1     originates from the period when the relevant events in Srebrenica and

 2     Zepa transpired, ones that you participated in.  Thank you.

 3        A.   You're asking whether the results were enormous.  Sixty people --

 4     liquidating sixty people is an enormous result, if that is what you're

 5     asking, so the answer can only be, Yes.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Does it not transpire, from the documents written by

 7     the Muslims, that these were mostly civilians from the surrounding

 8     villages and that one of these villages was burned to the ground?  Thank

 9     you.

10        A.   I would have to interpret that.  What I see is that -- what is

11     written there is that there was ammunition destroyed, that

12     60 Chetniks -- I assume that these are Bosnian Serbs, that they are what

13     is meant.  And whether they are military people or civilians, I cannot

14     see.

15        Q.   Thank you.  I read in paragraph 3 that the document said that all

16     the facilities that the aggressor might use for military purposes were

17     destroyed in the village of Visnjica, but that doesn't matter.  We're not

18     here to justify the actions by either the Muslims or Serbs.

19             Did UNPROFOR at the time, in the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa,

20     have information about the combat activities taking place around Sarajevo

21     and from demilitarised zones?

22        A.   UNPROFOR had the information, and it was shared with the UNPROFOR

23     units in Srebrenica.  We received an update about the situation in the

24     entire area around the enclave.

25        Q.   Thank you.  My question is:  Had the zone been demilitarised

Page 7447

 1     pursuant to the agreement, could the Muslims have been attacking from

 2     within that zone which was demilitarised?  Thank you.

 3        A.   No.  Formally, all weapons had been handed over.  But as I said

 4     to you, at the end of the enclave, many Muslim fighters were seen by me

 5     with weapons, so the zone was not totally demilitarised.  There were

 6     weapons.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  You said that all the weapons had been handed in.

 8     That's why I'm forced to quote to you again what the commander of those

 9     forces said, the forces that had handed over their weapons.

10             Mr. Naser Oric -- this is document D126.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please see this in e-court.

12     It says:

13             "It was important to us --"

14             I quote.  Thank you.  I apologise, and now we see it --

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Mr. Tolimir is asked to repeat the reference.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, can you please repeat the reference,

17     because that was not translated and your microphone was off at that time.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

19             This is document -- well, this is a tell-all, an interview by

20     Naser Oric after the fall of the Srebrenica enclave, where he's talking,

21     in the last two paragraphs, about how he handed over the weapons to

22     UNPROFOR.  And the witness now just said that all the weapons had been

23     handed over to UNPROFOR.

24             Can we look at page 3 in the English, please, and can we show the

25     last two paragraphs.

Page 7448

 1             And now we see this third page in the English as well, where it

 2     says:

 3             "'We did not want the Chetniks to see the weapons that we had not

 4     handed over.  That would be an argument for them to refuse to sign the

 5     agreement or to do who knows what.  We had some 2.000 barrels.  I knew

 6     that for sure.  And I did not know everything.  Weapons were being

 7     hidden.  We kept some 20 cannons, 20/1, with four barrels, which we

 8     turned into single-barrel cannon, so in the end they were used as a kind

 9     of anti-aircraft guns.  Let me explain, actually.  Each single barrel

10     that we managed to capture from the Chetniks, we would hide.  And when we

11     would be going out for an action, we would take them out.  Everybody hid

12     weapons from everyone else.  Only the bold ones reported them, the real

13     soldiers.  The others would hide them until they were needed.  All of

14     this is understandable.  We probably had some 4.000 barrels, thus, which

15     became evident during the breakthrough towards Tuzla.  This is without

16     counting the brigade in Zepa .'"

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   On the basis of this text, my question to you is:  Can it be seen

19     that all of the weapons were handed over to you or whether the Muslims

20     hid some of the weapons after the demilitarisation of the zone, according

21     to we have seen that Naser Oric has said?  Thank you.

22        A.   I would like to go back to what you have repeated twice, two

23     minutes past 10.00, line 12, as if I was saying that all weapons had been

24     handed over.  I only said that there was a weapon collection point where

25     weapons were lying and that this -- apart from that, Bosnian Muslims had

Page 7449

 1     weapons available.  If we saw them, we tried to confiscate them.  And at

 2     the end of the enclave, I saw many Muslims walking with weapons.  I

 3     already stated this.  I did not say that all weapons had been handed in,

 4     and this is clear.

 5             This is a remark I want to make.  You were speaking as if I

 6     assume that all weapons had been handed in, and we can see clearly

 7     together that this is not the case.  On the basis of the text, you are

 8     asking whether weapons could have been hidden.  I think that was the

 9     case.

10             Am I answering your question sufficiently with this?

11        Q.   Thank you.  Well, it's sufficient if you were to tell me whether

12     UNPROFOR, the Dutch Battalion, while it was in Srebrenica, knew that

13     there were some hidden weapons that Naser Oric mentioned in the text we

14     have just read.  Thank you.

15        A.   I knew and saw it only at the point in time in which the enclave

16     was attacked.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Since this is so, we're now going to read the last

18     paragraph of this statement that we see here both in English and the

19     Serbian:

20             "As soon as the UNPROFOR set up their check-points, we realised

21     immediately that we could not rely on them.  So one whole team of my men,

22     they were not men with military training, but they were reliable and they

23     were part of the reserve units, decided that we would establish our own

24     lines and that we would organise our own observers.  The system

25     functioned in the following way:  When an UNPROFOR patrol would approach,

Page 7450

 1     our guys on the lines would inform us so we could conceal the weapons.

 2     If the UNPROFOR soldiers asked us how come these boys were there on those

 3     lines, we would answer them that we did not trust them and that we were

 4     afraid of Chetniks, and that we wanted to have our own guards.  They

 5     showed some understanding for that, which was not the case when we dug

 6     trenches and fortifications."

 7             My question, on the basis of this, is:  While you were patrolling

 8     in Srebrenica, you members of the DutchBat, did you ascertain that

 9     Muslims were staying at positions without weapons when you came along?

10     This both applies to lines and trenches.  Thank you.

11        A.   At unpredictable times, we came along and we, of course, saw

12     Bosnian Muslims in the area of the boundary of the enclave.  I know that

13     a half a year before we came, DutchBat 2, our soldiers, also at that time

14     went into trenches and these spaces there, and that one of our colleagues

15     crawled onto a mine there.  So it did take place.  If we found weapons,

16     we confiscated them.  And as you just read out, those weapons were hidden

17     whenever we came.

18             Have I answered your question sufficiently, Mr. Tolimir?

19        Q.   Thank you.  And is that why you said -- during the

20     examination-in-chief by Mr. Thayer on the topic of these targets, you

21     said people wearing civilian clothing and armed with rifles belonged to

22     groups of Muslims within the enclave.  You asked -- actually, you

23     answered this in response to a question by Judge Mindua, when you said

24     that these people in civilian clothing and carrying weapons were from

25     within the enclave.  Is that who you meant, that they were from within

Page 7451

 1     the Srebrenica enclave, soldiers?  Thank you.

 2        A.   Only at the end of the enclave did I see soldiers walking in

 3     uniform.  Before that, I saw the Bosnian Muslims, the men, only in

 4     civilian clothes, and the weapons I saw only at the end of the enclave,

 5     when the enclave was attacked.  This is what I can say about that.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Do you recall, on page 7152, lines 5 to 9, in

 7     response to a question by Judge Mindua, you answered -- when he asked you

 8     whether these were Bosnian recruits, you answered that these were people

 9     wearing civilian clothing and armed with rifles.  On the basis of that,

10     are you able to tell us, if you remember, whether the Muslims only showed

11     the weapons at the end of the conflict which they had been concealing up

12     'til then?  Thank you.

13        A.   At the end of the conflict, as you call it, we saw Muslims

14     wearing or carrying their weapons openly.  From January to June, there

15     were no weapons carried openly in the enclave.

16        Q.   Thank you.  My question is:  Had the zone been demilitarised

17     pursuant to the agreement, would the Muslims have been able to carry

18     their weapons around or would they have had to conceal them?  Can you

19     please answer that question?

20             And in the meantime, can we look at D21 in e-court so that we can

21     see the provision of that particular agreement.

22        A.   In your question, you want me to choose between carrying openly

23     and hiding, and I am choosing for a third option, and that is handing

24     weapons over to a weapon collection point.  And that is what they should

25     have done.

Page 7452

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please look at this agreement now, which is

 2     on the screen in front of you.  You can see that this agreement on the

 3     cease-fire in the territory was signed between General Ratko Mladic and

 4     General Sefer Halilovic on the 8th of May, 1993, in the presence of

 5     General Philippe Morillon.

 6             Are you aware that at the time, Muslims were overtly attacking

 7     from within the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, the territory that was

 8     surrounded by Republika Srpska, they did not want to recognise the

 9     authorities of Republika Srpska, that they were attacking the villages

10     around the Zepa and Srebrenica enclaves, they had burned and attacked a

11     number of villages?  And a number of documents were shown before the

12     Trial Chamber on these incidents.  Are you aware or do you have any

13     knowledge about the attacks that are being referred to here?  Thank you.

14        A.   The attacks of 1993, I do not know.  I know they took place, but

15     I can't say which parties -- which party attacked the other.

16        Q.   Very well, thank you.  Are you aware -- did you ever hear from

17     Nikolic or Vukotic, since you mentioned that they were liaison officers,

18     officers for contact with the UNPROFOR, that 2.800 to 3.200 civilians and

19     soldiers were killed around Srebrenica from the Muslim enclave of

20     Srebrenica, attacks from there, and this was before 19 -- before the

21     signing of this agreement in 1993, so in the course of 1992 and 1993?

