Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 10995

 1                           Wednesday, 9 March 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning to everybody in the courtroom.

 6     Welcome back.

 7             The witness should be brought in, please.

 8                           [The witness takes the stand]

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning, Ms. Sayer.

10             THE WITNESS:  Good morning.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Welcome back.  Make yourself comfortable.

12             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I have to remind you that the affirmation to tell

14     the truth you made yesterday at the beginning of your testimony still

15     applies.

16             THE WITNESS:  Yes, of course.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And Mr. Tolimir is continuing his

18     cross-examination.

19             Mr. Tolimir, you have the floor.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I'd like

21     to greet all those present, and may these proceedings end in accordance

22     with God's will and not my own.

23                           WITNESS:  EMMA SAYER [Resumed]

24                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]

25        Q.   [Interpretation] I would like to greet the witness, and I wish

Page 10996

 1     her a pleasant stay with us today.  Thank you.

 2        A.   Thank you.

 3        Q.   You're welcome.

 4             Yesterday we discussed the agreement of the 24th signed by the

 5     Muslim army and the VRS.  Among other things, it stipulates that all

 6     could be evacuated to a territory of their own choosing for as long as

 7     the war went on in keeping with the Geneva Conventions.

 8             My question is this: Did you know that nowadays, in Srebrenica --

 9     do you know that in Zepa - sorry, not Srebrenica - there are now people

10     living there who had moved out during the war?

11        A.   I was -- I was aware there had been some return of former

12     refugees, yes.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that one of the signatories of that

14     agreement also currently resides in Zepa?  He testified here before the

15     Chamber and he stated his position.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

17             MR. THAYER:  Good morning, Mr. President.

18             I just want to make sure that there's no confusion on the record.

19     General Tolimir referred to an agreement signed on the 24th which he said

20     was signed by the Muslim army, so, number one, I'm -- I just want to make

21     sure we're talking about the agreement on the 24th, because I think

22     we're -- we would all be agreed that that was signed by Mr. Torlak.  If

23     it's the General's position that he represents the army, then so be it.

24     But I just want to make sure because we've talked about three, possibly

25     four, agreements, one in a meeting on the 19th that was signed by

Page 10997

 1     General Smith, the 24th, the 27th, and General Tolimir is now referring

 2     to a witness who he is saying lives in Zepa, and I'd be curious to know

 3     who that witness is.  And we can put it on the record outside the hearing

 4     of the present witness, if the Court thinks that's more appropriate, but

 5     I'd just like to know who that witness is.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, could you clarify the background of

 7     your question?  Was it just a mistake or what was it?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is possible that there was a

 9     mistake.  I believe I said that the Muslim side signed it on the

10     24th of July, not the Muslim army.  In any case, we will clarify who

11     represented the Muslim side when the agreement was signed.  It will

12     become clear through further questions.  I just wanted to know whether

13     this witness was aware that one of the persons who signed that agreement

14     now resides in Zepa.  I didn't want to mention his name, since he

15     appeared here as a protected witness.  If Mr. Thayer wishes to do so, we

16     can go into private session and then I can state his first and last name.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think this is a good proposal.  I know that

18     this person was not a protected witness.  He didn't have a pseudonym.

19     But we were all very careful mentioning his name.

20             MR. THAYER:  And perhaps we can just save a little bit of time.

21     If it is the witness I think General Tolimir is referring to, a simple

22     transcript cite to the portion of the testimony where this witness

23     allegedly stated that he currently lives in Zepa would be helpful.  I'm

24     not aware of any such testimony.  So if he has it, I would appreciate it,

25     before this witness answers a question based on that proposition.

Page 10998

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We should first go into private session so that

 2     there is no problem with giving the details.

 3             Mr. Tolimir, just a moment, we go into private session.

 4                           [Private session]

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25                           [Open session]

Page 11000

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  We are in open session, Your Honours.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, please continue.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Madam, yesterday, at transcript page 1975 [sic], lines 16 to 23,

 6     you said the following about the meeting of the 25th of July, 1995.  I

 7     quote:

 8             We met with Mr. Torlak because he was a type of main

 9     representative.  He was introduced to us as the main representative of

10     the population of Zepa, of the Bosniak Muslim population.  General Smith

11     was very interested in meeting him so as to be able to discuss things

12     with him and to convey the fact to him that from Zepa we were to go to

13     the Bosnian Presidency to meet with Minister Muratovic and the president.

14     We would be able to directly convey Torlak's concerns to them.  Most of

15     the conversation had to do with the exchange of POWs.

16             My question is this: You said that Mr. Torlak acted as a

17     representative.  Did he represent the Muslim population and the

18     Presidency as such, or how did he introduce himself during the discussion

19     General Smith had with him?

20        A.   He was introduced to us by General Mladic as one of the members

21     of the Zepa War Presidency, and he at no stage said that he represented

22     the Bosnian military.  It was made very clear that he was a civilian.

23        Q.   Thank you.  My question is this: During the meeting, did you

24     raise the issue of whether Torlak or some other members of the

25     War Presidency represented the population of Zepa and whether they were

Page 11001

 1     in communication with the government in Sarajevo?

 2        A.   We -- we understood from how he had been introduced to us that he

 3     was representing the civilian population in Zepa, and I don't recall

 4     they -- them being in communication with the government in Sarajevo.  Not

 5     on the civilian side.  I believe -- I believe there was a doctor going on

 6     one of the convoys with the wounded into Sarajevo.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I would like to mention for the record that the

 8     page of the transcript of yesterday's hearing was recorded incorrectly.

 9     Page 5, line 23, you are recorded to having said "at transcript page

10     1975."  It is, in fact, page 10975.  Just for the record.

11             Please continue.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, for the

13     correction.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   At transcript page 10976, lines 3 to 8, in answer to one of the

16     Prosecutor's questions about General Smith's conversation with

17     Hamdija Torlak you said the following:

18             General Smith tried to gain an impression about the atmosphere

19     and situation in Zepa and its population.  At that stage he asked

20     Mr. Torlak whether anyone wished to remain in Zepa.  My previous

21     testimony had to do with my clear recollection when I saw a type of

22     disbelief or shock on the face of Mr. Torlak when he heard that question

23     being put to him.

24             Next you said this.  The question was whether Mr. Torlak

25     communicated with General Smith about his belief of what was going to

Page 11002

 1     happen with anyone who remained.  And you answered in lines 12 to 15:

 2             Yes, it was clear that any Muslim, any able-bodied Muslim, who

 3     remained, would be at the risk of being killed if they remained.

 4             Did this part of the conversation have only to do with the

 5     able-bodied men or the entire civilian population?

 6        A.   The entire civilian population.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  In Mr. Torlak's response, did he mention the

 8     able-bodied part of the population when responding to General Smith?

 9     [Microphone not activated]

10             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Did Mr. Torlak say, Yes, it was clear that any able-bodied Muslim

13     man remaining behind would be at the risk being killed?

14             Is this what Mr. Torlak said?

15        A.   My impression, my recollection, is that he was speaking under

16     duress.

17        Q.   Thank you.  I heard your opinion.  But is what you stated in

18     lines 12 to 15 correct, when you said that his answer was purportedly if

19     any able-bodied Muslim man remained in the enclave would be risking his

20     own death?  I quoted you from lines 12 to 15.  Do you stand by it or

21     would you deny it now?

22        A.   Forgive me, but I don't have any copy of the transcript in front

23     of me, so I would find it helpful if I could see that.  Would that be

24     possible?

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  That would be possible, technically speaking.

Page 11003

 1             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yesterday's transcript, page 10976.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Lines 15 to 18.  Apologies, lines

 4     12 to 15.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Sorry.  Okay.  Thank you.

 6             Yes, I stand by lines 12 to 15 of the transcript.  It's exactly

 7     what I said yesterday.  They were repeatedly -- Mr. Torlak asked for the

 8     use of helicopters because they did not believe that road transport would

 9     be safe.

10             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Thank you.  I know -- I realize you stand by what you said, but

12     did you say yesterday that Mr. Torlak had the able-bodied men in mind

13     when answering?  I believe you still haven't provided me with an answer

14     to that.

15        A.   Yes.  He -- he did mention that Avdo Palic was in charge of the

16     men of fighting age within the enclave.  And when I've said in lines 12

17     to 14 that they were -- any man of fighting age was at risk, at risk of

18     death were they to remain in the pocket, yes, that is my recollection of

19     our conversation.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Since Mr. Torlak, in lines 12 to 15, is not

21     addressing the issue of the civilian population, the disbelief on his

22     face you saw, did it have to do with the men of fighting age or

23     civilian -- of civilians?

24        A.   I can't speak to that.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Did you provide your answer then based on what you

Page 11004

 1     could read on Mr. Torlak's face?

 2        A.   As I said yesterday, what I recall very clearly was the look of

 3     shock or disbelief when Generals -- on Mr. Torlak's face when

 4     General Smith asked him specifically whether anybody wanted to remain in

 5     the pocket.  And General Smith did not say whether any men of fighting

 6     age wished to remain in the pocket.  He said whether anybody wishes to

 7     remain in the pocket.  I hope that clarifies my answer.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Yesterday you testified during examination-in-chief

 9     and you wanted to say whatever you felt like; is this in addition to what

10     you stated in your statement?

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

12             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I would respectively request that

13     this type of question end now.  We don't need this kind of harassment of

14     the witness.  We heard some of it yesterday, and --

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer --

16             MR. THAYER: -- to say that the witness is saying whatever she

17     wants, Mr. President, is inappropriate.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I'm not of your opinion.  This witness was

19     present during this conversation.  It is not a harassment.  It is part of

20     legitimate cross-examination.

21             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I have no problems with him asking

22     her questions about what she saw, what she heard, what her opinion is,

23     what she thought somebody was thinking based on the demeanor.  Again, my

24     objection is to the disrespect with which that question is asked.  Where

25     he characterizes what she said yesterday as saying whatever she felt

Page 11005

 1     like.  We heard that yesterday, and I think it should end.  He should ask

 2     questions in an appropriately respectful manner of this witness, the same

 3     respect that we ask for every witness that comes before this

 4     Trial Chamber.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, Mr. Tolimir put to the witness the

 6     following:  "Yesterday you testified during examination-in-chief and you

 7     wanted to say whatever you felt like; is this in addition to what you

 8     stated in your statement?"

 9             I don't see any harassment in this wording.

10             Mr. Tolimir, please continue.  Or I would like to say, Ms. Sayer,

11     would you please answer the question.

12             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honour.

13             I don't really understand what you mean when you said -- when you

14     asked me if I -- if I said anything that I feel like.  I'm doing my best

15     to answer the questions that you have asked me.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I'd like

18     to thank Mr. Thayer and the witness, Ms. Emma.  I will not put any more

19     questions on this topic if anyone feels irritated by them.

20             Could we please have a look at the footage which is Exhibit D108.

21     It was recorded at Boksanica on the 19th of July, 1995.  I think

22     Mr. Torlak's there, General Mladic, and Mr. Kulovac.  The footage only

23     lasts for 18 seconds.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE: [Previous translation continues] ... Yes, we can

25     do that immediately.  But before we start with that, Mr. Thayer.

Page 11006

 1             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, we don't want to place any

 2     limitations on the questions, substantive questions, that Mr. Tolimir

 3     wishes to ask this witness.  I want to make that clear.  He's threatening

 4     to move on to another topic because of what he says he says.  If he wants

 5     to ask more questions on that topic, that's fine.  But again, to use

 6     that, to threaten to take his marbles and go home, is not appropriate.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, please let this document be shown to

 8     the witness.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  This is

10     D108, a footage from Boksanica where the witness was.  We can see some

11     people that the witness met at Boksanica.

12             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Can you tell us whether you can recognise the faces of the people

14     in the still?  And since you said you recall being in Zepa, do you recall

15     who the people you talked to were?

16        A.   Yes -- yes, I do recall the people who I talked to.  I don't -- I

17     don't recognise all the people in the still that I have on the screen in

18     front of me.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And which of them do you recognise?

20             THE WITNESS:  I recognise the gentleman on the left-hand side and

21     General Mladic, who is on the right-hand side.  I don't really recognise

22     the man in the middle.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  That would not be a problem to mention the name

24     of the man of the left-hand side.

25             THE WITNESS:  Okay.  Thank you.  Thank you, Your Honour.  I

Page 11007

 1     believe the man on the left-hand side to be Mr. Torlak.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 3             Mr. Tolimir.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  And

 5     thank you Ms. Emma.

