Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 8615

 1                           Thursday, 9 December 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning to everybody in the courtroom.  As

 6     you can see, we are only two judges.  During the first session of today,

 7     because Judge Nyambe can't be with us.  She has a serious emergency

 8     problem in her apartment that has to be resolved now.  The Chamber

 9     decided to sit pursuant to Rule 15 bis during the first session today.

10             Before the witness is being brought in, the Chamber would like to

11     deliver an oral decision regarding the accused's motion for adjournment

12     to study Mladic materials.

13             On Monday -- just a moment, I need the transcript.  Now it's

14     back.  On Monday, the 6th of December, the accused made an oral motion

15     that the trial be adjourned for approximately six weeks in order for him

16     to study the Mladic notebooks and related materials which were recently

17     added to the 65 ter exhibit list and subsequently admitted through the

18     witness Tomasz Blaszczyk.  In support of his request, the accused notes

19     that other Chambers have granted other accused one to three months'

20     adjournment to review these materials.

21             On the same day, the Prosecution responded by noting that the

22     accused should be able to use the three weeks of the upcoming winter

23     recess as part of the requested six weeks, and that the trial could then

24     resume with the cross-examination of Witness Blaszczyk in late January.

25             As a preliminary matter, the Chamber notes that the 29 documents

Page 8616

 1     at issue are listed in Appendix A of the Prosecution's 20 November 2010

 2     motion to amend the 65 ter exhibit list and consist of the following:

 3             19 notebooks purported to be authored by Ratko Mladic, which were

 4     seized in February of this year, then transferred to the OTP in March,

 5     and disclosed to the accused in April;

 6             7 documents allegedly corroborating various entries in the

 7     notebooks;

 8             2 demonstrative exhibits;

 9             1 document that addresses the seizure of the notebooks by the

10     Serbian MUP.

11             The Chamber notes that while the notebooks were disclosed to the

12     accused in good time, this disclosure took place after the start of the

13     trial.  Furthermore, the motion to add the diaries to the 65 ter list was

14     filed only very recently.

15             In sum, the accused received this arguably important material

16     when he was actively engaged in trial preparation and was only very

17     recently put on notice that the OTP would tender the documents through

18     Witness Blaszczyk.

19             Therefore, the Chamber considers that the accused's request for

20     an adjournment of the proceedings to study these materials is reasonable.

21             The Chamber now turns to the length of adjournment.  In this

22     regard, the Chamber notes that, although the notebooks at issue comprise

23     a substantial amount of material, the vast majority of the notebook pages

24     amount to only half a page or less of a content, much of which is simple

25     bulleted lists of other brief notes.  Therefore, the Chamber considers

Page 8617

 1     that a review of the notebooks should take considerably less time than

 2     the six weeks proposed by the accused.  Furthermore, while this Chamber

 3     is not bound by the decisions of other Chambers, it is important to note

 4     that adjournments in other trials have taken place for reasons other than

 5     allowing additional time to review the materials at issue here.

 6             With regard to the length of the adjournment to be granted, the

 7     Chamber does not agree with the Prosecution's suggestion that the winter

 8     recess period be used for this purpose.  Like the Prosecution, the

 9     accused and his legal team are entitled to use the recess as non-working

10     time should they so decide.

11             For the reasons stated above, pursuant to Rule 54, the Chamber

12     considers that it is in the interests of justice for the trial to be

13     adjourned for a period of three weeks after the winter recess to give the

14     accused an opportunity to thoroughly study the documents listed

15     previously.  This means that the trial will adjourn for the winter recess

16     at the scheduled time and reconvene on Monday, the 31st of January 2011.

17             This concludes the Chamber's oral decision on the matter.

18             Now, the witness shall be brought in, please.

19                           [The witness entered court]

20                           WITNESS:  MIRKO TRIVIC [Resumed]

21                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning, sir.  Please sit down.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.  Thank you.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I would like to remind you that the affirmation

25     to tell the truth you made at the beginning of your testimony still

Page 8618

 1     applies.

 2             And Mr. Thayer now is continuing his cross-examination -- his

 3     examination-in-chief.  Sorry.

 4             Mr. Thayer, are you able to indicate how much time you need?

 5             MR. THAYER:  Good morning, Mr. President.  I think about 20

 6     minutes to half an hour, max.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Okay.  Please continue.

 8             MR. THAYER:  Thank you.

 9                           Examination by Mr. Thayer: [Continued]

10        Q.   Good morning again, Colonel.

11        A.   Good morning.

12        Q.   I think we need to give you a copy of your diary again, please,

13     with the assistance of our friends.

14             MR. THAYER:  Your Honours, we will be spending probably about 20

15     minutes going through the hard copies of the diaries that we distributed

16     yesterday, and in the meantime, if we can get 65 ter 7108 on e-court,

17     please.  Now, if we could advance five more pages, or maybe six pages, to

18     0648-6777 is the ERN number that we are looking for, please.

19        Q.   Colonel, have you found that page in your hard copy there?  There

20     will be --

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   -- an eight-digit number, ending with 6777, in the upper

23     right-hand corner.  Do you have that page, sir?  And it's also displayed

24     at the moment on the computer.  Do you see that, sir?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 8619

 1        Q.   Okay.  This is a continuation of the notes you took at the

 2     commander's reconnaissance on 5 July.  This is just, as we have been

 3     referring to it, the flip side of the page 2 that you had marked and had

 4     spoken about yesterday.  If you would care to confirm that that's the

 5     case.

 6        A.   This was entered at the command post in Bratunac, the command

 7     post of the Drina Corps in Bratunac, at 1800 hours on the 5th of July.

 8        Q.   And that was a meeting that was held in -- as you said, at the

 9     command of the Bratunac Brigade, led by General Krstic, present were the

10     other brigade commanders, after which you went to that observation at

11     Pribicevac; is that correct?

12        A.   No.  At the Pribicevac observation post, we were there before,

13     before 6.00, and after having worked at Pribicevac, we received our

14     orders in the evening and a few of these bullet points that we recorded.

15     The orders were to carry out reconnaissance, to deploy units.  That's the

16     sequence that I noted.  And one of the remarks was that we should

17     organise coordination to secure the lines reached, that we could expect

18     the activity of the air force, that we had to mask our movements, the

19     positions and our vehicles, and a few other activities down to the issue

20     of the evacuation.  That was the issue that we had to deal with on our

21     own in our units.  We were supposed to have our own reserves during the

22     operation.

23        Q.   Okay.  First let me just pick up on something you just said and I

24     want to try to orient ourselves as to when exactly these particular notes

25     were taken.  You just referred to an evacuation.  What are you referring

Page 8620

 1     to when you say "evacuation"?

 2        A.   Well, you see, to be very precise and up to the point, one of the

 3     issues that I as a commander was warned by General Krstic was to envisage

 4     and decide what the direction of the evacuation of the wounded would be.

 5     This is determined for every unit, what would be the route of evacuation

 6     in order to avoid mixing of units and crowds on the roads, and so on and

 7     so forth.

 8        Q.   Okay.  Now, just to be clear about the sequence of events that we

 9     are talking about, before you went to the observation point in the area

10     of Pribicevac, was there a meeting of the commanders involved in this

11     operation at the Bratunac Brigade command?

12        A.   No.  There was no meeting.  The sequence was as follows:

13     I inspected my units on the 5th of July, and on page 1 I entered what you

14     can see, the Zeleni Jadar sector, I checked the numerical strength with

15     my officers.  I noted some questions that I was going to pose to the

16     operation commander, and that was the end of my work at Zeleni Jadar.

17     And then we had the so-called reconnaissance at the Pribicevac operation

18     -- observation post.  We looked at the area where combat activities would

19     take place, we looked at the axis, and at 1800 hours on that same day,

20     after our work at the Pribicevac observation point, we held that meeting

21     at the IKM at the command of the Bratunac Brigade, and that's where we

22     made a note of all the tasks that lie ahead.

23        Q.   Okay.  I just wanted to clarify:  You were at the Bratunac

24     Brigade command on only one occasion that day; is that correct?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 8621

 1        Q.   Okay.  Now, there is a reference on the page in front of us to,

 2     "At 0200 hours, a sabotage detachment of the VRS Main Staff will carry

 3     out an operation in the Jabucno sector."  Can you tell us what the source

 4     of this information was and what you know about this notation.  What can

 5     you tell us about it?

 6        A.   Personally, I can't say anything else, but that's the information

 7     that we heard from the operations commander.  He said that the operation

 8     would be launched in the Jabucno sector, and the time was set for

 9     artillery attack, and that was supposed to take place at 4.00 in the

10     morning.

11        Q.   And can you tell us where the Jabucno sector is?

12        A.   No.  It was not on my axis, and I really can't tell you where

13     that was, under whose command that area was.

14        Q.   Okay.  Let's go forward a few pages to 0648-6797.  Actually, if

15     we can go to page 25 in e-court, please.  It will be the prior page so we

16     can see the date, time and page.  Colonel, we are going to be looking at

17     the page with the eight-digit number of 0648-6796 first.  And I see -- I

18     don't know if anybody else is having this problem, but we don't have the

19     English translation on e-court.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, as you can see, the technician is

21     working very hard on it.  It's a technical problem to get the pages on

22     the screen.  But we have all hard copies.

23             MR. THAYER:  We can work with the hard copies, Mr. President,

24     that's no problem.

25        Q.   Sir, do you see a date and a time that you've entered for the

Page 8622

 1     beginning of another day?

 2        A.   Yes.  6796, that's the page number.

 3        Q.   And what is the date and time that you've entered here?

 4        A.   0900 hours on the 12th of July, 1995.

 5        Q.   Okay.  And just, again for the record, you've entered in red ink

 6     a page number when you placed the pages in the correct chronological

 7     order.  What page number have you written here?

 8        A.   The day before, we agreed on the numeration of pages, how pages

 9     would be enumerated, and this is page number 12.

10        Q.   Okay.  And just to move things along, is it fair to say that the

11     notes that you've written here, following this date and time of 0900

12     hours on 12 July reflect a meeting or a briefing that was held at that

13     time in the area of Bojna at the TV repeater led by, I think it was

14     Lieutenant Colonel Vicic?  I can't remember his exact rank off the top of

15     my head, but Vicic was the operations officer who was providing the

16     information; is that correct?

17        A.   Yes.  He was a colonel.  That's how I recorded it also.  And the

18     entry was made according to what Colonel Vicic told us.  For my units and

19     for my left and right-hand side neighbours, or in other words, the units

20     that were engaged on my flanks.  And they were to continue the attack on

21     their own axis.

22        Q.   Okay.  If we could turn the page -- we can see you've taken a

23     series of notes about the events of the day; is that correct?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   And can you just tell the Trial Chamber, approximately when would

Page 8623

 1     you make these entries in your diary during the course of these days?

 2     Would you do it during the events, later in the day of the events, or

 3     days later?

 4        A.   I believe that I've already told you or, rather, in my previous

 5     testimonies I said, when we spoke about that, I said that all my

 6     annotations were entered no later than the 13th.  That's when I recorded

 7     all the tasks that I had issued to my officers and my units, for

 8     departure from the area towards the Zepa sector.

 9        Q.   Okay.  I don't want to get hung up on a particular date.  That's

10     not my question, Colonel.  My question was just simply when you were

11     making your entries in this diary, can you tell us typically when you

12     would make the entries in it?  That's all I'm asking, without focusing on

13     a particular day.

14        A.   Thank you for your question.  When it comes to page 12, what was

15     entered below the date and below the time when that was entered, I did it

16     while the meeting was going on.  Otherwise, I would have flipped the

17     page.  And typically, I would do it in the evening, before I went to bed.

18     I just looked back at what had happened before my bedtime.

19        Q.   Now, if we look at 0648-6797, we see a reference to, "We left in

20     columns along the road at around 1850 hours to the slopes of Jahorina,"

21     and that refers to your search activity that you were assigned; is that

22     correct?

23        A.   Yes.  The units took off and it was almost at the end of the

24     task.  We were in columns, we were moving along the road around 1800

25     hours.  Your copy may not be legible, maybe you don't see this little

Page 8624

 1     circle, but it was around 1800 hours when we came to the northeastern

 2     slope of Jahorina, and that was the feature that I was supposed to take

 3     during the day, according to my orders.

 4        Q.   Okay.  And can you read the next entry that you've written,

 5     please, for us.  Just read it out loud.

 6        A.   "We come across a column of refugees dead [as interpreted], of

 7     refugees - but only one grandfather, the rest fled to the woods."