22        A.   I know that in that time, 1992-1993, there was a bloody conflict.

23     The two people that you refer to said nothing to me.  I know this from

24     the general open sources.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Since you were aware of this from open sources, are

Page 7453

 1     you aware that this conflict between Serbs and Muslims was halted with

 2     the demilitarisation of that area on the 8th of May, 1993?  Thank you.

 3             Thank you.  I correct myself: that the conflict was halted by

 4     concluding the agreement on the demilitarisation of Zepa and Srebrenica.

 5     Thank you.

 6        A.   I know that that was the case for Srebrenica.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Can you now please look at Article 1.  That speaks

 8     about the demilitarisation of the Srebrenica and Zepa area, and I am

 9     quoting:

10             "The demilitarised areas will include the area within the current

11     zones of conflict, lines of conflict.  The precise boundaries will be

12     marked by the UNPROFOR commander on the ground after consultations."

13             Thank you.

14             My question from this is this:  Was the demilitarisation supposed

15     to occur in the areas that were under the control of UNPROFOR, as is

16     stated in the agreement?  Thank you.

17        A.   That's correct.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Can you now please look at Article 3.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the next page of the

20     agreement in the English, please.

21             This is the provision on the demilitarisation.  We can see

22     Article 3.  It's shown here.  It states -- the first sentence states:

23             "Every military or paramilitary unit will have either to withdraw

24     from the demilitarised zone or submit/hand over their weapons.

25     Ammunition, mines, explosives and combat supplies in the demilitarised

Page 7454

 1     zones will be handed over/submitted to UNPROFOR."

 2             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   My next question is:  Had everything been implemented according

 4     to this agreement, and had the Muslims handed over their weapons, would

 5     then there have been a war waged from within the demilitarised zone with

 6     the Serbian Army and population outside of those zones?  Thank you.

 7        A.   You're asking me whether these articles were respected.  The only

 8     thing I can say is that I know that the Muslims, in the evenings or

 9     nights, did leave the enclave.  One Muslim fighter I spoke with showed me

10     proudly a weapon which he had taken from the Bosnian Serbs.  This is what

11     I can say about this.

12             In 1993, I was not in the enclave.  No Dutch unit was.  Weapons

13     were handed in, and it turned out that these were not all the weapons.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I think this was not the first time

15     that the witness provided you with an answer about the demilitarisation

16     and the weapons not being handed over to the UNPROFOR.  Do you think it

17     is necessary to dwell on this again?

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

19             I wasn't asking that.  I was asking the witness whether the

20     UNPROFOR could have been able to carry out any activities, combat

21     activities, from within the enclave had they handed over all of their

22     weapons.  So they can answer with a yes or a no.  Thank you.

23             I'm sorry, I misspoke.  I said "UNPROFOR," but my question was:

24     Had the Muslims handed over all of their weapons from Srebrenica, would

25     they have been able to carry out any kind of combat actions from within

Page 7455

 1     Srebrenica and outside of Srebrenica?  Thank you.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And you received your answer.

 3             Please carry on.

 4             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5        Q.   Since they didn't hand everything over, as we heard, are you

 6     familiar with Article 60, about demilitarised zones, from the

 7     Geneva Conventions, Protocol 1?  If you are not -- well, you said you

 8     knew the Geneva Conventions.  But if not, I'm going to read it.  Thank

 9     you.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The question was if you are familiar with

11     Article 60 of the Geneva Convention Protocol 1.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Article 60.  Well, I wouldn't be

13     able to recite it, so I assume that General Tolimir will be reading it

14     out.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I'm going to be reading

16     Article 60.  Article 1 of Article 60 of the demilitarised zone says, I

17     quote --

18             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreters refer the listeners to the

19     original English of the Geneva Conventions.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, we don't have it on the screen.  You

21     didn't give a reference with the document number.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             This is the Geneva Conventions.  And we did not provide a

24     translation because there is a text that is present in the courtroom, and

25     the witness said last time that he knew the provisions of the

Page 7456

 1     Geneva Conventions.  We are going to provide a print-out of that

 2     particular article to the witness, to the Prosecution, and also to the

 3     Trial Chamber.

 4             In Article 2 it --

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, that was not the question.  We are

 6     not asking for a print-out.  Can you tell us the number of the document

 7     in e-court so that it could be called up.  And then you may put your

 8     questions.  It is much easier if the witness can look at it.  What is the

 9     number of this document?

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, but we

11     did not put the Geneva Conventions in the e-court because these are laws,

12     if I may put it that way, which can be used.  Thank you.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think this is a complicated course of action.

14     I would suggest to have the first break three minutes earlier, and you

15     should contact your legal assistant to discuss how to proceed if you want

16     to put a question to -- a text to the witness.

17             We'll adjourn and resume at five minutes before 11.00.

18                           --- Recess taken at 10.26 a.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  So let's continue.

21             I see we have a print-out on our desks, but we don't have it on

22     the screen.

23             Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

24                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I was told this is now seen also on the ELMO, so

Page 7457

 1     that everybody can look at it on the screen and on the hard copy.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 3             I will not be reading out the entire Article 60, only item 7,

 4     which reads, and I quote:

 5             "If one of the parties to the conflict commits a material breach

 6     of the provisions of paragraphs 3 or 6, the other party shall be released

 7     from its obligations under the agreement, conferring upon the zone the

 8     status of demilitarised zone.  In such an eventuality, the zone loses its

 9     status, but shall continue to enjoy the protection provided by the other

10     provisions of this protocol and the other rules of international law

11     applicable in armed conflict."

12             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   This is my question:  If the Muslim side breached the provisions

14     of the demilitarised agreement, thus committing a material breach of the

15     agreement, the Serbian side, was it duty-bound to honour the status of

16     demilitarised zone, since offensive activities were taking part within

17     it, as we were able to see the surrounding Serb villages were the subject

18     of attacks?  Thank you.

19        A.   Do I understand that you are asking me whether an attack on the

20     enclave by the Bosnian Serbs was justified?

21        Q.   Thank you.  That is my question, in view of the fact that the

22     demilitarisation agreement was breached, through the very fact that

23     attacks were launched on civilians and the territory of the

24     Republika Srpska.

25        A.   It would be difficult for me to discuss every article and

Page 7458

 1     stipulation leading to a demilitarised zone being there.  You are saying

 2     that activities were taking place in the enclave towards the outside, but

 3     an attack on the enclave could not be justified by that.  You are really

 4     going to have to speak to legal experts if you wish to know more about

 5     this.

 6             I can say to you what I experienced, myself, on the ground during

 7     the attack on the enclave.  I was shot at.  If you want to talk about

 8     that, then I can answer your questions.  If, on the basis of -- if you

 9     were justified to do that, on the basis of articles, is a question to be

10     put to legal experts.

11        Q.   Thank you.  As a representative of UNPROFOR, were you aware of

12     the fact that the enclave would be attacked, if attacks are launched from

13     it, if a demilitarised zone is no longer in existence?

14        A.   I assume that at a higher strategic level you discuss then about

15     the new situation and you discuss with the representatives of the

16     United Nations.  I realised that in the enclave, we were not in a

17     position to stop an attack on the enclave.  We did not have the weapons,

18     we did not have the personnel.  The only thing that we could do was to

19     report the exchange of fire in the area of the enclave so that at another

20     level, decisions could be taken which could lead to a re-establishment of

21     a quiet in the area.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that the Muslims knew, because they were

23     told by UNPROFOR, that if they continue mounting attacks from the

24     demilitarised zone, this status of the zone would be lifted?  Thank you.

25        A.   I knew nothing about this.

Page 7459

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             Can we call up D16 in e-court, and then we will be able to see

 3     that even the Muslims, themselves, were fully aware of this.  Thank you.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Before you move on to another document,

 5     Judge Mindua has a question for the witness.

 6             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, Witness, Mr. Egbers.  Before

 7     the Defence counsel moves to another question, or the accused Tolimir, I

 8     would like to get back to the demilitarisation of the Srebrenica enclave.

 9     I will, of course, not look into the legal qualifications of the terms of

10     the agreement relating to Srebrenica.  This is something which the

11     Trial Chamber will do.  Nonetheless, I can put questions to you on your

12     actions and your mandate, the one you had been given when you were

13     operating there.

14             So this is my question:  Since you were part of UNPROFOR, what

15     did you rely on as regards this demilitarisation?  Did you rely on the

16     agreement between the warring parties, which we addressed earlier today?

17     Did you rely on this agreement between the warring parties or did you

18     rely on a decision taken by the Security Council?  Who asked you to

19     demilitarise the enclave?  This, in essence, is my question.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the enclave, we acted according

21     to the current rules of engagement.  The rules of engagement were based

22     on the Security Council, on their resolutions.  In the rules of

23     engagement, it was set out when we could act, and what was important

24     there, and I remember this clearly, is the order to only use weapons if

25     UNPROFOR troops were being shot at, themselves.  We had no order to

Page 7460

 1     defend the enclave.  We didn't have the personnel nor the means for this.

 2     And in my view, we had a warning function, so that others could support

 3     us from the air.  And we based ourselves, in the final instance, on the

 4     resolution of the Security Council.  This agreement, which was come to in

 5     1993, I have never seen it as literally before, but the consequences for

 6     the actions of my platoon on the ground is what I saw.

 7             Have I answered your question sufficiently, Your Honour?

 8             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, you have fully answered my

 9     question.  Thank you very much.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

12             In view of the question put by His Honour Mr. Mindua, can we

13     recall D21 in order for you to see that the agreement does not rule out

14     the relevant Security Council resolution.  Quite the contrary, it is

15     quoted in the provisions of the agreement.  Thank you.