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   The person in the middle you don't know is the person you met

 8     when you were there with General Smith.  It is Mr. Kulovac.  Perhaps you

 9     could recognise him if he had a hat on on this still.

10             They were there as civilian representatives in any case.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please play the footage to

12     see what their demands were.  It's only 18 seconds long.

13                           [Video-clip played]

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE: [Overlapping speakers] ... Mr. Tolimir,

16     Mr. Tolimir --

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We saw the footage but I'm afraid

18     not the sound.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, that was the sound.  We could see

20     that it was the highest possible sound.

21             This witness is Ms. Sayer.  Her first name is Emma.  I just want

22     to remind you to address her in the appropriate way.  Please continue.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

24             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Ms. Sayer, could you hear what the people were -- in the still

Page 11008

 1     were saying?  If not, we can replay it and try to put the volume up a

 2     bit.

 3        A.   I couldn't hear it very clearly, but I can read the subtitles

 4     that are in English at the bottom of the footage.

 5                           [Video-clip played]

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Can you tell us what it was that you were able to read in the

 8     subtitles?

 9        A.   Does anybody wish to stay, and then I did hear General Mladic

10     say, Koliko, how many?  And then the two representatives talked about --

11     about ten families wishing to stay.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We could try to play it again because we have now

13     another size.  If you wish, Mr. Tolimir, that could be possible.

14                           [Video-clip played]

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  We heard

16     them refer to a full ten families that have remained in Zepa.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Ms. Sayer, did Mr. Torlak say something similar at the meeting

19     with General Smith on the 27th of July, 1995, if you recall?

20        A.   I don't -- I don't recall him mentioning that there were a number

21     of families that wanted to stay, no.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we show P1979.  It's Baxter's

24     report on the situation in Zepa of the 26th of July, 1996.  And we're

25     interested in page 4 in Serbian and page 3 in English.  Paragraph 10.

Page 11009

 1     P1979.  Thanks.  We have paragraph 10 in English.  You can read it.  And

 2     we'll have it shortly in Serbian.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   This is what Mr. Baxter had to say, and I'm quoting from

 5     paragraph 10:

 6             "General Smith asked whether anybody wished to remain in the

 7     enclave.  Torlak replied that the general atmosphere was that everyone

 8     wanted to leave on the grounds of security.  He had no details about the

 9     handing over of weapons and said he would have to check with Avdo Palic.

10     Torlak stated that if the men in the enclave were more confident that the

11     Bosnian government would agree to the POW exchange, the mood of fear

12     would immediately alter."

13             This is my question:  Was basically the concern that

14     Hamdija Torlak had the issue of security and whether the government in

15     Sarajevo would agree to a prisoner exchange?  Thank you.

16        A.   Yes, he did -- he did speak about the -- that nobody wanted to

17     stay in the pocket of Zepa on the grounds of security.  And it was clear

18     that there was concern about whether the Bosnian Presidency would agree

19     to an all-for-all prisoner of war exchange.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Was his main concern whether an exchange would be

21     agreed to and whether they would be able to leave Zepa, since they had no

22     intention of staying there?  Thank you.

23        A.   My recollection is that he -- he was very concerned about whether

24     the prisoner of war exchange would happen and that that question mark was

25     causing a lot of uncertainty and fear amongst the men of fighting age

Page 11010

 1     within the pocket.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Was his fear down to what the Bosnian government

 3     would decide with respect to the exchange or down to what the Serbian

 4     side might decide to do with the prisoners?  Thank you.

 5        A.   My recollection is that he was concerned that the prisoner

 6     exchange would not be agreed.  And the implication was then that the men

 7     of fighting age, you know, would -- would be at grave risk.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Given the answer you've given me, I have to repeat

 9     what Mr. Torlak said to General Smith so that both you and the

10     Trial Chamber and all of us can have a look, including the Prosecution.

11             And I repeat.  Torlak stated --

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE: [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Tolimir,

13     Mr. Tolimir, this is a waste of time.  You have read it to the witness.

14     We have -- everybody in the courtroom has it on the screen.  There's no

15     need just to repeat.  You may put a question to the witness.

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   My question was:  Was he expressing his concerns about the

18     exchange or about the position that the government would take in relation

19     to the prisoners of war exchange, which would ultimately lead to their

20     release to freedom?  Thank you.

21        A.   My recollection is that the concerns focussed on the -- on -- on

22     the prisoner exchange, on the fact that if a prisoner exchange was not

23     agreed, the men of fighting age within the enclave would -- would be at

24     risk.

25             I'm not sure I quite captured what you meant about the position

Page 11011

 1     of the government.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  I was giving you my understanding of Mr. Torlak's

 3     words.  I was basing my question on what he said to General Smith.  I

 4     can't construe his words in any way.  My question for you was:  Were his

 5     concerns about what the Serbian army would have to say about the exchange

 6     or what the Bosnian government's position on that would be?  Did you know

 7     at all -- at all if he was able to know what the VRS position with regard

 8     to the exchange was?

 9        A.   To clarify, my recollection is that Mr. Torlak was concerned

10     about the Bosnian Presidency's response to the suggestion for the

11     prisoner exchange.  And I -- I can't speak to the question, the

12     supplementary, that you've asked about the VRS position.  I have no

13     knowledge of that.

14        Q.   Thank you, Ms. Sayer.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we show Exhibit D54.  This is a

16     letter sent by Mr. Izetbegovic to Mehmed Hajric on the 19th of July,

17     1995, wherein he states, and I'm quoting.

18             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   You have it there in English now.  I'm quoting from paragraph 3

20     of the letter sent by Alija Izetbegovic to Effendi Mehmed Hajric,

21     president of the War Presidency of Zepa on the 19th of July, 1995.

22     You'll see his signature at the bottom later on.  I'm quoting from

23     paragraph 3:

24             "My plan is to move out as many civilians as possible.  All of

25     them, if possible.  The troops stay on and continue to resist.  We will

Page 11012

 1     do everything in our power to help you by supplying materiel and

 2     technical equipment, volunteers, and offensive action in your direction.

 3     I do believe this is going ahead today.  If we do not succeed in this,

 4     you will try to push on along those roads.  You know which.  But this

 5     time without the burden of women and children who would, in the meantime,

 6     be pulled out."

 7             First of all, were you present during the talks Alija Izetbegovic

 8     had with General Smith on these issues?  Thank you.

 9        A.   As I said in my testimony yesterday, I was present at the meeting

10     very late in the evening, started at 2340 hours and after our first day

11     or afternoon in Zepa with President Izetbegovic.  I was present at that

12     meeting, yes.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Can you give us the date of that meeting, please, for

14     the record?  Thank you.

15        A.   It's the 25th of -- of July.

16        Q.   Thank you.  So it happened seven days before the letter he sent

17     to Zepa.

18             So did he, seven days later, in the presence of General Smith,

19     present his view of the situation in Zepa?  Thank you.

20        A.   I may be a little confused but the transcript I have in front of

21     me says that it happened seven days before the letter he sent to Zepa.

22     Is that just a mistranslation?  Because ...

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I don't know, but it seems to be wrong.

24             THE WITNESS:  Ah, okay.  Okay.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The meeting you attended --

Page 11013

 1             THE WITNESS:  Yeah.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE: -- took place on the 25th.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Yes, that's right.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It's just the other way around.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Which is -- the other way, which is after - thank

 6     you - which is after this letter.  They -- we had a long conversation

 7     between General Smith and President Izetbegovic, and also the two

 8     ministers were there, Muratovic and Masovic.  And there was a long

 9     exchange of information with General Smith updating the president on what

10     had happened during our visit to check-point 2 in that -- that afternoon.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Thank you.  Can you remember what he had told you about the

13     evacuation of the civilian population from Zepa and the remaining behind

14     of the able-bodied men?  Did he make any points on that?  Thank you.

15        A.   Minister Muratovic was very keen to know from General Smith

16     whether the Armija forces, particularly Avdo Palic was mentioned at this

17     point, had signed the agreement of the 24th of July that had been signed

18     by the Zepa War Presidency, and he led the questioning of General Smith

19     about that particular element.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Yesterday, you testified to the 65 ter document 6072

21     that was shown to you by the Prosecution.  This is the so-called Baxter's

22     report.

23             Can we call it up, please, and specifically item 16 which refers

24     to this issue.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And this is now P1979.

Page 11014

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   We see paragraph 16 where Izetbegovic tells General Smith as

 4     follows:

 5             "Izetbegovic told General Smith that he expected a new UN

 6     resolution in the next few hours enabling UNPROFOR to assume all the

 7     arrangements for the evacuation from Zepa and asked him whether he was

 8     ready to implement such a resolution."

 9             Do you remember this issue, since you were present at the meeting

10     Mr. Baxter is writing about?  And, if so, do you recall what it was that

11     Alija Izetbegovic had in mind when he spoke these words to General Smith?

12        A.   Yes, I remember this particular exchange.  And

13     President Izetbegovic explained that he had been speaking to a number of

14     different people from different countries, was the impression that he

15     gave, to try to increase support for a new UN resolution that would alter

16     the UNPROFOR mandate to allow us -- to allow UNPROFOR to implement the

17     arrangements for the evacuation from Zepa.

18             My recollection is that General Smith was very clear that,

19     obviously at the time, our existing, our existing mandate, you know, was

20     what it was.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember the date of this particular meeting?

22     Thank you.

23        A.   This particular exchange happened in the very early hours of

24     the -- the 26th of July.  So, you know, almost 1.00 in the morning, is my

25     recollection.

Page 11015

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Was the evacuation of the civilian population from

 2     Zepa over by then?  Thank you.

 3        A.   No.  No, it wasn't.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  We'll look at reports speaking to this later on.

 5             Let us now look at the rest of paragraph 16, starting from

 6     line 4, and I'm quoting:

 7             "Muratovic complained that UNPROFOR had assisted the evacuation

 8     of Zepa without the permission of the Bosnian government and that

 9     UNPROFOR should be responsible for compiling lists of the refugees on the

10     buses, escorting them safely to Kladanj, and comparing the figures and

11     names on arrival in Kladanj."

12             This is my question:  Does it follow from this that the operation

13     of evacuating the population from Zepa was conducted with the assistance

14     of UNPROFOR and that these people were on the buses, as Muratovic says?

15             So did you see civilians in Zepa on the 26th?

16        A.   This -- this meeting note refers to the 25th, to our experiences

17     in the Zepa on the 25th rather than 26th.

18             And my -- as I mentioned yesterday, my colleague

19     Captain Tom Dibb, who had been down in Zepa town, had seen, you know,

20     civilians down actually in Zepa town.  This exchange between

21     Minister Muratovic was very heated.  There was quite a lot of tension

22     because Muratovic was very concerned that similar problems with the

23     evacuation of the civilian population in Srebrenica on buses would occur

24     in Zepa, and he -- he really was very keen that UNPROFOR should keep

25     detailed records of every person that got on a bus driven by a Serb out

Page 11016

 1     of the Zepa pocket.  And that -- I remember the conversation being quite

 2     tense.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  But you do see that this is contradictory to what

 4     Muratovic had to say.  He criticised UNPROFOR for participating in the

 5     operation of compiling lists and for matching the lists compiled in Zepa

 6     with those compiled in Kladanj.  Were you aware of this?  Thank you.

 7        A.   Forgive me that that is not correct.  Muratovic was insisting

 8     that UNPROFOR should compile lists of people on the buses and that, you

 9     know, it says -- it says quite clearly here "and that UNPROFOR" -- oh,

10     I've touched the screen, I'm sorry, it's gone.  Sorry.

11             "And that UNPROFOR should be responsible for compiling lists of

12     the refugees on the buses, escorting them safely to Kladanj, and

13     comparing the figures and names on arrival in Kladanj."

14             And Muratovic's main contention was that that level of detail and

15     UNPROFOR security was not being given to the refugees, and that's what

16     the Bosnian side was so worried about.

17             I hope that clarifies the language that I've used.  And I did

18     author this report, and you can see my signature at the bottom.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Let's look at the first sentence of this

20     paragraph or, rather, the first part of this sentence.

21             "Muratovic complained that UNPROFOR had assisted the evacuation

22     of Zepa without the permission of the Bosnian government and that

23     UNPROFOR should be responsible for compiling lists of the refugees on the

24     buses," and only at this point do we have a comma in the sentence.  Is

25     that a phrase that is independent or is it dependant on the rest of the

Page 11017

 1     sentence?  Thank you.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  In the English text I don't see a comma.  Perhaps

 3     it's a translation issue.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Mr. President, yes.

