Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 11837

 1                           Monday, 28 March 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.22 p.m.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good afternoon to everybody in the courtroom.

 6             As you can see, only two Judges of this Bench are present this

 7     afternoon.  Judge Mindua has some medical problems and is not able to

 8     attend and the Chamber decided to sit pursuant to Rule 15 bis of our

 9     Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

10             The -- Mr. Thayer, I see you are going to take the floor.

11             MR. THAYER:  Good afternoon, Mr. President.  Good afternoon,

12     Your Honour.  Good afternoon to the Defence.  Good afternoon, everyone.

13             Just a quick proposal for the Trial Chamber.  We are currently

14     scheduled to sit in the afternoon this Thursday, and we were wondering on

15     behalf of the Prosecution, whether we might be able to change the sitting

16     to the morning, and I'd just if inquiry could be made if that's okay with

17     the Trial Chamber and the parties and everybody else involved.  That

18     would greatly convenience our team.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Gajic.

20             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Hello to everybody.

21             Mr.  President, the Defence does not object to have the sitting

22     in the morning on Thursday.  Our current schedule is such that on

23     Thursday we are probably going to be in the middle of the direct

24     examination of the following witness which is probably going to take a

25     little bit longer, or it is going to be the end of the cross-examination

Page 11838

 1     of Witness Obradovic.  So we think that it is perfectly okay to work in

 2     the morning on Thursday.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The Judges who are present at the moment in the

 4     courtroom would agree to that.  But we have to, of course, liaise with

 5     our colleague, if he will be available that morning.  We will let the

 6     parties know as soon as possible.  Thank you.

 7             The witness should be brought in, please.

 8                           [The witness takes the stand]

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good afternoon, sir.

10             THE WITNESS:  Good afternoon.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Welcome back to the courtroom.  I'm happy that

12     you could make it in time.

13             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I have to remind you that the affirmation to tell

15     the truth still applies.

16                           WITNESS:  RUPERT ANTHONY SMITH [Resumed]

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And Mr. Tolimir is continuing his

18     cross-examination.

19             Mr. Tolimir.

20             Before you continue, Judge Nyambe has a question for the witness.

21             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

22             Welcome back, General Smith.

23             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

24             JUDGE NYAMBE:  I just need to ask a small question in relation

25     to -- I think your last answer at the last session, which is -- which was

Page 11839

 1     in the transcript at page 73, lines 3 to 4.  I have -- if I'm -- I quote

 2     you incorrectly, please correct me.  In answer to General Tolimir's

 3     question, you had your answer as follows:

 4             "I think it would have been wholly impractical in the

 5     circumstances of -- of 11 July and thereafter ..." I think it was to

 6     protect -- his question was to protect the villagers within the enclave.

 7             My question, if I've quoted you correctly is as follows:  Why

 8     would it have been wholly impractical for UNPROFOR to protect the

 9     villagers in their homes where the VRS forces would not enter the zone?

10             THE WITNESS:  There were just not enough forces.  If my memory

11     serves me correct, when the initial study of the Srebrenica safe area was

12     made in 1992 or 1993, 1993, a -- a force of some possibly as high as

13     30.000 troops, certainly 20.000, was going to be required to defend the

14     safe area.

15             Now, my memory -- this may have been all the three safe areas,

16     not just Srebrenica, so my figures can be out.  But they certainly

17     weren't the -- under a thousand that we actually had there.  And that was

18     all that was supplied by the troop-contributing nations over the period

19     of the willing -- the safe areas by the Security Council and the forces

20     being provided or some forces being provided to make them safe.

21             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Now, Mr. Tolimir, it's your turn.  Please

23     continue.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Thank

25     you, Judge Nyambe.  May peace reign in this house.  May peace be upon

Page 11840

 1     everybody here.  May this day of the proceedings and the whole trial

 2     finish in accordance with God's will and not in accordance with my will.

 3     I would also like to greet General Smith again.

 4                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]

 5        Q.   [Interpretation] General Smith, we have just heard the question

 6     of Judge Nyambe who thereby connected our previous proceedings with

 7     today.  My question is:  Was the international community surprised by the

 8     speed with which the Muslims left Srebrenica and by the fact that they

 9     all gathered in Potocari?  Thank you.

10        A.   I can't speak for the international community.  The UNPROFOR did

11     not expect the enclave to collapse at the speed it did, or the defence of

12     the enclave to collapse at the speed it did.  But we -- I don't think we

13     were surprised by the population grouping themselves around the

14     Dutch Battalion's camp.

15        Q.   Thank you.  I would now like to take a look at your statement.

16     It's 65 ter 7247.  I would like to have the page on which you speak about

17     this same topic.  It's page 20.

18             You said that you were surprised that the Muslims hadn't left the

19     enclave on the 13th.  It's page 17, paragraph 3.  And this is what you

20     say.  Line 7, page 17, paragraph 3, line 7.  Thank you.

21             And it's page 16 in English.  And I'm reading from the sixth line

22     from the bottom in the penultimate paragraph:

23             "Until the 13th of July, I believe that the defenders managed to

24     escape, but it wasn't clear what were there numbers and what was their

25     success."

Page 11841

 1             Did you expect the Muslims to flee from the enclave and did you

 2     know of their plans?  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, please help us to find the relevant

 4     part in the -- oh, it's the last paragraph, just in the middle, "By the

 5     end of the 13th of July ..." Thank you.  We also need an indication not

 6     only for B/C/S, also for the English page.

 7             Sir, do you see that part?  The last paragraph --

 8             THE WITNESS:  It's in the last paragraph, not the penultimate.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  No, in B/C/S it's the penultimate but in English

10     it's the last paragraph.

11             THE WITNESS:  Oh, I see.  Yes, "By the end of 13th ..."

12             I didn't know that your question was the -- where are we?  No, I

13     didn't expect the people to flee from the enclave and I didn't know their

14     plans.

15             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation] Thank you.

16        Q.   Now, let us take a look at the same page, the paragraph above

17     this one where you say -- have you heard the words "after a short break,"

18     so in B/C/S, it's the second paragraph from the top, and in English it's

19     the third paragraph:

20             "On the 11 July, after a short pause, the BSA resume their attack

21     and close air support was used against the BSA.  Despite this support,

22     the Bosnian defence crumbled and the BSA entered the town without any

23     real fighting.  The majority of the population gathered around the

24     DutchBat compound at Potocari.

25             "Due to the gravity of the situation, I was recalled from my

Page 11842

 1     leave," and so on and so forth.

 2             So bearing in mind this, was it a surprise -- was it a surprise

 3     also for the people who were in the base in which the population

 4     gathered?  Thank you.

 5        A.   I don't -- I don't think -- given that it had fallen, the enclave

 6     had fallen, the -- the population going to the UN battalion, I don't

 7     think surprised me.  That we had not prepared for that, if that's what

 8     you mean by surprise, no, we had not prepared for such an eventuality.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Did UNPROFOR, in Srebrenica, know that the Muslims

10     were preparing a breakout?  Thank you.

11        A.   Not to my knowledge.

12        Q.   Thank you.  I asked you because you said that you expected them

13     to flee on the 13th, to move from the enclave to Tuzla.  So you were

14     recalled from your leave, and you were expecting that to happen on the

15     13th.  Does that mean that you had some previous information in your

16     possession pointing to their intentions?  Thank you.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

18             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I don't think that's what

19     General Smith's testimony was, that he expected them to flee on the 13th.

20     I think his answer was clear on the record.  And it seems to be a point

21     that General Tolimir is trying to pick up or insert.  So I want to make

22     sure there is no lack of clarity on the record about the answer.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I'm convinced that this witness is able to

24     provide us with his knowledge, probably.  Are you able to answer the

25     question, sir?

Page 11843

 1             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  The statement to which we are referring, the

 2     last paragraph on page 16 in English, "by the end of the 13th," it refers

 3     to my belief, not the actions of the defender.  I came to understand by

 4     the end of the 13th that the defenders had broken out.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Smith, for the

 6     reference that I quoted.  Also for the convenience of Mr. Thayer.  Now,

 7     let us take a look at 1D655.  Can we have 1D655.  That's also your

 8     statement.  And I would like to tender this statement.  Thank you.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, last week I asked you if you were

10     tendering the statement of the witness, and then you said you will not

11     tender it.  Now are you tendering it.  There's no misunderstanding, I

12     hope.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I think

14     that it was the Prosecutor who said that they were going to decide about

15     it later.  I wanted to use the statement when you asked me about it.  So

16     if I said something to that effect, then I made a mistake.  I think this

17     statement should be in evidence.  Thank you.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D193, Your Honours.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I would like to take a

21     look at paragraph 17 in both languages.  This is a statement given on the

22     12th of January, 2000, by General Smith to the representatives of the

23     NIOD, from the Netherlands.  Okay.  So now we can see paragraph 17 in

24     Serbian.  In the fifth line, we can see, "ABiH fled."  I think that we

25     are going to see the same thing in English where it says, "The IBiH

Page 11844

 1     [as interpreted] fled."

 2             So the IBiH fled and suddenly, Mladic with his troops found

 3     himself in the centre of Srebrenica.  According to Mladic, all this

 4     happened totally unexpectedly.  He was sorry that a Dutch soldier had

 5     been killed, and so on and so forth.

 6             We already explained earlier how that happened.

 7             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   My question is:  Bearing in mind that the VRS entered Srebrenica

 9     without any resistance, do you maybe know why the Muslims did not want to

10     put up any resistance?  You spoke with General Mladic in Belgrade

11     on 16th of July, that's what we can also find in the same paragraph.  So

12     do you maybe know why they didn't put up any resistance?  Thank you.

13        A.   I would like to make the point this is not a statement of mine.

14     This is someone else's record of an interview with me, and I don't

15     entirely -- while I accept its thrust, I don't necessarily accept exactly

16     his construction of what I said.

17             And in answer to your specific question, I don't know what the

18     intentions were or reasons for the Bosnian army's actions.

19        Q.   Thank you.  When you met Mladic in Belgrade on 16th of July, did

20     he tell you that he too was surprised by the fact that he was able to

21     enter the centre of Srebrenica very quickly?  Thank you.

22        A.   I don't remember him telling me that, no.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Did you meet General Mladic on the 16th of July?

24        A.   Yes, I did.  Yes.

25        Q.   Do you know whether General Mladic was in Belgrade also on the

Page 11845

 1     15th of July?  Thank you.

 2        A.   I believe he was, yes.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  As we can see here in paragraph 17, fifth line in

 4     Serbian, it says that:

 5             "Mladic gave permission for the ICRC to visit the prisoners.  At

 6     the time he was not concerned about the report that the BSA had separated

 7     men and women in Srebrenica because the BiH army did the same when they

 8     would take over certain villages."

 9             My question is: Bearing in mind that General Mladic approved the

10     visits to the prisoners in Potocari, and that he was in Belgrade on the

11     15th and 16th, do you know how come those prisoners were not visited,

12     although they were in Potocari?  Apparently he promised that and

13     certainly he would have kept his word.  Thank you.

14        A.   Where does it say in paragraph 17 that he promised it?

15        Q.   It's the following page in English.  The paragraph continues onto

16     the following page in English.  Thank you to Aleksander.

17        A.   And your question was then?

18        Q.   My question was:  Bearing in mind that UNHCR received promises

19     that they would be able to visit the prisoners in Potocari while

20     General Mladic was in Belgrade, what was it that could have happened that

21     they did not find any prisoners in Potocari?  Or maybe, if you know, did

22     UNHCR find some prisoners in Potocari?  Is it possible that somebody

23     changed the previous orders given by General Mladic and that the

24     situation thereby changed as well?  Thank you.

25        A.   I have no idea.  I left that meeting with the understanding that

Page 11846

 1     Mladic would approve the ICRC visiting prisoners.  And, to the best of my

 2     knowledge, that never happened.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Since we're still dealing with Srebrenica, and I

 4     don't have much time anymore, let me remind you of what you said

 5     concerning Srebrenica and Tolimir.

 6             On page 66 of the transcript of two days ago, that is, last week,

 7     the first day we -- of your direct examination.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Can you give us -- for the clarity of the record,

 9     can you give us the date or the day of the week of last week?

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The 21st of March.  Page 66 on that

11     day.  To Mr. Thayer's question, Mr. Smith replied about Tolimir:

12             "He was this charge of security.  That's an important position in

13     the command process.  I saw him at Zepa.  I didn't know that he had been

14     in Srebrenica.  I met him in the west of BiH," and so on.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Here's my question.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Go ahead, Aleksander.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Gajic.