16             Can we have D21 again, page 2.  Thank you.  This is the preamble

17     to the agreement.  Can we keep the English and call up the Serbian

18     version.

19             Thank you, though we need the page before in both English and

20     Serbian.

21             I will read out what the agreement says, and now we have the

22     right page in English.

23             Paragraph 2 reads:

24             "Reconfirming their will to establish peace within the territory

25     of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as stated in the agreement between contracting

Page 7461

 1     parties concluded on 8 May 1993.

 2             "Reconfirming Resolution 824 of the Security Council, in which is

 3     declared that the towns of Zepa and Srebrenica and their surroundings

 4     should be treated as safe areas by all the parties concerned and should

 5     be free from armed attacks and from any other hostile act."

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   This is my question:  Does it clearly follow from this that

 8     Resolution 824 of the Security Council is incorporated in the agreement,

 9     or is it left out?  Thank you.

10        A.   Included in this agreement.

11        Q.   Thank you.  If you look at the next passage, it refers to the

12     Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Protocol 1.  They, too, are

13     included in the agreement; is that right?  Thank you.

14        A.   That's correct.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Let us look at a document of the Republic of

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina sent to the 2nd Corps Command, the Operational Group

17     Srebrenica Command.  This is D16.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we call it up in e-court,

19     please.  Thank you.

20             We have it in the Serbian language.  I will be reading from the

21     second paragraph.  Now we have it in English as well.  I'm reading from

22     paragraph 2, and I quote -- this is a 17 February 1995 document of the

23     Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and they were quite clear on the fact

24     that they could lose the status of demilitarised zone.  So paragraph 2

25     reads:

Page 7462

 1             "We estimate that the aggressor," that's to say, forces of

 2     Republika Srpska, "will start offensive combat operations with the aim of

 3     completely overpowering the Milici-Podravanje Road, and then attempt to

 4     seize the territory of the demilitarised zones.

 5             "On the 16th of February, 1995, the aggressor filed a request

 6     with UNPROFOR to declare Zepa a non-demilitarised zone, with the

 7     following rationale:"

 8             Under bullet 1:

 9             "Helicopter flights were registered whereby the BH Army was

10     supplying weapons and ammunition."

11             Bullet point 2:

12             "Movements of the BH Army have been registered in the Zepa

13     sector."

14             Bullet point 3:

15             "Accusing members of UNPROFOR for covering up the activities and

16     intentions of the BH Army, which is why they no longer guarantee safety.

17             "On the night between 15 and 16 February, our helicopters were

18     seen flying over and infantry fire was opened on them."

19             Now let's skip the next paragraph and read the first bullet point

20     of the paragraph further down:

21             "A helicopter reconnaissance operation of the protected Zepa zone

22     was scheduled for 17 February 1995, but the aggressor side refused to

23     allow it.

24             "A visit by the Ukrainian Colonel," et cetera, "deputy commander

25     of the UNPROFOR Sarajevo sector, was announced for 18 February 1995 ..."

Page 7463

 1             Et cetera, et cetera.

 2             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Does it not follow from this document that the Command of the

 4     BH Army was quite clear on the fact that the Serbs were asking for the

 5     zone to be proclaimed a non-demilitarised zone because of the activities

 6     taking place therein?  Thank you.

 7        A.   The document that you are showing me shows, indeed, that the

 8     enclave of Zepa was discussed.  The sentence you read out, you are now

 9     asking me a question on that, and my answer is, Yes.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             Can we now look at D67, and you will see that it confirms the

12     veracity of the information concerning helicopter flights.  I am not

13     interested in anything else.  Thank you.

14             D67.  In e-court, you have it before you on the screen.  This is

15     a document sent on the 13th of July, 1995, to President Alija Izetbegovic

16     by the General Staff of the BH Army, and was sent through the

17     Intelligence Administration in Sarajevo.  All of that you can read in the

18     heading.

19             I will be reading out the fourth bullet point only, which is on

20     the next page in English.

21             Can we have the next page in English shown.

22             Bullet point 4 reads:

23             "In preparations for a future operation to link up the enclaves,

24     we brought in and took back four brigade commanders, two brigade chiefs

25     of staff, and the 26th Division Chief of Staff," Naser Oric.  It doesn't

Page 7464

 1     say that; I added it, "The division commander, who was meant to go on the

 2     next helicopter flight, did not return.  After the final flight ended

 3     tragically, Naser remained behind."

 4             There is mention of 17 helicopter flights through which the

 5     Muslims in Srebrenica and Zepa got weapons supplies.

 6             Can we go back to page 1 in both versions in order to look at the

 7     second bullet point.  It reads:

 8             "Seventeen helicopter flights were carried out, in each of which

 9     a helicopter was hit."

10             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Based on what I've just read, was any of this known to you, to

12     UNPROFOR in Srebrenica, that the Muslims were getting weapons through

13     Zepa and through the air from Tuzla?  Thank you.

14        A.   What I know is that from Srebrenica, people were walking on foot

15     to Zepa.  I, myself, did not see any helicopter flights, because this,

16     I think, is only about the Zepa enclave.  Is that not so?

17        Q.   Thank you.  It's the commander of the BH Army writing this, who

18     reports to his president that 17 helicopter flights were conducted and

19     that Zepa and Srebrenica were given supplies by helicopter.  He also

20     reports on the attempts to bring commanders into Tuzla -- into

21     Srebrenica, that is, by helicopter in order to engage in an operation to

22     link up Zepa and Srebrenica.

23             Can you tell me:  If this something you had not seen, does it

24     necessarily mean that it did not happen?

25        A.   I cannot say that it did not take place.  What I see is that this

Page 7465

 1     text is dated the 13th of July, 1993 [as interpreted], a few days after

 2     the enclave fell.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think there was a mistake with the date.  It

 4     shows clearly that it is 13th of July, 1995, and not 1993, as the answer

 5     was interpreted.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So two days after the enclave was

 7     run over.  You're saying that helicopter flights took place.  I didn't

 8     see them.  Maybe they went to Zepa.  Perhaps you were there at that time.

 9     Maybe you can say something about this.

10             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11        Q.   I have no right to testify, but I've shown you a document where

12     the chief of the BH Army, two days after the fall of Srebrenica, reports

13     to his president on the extent of activities taken up in order to

14     reinforce the combat levels in Srebrenica.

15             My question was:  Did you, in UNPROFOR, know of any of these

16     activities taking part in the BH Army that were referred to by

17     Rasim Delic?  Thank you.

18        A.   I was not aware of this.  I don't know if UNPROFOR knew about

19     this.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Since you were not aware of this, can you answer the

21     following question:  If the Serbs grant Srebrenica the status of a

22     demilitarised zone, a Srebrenica which was about to fall on 8 May 1993,

23     was it justified for UNPROFOR to tolerate the presence of weapons, not to

24     divulge this, not to prevent this, and thus allowing Muslim-Serb

25     conflicts to take place within the territory of the enclave because there

Page 7466

 1     were weapons there?  Thank you.

 2        A.   From 1995, I was in the enclave.  I can only answer this question

 3     from myself, what I experienced, what I saw.  I can't speculate about

 4     1993 to 1995.  I don't think UNPROFOR contributed to the development of

 5     the conflict between Muslims and Serbs.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             Go ahead, Mr. Vanderpuye [as interpreted].

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

 9             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

10             I'm sorry for the intervention, but while we have it up on the

11     LiveNote, at page 40, line 19, I think it's worth putting on the record

12     the following:  General Tolimir said:

13             "I have no right to testify."

14             He's made similar statements during the course of the proceedings

15     on other occasions.  I just want to make it clear, from the Prosecution's

16     position, that we understand that he has an absolute right to testify as

17     a witness in his own defence, pursuant to Rule 85(C), if he so chooses,

18     and the Prosecution will not do anything to impair that right that he

19     holds as a fundamental right, to testify as a witness in his own case.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think that everybody is aware of this Rule.  I

21     was concerned about your formulation as well, because you have the right

22     to testify, but you are not allowed to give evidence while putting

23     questions to a witness.  I'm quite sure that I understood your remark in

24     that way, that you are not allowed to give evidence by putting questions.

25             Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

Page 7467

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 2             I thought that the Prosecutor took it that way as well.  But if

 3     not, I just want to explain that during questioning, I cannot testify,

 4     and the witness knows that as well, since he asked if he may say

 5     something.  But, in any case, thank you for the explanation.

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Sir, please, during the cross-examination you said, repeatedly,

 8     that there were armed civilians who had opposed the organised armed

 9     force of the Army of Republika Srpska, and questions were put to you also

10     by Mr. Mindua.

11             My question is:  Do you remember that?  Do you remember that part

12     of the examination, and do you remember the questions that Judge Mindua

13     put to you on that topic?  Thank you.

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   Thank you.  My question is:  Should it have been allowed, in the

16     demilitarised zone, for the number of civilians to rise so much,

17     civilians that could have taken part in the armed resistance towards the

18     Army of Republika Srpska?  Is that something that should have been

19     allowed to happen?  Thank you.

20        A.   I don't know.  This was before my time.  I do know that when we

21     came to the enclave, people who were in the enclave were not free to go

22     to Central Bosnia, their own Muslim area.  Those who were there had to

23     stay.

24        Q.   Thank you.  I asked you whether the UNPROFOR should have

25     prevented any kind of armed attacks from within the demilitarised zone,

Page 7468

 1     at the areas surrounding the zone, from an area that it had granted the

 2     status of a demilitarised zone.  Thank you.