 5             I think my last answer sort of explained that Muratovic was

 6     unhappy that we had been in the pocket of Zepa and had observed

 7     civilians, you know, preparing for the evacuation of a civilian

 8     population from the Zepa pocket but that we hadn't -- UNPROFOR hadn't

 9     taken, you know, the full responsibility for it.  It was a Bosnian Serb

10     army operation.  It was not an operation that UNPROFOR was in any way

11     controlling.  So I hope that clarifies, in answer to your question.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I would like to clarify with you to

13     which comma you were referring.  In the B/C/S text or in the English

14     text?  I see only a comma after the word "autobusima" in the B/C/S or

15     "refugees on the buses" in the English text.

16             Was that the comma you were referring to or to another?  A comma

17     in the beginning of the sentence between the first and the second part

18     would change the meaning.  But there is no comma, in my understanding.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I said that a comma

20     came only after "the buses," so whatever is written ahead of the comma

21     relates to that particular clause.  In other words, Muratovic complained

22     that UNPROFOR had assisted the evacuation of Zepa and that UNPROFOR

23     should be responsible for compiling lists.  So this report refers to a

24     protest that Muratovic lodged with UNPROFOR.

25             Let's see what Alija Izetbegovic had to say further down.

Page 11018

 1             Paragraph 16, third line from the bottom:

 2             "Izetbegovic thanks General Smith for his help an efforts and

 3     said that the government would await the outcome of the new UN resolution

 4     and, in the meantime, speak to Dr. Kulovac and continue its efforts

 5     through Masovic and the prisoners of war exchange commission."

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   This is my question:  Do you remember, what was it that

 8     Alija Izetbegovic was thanking General Smith for?  Thank you.

 9        A.   President Izetbegovic was thanking General Smith for actually

10     going out to the check-point 2 as -- himself, personally, after the

11     morning meeting with General Mladic.  And he was thanking him for his

12     personal, you know, feedback from that meeting about the situation on the

13     ground.  And also he made reference to the fact that General Smith had

14     sent a headquarters UNPROFOR liaison team with independent communication,

15     of -- the Ukrainian company was there, into Zepa town itself with civil

16     affairs support, and President Izetbegovic was expressing gratitude for

17     the course of action that General Smith had taken in this regard.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Since General Smith will testify here, he will tell

19     us what it was that he was discussing with Izetbegovic.  Therefore, I

20     won't ask you to interpret his opinion.

21             Let's look at D173 in e-court.  It is a report drafted by the

22     same people that were referred to.  General Smith sent that report to

23     Zepa.  Without going back to paragraphs 15 and 16 of this document

24     because they are quite lengthy.

25             Thank you.  We see a statement of one of those people by sent by

Page 11019

 1     General Smith to Zepa.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we go to page 3.  He arrived

 3     on the 19th, pursuant to General Smith's orders.  Let us go to page 3,

 4     please, paragraph 16, and paragraph 17.  Thank you.

 5             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   This is what is stated in paragraph 16.  I quote:

 7             "We created written lists of the evacuees.  And as far as I can

 8     recall, we had a separate list for each vehicle.  I handed over those

 9     lists later, either to UNHCR or someone in UNPROFOR.  We also tried to

10     place one UNPROFOR soldier to each vehicle, but I'm not sure if we

11     managed to do it all the time during the evacuation."

12             In paragraph 17 it says:

13             "The evacuation lasted probably three days ..." he arrived on the

14     19th.  And he goes on to say, "or a bit longer.  The atmosphere was quite

15     tense throughout, but we managed to get all those people on board who had

16     come to the centre and were willing to go.  In my estimate, approximately

17     7.000 people were evacuated."

18             This was paragraph 16 and 17 of D173.  This particular witness

19     testified before you.

20             Can you tell us this:  At the time when General Smith was there,

21     when the meeting with Izetbegovic was held, were you able to find any

22     civilians in the enclave of Zepa?

23        A.   As I testified yesterday, the meeting with Izetbegovic was held

24     on -- in the very early hours of the morning of the 26th and related to

25     the events of the 25th of July.  So there were a number of -- when we

Page 11020

 1     arrived --

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, it would very polite if you could

 3     listen to the witness when she is giving you an answer.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 5             So when we first arrived on that first afternoon, on the 25th,

 6     there were a number of vehicles in the area of check-point 2, and that's

 7     when we had the opportunity to meet up face to face with the headquarters

 8     UNPROFOR liaison team, and specifically Captain Dibb.  And I believe that

 9     at that stage General Smith did have an opportunity to speak to both

10     Captain Dibb and, I think, the civil affairs teams.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Thank you.  Have you read this report written by civilian

13     affairs?  Did that person send any reports about the evacuation to

14     Sarajevo?

15        A.   I personally have never seen this piece of witness statement

16     before or my -- my role at the headquarters was not to read the civil

17     affairs reports.  So I'm aware that information was transmitted by my

18     colleague Captain Tom Dibb and the civil affairs team throughout their

19     whole time that they were in the Zepa pocket, but I didn't personally

20     read all of it.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  For the clarity of the record, this document on

22     the screen in front of us is witness statement of Mr. Joseph of 2005.

23             Were you referring to this statement when you were mentioning a

24     report of civil affairs, Mr. Tolimir?

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 11021

 1             I did have the statement in mind, and I asked the witness whether

 2     she ever received reports from Mr. Joseph.  I do not dispute that the

 3     evacuation took place on 15th, the 16th, and the 17th, but he was in

 4     charge of the evacuation and he probably reported on it.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, that was not my question.  I was

 6     referring to your question you put to the witness, page 25, line 11.  I

 7     quote:  "Have you read this report written by civilian affairs?"  To

 8     which report written by civilian affairs were you referring to?  Or were

 9     you referring to the witness statement of Mr. Joseph?  That was the

10     matter I would like to ...

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

12             I wanted to ask whether she read any reports sent by

13     Edward Joseph as the civil affairs officer.  That is to say, any reports

14     sent by UNPROFOR command to Zepa.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This is really a different question now.  The

16     witness may answer that.  But in the meantime, I would like to see the

17     first page of this witness statement of Mr. Joseph again.  It will be on

18     the screen shortly.

19             Mr. Thayer.

20             MR. THAYER:  And while that's coming up, Mr. President, I don't

21     think there's any dispute but perhaps General Tolimir misspoke with

22     respect to the dates.  We have the 15th, 16th, and 17th.  I don't think

23     there's any dispute that we're talking about the 25th, 26th, and

24     27th of July, just so there's no confusion when we go back to the record

25     later.

Page 11022

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And what we have on the screen is on the head of

 2     the ICTY OTP information report.  Submitter, Olli Salo; subject,

 3     interview with Edward Joseph; date, 9th of February, 2005; witness,

 4     personal details.  And then we have a witness statement.

 5             But your last question was whether the witness read any reports

 6     sent by Edward Joseph as the civil affairs officer.

 7             Ms. Sayer, could you answer that question.

 8             THE WITNESS:  The civil affairs reports that I would ordinarily

 9     read as part of my role related normally to the Bosnian Muslim or the

10     Bosnian Croat side.  So the reports that I read from the UNPROFOR liaison

11     team that was in the Zepa pocket over this period were all coming from

12     Captain Dibb as opposed to Mr. Joseph.

13             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Thank you.  I quoted paragraphs 16 and 17 from the statement.  Is

15     it clear from those paragraphs that Mr. Joseph also took part in the

16     creation of lists of those who were to be evacuated?  And was he also in

17     charge of assigning personnel to escort the buses?

18        A.   I can't speak to that.  My recollection about the personnel on

19     the buses was that that was the responsibility of the French military

20     contingent of UNPROFOR, as opposed to civil affairs.

21        Q.   Thank you.  I am not familiar with your tasking, but I just

22     wanted to go back to paragraph 16.  Here, it is stated that they created

23     written lists.  That means the persons who wrote the report of the

24     evacuees.

25             "And as far as I can recall, we had separate lists for each

Page 11023

 1     vehicle.  I handed over those lists later, either to the UNHCR or someone

 2     in UNPROFOR.  We also tried to place one UNPROFOR soldier to each

 3     vehicle, but I'm not sure if we managed to do it ... throughout the

 4     evacuation."

 5             My question is this:  Did any civil affairs, UNHCR, and UNPROFOR

 6     representatives take part in the evacuation of the civilians from Zepa?

 7        A.   As I have referenced yesterday in my testimony, I was aware that

 8     this took place actually in Zepa town where I was never present.  But

 9     from my conversations with Captain Tom Dibb, you may recall from

10     yesterday's testimony that there was quite a significant debate and some

11     tension between the ICRC people and the UNPROFOR people that actually

12     were in the Zepa pocket over -- over the difference sorts of activities

13     that they should undertake or be willing to undertake.  So I did not know

14     that there were written lists for each -- each vehicle, for example.  But

15     I did know that there was an attempt to put an UNPROFOR person on each of

16     the vehicles.  And I remember there being an exchange between

17     General Smith and General Mladic when that hadn't happened, when, you

18     know, UNPROFOR soldiers were forbidden to get on a number of vehicles,

19     and General Smith raised this as a matter of concern with General Mladic.

20             So that's the extent of my knowledge relating to this.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Were UNHCR and UNPROFOR representatives, as well as

22     civilian affair representatives and Mr. Dibb, allowed to evacuate any

23     person from the centre of town and was willing to leave?  We can see that

24     in paragraph 16 -- 17.  Are you familiar with that?

25        A.   I am aware that an evacuation took place, yes.

Page 11024

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that the VRS had no participation in the

 2     checking of IDs, age, and those put on board those vehicles?  Not a

 3     single person was checked out of the entire civilian population that was

 4     to be evacuated.

 5        A.   My -- in yesterday's testimony, I explained that I have seen

 6     Captain Tom Dibb on the afternoon of the 25th at check-point 2, and he

 7     had told me that there was a Serb military doctor who was involved in

 8     looking at the condition of wounded and that they had been involved in

 9     that process.

10        Q.   Thank you.  This is when the wounded were in question.  But did

11     he tell you that anyone hindered the evacuation of the civilian

12     population and whether -- of the Palic or UNHCR or UNPROFOR

13     representatives requested that the rest be evacuated as well.

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could Mr. Tolimir repeat

15     the entire question.  The interpreter simply did not understand.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, the interpreters asked you to repeat

17     the question because they are not sure if they understood it correctly.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Based on what you could see in the reports of UNHCR and UNPROFOR

21     representatives as well as civilian affairs representatives, could you

22     conclude that the evacuation of civilians from Zepa was carried out

23     without any hindrance by the VRS, as Mr. Joseph wrote in his report and

24     as he testified here before you?

25        A.   I -- I reflected yesterday in my testimony on the atmosphere

Page 11025

 1     amongst the civilian population, as described to me by Captain Tom Dibb,

 2     being very tense in the Zepa enclave and that whenever there were

 3     Bosnian Serb, you know, military people around, you know, the tension

 4     levels were very high.  So that's really all I can speak to on -- on that

 5     front.

 6             The people I met from the Zepa War Presidency, I think I've also

 7     reflected that the impression that I formed very strongly was that they

 8     were frightened and under duress.  So I can't really speak to anything

 9     else.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Let us look at reports of some other people involved

11     in the evacuation.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have P585.  It is

13     Louis Fortin's diary.  Page 143, please, in the Serbian, and 140 in the

14     English.  It is the entry for the 21st of July, 1995.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This should not be broadcast because it's

16     confidential.

17             THE WITNESS:  Excuse me, I wonder if I may have some more water.

18     Thank you.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, of course.  The Court Usher will assist you.

20             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             We have it in the English language but not in Serbian still.

23     Page 143 in the Serbian please.

24             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Thank you.  It reads as follows:

Page 11026

 1             "A meeting between General Gobillard General Harland on the

 2     21st of July' --

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, please give a reference from which

 4     part you are reading.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  We can see on the

 6     screen that it concerns the 1st of May, 1995.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Which page?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P585, page 143 in the Serbian, and

 9     page 140 in the English.  The entry for the 21st of July, 1995, and not

10     for the 1st of May, 1995.  21st of July, 1995.  We can see it now.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  No, we don't have it in English yet.

12             Mr. Thayer.

13             MR. THAYER:  I just wanted to mention it's still the wrong page.

14     The page number is correct as quoted by General Tolimir.  Page 140 does

15     reflect the meeting on 21st of July.  So I'm not sure.  Maybe there's a

16     different version in e-court.  There we go.  Got it.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  This is page 143 in B/C/S and 140 in

18     the English.