 8        Q.   I'm sorry, if you could just reread that entry again.  There was

 9     I think an oddity in the translation or the transcript, I'm not sure

10     which.  But if you could just read it again into the record for us,

11     please, so we can get it 100 per cent correct.

12        A.   "We came across a column of refugees - but only one grandfather

13     or old man was left there, the rest fled to the woods."

14        Q.   And the word that you've used for "refugees" here, sir, what is

15     that in your language?

16        A.   See here, I didn't really say "refugees."  I used the word

17     "Zbjeg" in the Serbian, which is used to refer to the area, to the sector

18     where people were, so I used this word "Zbjeg" to indicate the area where

19     a number of people have sought shelter, and the conclusion that it was

20     indeed "Zbjeg" was made on the basis of the fact that these people used

21     remnants of some of the equipment that they found, say tents, nylon bags,

22     and whatever they could find as though they collected the picnic -- as

23     though they collected all those things after a picnic where somebody left

24     them, irresponsibly.  So this is what we came across, and my soldiers

25     came down to Vrteca [phoen] and they came across an old man who couldn't

Page 8625

 1     follow them, and they carried him to the road where I was with my

 2     platoon.

 3        Q.   So just clarify for us, how many people did you actually see at

 4     this location?

 5        A.   Just this old man.  We didn't see anybody else either on the move

 6     or to that area underneath.  This was some 100 metres from the road.  One

 7     couldn't see, or we did not observe them on the move.  I think that when

 8     they became certain that the troops of the Army of Republika Srpska were

 9     moving in that direction, they made a plan to continue on in a different

10     direction, so when my people came along, they found nobody else there

11     except for the old -- this old man, this grandfather, and nobody else was

12     there.  And this old man was of limited mobility.  He could move but with

13     great difficulty.  He was quite old, and they carried him to the road.

14        Q.   On so in this context here, where you've used this word "Zbjeg"

15     are you referring to a group of civilians or military or mixed, or can

16     you tell us what you mean here?

17        A.   See, my conclusion was that this is where people stayed, this is

18     where they had their makeshift accomodation.  One could assume that they

19     were soldiers but it was difficult to comprehend what this very old and

20     very sick man was doing with them, so this is why we used this word, a

21     column of people, "Zbjeg."  We assumed that there were also some

22     civilians there who were protected by the soldiers.  We didn't see any

23     women there.  We saw the elderly as we passed by, in Potocari and also on

24     the day when I saw them being transported on vehicles, and as for this

25     instance here, I really couldn't say.  I didn't see anybody who was armed

Page 8626

 1     or anybody who was not armed, any particularly young people.  We really

 2     didn't see anybody special except for this elderly man in this sink-hole,

 3     and we could see that people had a sort of makeshift accommodation there

 4     before we arrived.  And just to add, this statement here is a follow-up

 5     to what is written earlier, where I say that we were leaving in columns.

 6        Q.   Okay.  Now, let's briefly look at a couple of entries in your

 7     Zepa section.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I put a question to the witness before you

 9     move to another entry.

10             You were several times referring to this old man your men carried

11     to the road.  What happened to that man later?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I drove him in my vehicle to

13     Potocari.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And then?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I suppose he left your car.  Where?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As I have told you, in Potocari,

18     where they were all gathering, where it -- where they were told that the

19     residents should gather.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  Mr. Thayer, please carry on.

21             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

22        Q.   Now, as you've explained to us already, when you started the Zepa

23     portion of your notebook, you simply flipped it over and started making

24     your entries in the reverse.  So what we need to do in the hard copy is

25     flip over the hard copy notebook so that the ERN that we see is

Page 8627

 1     0648-6847, and that should be the last page in e-court of the document.

 2     And Colonel, can you just confirm for us that what you see on the screen,

 3     which bears -- if we could just scroll up on the right-hand side, please,

 4     to catch the ERN, bears the ERN 0648-6847, is the back of your notebook

 5     where you began the Zepa portion of your diary.

 6        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 7        Q.   Now, we are going to have to work backwards in e-court because

 8     this document was numbered, obviously, sequentially, so if we go back one

 9     page in e-court, and in the hard copy we just flip down the page, and if

10     we see 0648-6846.  Colonel, if I could ask you to just go to 0648-6846,

11     that's just the flip side of the back cover; is that correct?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   And I see you have just confirmed that on your original notebook,

14     just for the record; is that correct?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Okay.  Now, if we go back one more page in e-court, to 0648-6845,

17     and that's page 74 in e-court, we see an entry with a date of 18 July

18     1995.  I just want to ask you, is that page in chronological order or

19     not?

20        A.   No.  It's not in chronological order.  You can see in the

21     original, and here, that there was a problem with the first page.  Later

22     on, reference points were recorded as an additional notation, but it

23     really was not linked to the chronology of events.

24        Q.   Okay.  So if we go back one more page to 0648-6844, page 73, we

25     see an entry with a number 1 in red ink at the top of the page and a date

Page 8628

 1     of 16 July 1995, 2000 hours.  Can you explain to us what this entry

 2     shows?

 3        A.   This entry here reflects that I was at the meeting at the IKM of

 4     the Drina Corps concerning the assignments aimed at liberating Zepa.

 5     I prepared the facts on numerical strength of troops under my command.

 6        Q.   Okay.  And you've written -- or can you just tell us who wrote

 7     this page number 1 in a circle in red ink at the top of the page, and

 8     what does that represent?

 9        A.   I did.  That's the first page in recording the events concerning

10     the assignments completed by my brigade at Zepa.

11        Q.   Okay.  And is it fair to say you used the same method in this

12     Zepa portion when you numbered the pages, that you numbered just the --

13     we have referred to it, I think, as the top page of each page in red ink?

14        A.   Every page was used anew.  I did not use the flip page.  I didn't

15     put numbers on flip pages.

16        Q.   Okay.  But, in fact, you did use the flip page, you just didn't

17     number it, just so we have it clear on the transcript.

18        A.   Yes.  We confirmed as much on the previous day, concerning

19     Srebrenica and records of Srebrenica.  I used both pages, and the

20     chronology, the numeration of pages is done in red.

21        Q.   Okay.  If we could go back a couple more pages in e-court to

22     0648-6841, I want to just put a couple more questions to you about your

23     diary.  And that's page 70 in e-court.  There is a reference here, if you

24     have it in front of you, Colonel, to launching something concerning

25     aerial bombs.  Can you explain to us what this entry concerns?

Page 8629

 1        A.   This entry pertains to the task to launch from an improvised

 2     launch pad on a vehicle, launching of an aerial bomb which could not be

 3     launched in the standard way but was, rather, used to produce

 4     psychological effects in a larger area, to affect the attitude of the

 5     people, not because it had chemical effects or anything of the sort but,

 6     rather, because it was supposed to produce a large explosion.  It was

 7     supposed to be launched from a trailer.  Its popular name was sow,

 8     "krmaca" in Serbian.  That's what this aerial bomb was called but it

 9     wasn't really very accurate.

10        Q.   And, sir, wasn't it the case that it was that inaccuracy that you

11     just referred to that was part of the psychological effects that you just

12     referred to that this weapon was intended to produce?

13        A.   I don't know.  I didn't use it, and I didn't know what effects it

14     produced.  It wasn't part of the standard ammunition of fire support as

15     standard missile.  Rather, it was used via some makeshift equipment in

16     order to intimidate the other side.  Both sides used it.  These aerial

17     bombs came from the ammunition that remained in various warehouses

18     throughout Bosnia, the ammunition that hadn't been pulled out, and

19     whoever came across it would use it.  Here, they even mention the name of

20     the person who was supposed to come and do the launching.

21        Q.   Just so we are clear what we are talking about, these are bombs

22     that were fashioned from using rocket motors and so forth and attaching

23     them to a large artillery shell and launching them off of the back of

24     some kind of a truck; is that correct?

25        A.   I really don't know what charge it had, and I wouldn't want to

Page 8630

 1     speculate on that.  It was launched from a truck, not from the standard

 2     launch pad that such bombs were typically launched from.

 3        Q.   And in this case, who ordered the use of these aerial bombs?

 4        A.   It says here only that he should report to Rogatica at 800 hours,

 5     this was written by General Krstic, and that the firing should be

 6     completed by 9.  Whether it was done or not, I don't know.  This person

 7     was supposed to report by 800 hours to Rogatica.  To whom really I don't

 8     know, probably to the command post of the brigade at Rogatica.  It says

 9     here by 0900 hours firing, which means that somebody was supposed to show

10     up within that hour with a powerful explosion.  I suppose this refers to

11     the firing, to the launching, of this aerial bomb.  It was supposed to be

12     completed within a certain period of time, because the launching of this

13     missile was dangerous, both for the firing party and to the opposite

14     side, because occasionally, when firing such missiles, there were

15     accidents, and this is why this was supposed to be done by 0900 hours,

16     because after that, there would be troops on the movement and it would be

17     dangerous to launch it.

18        Q.   And this individual, Mitar Komlenovic, do you know from which

19     unit or which level of command he came?

20        A.   He was from my unit but he wasn't there with me.  He was an

21     engineer.  Most likely he did some work on that launch pad.  He was in

22     the logistics organ and this is why I recorded here that Mitar Komlenovic

23     was to come to Gusinac on the following day and report by 800 hours.

24     It's not that he was supposed to come with the missile, it's just that he

25     was supposed to come.  I assume that this aerial bomb was already in

Page 8631

 1     Rogatica, and Mitar was an engineer, he was a deputy, I think in charge

 2     of the technical service in the logistics organ of the 2nd Romanija

 3     Brigade.  Prior -- or otherwise, he worked in a factory in Sokolac.

 4        Q.   Okay.  Let's move along a few more pages to 0648-6833, please.

 5     We see here that on this entry from 1100 hours on the 23rd of July --

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   -- there is a reference to a bridgehead.  Can you tell us, if you

 8     remember, what this feature or location is?

 9        A.   Are you referring to the bridgehead?

10        Q.   Indeed.

11        A.   If you have followed my previous testimony, and I suppose you did

12     since you proofed me, in carrying out the assignment in the Purtici

13     village sector, or in Borak, I wrote a couple of times that the axis of

14     the deployment of my unit was intersected by a river which was an

15     underground river in some locations, and this canyon, the canyon of that

16     river, is what I called the bridgehead, in order to orient everyone

17     better.  And it was difficult to cross that water, to cross that river,

18     because the river banks were quite rocky and on an incline, and it was

19     quite difficult for those who were attacking as the defending forces

20     could control the area very easily.  This is why I recorded the task

21     given by General Krstic indicating that the deadline was 1400 hours to

22     bring the forces to the bridgehead.  That means that my assignment was to

23     take the forces on the other bank.  The river had been dry by that point

24     so we were supposed to cross the riverbed and get the forces on the other

25     bank.

Page 8632

 1        Q.   Okay.  Now, Colonel, you and I may have talked about this several

 2     years ago when we met, but the -- this information has never been

 3     discussed in any trial, so can you tell us, as precisely as you can,

 4     where, when you refer to the bridgehead here, can you tell us as

 5     precisely as you can what that particular location is.  I understand we

 6     are talking about the area near Purtici, but was there some particular

 7     feature or location that's more -- even more specific than that that you

 8     can orient us to when you refer to the bridgehead?  If not, that's okay,

 9     but if there was some specific location that you were discussing here and

10     elsewhere in the diary when you refer to the bridgehead, that would help.

11        A.   Based on what I heard during proofing, and based on the task, the

12     difficult task, that was given to me and that I recorded here on the 23rd

13     of July 1995 at 1100 hours, and you can see that underneath, in quotation

14     marks, I wrote, "Interrogation."  I will tell you what it was about.  It

15     was difficult for me to cross the riverbed which was located under the

16     Borak feature, and that was a level area, and how should I describe it?

17     When one crosses the riverbed, it was as though one entered a football

18     pitch that was level but there were stands for 100.000 people on each

19     side of that level field.  There was a settlement near Borak, and there

20     was an elevation there, and when we managed to cross on the 23rd, we were

21     able to defeat the forces of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to push

22     them from Borak.  A soldier of mine was killed in the process.  So the

23     left side of that elevation is -- the left side of that elevation is

24     located under the Borak settlement.

25        Q.   Okay.  Colonel, just to follow up on one thing.  You said, "Based

Page 8633

 1     on what I heard during proofing ..."  That may be a translation or some

 2     other issue, but, in fact, just -- can you confirm that you and

 3     I actually haven't been able to have any proofing this time, other than

 4     just meeting briefly on Sunday to tell you what the procedure was going

 5     to be for introducing your prior testimony; is that correct?