 3        A.   The units which were there, the UNPROFOR units, could only man

 4     observation posts.  In my part of the enclave, 50 kilometres perimeter

 5     had one observation post from which, together with 12 soldiers, I had to

 6     keep an eye on the whole thing.  We had no view of what was happening at

 7     night or in the evening outside the enclave or within the enclave.  We

 8     didn't have the personnel.

 9             Have I answered your question sufficiently?

10        Q.   Thank you.  Are you able to tell me whether the members of

11     UNPROFOR, or its command, or you officers, expected that the Muslims

12     would defend the enclave with arms in the event of an attack?  Thank you.

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   Thank you.  And what was this expectation based on; based on the

15     knowledge that they had sufficient weapons or based on something else?

16     Thank you.

17        A.   I based the expectation on the weapons present at the weapon

18     collection point, and these were maintained faithfully.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Is this your personal opinion or is that the opinion

20     of UNPROFOR?  I asked whether the UNPROFOR expected the Muslims to defend

21     the enclave with weapons, so I asked whether that was your personal

22     opinion on whether it was the UNPROFOR units that expected that the

23     Muslims would defend themselves with arms in the event the enclave was

24     attacked.  Thank you.

25        A.   This is my personal opinion.

Page 7469

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             Can we look at P1148 now, please, page 10 of P1148.  Page 10.

 3             And then when we see that -- on the basis of that -- P1148, this

 4     is an exhibit.  Page 10 of that exhibit.  This is your interview.  We can

 5     see page 10 now.

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   You say:

 8             "In the month of May --"

 9             This is the text immediately below the first redacted part -- no,

10     actually, after the second redacted part in the English.  This is what

11     you say:

12             "An incident occurred in May.  The general perception was that

13     the Muslims would defend the enclave themselves and that the UN forces,

14     in that case, could withdraw to blocking positions, but the Muslim

15     defence never came.  It was on the basis of this perception that the plan

16     to withdraw was based."

17             My question:  In view of the fact that you're talking about the

18     general perception that the Muslims would defend the enclave themselves,

19     was that the general perception prevalent among the DutchBat, as a whole,

20     or was that just your general perception?  Thank you.

21        A.   I can only repeat what I said.  It was my perception, because

22     there still were weapons at the weapon collection point.  I believe,

23     also, that the battalion commander, Karremans or Franken, opened the

24     weapons collection points for the Muslims when the enclave was attacked,

25     and no weapons were picked up.  So these weapons, which had been

Page 7470

 1     confiscated and maintained, could have been used in defence.  There was

 2     no organised defence of the enclave.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Please, Commander Karremans and Franken, did they

 4     open a check-point in May, like you say, or was this in July, and was it

 5     the general perception -- that was the general perception of one man or

 6     the general perception of all the people who were staying in that area,

 7     meaning UNPROFOR representatives?  Thank you.

 8        A.   The weapon collection point was opened in July for the first, but

 9     earlier statements have been made about this.  My perception was that the

10     Muslims would defend the enclave.  I can't speak for others.

11        Q.   Thank you.  My question is:  And is this why the UNPROFOR took up

12     blocking positions, in order to enable the Muslims to carry out their

13     defence?  Thank you.

14        A.   That is not the reason why blocking positions were taken.  As a

15     military person, if an attack were to be -- had to be held back, an

16     attack at this scale, I would need anti-tank weapons with a long range,

17     tanks, and air support, artillery, mortars.  This would have been a

18     large-scale military operation.  This is not something that you can do

19     with just a rifle.

20             We were there in the blocking positions to show that there was a

21     new line had been drawn and that everything to the south of that blocking

22     position was in danger.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Last time, I read to you what Major Franken, as

24     deputy commander, said about the green order.  Can you please tell me,

25     the open conflict between UNPROFOR and the Army of Republika Srpska, was

Page 7471

 1     that precisely there in order to enable the Muslims to defend the enclave

 2     or was this something that happened for a different reason?  Thank you.

 3        A.   The shooting of -- at UNPROFOR soldiers by the Republika Srpska,

 4     the BSA, cannot be seen apart from an attack on the total enclave.  Only

 5     once our soldiers were shot at by the Bosnian Serbians did they become a

 6     party to the conflict.  I cannot speak about any other defence of Bosnian

 7     Muslims, apart from one thing --

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter didn't hear the word.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- which only ever shot that one

10     time, artillery.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12        Q.   You now use the term "conflict between the Serbs and UNPROFOR."

13     Please, is an air-strike and three-day green order, was that -- that

14     occurred because you were attacked once by a single tank shell or were

15     you attacked every day?  And in your testimony, you showed only such one

16     attack in which you guided an air-strike at a Serbian air tank -- at a

17     Serbian tank --

18             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not hear the rest of what

19     Mr. Tolimir said.  Thank you.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, the interpreter didn't catch the

21     last part of your question.  You're only recorded having said:

22             "In your testimony, you showed only such one attack in which you

23     guided an air-strike at a Serbian tank ..."

24             And then the rest was not heard.  Perhaps you can complete your

25     question.

Page 7472

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             In the question, I further explained that an APC or a tank crew

 3     guided an aeroplane to strike at tanks of the Serbian Army that were at a

 4     distance of up to two kilometres, and I asked the witness whether it was

 5     just that incident that was the basis for a three-day conflict between

 6     the Army of Republika Srpska and UNPROFOR.  Thank you.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What you are describing is close

 8     air support on the 11th of June, the date on which the enclave fell.

 9     We -- two F-16s assisted us there.  I then went to Potocari with all the

10     refugees, and there I heard that the threats by the Bosnian Serbian Army

11     was such that we had to stop our military activity immediately.  I'm

12     talking about one day in which there was close air support.  And I was

13     shot at by a tank more than -- several times.  I've given a statement

14     about this before.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16        Q.   Since you talked about this earlier, we will leave it up to the

17     Trial Chamber to judge.

18             Anyway, can you please tell us here --

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

20             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, there's some -- an unclear passage

21     that preceded Your Honour's intervention, and I was waiting for some of

22     the answers to be completed before getting up.

23             If we look at page 46, lines 14 through 16 -- actually, the

24     beginning of the answer starts on line 12.  Colonel Egbers said:

25             "I cannot speak about any other defence of Bosnian Muslims, apart

Page 7473

 1     from one thing ..."

 2             And then the interpreter stated that the interpreter didn't hear

 3     the word.  And Colonel Egbers' answer is then recorded.

 4             "... which only shot that one time, artillery."

 5             So unfortunately we have an unintelligible answer.  The

 6     interpreter flagged it for us, and we had an intervention after that.  So

 7     I'm raising it now before too much water passes under the bridge.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  I think that is very helpful.

 9             Mr. Egbers, perhaps you can provide us with an answer again.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The only thing I saw in the

11     blocking position was an artillery piece which never shot.  That was the

12     only thing which could have had a -- or executed a defensive action.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  In line 15 of page 46, you were recorded in the

14     following way.

15             "... which only ever shot that one time, artillery."

16             Was that a wrong interpretation and recording?  Now you are

17     saying it was never used?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, you're right, it never shot.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

20             Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Thank

22     you, Mr. Thayer.  Thank you, Witness.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Can you please tell us -- can you answer my question, please?

25     Were you in an APC or were you in APCs that were guiding planes during

Page 7474

 1     the destruction and neutralisation of Serbian targets in Srebrenica?

 2     Thank you.

 3        A.   One of the soldiers, as a forward air controller, maintains

 4     contact with the aeroplanes.  I assume that you are referring to that

 5     one-off deployment of F-16s.  At that time, I was near Blocking

 6     Position 1, and all I could do was follow what was being said, in terms

 7     of communication with the F-16s.  So I was outside of an APC, and there

 8     were other people who were in contact with the aeroplane.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  These others who maintained contact with the

10     aeroplanes, were they the eyes of that plane that was firing at targets

11     on the ground?  In that case, were they -- was it a question of the

12     UNPROFOR members being in close connection with the aeroplanes that were

13     conducting the air-strikes, NATO aeroplanes?  Thank you.

14        A.   It is correct that the forward air controllers tried to guide the

15     F-16 pilots to the ground target.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Did they act in close co-ordination with NATO at the

17     time or not?  Thank you.

18        A.   I know nothing of the sort.

19        Q.   Thank you.  I understand that.  Are you able to tell me this now:

20     On the 13th and 14th of July, for security reasons, were you held at a

21     school in Konjevic Polje, due to which you lodged a protest to

22     Republika Srpska?  This is something that you talked about in the

23     previous part of your testimony.  Yes or no?  Thank you.

24        A.   You are saying, in your question, that I was held for security

25     reasons.  Was this my security or the security of others?  Because I

Page 7475

 1     wanted to drive on to Srebrenica along the football pitch, but I was

 2     detained by one of the soldiers, holding a rifle, and forced to step

 3     outside.  This was told to me later on, that this was for my own

 4     security, but what I saw was that somebody pointed a gun at me and told

 5     me to stop.

 6        Q.   Later, during the night, when you saw those Muslims that were

 7     captured in the school, when you felt the firing of the Muslim infantry

 8     at the school, when you heard that the Muslim column had separated and

 9     was going along the Konjevic Polje-Potocari road, did you know then that

10     this was for security reasons?  Thank you.

11        A.   During the night, in the surrounding of Nova Kasaba, there was a

12     lot of firing.  I don't know why that happened.  What I was told was that

13     there were fire-fights with Muslims, and this was also what I reported

14     on.  Today, my position is different.  Now I think it might have been

15     different.  But you are trying to make me believe now that I was being

16     detained for my own security and that I should be grateful to the

17     Republika Srpska for doing so.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I didn't say that.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Egbers, may I ask you the following, you

20     said:

21             "I wanted to drive on to Srebrenica along the football pitch, but

22     I was detained by one of the soldiers."

23             To which army did this soldier belong?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was a Bosnian Serb soldier.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

Page 7476

 1             Mr. Tolimir.

 2             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3        Q.   Did you want to go -- pass by Konjevic Polje in order to do some

 4     reconnaissance or for some other reason?  Thank you.