19             Please go ahead, Mr. Tolimir.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to thank Mr. Thayer.

21     Thank you, Mr. President.

22     (redacted)

23     (redacted)

24     (redacted)

25     (redacted)

Page 11027

 1     (redacted)

 2     (redacted)

 3     (redacted)

 4     (redacted)

 5     (redacted)

 6     (redacted)

 7     (redacted)

 8     (redacted)

 9     (redacted)

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, we should consider if it's

11     appropriate to read this text into the transcript because it's a

12     confidential document.  But I'm not quite sure if that is really the fact

13     because we saw some pages with redactions.  Can you tell us, or perhaps

14     Mr. Thayer, if we have the redacted version of the confidential version

15     on the screen.

16             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, there are two levels of redactions

17     going on.  One is that -- which were imposed upon the OTP by the

18     provider.  The second -- and that is placing it under seal and referring

19     to the contents in private session.  So, Mr. President, you are correct.

20     I was actually discussing with Ms. Stewart whether to stand up, given the

21     content.

22             The redactions that we see, to which Your Honour is referring,

23     the blacking out, refers to very, very personal, purely personal matters

24     which Colonel Fortin had wished to be redacted.  This, again, was a

25     personal diary of his.  I think you heard about this when he testified.

Page 11028

 1     So that's what the actual blacked out parts refer to.  That's independent

 2     of the Rule 70 restrictions that were placed upon us.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Perhaps you can help us if there is any problem

 4     with reading out some portions of this diary into the record, or should

 5     that be in private session and the public part be redacted?

 6             MR. THAYER:  I think it really should be in private session,

 7     Mr. President, to comply with the Rule 70 restrictions.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  In that case, we should turn into private

 9     session.

10             And the parts you have read out, Mr. Tolimir, should be redacted.

11                           [Private session]

12     (redacted)

13     (redacted)

14     (redacted)

15     (redacted)

16     (redacted)

17     (redacted)

18     (redacted)

19     (redacted)

20     (redacted)

21     (redacted)

22     (redacted)

23     (redacted)

24     (redacted)

25     (redacted)

Page 11029











11     Pages 11029-11030 redacted. Private session.
















Page 11031

 1     (redacted)

 2     (redacted)

 3     (redacted)

 4     (redacted)

 5     (redacted)

 6     (redacted)

 7                           [Open session]

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  By my mistake, we left the

10     courtroom for our first break in private session.  We are now back in

11     open session.

12             Before Mr. Tolimir is continuing his cross-examination, I would

13     like to ask Mr. Gajic to clarify one thing.  We heard your submission,

14     your response, to a motion of the Prosecution to convert some witnesses

15     from viva voce to 98 bis respectively, 92 ter.  Your response was only

16     related to one witness, you discussed yesterday, and not the others.

17     Does that mean that you will respond to the motion of the Prosecution in

18     writing?  Just to clarify the situation.

19             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, yes, of course, my

20     response had to do with one witness only.  We will submit the remainder

21     of our response in writing.  We will do so because that is what the

22     Court Officer asked to us do.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  This is clear now.

24             Mr. Tolimir, you may continue your cross-examination.  Will you

25     still deal with the last document we had -- or still have on the screen?

Page 11032

 1     In that case, we should go into private session.  Otherwise, you may

 2     continue in open session.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I will

 4     not be using the document anymore.  I will be asking the witness about

 5     her knowledge.  Thank you.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, please continue.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Please, Ms. Sayer, a moment ago we discussed a document which

10     contained a public statement made by Silajdzic to the general public and

11     UNPROFOR.  Therefore, it was in the public domain.  Do you remember, we

12     just discussed it, if General Smith --

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, you see Mr. Thayer on his feet.

14             Mr. Thayer.

15             MR. THAYER:  And, Mr. President, I'm going to keep getting on my

16     feet if General Tolimir is going to build into his questions statements

17     that are just unsupported by the record.  If he would just the question

18     without building in these misstatements.  I don't think there's anything

19     in that portion that suggests that it was a public record, that it was a

20     public statement.  To the contrary.  It was a meeting between

21     General Gobillard and Mr. Silajdzic.

22             So I'm going to keep standing up as long as he keeps

23     misrepresenting the facts.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I think Mr. Thayer is correct.  We

25     saw a record -- a reference to a specific meeting which was not a public

Page 11033

 1     meeting.  Please continue.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I wasn't referring to

 3     the meeting.  I was referring to Mr. Silajdzic's statement for the press

 4     and UNPROFOR, which is clearly referenced here.  If Mr. Thayer wants to

 5     keep this confidential, he may do so, but I do believe that the public is

 6     already aware of this.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE: [Previous translation continues] ... No, this is

 8     not the problem.  You said, We saw a document about a public statement

 9     made by Silajdzic.  The document was not related to a public statement.

10     Perhaps there was a public statement, but the document was not referring

11     to that.  Please choose your words very carefully.

12             Continue, please.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   This is my question:  Did you hear a public broadcast of a

16     statement where Mr. Silajdzic stated that he wanted to assist the

17     evacuation of civilians from Zepa but that he also wanted them to stay

18     there in order for the Serbs to have blood on their hands once they

19     capture Zepa?  Is this something you heard broadcast?  Thank you.

20        A.   No.  I don't recall hearing a broadcast, a public broadcast, in

21     that regard.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Since you were present at meetings where you were

23     able to hear things and you read reports, this is my question for you:

24     Did General Smith, through his action or inaction in stalling the

25     negotiations surrounding the all-for-all exchange, contribute to the wish

Page 11034

 1     of Silajdzic to have the Muslims remain in Zepa in order for the Serbs to

 2     be compelled to seize it and to get blood on their hands?  Thank you.

 3        A.   I am not aware of any action that General Smith took in order to

 4     stall the negotiations surrounding an all-for-all prisoner exchange.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we show D56 now, please.  Or

 7     D55.  Whichever is easier for e-court.  Thank you.

 8             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   While we're waiting for the document to appear, I'll put my

10     question to you.  We'll have a look at what General Smith was doing.  We

11     see the fall of Zepa there.  This is a document produced by Bezruchenko.

12     You must have met him in your time there.  He was at the UNPROFOR HQ and

13     appeared as an expert for the Prosecution here.  Thank you.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, this is not an appropriate way to

15     ask for a document.  This or that.  You should decide which document you

16     want to have on the screen.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I want

18     this document, page 30.  Thank you.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Which one is it?  D56 or D55?

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D55.  Page 30, paragraph 108.

21     Thank you.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   I'm quoting from paragraph 108.  You have it there.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the witness be shown the

Page 11035

 1     paragraph which is at the bottom in English.

 2             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   This is what Mr. Bezruchenko had to say as an expert for the

 4     Prosecution:

 5             "Following the meeting between General Smith and Hamdija Torlak

 6     on 126th of July, 285th brigade commander Avdo Palic sent a dramatic

 7     appeal for help to BIH President Alija Izetbegovic and General Staff

 8     commander Rasim Delic."

 9             What follows below is the entire telegram which I'm not going to

10     quote in its entirety but only one portion.

11             It reads:

12             "President, at about 2100 hours, negotiations in Boksanica ...

13     were concluded at which General Smith; Torlak, Hamdija, president of the

14     executive board of Zepa, and war criminal Ratko Mladic were present."

15             I would like to skip the next four or lines to quote from line 6:

16             "During the negotiations, General Smith stated that our side did

17     not accept the agreement about the exchange of all for all and that our

18     side was looking for some additional concessions.  Hamdija Torlak

19     remained at the place of negotiations in Boksanica and he was told that

20     if we were ready for an all-for-all exchange, during the night or until

21     0800 hours in the morning, General Smith will let us know, so that a plan

22     of helicopter evacuation could be prepared."

23             What is the extent of your knowledge about this, since on the

24     26th, as you say, you were present at a meeting with Hamdija Torlak,

25     General Mladic, and General Smith?  You were able to see an image of

Page 11036

 1     that.

 2        A.   My recollection is that there was a discussion between -- well,

 3     General Smith reflected the comments that President Izetbegovic and

 4     Minister Muratovic and Minister Masovic had made the evening before, and

 5     there was definitely conversation, I can recall, about a helicopter

 6     evacuation being supported by UNPROFOR.  But I don't believe that the

 7     Bosnian Serb side agreed to the helicopter evacuation.

 8        Q.   Thank you, Ms. Emma.  My question didn't have to do with

 9     helicopters.  Can you tell me whether mention was made at the meeting and

10     whether General Smith said that the Bosnian side was not agreeing to the

11     all-for-all exchange and that it was asking for additional concessions?

12     Thank you.

13        A.   I'm afraid I don't recall that, no.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Can we have line 11 of the same text now, where it

15     reads:

16             "We cannot believe that this problem looks like you will not

17     solve it.  If this problem is not resolved in the course of tomorrow,

18     we [sic] must make a decision tomorrow to make a breakthrough in your

19     direction with 2.000 men and 10.000 rounds ... whoever will cross over,

20     and you have the picture of Srebrenica," and so on.

21             This is my question: In this telegram that Avdo Palic sent to

22     Izetbegovic, did he express his protest about the fact that the army was

23     being compelled to break through out of the encirclement?

24        A.   I am reading this document in front of me for the first time.

25     And I should probably let you know that I never personally met

Page 11037

 1     Avdo Palic, so I cannot speak to whether this is an accurate reflection

 2     of what he said or not.  I have no knowledge.

 3        Q.   Thank you, Ms. Sayer.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at line 16 now of the

 5     same telegram sent by Avdo Palic to Alija Izetbegovic.

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   It reads:

 8             "I am appealing to you on behalf of combatants or fighters who

 9     have for the past 15 days been fighting like lions.  I ask you in the

10     name of fallen soldiers.  And in my ranks have I sons or parents of those

11     who died.  I ask you in the name of the evacuated families and children

12     who are -- who can't wait to meet with their fathers who are left on the

13     Zepa mountain to be slaughtered or annihilated in any other way.  I ask

14     you again in the name of my soldiers to make it possible for us to defend

15     Bosnia in some other battle-fields."

16             Since you were saying yesterday that General Smith was not aware

17     of Avdo Palic's position, did he express his position in public to his

18     Presidency in the telegrams, and did he not in this document publicly say

19     that he supported Torlak as his representative who was waiting at

20     Boksanica for a response?  Thank you.

21        A.   I refer to my earlier answer, that I've never seen this document

22     before or met Mr. Palic.

23             So General Smith -- the only conversation that I am aware that

24     General Smith had about Avdo Palic was when Minister Muratovic was

25     pressing him very hard to state whether Avdo Palic had signed the

Page 11038

 1     agreement of the 24th of July that had been signed by the

 2     Zepa War Presidency.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, how can I understand your last

 4     question?  You said:  "Did he express his position in public to his

 5     president in the telegrams?"

 6             What do you mean by the words "in public"?  Is your understanding

 7     that a telegram to a president is a public statement?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, for

 9     allowing me to state my mind.

10             I should have said "clearly," "jasno," rather than "publicly,"

11     "javno."  Maybe I misspoke.  What I meant was, did he not state it

12     clearly to Alija Izetbegovic.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  This clarifies the

14     situation.

15             Please carry on.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

17             Can we go back to page 23 of this report now.  This is

18     Bezruchenko's report about the fall of Zepa.  Let's look at paragraph 86

19     on page 23.  Thank you.  We see it there.

20             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Mr. Bezruchenko says:

22             "UNPROFOR, Sector Sarajevo, at this point UNPROFOR

23     Sector Sarajevo began preparations for evacuations of civilians from

24     Zepa.  UNPROFOR operations order dated 20 July made the following

25     assessment of the situation."

Page 11039

 1             And I'm quoting the translation from English.

 2              "BiH defence of Zepa has collapsed, and surrender of the enclave

 3     to VRS has been accepted.  Large numbers of displaced persons wishing to

 4     seek refuge in the Federation-controlled territory will therefore have to

 5     moved."

 6             And in footnote 131 you can see the original title of the

 7     document in English.  Have you read it?  Do you remember?  Thank you.

 8        A.   In my role at headquarters UNPROFOR, I did not read OP orders

 9     from Sector Sarajevo which was commanded by General Gobillard.  They

10     would normally have been dealt with either by the Chief of Staff,

11     General Nicolai, or -- or by Colonel Baxter.  So I haven't seen this

12     report.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Let's look at paragraph 87 now.  The order determined

14     the UNPROFOR mission as follows; I'm quoting from the English

15     translation:

16             "In conjunction with BiH government and UNHCR, UNPROFOR is to

17     coordinate the evacuation of displaced persons from Zepa to Zenica."

18             And in footnote 132, we have the referenced document, which you

19     would have to read for yourself in English.  I don't read English.