19             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, we're talking about

20     page 11588 of the transcript.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  Thank you very much.

22             Mr. Tolimir.

23             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Here's my question:  Did anybody tell you that he had seen

25     General Tolimir in Srebrenica?  Any co-worker of yours or anybody from

Page 11847

 1     UNPROFOR, or a soldier?  Thank you.

 2        A.   I don't recall being told that.  Certainly not at the time in

 3     1995.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Later, on the same page, Mr. Thayer asked you whether

 5     General Tolimir had to be in Srebrenica.  Would your statement be

 6     different if you had knowledge of him not being there.  And you said on

 7     page 67, I believe it's line 8, you said:

 8             "No, it would not change my mind.  If Mladic was in Srebrenica,

 9     he didn't need a second person around.  But it wouldn't surprised me if

10     Mladic had sent out one of his assistants," and so on.

11             Tell me whether the OTP possibly put to you that Tolimir was in

12     Srebrenica and, therefore, asked you such a question?  Thank you.

13        A.   I can't remember the record.  Can't we see what you're asking in

14     the record?  I was answering a question, so if it was from the

15     Prosecution, it's there in the record.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Gajic, would it be possible to tell us the

17     page number Mr. Tolimir is referring to?

18             Mr. Thayer.

19             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, that's transcript page 11587, line 1.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We will have it on the screen soon, I hope.

23     Page 11587, line 1.

24             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation]

25        Q.   While we're waiting, let me ask you, Mr. Smith:  Did your staff

Page 11848

 1     in Sarajevo tell you that that they were in telephone contact with

 2     General Tolimir and that they agreed to hold a meeting with him in

 3     Srebrenica on the 11th and the 12th, but they didn't appear.  Did they

 4     inform you of that given that they were in telephone contact with the

 5     Main Staff?  Thank you.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Sir, do you see it now on the second screen?

 7             THE WITNESS:  I don't see the specific bit, but I've got the page

 8     there.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Page 11587, line 1.

10             THE WITNESS:  Yes, right.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Smith.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Let the witness answer.

14             THE WITNESS:  I'm just trying to remind myself of what the actual

15     question was of -- of this page of the transcript.

16             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Thank you.  I asked you whether your co-workers, when returned to

18     the UNPROFOR command in Sarajevo, tell you that they were in telephone

19     contact with General Tolimir and that they had called meetings with him

20     on the 11th and 12th in Srebrenica?  It was General Nikolai who did so.

21     Was that related to you?  Thank you.

22        A.   I don't remember it being related to me.  But, remember, I've

23     just come off leave, so I would have had a briefing in which all of these

24     events were told to me in one go.  I don't remember that specific bit of

25     it, if it was included.

Page 11849

 1        Q.   Thank you, General.  We asked General Nicolai when he was giving

 2     evidence why he didn't come on the 11th, and he replied because of the

 3     air-strikes and that there was no need for him to come.  And they also

 4     didn't come on the 12th, although General Mladic had approved their

 5     coming because the UNPROFOR representatives claimed that UNPROFOR wasn't

 6     engaging the VRS from Srebrenica, and I claim the contrary.  And

 7     General Mladic said, Let General Nicolai come and you come with him.  And

 8     he waited for them on both days.

 9             Did you know that UNPROFOR engaged the VRS from the Srebrenica

10     protected zone?  Thank you.

11        A.   By engaged, you mean firing at them?

12        Q.   Thank you.  I may have been misinterpreted.  I said that they

13     engaged the VRS, by which I mean that they fired at the VRS during the

14     combat operations.  Thank you.

15        A.   The specific details I don't recall, but I remember that -- it

16     being reported that fire was exchanged.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, you were referring to the testimony

18     of General Nicolai.  Could you, for the sake of the record, give us a

19     reference where we can find this relevant part of his testimony.

20             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you.  My legal assistant will check -- that

21     he already has.  General Nicolai said that on page 4184 in lines 11

22     through 17.  I quote:

23             "Based on what you said" --

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  That is not necessary.  I just wanted to know

25     where we can with find it on the record.  Please continue your

Page 11850

 1     cross-examination.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1184, lines 11 through 17.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Since General Nicolai here confirms that he was supposed to come

 5     to Srebrenica on the 12th of July, my question is:  Whether you know that

 6     UNPROFOR was firing to -- at the units of the VRS from the protected zone

 7     of Srebrenica on the 10th, 11th and 12th.  That is, three days in all.

 8     Thank you.

 9        A.   As I've said, I recall -- or, rather, my memory is that there had

10     been an exchange of fire or exchanges of fire.  The details I don't

11     recall at all.

12        Q.   Thank you.  General, sir, we'll see now what Mr. Franken says

13     about that, who was deputy battalion commander at Srebrenica.  And he

14     stated that on the 1st of July, 2010, while giving evidence in this

15     trial, on transcript page 3473, line 6, to the question of the Defence

16     why he issued the green order, he replied, "It must have been in the

17     evening of the 9th of July."  And on page 3453 of the transcript, he

18     explained what issuing green order meant.  In lines 16 through 19.

19             Could we please see page 3453, line 16 through 19.

20             I quote:

21             "The rules of engagement" --

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Wait a moment.  Wait a moment.  We should have it

23     on the screen.  And that is now, please carry on.

24             But, please, slow down while recording.  It is very difficult for

25     the interpreters and the court recorder.  Go ahead, please.

Page 11851

 1             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2        Q.   "The rules of engagement given to us before as a UN unit, one of

 3     our problems, we were only to use our weapons in self-defence, were ruled

 4     out and we went back to the rules of engagement of an army ... in

 5     combat."

 6             In lines 23 through 25, he says, I quote:

 7             "As of the issuing of the green order, we were in combat with the

 8     VRS, and the VRS was a target for us, and, in fact, the opposite is

 9     realistic and true as well."

10             And on page 3484, in lines 1 through 6, he says:

11             "My mandate had changed considerably.  From the moment when we,

12     the UN, issued the order to defend Srebrenica, and was the reason why I

13     issued the green order.  After that, the rules of engagement," et cetera,

14     "all restrictions as to the use of weapons were no longer in force

15     because that goes hand in hand with the order to defend something."

16             Now my question is:  Did the UNPROFOR, by taking sides or siding

17     with one of the parties to the conflict, commit a breach of its mandate?

18     Thank you.

19        A.   I -- could you tell me who this man, Major Franken, is it?

20     That -- you said he was Franken.  I don't recall who he is.

21        Q.   He was the deputy of Colonel Karremans.  Thank you.

22        A.   Right.  Thank you.  So he is the second in command of this unit?

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Of the DutchBat, yes.

24             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  And we've -- the page flicked as I was

25     starting to read it, so I'm slightly unsighted.  But I think I can

Page 11852

 1     understand.

 2             What you are saying is that he then changes the rules of

 3     engagement by -- in his argument that he produces this other order.  And

 4     these are not the UN rules of engagement.  Is that what you're telling

 5     me?

 6             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Did he not state clearly here that he -- that he

 8     starts to apply combat rules instead of UN rules.  He says:

 9             "My mandate changed considerably from the moment the UN issued me

10     the order to defend Srebrenica."

11             That's page 3484, lines 1 through 6:

12             "And that is the reason why I issued the green order."

13             Thank you.

14        A.   I'm hesitating to answer because this whole of the account that

15     you've produced in front of me, I don't remember anything about green

16     orders or any other coloured order, nor do I recall that there was a --

17     in -- emanating from my headquarters and this must have been happening in

18     my absence, that we gave them an order to change their rules of

19     engagement.  My memory is that the rules of engagement we had were

20     adequate.

21             So I'm -- I don't know what this is about, and without reading

22     the whole of the transcript, I'd be pressed to answer your question with

23     any confidence at all.

24        Q.   Thank you.  After reading this part of the transcript without the

25     testimony of Mr. Franken, who commanded the troops on the ground, can you

Page 11853

 1     confirm that the UN fired at the VRS units on the 8th, 9th, 10th, and

 2     11th?  Thank you.

 3        A.   No, I can't.  If it says it in this statement then that's what

 4     that man said.  I can't -- the most I can remember is that the UN force

 5     in Srebrenica engaged the Bosnian Serb army on at least one occasion.

 6     The dates and circumstances, I cannot recall.

 7        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Smith.  Tell us, please, was the command in -- or,

 8     rather, the headquarters in Tuzla the superior command of the units in

 9     Srebrenica?  Thank you.

10        A.   That is correct, yes.  They answered to the -- the Srebrenica

11     unit answered to the Tuzla headquarters.  The sector headquarters in

12     Tuzla.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Let us take look at 1D369.  It may have a different

14     number now.  What does this report say about that?  The command of the

15     2nd Corps sent it on the 9th of July to the president of

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, and the commander of the BH army,

17     Rasim Delic, and the chief of the operative command,

18     General Hajrurahovic [phoen].

19             Now we can see it.  In paragraph 1, it says that on 9 July 1995,

20     a meeting was held at the corps command between the 2nd Corps chief of

21     staff, Brigadier Budakovic, and the acting UN commander for the

22     north-east.

23             Now let us see bullet point 3.  It says:

24             "The commander of the Dutch Battalion has issued an order to open

25     fire on the aggressor's soldiers launching the attack."

Page 11854

 1             Thank you.  Did the north-east command of the UN inform you that

 2     the commander of the DutchBat had issued attack orders?  Thank you.

 3        A.   No.  And I'm on leave at this period.  If he had given that

 4     order, which I don't find surprising that he has told him to defend

 5     Srebrenica, then it would have been reported to the headquarters in

 6     Sarajevo.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  We see that under the last bullet point on this page:

 8             "Furthermore, Colonel Brantz inform us that the air-strike

 9     procedure is under way," and gave us an example of three NATO aircraft

10     were capable of destroying about 70 targets.  Thank you.

11             Here is my question:  Did you have information that in Srebrenica

12     NATO aircraft were supposed to attack and target all targets around

13     Srebrenica?  Thank you.

14        A.   We're talking of the 9th of July?

15        Q.   The bombing was on the 11th.  But he speaks that they were

16     informed on the 9th by Colonel Brantz.  Thank you.

17        A.   I don't know what Colonel Brantz was telling them.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Up there, we can also read:

19             "In addition to demanding that they leave the UN safe area, he

20     also requested freedom of movement of convoys during the talks between

21     Brigadier Nicolai and the aggressor's forces, General Tolimir."

22             We see them confirming that Brigadier Nicolai spoke to me about

23     this situation.  Thank you.

24        A.   Yes, I can see that.  I might add also that three aircraft

25     couldn't carry enough bombs to attack 70 targets.  So at the bottom of

Page 11855

 1     that page.  It's -- it's not credible.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that Colonel Karremans held a meeting on

 3     the 10th in the evening with the Muslim side, and at that meeting he

 4     requested the Muslims to leave the so-called safe zone so as not to be

 5     affected by the bombing that was to start against the positions of the

 6     VRS?  Thank you.  On the 11th.

 7        A.   I don't know that he did that.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  In this trial, on several occasions, the statements

 9     of the president of the War Presidency, Nikolic, and the interpreter for

10     Karremans, have been used.  But I don't intend to use them now.  They

11     said then, however, very clearly, that Karremans said that everything

12     around Srebrenica would be targeted whether it was walking on two, four,

13     or 100 feet.  I'm now paraphrasing but I'm not going to go more deeply

14     into that because you say you don't know anything about it.

15             When we were speaking about Zepa, at one point you said that you

16     noticed that the soldiers carried uniforms similar to those of the VJ.

17     Do you remember that?  Thank you.

18        A.   Which -- this was when you were -- you were showing me a film

19     about Zepa?

20        Q.   Thank you.  Did you see the insignia of the Army of Yugoslavia on

21     those uniforms?  Thank you.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, the witness asked you to clarify if

23     you are referring to this video we have seen in the courtroom or to any

24     other parts of his evidence.

25             Could you please clarify that.

Page 11856

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I asked

 2     the witness whether he remembered saying that the uniforms were much like

 3     those of the Army of Yugoslavia.  If he doesn't remember, okay.  If he

 4     does --

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, please listen carefully.  The

 6     witness asked you, to be able to answer your question, if you are

 7     referring to the video which was shown in the courtroom last week to the

 8     witness, or are you referring to his knowledge or whatever.

 9             Are you referring to that video?

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  No, I'm not referring

11     to the video.  I'm referring to what the witness said, but I'll find it

12     and remind him once I find the exact page.  Thank you.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You -- the witness asked you -- didn't ask you

14     for a page number but if you were referring to that part of his evidence

15     last week when you asked him to identify uniformed people to be seen on

16     the video.  That was the question.