 5        A.   I was on my way back from accompanying a column of refugees to

 6     Kladanj, and on my way back, back to the enclave, I was stopped.  I was

 7     not the only person being stopped.  There were other soldiers who were

 8     sitting alongside the road and just waiting to see what happened next.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  During the night that you spent in the school in

10     Konjevic Polje, could you feel the firing by artillery at the building?

11     Thank you.

12        A.   No.  I heard prolonged shots from a machine-gun.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             Could the e-court please show P1145, page 7, paragraph 4, lines 2

15     and 3 and 4.  Thank you.  Page 7, paragraph 4, lines 2, 3 and 4.  Thank

16     you.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   You can see that now, that paragraph 4, which states, line 2, the

19     second sentence:

20             "The --" [No interpretation]

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I have to interrupt you.  We don't

22     receive a translation at the moment.  Could you please repeat the

23     quotation.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry.  I am going to read

25     again the fourth paragraph of page 7.  This is one paragraph but last in

Page 7477

 1     the English, where it says -- actually, it's paragraph 2 on this page

 2     that we are looking at in the English, and it states, I quote:

 3             "Suddenly, the school building came under fire."

 4             This is line 2 -- this is the third paragraph in English, which

 5     begins with:  "Later ..."  And the second sentence in that paragraph in

 6     the Serbian states, I quote:

 7             "Suddenly, the school building came under fire of small-calibre

 8     weapons from the direction of the woods.  I did not notice which part of

 9     the building was hit.  The Bosnian Serbs responded by firing from their

10     double-barrel anti-aircraft gun, type M53-59, and a machine-gun on an

11     armoured BOV vehicle."

12             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   This is what you said in your statement, what I quoted back to

14     you.  Is it evident from here that the building was attacked by someone

15     else and that the soldiers of the Army of Republika Srpska retaliated in

16     kind?  Thank you.

17        A.   That is, indeed, correct.  Two shots were fired, two gun-shots,

18     aimed at the school or near the school, and then Major Zoran's response

19     is quite remarkable.  He took two Muslim boys from a house and he used

20     them as a sort of a human shield, and he had them walk out in front.  And

21     then 25 soldiers walked behind.  Now, fortunately, the two boys then came

22     back alive on that occasion.  And the shooter or shooters were not found,

23     but it is correct that there were shots fired at the school.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Did you leave Konjevic Polje, on the following day,

25     for Potocari on the vehicles of the Army of Republika Srpska?  Thank you.

Page 7478

 1        A.   During my stay at the school, I saw many white UN vehicles, and

 2     Bosnian Serb soldiers driving those vehicles also wearing UN helmets and

 3     UN bulletproof jackets.  There was no distinction that could be made

 4     between UNPROFOR soldiers and Bosnian Serbs who had dressed up as

 5     UNPROFOR soldiers, i.e., driving a white vehicle, with a white [as

 6     interpreted] helmet.  That vehicle could have been -- or that person

 7     could have been a real UNPROFOR soldier or Bosnian Serb.  This is the

 8     reason why I requested to be taken back in an armoured vehicle to

 9     Srebrenica.  I requested that permission from my battalion commander.  In

10     the first instance, this request was denied, and they wanted me to return

11     unprotected in a white vehicle.  I have had to convince them to be

12     allowed to be taken back by the Bosnian Serbs in an armoured vehicle.  I

13     was forced to leave behind the two remaining UN vehicles at the Bosnian

14     Serbs.  Because there was -- it was not possible -- impossible to make a

15     distinction between UNPROFOR and Bosnian Serb soldiers, I preferred to

16     take an armoured vehicle back.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

19             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, at page 53, line 11, there's a

20     reference to "UNPROFOR soldiers, i.e., driving a white vehicle, with a

21     white helmet."  We've been in trial for several months, and I'm not sure

22     anybody's heard a reference to white helmets.  That may be what the

23     witness said.  I'm not sure.  I think it would be worth, just so we don't

24     have to waste any time on redirect, clarifying whether that is, in fact,

25     what he said or whether he said something else.

Page 7479

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] White vehicle, blue helmet.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 4             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Mr. Egbers, you have described for us what the situation was like

 6     before Mr. Thayer's interruption, and you said that the Serbs could have

 7     taken the vehicles.  But was it not possible for the Muslims to seize

 8     your vehicles, and not the Serbs, on the night between the 13th and the

 9     14th in order to travel along that particular road?  Thank you.

10        A.   Driving such a vehicle is not easy.  And I could see the white

11     armoured APCs parked outside the school where I was staying, and there

12     were Serbian soldiers emerging from those vehicles, wearing a blue

13     helmet, walking towards the school, so I am positive that they were

14     Bosnian Serbs who I saw.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Since I haven't

16     received an answer to my question, let the Trial Chamber be the judge of

17     that.  I can't spend time on this anymore.

18             Can we now call up P1143 in e-court, page 3.  Thank you.

19             Thank you.  Can we look at paragraph 11 of your statement, both

20     in Serbian and in English.  Paragraph 16 in English and Serbian.  Thank

21     you.  That's page 2 in English and 3 in Serbian.  Thank you.

22             Thank you.  I'll be quoting the first line from paragraph 16:

23             "After the fall of the enclave, during evacuation or

24     deportation - we'll call it evacuation, let's keep it correct - of

25     course, men were separated from the women."

Page 7480

 1             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Since you accompanied these convoys, you said here, did you not,

 3     when speaking of it being an evacuation or deportation, that you would

 4     refer to it as an evacuation, and you did state that you did not want to

 5     depart from the truth?  Thank you.

 6        A.   I would like to explain what I meant here.

 7             The word "deportation" reminds me of the deportation of the Jews

 8     in the Second World War.  Naturally, people in this case were being

 9     transported against their will.  "Evacuation" is maybe a slightly easier

10     term without using an emotional term from the Second World War, which is

11     why I referred in this case to "evacuation," but the sentence shows that

12     we are actually talking about a deportation.

13             What is exactly your question about this first sentence of

14     paragraph 16?

15        Q.   Since you've just said that people were transported against their

16     will - at least that's how it's been interpreted to me - did

17     Colonel Karremans seek from General Mladic, and General Nicolai too, that

18     people be taken out of Srebrenica against their will?  Thank you.

19        A.   Actually, people had no choice.  There were thousands of them

20     together, temperatures of 35 degrees centigrade, without any prospect of

21     returning to the enclave, so obviously they prefer to take their families

22     and go away.  So if you had asked people then, Do you want to leave here,

23     the answer would be, Yes.  But they were forced in that situation, where

24     they were cramped together without food, without water, and they were

25     forced to stay there.

Page 7481

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell me, was it not their army, too, which

 2     fired upon the Army of Republika Srpska and the surrounding Serb

 3     settlements from within the demilitarised zone, responsible for them

 4     ending up in such a situation, ultimately?  Thank you.

 5        A.   I don't agree with you, if that's the way you reason.  I

 6     understand that you think that way, but the blame for the attack on the

 7     enclave cannot be placed on the Bosnian Muslims in that way.  Those in

 8     the enclave, I saw them as refugees packed together in a small enclave.

 9     It is a too-big step to follow your reasoning, which would be that the

10     Muslims incited the attack on the enclave.

11        Q.   Thank you.  I understand why you reason this way.  I showed you a

12     document clearly showing that 60 Serbs had been killed, et cetera,

13     et cetera, but let Their Honours draw their conclusions.

14             Tell me, did the Muslims not -- did they not leave the civilian

15     population in the hands of UNPROFOR, Serbian Army, and left the enclave

16     and the area to engage in a breakthrough under those circumstances?

17     Thank you.

18        A.   This is clearly a question at a political level.  You are asking

19     my opinion on this, but as a soldier, as a platoon commander, I was not

20     involved in this.  In 1993, we created this situation, the Bosnian Serbs,

21     the Bosnian Muslims and the United Nations.  There was an enclave, there

22     were agreements, and this is the situation I was in.  I cannot now say

23     that I can follow your reasoning now at a political level.  This is a

24     question you have to ask of the political leaders who at that time were

25     responsible.

Page 7482

 1        Q.   Thank you.  I'm asking you this simply because in a part of your

 2     statement, you said that the civilians who had been transported from the

 3     UNPROFOR base in Srebrenica to the UNPROFOR base in Potocari said that

 4     the army had taken to the woods, so that was before Karremans asked for

 5     the evacuation from Mladic.  Do you know, didn't Karremans ask of

 6     General Mladic for the Muslims to be evacuated from the Potocari area to

 7     the area under the control of the Muslims?  That would be my question.

 8        A.   I don't know.  The situation was so extreme that I could imagine

 9     that a solution had to be found for the people who were there.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that at the London Conference, when

11     Lord Carrington was removed, as was Owen, the parties signed an agreement

12     on free evacuation and free movement from one territory to another and

13     transportation of humanitarian aid; yes or no?  I think this is something

14     that I've mentioned the last time as well.