20             This is my question.  In these operational orders issued by

21     UNPROFOR that I've just quoted from, is there a position expressed that

22     UNPROFOR should get involved in the evacuation of the population or,

23     rather, of the displaced persons from Zepa to Zenica?  Thank you.

24        A.   The text says that UNPROFOR is to coordinate the evacuation of

25     DPs from Zepa to Zenica, which is rather different than to organise.

Page 11040

 1        Q.   Thank you for stating with precision what was written there.

 2     That's true; UNPROFOR was supposed to coordinate.  Thank you.

 3             If you can, look at paragraph 88, which states as follows:

 4             "The evacuation operation was supposed to be executed in three

 5     stages and involve UNPROFOR forces of Sector Sarajevo, Sector North-East,

 6     Sector South-West, as well as HQ UNPROFOR."

 7             And he explained it in footnote 133.  He said that these were the

 8     organisations that UNPROFOR was supposed to coordinate.  Is that what you

 9     had in mind when you specified that it had to do with coordination

10     between UNPROFOR?  Was it these other organisations that were supposed to

11     be involved in that?  Thank you.

12        A.   I should clarify.  I haven't seen any of the specific OP orders

13     that are referenced in the footnotes to this document.  But normally a

14     military OP order would, you know, include a great deal more detail than

15     the very small extracts that have been highlighted in this report that

16     you've just read at paras 88 and -- yeah, at paragraph 88.

17        Q.   Thank you.  If you didn't read or see them, does it mean that

18     there were no documents produced on the 20th of July as operational

19     orders of the Sector Sarajevo HQ?  Thank you.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, what is that kind of question?

21     She -- the witness clearly stated that she hasn't read it.  You -- you

22     can't draw from that that there were no documents like that.  This is not

23     helping.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I put my question, and

25     she can say, I know, I don't know, whether the question is stupid,

Page 11041

 1     logical, or illogical.  I merely put it as it is.  Thank you.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Well, then my answer would be that the question is

 3     illogical as -- merely the fact that I haven't --

 4             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6        A.   -- read it doesn't mean that they don't exist.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  This is my next question:  Were you actively involved

 8     in the developments surrounding Zepa?  Can you tell us when it was that

 9     UNPROFOR commenced engaging in preparations for the evacuation of the

10     civilians from Zepa, and what did it -- the preparations involve?  Thank

11     you.

12        A.   Perhaps I can clarify, as I testified yesterday, that my primary

13     role within headquarters UNPROFOR working for General Smith was as the

14     liaison officer with the Bosnian Presidency and the Croat -- and the

15     Federation.

16             It was unusual for me to be involved in Bosnian Serb-held

17     territory, and the only reason that I was involved in the meetings that

18     was discussed at length yesterday was because my colleague

19     Captain Tom Dibb was already deployed in the Zepa enclave.  My role is --

20     was largely on these visits to keep notes, to act as an interpreter when

21     required, and to, you know, observe as -- as part of General Smith's

22     party, what was going on, on the ground.

23             I hope that helps explain that I did not have a role in the

24     strategy or the operational control of UNPROFOR's operations at that

25     time.

Page 11042

 1        Q.   Thank you.  In that case, my question is this:  Did General Smith

 2     and his party, together with you, do anything to allow or to create the

 3     conditions which would allow the civilian population to remain in Zepa?

 4        A.   One of the documents that we saw yesterday made reference to

 5     UNPROFOR's mandate, and General Smith was very clear throughout the time

 6     he was on the ground at check-point 2 what UNPROFOR could do and what we

 7     couldn't do.  Specifically we were not able to guarantee any part of the

 8     agreement that was signed, for example, on the 24th of July by the

 9     Zepa War Presidency.

10             So I hope that answers your question.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Do the provisions of that agreement provide any

12     security guarantees to the departing population in keeping with the

13     agreement itself, any guarantees during the period of the war?  And we

14     refer to paragraph 7, I believe.

15        A.   Paragraph 7, I believe, as we saw yesterday, did reference the

16     Geneva Convention.  The point that I'm making is that General Smith,

17     my -- I have a very clear recollection that General Smith was extremely

18     clear with both General Mladic and the members of the War Presidency that

19     UNPROFOR could not sign or be party as a guarantor to that agreement.

20        Q.   Thank you for stressing that.

21             Does it mean that under the agreement provisions the population

22     of Zepa was supposed to be evacuated and eventually allowed to return

23     once the war was over?  Were they allowed to do that?  Thank you.

24        A.   I believe we spoke yesterday about the phrase "to freely choose."

25     The population were supposed to have the ability to freely choose where

Page 11043

 1     they wanted to live.  And as I reflected yesterday, from my conversations

 2     with Captain Dibb, the impression that was formed by him and passed to me

 3     was that the local population did not feel that they had freedom to

 4     choose.  They were leaving because they were afraid and they felt there

 5     were no other options.  Yeah.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Tell us this, please: Does Dudnik's signature, who

 7     was UNPROFOR representative and UNPROFOR commander in Zepa, provides any

 8     legitimacy to him to sign that agreement?  Was it his -- done on his

 9     personal own behalf, or did he do that on behalf of UNPROFOR?

10        A.   I can't speak to what was in Colonel Dudnik's mind when he signed

11     the agreement.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us whether it was the position of

13     General Smith in his conversations with General Mladic and Torlak was his

14     own personal position, or did he act on behalf of UNPROFOR HQ?  Who did

15     he act on -- on whose behalf did he act?

16        A.   I think, really, that's a question for General Smith.  But

17     General Smith was commander of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, so ...

18        Q.   What about Colonel Dudnik?  Was he not the commander of UNPROFOR

19     in the enclave of Zepa?

20        A.   He was the colonel of the Ukrainian contingent of UNPROFOR in the

21     enclave of Zepa.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Was the UNPROFOR contingent under the command of

23     Sector Sarajevo and the UN forces in Bosnia?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Let us look at some footage concerning Zepa to see

Page 11044

 1     what the representatives at the negotiations had to do about the security

 2     of the population.  It is P740.  You can see some people in this still

 3     whom you had recognised as being Mr. Torlak and General Mladic.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could you now play the footage,

 5     please.

 6                           [Video-clip played]

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Were you able to hear what General Mladic said or perhaps to read

10     the subtitles?  What did he tell Mr. Torlak about the able-bodied men as

11     part of the column that was passing through the Boksanica check-point?

12     Didn't he tell him that there were some able-bodied men there?

13        A.   The subtitles indicated that he did refer to able-bodied men.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Could you hear Mr. Torlak's answer?  What did he tell

15     the General?

16        A.   No, sorry, I -- I heard the bit about the coffee and the sugar.

17     But I'm not sure about his answer to the last bit.

18             Perhaps if it could be replayed, if that's important.

19        Q.   Thank you.  It is, since they were not taken out of the convoy

20     but were actually allowed to proceed.

21                           [Video-clip played]

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Were you able to read Mr. Hamdija's response whereby he said that

25     there weren't that many?

Page 11045

 1        A.   Yes, I did read that in the subtitles.

 2        Q.   Did you hear General Mladic say, I don't want to see any more of

 3     them coming in?

 4        A.   It's up on the screen in front of me at the moment.

 5        Q.   Does it mean that they were actually allowed to proceed?  And

 6     they were able-bodied men, as both Mladic and Torlak agreed.  Because

 7     Torlak said that there weren't that many.

 8        A.   I have -- I have no knowledge of this exchange.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  You could hear it, and you also saw Mr. Joseph's

10     report, where he says that he managed to evacuate everyone from the list

11     successfully.  Does it mean that the VRS did not at all check the age in

12     order to ascertain who -- which men were of military age and which were

13     not during the evacuation of Zepa?

14        A.   I don't know.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we next see Exhibit P585

17     again.  It is Fortin's diary.  Could we have page 56, the entry for the

18     25th of July, 1995.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It should not be broadcast.  And if you want to

20     read anything from that document, we have to go into private session, I'm

21     afraid.  But this ...

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I wanted to read out

23     certain portions.  Because Mr. Fortin did not want to have that under

24     seal.  We made use of this in public session when he testified.  In any

25     case, I will abide by your instruction.

Page 11046

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Perhaps Mr. Thayer can help us, if there is a

 2     need to go into private session.

 3             MR. THAYER:  Well, Mr. President, as of yet, I don't know exactly

 4     what portion we're talking about.  So I'm afraid I can't help the Court

 5     right now.  In a moment I may be able to, but ...

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  The same portion was

 7     read out during Mr. Fortin's testimony.  I will read it out.  If

 8     Mr. Thayer believes that it should not be made public, I will not object.

 9     However, it was red out in public once before.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It would be very helpful if you could give us the

11     relevant part, indicate the page number, to check that.

12             MR. THAYER:  In this section of Colonel Fortin's diary, there are

13     a number of entries for various meetings and conversations throughout the

14     day on the 25th.  So if we could have page numbers, as Your Honour asked

15     for, and a time, because he identifies a lot of these meetings by time,

16     that would be particularly helpful.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  It is

19     P585.  P585.  It is already an exhibit.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This is on the screen.  We were asking for a page

21     number and a date of the entry you want to read out.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Page 156.  The entry

23     for the 25th of July, 1995, concerning the enclave of Zepa.  It is about

24     a meeting between General Janvier, Smith, and Gobillard.  The last

25     paragraph --

Page 11047

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Which page is it in English?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The same page in the English.

 3             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President --

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

 5             MR. THAYER:  Again, I -- the reason I asked for the time is that

 6     there are a number of meetings.  If we're referring to the meeting that

 7     begins at 0930 hours, that begins on page 155 in the English, not 156, if

 8     the General is interested in the witness being able to read the actual

 9     account of the meeting from the beginning.  It begins on 155.  It's a

10     meeting at the airport, 25 July, 0930 hours.  I don't know if that's what

11     General Tolimir is referring to, but that's where it begins in English,

12     page 155.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I don't know if that is the page we have on the

14     screen at the moment.  There is mentioning of a meeting between

15     Generals Janvier, Smith, and Gobillard at the airport, 25th of July,

16     0930 hours.  But I don't see that -- oh, yes, it's also on the B/C/S on

17     the left side of the screen.

18             Is there any problem to deal with that in a public session,

19     Mr. Thayer?

20             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I think to stay on the right side of

21     the Rule 70 restrictions that have been imposed we should remain in

22     private session whether or not it came in, in public inadvertently

23     through Colonel Fortin.  I think, as the Trial Chamber's already noted,

24     that is the requirement for this document from the Rule 70 provider.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  We will turn into private session.

Page 11048

 1                           [Private session]

 2     (redacted)

 3     (redacted)

 4     (redacted)

 5     (redacted)

 6     (redacted)

 7     (redacted)

 8     (redacted)

 9     (redacted)

10     (redacted)

11     (redacted)

12     (redacted)

13     (redacted)

14     (redacted)

15     (redacted)

16     (redacted)

17     (redacted)

18     (redacted)

19     (redacted)

20     (redacted)

21     (redacted)

22     (redacted)

23     (redacted)

24     (redacted)

25     (redacted)

Page 11049











11     Page 11049 redacted. Private session.















Page 11050

 1     (redacted)

 2     (redacted)

 3     (redacted)

 4     (redacted)

 5     (redacted)

 6     (redacted)

 7                           [Open session]

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, please continue.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

11             Could we please have P1980.  We saw that document yesterday.  It

12     is the Baxter report.  The witness provided some answers regarding it in

13     view of some Prosecution questions.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   I wanted to ask you this:  Do you recall whether Mr. Louis Fortin

16     attended the meeting as well?  The meeting was held on the

17     28th of July, 1995.  Sorry, the 27th.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Which meeting are you referring to, Mr. Tolimir?

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The meeting between Smith and

20     Mladic that Mr. Baxter refers to in his report.  It was on the 27th, and

21     I believe the report was drafted on the 28th.  It was discussed yesterday

22     during our hearing.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Where in this document - page 1 we have on the

24     screen - can we find a reference to that meeting?  It would help the

25     Chamber and witness.

Page 11051

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Paragraph 4.

 2             Could we also have that paragraph in the Serbian.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   My question is this:  Was the meeting attended by Mr. Fortin, who

 5     actually referred to the meeting here?

 6             Apologies, no, this is the Baxter report.  And we will see

 7     Fortin's report about the same topic a bit later.

 8        A.   I don't -- I don't recall Mr. Fortin being at the meeting.  There

 9     were a number of Sector Sarajevo staff in the -- the Zepa enclave.  It's

10     possible that he had travelled in one of their vehicles, but he certainty

11     had not been part of General Smith's party, in the vehicles that -- that

12     we travelled to check-point 2 in.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Let us look at para 4:

14             "General Smith explains to Mladic that the Bosnian government

15     were unlikely to accept this agreement as they had had no direct

16     involvement," as you yourself stated during your testimony.