17             Are you referring to that video?

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I said

19     that I wasn't referring to the video but to the witness's statement.

20     It's 65 ter 7247, page 20, the last line in Serbian, where the witness

21     speaks about that in his statement.

22             Could we see the statement in e-court if it is that important,

23     but I wasn't going to waste much time on that.  So it's 65 ter 7247,

24     page 20.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, this is now D193.  You have to

Page 11857

 1     decide if a question you are putting to the witness is important or not.

 2     But if you put a question, you should help the witness to understand the

 3     question.  This is all what he was asking for.

 4             I hope we have the right page now on the screen.  Page 20 in

 5     Serbian.  And what is it in English?  Which page in English?

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's the following paragraph.

 7     Actually, on the following page.  I kindly ask my legal assistant to help

 8     me with the page reference in English.  It's the previous page, or the

 9     previous paragraph.  We will see in a minute.  Thank you.  I'll read out

10     the Serbian text.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  No, please wait until we have the relevant page

12     on the screen.

13             Mr. Thayer is going to assist you.

14             MR. THAYER:  We have the correct page on the screen,

15     Mr. President.  It's the first paragraph right at the top.

16             THE WITNESS:  I've got it, yeah.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

18             Now you may read it.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  May I continue,

20     Mr. President.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes.

22             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation]

23        Q.   I quote -- Mr. Smith stated the following, I quote:

24             "It was of note that the Bosnian Serb soldiers who had taken part

25     in the decisive action in Zepa had the appearance of a special forces

Page 11858

 1     organisation.  From the preponderance of black fatigues with VJ flashes,

 2     they certainly appeared to be VJ and mercenary members.  In contrast,"

 3     and so on, "... the approaches to Zepa were controlled by regular units

 4     of the BSA."

 5             Here is my question:  Did you see any one member of the VJ in

 6     Zepa or Srebrenica, or maybe your assistants or co-workers did?  Thank

 7     you.

 8        A.   I don't -- what I'm reporting there is -- is what I saw.  Whether

 9     they were really VJ or not, I couldn't tell you.  What I saw was what is

10     recorded in that paragraph.

11        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Smith.  Did the sides to the conflict use NATO

12     uniforms?  For example, did BiH army wear uniforms usually worn by NATO

13     country, and I mean fatigues worn by that army?  Thank you.

14        A.   The Bosnian army had a uniform that was very similar to -- in its

15     camouflage pattern, to that of the United States.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Does that mean that the United States participated in

17     the war on the side of the BH army, if you say that they wore the same

18     uniforms?  Thank you.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, he didn't say that they were the

20     same uniforms.  The witness said that they were very similar to -- in its

21     camouflage pattern, to that of the United States.  This is a difference.

22     If you put a statement of the witness to the witness, please make sure

23     that the quotation is correct.

24             Go ahead, please.

25             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 11859

 1        Q.   You said that the Army of Republika Srpska had uniforms similar

 2     to the VJ.  They are not the same -- they are the same army.  And if the

 3     BiH army had uniforms similar to the United States' army uniform, that's

 4     not the same army.  Is that what you are saying?

 5        A.   I'm not sure I've said that the Army of the Republika Srpska is

 6     the same as the VJ.  Where have I said that?

 7        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Smith.  I just quoted from your statement, and we

 8     see it on the screen now.  The last paragraph in the Serbian language

 9     version.

10             However, that no longer matters because we don't have the time.

11     What I'm saying is this, if the two militaries use the same uniforms or

12     similar uniforms.  Thank you.  Well, we have it in the Serbian

13     translation, and the translation that I was provided with by the OTP may

14     be wrong.  I don't want to waste any more time on that.  In the English

15     version, you will find it on the previous page, actually.  Thank you.

16        A.   I'm sorry, I just don't understand what you want me to look at.

17             If you are referring to the first two sentences of the top

18     paragraph of the page, the number of which I think is 20, but I can't be

19     sure of that on my screen.  Yes, 20, in English.  There are two sentences

20     there.  The first sentence I say that:

21             "The Bosnian Serb soldiers who had taken part in this decisive

22     action in Zepa had the appearance of a special forces organisation."

23             New sentence:

24             "There certainly appeared to be VJ and mercenary members of this

25     units from the preponderance of black fatigues with VJ flashes."

Page 11860

 1        Q.   Thank you.  I thank you for having translated things properly for

 2     me.  In the Serbian translation, it says it was clear that they were

 3     members of the VJ and mercenaries.  And now, you have provided us with

 4     the exact translation, and you said that they were similar to them.

 5     Thank you.

 6              THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now let's look at a different

 7     document.  Its number is 1D702.  Can we see it in e-court.  That is a

 8     letter sent by the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska on the

 9     4th of September.  Commander Mladic sent it to the UNPROFOR commander in

10     Zagreb, General Janvier, via the command of the UNPROFOR command in

11     Sarajevo.  And now we see that it says here:

12             "I received your letter dated the 3rd September in which you

13     informed me that you received -- that you had refused to receive my

14     letter and that that would be the reason for new shelling of

15     Republika Srpska."

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Do you remember that that letter was sent to Zagreb via your

18     command?  Thank you.  There is no translation in English.  I have read

19     for you when the letter was sent, who sent it, and who it was sent to.

20     It was sent to you and General Briquemont.  Thank you.

21        A.   I don't remember us acting as the forwarding agency for Mladic's

22     headquarters, and I don't -- my -- I don't see that my headquarters is on

23     this distribution list that's on the screen anyhow.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please tell the Trial Chamber whether the

25     Main Staff had a direct contact with General Briquemont in Zagreb, or

Page 11861

 1     when they wanted to get in touch with him, did they have to go through

 2     Sarajevo?  Thank you.

 3        A.   They may well have gone through Sarajevo.  I don't recall.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Please, let's look at the third paragraph where

 5     General Mladic says this:

 6             "I have never heard of a case.  I did not even read in literature

 7     that a correspondence between two generals may be used as a cause at the

 8     level of the international community for ultimatums, blackmails, and

 9     pressures on one of the sides to the conflict and ultimately for that

10     people being bombed."

11             My question is this:  Did you use correspondence to put pressure

12     on any of the two sides?  Thank you.

13        A.   I can't comment on this letter unless I have a translation.

14             I communicated with correspondence and by telephone calls or in

15     face-to-face meetings.  In that, we had a correspondence.  And they

16     occurred with both the Bosnians and the Bosnian Serbs.  But it's the

17     message carried in the correspondence, that is, if it is going to apply

18     pressure, applies pressure.

19        Q.   Thank you.  In the third paragraph, General Mladic says in the

20     last sentence:

21             "Why did you not tell the general public the truth about what

22     happened at Markale II on the 28th of August, 1995?"

23             In the following paragraph, he says:

24             "Why didn't you inform the general public about the contents of

25     two telephone conversations that I and General Rupert Smith had with

Page 11862

 1     regard to that severe incident?  Why a mixed commission of experts did

 2     not go to the spot to investigate?  Why UNPROFOR and the Muslim side did

 3     not allow independent ballistic experts to go to the spot as we have

 4     agreed?"

 5             Did you have agreement with General Mladic about all those things

 6     that he is conveying to General Briquemont?

 7        A.   Who is Briquemont?  Or are you confusing him with General --

 8        Q.   I apologise.  It was actually General Janvier.  Bernard Janvier.

 9     I misspoke.  I said Briquemont and I meant Janvier.

10        A.   I didn't have an agreement with General Mladic on those matters,

11     no.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I interrupt you for a moment.

13             Judge Nyambe has a question for the witness.

14             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Yes, General Smith, I just need some

15     clarification.

16             With regard to the mandate of UNPROFOR in the context of the

17     evidence of -- is it General Nicolai, Mr. Thayer, the one who was talking

18     about the green order?  Colonel Franken.

19             MR. THAYER:  Madam Judge, yes, it was Colonel Franken.  And to

20     some degree you are correct, General Nicolai commented and was asked a

21     fair number of questions on cross-examination about the green order as

22     well, but it was Colonel Franken who described the green order itself.

23             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Okay.  Thank you.

24             Now, following up on that, did the green order to defend

25     Srebrenica which translated, as I understand it, into direct combat with

Page 11863

 1     one of the parties to the conflict, change the UN mandate, in fact?

 2             THE WITNESS:  No, I don't think it did at all.  The -- the

 3     mandate is -- let me use the correct word, the resolution of the -- that

 4     the Security Council produced on the subject of the safe area and the

 5     subsequent resolutions that covered it, were there to protect the safe

 6     area and the civil population within it.

 7             If -- as I remember, the UN rules of engagement, you -- the UN

 8     force, you could work your way down through those rules of engagement,

 9     or, rather, the situation would work you down the rules of engagement to

10     the point where you were having to act as the defence of the area.

11             What's -- where you got into difficulties is that the

12     troop-contributing nations did not necessarily have the same

13     understanding of each other as the UN rules of engagement and did not

14     necessarily interpret them in the same way as the UN, as a whole, had

15     drafted these rules of engagement.  And what I suspect but don't know and

16     I don't ever remember reference to this idea of a green order, that isn't

17     to say I didn't hear it, I just can't recall it, is that what was

18     happening at this stage, is, if you like, the actions of this Dutch

19     battalion had started to become rather more Dutch than UN, and they were

20     falling back onto their own Dutch understanding of the rules of

21     engagement.  That is what I suspect is going on here.  But there is no

22     proof of that that I can produce you at this stage or from my memory.

23             JUDGE NYAMBE:  But I'm just trying to understand military things.

24             My understanding is that the initial UN mandate was in

25     self-defence and in the defence of the population, civil population, and

Page 11864

 1     so on and so forth.  When the green order was issued by the UN to this

 2     DutchBat soldier, it moved from self-defence to direct combat with one of

 3     the parties to the conflict.

 4             Is my understanding correct?  Because that was his testimony.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  First of all, I don't -- I would -- I would

 6     want to go back myself and ask more about the green order because I don't

 7     think that had anything to do with the UN, as the UN.  I suspect this was

 8     within the Dutch arrangements as to how you went down their rules of

 9     engagement.  I just cannot recall this idea of a green order.

10             Now, I've slightly lost.  Can we go back to your question.  You

11     were trying to see whether it changed -- they were in fighting.

12             Now, when you come to the point that you're actually defending

13     yourself, you are unavoidably engaging one or other party, and so, in

14     fact, you are in that situation.  It's been created for you.  You haven't

15     set out to do it, but, nevertheless, you are now in that situation.  You

16     are a combatant.

17             In my own mind, in my own practice in my service, I understood my

18     way of thinking about this was to understand what the end result was

19     supposed to be; in this case, the defence of the civil population.  And

20     so you were not engaging in this position in this combat for your gain,

21     except, and insofar as for you to carry out your task, you had to defend

22     yourself.  And, therefore, you were a bit like a policeman who can use

23     force to defend himself and also achieve the objects of taking the

24     prisoner to court, or whatever it is that he is supposed to be doing, he

25     isn't engaged in this combat except as the officer of the law.  And so

Page 11865

 1     that's how I personally have understood my -- you know, myself and my

 2     command in these sorts of circumstances.  But it doesn't alter the fact

 3     once are you fighting, you are on one side and the other person is on the

 4     other one, and there is no getting away from that at all.

 5             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you for your answer.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you, indeed.

 7             Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  We don't have much

 9     time.  Therefore, I would like to move onto a different topic.

10             Can the court please produce 65 ter 7246.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   This is a book by General Rupert Smith.  The title is "The Use of

13     Force:  War in a Modern World."  Thank you.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  While it is coming up, Mr. Tolimir, you have used

15     today three documents and you didn't tell us if you are tendering them.

16     They are 1D165, 1D369 and 1D702.  I would just like to remind you that

17     you should decide what --

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Thank

19     you very much.  I would like to tender those documents for admission.

20     Thank you.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Gajic.

22             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, just a remark, 1D655

23     has already been admitted as D192.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  We are now dealing with 1D369.  If

25     I'm not mistaken, I haven't heard anything from this witness about

Page 11866

 1     this -- the content of this document.  And the witness didn't tell us

 2     anything about the content of 1D702.  That was the letter from

 3     General Mladic to General Janvier.  And in addition, the last one doesn't

 4     have a translation yet.

 5             Would it be appropriate to mark both documents for identification

 6     to be used with another witness, for instance?