15        A.   No.

16        Q.   Did you know that the agreement on Geneva Conventions -- or,

17     rather, the agreement on evacuation also includes evacuation from an

18     occupied or besieged area?  Are you familiar with Article 17 of the

19     Geneva Conventions?  It's just the case, as was with Article 60, you

20     don't have it in English.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But can the Trial Chamber allow me

22     to just read it out simply?  Thank you.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Try it, and we will see how to manage it.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Article 17 --

25             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreters note that we don't have the

Page 7483

 1     exact reference and don't have the original text of the Geneva

 2     Conventions.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We don't have interpretation because there is no

 5     English text.  This is a problem for the interpreters.  Please start your

 6     reading again very slowly.  And if it's a long text, you should be aware

 7     of the time you have already used in cross-examination.  It is six hours

 8     and forty-four minutes of the seven hours you have indicated that you

 9     needed.

10             Carry on, please.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

12             To cut this short, I will only quote the following part:

13             "The warring parties shall see to it that local agreements are

14     concluded for evacuation from an occupied or encircled area."

15             This is Article 17 from the Geneva Conventions and their

16     additional protocols.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   My question is as follows:  Based on this article, UNPROFOR and

19     Karremans as commander of the DutchBat, a representative of the Muslim

20     and Serb side, did all of these parties sign an agreement on evacuation,

21     and are you aware of there having been signed an evacuation agreement for

22     Srebrenica?  Thank you.

23        A.   I know there was consultation in Hotel Fontana between Mladic and

24     Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans.  There are pictures of that.  What I know

25     is at some moment, the transporting of people who were there began.  At

Page 7484

 1     that time, I was a lieutenant in charge of executing, and not at -- I was

 2     not involved in consultation at a higher level.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

 4             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I'm going to inquire whether the

 5     Defence is suggesting that there was some kind of signed written

 6     agreement prior to 12 July or on or about 12 July 1995 with respect to

 7     the removal of the Muslim population of Srebrenica from Potocari.  That

 8     seems to be the gist of the question, and I'm inquiring what the basis is

 9     of that question.  Again, we've been in trial for many months, and this

10     is the first time I've ever heard of a written agreement of some kind

11     that was signed by the parties prior to the removal of the Muslim

12     population from Potocari.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, can you clarify this?

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15        Q.   Did you ever watch a movie where representatives of the Muslims

16     and General Mladic, in the presence of Colonel Karremans, discussed

17     evacuation?  So did you ever watch such footage prior to your testimony

18     before this Tribunal?  Thank you.

19        A.   Yes, on television, and there are photos of this.

20        Q.   Thank you.  And did you ever see a statement on evacuation signed

21     by Mladic, an UNPROFOR representative, and a representative of the Army

22     of Republika Srpska in Srebrenica, where an added sentence was written by

23     hand in response to a request by Major Franken; yes or no?

24        A.   I can remember something like this.

25        Q.   Can you tell us what the purpose was of the meetings between

Page 7485

 1     General Mladic, Karremans, and Mr. Mandzic?  Thank you.

 2        A.   I don't know.  This was before the deportation or evacuation, so

 3     I don't know.  You're going to have to ask them.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  We will be asking this question of some of the

 5     participants in the event, and the Trial Chamber is aware of this.  What

 6     I meant was the statement on evacuation which they signed and which you

 7     may have had occasion to look at, and maybe not.  It was signed on the

 8     17th of July.

 9             Let me ask you about a different document which was also produced

10     after the fall of the enclave of Srebrenica.  It's P603, an agreement

11     between General Smith and General Mladic on the departure of UNPROFOR

12     from Srebrenica.

13             Were you familiar with this document at all?

14        A.   No.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Did you leave Srebrenica, together with the DutchBat,

16     after the relevant events there?  Thank you.

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Did there exist an agreement about your departure between

19     General Rupert Smith and General Mladic?  Did you know of it?  Thank you.

20        A.   I did not know about this.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Did you travel via Bosnia or via Herzegovina to

22     Zagreb, or via Serbia?  Thank you.

23        A.   Through Serbia.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Was the journey through Serbia shorter, more

25     convenient and faster, because it's a motorway, or was the shorter route

Page 7486

 1     through Bosnia?

 2        A.   I don't know.  We entered Serbia at Zvornik.  That's all I can

 3     say to you.  And why, I don't know.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Did General Smith choose the route to be taken to

 5     reach Zagreb and onwards, to travel to the Netherlands, or was this

 6     something that General Mladic had a say in?  Thank you.

 7        A.   I can't give an answer to this.  I don't know.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Was the road through Serbia safer or was it safer to

 9     travel through a combat zone in Bosnia?  Thank you.

10        A.   I would have to interpret this.  It's been translated as "combat

11     zone."  Then a route through Serbia would be safer.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us, were you deported through Serbia or

13     did you, yourselves, travel through Serbia, via Zagreb, on to Holland?

14     Thank you.

15        A.   We could travel, ourselves, in a convoy.  We could travel,

16     ourselves, in a convoy.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Tell me, please, why parts of your statement were

18     redacted, the one we looked at a moment ago, where you spoke of the

19     general perception that the Muslims, et cetera?  Can you tell us, why was

20     that portion of your statement redacted?  That was page 10, if you

21     recall.  We had it on our screens a moment ago, and I read out the

22     portion which was just below the redacted part.  That was P1148, and we

23     can ask for it to be shown in e-court in the meantime if you can't

24     remember.

25        A.   I don't know what's underneath that.  But when issuing the

Page 7487

 1     statement, the witness statement, I wanted to respect the circumstances

 2     of my colleagues.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

 4             MR. THAYER:  May we go into private session for a brief moment,

 5     Mr. President?

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We turn into private session.

 7                           [Private session]

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 7488

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25                           [Open session]

Page 7489

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  We are back in open session, Your Honours.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

 3             The accused has concluded his cross-examination.  I think this is

 4     the appropriate time for the second break of today, and then the

 5     Prosecution will conduct the examination-in-chief [sic].

 6             We adjourn and resume at 1.00.

 7                           --- Recess taken at 12.29 p.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 1.01 p.m.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Thayer, your re-examination.

10             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President, and I will finish, one way

11     or the other, with my re-examination today.

12             May we have P1148, please.

13                           Re-examination by Mr. Thayer:

14        Q.   Sir, what we can see here is a copy of your statement in

15     connection with the Assen debriefing.  Do you recall that?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   And I apologise, I don't mean to be rude, but good afternoon to

18     you.

19             MR. THAYER:  May we go to page 10, please.  I want to pick up

20     pretty much where General Tolimir left off before the break.  We can see

21     here the portion in the middle of the page where General Tolimir read

22     from, this redacted portion.

23             May we go into private session, Mr. President.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We turn into private session.

25                           [Private session]

Page 7490











11 Page 7490 redacted. Private session.















Page 7491

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13                           [Open session]

14             THE REGISTRAR:  We are back in open session, Your Honours.

15             MR. THAYER:  And, Mr. President, what I propose to do, and we'll

16     need to work this out, I think, after Colonel Egbers' departure, is to

17     tender to the Trial Chamber the complete unredacted version just so the

18     Trial Chamber has available to it those portions that lie beneath the

19     redaction.  It wasn't an issue that we had to deal with before, but

20     General Tolimir raised it at the very end of his cross-examination, so

21     I think it's only fair to make that available to Your Honours so you can

22     have the benefit of the full document.  We, of course, don't have a

23     proposed P number, it's not up-loaded, but the Defence has had it for

24     weeks now, and I think it would be helpful for the Trial Chamber.  So I

25     just wanted to alert you to that.  We will be tendering this document in

Page 7492

 1     its entirety.  I don't think it needs to be under seal, given what

 2     Colonel Egbers has said, and we certainly will not be making reference to

 3     it for our purposes, but it will be, hopefully, available in e-court.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We're looking forward to that.

 5             MR. THAYER:

 6        Q.   Now, Colonel, General Tolimir today asked you some questions

 7     about what your expectation was of how the Muslims would defend

 8     themselves, and you referred to the weapons that were in the weapons

 9     collection point, and it was the perception that the Muslims would defend

10     themselves with those weapons.

11             May we have D84, and I'll put my related questions to you.

12     Again, that's D00084.

13             Okay.  Colonel, just take a moment.  It's a short document.  It's

14     dated 9 June 1995.  This was shown by the Defence to a prior witness, and

15     it's marked for identification, not yet admitted.  It is from the Chief

16     of Staff of the 28th Division, Mr. Ramiz Becirovic, and we can see here

17     that he states:

18             "We have not yet taken the weapons surrendered to UNPROFOR during

19     demilitarisation or distributed them to the units.  We have reached an

20     agreement with the UNPROFOR command that if the aggressor carries out an

21     infantry attack on the safe area, the depot in which UNPROFOR is guarding

22     our weapons will be promptly opened and the weapons placed at our

23     disposal.  After this agreement, we sent our boys to the weapons depot.

24     They cleaned the weapons, separated out the guns in good working order

25     and reassembled the weapons that were not in working order but which

Page 7493

 1     could be combined with other weapons.  We have thus carried out

 2     preparations to take over the weapons if it proves necessary to do so."

 3             Sir, having seen this document, can you tell the Trial Chamber

 4     how this comports or doesn't comport with your perception, your

 5     understanding of the Muslims' intentions that General Tolimir asked you

 6     about earlier?

 7        A.   What I can say about that is that in the weapon collection

 8     points, there were weapons, not many.  There was not enough, by any

 9     means, to prevent any attack.  The weapons that were there were

10     maintained, but we knew that it simply wasn't enough to fight back

11     against an attack or to wage war with.

12        Q.   Okay.  And when you say "maintained," Colonel, are you referring

13     to what's noted here, cleaning weapons, putting them in working order and

14     reassembling, or are you referring to some other kind of maintenance?

15        A.   The first thing you said; cleaning, keeping them ready for use.

16             MR. THAYER:  Okay.

17             Mr. President, the Prosecution would tender Defence Exhibit 84 at

18     this time.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  In my understanding, this is an exhibit already.