 6        A.   Yes, that's correct.  I said "proofing" but I meant my own

 7     preparations.  I had read the original of the diary in order to refresh

 8     my memory of what I had recorded, and the images of all the events were

 9     indeed refreshed.  I'm not much of an optimist and I don't think that my

10     memory is clearer now than before, but in any case, I remembered many of

11     the important things when it comes to the chronology of the events.  My

12     memory has been jogged by the diary when I read it.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I interrupt for a short moment?  I was --

14     I would like to refer to this answer as well, page 18, line 13.  "Based

15     on what I heard during proofing," can you tell us -- now you explained

16     what you meant by that, by reading your diary, but how can I understand

17     the word "what I heard during proofing"?  Can you explain a little bit

18     further what you are referring to.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, you see, I listened to the

20     prior evidence that I had given, before I entered the courtroom here.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  When you say, "what I heard during proofing," you

22     are referring to listening to the audiotapes of the prior proceedings; is

23     that correct?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  Mr. Thayer.

Page 8634

 1             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 2        Q.   And again, the reason we weren't able to actually have a proofing

 3     session this time was because it took just too long for you to listen to

 4     that testimony; is that correct?

 5        A.   Yes, unfortunately.  Maybe it would be better if I'd spent less

 6     time here, but that's the way the cookie crumbles, I suppose.

 7        Q.   Let's -- just a couple more clarifications here about how this

 8     diary is set up.  If we can go to page 0648-6828, please.  We need to

 9     back up a little bit more.  And that's page 57 in e-court.  We can see a

10     heading you've written of "Course of operations" and then the date of 18

11     July and 19 July.  Do you see that, Colonel?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   And if we go back one more page to 6827 in e-court, and this is

14     at page 56 of e-court, we see entries of 20 July, 21 July.  And if we go

15     back one more page to 6826, you're continuing your entry for the 21st of

16     July.  And if we back up one more page to 6825, we see entries for 22

17     July and 23 July.  Can you tell us what you're doing in your diary here,

18     when you've sort of bullet-pointed these various dates, starting on the

19     18th -- with the 18th of July, under "Course of operations" and

20     continuing for all those other dates?

21        A.   Let me put it this way:  We were, on the 23rd of July at 1100

22     hours, I was given a task and I recorded the task that I'd been given on

23     page -- on the previous page, that is 6833, and then there was a halt in

24     the operations.  I did not record why, whether there was some

25     negotiations or talks or something else.

Page 8635

 1             And then on the 25th of July, I summarised what had happened

 2     before, of the work before.  I recorded the numerical strength, first of

 3     all, at various features.  Under 1, I recorded Purtici, and number 2

 4     Strmica, and under 3 the command part of my brigade, command elements of

 5     my brigade, and then guests, meaning those who were under my command.

 6             And on the 24th of July, the day before, Bratunac is recorded.

 7     I also recorded the losses that we had suffered, and this is where

 8     I recorded who was killed at the bridgehead after we had managed to cross

 9     the riverbed.  I recorded the names of those who were wounded and,

10     finally, I recorded the course of the events, the course of the

11     operation, and all that in a chronological order, starting with the 18th

12     of July, 19th of July, 20th July.  And here I can see that we started

13     discussing the surrender protocol with the enemy side on the 20th and

14     then on the 20th in the evening we started preparing to continue the

15     operations.

16             On the 21st we received an order from General Krstic to pull out

17     some of our forces, and then on the 22nd of July and the 23rd of July,

18     again, I recorded what had happened during the morning and organised war

19     group and that we worked on the breakthrough, and then around 10.30 hours

20     we ended all that and we were called from the forward command post for me

21     to report to General Krstic.

22             And then on 23rd of July, at 1100 hours, I met up with General

23     Krstic, we already discussed that, so this was just a summary of the main

24     activities that had taken place day by day.  And here I also recorded

25     the --

Page 8636

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Very sorry, I have to interrupt you.  You are

 2     talking very fast again and it is very difficult for the interpreters to

 3     catch everything you are saying.  Please slow down a bit.  And carry on.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And finally, we come to the 23rd of

 5     July, where I recorded the fact that I was interrogated.  I recorded the

 6     fact that General Krstic addressed me in a very harsh manner, in a very

 7     impertinent manner.  He doubted the accuracy of my reports and he gave me

 8     certain tasks, or a task, which I recorded here, and I wouldn't go any

 9     further into the detail of that.

10             On the 24th of July, we started our breakthrough, my unit and me.

11     And then we crossed over.

12             MR. THAYER:

13        Q.   Okay.  What I'm interested in at this point, Colonel, is can you

14     tell us when your diary entries resume in terms of stopping this recap of

15     the course of operations and actually making a contemporaneous entry in

16     your diary.  Can you find that in your diary so that, when we go back and

17     look at the diary later, we can tell from what you've told us today and

18     looking at the diary, when your diary then picks up again with a

19     contemporaneous entry of the events as opposed to this recap that you've

20     just been telling us about.  If you can just tell us what the eight-digit

21     page number is, then we can go to that very quickly.

22        A.   You're asking me to find your page number.  The recap was on the

23     25th of July.  Everything was recorded that had happened from the 18th

24     through to 25th of July.  And then on the 26th of July, I continue at

25     1900 hours.  This is where I continue recording the events as they

Page 8637

 1     happened.

 2        Q.   Okay.  And that's at ERN 0648-6821.  And if we could have that

 3     page on e-court, just so we can confirm.  That's page 50 of e-court,

 4     please.  And we see here an entry for 1900 hours, 26 July 1995.  Is that

 5     the entry you were referring to, sir, what we have here on the screen?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   Okay.

 8             Now, if we go to 0648-6808, page 37 in e-court, we see an entry

 9     for Saturday, 29 July 1995 and nothing else.  Can you explain what's

10     going on here, Colonel?

11        A.   Obviously, on the 28th of July, I recorded precisely what was

12     going on, or what had been going on on the 28th.  And I entered the date

13     of the following day, of Saturday.  That's all I did for that day.  I was

14     wounded on that day, and that's how my records stopped with regard to the

15     events at Zepa.  Actually, that's when I stopped recording anything that

16     was going on in terms of the war operations in the area.

17        Q.   Okay.  And in between the Srebrenica section and the Zepa section

18     of your notebook, there were some various personal materials that were

19     also in there.  Is that what we could expect to see if we go beyond this

20     date of the 29th, Colonel?

21        A.   I'm afraid I didn't understand your question.  Could you repeat,

22     rephrase?

23        Q.   There is a -- in your prior testimony, you referred, for example,

24     to a prayer and some lists of items that can be found in this diary.  And

25     some of these were items of a personal nature that weren't related to the

Page 8638

 1     -- either of the operations.  My only question is:  If we go beyond that

 2     last entry of the 29th of July, is that what we are going to see if we

 3     are looking in the diary beyond that date?  Just so everybody understands

 4     what else is in here.  I don't need to spend time looking at the prayer,

 5     for example, I just want to ask, is that what's in there?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   Okay.

 8        A.   There are a few more pages where I recorded some personal things.

 9     Amongst other things, a prayer that my daughter said for me while I was

10     hospitalised.

11             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, as the Trial Chamber can see, it's a

12     little bit counterintuitive how this had to be put together.  If the

13     Trial Chamber has no other questions, I just have one quick document to

14     work with Colonel Trivic with and then I am completed.  I didn't know if

15     you had any questions, given how this is set up, that you'd like to put

16     to Colonel Trivic now.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, just Judge Mindua has a question.

18             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes.  I would like to ask a

19     clarification to the witness.  Sir, you stopped writing on the 29th of

20     July 1995, and this was a Saturday, as I can see.  And you said that you

21     had been wounded.  Could you tell us in which circumstances you were

22     wounded.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was wounded in combat.  By a

24     bullet from a 5.56 rifle, from the Zlovrh elevation.  That's where the

25     communication centre of the former JNA was, and at that moment it was

Page 8639

 1     under control of the BiH army or, rather, the Muslim forces at Zepa, and

 2     in the final stages of that operation, as we were chasing the enemy

 3     during the final stages of our active combat, of our attack, I was in a

 4     combat formation with a few of my soldiers.  We hit heavy resistance; one

 5     soldier was killed, a few were wounded, and I was among them on the 29th

 6     July in the afternoon, sometime between 1700 and 1800 hours.

 7             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.  But please

 8     remind me something, sir.  You are talking about the Zlovrh elevation and

 9     you said that this was the communication centre.  Was that the

10     communication centre that was later on bombed by NATO, or are we talking

11     about a totally different elevation, near Zepa, in fact?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  That's the feature that was

13     above Zepa settlement or the Zepa valley.  During NATO activities, I was

14     still undergoing treatment, so I don't know, but I suppose that that's

15     the centre that had been built for the top command of the army of the

16     former state, so I can only assume that that was one and the same because

17     I am not aware of any other Zlovrh, and Zlovrh, as the name in our

18     language says, it was a very evil position for us.

19             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, sir.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

21             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  May we have P1230 on

22     e-court, please.

23        Q.   Colonel, just take a moment and refamiliarise yourself with this

24     document.  You were shown this during your prior testimony.  Let us know

25     when you're ready to go to the next page.

Page 8640

 1        A.   Yes.  We can go on.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We have it on the screen.  Please carry on.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well.  Yes, I've read it.

 4             MR. THAYER:  If we could go back one page in the English and stay

 5     where we are in the B/C/S, please.

 6        Q.   Sir, as we can see, this is a notification signed by General

 7     Miletic, then-Colonel Miletic, stating that they've approved the movement

 8     of an UNPROFOR convoy.  You were asked about this paragraph where he

 9     writes, "I demand a detailed check of all vehicles," et cetera,

10     et cetera.  And when you were asked about this particular paragraph in

11     the last trial - and this is at transcript page 12043 - you said that,

12     and I quote, in reference to what would have happened if the subordinate

13     units had not complied with this demand in this document, you stated:

14             "I think it's inconceivable that they wouldn't comply.  They were

15     informed what they were supposed to do, and I presume that they reported

16     back about what they did, to the Main Staff."

17             My question to you, Colonel, is:  Can you describe for the Trial

18     Chamber the importance of this concept of reporting back, reporting back

19     from a subordinate to a superior command.

20        A.   I don't see anywhere here in the document that reports -- the

21     report had to be submitted.  And your question is what a unit is

22     duty-bound to do, and I answered that in my previous testimony, that a

23     unit is supposed to report on anything that goes beyond the scopes of the

24     tasks given to it by the Main Staff.  Could you please rephrase your

25     question?  Put the question to me again.  I would like to see the first

Page 8641

 1     page, just to check the heading of this document.

 2        Q.   Okay.  And while you're doing that I'll read the questions and

 3     answers at issue in the prior trial.  I asked you --

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The prior trial was the Popovic trial and this is

 5     P1196 and -97.

 6             MR. THAYER:  Yes, thank you, Mr. President.  This is at

 7     transcript page 12043, beginning at line 15.  I asked you:

 8             "Q.  I'm asking you, if you had not followed these procedures as

 9     demanded in this paragraph, what would the consequences have been if you

10     had permitted these vehicles simply to go through?"

11             And obviously when I said "you" I didn't mean you personally,

12     I meant the recipient of this demand, the subordinate unit.

13             And you answered:

14             "A.  There is no mention here of units.  This refers to the

15     military post 7111.  This notice was addressed to it as was the demand

16     for it to adhere to proper procedures, or proper procedure, and I don't

17     know if they complied."

18             And then I followed up and I asked you:

19             "Q.  Well, what do you think would have happened if they didn't

20     comply, sir?"

21             And your answer was:

22             "A.  I think it's inconceivable that they wouldn't comply.  They

23     were informed what they were supposed to do, and I presume that they

24     reported back about what they did, to the Main Staff."

25             Okay.  So without getting hung up on this particular document, my

Page 8642

 1     question is simply:  Can you tell the Trial Chamber, in the context, for

 2     example, of this answer that you gave in the last trial, what the

 3     importance is of this concept of reporting back.

 4        A.   I will pick it up from what I said previously.  The -- this

 5     document was sent to some brigades to whom it was not intended, and you

 6     can see the list of the brigades in handwriting.  And as for the military

 7     post 1711, this was sent as an official document or, rather, information

 8     that the movement of the convoy had been approved along different axes,

 9     and so on and so forth.  And finally, on the second page, something that

10     you emphasised in your question, there is a list of requests or demands,

11     so this document is both information as well as a list of requests from

12     the military post.  One of them is a detailed control of all vehicles,

13     and so on and so forth.