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I don't

 8     see a problem.  The witness said that he couldn't testify about the

 9     document, but because the document does not have a translation.  Thank

10     you.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  1D369 will be marked for identification.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D194, Your Honours, MFI.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And 1D702 will be marked for identification but

14     also pending translation.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit 1D195, Your Honours, marked for

16     identification.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we now look at

19     page 172 in e-court in this book.  We are interested in paragraph 2.

20     There's no translation.  I'm going to read from the book.

21             We are looking at the right-hand side page where it says, "The

22     Muslim pockets ..."

23             I'm reading that paragraph:

24             "The Muslim pockets were used by the Bosniak Sarajevo

25     government ... as pressure points on the international community for

Page 11867

 1     firmer action.  The longer that aid convoys were unable to reach them,

 2     the greater the pressure on the mandate.  When convoys did succeed, calls

 3     for firmer action were unwarranted.  Two weeks after the first successful

 4     delivery, Muslims launched an offensive towards Bratunac (a Serb-held

 5     town just outside the besieged Srebrenica).  Thus the integrity of UNHCR

 6     and UNPROFOR was undermined, further convoys were impossible and the

 7     pressure for firmer action resumed."

 8             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   What did you mean when you said that pressure was implied on the

10     international community for firmer action?

11        A.   First of all, I haven't said that.  This is a quote of a UNHCR

12     official that I have taken from the book referenced at the bottom of the

13     page.

14             However, what is being referred to there is a concern as to the

15     state of the civil population and people demanding that the population be

16     fed and medicine, and so forth, be delivered to them.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Did you say this:

18             "This explanation ... reflects the true situation and it shows

19     how UNPROFOR and UNHCR became hostages or shields in that," and so on and

20     so forth.

21             Did you say this?  Thank you.

22        A.   Not as you quoted it.  What I have written is this explanation,

23     the quote I have put in -- on the page, as, indeed, the situation it

24     reflects, shows how the UNHCR and UNPROFOR became caught in the first of

25     what I came to call the hostage or shield situations that marked the

Page 11868

 1     story of UNPROFOR.  They had no good choices.

 2        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Smith.  Since we don't have any more time, we can

 3     look at the text on our own.  Let me ask you this: After the agreement

 4     was signed on the demilitarisation of Srebrenica and Zepa, was

 5     demilitarisation indeed carried out; or, alternatively, did the zones

 6     remain militarised?  Thank you.

 7        A.   The -- as I recall it, there wasn't agreement to demilitarise as

 8     a single agreement.  There was agreement about the safe areas in which

 9     demilitarisation was part of it.  And the -- and no, they were not

10     demilitarised.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us why is it then that we call it

12     agreement on the demilitarised zones of Zepa and Srebrenica?  Thank you.

13        A.   I don't remember them being called that.  They were called safe

14     areas.

15        Q.   Thank you.  If we have time, I'm going to show you this agreement

16     on the demilitarisation of Zepa and Srebrenica.  The Trial Chamber has

17     already seen it.  And now, can we please look at page 174 in e-court.  We

18     are interested in the last paragraph on this page, and I quote:

19             "If something must be done became the main approach to the Balkan

20     crisis, it was further complicated by the something being the desire to

21     use air power which emanated from the USWashington was increasingly

22     involved in the debate as to what to do about the Balkans, not least due

23     to a powerful lobby by the Bosniaks and the Croats.  The US stance was

24     clear: it didn't want to be involved on the ground and equally saw no

25     need to be neutral with regard to the sides."

Page 11869

 1             My question is this: Did the US forces and representatives tell

 2     you clearly that they wanted to use air power in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

 3     Thank you.

 4        A.   No.  I never discussed this with the US forces, and certainly not

 5     in the sense that you're asking the question.  I'm talking about

 6     something that's going on in 1992, or 1993, in those paragraphs, and I

 7     didn't have conversations with the US forces.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Did you feel a bias towards Croats and Muslims when

 9     you talked to US representatives?  Was their attitude towards Croats and

10     Muslims different than their attitudes towards Serbs?  Thank you.

11        A.   When am I having these conversations?

12        Q.   I asked you whether you felt that.  Thank you.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  No, you were additionally saying, "... when you

14     talked to US representatives."  And the witness asked you to which talks

15     you were referring, which time.

16             Could you help --

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I may have been speaking very fast

18     so my -- the first part of my question was missed.

19             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   And that was whether you felt that.  Okay.  Did you ever hear

21     from US representatives that they wanted to use air power against the

22     Serbs?  That was one question.  Thank you.

23        A.   I have sat as a -- as part of a delegation in the North Atlantic

24     Council and heard the United States representative arguing in the case

25     for a no-fly zone, for example.  Yes.

Page 11870

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Can you help us: When did that happen?

 2             THE WITNESS:  I think it's 1993.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 4             Mr. Tolimir.

 5             THE WITNESS:  And I think if we turn the pages of the book that's

 6     what I'm -- that paragraph that we've had at the bottom of the page,

 7     whatever the number is, goes on to talk about the establishment of the

 8     no-fly zone.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Let's go to the next page to the -- to the top.

10             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  When did this meeting of NATO happen you were

12     mentioning just now?

13             THE WITNESS:  I -- I'm afraid I can't remember the month.  It's

14     1993.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

16             THE WITNESS:  But I --

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Let's look at the --

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Just to be able to put it into context --

19             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  -- that's the reason why I ask.

21             Please continue.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My apology, Mr. President.  Let's

23     look at page 184 in General Rupert Smith's book.  There's a reference to

24     the London Conference which took place in 1995.  Thank you.  And he says

25     this.  In the first paragraph he says this.  We can see it now:

Page 11871

 1              "We could be sure Mladic would take measures to counter our

 2     threats.  I explained I was quite happy to fight the Bosnian Serbs but

 3     not on only one pretext, defence of the British, and in the one place,

 4     where they had the initiative, and I was unable to reinforce and had no

 5     weapons other than air power in range."

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Can you explain to the Trial Chamber, you said that at that

 8     meeting, the Americans requested for a no-fly zone to be established.

 9     Would that have been the same type of measure as those that were used

10     against Republika Srpska when you targeted everybody?  Is that the same

11     situation as in Libya, where the Brits are in charge and when -- where

12     Libyan citizens are being liberated under their patronage?  Is that the

13     same situation?  Thank you.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I have to stop you again.  We are

15     dealing with Bosnia and not with Libya.  I told you two times last week,

16     and it's not an appropriate way to conduct your cross-examination.

17             You should consider this question during the break.  We must have

18     our first break now, and we will resume 20 minutes past 4.00.

19                           --- Recess taken at 3.48 p.m.

20                           --- On resuming at 4.24 p.m.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Can we

23     have page 187 of the same book in e-court.  Page 187 of the book written

24     by Mr. Smith about the utility of force.  Thank you.

25             Can we have page 187.  It's in English.  We are interested in the

Page 11872

 1     last paragraph where it says, and I quote:

 2             "With the start of the second phase of the NATO-UN action, the

 3     Croatians and the Federation launched a joint offensive towards

 4     Banja Luka from the positions gained in south-west Bosnia and the

 5     Krajinas in August.  They made rapid progress, aided, no doubt, by the

 6     effects of the bombing.  By the 14th September, we were beginning to run

 7     out of targets to attack, but Richard Holbrooke had brought the

 8     negotiations to the point at which that same day, Milosevic pressured the

 9     Bosnian Serbs into a cease-fire," et cetera.

10             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   My question is:  Did you write this in your book?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Do you stand behind what you wrote?  Thank you.

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Were Muslims and Croats supported by the NATO

16     bombardment carried out at UN request in this offensive in which they

17     went from Zagreb to Banja Luka?  Thank you.

18        A.   No, they were not supported in the sense you're stating it.  The

19     two events were coincidental.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Was there a lack of the targets within the Republic

21     of Srpska Krajina in Republika Srpska because the targets were either

22     destroyed or simply there were no more targets?

23        A.   I wasn't conducting operations in the Krajina.

24        Q.   Thank you.  However, here you say that you were beginning to run

25     out of targets to attack.  And then Richard Holbrooke use this force in

Page 11873

 1     order to exert pressure on Milosevic who was then to pressure the Bosnian

 2     Serbs; isn't that true?

 3        A.   I say that we were beginning to run out of targets, but you said

 4     in your question, was there a lack of targets in the Krajina, in the

 5     Republika Srpska Krajina, and I said I wasn't operating there.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Did NATO bombard all the targets in Republika Srpska

 7     Krajina, including the Udbina airport?  Thank you.

 8        A.   On the assumption that I am understanding the Republika Srpska

 9     Krajina as that part of Croatia in which the Croatian Serbs had lived, I

10     don't think NATO conducted any air attacks in that area.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have page 7 in e-court.

13     The penultimate paragraph goes as follows.  You can also read it on the

14     screen now.  The penultimate paragraph.  Thank you.  I would like to

15     tender this document that we just saw on our screens.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, how many pages does this book have?

17     I mean not the pages in e-court.  The pages in e-court or the pages of

18     the book?

19             Mr. Gajic.

20             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, if I'm not mistaken,

21     this book consists of more than 300 pages.  I can't give you the precise

22     number right now.  It was also used during the cross-examination of

23     General Smith in the Popovic case.  We think that this would be useful

24     material if we were to have it in evidence, both for the parties and the

25     Trial Chamber.

Page 11874

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Gajic, do you know if that was tendered in

 2     the Popovic case and admitted into evidence?  I mean the whole book.

 3             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I think that it

 4     wasn't.  It's hard to follow the transcript in the Popovic case because

 5     their practice was different.  The exhibits were not immediately put into

 6     evidence but only subsequently.  However, it is quite clear that certain

 7     segments of the book were used, although they were not admitted into

 8     evidence.

 9             Thank you.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, you have used, if I'm correct, the

11     pages 172, 174, 184, and 187 in e-court.

12             To admit the whole book would be a heavy burden, especially for

13     the Trial Chamber but also for the parties, when we come to the end of

14     the trial.  Is it perhaps possible that you just tender these pages which

15     are important for understanding of today's hearing and also the -- the

16     front page of the book so that we know that what it is about?

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

18             I think it would be very useful for the Trial Chamber to admit

19     the whole book because, if you read just the parts, you are not going to

20     understand the context.  This book is in English so it didn't even have

21     to be translated.  I personally don't need it because I am aware of the

22     events.  General Smith also doesn't need.  You need it.  You really need

23     it.  And I think that I'm going to use this book on some other occasions

24     before the end.  I don't have much time left, and if we don't admit it

25     into evidence, then we are not going to have all those points that I will

Page 11875

 1     be unable to touch upon until the end of my cross-examination.

 2             Thank you.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

 4             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, presumably the issue of whether the

 5     selections that General Tolimir put to the witness should be in context

 6     should be clear from the questions themselves.  The questions as they are

 7     put should be in a proper context, so there should not be a separate

 8     exercise by the Trial Chamber to go make sure that the questions were put

 9     in the proper context to begin with.

10             That said, the procedure which Your Honour has outlined is what

11     took place in the Popovic trial.  Only the selected pages of the book

12     were placed in evidence.  We're just as happy to have the entire tome in

13     evidence.  I don't think it affects General Smith's royalties one way or

14     the other, and it's -- our philosophy is the more the merrier, as you

15     know.  But, again, the procedure that was followed in Popovic was just

16     the selected pages went into evidence.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think not to waste time with this witness we

18     should postpone the decision on the admission of this document and come

19     back to that later.

20             Mr. Tolimir, please continue.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  In that

22     case, can we have 1D121.  This is a segment from a book about

23     intelligence services and the war in Bosnia in 1991 and 1992, and this is

24     part of the study on Srebrenica made by the Dutch Institute for War

25     Documentation.  1D211, I apologise.  I may have misspoke.  1D211.

Page 11876

 1             Can we have page 3 this e-court, paragraph 5 on the right-hand

 2     page.  I can't see a thing.  I quote:

 3             "Finally, the secret operations are of interest because various

 4     statements pointed to the conclusion that the clandestine supplies

 5     usually led to rapid transit to the eastern enclaves, such as Srebrenica

 6     and Zepa.  The VRS complained that the supply of new weapons usually

 7     facilitated new sorties from the enclaves into Bosnian Serb villages and

 8     military positions, which in turn provoked a response from the VRS.  This

 9     action-reaction cycle again put UNPROFOR troops in danger.  In the

10     enclaves, the ABiH actually all too often used the observation posts as a

11     cover in military actions against the VRS.  It is important to

12     reconstruct the secret arms supplies from Iran via the Croatian pipeline,

13     and the black flights to Tuzla, because this will make clear that

14     different NATO member states had different political and military views

15     on the possible consequences," and so on and so forth.