17             I continue:

18             "... and they ultimately held the POWs who were being offered for

19     exchange.  Mladic scornfully replied that Muratovic had had ample

20     opportunity to meet with Mladic at OP-2 but had consistently refused the

21     offer.  Mladic asked General Smith to inform the Bosnian government that

22     the agreement had been signed, and those men in Zepa who refused to

23     surrender their weapons by 1800 hours would be liquidated."

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see what else Baxter has

25     to say -- sorry, Fortin, at page 585.

Page 11052

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE: [Previous translation continues] ... again, very

 2     confusing.  You should put a question to the witness.  You have read out

 3     into the record a certain part of this document.  You should put a

 4     question to the witness before you move to another part of it.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Did you discuss the word "liquidation" yesterday as something

 8     that General Mladic told General Smith, which astounded you, as you said?

 9        A.   It wasn't the word "liquidation" that astounded me yesterday.

10     But yesterday we did talk about my recollection specifically of this

11     phrase that they would be liquidated if they refused to surrender their

12     weapons by the deadline of 1800 hours; that's correct.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Is this standard military lingo, a military term that

14     would be used in order to treat an enemy who is refusing to lay down

15     weapons, especially if it is all taking place within a demilitarised

16     zone?

17        A.   I don't believe it's standard military terminology to talk about

18     liquidating people of the opposing side, no.  Certainly not in English.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us how the British Army interprets what

20     needs to be done with the enemy if they continue providing resistance in

21     a territory already under the control of the British Army?  Let's use the

22     example of the Falkland Islands, for example.

23        A.   Well, if there is a battle going on, as there was in the

24     Falkland Islands, between two parties, it continues until there is either

25     a surrender or some form of peace accord.  So the fighting would

Page 11053

 1     continue --

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember how many --

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE: [Previous translation continues] ... the witness

 4     has not finished the answer.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

 6             But, you know, in -- using the Falklands as an example, I do not

 7     believe that, in any of the books I have read about the Falklands from

 8     the Generals who were responsible for that campaign, the term, you know

 9     "liquidating the enemy" was not used.  Thank you.

10             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Thank you.  Did the English army invade the Falkland Islands and

12     their population?  Thank you.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, we are not dealing with the Falkland

14     war in this courtroom.  The witness is not called as a witness in this

15     trial to testify about the Falkland conflict.

16             Carry on, please.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  The witnesses herself

18     said that in Britain weapons were not used to prevent such occurrences.

19             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Can you tell us, did you have any knowledge about there being

21     fighting going on between the Serbs and Muslims in Zepa?

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, this is a misstatement.  The witness

23     didn't say that.  Put a question to the witness in relation to the facts,

24     to Zepa, and the involvement of this witness in the negotiations and the

25     UNPROFOR activities.

Page 11054

 1             Carry on, please.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Please, Ms. Sayer, tell us, were the Muslims in Zepa armed, and

 5     did they mount resistance to the Army of Republika Srpska?  And was it

 6     for this reason that negotiations were taking place for their surrender

 7     of weapons and for the agreement that -- that was ultimately signed?

 8     Thank you.

 9        A.   I'm aware that there was a -- an armed force of Armija BH

10     soldiers within the Zepa enclave.  Indeed, we've spoken about their

11     commander, Avdo Palic.  But, as we mentioned, has already been mentioned,

12     part of the discussion between Minister Muratovic and General Smith

13     focussed on whether Avdo Palic had been party to the agreement that had

14     been signed by the Zepa War Presidency, because the -- Minister Muratovic

15     felt that Mr. Palic had not, that this had not been signed with the

16     agreement of the Armija troops on the ground in Zepa.

17             I hope that clarifies my answer to your question.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Tell us, following the talks between General Smith

19     and Muratovic, did Muratovic realize that the army in Zepa agreed to lay

20     down their weapons and not to take part in any further combat?  Thank

21     you.

22        A.   I recall General Smith explaining to Minister Muratovic that he

23     had not met Mr. Palic during his visits to OP-2 in Zepa.  So they would

24     not have had that exchange that formed the part of your question.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Did representatives of UNPROFOR talk to and were they

Page 11055

 1     in contact with Avdo Palic?  And did Avdo Palic pass through Boksanica as

 2     each and every bus carrying inhabitants of Zepa traversed the area?

 3     Thank you.

 4        A.   I'm not aware that he passed through the check-point 2 at any

 5     time.  I have no knowledge of that.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now show P585, please.

 8     Page 136 in Serbian and 156 in English.  This is Fortin's diary which

 9     speaks to the same event --

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE: [Previous translation continues] ... I've just

11     stopped you because we have to go into private session first.

12             Private.

13                           [Private session]

14     (redacted)

15     (redacted)

16     (redacted)

17     (redacted)

18     (redacted)

19     (redacted)

20     (redacted)

21     (redacted)

22     (redacted)

23     (redacted)

24     (redacted)

25     (redacted)

Page 11056











11     Page 11056 redacted. Private session.















Page 11057

 1     (redacted)

 2     (redacted)

 3     (redacted)

 4     (redacted)

 5     (redacted)

 6                           [Open session]

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

 9             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   This is my question: Were you present during the part of the

11     negotiations when General Mladic told General Smith that Muslim soldiers

12     should turn over their weapons or else fighting will continue and they

13     would be killed if they hold on to their weapon?  Thank you.

14        A.   Yes.  I was present.

15        Q.   As a soldier, you were a soldier at the time, do you believe it

16     legitimate for a commander to decide to continue engaging in combat

17     against those who refused to sign agreement on cessation of combat?  Is

18     that a legitimate decision, in your view?

19        A.   In my view, if you were in a combat situation and the fighting is

20     continuing and you end up having a situation where you are able to take

21     prisoners of the opposing side, there should be no question that

22     prisoners would be liquidated simply because they had refused to

23     surrender their weapons.  Once you've taken them prisoner, you have to

24     abide by the Geneva Convention on the rule regarding prisoners.  So it's

25     perfectly acceptable to remove their weapons from them and hold them as

Page 11058

 1     prisoners.  It is not, in my belief, acceptable to kill them once you've

 2     taken them as prisoner.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Did General Mladic refer to taking these soldiers

 4     prisoner or about continuing with the fighting unless they agreed to

 5     surrender their weapons?  Thank you.

 6        A.   I refer back to the note that I largely authored about this

 7     exchange, where Mladic gave an ultimatum that if the men of fighting age

 8     refused to surrender their weapons by the deadline he set of 1800 hours,

 9     that they would be liquidated.  I -- I wrote -- my notes accurately

10     reflected what General Mladic said.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Tell us, did the Muslims refuse to surrender weapons

12     up until the deadline indicated in the agreement and in General Mladic's

13     statement?  Thank you.

14        A.   I -- I -- we weren't in the enclave at the time of the -- the

15     deadline, so I -- I believe that there were men of fighting age that

16     refused to surrender, but I didn't personally see them.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Did you come to learn from anyone, either from

18     UNPROFOR or from any of the warring parties during the negotiations and

19     your three-day stay in Zepa, that the Muslim army did not wish to

20     surrender weapons and to surrender at the UN base, as indicated in the

21     agreement?  Thank you.

22        A.   As I think I've reflected in my testimony already, I did -- my

23     impression from speaking to Captain Dibb and others was that the members,

24     the men of fighting age within the enclave who were part of the Armija

25     force, had little confidence in their being treated properly as prisoners

Page 11059

 1     of war if they surrendered their weapons.  And certainly that was a fear

 2     that was also relayed at the meeting that happened in the early hours of

 3     the morning at the Presidency on the 25th/26th of July.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Are you testifying here about what it was that

 5     soldiers whom you didn't see were thinking or about what General Mladic

 6     said to General Smith about the agreement and adherence to it or

 7     violation of it by one of the two sides?  Thank you.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, your question put to the witness

 9     was:  "Did you come to learn from anyone, either from UNPROFOR or from

10     any of the warring parties during the negotiations," and so on.  You were

11     asking for that.  So that I'm surprised by the way you put the next

12     question to the witness.

13             Go ahead, please.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr.  President.  I'm

15     asking her, in the question that surprises you, whether she's testifying

16     about the views held by the soldiers who refused to surrender weapons or

17     about the events that happened in the relevant time-period.  Thank you.

18             THE WITNESS:  And I -- my answer relayed the impression gained

19     from Captain Dibb who was within the Zepa town throughout that period,

20     and also, you know, the questions that were asked by members of the

21     Bosnian Presidency in the meeting between General Smith,

22     President Izetbegovic, and Ministers Muratovic and Masovic on the late

23     evening of the 25th of July and early hours of the morning of the

24     26th of July, when, you know, President Izetbegovic and

25     Minister Muratovic both expressed their fear that even if they agreed to

Page 11060

 1     an all-for-all prisoner exchange, that the fighters, the Bosnian fighters

 2     within the Zepa enclave, would -- would still be subject to atrocities by

 3     the Bosnian Serb army.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Was their fear justified and was it materialised, in

 5     reality?

 6        A.   In my opinion, their fear was justifiably based on the experience

 7     that had just occurred in Srebrenica, which, in conversations between

 8     General Mladic and General Smith, General Mladic had claimed had been

 9     finished in the correct way, and yet, in this particular period, there

10     was a growing amount of information and evidence that suggested very

11     significant numbers of people, of men, had been killed, as they -- as

12     they sought a way to Federation territory from the enclave of Srebrenica.

13             So, in my opinion, I could understand why President Izetbegovic

14     and Minister Muratovic were afraid that the situation in Zepa would

15     deteriorate along the same lines, and this is why I believe they were

16     very keen to have any weapons that would be surrendered, surrendered to

17     UNPROFOR and not to BSA, and Minister Muratovic was desperate for the

18     evacuation to take place by helicopter rather than by road.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Yesterday you spoke of the agreement by the

20     War Presidency on the surrender of weapons.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have P736 shown.  Thank

22     you.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   It was signed by the three-member Presidency, as discussed in

25     your cross-examination yesterday.

Page 11061

 1             Do you recall that?

 2        A.   Yes, I recall us speaking about it yesterday.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Since you remember this, do you see here a document

 4     which the War Presidency of Zepa issued and signed?  It was signed by the

 5     three representatives of the War Presidency of the municipality of Zepa:

 6     Mehmed Hajric, Hamdija Torlak, and Amir Imamovic.

 7             Do you see that?

 8        A.   Yes, I can see it in front of me.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we show the body of the text of

11     this decision in English.  Thank you.

12             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   We'll be reading the first paragraph of the decision, below the

14     headline decision.

15              "All the able-bodied men aged 18 to 55 shall surrender their

16     weapons to representatives of the Army of Republika Srpska in the

17     presence of UNPROFOR at the UNPROFOR base in Zepa.  All the able-bodied

18     men shall be registered by the ICRC and shall be guarded by the forces of

19     the VRS in the presence of UNPROFOR in Zepa until an agreement on the

20     exchange has been reached.

21              "All the able-bodied men registered by the ICRC shall, once the

22     agreement is reached on the exchange and the exchange of prisoners of

23     war, be safely escorted by UNPROFOR and evacuated to the territory of

24     their choosing.  Urgently inform the Muslim authorities in Sarajevo of

25     this decision and carry it out forthwith.  27th of July, 1995," signed by

Page 11062

 1     the three members who took the decision, as well as by Rajko Kusic and

 2     General Mladic, who kept this as a guarantee that weapons would be

 3     surrendered.

 4             This is my question:  In keeping with the decision of the

 5     War Presidency, did the Muslims surrender their weapons to the VRS and

 6     UNPROFOR, and did they ultimately came to the UNPROFOR base?  Thank you.

 7        A.   I -- I -- I don't know the full answer to that question, I'm

 8     afraid.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  And did Muslim soldiers come to the UNPROFOR base to

10     surrender their weapons, as this decision indicates?  Thank you.

11        A.   I'm afraid I can't speak to that, as I was never at the UNPROFOR

12     base in the centre of Zepa town.  That's where my colleague

13     Captain Tom Dibb was.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Yesterday you testified to this document, and it was

15     admitted through you.  Is there anything you can tell us about this

16     document that you have knowledge of?