14             The officer who sent this document or, rather, the Main Staff,

15     informed the unit to do that, but also it informed it that the same thing

16     had been sent to the UNPROFOR command, so any misunderstanding is avoided

17     when checks were carried out.  The military post that received that task,

18     I'm sure, and I adhere by that, if they told that something was not in

19     keeping with the procedure and goes beyond the scope of what had been

20     agreed, that unit was duty-bound to send back a report and then UNPROFOR

21     would decide how to deal with the things that went beyond the procedures

22     and how the procedure would go on in the future.

23             I must say that the brigades which are listed in handwriting

24     received that only by way of information, because we did not have

25     check-points at which vehicles would be controlled.  My unit didn't have

Page 8643

 1     a check-point.  I don't know if any other had.  So the passage of convoys

 2     was under the authority of other organs and commands, not of the brigade

 3     commands.

 4             I can just share my positions with you, and my position is that a

 5     report had to be drafted if something was not in keeping with the

 6     procedures.  We had to record the quantities of fuel and how the

 7     documents were drafted.  I suppose that the last request arises from the

 8     fact that there were some aberrations from the procedures in some

 9     previous instances.

10        Q.   Colonel, again, my question is a much simpler question, and

11     please don't get hung up on this specific document.  Just as a general

12     military matter in your experience, can you explain to the Court the

13     importance of the concept of reporting back, this term that you used in

14     your prior answer, as it applies more generally.  I'm not talking about

15     this situation that is in this document.  When a superior gives an order

16     to a subordinate, can you tell the Trial Chamber about the importance of

17     this idea which you spoke about, this term "reporting back"?  What is the

18     importance of that?  And how does that fit into the proper functioning of

19     the military?

20        A.   I believe that I have already answered that several times.  In

21     any case, my position is unchanged.  A report has to be accurate, it must

22     not be drafted in a way to please me, and there shouldn't be any doubts

23     about the credibility of a report, because otherwise, the army could not

24     function properly, especially not in combat.  Some minor details may

25     differ from the truth.  For example, if I came at quarter to 7, I can

Page 8644

 1     still say that I arrived at 7, but these are very specific tasks that had

 2     an impact on the functioning of the system.  And when it comes to the

 3     functioning of the system, accurate reporting implies or, rather, demands

 4     that the entire system relies on accuracy, credibility, timeliness.  If

 5     all those are not in place, the army cannot function and tasks cannot be

 6     coordinated properly.

 7        Q.   And was it the case that when an order was given, that order was

 8     expected to be executed and a report sent back from the subordinate unit

 9     to the superior, indicating that the order had been complied with or

10     otherwise executed, or that there had been some problem?

11        A.   In any case, this is what is implied.  All activities given to

12     subordinates have to be reported on.  And if there are no specific

13     requests for a report to arrive by a certain time, then reporting has to

14     be incorporated into regular reporting, which is commonplace during

15     combat.  Once a day regular combat reports are sent containing all orders

16     and all activities that had been completed or are still undergoing.

17             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Colonel.  I see we are past the break.

18     That concludes my examination.

19             And, Mr. President, the Prosecution would tender P1230.  This was

20     one of the documents that were subject to the Trial Chamber's ruling the

21     other day.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  This document will be received as

23     Exhibit P1230.

24             We are really far beyond the break time.  We have to break now

25     and we will resume at 5 minutes past 11.  I think we have to discuss the

Page 8645

 1     length of the examination-in-chief later.

 2             I would like to ask the Court Recorder to check the beginning of

 3     page 27 during the break.  We adjourn and resume at five minutes past 11.

 4                           --- Recess taken at 10.37 a.m.

 5                           --- On resuming at 11.07 a.m.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Before Mr. Tolimir gets the floor, I would like

 7     to remind both parties, but again in particular the Prosecution, that

 8     when the Chamber gave some guidance about how to proceed in the courtroom

 9     recently, I think last week, there was one part of this guidance I would

10     like to quote:

11             "Both parties, and in particular the Prosecution, have on

12     occasion exceeded their estimates, and the Chamber will seek to ensure

13     that, as much as possible, this be kept to a minimum."

14             The Chamber is quite concerned about the wrong estimation that

15     the Prosecution made.  The Prosecution indicated that it will use one

16     hour for examination-in-chief.  Instead of one hour, it used three hours

17     and 30 minutes.  This morning, Mr. Thayer said, when I asked him how much

18     time he will need today, he said, "I think about 20 minutes to half an

19     hour, maximum."  Instead of that, he used one and a half hour.

20             The Chamber is concerned about this use of time, or about the

21     wrong estimation, but I think for the -- for planning purposes, and for

22     preparation of the cross-examination of the Defence, this is not very

23     satisfactory, and I would like to remind the Prosecution to keep their

24     examination to a shorter time, especially if we have to do with 92 ter

25     witnesses.  Their prior testimony is already in evidence and therefore we

Page 8646

 1     should try to be -- the Prosecution should try to keep the estimation

 2     right.  I take into account the length of some answers.  That happens

 3     also in cross-examination.  We have had such instances.  But indeed, this

 4     situation is not very satisfactory.

 5             Mr. Thayer.

 6             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Your Honour has, I think

 7     kindly, referred to the Prosecution collectively, and I'll just say right

 8     now I am the prime suspect and I'm guilty as charged.  I think I have

 9     demonstrated that my estimates are, frankly, rubbish and that is despite

10     really trying to make accurate estimates as possible.  Clearly, they have

11     not been.  And I apologise for that.  I think it is safe to say I will

12     just need to -- my first reaction is going to have to be whatever

13     I estimate I'll have to increase it somewhat.  I understand that the

14     Trial Chamber doesn't want to hear that necessarily, but for planning

15     purposes, I understand Your Honour needs better estimates, and you will

16     get those.  I can assure you of that.

17             And I think it's clear to everybody that the problem has

18     fundamentally been mine.  And I understand that, in some cases, we have

19     witnesses who provide more narrative answers or for whom it requires a

20     little bit more work to get where we want to go, but fundamentally this

21     is an issue of my time estimates.  I recognise that and I will do better.

22             One thing I would like to just make clear to the Court, though,

23     is that the areas with which I have been entering into these sometimes

24     contentious discussions with Colonel Trivic, for example, are entirely

25     new areas that weren't gone into in the prior testimony, and these are

Page 8647

 1     areas that are fundamental to the issues in this case.  Not in the

 2     Popovic case but in this case; issues of communications, issues of

 3     reporting as we just heard, issues of what the term "Zbjeg" means.  These

 4     are all issues that are important to this case, or fundamental to this

 5     case, as the Court will recall from other witnesses.  I'm trying to take

 6     this witness, for example, as I think we all do, in directions that are

 7     relevant and new to this case.  That said, I will do what I can with

 8     these new areas to streamline it as much as possible, be more realistic

 9     about the estimates.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The Chamber accepts your guilty plea.  However,

11     Mr. Thayer, it's not a problem of the examination-in-chief itself but

12     with the preparation.  The estimation was wrong.  Perhaps you were right

13     to put these questions to the witness.  I don't judge that.  But in

14     preparation, you should have a realistic estimation, as you and your

15     colleagues from the OTP requested from the Defence several times, and

16     therefore this is, I think, the right time to remind parties to comply

17     with their own estimates.  You will have realised that this Chamber is

18     quite liberal going further, and we don't like time restraints.  On the

19     other hand, it is -- we -- this is a request to be very disciplined in

20     this respect.  Thank you very much.

21             Now, Mr. Tolimir, you should commence your cross-examination.

22     Mr. Tolimir.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  I would

24     like to greet everybody who is present, and may God's peace reign in this

25     house and may God's will be done in these proceedings and not necessarily

Page 8648

 1     mine.  I would like to particularly greet this witness, whom I haven't

 2     seen for a long time, and I wish him a pleasant stay among us here.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir:

 5        Q.   [Interpretation] Please, our time is quite limited.  A lot of

 6     documents have been tendered through you, so let us use this document

 7     that we saw as the last document, P1230.  This was used during your

 8     examination-in-chief.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, at the outset of your examination,

10     I would especially you both - you, Mr. Tolimir, and the witness - remind

11     to speak very slowly and to pause between question and answer.  I think

12     this witness is a high-speed speaker and therefore both of you should be

13     very careful.  We need a clear record.  Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  We will

15     do our best.  Could we see page 2 of this document.

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   While we are waiting for it to come up, let me ask you this:  The

18     Prosecutor put a number of questions concerning this document.

19     I couldn't quite understand what they pertained to, but let me ask you

20     this:  Can it be seen clearly from this document, on page 1, that it says

21     here that the leaders of the convoy would have the lists of personnel,

22     equipment, and a bill of -- loading bill.  On this page, does it say,

23     especially under item 3, that particular identification should be done

24     concerning all people so that the documents and identities should be

25     checked?

Page 8649

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   Does this document go to the UNPROFOR command?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   Now, tell me this, please:  This -- these checks that were

 5     supposed to be done, were they transparently announced to UNPROFOR so

 6     that they could prevent misuse that had taken place earlier, at the entry

 7     and exit into the enclaves?

 8        A.   Yes.  There had been problems earlier concerning entry and exit

 9     into enclaves and, as I have mentioned during my testimony, that's

10     precisely why this document was composed, in order to prevent that.

11        Q.   Thank you.  We have completed this document.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Trivic, you and Mr. Tolimir are using the

13     same language.  Therefore it is absolutely necessary that you wait with

14     your answer until the -- you see the record, until the record has

15     stopped.  Otherwise, the interpreters can't catch your answer because

16     they are still interpreting the question of Mr. Tolimir.  Please bear

17     that in mind.

18             Mr. Tolimir.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I would

20     also like to ask that this screen be removed.  I can't see the

21     transcript.  I used to be able to see it and now I see myself on the

22     screen.  Oh, it's fine now.  It's fine.  It's fine now.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  We will

25     try to abide by the rules of these proceedings.

Page 8650

 1             Could we see in e-court P1231.

 2             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   And while we are waiting for that to appear on the screen, I can

 4     tell you that this is a statement that Colonel Trivic gave on the 24th of

 5     January 2002 to the investigators of the Tribunal.  Thank you.

 6             My first question:  Why did you, on the 24th of January 2002,

 7     come to have this interview, given the fact that there had already been

 8     an interview conducted with you earlier?  Thank you.

 9        A.   I never thought about it, why I had been asked to come to be

10     interviewed on various occasions.  If I can just take a look at this to

11     see whether, at the beginning of the interview, I was given a reason for

12     being invited.  Most likely they wanted additional information concerning

13     some events that the OTP was interested in and wanted to go over me --

14     wanted to go over with me one more time.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Trivic, perhaps I made a mistake by not putting a

16     very clear question, and my question was whether, during the second

17     interview, you clarified something that was erroneously stated during the

18     first interview?  And were you told about this, given that in lines 13 to

19     16, on page 2 of the Serbian translation -- could we see page 2 of the

20     Serbian so that the witness can see it.  It says here:

21             "You are here as a witness, which is to say that during the six

22     years that we have been investigating this event we never came across any

23     indication pointing to the fact that you or your unit in any way were

24     involved in the events on 11 and 12 July."

25             All right.  It's page 3 in the English.  I just wanted to see

Page 8651

 1     whether, during the second interview, anything was clarified that was

 2     erroneously stated during the first interview.  Thank you.

 3        A.   I don't think so.  I don't think there was anything questionable,

 4     and in these lines that you mentioned 12, 13, and so on, in the second

 5     paragraph, we deal with a question that I put initially, namely that the

 6     summons was sent to me as a Lieutenant-General Mirko Trivic, and I was

 7     never promoted to the rank of general.  And here in this portion, the

 8     Prosecutor and I established that a lot of people who were colonels at

 9     the time and were, unfortunately, involved in these events, in the

10     meantime had become generals.  So I wanted to clarify whether they had

11     made a mistake in my name or in my rank when summoning me to the

12     interview.  Other than that, I don't think that anything else was

13     questionable from the first interview.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Please, on page 3, 4, 5 and 6, of this interview, the

15     Prosecutor, Mr. McCloskey, put some questions to you about the meeting at

16     Bojna.  Was it a contentious issue that you were in Bojna on the 12th of

17     July at 9.00 in the morning?  Thank you.

18        A.   No.  There was nothing contentious about it.  The question put to

19     me was whether, and at which time, I met and greeted General Mladic.  At

20     the bottom of the page I answered, at around 1800 hours.  I also said

21     that I didn't know when I was told to come to the Bojna sector on the

22     12th at 9.00.  I don't know whether I was notified of this in the evening

23     hours on the previous day or that morning.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Further, on pages 4, 5, and 6, you were asked who had

25     issued tasks, who was present at the beginning, whether security organs

Page 8652

 1     were present, and then you answered by saying that brigade commanders

 2     were there and that you didn't remember any security organs being there

 3     but that perhaps Popovic was there.  That's on page 5, lines 22 to 26.