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   My question is:  Did UNPROFOR take any measures in order to

18     prevent the BiH army from using observation posts in enclave to carry out

19     their sabotage actions in the territory of Republika Srpska?  Thank you.

20        A.   Are we referring to this generally or specifically in those two

21     enclaves?

22        Q.   Thank you.  I was speaking generally.  But you can also comment

23     more specifically.

24        A.   The -- and I'm speaking of 1995, which is when I'm there.  To the

25     best of my knowledge, we did not allow the Bosnian army to use our UN

Page 11877

 1     positions to conduct operations.  It certainly wasn't done under any

 2     orders of mine.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Are you aware of the fact that the BiH army soldiers

 4     were deployed along the same line to which the observation posts held by

 5     the DutchBat belonged?  And from that same line, they acted together with

 6     UNPROFOR as Mr. Preker [as interpreted] said on the 9th, 10th, and the

 7     11th.

 8        A.   The line in Srebrenica - which is what you're now talking about,

 9     am I correct --

10        Q.   That's correct.

11        A.   -- was coincidental in a number of places.  Not in every case was

12     the OP line the same as the Bosnian army line and if -- as you described

13     in that previous account, which I've said I'm unable to comment on, it's

14     not my account, then the UN force was firing on the Bosnian -- on the

15     Serb -- Bosnian Serb forces.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

17             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, just so we have a clean record later,

18     page 39, line 11, I see there's a reference to a Mr. Preker, and I think

19     we just need some clarification as to who that witness is, and I'd also

20     like to know whether there's any transcript cite or other support for

21     whatever this statement is.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The page numbers have changed.  In e-court, we

23     have now page 7.  In LiveNote we are on page 40.

24             Can you please repeat -- I see it "Mr. Preker."  "And from that

25     same line, they acted together with UNPROFOR as Mr. Preker said on the

Page 11878

 1     9th, 10th and 11th."  I think there must be a misinterpretation.

 2             Mr. Gajic is able to help us.  Mr. Gajic.

 3             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, Mr. Tolimir referenced

 4     the testimony of Mr. Franken.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 3454.  Line 23 to 25.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  We heard this name earlier,

 7     Colonel Franken, from DutchBat.

 8             Sir, do you recall the question?

 9             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  And I think I'd understood him to be talking

10     about that -- that reference, that he -- that was in the previous

11     session.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Mr. Smith, since I don't have much time left I would like to take

16     a look with you, page 4 in e-court, I'm interested in the

17     paragraph describing the various attitudes within the American

18     administration.

19             Will quote just one sentence.  You can see it here.  It's in the

20     second paragraph, line 4, and it is underlined in red.  I quote:

21             "Everyone did realise that the Balkans would provide the United

22     States with better access to the Middle East."

23             My question:  Can you tell the Trial Chamber how would it be

24     possible for the United States to have a better access to the Middle East

25     via the Balkans?  Thank you.

Page 11879

 1        A.   I don't what -- I can read the underlined-in-red sentence.  I

 2     don't know what it's -- who is saying it, when this conversation or idea

 3     is being discussed or the author is reaching this conclusion.  Can you

 4     help me there?

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And please help the Chamber.  I don't know if you

 6     introduced this document by mentioning the author and the title of this

 7     book.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I said at the beginning

 9     that this was 1D211 and excerpt from the book by Cees Wiebs:

10     "Intelligence and the War in Bosnia 1992-1995."  That is part of the book

11     entitled:  "The Report on Srebrenica," and the author is the Dutch

12     Institute of War Documentation.  Mr. Smith also gave an interview to that

13     institute.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We can now see what it says on

16     page 6 in e-court.  It is also underlined:

17              "Meanwhile Holbrooke was becoming increasingly frustrated that

18     the Croatian pipeline was not progressing well.  Lake once described

19     Holbrooke as high maintenance.  Holbrooke, therefore, proposed to deliver

20     arms and ammunition ... via third party countries.  Lake ... always

21     accepted such covert operations.  However, he found the plan too risky in

22     this particular case.  The Secretary of State Christopher shared this

23     view.  Holbrooke's proposals lead to a debate within the administration.

24     Clinton and State Department officials considered supplies via

25     Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan.  This was nothing new.  In the 1980s,

Page 11880

 1     Saudi Arabia had already supplied arms worth 500 million dollars, via the

 2     CIA, to the Mujahedin fighters in Afghanistan."

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   If you look at this paragraph in this book on intelligence

 5     affairs, we see that they were trying to find ways to clandestinely

 6     supply arms to the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia.  Did UNPROFOR or your

 7     government take a position on the issue of secret arm supplies to the BiH

 8     army and Croatian army?  Thank you.

 9        A.   First of all, the paragraph doesn't say what it -- you say it's

10     saying.  You actually got the Secretary of State.  It's being said that

11     he did not support lift, arm and strike.

12             So -- this is a description, as I read it, of discussions going

13     on and the various parties to it and their positions in that discussion.

14             As for my government, you must ask them.  I don't know what their

15     position was.  And UNPROFOR had no part in supplying arms to either side.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 7 in e-court.  I'm

18     interested in the left-hand side, the penultimate paragraph.  It has also

19     been marked:

20              "On 16th of April, 1994, Galbraith spoke with religious leader

21     of the small Muslim community in Zagreb, Imam Sefko Omerbasic.  Who later

22     informed the Iranian ambassador that American diplomates had urged him to

23     purchase arms for the ABiH.  The CIA managed to gain access to a report

24     of this discussion and they suspected that Galbraith was engaged in a

25     secret operation."

Page 11881

 1             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Do you know who Galbraith is?

 3        A.   I think he was the United States ambassador to Croatia.

 4        Q.   Do you know that during the Operation Storm he appeared on a

 5     Croatian tank?  This was shown even in this Tribunal.  And during the

 6     Defence case of Ante Gotovina, and it was claimed that the Americans made

 7     the plans for this operation.

 8        A.   I don't know that he appeared on a tank.  I don't know that he

 9     did.  And I don't know who made the plans for the Croatian operation.

10        Q.   Thank you.  I don't know if you saw that video footage.

11     Galbraith can be seen riding on a tank from Zagreb during the offensive

12     which in your book was described as the offensive from Zagreb to

13     Banja Luka.  So the United States did not hide their involvement in that.

14             My question is: Do you know that the Americans took part in

15     planning of that operation?  I mean Operation Storm 95.  Thank you.

16        A.   I told you, I don't know who made the plans.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us whether you received any information

18     from the VRS about the secret arming of Muslims via the Tuzla airport?

19     Thank you.

20        A.   Not in the sense that you've described.  Mladic, on at least --

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please let the witness answer.  You are putting

23     questions to the witness, you should give him the chance to answer the

24     question.

25             Please continue, Mr. Smith.

Page 11882

 1             THE WITNESS:  Mladic, on at least two occasions, told me that

 2     aircraft were landing at -- on one of the air strips in the Tuzla

 3     vicinity and that -- and very much wanted me to stop them.

 4             The implication was that weapons, and so forth, were coming in

 5     that way, but we never intercepted any of the airplanes to know if that

 6     was actually the case.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]  Thank you.  Can we now have in

 8     e-court, 1D662.

 9             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   That's a memo from the Main Staff of Republika Srpska, dated 24th

11     of February, 1995.  It was sent personally to General de Lapresle in

12     Zagreb and also personally to you in Sarajevo.  So you can see that the

13     date is the 24th of February.  And now take a look at the third

14     paragraph where it says, "Generals," this is what Mladic says to you:

15             "Generals, you took upon yourself the obligation to control the

16     air-space above the former BiH, and you are extremely diligent both in

17     practice and in words when it is about the Serbian side.  That is why it

18     is incomprehensible that in front of UNPROFOR's eyes at Carovici and

19     Tuzla air strips, Muslims can receive weapons and military equipment

20     right at the time when agreement had been reached about the four-month

21     ceasefire agreement which was initiated and sponsored by the most high

22     functionaries of UNPROFOR."

23             Can you tell me whether you received this letter from

24     General Mladic?  Thank you.

25        A.   I don't remember it specifically, but I am quite prepared to

Page 11883

 1     agree that received that letter.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  In this letter, General Mladic, at the end, says,

 3     that he expects you to ensure that UNPROFOR prevents the arming of

 4     Muslims and the violations of this agreement.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

 6     document before we can move on to the next one.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You are tendering the document.  Please wait a

 8     moment.

 9             It will be marked for identification, pending translation.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D196, marked for identification,

11     Your Honours.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

13             Mr. Tolimir, at this point in time, I would like to ask you how

14     much additional time for your cross-examination you need?  Because you

15     have now reached, more or less, the time of 11 hours.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I was told that I still

17     had ten minutes, so that's why I planned to finish within the next ten

18     minutes.  Thank you.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  Just for planning purposes,

20     Mr. Thayer, have you any idea how much time you need for re-examination?

21             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I think I'll need a session.  But I

22     think I can finish today.  If -- if we end in the next 15 or 20 minutes.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

24             Mr. Tolimir, go ahead.  Please.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Thank

Page 11884

 1     you, Mr. Thayer.  Could we please see P4130.  We can see it -- or,

 2     rather, no, not yet.  It's a letter dated 6 March 1995 about a meeting

 3     between General Smith and General Mladic held on 5th of March, 1995.  It

 4     was written by Mr. Woute [phoen], the commander's adjutant or, rather,

 5     General Smith's adjutant.

 6             And in line 4 of the letter, in paragraph 1, we see -- actually,

 7     we actually can't see it yet.  I apologise.  Could we please see P1430 on

 8     the screens.  P1430.  Thank you.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Gajic.

10             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I can see various

11     variations in the transcript. [In English] It is P1430.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please repeat.

13             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] P1430.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Let's see if it works now.

15             Mr. Tolimir, you have the document on the screen.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   We can see in line 4 of this document where it says that Mladic

19     initiated the meeting.  Thank you.

20             And in line 7, in English, and it's line 8 in Serbian that:

21             "Tolimir also attended throughout?"

22             Let us take look at paragraph 2, subparagraph (b).  It says:

23             "Tuzla:  Mladic alleged the use of Tuzla air field for supply of

24     arms to the BiH covered by NATO.  General Smith stated that he was

25     satisfied that NATO was not escorting or was in any way associated with

Page 11885

 1     the alleged landings of aircraft at Tuzla."

 2             Since you stated that NATO didn't cover this flight, could you

 3     tell us who did and who stood behind the organisation of these flights?

 4     Thank you.

 5        A.   I don't know the answers to those questions.  The -- once we

 6     began to investigate these, and I would add that we were -- we were also

 7     aware that we were having airplanes in the vicinity.  I should perhaps

 8     explain, the Tuzla air field was a large Yugoslavian Tito-period air

 9     field, consisting of a main runway and a number of reserve air strips.

10     These aircraft were landing, or flying very low over the -- one of the

11     reserve strips some distance from the main strip where the UN base was.

12     They had reported the sounds of -- at night of low flying airplanes, and

13     which coincided with these complaints of Mladic, so I was in no doubt

14     that this was occurring.

15             I equally, having challenged NATO, established that they were --

16     had nothing to do with it, but who it was, I have -- I don't know, and

17     the flights stopped once we started to investigate.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please see D67 now.  This

20     is a document of the intelligence administration of the BH army.  It was

21     sent out on 13 July as an interim report.  And it's a report in which

22     Alija Izetbegovic is informed after the fall of Srebrenica about the

23     activities by the BH to supply weapons to the enclaves before the fall.

24             And in paragraph 2, it reads:

25             "Specifically the following has been done for Srebrenica and

Page 11886

 1     Zepa."

 2             And then they go on to state how much materiel, ammunition, and

 3     so on, were supplied, and so on.

 4             And bullet point 2:

 5             "Seventeen helicopter flights were carried out, in each of which

 6     a helicopter was hit."

 7             And bullet point 3:

 8             "In this way, we transported a number of seriously wounded," and

 9     so on.

10             Bullet point 4:

11             "As a preparation for the upcoming operation of linking up the

12     enclaves, we brought and returned four brigade commanders," and so on.

13     It's on the following page in English.

14             Could the witness now be shown the following pages as well for

15     him to be available to inspect it visually.  And, later on, I'll ask my

16     question.  Thank you.