17        A.   Yes.  I can testify again that when General Smith spoke to the

18     three members of the War Presidency that had signed this document, and

19     General Mladic, he explained that he felt it was unlikely that the

20     Bosnian government would accept the agreement, and I -- I did -- there is

21     a part in the meeting note.  There is a couple of paragraphs specifically

22     about that that we did read yesterday.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us, did you and General Smith know which

24     were the provisions because of which the Bosnian government refused to

25     accept this agreement, or was behind it the intention harboured by

Page 11063

 1     Silajdzic to have the Serbian army capture Zepa and bloody their hands?

 2     Thank you.

 3        A.   I can tell you what General Smith said at the time and is noted

 4     in the meeting note was that the -- he felt the Bosnian government were

 5     unlikely to accept the agreement because they had not been party to it.

 6     And there had been a long exchange between -- of messages that we had

 7     conveyed from the Bosnian Presidency to General Mladic, trying to find an

 8     agreement between the two sides, for Minister Muratovic to meet with

 9     General Mladic.  And as I said yesterday, General Mladic refused to go to

10     the airport and Minister Muratovic refused to come to check-point 2.  And

11     so General Smith reiterated the fact that he felt it was unlikely that

12     the Bosnian government would accept it, as they had not been party to

13     drawing it up.

14             I hope that answers your question.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know if the Muslim army was aware that a

16     meeting had to take place between Mladic and Muratovic, and was it -- was

17     that the reason why they did not surrender their weapons?  Thank you.

18        A.   I don't know.

19        Q.   Do you know who gave up on signing the agreement?  Was it the

20     Army of Republika Srpska or the Muslim side for whom this decision was

21     intended, to begin with?  Thank you.

22        A.   Could you please clarify which agreement you're referring to?

23     Are you referring to the prisoner of war exchange or this particular

24     agreement that we have in front of us?

25        Q.   I mean the agreement we have in front of us.  We read a moment

Page 11064

 1     ago Palic's statement that General Smith had said that the Muslim

 2     government was placing additional conditions on the signing of the

 3     agreement.

 4        A.   I believe that the statement that we saw from Mr. Palic was that

 5     General Smith had reflected they were placing additional conditions on

 6     the prisoner of war exchange rather than this agreement.  But perhaps I

 7     misunderstood you.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  My question was this:  Did the Army of

 9     Republika Srpska give up on this decision, or was it the Muslim army,

10     members of whom should have surrendered their weapons and who were the

11     subject of this decision?  Thank you.

12        A.   My impression was that General Mladic's patience had run out and

13     that is why he gave the ultimatum of, you know, the deadline of

14     1800 hours for the total surrender of the Armija forces within the Zepa

15     enclave.  He certainly, in that exchange that we saw in the meeting note,

16     was adamant that he would not meet, you know, Muratovic at the airport

17     and said that Muratovic had had plenty of opportunity to come to

18     check-point 2.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I think it's time for our second

20     break.

21             We must have our break now, and we'll resume at 1.00.

22                           --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

23                           --- On resuming at 1.04 p.m.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Before we continue, I would like to raise,

25     briefly, a minor matter.  I've heard from -- that the Prosecution would

Page 11065

 1     like to change the surrogate sheet for the Exhibit P594 because it

 2     incorrectly refers to P1756.  If that is correct and my understanding is

 3     correct, then this will be granted.

 4             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  That is correct.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  You may do that.

 6             We should continue.  And I would like to ask, Mr. Tolimir, can

 7     you give us an estimation of the length of the remainder of the

 8     cross-examination?  Is that possible?

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I think

10     we'll take another 15 minutes, depending on the answers I receive.  The

11     rest is beyond my ability to assess.  Much will depend on the answers I

12     receive from the witness.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  That's absolutely fine.  Please continue.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Ms. Sayer, you wanted to see what Mr. Palic had to say about what

17     Smith told Torlak at the meeting.  Perhaps I can give it to you, if you

18     still insist on seeing that.  Otherwise, I'll move on.  It is a single

19     sentence which I can quote.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have D55.  Page 30,

21     paragraph 108.  It is Mr. Bezruchenko's report which he drafted as an OTP

22     expert.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   We see page 29 in the English and page 30 in the Serbian.

25             Let us again look at line 6, in the third paragraph, where we see

Page 11066

 1     the text in small font.  It says:

 2             "During the negotiations, General Smith stated that our side

 3     deadlined to accept the agreement on the exchange all for all and that we

 4     were asking for additional concessions."

 5             Next, he also says that we cannot believe that you seem unwilling

 6     to resolve this issue.

 7             Then in line 16, it says:

 8             "I am asking you on behalf of the fighters who have been fighting

 9     during the last 15 days," and so on.

10             Perhaps now can you tell us what you wanted to say about whether,

11     in this telegram by Avdo Palic sent to Alija Izetbegovic, Palic said that

12     he - that is to say Izetbegovic - was unwilling to resolve the exchange

13     all for all and was this conveyed to the Muslim side, since you were

14     present at the meeting?

15        A.   The meeting I was present at late in the evening of the

16     25th/early hours of the 26th of July between General Smith and

17     President Izetbegovic, at that meeting, President Izetbegovic had stated

18     that he was very open to pursuing an all-for-all prisoner exchange but

19     that they were -- the Bosnian side was concerned that the BSA would not

20     uphold their side of the agreement.

21             I -- at that meeting in the late hours of -- of 25th/early hours

22     of the 26th, there was no mention of concessions -- sorry, of additional

23     concessions being required by the Bosnian Presidency side that this

24     document on the screen in front of us refers to.

25        Q.   Let us look at line 8 where it's -- Avdo Palic says:

Page 11067

 1             "During the night, or that is to say in the morning before 8.00,

 2     General Smith needs to be informed so that a plan could be drawn for the

 3     helicopter evacuation."

 4             Can we see that in the telegram by Avdo Palic whereby he refers

 5     to the meeting of 8.00 which you have just described?

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  A part of that sentence we can see in the English

 7     version in line 1 and the following lines.

 8        A.   Yes, I can see -- I can see the lines on the screen in front of

 9     me.

10        Q.   My question is this:  Was UNPROFOR making any plans for

11     helicopter evacuation, such as referred to by Avdo Palic?

12        A.   The question of helicopter evacuation did -- was raised by

13     Minister Muratovic at that meeting, and General Smith -- I recall

14     General Smith discussing it, and I believe he stated his view, that he

15     thought that it was unlikely that General Mladic would allow a helicopter

16     evacuation.

17        Q.   Thank you.  And we saw that in the agreement General Mladic was

18     willing to release them.  So was it all left to whether Smith and

19     Muratovic could be believed or not, or were there any other positions

20     involved?

21        A.   I don't believe that the agreement makes any mention of

22     General Mladic agreeing to release the men of fighting age by helicopter

23     evacuation.  So I'm not sure what -- what your question refers to.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Having quoted this document, we are now going back

25     again to the War Presidency decision to see what it says there.

Page 11068

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] However, in the meantime, could we

 2     go on to page 31 in the Serbian of this document.  We can stay on this

 3     page in the English.  I'm interested in paragraph 109.

 4             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Alija Izetbegovic says as follows, on the 26th of July, 1995.

 6     I'm quoting paragraph 109, the small print:

 7             "There is information that a certain number of your soldiers is

 8     moving towards the village with an intention to surrender.  I do not know

 9     if it is correct.  Warn them about the danger and put them under control.

10     Negotiations about an exchange are in progress.  We have sufficient

11     arguments to obtain good conditions for the exchange because we keep a

12     great number of their prisoners.  However, we have to be careful about

13     what we are doing.  Something else, by the way, it is important to burn

14     the entire archive and letters."

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now go to page 110 --

16     actually, paragraph 110, which spills over to the next page.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Let's look at this portion that we can see and then we'll move on

19     to the next.  On the 26th of July, 1995, at 700 hours, Colonel Palic sent

20     his last desperate message to President Izetbegovic.  This time Palic was

21     direct to the point of being impolite.  I quote:

22             "Mr. President," you can see the two first lines in English, "we

23     received both your letters and the agreement you sent to us.  I ask you,

24     and let this remind -- remain only for you and me, are you ready to

25     exchange us, the people of Zepa, which number about two and a half

Page 11069

 1     thousand with the people who arrived from Srebrenica, for all the

 2     Chetniks?  We emphasise that half of the people have no weapons, and we

 3     have no chances of breaking through.  Reply to us until 8.00 in the

 4     morning so we know how to behave, because our representative

 5     Hamdija Torlak and criminal Mladic are still at Boksanica.  And one more

 6     question, are you ready to pay for the expenses of our evacuation by

 7     helicopter if UNPROFOR accepted it?"

 8             My question is this: Well, it also says, in paragraph 110,

 9     Mr. Bezruchenko states that this message did not end with the traditional

10     greeting of "Salaam" and that therefore he deemed it as a last desperate

11     attempt.

12             Was Palic stalling any surrender so that the civilians be allowed

13     to leave Zepa and so that what Silajdzic had said would come true,

14     meaning that the Serbs would have blood on their hands by having been

15     forced to take Zepa by force?

16        A.   That's not my impression from the document.  My impression from

17     the document is that he was requesting information from the president of

18     the Bosnian government as to what action he should take as the head of

19     the Armija forces within the enclave.

20        Q.   Thank you.  In this telegram is he reporting to Alija that the

21     official representative of Zepa, Mr. Torlak, was at Boksanica?

22        A.   That's what the English translation from the previous page did --

23     did say, yes.

24             No, on this page, sorry, on page 31.

25        Q.   Thank you.  I promised to show you again P736, in paragraph 2 of

Page 11070

 1     the decision.  I will make good on this promise, and afterwards I will

 2     conclude my cross-examination.

 3             We can see again the Presidency decision, the third paragraph,

 4     which reads:  All able-bodied men ... registered by the ICRC ... shall,

 5     following the signing of an agreement on the exchange of POWs, be -- will

 6     be safe and escorted by UNPROFOR.  They will be evacuated to a location

 7     of their own choosing.

 8             Can you see General Mladic's signature on the document at the

 9     bottom?

10        A.   I can see it in the Serbian version, but -- yes, now.  Now I can

11     see the translation on the right-hand side of the screen.

12             And can I clarify, this is actually the War Presidency, the

13     Zepa War Presidency, decision, rather than the Bosnian Presidency.

14     That's correct, isn't it?

15        Q.   Thank you.  Did you ever act as a military analyst during your

16     career?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Since you did, is it your conclusion, then, that it

19     was Palic who was asking the Presidency whether they were ready to accept

20     something?  Was it your conclusion whether the commander of the army in

21     Zepa, Mr. Palic, was actually being suspicious of the intentions of his

22     Presidency on the evacuation of the soldiers from Zepa?

23        A.   Actually, my conclusion is somewhat different.  My conclusion

24     from the document that we've seen, from the telegram from Mr. Palic to

25     President Izetbegovic, is that it has a note of desperation in the form

Page 11071

 1     of language that is used.  And that is perhaps indicative of Palic's

 2     recognition that the time is continuing to pass rather rapidly towards

 3     the ultimatum that General Mladic has given the Bosnian Muslim men of

 4     fighting age whom Palic commands.

 5             So that would be my conclusion, that this is a request from the

 6     military, the Bosnian military commander on the ground, for clarity from

 7     his political commander, his president, as to what course of action he

 8     should take.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Was Palic's request in accordance with the military

10     situation on the ground?

11        A.   I'm afraid I don't understand your question.  I think it --

12     Palic's request seems to emanate from the military situation on the

13     ground.

14        Q.   Thank you for this answer.  Thank you for all the answers you

15     provided during your testimony.  I thank you for coming here.  On behalf

16     of this Defence and my own, we wish you a safe journey home.  May God

17     bless you.  We have no further questions of you.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, this concludes our

19     examination of the witness.  I'd like to thank to all those who had

20     sufficient patience to bear with us, since I believe we made a number of

21     mistakes.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much for your words, Mr. Tolimir.

23             Mr. Thayer, do you have re-examination?

24             MR. THAYER:  Briefly, Mr. President.  I should -- I will conclude

25     before the end of today.  If we could have that document back up, just

Page 11072

 1     very quickly.  That was P736.  I just want to pick up where

 2     General Tolimir left off.

 3                           Re-examination by Mr. Thayer:

 4        Q.   And, ma'am, good afternoon to you.

 5        A.   Good afternoon.

 6        Q.   General Tolimir read you to the paragraph that's just above Roman

 7     numeral II in both versions.  He referred to the portion where this

 8     document states that the POWs would be escorted by UNPROFOR.  I want to

 9     just focus your attention for a second on the paragraph that's right

10     above that one, where this document says that: "All able-bodied men shall

11     be registered by the ICRC and shall be guarded by the forces of the VRS

12     in the presence of UNPROFOR in Zepa ..."