 4     And then based on all of the -- or, rather, this is what you said in

 5     response.  At the meeting, when you were preparing the operation in

 6     Bratunac, at the first meeting, were there any security organs present?

 7     Thank you.

 8        A.   As I have stated so far, in my records, I recorded those

 9     individuals who were important for me.  As for the other members of the

10     Drina Corps command and subordinate persons, I would rather not speculate

11     or attempt to remember whether I saw somebody or not.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you, Mr. Trivic.  Now, would you please look at

13     page 6 of your statement, Serbian version, lines 28 to 32.  It's at the

14     bottom of the page.  Based on that, my question is this:  Were you told

15     about the task to prevent the withdrawal of the Muslim army from the

16     Srebrenica enclave and their pullout towards Tuzla and to prevent the

17     enclaves being joined with the territory held by Muslims in the

18     Federation?  Thank you.

19        A.   No.  I was not given such a task.  We were ordered to continue

20     the attack.  While preparing to come and testify here in the courtroom,

21     I thought about this, and naturally I would reconsider these answers if

22     I were to provide answers again.  And on the 12th of July, it was more a

23     case of chasing rather than preventing somebody from leaving.

24        Q.   Thank you.  I put this question to you precisely in order to

25     clarify whether the forces of your brigade and neighbouring brigades were

Page 8653

 1     chasing these forces or were they executing other tasks and were there

 2     perhaps some forces that were preventing the pullout?  And actually, can

 3     you describe to us which forces were engaged in chasing and which forces

 4     were engaged in preventing the pullout?

 5        A.   My brigade, the Bircani Brigade, we were given a task to be

 6     engaged in the area all the way up until Jahorina and Jastrebac whereas

 7     the Zvornik Brigade had remained among the reserve forces.  So if we went

 8     beyond the boundaries of the enclaves, then one could say that the units

 9     which normally held positions facing the enclave of Srebrenica remained

10     there with the same task; to disarm.  This is how I would describe it, as

11     a disarmament.  And also they were tasked to prevent the forces of the

12     28th Division from joining the other forces while being armed.  These

13     units, which held the positions facing enclave before had that same task,

14     and only some forces successively arrived to the area from the Zepa

15     enclave.  If I understood your question well, then I think this is the

16     right answer.

17        Q.   Thank you for this explanation.  That's precisely what I wanted

18     to hear.  I wanted us to see that the column wasn't being chased.

19     Rather, the enemy was being prevented from doing what you explained to

20     us.

21             Can we now turn to page 14 of your statement.  In line 4.  You

22     can see line 4.  The Prosecutor asked you whether you saw Beara in the

23     evening on the 12th in the Bratunac area, and you say:

24             "Well, I have told you very clearly that beyond the brigade,

25     General --"

Page 8654

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the speaker please slow down.

 2             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   My question is:  In Bratunac, at that meeting discussed at page

 4     is 14, in addition to you commanders who had been issued a task, were

 5     there only Generals Krstic and Mladic present and was there anyone else

 6     from the Main Staff present too?

 7        A.   At the meeting held on the 12th, in the working segment of the

 8     meeting, nobody else was present, as far as I can remember, except for

 9     General Mladic, who issued the well-known task to commence the

10     implementation of the following assignment and to take advantage of the

11     situation.  As for the evening, I don't think that there was anybody else

12     from the Main Staff except for General Mladic.

13        Q.   [Microphone not activated]

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for the speaker.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Thank you.  I apologise for not saying that it was page 22 in

17     English.  Thank you for clarifying this.  I don't have any further

18     questions about the statement you gave to the Prosecutor.

19             Now we can turn to what happened in the beginning of your

20     examination-in-chief.  On page 24, you were asked the following:

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Are you referring to the transcript of today or

22     another document?

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I am referring to the

24     transcript of yesterday -- or the day before, rather.

25             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Page 8655

 1        Q.   At the beginning of your examination-in-chief you were asked

 2     about how things transpired and how come you had left Srebrenica and went

 3     in the direction of Viogora and how did you enter the town.

 4             My question is this:  Was the town -- and that's on page 24 --

 5     was the town under artillery fire or any other kind of fire coming from

 6     infantry weapons at the time when you entered Srebrenica?  And we could

 7     see a photo depicting you and General Mladic and Krstic and even before

 8     that.

 9        A.   No, there was no fire.  We entered walking.  There was no need to

10     do anything else.  There was no fire being opened on any of the sides

11     because people who found themselves there would have come under fire and

12     would be threatened.  The enemy side would have threatened their own

13     population and our side would have threatened the units that had already

14     entered the town.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The reference to page 14 of the transcript of the

16     7th of December can't be right.  It must be another page.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I said page 34 and 24.

18     Page 24, where you can see a reference to the movement of unit and its

19     entering Srebrenica.  And since the witness has already answered, I'm

20     going to ask him about the way he entered Srebrenica because he said that

21     he remembers all that very well.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, we need a clear record.  I'm

23     confused at the moment.  We see a reference to page 14, to page 24, and

24     34.  What are you referring to?  When you put a question to the witness

25     in respect of a certain part of the transcript of Tuesday this week, you

Page 8656

 1     should be very precise.  What are you referring to?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I was referring to

 3     pages 32 through 34, and I referred to page 34 because there is a

 4     reference there to the movement of the unit and departure in the

 5     direction of Vijogor.  That's in line 6.  But I can also give you

 6     reference for Srebrenica, if you need it, and then we can go -- continue

 7     talking about that.  I can refer to the transcript page if you want me to

 8     do that.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  If you put a question to the witness in reference

10     to a page of the transcript of Tuesday, it should be correct reference,

11     and page 24 of that transcript only Mr. Thayer was dealing with numbers

12     of documents.  Now you say it is page 32 to 34.  This is quite different.

13     I would only ask you to be very precise.  Please carry on.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

15     I appreciate what you said.

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Please, I don't want to go back to the transcript at all.  I'm

18     asking you about the time when you entered Srebrenica and when your photo

19     was taken with General Mladic and others.  I'm asking you about that.

20     Was there any street fighting in Srebrenica as you were entering the

21     town?  Thank you.

22        A.   There was no street fighting at the time.

23        Q.   Thank you.  When it comes to Muslim fighters, Muslim combatants,

24     were they in Srebrenica at the time when you entered together with

25     General Mladic, General Zivanovic, and the others who were with you,

Page 8657

 1     which we could see in the video clip, and you all entered on the 11th?

 2        A.   When it comes to the elements of the 28th Division or soldiers of

 3     the BiH army, we did not come across any of them in Srebrenica as we

 4     entered the town.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  My next question is this:  Did you come across any

 6     weapons that they had discarded as you were entering Srebrenica, or maybe

 7     around the town, as you were coming close to it?  Thank you.

 8        A.   No, there were not any discarded weapons.  As far as I know, my

 9     unit or any of my neighbouring units did not come across any weapons.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Did UNPROFOR later on surrender to the Republika

11     Srpska army the weapons that they had kept in their custody, the weapons

12     that were given to them by the Muslims when Srebrenica was being

13     demilitarised?

14        A.   No, I don't know anything about that so I can't give you a proper

15     answer, I can't give you a decisive answer.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know if members of your corps or your brigade

17     or any other units that cooperated with you in combat around Srebrenica,

18     did they come across any weapons that the members of the 28th Division

19     had discarded while withdrawing from Srebrenica?

20        A.   I don't know anything about that.

21        Q.   Thank you.  On page 34, line 20, of the transcript of the last

22     day of this trial, there is reference to the breakthrough of the Muslim

23     army towards Tuzla.  Could you please tell us, did members of the 28th

24     Division that the Prosecutor referred to herein, did they take all the

25     weapons that they had while they were in Srebrenica enclave?

Page 8658

 1        A.   I don't know whether they took all the weapons, but if we don't

 2     have any information from either my units or any other units that

 3     something had been left behind, and if there is a fact that they managed

 4     to break through on their axis of movement in the area of defence of the

 5     Zvornik Brigade, then one may come to the conclusion that they did take

 6     all the weapons in order to help them carry out a successful

 7     breakthrough.

 8        Q.   You have just mentioned the word "breakthrough."  In your diary

 9     that you kept, your personal diary, you entered information about your

10     report to Pandurevic when you were together at the command post or,

11     rather, the new command post in Solila after he had handed over the task,

12     and let me not suggest anything to you.  Can you tell us what you

13     recorded.  What was his report about?  What did his report contain?

14        A.   If you --

15        Q.   I apologise.  It's at page 2 in your diary and the ERN number is

16     0648-6842.  I apologise for not mentioning the ERN number immediately.

17     Thank you.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer?

19             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  It might help if we want

20     to put it on e-court, or if you're following in the hard copy of the

21     diary, to find exactly where we are.  It's 65 ter 7108, and if you want

22     to follow in the hard copy of the diary, simply flip it over to the side

23     where it says Srebrenica/Zepa 14 to 29 July and start working your way

24     backwards and you'll find the ERN that was cited.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This is now P1444.

Page 8659

 1             MR. THAYER:  And it's page 71 in e-court, Mr. President.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I start answering?

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've found this, thank you,

 5     Mr. Thayer.  At that meeting, when we were talking about the troops of

 6     the 28th Division, I noted down the following under bullet point 3 of

 7     page 2, and this will answer the question put to me by Mr. Tolimir.

 8     Under bullet point 3, I recorded this:  "The situation in Srebrenica in

 9     enclave Birac --" and then there are bullet points, there are smaller

10     armed groups, the Milici and the Bratunac Brigade engaged in scouring,

11     and then under bullet point 4, which refers to the breakthrough, I wrote,

12     In the area of responsibility of the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade the

13     situation is very complex.  And the following bullet point, elements of

14     the 28th Division, or Muslims, crossed the Karakaj-Crni Vrh road and they

15     came to the Baljkovica sector, and we are talking about 2.000 soldiers

16     altogether.

17             And in conclusion, I noted that they are blocked and that, after

18     engagement, they took three pieces of equipment, of self-propelled

19     equipment, and in brackets, they burned two of those pieces of equipment,

20     and one self-propelled cannon opened fire on the brigade troops.  And one

21     more statement, they did not manage to link up with the forces in the

22     Kalesija sector and the Tuzla sector.

23             And finally, eight policemen taken in custody and there is

24     blackmail going on.

25             And this will be the long and the short of what General Krstic

Page 8660

 1     had told us at the meeting which he was held on the 16th of July at 2000

 2     hours.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Please, tell us as a soldier whether the situation

 4     was complex in military terms and that's why an entire unit had to

 5     abandon its previous task and they had to return to their original areas

 6     of responsibilities?  Was that a very complex situation when you had to

 7     chase those enemy's troops?  Please make a clear record.

 8        A.   Yes.  A reference to as many as 2.000 soldiers is illustrative of

 9     the situation.  They managed to break through.  Obviously they wanted to

10     link up with their own forces in the Kalesija and Tuzla sectors.  And

11     because of the situation, the commander of the Zvornik Brigade, with his

12     troops from Zepa, returned into his original area of defence.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Could the e-court please produce P1202.

14             And while we are waiting for the document to be displayed, I'm

15     going to say for the record that this is the document from the command of

16     the Drina Corps dated 2 July 1995.  And the title is, "An order for

17     active combat."  And in that document we are going to look at the first

18     bullet point referring to the enemy where it says, and I quote the second

19     paragraph of this document, reads:

20             "We believe that in the forthcoming period, the enemy will

21     intensify offensive activities against the Drina Corps area of

22     responsibility, mainly in the Tuzla, Zvornik, and Kladanj Vlasenica

23     directions with simultaneous activity by the 28th Division forces from

24     the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa in order to cut the Drina Corps area

25     of responsibility in two and connect the enclaves with the central part

Page 8661

 1     of the territory of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina which is held by

 2     the Muslim forces."

 3             Please, bearing all this in mind, my question is as follows:  Did

 4     they manage to pull out from the enclaves?  I'm referring to the Muslim

 5     troops in Zepa and Srebrenica.  And did they manage to link up with the

 6     forces in Kladanj and Tuzla?  Thank you.