17             Thank you.  You can see here an overview of what was sent to

18     Srebrenica and what was sent to Zepa.  That was on the previous page.

19     Now it's continued on this one and the following one.  And once you see

20     all this and Delic's signature, could you please return to page 2 where

21     the beginning of the table is, where the summary of everything that was

22     sent there.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   And now my question is about the flights from Tuzla to Srebrenica

25     and Zepa to supply weapons.  Were the people in Srebrenica and Zepa aware

Page 11887

 1     that there was an air-lift in place for the supply with weapons and

 2     ammunition?

 3        A.   I'm sorry, who -- which people?

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Did UNPROFOR members in Zepa and Srebrenica know that

 5     there was this air-lift to supply arms to the Muslims in Srebrenica and

 6     Zepa?

 7        A.   In my time in 1995, I received no reports from either enclave of

 8     this resupply happening.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Please tell the Trial Chamber whether it's possible

10     for a helicopter to land at night without it being observed by UNPROFOR,

11     or unheard by UNPROFOR?  And is it possible for a helicopter to fly at

12     night without special equipment?  Thank you.

13        A.   I don't know what equipment the Bosnian army helicopters had, and

14     it is possible to do this, and there was relatively few UNPROFOR in a

15     large space.  And I don't know where these aircraft were landing in

16     either of the enclaves.

17             The -- both sides were flying helicopters, and they are extremely

18     difficult to pick up when flown close to the ground, so we were getting

19     no coverage of this by the NATO forces doing the no-fly zone.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Did UNPROFOR tolerate the resupply of Muslims with

21     armaments in the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica?  Thank you.

22        A.   I don't know what you mean by "tolerate."

23             We didn't know it was going on.  And to the degree that we could

24     stop it, we could suppose it was going on, but no more.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 11888

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please see 1D606.  Thank

 2     you.  Could we please see 1D606, 605.  Here we have 606.  Thank you.

 3             Please take a look at it.  It says in the letterhead:

 4             "Bosnia-Herzegovina embassy, to the Republic of Croatia,

 5     military-economic mission, Zagreb.

 6             "We forward from a document from the Bihac district office to the

 7     5th Corps."

 8             And it says down there:

 9             "Please provide confirm of received materiel or problems

10     concerning reception.  Truck number UNHCR 10379."

11             And this is a overview of armaments and ammunition received in

12     Bihac from Zagreb via UNHCR.

13             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Did you known that the UNHCR was being used to arm the Muslim

15     army?  Thank you.

16        A.   Where does it say that UNHCR carried that?

17        Q.   The following page in English.  Thank you.

18        A.   That it has been numbered, that doesn't make it an UNHCR

19     delivery.

20        Q.   Thank you.  About the transport from Zagreb to Bihac through

21     Serb-held territory, was it -- were all these accompanied by UNPROFOR or

22     were they able to pass through on their own?  Thank you.

23        A.   I don't recall every convoy.  But in most cases, particularly in

24     the Bihac area, I think the UNHCR ran their own convoys, and UNPROFOR did

25     not escort them.

Page 11889

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Are you saying that UNPROFOR did not escort UNHCR

 2     convoys from Zagreb to Bihac?  Thank you.

 3        A.   No, I'm not saying they didn't.  I'm saying that my memory is

 4     that, in most cases, they didn't.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please see 1D605 now.

 7     We're waiting for it.

 8             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   It says:

10             "Armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina 5th Corps.

11     They are sending those to the embassy of the Republic of BiH to the

12     Republic of Croatia.  It is a logistical report on receipt of a shipment

13     of war materiel through UNHCR.  Regarding your document," number

14     so-and-so, "of 18 May 1993, we hereby inform you that we have received

15     this shipment of 17 May with some small differences which are not

16     important.  There was no problem with the takeover of the equipment;

17     however, we caution you again that it is necessary to exercise maximum

18     secrecy regarding this channel, engaging the smallest possible number of

19     persons to carry out this work."

20             And now they are asking for a shipment, the details of which are

21     described below, and they end by saying:

22             "This is ammunition that we absolutely lack and material needed

23     in special purposes weapons," and so on.

24             It is signed by the 5th Corps commander, Ramiz Drekovic?

25             This document also speaks about arm supplies for the 5th Corps

Page 11890

 1     through UNHCR.  Thank you.

 2        A.   Yes, I can see that up at the top where it says "logistics

 3     report."

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Did you receive reports about this practice, that

 5     this embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia supplies arms and

 6     ammunition to the Muslims through UNHCR?

 7        A.   No, and this is new news to me.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please see 1D607.  Thank

10     you.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   It's the embassy that is now writing to the command of the

13     5th Corps, and saying that 70 tonnes of D-2 fuel have been sent from the

14     army fuel contingent for the 5th Corps.

15             Was this supply channel through the UNHCR from Zagreb in function

16     as early as 1993?  Thank you.

17        A.   Well, the later is dated 1993.  But it also makes the point that

18     the UNHCR doesn't know where the diesel comes from.  So they appear to be

19     innocent party being used in this.

20        Q.   Thank you.  I've showed three documents from 1995 and 1993 for

21     you to be able to see the continuity of supplying the BH army through

22     UNHCR for two years.

23             And now my question is: Is it possible for such a channel to be

24     in existence for two years without the UNPROFOR knowing the first thing

25     about it, although they are escorting these convoys through Serb-held

Page 11891

 1     territory?  Thank you.

 2        A.   I just told you, I don't think we did escort the convoys into

 3     Bihac very often, if at all.

 4             Secondly, I've just pointed out to you that it appears from the

 5     1993 letter that the UNHCR don't know the provenance of what they're

 6     carrying in their trucks.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I kindly ask the President to admit

 9     into evidence document 605, 606, 607, unless they are admitted already.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I understand they aren't.

11             They -- all three will be received as exhibits.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D196 through Exhibit D199,

13     Your Honours.  98, I'm sorry.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  That means -- we already have D196.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  My mistake, Your Honour.  Exhibit D197 through

16     D199.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

18             Mr. Tolimir.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Could we

20     please see 1D211 in e-court.  Page 14.  Thank you.  We can't see it yet.

21     So it is 1D211.  We see it now.

22             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   As can be seen on the right, this is about the Tuzla air base.

24     To avoid reading it out because I lack time, my question is: Was the

25     Tuzla air base one of the largest air fields in Eastern Bosnia used by

Page 11892

 1     both the NATO forces and UNPROFOR for their needs in Eastern Bosnia?

 2     Thank you.

 3        A.   What did you say about NATO?

 4             It -- as I said, I described the air field.  Yes, it was one of

 5     the largest air fields.  The UN were based on the camp by its main strip.

 6     NATO wasn't there in 1995, but NATO established a base there in -- you

 7     know, took over from the UN base in 1996.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  A minute ago you said that the auxiliary air field

 9     was used by helicopters of the BH army, and we also saw a document about

10     armaments.

11             My question is:  Did the BH army, or NATO, or UNPROFOR, have

12     control over the -- over Eagle air base in Tuzla?  Thank you.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

14             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, again, I understand that

15     General Smith can handle himself, but his testimony is clear, and I don't

16     think he said anything like the ABiH was using that air field.  I don't

17     think he ever said that.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Sir, are you able to answer the question?

19             THE WITNESS:  I was about to say -- go further, and I didn't say

20     helicopters either.

21             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Thank you.  I have no time to return to the transcript, but a

23     short while ago you spoke about it while we were reading that letter, or,

24     rather, the report from the meeting that you had with Mladic and me when

25     Mladic protested because of the misuse of Tuzla air field.  And you said

Page 11893

 1     that there was an auxiliary strip that they used.

 2             So if you want to reply, okay; if you don't want to, well, we can

 3     move on to the following question.  Thank you.

 4        A.   I did say there were reserve strips, one of which appeared to be

 5     being used or flown very low over.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  I don't want to go into the black flights now because

 7     I don't have time.

 8             Just one more question and we'll finish.

 9             Please let us see 1D211, page 16.  Thank you.

10             This is about the reporting of UNPROFOR.  I'm now quoting:

11             "On Friday, 13 February, the daily overview report of UNPROFOR

12     headquarters in Sarajevo stated at that there was continued evidence of

13     BH army resupply [sic] activity.  Since early January 1995, the convoys

14     from Croatia with arms and ammunition had increased considerably, and in

15     other parts of Bosnia the same observations were made.  In the spring,

16     DutchBat would also establish that the ABiH received new arms from Tuzla

17     and that training was being stepped up.  This news spread rapidly, and in

18     due course, this could only have negative consequences for the

19     clandestine arms supplies to the BH army [sic].  The American pressure on

20     Le Hardy was apparent increased, because he became involved in a

21     acrimonious exchange with Americans on this subject.  Under apparent

22     American pressure ... he produced a second report on 18 February in which

23     he state that his earlier report was incorrect and he made

24     recommendations for achieving more accurate reporting ... according to

25     him, no one had seen the aircraft - which wasn't true - but only heard

Page 11894

 1     it.  He also made a number of suggestions so that the Norwegians could

 2     report better.  This second report is remarkable:  On the one hand,

 3     Le Hardy states that all alleged observations of the Hercules were wrong,

 4     but, at the same time, he makes a wide variety of recommendations,

 5     including stationing a Danish tank on Tuzla air base, to control the

 6     highway strip and to occupy more favourable positions, to improve the

 7     chance of actual hard observations."

 8             Here's my question:  Since you were UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia

 9     in 1995, in Sarajevo, did you get this report and this information and

10     similar information about the supplying of the BH army with new armament?

11     Thank you.

12        A.   Who is Le Hardy?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It hasn't been interpreted to me.

14     I don't know what the General asked me.

15             THE WITNESS:  Who is Le Hardy?

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   You will see it in this UNPROFOR report.  This was issued by

18     UNPROFOR about the man who was in charge of implementing those secret

19     sorties.

20        A.   I'm not looking at UNPROFOR report.  I've got a page from a book,

21     which, I think from it, my memory of the number, is the same one we saw

22     written by a man who'd been on the Netherlands war document inquiry

23     or ...

24        Q.   Thank you.  He obviously worked pursuant to some documents.  It

25     says here, on Friday, the 13th of February, the daily report of UNPROFOR

Page 11895

 1     staff in UNPROFOR stated that there was continued evidence of ABiH arms

 2     resupply activity.

 3             In other words, he stated that, based on some reports; right?

 4     Thank you.

 5             Please, if you look at paragraph -- at the following paragraph,

 6     that is.  The previous paragraph on the left-hand side, you can see it

 7     already.  If you look at the third paragraph where -- paragraph where it

 8     says that on the 16th of February.

 9             Do you see that, do you see the paragraph starting with:

10             "The 16th of February, the second C-130 was seen, and on the

11     following day two more were seen.  The British daily press even

12     established a connection with a visit by Holbrooke to Turkey on the

13     7th of February.  But that was not the end of the matter because a

14     further four flights were observed where one aircraft was seen by a

15     British UNMO using night-vision binoculars.  On 17th and 19th February,

16     UN personnel made 16 reports of helicopters that landed on Tuzla air

17     base."

18             Thank you.  End of quote.

19        A.   I can read that too.  I wanted to know who Le Hardy was.  I

20     thought you were asking me about his report.  He, I don't think, was

21     anything to do with the daily situation report that you referred me to,

22     and I've acknowledged that we were having these reports.  I've already

23     said that for you, that we had these reports of aircraft landing.

24     Nothing like the number being reported here, as I remember it, but

25     that -- that this was going on at Tuzla was -- I acknowledge it was

Page 11896

 1     happening.  I don't acknowledge it was necessarily as many flights as

 2     being put here.

 3        Q.   Thank you, General, sir.  I have no more time.  I don't want to

 4     abuses either the Chamber's time or the OTP's time.  I would like to

 5     thank you for coming here to testify.  I apologise for all of my

 6     questions.  I had to put them because I defend myself.  Thank you for

 7     everything.  I wish you a safe journey home.  God bless you and I wish

 8     you to fully enjoy your days of retirement.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is as much as I

10     had to ask the General.  We have no further questions, and, in any case,

11     we don't want to abuse anybody else's time.  Thank you.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

13             Mr. Gajic.

14             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, an omission on the

15     part of the Defence.  We would like to tender 1D211.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  How many pages does this document contain?

17             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, the document before

18     us -- I apologise - please bear with me for a moment - currently, 33

19     pages have been uploaded into e-court, but we would like to reduce that

20     to some 15 pages that speak about the Croatian connection, and this is

21     what Mr. Tolimir discussed with General Smith and the flights for Tuzla.