20             MR. THAYER:  It's only MFI'd at present, Mr. President.  It was

21     used with a prior witness who I think the Trial Chamber thought didn't

22     have enough connection to the document or enough to say about it.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

24             Mr. Gajic.

25             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, just for the

Page 7494

 1     transcript, this document was used with Witness Cornelis Nicolai.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 3             Carry on, Mr. Thayer, please.

 4             MR. THAYER:  And, Mr. President, as we've seen already, both

 5     sides are making use of a common fund of documents as exhibits, as it

 6     were.  So you may see, as you've already seen, the Defence using

 7     Prosecution exhibits, and vice versa.

 8        Q.   Now, sir, I want to turn your attention to the blocking position

 9     which you took up.  Again, that was code-named Bravo 1 or B1; is that

10     correct?

11        A.   That is correct.

12        Q.   Do you know how many other blocking positions were deployed at

13     about the same time you were?

14        A.   It's not quite clear to me.  Certainly, at least four.

15        Q.   And can you recall approximately where those other positions were

16     located in the enclave?  We don't need elevations or anything like that,

17     but can you recall approximately where they were?

18        A.   The positions were approximately at the same -- on the same

19     horizontal map line as Blocking 1.

20        Q.   Okay.  And General Tolimir asked you, during his

21     cross-examination, a lot of questions about the various positions which

22     you and the other peacekeepers took up.  You suggested it would be

23     helpful to be shown a map on a number of occasions, so I'd like to do

24     that now, give you that opportunity.

25             MR. THAYER:  May we see P1160, please.

Page 7495

 1        Q.   Sir, can you make out what's before you?  If you need a moment to

 2     orient yourself, please do.  And when you're ready, let us know.

 3        A.   I'm ready.

 4        Q.   Okay.  This is a cut-out of a map of the Srebrenica area which

 5     you marked during your Popovic testimony, and we can see, pretty much

 6     right smack in the middle, you've written "B1" and circled an area.  What

 7     does that area depict, sir?

 8        A.   In that sharp curve or bend on the way to Alpha, that's

 9     Position 1, that's Blocking Position 1.

10        Q.   Okay.  You referred to OP Alpha.  Do you see on this map any

11     location which is in the vicinity of OP Alpha?  And if you do, I'm going

12     to ask you to mark this exhibit again with some additional notations.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Should it be blown up a bit so that it is better

14     legible?

15             MR. THAYER:  We can try.  We may lose some of the resolution.

16        Q.   But can you read it okay or do you need it to be blown up,

17     Colonel Egbers?

18        A.   Slatina, the village, was near the observation point.  I can show

19     you that.

20        Q.   Okay, sir.  If you would, circle Slatina.

21        A.   [Marks]

22        Q.   And if you would --

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It would be helpful to have another colour,

24     perhaps.  In blue, it would be more distinct from the other marking.

25             THE WITNESS: [Marks]

Page 7496

 1             MR. THAYER:

 2        Q.   And if you would just mark -- can you write "OP A" next to that

 3     location?

 4        A.   I can't show you the exact position, unfortunately.  I'd need a

 5     better map for that.  But it was approximately there [marks].

 6        Q.   Okay.  Now, in your testimony, you described your position at

 7     Bravo 1 as being in the area of two 180-degree turns.  Can you see those

 8     two 180-degree turns or describe approximately where they are located?

 9     And, again, I don't think we can blow it up at this point, since you've

10     marked it, but if you can see approximately where it is and perhaps just

11     draw an arrow indicating where those two 180-degree turns are located.

12        A.   [Marks]

13        Q.   Okay.  And I just note, for the record, you've drawn a small

14     arrow right below your prior notation of "B1."

15             Now, here's where it's going to get a little tricky.  Can you

16     mark the approximate location of the other blocking positions on this

17     map?

18        A.   I don't know it exactly, but they were to the east of me, so

19     approximately on this side [marks].  But I'd need to look it up.

20        Q.   Okay.  And you've drawn three small circles to the left of your

21     arrow underneath "B1."

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  To the right of --

23             MR. THAYER:  That's right, I beg your pardon.  Thank you,

24     Mr. President.  To the right of your prior marking of "B1."

25        Q.   Now, you referred on a number of occasions to a line which the UN

Page 7497

 1     was drawing, which could not be crossed by the Bosnian Serb troops.  And

 2     where was that line to be found, if you can explain it using this or if

 3     it helps to draw approximately where that line would be?

 4        A.   Of course, it's a virtual line.  From Blocking Position 1

 5     [marks], that was the imaginary line that you're talking about.  Blocking

 6     Position 1 was part of it.

 7             MR. THAYER:  Okay.  Thank you, Colonel.

 8             I think we're done with this exhibit, so if we could save it,

 9     we'll move on.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Are you tendering it?

11             MR. THAYER:  Yes, indeed, Mr. President.  Thank you.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This marked map will be received as an exhibit.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P1336, Your Honours.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Don't I have to sign it?

15             MR. THAYER:  No, you don't, but thank you for the offer.

16        Q.   Now, on the day you were directly targeted by the VRS, which

17     you've explained led to the deployment of close air support, were there

18     any Muslim fighters in your area?

19        A.   Yes, very close, but not on the road that -- or the route that I

20     then took to get into safety.

21        Q.   And, again, when you say "very close," can you give the

22     Trial Chamber some figure to indicate?

23        A.   Approximately 50 or 60 metres.  It's difficult to say now, but

24     not more than that.

25        Q.   Now, General Tolimir asked you, and this was at transcript

Page 7498

 1     page 7165, and I quote:

 2             "How did you make the Serbs know that there was, indeed, a

 3     hypothetical line there?"

 4             And your answer was:

 5             "That must have been agreed at your level between UNPROFOR and

 6     the Bosnian Serb Army, not at my level on the ground as a lieutenant."

 7             And you expanded on that again at transcript page 7167.  You said

 8     that:

 9             "I was told that the Bosnian Serb Army was informed that the

10     hypothetical line could not be crossed, and that if that happened,

11     aeroplanes would be used to neutralise the armoured vehicles of the

12     Bosnian Serbs."

13             Now, General Tolimir asked you a couple of questions related to

14     this issue as to whether or not the VRS had been informed about this

15     line, and the consequences thereof.  I want to show you a couple of

16     exhibits in this regard.

17             The first one is P683, please.

18             Colonel, what we have here are -- or is a report of a telephone

19     conversation.  This was drafted by General Nicolai's military assistant,

20     and it records a telephone conversation that General Nicolai had with

21     General Tolimir on the 9th of July at approximately 1930 hours.  We only

22     have about 20 minutes left, so I'm just going to move to a couple of the

23     more salient points.

24             If we look at the large paragraph in the middle of the document,

25     we can see that:

Page 7499

 1             "General Nicolai once again reiterated that the BSA had

 2     penetrated into the DMZ to a distance of at least four kilometres, which

 3     constituted an immediate threat to the safe area of Srebrenica."

 4             Now, first of all, does this statement by General Nicolai

 5     accurately reflect what you were observing on the ground at this time?

 6        A.   That's correct, it's true.

 7        Q.   Now, further on into this paragraph, we see that:

 8             "General Nicolai insisted on immediate cease of this offensive

 9     and the BSA withdrawal to a distance of at least four kilometres within a

10     few hours.  The agreement witnessed by the then commander,

11     Lieutenant General Morillon, had to be respected.  This strong warning,

12     supported by the force commander, General Janvier, and Mr. Akashi, would

13     be confirmed in writing."

14             Now, I'll skip the other portions I was going to go over, in the

15     interests of time.  There's a reference here to a strong warning that was

16     to be issued, and I want to show you a related document and then put my

17     question to you.

18             MR. THAYER:  If we could see P684, please.

19             What we have here is a fax -- I'm not sure if we're --

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think the interpreters are on the wrong channel

21     at the moment.  Please repeat your question.

22             MR. THAYER:

23        Q.   What we have here is a fax cover sheet from the office of

24     General Rupert Smith, the UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

25     It's dated 9 July, as we can see in the upper left corner here of the

Page 7500

 1     heading box, and the time is 2220 hours of 9 July.  And the subject is:

 2     "Warning to the Bosnian Serbs."  And if we look down in the message line,

 3     we can see that General Smith's office is indicating that:

 4             "We have sent it as a CapSat to General Mladic, and we will issue

 5     it as a press statement."

 6             MR. THAYER:  Now, if we can go to the next page --

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, it's a small point, but the time,

 8     2220 hours -- oh, no, yes, I see it.  Thank you for this indication.

 9             MR. THAYER:  And if we go to the next page in both versions, we

10     can, in fact, here see a written warning to the Bosnian Serbs' attacks

11     against the Srebrenica safe area.  The first paragraph summarises some of

12     the events, the civilian deaths caused by the VRS attack, peacekeepers

13     being taken captive, but I want to focus your attention on the last

14     paragraph, the bottom paragraph, where it says:

15             "The Dutch Battalion has been ordered to establish a blocking

16     position to the south of the town.  The Special Representative of the

17     Secretary-General and the force commander have decided that if this

18     blocking position is attacked by BSA forces, NATO close air support will

19     be employed.  The BSA is reminded of the grave consequences of ignoring

20     this warning."

21        Q.   My question to you, sir, is:  Having seen these two documents,

22     how does that comport or not comport with your knowledge and your

23     understanding of these events at the time as to what was happening above

24     your level?

25        A.   This is fully in line with what I have stated earlier.  This

Page 7501

 1     familiar to me or it appears -- seems familiar to me.