 7        A.   I believe that some of the troops, some of the elements of the

 8     army managed to link up with them.  Some troops were disarmed and,

 9     according to the information that was available to us and the general

10     public in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as the international general public,

11     some of the elements went in the direction of Serbia.  They crossed the

12     Drina River and ended up on the other side.  Two days ago I mentioned

13     that the elements, or smaller groups, continued to look for ways to link

14     up with their forces for a number of days thereafter and there were still

15     losses at this time when I was hospitalised, after having been wounded,

16     and the officers from the command of my brigade visited me and informed

17     me about the losses that happened even after both tasks had been

18     completed.

19        Q.   Could it be said that the Muslims did not manage to link up the

20     territories of the enclaves with Tuzla, however, they managed to pull out

21     some of their soldiers, as you have said, and some of their ammunition,

22     and link up with the majority of forces in the Federation of Bosnia and

23     Herzegovina?  Thank you.

24        A.   Yes.  That was the objective of their activities, as it says here

25     in the document, for the enclaves to be linked up, which they didn't

Page 8662

 1     manage to do because one of the enclaves fell, and automatically that

 2     changed the status of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in that area.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  You as brigade commander, did you receive information

 4     prior to that that starting from the spring of 1995, Muslims had been

 5     conducting active combat operations towards the territory of Republika

 6     Srpska, precisely in order to conquer territory, link up their

 7     territories, break up Republika Srpska and its army?

 8        A.   Yes.  Such information came in via official correspondence, it

 9     was sent to subordinate units, and it was reported in the media as well,

10     about sabotage activities in the area, in the villages surrounding the

11     enclaves, where there were various misdeeds - that's exactly the right

12     word, misdeeds - and atrocities committed.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Now we will look at D52 in e-court.  This is the

14     document of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina dated the 8th of July

15     1995, where they provide information about the combat results of their

16     units and the soldiers of the 28th Division.  We don't need to read the

17     entire document because it's known to all of the parties, but please look

18     at the first bullet point, where he informs his own 2nd Corps by saying

19     60 Chetniks were liquidated and, according to unconfirmed reports, the

20     aggressor suffered even greater losses and had many wounded.

21             Then in the second bullet point he says that 16 automatic rifles,

22     three machine-guns, and so on and so on, were captured.  I would like to

23     ask you this:  Does this indicate that there were active combat

24     operations conducted by the troops of the 28th Division from the

25     territory of the Srebrenica safe haven towards the area where your troops

Page 8663

 1     were; and as a result, did they kill the number of civilians indicated

 2     here?  Thank you.

 3        A.   Yes.  This is yet another indicator of the fact that there were

 4     active combat operations, and we see here the analysis of these

 5     operations.  And it's written here, in order to strengthen the combat

 6     morale of their troops.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

 8             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, perhaps General Tolimir misspoke but

 9     I don't think there is any reference in this section that he's citing to

10     civilians, and in fact, I think General Tolimir himself has acknowledged

11     on a prior occasion that this was a military target and these were

12     military losses, I think as evidenced by the amount of military hardware.

13     As I said, maybe he misspoke when he referred to them as civilians, but

14     I think it's worth clarifying, for the record.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir asked, "... did they kill the number

16     of civilians indicated here?"  We see in the document 60 Chetniks were

17     liquidated.  I would like to ask the witness:  Do you know anything about

18     the question if they were civilians, these 60 people, or military

19     personnel?

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is how I would interpret this:

21     In the first bullet point, it says 60 Chetniks were liquidated.  And we

22     also used derogatory terms.  We called the opposing side Turks and they

23     called us Chetniks.  We all used derogatory terms, so let me interpret

24     this in my way.  60 Chetniks were liquidated, and then they go on to list

25     various things, and they say, according to unconfirmed reports, the

Page 8664

 1     aggressor suffered even greater losses, and so on.  So the 60 people were

 2     killed and the number of the wounded is not known because everybody was

 3     pulled out.  And if we add up the weapons that were captured, we can see

 4     that there were 16 plus 3 plus 1 plus 1 carbine, so there was a total of

 5     21 pieces of weapons.  That is to say 21 soldiers.  And the remaining

 6     were Chetniks, if I can use their term, Chetniks without weapons.  They

 7     go on to say that there were livestock seized, and this indicates that

 8     all this transpired in a village.  And they also mention a van.  They

 9     don't mention a military vehicle, they mention a van.  So according to

10     their report, I would say that there was, at the most, a platoon here of

11     up to 25 men, and then the remaining persons were civilians, between 25

12     and 60, the remaining persons were civilians, because we can see that

13     they also captured livestock in the process.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Let me clarify the following:  Is that a

15     conclusion you have drawn from this document or is it your personal

16     knowledge at that time when this happened?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, this is my

18     conclusion after reading this document.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  Mr. Tolimir, please carry

20     on.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

22             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Tell me, please, did you hear that the village of Visnjica, which

24     was not at the front line, was attacked and that there were victims

25     there?  Or were other villages around Srebrenica attacked, villages that

Page 8665

 1     were not in the theatre of war or at the front line?  Were other villages

 2     in the territory of Republika Srpska attacked?

 3        A.   Yes.  I heard of such operations, and I know of losses that were

 4     incurred further in the depth of the territory, not just at the front

 5     line.

 6        Q.   Can you please explain to us, what do you mean, not just at the

 7     front line?  What is the distance between the demarcation line and the

 8     depth of the territory where there were losses?

 9        A.   Well, according to the rules, the front area covers some 100 to

10     150 metres, and this is where the platoons are deployed, and that further

11     into the depth is the area normally held by a battalion, which has the

12     depth of 3 kilometres, typically.  So after this front area, which covers

13     100 to 150 metres, further in the depth losses were incurred in the areas

14     held by battalions; that is to say 3 kilometres further away.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Could we now see 153, please.  While we are waiting

16     for the document, let me say that this looks to be a document of the

17     General Staff --

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, can you tell us, 153 is not a

19     document.  Are you referring to P153 or D153?

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise.  I wrote down

21     incorrectly.  It should be D53, D53.  Thank you.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] [Microphone not activated]

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could this be zoomed

Page 8666

 1     in, please, so that the witness can see it.  Otherwise the font is too

 2     small.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   This is a document of the General Staff of the Army of Bosnia and

 5     Herzegovina which is a -- which is dated 17th of June - that is to say, a

 6     month before the attack on the enclave - where it says, "Preparations for

 7     offensive of combat operations, order."  Before we start dealing with the

 8     document, can you tell the Chamber what offensive combat operations are.

 9     What does that term encompass?  Thank you.

10        A.   Could you please repeat it?  I wasn't focused on your question,

11     I was reading the document.

12        Q.   Can you please tell us, describe as a soldier, what "combat

13     offensive operations" are, or "offensive combat operations" are.

14        A.   Offensive combat operations are all operations which include

15     activities, or, rather, which, based on the initiative in the combat,

16     offensive combat operations are various incursions, attacks; everything

17     that means having the initiative in relation to the opposing side.  In

18     other words, active combat operations, with the objective of moving in to

19     attack.

20        Q.   Thank you.  We can see here an order issued by Rasim Delic, the

21     commander of the 2nd Corps, Brigadier Sulejman Budakovic sent to the 28th

22     Division.  That is to say that this order came from the corps command in

23     Tuzla and it was sent to the 28th Division.  It says here:

24             "Pursuant to a verbal order of the commander of the General Staff

25     of the BH Army, army General Rasim Delic, and on the occasion of the

Page 8667

 1     great success achieved by units of the BH Army in the wide area around

 2     Sarajevo and Gorazde, and also on the basis of intelligence that the AS

 3     command of the Protection Regiment in Han Pijesak is holding part of its

 4     units in reserve to intervene in the event of an attack by our forces

 5     from Zepa, I hereby order."

 6             And then under number 1:  "Execute all preparations in the

 7     command of the 28th Land Army Division to execute offensive combat

 8     operations with a view to liberate the territory of Bosnia and

 9     Herzegovina overstretching the aggressor forces and inflicting losses on

10     them, coordinating action with the BH Army forces carrying out operations

11     in the broader Sarajevo area."

12             Now, based on what I have just read, my question to you is:  One

13     month before the Muslim forces left the enclave of Srebrenica, does the

14     corps commander from Tuzla order his forces that offensive combat

15     operations be carried out from this protected area?  And if so, could you

16     explain which offensive combat operations these were?  And did this

17     happen one month before the Army of Republika Srpska prevented such

18     activities?

19        A.   It's true.  Quite clearly, this is an order to conduct

20     preparations for combat operations, and its objective clearly is once the

21     task is issued to commence with offensive activities, to act in concert

22     with the forces carrying out operations in the Sarajevo area.  This is

23     quite a logical military procedure, and it is clear here that further

24     activities are continued, further activities of various kinds, in order

25     to enable larger operations in some other area for which tasks are not

Page 8668

 1     yet issued, but the General Staff will issue its order to regulate that.

 2     Something along the lines of the task given by the Drina Corps concerning

 3     the enclaves.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Now could we see D67 in e-court, please.  Again, this

 5     is a document of the BH Army signed by Rasim Delic, and this document was

 6     sent via the 1st Corps by [as interpreted] the president of the

 7     Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  I'm interested in the fourth

 8     bullet point.  Would you please look at it and I will read it.  It's on

 9     page 2 in the English.  It says here:

10             "In preparation for a future operation to link up the enclaves,

11     we brought in and took back four brigade commanders, two brigade chiefs

12     of staff, and the Chief of Staff of the 26th Division.  The Division

13     commander, who was meant to go on the next helicopter flight, did not

14     return.  After the final flight ended tragically, Naser remained."

15             What I want to ask you is this:  Based on this, can it be seen

16     that the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina prepared even before, even prior to

17     that time, the linking up of the enclaves protected by the 28th Division

18     in Zepa, and was it their goal to link up that area with the territory

19     under the control of the 2nd Corps of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

20     Thank you.

21        A.   Yes.  It is obvious.  This is a very clear document dated the

22     13th of July, as I can see.  It was sent at 1500 hours.  Preparations

23     were underway, irrespective of the fact that the enclave of Srebrenica

24     had fallen, as it were.  It is obvious that some of the elements had

25     pulled out and linked up with the main body of the troops.  Plans were

Page 8669

 1     being made for future operations with a view to linking up the forces

 2     from the enclaves with the main body of the 2nd Corps.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I would like to refer to page 53,

 5     line 8.  You are recorded to having said, "This document was sent via the

 6     1st Corps by the president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

 7     I think this document is sent to the president.  Is that correct?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, for

 9     having asked me to remove this mistake from the transcript, which is

10     exactly what I am doing now.  General Delic sent this report to Alija

11     Izetbegovic via the commander of the 1st Corps after the fall of enclave

12     to demonstrate what they had been up to before the fall of the enclave

13     and this is what I meant, this is what I had in mind.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  I just wanted to clarify,

15     "by the president" is wrong; it should be "to the president."  Please

16     carry on.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Mr. Trivic, I apologise to you as well.  I didn't tell you and

19     I didn't allow you to read the entire document.  Let me tell you that

20     this document was drafted after the fall of the enclave.  It was written

21     by Rasim Delic, it was sent to the president of the Presidency in order

22     to tell him what had been undertaken before the fall of the enclave.  In

23     this document, he says that whatever I have read out to you, that

24     preparations were underway for future operations and that the brigade

25     commanders had been returned.  This is something that is a fait accompli,

Page 8670

 1     something they had done already.  I'm asking you now, because of these

 2     activities and similar activities that they undertook, is that why

 3     Krivaja operation was launched?  Does this document show that they were

 4     engaged in certain military activities in order to prepare what the

 5     reports sent to Alija Izetbegovic describes?  Thank you.

 6        A.   Yes, the document clarifies the situation somewhat.  And you're

 7     absolutely right.  Based on this report, you can tell that preparations

 8     were underway in order to link up the enclaves.  However, the attempt

 9     failed because the commander of the 28th Division did not manage to

10     return to the enclaves.

11        Q.   So you can see clearly that there were preparations going on for

12     future operations.  I'm repeating my question.  In order to prevent those

13     preparations from continuing, is that why operation Krivaja was launched,

14     in order to disarm the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica?  Thank you.

15        A.   Yes, the operation was launched in order to narrow down the area,

16     to prevent incursions, to narrow down the -- to reduce the enclaves which

17     would prevent the linking up of the enclaves.  They would be more apart

18     and that was the goal, the main goal of Operation Krivaja.

19        Q.   On the following pages of this document -- can they be shown to

20     the witness -- you can see reference made to the quantities of weapons

21     and ammunition which had been brought to Zepa and Srebrenica, which had

22     been air lifted -- air dropped, and also reference is made to a

23     helicopter that had been downed.  Do you know anything about helicopter

24     sorties from Tuzla bringing weapons for the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves

25     and about accidents that those helicopters had?