22     And we're talking about the 15 pages that we would like to tender into

23     evidence of all of the pages that have been uploaded into e-court.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The Chamber is looking forward to a proper motion

25     to admit these documents so that we know what you are talking, which

Page 11897

 1     pages you really are tendering.  Thank you.  We postpone the decision on

 2     that.

 3             Mr. Thayer, now your re-examination, and I hope it will be

 4     possible to finish and let Mr. Tolimir exceed his time a bit as the

 5     Prosecution did at the beginning in the examination-in-chief.

 6             Mr. Thayer.

 7             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 8                           Re-examination by Mr. Thayer:

 9        Q.   General, good afternoon.

10        A.   Good afternoon.

11        Q.   I'd like to turn, first, to an issue that was raised this

12     afternoon by the Honourable Judge Nyambe with respect to the green order

13     that you heard a little bit about of.

14             MR. THAYER:  May we have D193 in e-court, please.  And we'll need

15     page 16 in both the English and the B/C/S, please.

16        Q.   General, I'd like to draw your attention to the paragraph, and

17     it's the third paragraph on this page that begins with:

18             "July was dominated by the fall of the enclaves."

19        A.   Could my screen go up one size, please?

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It's quite difficult because it's a large

21     document.

22             THE WITNESS:  That's fine.  I've got the paragraph.

23             MR. THAYER:

24        Q.   And for the record, we're looking at a copy of your OTP witness

25     statement from 1996.  You state here that:

Page 11898

 1             "The attack on Srebrenica started on the 6th July and was seen at

 2     the time as a local affair and as a punishment for attacks by the

 3     Bosnians from inside the enclaves."

 4             You go on, and you describe:

 5             "The attack intensified during the 8th, 9th and 10th.  On the

 6     8 July, the built-up area of the town was engaged by artillery and UN

 7     observation posts were taken by the BSA using tanks.  UN troops were

 8     taken from two OPs and moved to Bratunac north of the enclave.  It was

 9     believed at this stage that the objective of the BSA was merely to limit

10     the size of the enclave.  During the evening and night of the 8 July, the

11     shelling of the town intensified and many civilians entered Srebrenica

12     from the villages in the southern part of the enclave.  On the morning of

13     the 9 July, BSA infantry attacks supported by tanks progressed up to the

14     heights just south of Srebrenica town.  Four UN OPs were surrounded and a

15     Dutch Battalion APC was captured.  The ABiH resisted with small-arms and

16     mortar fire, but were reported to be easily outgunned."

17             And then you refer to 30 Dutch personnel being captured and were

18     surrounded by BSA troops.

19             You provided this context, sir, in your statement, and I wanted

20     to focus now on the next paragraph:

21              "In the early hours of the morning of the 10 July, the BSA

22     resumed the attack, and by the end of the day had secured the heights

23     around the south of the town.  The UN force established a blocking

24     position on the road leading into Srebrenica and issued an ultimatum

25     threatening the use of air attacks if the attack on Srebrenica was not

Page 11899

 1     discontinued."

 2             And then go on to describe the use -- the employment of the close

 3     air support.

 4             Now, you were asked a series of questions by General Tolimir

 5     about this so-called green order which was issued down the DutchBat chain

 6     of command on the 9th of July.  What I'd like to show you now is a copy

 7     of that green order.

 8             MR. THAYER:  And if we could have P00601.  The original is in

 9     Dutch, but let's look at the English and the B/C/S.

10        Q.   We can see that this is dated the 9th of July in the evening

11     hours from Major Franken to Captain Groen.  Now the Trial Chamber has

12     heard testimony about a warning that was issued by UNPROFOR to the

13     Bosnian Serb army about its establishment of these blocking positions

14     that you described in your report.

15             Can you tell the Trial Chamber just generally what the purpose of

16     those blocking positions was.

17        A.   This is very much a memory.  The purpose was to provide a clear,

18     as it were, line in the sand, not only as a defence on that axis, but as

19     a clear point at which the UN, as the UN were becoming engaged in the --

20     in -- in defending the enclave.

21             That's my memory of it at that time.  But, remember, I'm -- this

22     is me learning of this at -- by radio calls and then being called off

23     leave and being told about it in more detail.

24        Q.   And what had to happen, General, for the UN to become engaged?

25        A.   Oh, the attack had to continue and seek to penetrate that

Page 11900

 1     blocking position.

 2        Q.   And if we look at this document, we see that the assignment is

 3     listed as preparation an arrangement of defence of the southern edge of

 4     Srebrenica.  And it lists some routes, and it refers to position B1, and

 5     the Trial Chamber has heard that that's a reference to a blocking

 6     position, Bravo 1.

 7             And then we see in the order:

 8             "Prevent with all available means a breakthrough of the BSA ...

 9     into the town.

10             "Nota Bene:  This is a seriously intended green assignment."

11             Now, General, the Trial Chamber has heard that this term green

12     assignment refers to, in a manner, the taking off of the blue helmet and

13     the placing of the combat green helmet.  At this point, General, with

14     these blocking positions set up, as you've explained it, in order, again,

15     for the DutchBat forces to be engaged with the VRS, what has to happen?

16        A.   Well, the position has to be -- their blocking position has to be

17     attacked and the -- and the -- the attack has to continue, if you like,

18     in order to have this engagement.

19        Q.   And do you recall that, in fact, tanks were observed moving

20     northward, penetrating and firing upon some of these blocking positions?

21        A.   I recall that there is armoured, Bosnian Serb armoured vehicles

22     there, because they become part of the targets, if I recall correctly, of

23     the close air support.

24        Q.   And, fundamentally, what's the purpose of preventing a

25     breakthrough of the BSA into the town?

Page 11901

 1        A.   Would continue to keep the town a safe area for the civil

 2     population, albeit it's being shelled at the time.

 3        Q.   And the VRS attacks on the UN positions, did those constitute a

 4     violation of any of your mandates?

 5        A.   First of all, it was an attack on the UN.

 6             Secondly, yes.  The civil population is being shelled in their

 7     houses in Srebrenica, and the enclave is being attacked.

 8        Q.   General, I want to spend a little bit of time discussing the

 9     basis, the authorisation for UNPROFOR's use of its air power available

10     through NATO.

11             General Tolimir asked you a number of times whether the

12     Security Council ever gave you authorisation to use air power against the

13     VRS.  He asked you which Security Council resolution did so, and so

14     forth.  So I want to address those specific questions.

15             MR. THAYER:  And if we could have P2087 quickly, please.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, may I ask you in the meantime, I was

17     told there is another witness waiting.  Is it probable that he will

18     commence his examination today?

19             MR. THAYER:  It is not, Mr. President.  Thank you for reminding

20     us.  If we may cut him loose, that would be great.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Should be released for today.

22             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

23        Q.   General, we saw this protest letter earlier in your testimony.

24     And you refer in it in the second paragraph specifically to:  "Security

25     Council Resolution 836."

Page 11902

 1             And you say that you shall feel free to recommend the use of NATO

 2     air forces to meet your obligations.  We saw that --

 3        A.   Mm-hm.

 4        Q.   -- that before.  Let's take a look at 65 ter 2438 before I put my

 5     next series of questions to you, General.

 6             MR. THAYER:  And that has now been marked as P01208.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, you have switched on two microphones.

 8     One is enough, I think.

 9             MR. THAYER:  May we have page 9 in e-court, and that will be

10     page 10 in the B/C/S, please.

11             For the record, we can see that we're at tab 3.  If we can move

12     four pages more in the English.  And that will be page 15 in the B/C/S.

13        Q.   I think we also saw this document earlier in your testimony.

14     This is a proposed demilitarisation plan that was put to you by

15     Mr. Joseph and Mr. Harland on the 19th of July.  And I just want to focus

16     on the references first.  You can see that there is reference to

17     Security Council Resolutions 824, 836.  And, in particular, I'm going to

18     want to focus on the North Atlantic Council decisions of 22 April, and we

19     can see here that Mr. Joseph describes the continuing bombardment of the

20     civilian population of Zepa and the attacks on the UNPROFOR troops.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, you left out the date of the

22     North Atlantic Council decision of the 22nd April.

23             MR. THAYER:  1994, Mr. President.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  That is helpful for a better

25     understanding.

Page 11903

 1             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I'm going to be putting up a series

 2     of these resolutions, but I see we're at the break.  Perhaps now is a

 3     good time.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Indeed.  We must have our second break now for

 5     half an hour.  And we will resume at quarter past 6.00.

 6                           --- Recess taken at 5.47 p.m.

 7                           --- On resuming at 6.17 p.m.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Thayer, please carry on.

 9             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

10             May we have 65 ter 7266, please.  And if it's possible to enlarge

11     it just a little bit.

12        Q.   Okay.  General, can you see that we've got Resolution 836 up on

13     the screen.

14        A.   Yes, I can.  Yeah.

15        Q.   It's dated the 4th of June, 1993.  And towards the beginning, we

16     can see that it reaffirms Resolutions 819 and 824.  And then it precedes

17     through a number of findings and other language referring to the ethnic

18     cleansing and plight of the civil population in the safe areas.

19             MR. THAYER:  If we could go to the next page, please.  And that's

20     page 3 of the B/C/S, please.

21        Q.   We can see that the Security Council is alarmed by the plight of

22     the civil population in Sarajevo, Bihac, Srebrenica, Gorazde, Tuzla, and

23     Zepa.

24             Condemning the obstruction by the Bosnian Serb party of

25     humanitarian assistance.

Page 11904

 1             In the middle of the page, we can see that the Security Council

 2     stresses that there must be complete cessation of hostilities, withdrawal

 3     from territories seized by the use of force and ethnic cleansing,

 4     reversal of the consequences of ethnic cleansing.

 5             Now, what I'd like to do is go to the next page and focus on a

 6     particular paragraph.  Two particular paragraphs.

 7             If we can focus on paragraphs 9 and 10, please.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It should be the next page in B/C/S.

 9             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  That's absolutely right.

10        Q.   And I won't take the time to read it into the record.  We can all

11     see it.

12             General, can you tell the Trial Chamber the connection, if any,

13     between paragraphs 9 and 10 of Resolution 836 and the operation of NATO

14     air power through UNPROFOR?

15        A.   I mean, the paragraph 9, if you like, creates the condition in

16     which the Dutch Battalion is conducting that -- the action that we've

17     seen already, or discussed already.  They are occupying a blocking

18     position where, if they are attacked, they will be acting in

19     self-defence.  And they take the necessary measures, including use of

20     force, to deal with the -- that situation.  And -- which is spelt out.

21     You have got the bombardment of a safe area, which, if I recall this

22     document, defined earlier on by reference to the places and so forth.

23     Oh, it is said, silly me.  It says it in paragraph 5 above.

24             And then an armed incursion into them and also any action that is

25     inhibiting their ability to move.

Page 11905

 1        Q.   Thank you, General.

 2             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, the Prosecution will tender

 3     65 ter 7266.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2133, Your Honours.

 6             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I have already reduced my

 7     re-examination significantly.  I would like to be able to finish today

 8     and if I could, I would like to tender Resolutions 819 and 824, basically

 9     from the bar.  They're both referred to in the indictment.  We've heard a

10     lot of references to it.  I think they essentially speak for themselves.

11     It is referred to again, explicitly in this document.  I think it might

12     save some time, and if there is no objection from the Defence, I think we

13     can move through this in time to get General Smith home today.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, are there any objections?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

16             Since this is mentioned in the indictment, maybe it would be

17     useful to use only those which are mentioned in the indictment.  And

18     maybe it would be useful if we could work with this witness and go

19     through them witness, witness [as interpreted] and then introduce them

20     into evidence.  Thank you.

21             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I'm not sure if that is an objection.

22     Again, these are mentioned in the indictment.  We've seen references to

23     them.  Frankly, I don't think we need to go through them with this

24     witness.  I'm not sure if there is going to be another witness to walk

25     through the resolutions that, again, are a matter of historical record.

Page 11906

 1     I think we're quite safe in just admitting them.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  I'm not sure, Mr. Tolimir, if I

 3     understood your position correctly.  I didn't hear any objection to

 4     admissions of the two Security Council resolutions that the Prosecution

 5     is tendering; is that correct?

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I have no objection to

 7     the Security Council resolutions.  My objection pertains to all other

 8     documents which were not considered here.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  At the moment only dealing with these two

10     Security Council resolutions.

11             They will be received as exhibits.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P2134 and Exhibit P2135, Your Honours.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  But for the record, Mr. Thayer, you

14     should state the 65 ter --

15             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I was about to do that.

16     Resolution 819 is 65 ter 7267; and Resolution 824 is 65 ter 1980.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  Please carry on.