13             My question to you is: Based on your experience on the ground,

14     participating in the various meetings, discussions, how did the Muslims

15     in Zepa feel about ever being guarded by the VRS?

16        A.   My impression is that the Bosnian Muslim population in the Zepa

17     enclave were extremely nervous about the proposal of being guarded by the

18     Bosnian Serb army at any time.  And that as the time passed, over the

19     three days, the request for UNPROFOR to take a more active role than

20     observing became more regular.

21        Q.   War is a nerve-wracking experience and people are often nervous

22     in war.  Was there anything that you were aware of in terms of the Muslim

23     population that was communicated to you that suggested to you why they

24     were nervous about ever being guarded by the VRS?

25        A.   When I met with Captain Tom Dibb, he did reflect that some of the

Page 11073

 1     people that he had spoken to in Zepa town had spoken to people who had

 2     arrived in the town in the wake of the Srebrenica events.  And as a

 3     result, you know, rumours of what had happened at Srebrenica had spread

 4     amongst the civilian population in Zepa quite rapidly, and for this

 5     reason they -- there were -- they were very afraid of being left in the

 6     power of the Bosnian Serb army, whether they were women or men of

 7     fighting age.

 8        Q.   Now, at page 8 of today's transcript, line 22, you stated that --

 9     and I'll just quote exactly what you said.  You said:

10             "They were repeatedly -- Mr. Torlak asked for the use of

11     helicopters, because they did not believe that road transport would be

12     safe."

13             The -- I just want to ask you what you understood from your

14     discussions and attending these meetings this reference to, as you put

15     it, "the road transport would not be safe" referred to?  Are they afraid

16     of driving off a cliff, are they afraid of pot holes?  What about the

17     road transport was it that they were afraid about?

18        A.   Okay.  To clarify, they were afraid that the -- that the buses

19     would not be allowed through to the Bosnian-held territory without

20     interference from the Bosnian Serb forces.  Specifically they were afraid

21     that there would be segregation of men of fighting age and also perhaps

22     women of a certain age, as had happened in Srebrenica.

23        Q.   Okay.  I think just before the last break we took there were some

24     questions put to you about the term, the meaning of the term "liquidate"

25     and your testimony about General Mladic using that term.

Page 11074

 1             Do you remember what you said in your OTP witness statement

 2     exactly about the impression that you drew from this particular encounter

 3     with General Mladic when he made this statement?

 4        A.   Yes.  I do recall in my witness statement reflecting my

 5     impression that General Mladic's demeanour had hardened over the course

 6     of the three days, and I specifically noted the use of the phrase

 7     "liquidated" to make sure it went into our record of the day, day's

 8     events.

 9        Q.   And do you recall exactly what you said with respect to whether

10     liquidation would apply to armed Muslims, unarmed Muslims, both, or

11     neither?  Do you remember exactly what you said in that regard?

12        A.   I believe I said it was -- it would apply to anybody that

13     remained in the -- in the pocket.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             Mr. Thayer asked the witness for her opinion, and the witness

17     said in her answer "I believe."

18             I think this is irrelevant for the establishment of facts.  The

19     witness was asked about this issue in cross-examination as well.

20             Thank you.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Indeed.  And this is perhaps the reason why

22     Mr. Thayer is dealing with this part.

23             The witness was not asked for her opinion.  Mr. Thayer asked her:

24             "Do you recall exactly what you said with respect to whether

25     liquidation would apply to armed Muslims ..."

Page 11075

 1             And then later, in the second part of the question:  "Do you

 2     remember exactly what you said in this regard?"

 3             This is it not a question with which he asked for an opinion.

 4             Please carry on, Mr. Thayer.

 5             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  And why don't we --

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the interpretation

 7     we received was "what do you think about," et cetera.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  That might be an interpretation issue but I heard

 9     it as I read it to you, and that is recorded in that way.  Thank you very

10     much.

11             Please continue, Mr. Thayer.

12             MR. THAYER:

13        Q.   I want to ask you a question, ma'am, that ties into two topics

14     about which General Tolimir cross-examined you.  He put it to you at one

15     point, or he asked you, whether the fear of the Bosniaks in Zepa was

16     justified and whether it ever materialised.  I think he asked that just

17     before the break.

18             Do you recall that question or those two questions, ma'am?

19        A.   Yes, I do recall.

20        Q.   Okay.  I want to show you a document which will address that

21     question and I think also tie into another topic that General Tolimir

22     raised.

23             MR. THAYER:  If we could have P00755 on e-court, please.

24        Q.   We can stay on the first page in the English because we can see

25     from the original which is next to it that this is type-signed by

Page 11076

 1     Commander Rajko Kusic, the commander of the 1st Podrinje Light Infantry

 2     Brigade, also known as the Rogatica Brigade.  Did you ever have occasion

 3     to meet him or hear about him during your time in Zepa, Colonel Kusic?

 4        A.   I have heard his name, yes.

 5        Q.   Do you recall ever meeting him?

 6        A.   It's possible that he was among the Bosnian Serb military who --

 7     officers who were part of General Mladic's company.  But we were never --

 8     I was never personally introduced to him.

 9        Q.   Okay.  I understand you never had the pleasure of his

10     introduction.

11             If we look at the date, it's 8 August 1995.  We can see that it

12     is a daily combat report to the Drina Corps Command.  It refers

13     specifically to events, as we can see, that occurred on the

14     7th of August, 1995, in the afternoon.  There's a reference here to the

15     canyon of the Praca river and five remaining -- and Colonel Kusic uses

16     the derogatory term "Balija" who were, after the fall of Zepa, travelling

17     along a certain route.  And he indicates that they went down to the

18     railroad tracks at Dub and tried to reach Renovica walking on the

19     railroad tracks and that this group was liquidated.  He goes on to say

20     that the group was separate and it travelled for ten days.

21             And I'd ask you, if you could look at the original, do you see

22     the portion where it says, "the group was separate and it travelled for

23     ten days"?  Do you see that in the original Serbian, or B/C/S, as we call

24     it here?

25        A.   Yes.  Yes, I do see it.

Page 11077

 1        Q.   Okay.  We have the English translation here and I'll just read up

 2     to a point.  It says:

 3             "The same day, in the vicinity of Luke, an unarmed Ustasha, borne

 4     in Srebrenica, 24 years old," and we can see how it's been translated.  I

 5     want to ask you, can you see what word is actually used here in the

 6     original?

 7        A.   Yes.  It -- the word used is - my pronunciation is bad, I

 8     apologise - "likvidiran."

 9        Q.   Okay.  And is that the same verb that General Mladic used in that

10     encounter that you were asked so many questions about?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   The report goes on, and it says:  "Before he died," referring to

13     this unarmed man, "he said that he fell behind the others and he was

14     looking for ... food."

15             My question to you, ma'am, is:  From what you can see here in

16     this report, how does the fate of this young unarmed hungry man

17     correspond to the fears that you personally saw expressed during your

18     time in Zepa by the Bosniak population?

19        A.   It would appear to bear out their justifiable fears, the

20     Bosnian Muslim's justifiable fears of what would happen after the

21     deadline had passed.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I object

24     to the question because the Prosecutor put the question without knowing

25     how the soldier perished.  Was it after the fighting for the enclave of

Page 11078

 1     Zepa or whether it was at some other front.  Thank you.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer was reading from the text in front

 3     of us.

 4             Mr. Thayer, please continue.

 5                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please carry on.

 7             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, that concludes my re-examination.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Mindua has a question for the witness.

 9                           Questioned by the Court:

10             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, Witness.  Good afternoon,

11     first of all.  I would like to ask you the following.  Actually, I have

12     two questions for you.

13             But before I put these questions, I would just like to remind

14     you, of course, not to hesitate to let me know if I misunderstood what

15     you said.  I do not want to take up any time in order to look for the

16     exact reference on the transcript, but I believe you said with respect to

17     the letter of Colonel Avdo Palic who sent therefore that letter to

18     President Alija Izetbegovic as being a letter which was a desperate call,

19     and this is something that you mentioned when you talked about the

20     evacuation by helicopter of the men from Zepa.

21             So this was my first observation.

22             Second observation is that you said today as well that

23     General Smith did not believe that General Mladic would accept the

24     evacuation of the men from Zepa by helicopter.

25             So, as I mentioned that I had two questions for you, I will now

Page 11079

 1     put the first question.  So do you know what made General Smith say that,

 2     when he said that General Mladic would never accept the evacuation by

 3     helicopter of the men from Zepa?

 4        A.   When the evacuation by helicopter was first raised by Mr. Torlak,

 5     General Mladic was party to that conversation between Mr. Torlak and

 6     General Smith.  And my recollection is that General Mladic indicated that

 7     he would not -- that this would not be an acceptable resolution, to

 8     evacuate the men of fighting age by helicopter, and he kept referring to

 9     all of the buses and road transportation that the Bosnian Serb army had

10     organised for the evacuation.

11             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Very well.  Thank you very much.

12             Now I have a second question for you.  I wanted to know if the

13     UNPROFOR was charging their services in case of helicopter evacuations,

14     so I wanted to ask you the question, before you actually said that

15     Mr. Torlak -- or that, rather, General Mladic, had already said and

16     expressed his hesitance in terms of that type of transportation to

17     Mr. Torlak, so I would like to know if Colonel Avdo Palic knew that

18     General Mladic would not pay or would not allow for or does not support

19     this helicopter evacuation of the men from Zepa, do you know why did

20     Colonel Avdo Palic ask President Izetbegovic if he was willing to pay for

21     transportation fees and to charge them to the UNPROFOR?

22        A.   I -- I do not know why Colonel Palic believed that UNPROFOR would

23     charge a fee to be -- to arrange the evacuation by helicopter.  At none

24     of the meetings that I was present at was any form of payment for

25     UNPROFOR discussed, in terms of helicopter evacuation or road evacuation.

Page 11080

 1             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

 2                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Nyambe has a question.

 4             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

 5             Just to follow up on Judge Mindua's question, the issue of who

 6     would pay for the evacuation if it was undertaken by helicopter did arise

 7     in some of the -- in one of the documents that was presented today to

 8     Court, if my memory serves me right.

 9             Do you agree that it has -- let me rephrase my question.  Do you

10     agree that it was raised?

11        A.   I -- the document that we saw, the telegram from Colonel Palic to

12     President Izetbegovic, I believe that's where there is a question about

13     whether the Bosnian government would pay UNPROFOR.

14             And I don't recall at any of the meetings where I was present

15     there being any notion of UNPROFOR charging anybody for evacuation by

16     helicopter.

17             JUDGE NYAMBE:  My question is:  Which came first?  The telegram

18     to the president about the cost, if it -- the cost of the evacuation if

19     it was under taken by helicopter; or General Mladic's use of the term

20     liquidate, liquidate them?

21             Which came first?

22        A.   I'm afraid I don't recall the date of Mr. Palic's telegram to the

23     Presidency.  But I do -- can speak to the meeting at the Presidency in

24     the late hours of the 25th of July and the early hours of the 26th, where

25     Minister Muratovic was very insistent that the evacuation of the

Page 11081

 1     population of Zepa should be by helicopter.

 2             So that was certainly mentioned by the Bosnian Presidency side at

 3     that meeting and is memorialised in my note of that meeting.

 4             My recollection of the term "liquidate" is at -- is memorialised

 5     in the meeting note, the summary, as at 0800 on the 28th of July, I

 6     believe.  But perhaps it might be helpful to -- to check that on -- on

 7     e-court.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

 9             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I may be able to save us some time.

10     The reference to the telegram from Colonel Palic to President

11     Izetbegovic, which General Tolimir used during his cross, is at

12     paragraph 110 of D55, and the report indicates that telegram was at 0700

13     on the 27th of July.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

15             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Ms. Sayer, you will be pleased to hear that this

17     concludes your examination in this trial.  Thank you very much that you

18     came to The Hague and provided us with your knowledge and memory.  Now

19     you are free to return to your normal activities.  The Chamber would like

20     to thank you very much.

21             THE WITNESS:  Thank you very much, Mr. President.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think we have not only reached the time of the

23     end of today's hearing but we are over time now.  We can't start with the

24     next witness, although Mr. Elderkin entered the courtroom.  We have to

25     adjourn and resume tomorrow at 9.00 in this courtroom.

Page 11082

 1                           [The witness withdrew]

 2                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.49 p.m.,

 3                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 10th day of

 4                           March, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.