Page 8671

 1        A.   Personally, I don't remember having heard any information about

 2     those sorties, and if I knew something, I've forgotten it in the

 3     meantime.  I can't remember.  There were talks about helicopter flights

 4     over Srebrenica and Tuzla but they didn't fly over my zone.  And all of

 5     that was a regular occurrence, it was not something that I was concerned

 6     with at the time.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  In your previous testimonies, for example, in the

 8     Popovic -- in the Popovic case, on page 11808, you described the

 9     preparations for Krivaja operation, and this is lines 19 through 13 [as

10     interpreted], and you said:

11             "I remember that everything was in keeping with the customary

12     procedure.  There was an intelligence service from the corps who briefed

13     us about the situation and the estimates about the enemy forces.  He also

14     gave us an estimate about their strength and deployment according to what

15     he knew, according to the intelligence that he was privy to.  That was an

16     officer that I had not seen before."

17             And then in line 20 on the same page of the transcript, you said

18     that that was Kosoric.  Thank you.  And based on what I have just read

19     out, you will probably remember what you testified about.  And my

20     question is this:  Did you learn from the intelligence officers of your

21     command about the activities and attempts by the enemy before Operation

22     Krivaja ever took place?  If that was the case, can you just briefly tell

23     us what they informed you about?  Thank you.

24        A.   As part of our regular activities or as part of the intelligence

25     officers' activities of my superior command, they sent us information and

Page 8672

 1     the reports arrived at the intelligence officers of the brigade and they

 2     informed us about the strength, the deployment, the intercepted

 3     conversations if there were any, the problems that could be noticed on

 4     the enemy side.  So those reports contained all the intelligence that is

 5     normally gathered, and the reports were sent on a daily basis.

 6             As for your question about the intelligence officer being at the

 7     intelligence post at Pribicevac, he informed us about the task and he

 8     indicated the area where they were able to observe the firing point, the

 9     depth, the axis, the supply channels, and all that was in respect of the

10     concrete task.  All that was carried out at the Pribicevac observation

11     point.

12        Q.   In the Popovic case, transcript page 1180 -- 10, lines 8 through

13     14, you shared your understanding of the tasks and objectives of Krivaja

14     operation, and I'm going to quote you - I don't want to rephrase your

15     words - and I quote:

16             "The main goal of the operation that was set out by the

17     command -- I thank you, I apologise -- the main task -- the main goal of

18     operation that was set out by the corps command as a result of the

19     previous events and developments, the days and the months preceding that

20     decision, was to break off the protective areas of Zepa and Srebrenica

21     and to pull them apart from each other in view of the fact that there

22     were constant incidents and sabotage actions being carried out from the

23     protected area and that we suffered losses on the lines and in the

24     villages in the immediate vicinity of the protected areas."

25             And then on page 11884, you continued to say, in lines 12 through

Page 8673

 1     16 --

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The document P1197.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you, Mr. President,

 4     I apologise for not having said that before.  Thank you.

 5             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   You continued to say:

 7             "We were given a task in respect of the elements of the 28th

 8     Division of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to engage them but to

 9     avoid any contact with members of the UNPROFOR and their check-points

10     which were deployed along the length of the axis where our units were

11     engaged in combat.  We were also told that the objective of the operation

12     was not the town of Srebrenica or its population."

13             This is what you said in the Popovic transcript.  Based on what I

14     have just read out to you, my question is this:  Could you please

15     explain, when you say that the objective was not the population of the

16     town of Srebrenica, what did you mean by that?  What was supposed to be

17     your conduct towards the civilian population and towards UNPROFOR?  Thank

18     you.

19        A.   From my previous testimony and from the testimony in this case,

20     there are some things that I would like to highlight:  Not for a single

21     moment, not in a single document, not in a single contact with my

22     superiors did I ever hear any reference being made to opening fire on any

23     indiscriminate target in order to enter Srebrenica.  I have to go back to

24     an interpretation and an analysis of one part of my testimony in the

25     Blagojevic case, where I talked about the different stages that we went

Page 8674

 1     through.  The developments and the goals were adapted to the situation on

 2     the ground.  It was not at all cost that we planned from the outset to

 3     enter the settled area of Srebrenica.  For example, my unit, and you can

 4     see that in my diary, my unit, on the 12th or, rather, already on the

 5     10th of July, already had its march route changed and as the resistance

 6     subsided and as we say that we would be able not only to reduce the

 7     enclave of Srebrenica but come very close to it, that we should alter our

 8     original task and mission, and finally, our final goal became entering

 9     Srebrenica, which we did.

10             Let me reiterate that there was no single order or single

11     document that set out the tasks to be carried out at all cost, and that

12     would be to enter Srebrenica irrespective of any losses that we might

13     have suffered.  The conduct towards UNPROFOR soldiers and their

14     check-points was supposed to be correct, and that materialised at the

15     moment when I came into contact with them.

16             And as for the other people that I saw and that I came in contact

17     with, and my conduct towards them was exactly as one might expect from

18     civilised people and honest soldiers.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, if you look at the clock, I think

20     it's the proper time for our second break.  The Chamber would appreciate

21     if you could give us, after the break, an estimation of the length of

22     your cross-examination.

23             We resume at 1.00.

24                           --- Recess taken at 12.31 p.m.

25                           --- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.

Page 8675

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Gajic.

 2             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon to everyone.  Your

 3     Honours, in response to your request about the time estimate we would

 4     need for cross-examination of this witness, we would like to tell you

 5     that we will require the entire day tomorrow, leaving some time for the

 6     re-examination by the Prosecution at the end of the day tomorrow.

 7             The other matter is that I would like to ask that P1231, which

 8     was marked for identification, be now admitted into evidence.  That is

 9     the conversation between Colonel Trivic and one of the investigators, and

10     this document was used in cross-examination just now.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  I was going to raise these

12     problems as well.  I wanted to know, if the cross-examination will not go

13     over the full day tomorrow, if the Prosecution intends to call the

14     witness Gallagher tomorrow, but I think now there is no need for a

15     discussion about that.  I'm referring to a motion we received, a

16     confidential motion we received this morning.  Perhaps I can ask the

17     Defence if they had the chance to -- if they have already position to

18     express or if they want to respond to that, if they are objecting or not.

19     If that is possible.  Otherwise, we should deal with that tomorrow.

20             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honours, I have not

21     seen any motions yet.  I haven't opened my e-mail yet today.  So we will

22     reply to that later.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I can deal with that tomorrow at the beginning of

24     our hearing.

25             The other question I would like to mention is if we are sitting

Page 8676

 1     in the morning or in the afternoon tomorrow.  We can't decide now.

 2     I think we have to wait -- we are scheduled for the afternoon.  I know

 3     that many participants would prefer to sit in the morning.  That depends

 4     on the progress another trial will make this afternoon.  Therefore,

 5     I would like to remind everybody to be aware that we could reschedule the

 6     hearing from the afternoon to the morning for tomorrow.  Please look at

 7     the -- your e-mails.

 8             Mr. Tolimir, please continue -- no, first, we receive as evidence

 9     P1231.

10             Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  The

12     witness spoke about the change of order given.  Could we now see 65 ter

13     00197, which was tendered into evidence by the Prosecution.

14             While we are waiting for it to come up on the screen, let me say

15     that this is a document of the command of the Drina Corps, dated the 15th

16     of May 1995.  It is entitled, "Stabilisation of defence around the Zepa

17     and Srebrenica enclaves and creation of conditions for liberation of

18     enclaves.  Order."

19             In the first item of this order, it says:

20             "According to the information gathered, the Muslims are carrying

21     out intensive preparations for offensive operations from the greater area

22     of Tuzla, Kladanj, and Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, with the basic goal

23     to cut the Republika Srpska territory, to connect the non-enclaves with

24     the central part, the so-called Bosnia and Herzegovina, and access the

25     Drina River.  Simultaneous offensive activities are expected from the

Page 8677

 1     area of Kladanj and Kalesija.  They will intensify infiltration of the

 2     reconnaissance and sabotage groups before the offensive operations on a

 3     larger scale, fully using the in-between areas and natural vegetation."

 4             So this is page 1 of this document.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  For the record, this is P1217.

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   We saw that this document is from May, Mr. Trivic.  It was

 8     drafted in order to prevent the activities that I just read to you about.

 9     However, on the very next day -- this was written on the 15th of May, and

10     then on the next day, this is the last page of 65 ter 00198 -- could we

11     please see 00198.  65 ter 00198.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This is P1218.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's correct, Your Honour, thank

14     you, Mr. President.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   So immediately on the following day, another document was drafted

17     on the 16th of May.  It was sent to all units, just like the first one,

18     and in item 3 it says:

19             "Forces at the western part of the front, Drina Corps area of

20     responsibility and around Zepa enclave, will continue to defend firmly

21     the positions taken."

22             And in item 1, it says:

23             "Due to insufficient number of troops for full implementation of

24     the task of closing the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica, the order above

25     is being amended and supplemented by the following."

Page 8678

 1             That means the one of the 15th of May.

 2             So in the first one, you were given an order to carry out certain

 3     operations, and in the second one they were withdrawing it due to

 4     insufficient number of troops.

 5             Would you please, as a soldier, explain what these two documents

 6     mean.  Would you please explain it for the record.  Thank you.

 7        A.   It is clear that these two documents compose one order.

 8     I suppose that the assessment used for the first document was wrong, and

 9     when the subordinate units reacted to that document, then they gave up on

10     the initial task and confirmed in writing that they were giving up on

11     that task.  However, the forces at the demarcation line were to continue

12     trying to move the lines towards the enclaves, as far as possible,

13     towards the enclave of Zepa, due to this constant contact between two

14     enclaves.  It is clear that these two documents should be read together

15     as one document, and that the second one is a written correction

16     indicating that the task issued in the first document was now changed.

17        Q.   Thank you.  In the Popovic case, at page 1193 of the transcript,

18     when speaking of the offensive of the Muslims against Republika Srpska

19     and the enclaves there, you said the following.  I'm quoting:

20             "There was an offensive conducted in various areas, including in

21     the spring of 1995.  The offensive was launched from the Tuzla area,

22     I think towards the area held by the East Bosnia Corps and the Drina

23     Corps.  I was supposed to send some parts of my unit to provide

24     assistance in the area of the Zvornik Brigade.  If I remember well, I was

25     supposed to do that because the brigade was being attacked in its own

Page 8679

 1     area of responsibility."

 2             Now, please tell me, given that you sent some of your forces to

 3     the Zvornik Brigade, which faced the Tuzla Corps of the BH Army, was

 4     there an intention by the Tuzla Corps and the BH Army to link up their

 5     forces from Tuzla with the forces which were in Srebrenica and Zepa?  And

 6     what can you tell us about that in general?

 7        A.   As a professional soldier, please allow me to answer that

 8     question.  Each activity undertaken has a goal, in order to engage

 9     forces, men and resources, in order to provide support to them, in order

10     to protect the people, this is not done randomly.  There is always a goal

11     when activities are being undertaken.  And later on, if these goals are

12     accomplished, then that improves the position of own forces.  So

13     I suppose that that was the goal of these activities, as far as can be

14     seen from various documents of both armies, namely that each activity has

15     a defined goal, a defined objective.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Before this break, you spoke about the change in an

17     order given, as we just saw, and you said that there were also changes

18     made in the course of the combat, and allegedly you yourself did it on

19     the 10th of July.

20             Could we now see D431, please.  We can see D431 here.  This was

21     sent by the Main Staff.  I signed it.  I apologise:  D41.  D41.  This is

22     an order signed by Krstic.  This is the order we just saw, on the 16th of

23     May, and now can we see, in e-court, D41?  Thank you.  Okay.  We see it

24     now.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I note for the record that this is not included

Page 8680

 1     in the list of documents to be used with this witness in

 2     cross-examination.  Mr. Gajic.

 3             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I think that the same

 4     document can be found on the OTP list, but with a P number.  So this is a

 5     known document.  It is known both to us and the Prosecution, and I think

 6     that the document was used with this witness in another trial.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Would you please give us the P number you are

 8     referring to?

 9             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] I apologise.  I would need to look it

10     up.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer?

12             MR. THAYER:  It's P690, Mr. President.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  Mr. Tolimir.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Thank

15     you, Mr. Thayer.  Could we now see in e-court D -- P690.  We can see it

16     in the English.  Could we see it in the Serbian as well so that the

17     witness can see what this was about and why the order was changed in the

18     course of the combat in Srebrenica.