 2             MR. THAYER:  Now, may we have P293, please.  And this should not

 3     be broadcast, Mr. President, please.

 4        Q.   I just want to quickly show you this document, Colonel, and then

 5     tie this in to the next exhibit and put my question to you.

 6             What we have here is a report of an intercepted radio-telephone

 7     conversation on the 9th of July at 2310 hours, less than an hour after

 8     the written warning that we just saw a moment ago was issued, between the

 9     force commander, the FC, General Janvier, and General Tolimir.  We can

10     only -- or the intercept operators could only hear General Tolimir's

11     side.

12             But if we go down to about the middle of the document, we can see

13     General Tolimir indicating:

14             "I got the message from the General's courier."

15             Do you see that, Colonel?

16             MR. THAYER:  And if we could go to P685 now quickly, please.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The answer of the witness to your last question

18     was not recorded.

19             "Do you see that, Colonel?"  And there's no answer.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

21             MR. THAYER:  We have here --

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  One moment, Mr. Thayer.

23             Mr. Tolimir.

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Your microphone is off.

Page 7502

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 2             The witness answered by saying that he thought that he had seen

 3     the document.  Can he tell us when it was that he saw it and whether this

 4     document contains a single word of what Mr. Janvier and Mr. Nicolai

 5     stated?  And can he also tell us if the Serb side agreed with what they

 6     were told or did they suggest something else?  Thank you.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, at the moment the Prosecution is

 8     re-examining the witness, not you.  We will see if Mr. Thayer will figure

 9     out these parts of your question.

10             Mr. Thayer.

11             MR. THAYER:  Well, Mr. President, I think General Tolimir is

12     confused.  The witness did not say that he was familiar with this

13     intercept.  I think he indicated that he was familiar, in some fashion,

14     with the content of the prior two documents.  So I think all he was

15     saying was that he does see the intercept before him, which Your Honour

16     had his answer recorded on the record with a yes.  So I think

17     General Tolimir is speaking at cross-purposes here.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

20             I am not confused or puzzled by anything.  I think it would be

21     proper to ask the witness when he saw the document.  Was it because

22     Mr. Thayer showed it to him, or was it out in the field, was it during

23     the operation?  Because he said that he gave an answer that wasn't a

24     definite one as to whether he had seen the document or not.  And then

25     they could continue their discussion.

Page 7503

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We have the answer of the witness on the record,

 2     as he gave it, and Mr. Thayer should continue asking questions.

 3             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 4        Q.   What we have before us is another report of a telephone

 5     conversation between General Nicolai and a representative at the

 6     Main Staff of the VRS.  And we can see that General Nicolai informed the

 7     switchboard operator that he had called for close air support because of

 8     the Serb attack on the town of Srebrenica:

 9             "General Nicolai said he would phone if it was not too late."

10             And this is dated 10 July at 1920 hours.

11             Again, sir, my question is:  How does this document and the prior

12     document, which suggests that General Tolimir received the written

13     warning, comport with your understanding, from your position on the

14     ground, as to what was going on at the higher levels?

15        A.   It comports completely.  And I can make the remark immediately

16     that I have not ever seen these documents before.

17        Q.   Now, General Tolimir asked you, and this is at transcript

18     page 7170 last Tuesday, and I quote:

19             "If you had been issued a green order to open fire on the Army of

20     Republika Srpska, as Colonel Franken says, didn't that mean that in

21     self-defence, the Army of Republika Srpska would return fire, would also

22     open fire at you?"

23             Do you remember that question, sir?

24        A.   Yes.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

Page 7504

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 2             Mr. Thayer is asking the witness if he is aware if I received a

 3     written document about what he said, that Nicolai sent this on the

 4     10th of July at 1226, where it is said that air support will be approved

 5     because the Serbs attacked Srebrenica.  It doesn't say "because the Serbs

 6     attacked UNPROFOR," because the assertion is made here that the Serbs

 7     attacked UNPROFOR.  So I would like a clear distinction to be made here,

 8     whether I had any kind of written order, and whether UNPROFOR can issue

 9     any orders to me, and whether I accepted that information.  Thank you.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

11             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, if I may move on in the five minutes

12     I have left.  I've already cut my re-examination to fit the time that we

13     have left.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Carry on, please.

15             MR. THAYER:  Thank you.

16        Q.   Now, in his hypothetical, as we just heard, General Tolimir

17     characterised the VRS firing at UNPROFOR as self-defence.  And I don't

18     want to discuss the hypothetical.  I want to discuss what you experienced

19     and observed in the reality of those days, what was unfolding in front of

20     you around you and what was being reported to you --

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, we have a problem with the transcript

22     in e-court at the moment.  There must be a technical problem in the whole

23     courtroom, but we can follow in LiveNote.  Sorry for interrupting you.

24             MR. THAYER:  Not at all.  Thank you.

25        Q.   In the days of the VRS attack, prior to the green order being

Page 7505

 1     issued on 9 July, had the UN peacekeepers fired on the VRS?

 2        A.   No.

 3        Q.   And on the flip side, what had the VRS been firing at, in those

 4     days from 6 July, the beginning of the attack, until 9 July, when the

 5     green order was issued?

 6        A.   The VRS was firing at the south of the enclave observation posts,

 7     and the temporary observation post which was set up, and in the area of

 8     our troops in the south of the enclave.  So tanks were firing at

 9     observation posts.

10        Q.   And you've already testified about the VRS shelling of Srebrenica

11     town.  Based on your experience and observation during this period, and

12     what was being reported, did the VRS appear to you to be acting in

13     self-defence in any fashion?

14        A.   Absolutely not.

15        Q.   You were ordered to go back up to Bravo 1, despite your position

16     having come under VRS fire previously, which caused injuries to your men

17     as well as some of the Muslim fighters who were 50 to 60 metres away.

18     General Tolimir suggested that it was a foolish thing for you to do, to

19     go back up to Bravo 1.  Before going back up to that position, sir, did

20     the men under your command want to go up?

21        A.   No.  They had just been shot at.  We only just got through this,

22     we were happy to be alive, and, nevertheless, we had to go.

23        Q.   And, indeed, you've already testified that when you did resume

24     your position at Bravo 1, that you came under VRS fire again, and that

25     that fire pursued you and your vehicles as you fled the position for

Page 7506

 1     safety; is that correct?

 2        A.   That's correct, that's correct.

 3        Q.   Sir, based on the pattern and accuracy of the firing that was

 4     targeting you, what would have happened had you and your fellow

 5     peacekeepers stayed at Bravo 1 on 11 July, the day that the close air

 6     support was called in?

 7        A.   I think there would have been many deaths among the UNPROFOR

 8     soldiers.

 9             MR. THAYER:  With the Court's indulgence, I just have a couple of

10     more questions.  It won't exceed, I think, about three minutes.  If I

11     could just put these to clarify a couple of issues.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Go ahead, please.

13             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

14        Q.   Sir, you described a cloth that you placed on top of your APC for

15     the close air support planes to observe.  What colour was that cloth?

16        A.   Fluorescent yellow and orange.

17        Q.   Okay.  So when General Tolimir refers to a white flag on your

18     APC, there was no such thing; is that correct?

19        A.   That's correct.  It is a cloth which the F-16 pilot can see

20     easily so they know where we are and where the hypothetical line,

21     therefore, is.

22        Q.   At any time when you were on Bravo 1, did you or the peacekeepers

23     you were with fire at any VRS positions, sir?

24        A.   No, no.

25        Q.   And at any time while you were at Bravo 1, did any of the Muslim

Page 7507

 1     fighters that were, as you said, positioned 50 to 60 metres from you fire

 2     at any of the VRS positions?

 3        A.   No.

 4        Q.   My last question for you, sir, is:  General Tolimir read a

 5     portion of your NIOD interview transcript regarding when one of the buses

 6     broke down during the first convoy, removing the Muslim population from

 7     Srebrenica, and he quoted a portion of the interview regarding the

 8     reaction of some of the Muslim and Serb people who had perhaps formerly

 9     lived together and were still friendly.  Do you remember that?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   And I'll just cite for the record, in case anybody wants to check

12     later on, and this is in P1143, for the record, at paragraph 60.  You

13     state that:

14             "The reaction in Bratunac was rather hostile.  Bosnian Serbs

15     stood by the side of the road and jeered, as it were, at all the people

16     who came along."

17             Is that an accurate statement, sir?

18        A.   That's correct.

19        Q.   What else did those Bosnian Serb people do that was hostile?

20        A.   It was like a scene from the film "Schindler's List," which we

21     had seen just before.  The buses were going through a large street.  All

22     people were there and were screaming and shouting at the buses.  They

23     were very hostile and they were throwing things.  And then as well as

24     that, they were having a party.

25             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Colonel.

Page 7508

 1             That concludes my re-examination.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 4             Am I permitted to ask or would you care to ask the witness one

 5     question which was featured in the cross-examination, but there was no

 6     direct answer?  But the witness was asked this question.  It was asked in

 7     the context of the green order.  Thank you.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, Mr. Thayer has finished his

 9     cross-examination [sic].  There's no reason to put additional questions,

10     and the Chamber has no questions for the witness.

11             Therefore, Mr. Egbers, the Chamber would like to thank you for

12     your attendance here, that you were able to come to The Hague, to the

13     Tribunal, again and to provide us with your knowledge.

14             Thank you very much, again, and now you are free to return to

15     your ordinary activities.  Thank you very much again.

16                           [The witness withdrew]

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  At this point in time, I would like to thank the

18     Dutch interpreters for their attendance.

19             And we have to adjourn now.  We resume tomorrow morning at 9.00

20     in this courtroom.

21                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m.,

22                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 10th day of

23                           November, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.