19             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   This is a document from the Main Staff, dated 9th of July, sent

21     to the command of the Drina Corps, signed by Major General Zdravko

22     Tolimir.  It says:  "The President of Republika Srpska --" I'm quoting

23     now:

24             "The President of Republika Srpska has been informed of

25     successful combat operations around Srebrenica by the units of the Drina

Page 8681

 1     Corps and that they have achieved results which enable them to occupy the

 2     very town of Srebrenica."

 3             The second paragraph:

 4             "The president of the republic is satisfied with the result of

 5     combat operations around Srebrenica and has agreed to continue operations

 6     in order to take over Srebrenica, disarm Muslim terrorist gangs, and

 7     completely demilitarise the Srebrenica enclave."

 8             The third paragraph:

 9             "The President of Republika Srpska ordered that in the follow-up

10     combat operations, full protection of UNPROFOR members be ensured as well

11     as the Muslim population, and that they be guaranteed safety in the event

12     they cross over into the territory of Republika Srpska."

13             In the last paragraph, it says:

14             "In accordance with the order of the President of Republika

15     Srpska, issue an order to all combat units participating in combat

16     operations around Srebrenica to offer maximum protection and safety to

17     all UNPROFOR members and civilian Muslim population.  Order the

18     subordinate units to refrain from destroying civilian targets unless

19     forced to do so due to strong enemy resistance.  Ban the torching of

20     residential buildings, and treat civilians and war prisoners in

21     accordance with the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.

22             "Assistant commander, Major General Zdravko Tolimir."

23             Based on this, I would like to ask you the following:  Were you

24     informed by the corps command that there was a change of this kind on the

25     10th of July and this is why you conducted regrouping and adjustment of

Page 8682

 1     forces that you described in your diary on page 0648-6783?  Thank you.

 2        A.   Yes.  Yes.  On the following day, when -- just a moment, please.

 3     I need to find my diary so that I can see what I wrote down.  On the 10th

 4     of July, on page 6 of my Srebrenica diary:

 5             "There is a decision to change the axis of the attack of the 2nd

 6     Romanija Brigade, (specified in an order.)  The forces are being

 7     regrouped and are acting in coordination with the Zvornik Brigade as the

 8     left flank neighbour to continue the attack in Orahovica, Vogan, Zivkovo

 9     Brdo, Kusevice [phoen] village, Bojna, Rajne village, Srebrenica."

10             So based on the information that reached the IKM of the Drina

11     Corps, perhaps it would be relevant to see when that information arrived,

12     at what time it arrived to the IKM.

13             Perhaps you could lower the document a bit.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer?

15             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Before we go back to this

16     document, if I could, just for the sake of the record, ask that the

17     witness confirm what he is reading from because he said he's going to

18     read from his diary and he's reading from it and I think it would be

19     helpful to have a reference to the ERN number for the record so that we

20     can go back.  And I would just ask if the witness could read the

21     eight-digit ERN number on the page he was reading from just so that we

22     have that handy for us in the future.  Again, that's from P1444, the

23     witness's diary.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Indeed that would be very helpful if you could

25     indicate the ERN number and the page number.  And I would like to add,

Page 8683

 1     are you reading from your original diary or from the copy we all have in

 2     front of us?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Since I have to give you the page

 4     number as denoted by the OTP, then I'm going to be reading from that

 5     page, from the photocopy which is identical to the original that is

 6     before me.  And the number is 0648-6784, and the page number in my diary,

 7     marked in red ink, is 6.  The date on that page is 10 July 1995, which

 8     shows that that was after the document that General Document [as

 9     interpreted] had sent to Generals Gvero and Krstic for their information.

10     In my diary on that date, I noted this, the decision to change the

11     direction of attack of the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade, as specified

12     in the order, and to regroup forces in coordinated action with the 1st

13     Zvornik Brigade as the left neighbour - that's my unit - and continued

14     the attack along the axis of Orahovica, that's the general area, whereas

15     the narrow area is Vogan, Zivkovo Brdo, Pusmulici village, Rajna village,

16     Bojna, the repeater Bojna, and finally in the direction of Srebrenica.

17     And my remark here is that a lot of time was spent in grouping forces

18     from the direction of Alibegovac, Lipovac, Siljato Brdo, Vijogor village,

19     to the newly defined axis.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Thank

22     you, Witness.  I apologise for not having given you the ERN number

23     immediately.

24             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   My question now is this:  In keeping with this particular order

Page 8684

 1     about the protection of UNPROFOR forces and the civilian population, did

 2     you receive from your corps command any orders about the protection of

 3     UNPROFOR forces and the civilian population?  Thank you.

 4        A.   Yes.  However, such tasks had been set out at the beginning of

 5     the initial order.  In this particular case I did not deem it necessary

 6     to record such instances every time I came in contact with my superior

 7     officer.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please state clearly, and do it for the

 9     record, and can you tell us "yes" or "no," did you receive orders from

10     the corps command about the protection of the civilian population and

11     UNPROFOR forces?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   And now, please, could the Court produce document D69.  Thank

14     you.  The document was issued by the Drina Corps on the 8th of July, two

15     days before the 10th, which is the date of the witness's entry that he

16     has just read.  Could you please look at the penultimate paragraph, where

17     it says:

18             "The Main Staff has ordered you not to attack UNPROFOR but,

19     rather, to prevent any surprises and stop the Muslims in their intention

20     to join up Srebrenica and Zepa."

21             Thank you.  My question is this:  From the very outset of the

22     operation, you had been instructed that your target was not either

23     UNPROFOR or the civilian population but something else.  What was the

24     target of your operation?  Can you tell us, please?  Thank you.

25        A.   Let me be very specific, because this is what you are asking me

Page 8685

 1     to do, probably because of the time.  I've already shared with you the

 2     target of the operation, the main goal of the operation.  I don't think

 3     that that should be repeated.  We received repeated orders not to target

 4     UNPROFOR and to prevent surprises and intentions of the Muslims to join

 5     up the two enclaves in question.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  In the Popovic transcript, page 1811, lines 15

 7     through 17, you said about the protected areas, and I quote:

 8             "I wouldn't say under protection but under the shield of UNPROFOR

 9     units, there were incursions targeted at our units."

10             My question is this:  Could it happen, unbeknownst to UNPROFOR,

11     that there were any kind of actions coming from the enclaves targeting

12     the Serbian population and military targets in Republika Srpska?

13     According to what you know.  Thank you.

14        A.   I suppose that it was possible.  They could engage in incursions,

15     given the fact that the observation posts manned by UNPROFOR were not

16     close to each other and that they did not engage in full observation

17     activity at all times.  But I wouldn't say that those incursions were

18     carried out under UNPROFOR protection, but the mere fact that the

19     UNPROFOR forces were deployed in the area was used by the Muslims as a

20     shield.  In other words, they used their presence in order to find

21     passage through a valley, along a river, and carry out their incursions.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Bearing in mind that there were constant contacts

23     between UNPROFOR and the two sides, and that the two sides informed

24     UNPROFOR about their respective activities, let's not waste any more time

25     on -- time on that.  Even General Mladic wrote to the command of UNPROFOR

Page 8686

 1     in Sarajevo which was at his level.  He informed them about the events in

 2     February.  Already in February he stated that he couldn't consider

 3     Srebrenica and Zepa demilitarised zones given the activities that were

 4     taking place there.  In view of the information that was received, was it

 5     possible that there was no knowledge about activities going on in the

 6     enclaves and coming out of them?  Thank you.

 7        A.   This is a more specific question.  I don't think it was possible

 8     for UNPROFOR not to be aware of those activities.  What I said in my

 9     previous answer was that they could carry out incursions, that they could

10     pass through some areas unobserved, but still UNPROFOR was there to

11     establish the consequences of such incursions.  Those incursions could

12     not go unobserved by UNPROFOR in that respect, as it were.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Let's not show the document, let's just say that in

14     your testimony earlier today you said that no heavy weaponry had been

15     handed over to the Army of Republika Srpska, or at least that you don't

16     know anything about that.  And finally, you said in your statement that

17     fire was opened on you from heavy weaponry, weaponry over 12 millimetre

18     in calibre.  You said that in the Popovic case on page 11913, when you

19     spoke about the spring offensive -- I apologise.  I gave the wrong

20     number.  When you entered Srebrenica, fire was opened on you, as you

21     stated, and that fire came from heavy mortars.  Can you tell us something

22     about that?  Or, rather, from heavy machine-guns.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, you must give us the correct page

24     number of the Popovic case, which is P1197.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Page

Page 8687

 1     number is 11887.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Now your answer, please.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 11883 is the correct page number.

 6     Thank you.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Now we have the third version.  I hope this is

 8     the correct one.  The question of Mr. Tolimir was:  Can you tell us

 9     something about that, or, rather, from heavy machine-guns?  Do you recall

10     the question?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Based on the Popovic case testimony

12     -- could you please jog my memory?  Could you please repeat your

13     question?

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Okay.  Let me remind you, the transcript number, page number is

16     11883.  You said that your group, on the 10th of July, was exposed to

17     fire from anti-aircraft weaponry.  What kind of weaponry was that and

18     where were they located?  The page number is 11883.  Thank you.  The

19     lines are 5 through 7.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  [Microphone not activated] We have a technical

21     problem again.  Now we see it again.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  I adhere by what I stated.

23     Fire was indeed opened from big calibre weaponry, I suppose from

24     anti-aircraft cannons.  They were either single-barrelled cannons or even

25     bigger weaponry, and that was after the regrouping of our forces in the

Page 8688

 1     Zivkovo Brdo sector.  And after we had passed through the Slapovici

 2     sector.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Could the Court please produce P01224.  Thank you.

 5             This is another document drafted by the BiH army, issued by the

 6     command of the 2nd Tuzla Corps.  Or, rather, it was sent to the command

 7     of the 2nd Corps in Tuzla and it was signed by Ramiz Becirevic, who was

 8     Naser Oric's deputy in Srebrenica.  He sent it to the command of the 2nd

 9     Corps in Tuzla.  We are interested in the second page of this document.

10     And since you are an artillery man, could you please explain something

11     that we see on the second page.  It says, "Artillery units of

12     anti-aircraft defence."  This is a big title in capital letters.  And

13     then under number 1, or rather from 1 through 25 on this page, you see a

14     list of departments and tools and pieces which are used by the unit.

15     Ramiz reports on what he has and what he has assigned to the task.  He

16     reports back to his corps.  Could you please explain to us, as an

17     artillery man, can you explain for the Trial Chamber what is PAT 20/21

18     and all the other designations of heavy artillery?  Thank you.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I take it that this was under seal in the Popovic

20     case.  Is that correct, Mr. Thayer?  In that case, it should not be

21     broadcast.

22             MR. THAYER:  You're correct, Mr. President.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

25             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Page 8689

 1        Q.   My question for the witness is this:  I didn't know that the

 2     document was under seal.  My question is this:  Does this testify to the

 3     fact that there was heavy weaponry in Srebrenica and that there were

 4     departments or troops assigned to those pieces?  Were you aware of the

 5     existence of a 20-millimetre anti-aircraft cannon?

 6        A.   Yes.  It arises from this that there were crews or departments,

 7     that there was a 20-millimetre cannon, which required a crew of over

 8     three men at a time.  There were several squadrons and the 28th Division

 9     had 20-millimetre uni-barrelled cannons as well as anti-aircraft

10     machine-guns on their strength.  The latter is a smaller calibre type of

11     weaponry where the 20-millimetre cannons are considered heavy weaponry.

12     And all that was used in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina to open fire on

13     infantry troops.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Did you become exposed to fire from such weaponry

15     from PAMs or from cannons?  Because here, item number 8 shows a

16     20-millimetre PAM.

17        A.   Fire was opened from both, as well as from infantry weapons.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, we are at the end of today's

20     hearing.  You have to continue tomorrow.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just tender this document

22     into evidence?  And we will continue tomorrow, I suppose.  Thank you.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This -- we will deal with that tomorrow because

24     I see a problem.  These are all P documents, MFI'd from the list of the

25     Prosecution but not used with this witness through examination-in-chief

Page 8690

 1     and I have to clarify with the Registry if it will be appropriate to have

 2     this as a P number while you are using that during the cross-examination

 3     in fact as a D document, but I think we should check that until tomorrow.

 4             Thank you.  We have to adjourn for the day.  May I remind you

 5     that you're not allowed to have contact with any of the parties during

 6     the break.  We are resuming tomorrow in the afternoon unless you get an

 7     information that we will sit in the morning, but that will be -- this

 8     information will be, at the earliest possible, in the late afternoon.  It

 9     depends on the progress of the other trial.  We adjourn.

10                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,

11                           to be reconvened on Friday, the 10th day of

12                           December, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.