18             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

19             May we have 65 ter 7268 on the screen, please.

20        Q.   General, when we looked at Ed Joseph's proposed demilitarisation

21     agreement before the break, there were several resolutions and a

22     reference to a 22 April 1994 NATO decision.  I'd like you to just take a

23     look at this.  We can see from the top a reference to condemning the

24     recent Bosnian Serb attacks against Gorazde.  It reaffirms the readiness

25     of the Alliance to protect the safe areas.  And again here's the

Page 11907

 1     reference to Resolutions 824 and 836.

 2             MR. THAYER:  And if we turn the page, in paragraph 9 we can see

 3     that NATO agrees to several things.

 4        Q.   Can you tell the Trial Chamber when you've had a chance to take a

 5     look think, General, how this fits in with the authority you testified

 6     you had to enforce your mandate through the use of NATO air power.

 7        A.   Yes.  This is the -- if you like, the essential linking decision

 8     of NATO that is as much an authorisation to their subordinate commanders

 9     to act in support of UNPROFOR and allows UNPROFOR to call on the -- on

10     NATO should they find themselves in certain situations as listed in this

11     document.

12             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, the Prosecution tenders 65 ter 7268.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Is there a translation available?

14             MR. THAYER:  No, there is not, Mr. President.  So we will ask

15     that it be MFI'd.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  It will be marked for identification,

17     pending translation.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P2136, marked for identification,

19     Your Honours.

20             MR. THAYER:

21        Q.   General, General Tolimir asked you last week why you had bombed

22     the Zlovrh facility, and I -- I think we understand that when I say

23     "you," I'm referring to you in your role as commander, why you bombed the

24     Zlovrh facility in Zepa at the end of August.  And you couldn't remember

25     why it had been selected as a target.

Page 11908

 1             Do you recall that series of questions?

 2        A.   Yes, I do.

 3        Q.   Okay.  Let me show you a couple of documents.  The first is 7264;

 4     65 ter 7264.

 5             General, do you recall being shown a combat report dated the

 6     30th of August from the Rogatica Brigade, describing the attack on the

 7     Zlovrh feature?  Do you remember General Tolimir showing that you?

 8        A.   Yes, I remember that.

 9        Q.   Okay.  What we have here is a very urgent report.  It's the same

10     date, 30th of August, and the subject is NATO air-strikes in various

11     corps area of responsibility.  We have a partial translation, the full

12     version, obviously, is in B/C/S.  And I want to focus your attention on

13     this portion that we have translated.  And we will see in a second that

14     this is authored by General Mladic.  He writes:

15             "During these two massive attacks, the enemy fired at the general

16     area of the Main Staff of the VRS without consequences."

17             And you will see here at radar position of an air surveillance

18     warning and guidance centre, a radio relay centre in Jahorina.  The

19     Stolic and Kmur repeater --

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir --

21             MR. THAYER:

22        Q.   -- and the former radio rely centre in Zlovrh, among others.

23             And if we could go to the next page in English, please.

24             General Mladic writes:

25             "The goal of enemy activities was obviously to damage and destroy

Page 11909

 1     the command posts, communication centres in order to paralyse the command

 2     and control in the VRS on strategic and operational level, which might be

 3     an introduction into more extensive activities and engagement of the

 4     rapid reaction forces."

 5             General, does that help refresh your recollection about what the

 6     targets were of that attack, and, in particular of the Zlovrh repeater

 7     that we saw.

 8        A.   It certainly refreshes the -- the general thrust of the targeting

 9     was to do what the -- is to attack the command and control facilities,

10     particularly those to do with the air defences.

11        Q.   And this facility that is listed here that General Tolimir asked

12     you about, the radio relay centre at Zlovrh, can you just describe what

13     the importance is of a radio relay centre?

14        A.   If it's the -- the nature of the communication systems, often you

15     need to put repeater or relay stations into the system in order to link

16     them all up, and I would think that that was one of those facilities.

17             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, the Prosecution tenders 65 ter 7264.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You said only a part of the document was

19     translated; is that correct?

20             MR. THAYER:  That's correct, Mr. President.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Could we see the second page of the B/C/S

22     version?

23             Can you provide us with any reason why only a part of that was

24     translated?

25             MR. THAYER:  Time, Mr. President.  We -- we were only able to, in

Page 11910

 1     the time we had, focus on the -- the pertinent part and we will get the

 2     rest of it translated.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  In that case, we should mark it for

 4     identification, pending a full translation.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2137, marked for identification,

 6     Your Honours.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

 8             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  May we have 65 ter 7263.

 9        Q.   Now we don't have a translation into B/C/S of this document and

10     I'll just read in some of the relevant portions.

11             It's dated, again, the 30th of August, and it is from

12     General Janvier to Mr. Annan, and you are copied in for your information

13     regarding the NATO air-strikes and Rapid Reaction Force action.

14             Paragraph 1 states that:

15             "NATO air-strikes began at 010 [sic] hours and continued until

16     0445 hours this morning.  The strikes were predominantly targeted against

17     the Bosnian Serb integrated air defence system; that is, radar, missile

18     and communications sites."

19             Again, sir, does this help refresh your recollection about what

20     the nature of the target at that Zlovrh radio relay centre was that was

21     struck on the 30th of August?

22        A.   Yes, in the general pattern.  Again, I can't remember the

23     specific target list, but it would have fitted into that description of

24     the integrated air defence system.

25             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, the Prosecution would ask that 7263

Page 11911

 1     be admitted pending translation, MFI'd pending translation.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be marked for identification, pending

 3     translation.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2138, marked for identification,

 5     Your Honours.

 6             MR. THAYER:

 7        Q.   Now, I'm going to cut this portion a little short.  But you were

 8     shown the agreement --

 9             MR. THAYER:  And if we could have D0051.  D51, please.  This

10     agreement on the disarmament of the able-bodied population in the Zepa

11     enclave of the 24th of July.  You were shown that a number of times.  In

12     particular, paragraph 7.  Let's just bring that up for a second.

13     Paragraph 7 reads:

14             "In accordance with the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and

15     the Additional Protocols of 1977, the civil population of Zepa shall be

16     given the freedom to choose their place of residence while hostilities

17     continue."

18        Q.   Now, you testified that both sides in the conflict were in the

19     habit, you said, of sprinkling their argumentation and documents with

20     references to the Geneva Conventions.  And I want to discuss with you in

21     this context those conventions.

22             The Honourable Judge Mindua pointed out that the Article 17 would

23     apply to the movement of some of the people and that it is encouraged.

24     So let's take a look at that, if we could.  That's 07269.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I take it you're referring to 65 ter list?

Page 11912

 1             MR. THAYER:  It's a 65 ter number, Mr. President.  Unfortunately,

 2     it wasn't on our list.  Again, this is something that has come up on the

 3     fly, as it were.  It is on the list of re-direct documents that we sent

 4     to the Defence.

 5             If we could blow that up, please.  Great, thank you.

 6        Q.   Here we have Article 17, and it's of the 4th Geneva Conventions,

 7     12 August, 1949.  I think we're all agreed that this is what would apply,

 8     theatrically, to what was going on.  And let's look at the actual

 9     language of the Article.  We can see that it states:

10             "The parties to the conflict shall endeavour to conclude local

11     agreements for the removal from besieged or encircled areas, of wounded,

12     sick, infirm, and aged persons, children, and maternity cases, and for

13     the passage of ministers of all religions, medical personnel and medical

14     equipment on their way to such areas."

15             So, General, the Article that we're talking about that would --

16     would apply to the situation, can we see here that it's limited in any

17     way to a particular class or -- or group of people, generally speaking?

18        A.   Yes, it is.  I mean, they're described as the old, the sick,

19     children, and maternity cases.

20        Q.   Okay.  So any encouragement of such agreements, can we agree

21     perhaps on the word "vulnerable," would that cover this general group of

22     people, perhaps?

23        A.   If you would like to call them that, yes, we could label them

24     vulnerable.

25        Q.   Paragraph 7, as we just saw, and if we could go back to D51, we

Page 11913

 1     can see that this reference in this agreement to the Geneva Conventions

 2     as parked, as it were, right in the middle of the agreement, without any

 3     reference to the particular class that we just spoke about?

 4        A.   Mm-hm.

 5        Q.   Is that correct?

 6        A.   That's correct, yes.

 7        Q.   How does this citation, having seen the actual relevant Article,

 8     fit with your prior understanding or experience that both sides were in

 9     the habit of sprinkling, as you said, their argumentation and documents

10     with references to the Geneva Conventions?

11        A.   Well, it -- it rather confirms that point of view.  It also, you

12     note, it doesn't cover those vulnerable people in any -- with any

13     specificity.

14             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, the Prosecution would tender

15     65 ter 7269.  Actually, we would offer it as marked for identification,

16     pending translation.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Although I'm not persuaded that it is necessary

18     to tender international agreements as a basic of -- yeah, kind of law, it

19     will be received but only marked for identification, pending translation.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P2139, marked for identification,

21     Your Honours.

22             MR. THAYER:  Judicially noticed, Mr. President.

23        Q.   Now, General, General Tolimir asked you a number of questions

24     pertaining to your testimony about the negotiations that you were privy

25     to between Mr. Bildt and President Milosevic towards the very end of

Page 11914

 1     July 1995.

 2             Do you remember your testimony and then the cross-examination on

 3     that topic?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   And General Tolimir put it to you in various forms and fashions

 6     that everybody made it safely across the Drina and it all ended up in a

 7     positive way and that these people were free to go to Serbia.  Are you

 8     aware, General, as to whether or not the Bosnian Serb -- let's start with

 9     the military leadership, was aware of these negotiations?

10        A.   To the best of my knowledge, they were not aware.

11        Q.   And was that something that was done deliberately?

12        A.   I don't know.  Certainly I wasn't discussing it with them.  This

13     wasn't my negotiation.  And as I think I told the Court, I was aware of

14     it but not party to the negotiations at the time.

15        Q.   And, General, are you aware what actions the VRS took regarding

16     those men and boys as they were trying to cross the Drina during those

17     couple of days and nights at the end of July?

18        A.   No, I'm not aware.

19        Q.   Did you ever hear reports that they were shelled by the VRS, as

20     they tried to cross into Serbia?  Does that ring any bells?  Did you ever

21     hear that, sir?

22        A.   No, I don't think I did hear that.  No.

23        Q.   Moving onto another topic, General.

24             Do you recall General Tolimir suggesting to you that the VRS kept

25     in mind the safety of UN soldiers, and he showed you an order from

Page 11915

 1     General Mladic regarding the robbery and theft of property at

 2     check-points, at VRS check-points; do you remember that?

 3        A.   Yes, I do.

 4        Q.   And you testified that you complained to Mladic and that the

 5     robberies decreased, and that this, as you said, showed Mladic's grip and

 6     command of his forces; do you remember that?

 7        A.   Yes, I do, yes.

 8        Q.   Well, I want to just ask you a couple of questions about another

 9     occasion, and you talked about this a little bit already, when the VRS

10     had an opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to the safety of

11     UNPROFOR, and I'm talking about the taking of the UN hostages following

12     the air-strikes in May of 1995.  You've spoken about the grip of

13     General Mladic and the discipline in his army.  Did you form any

14     conclusions about whether the hostage-taking in May, the 400 or so

15     hostages that you testified about by the VRS, was spontaneous, committed

16     by rogue elements or some other conclusion?

17        A.   My conclusion was that this -- this was centrally conducted and

18     was initiated at Pale from the centre.

19        Q.   And when you say "at Pale from the centre," what are you

20     referring to, General?

21        A.   Well, the political headquarters was there.  That's where, if I

22     recall correctly, certainly that was where the first hostages were

23     seized, and I was rung up and threatened with their murder, if the

24     bombing didn't stop.  And from memory, it was there that I -- I spoke on

25     the telephone with Mladic.

Page 11916

 1        Q.   And to what extent, based on your experience an observations at

 2     the time, did you make any conclusions concerning the involvement of the

 3     VRS in the taking of these hundreds of hostages?

 4        A.   Oh, in the reporting of them being taken, that they were being

 5     seized by VRS people, and also it was noteworthy that the Russian units

 6     were not being afflicted in the same way, which was another indication

 7     that this thing was -- this -- this hostage-taking was being controlled.

 8        Q.   Let's take a look at another document, General.  It's

 9     65 ter 7265.

10             What we have here, General, is a communication from the VRS

11     Main Staff intelligence and security sector.  The date is 27 May, 1995.

12     Subject; NATO air-strikes.  It is type-signed by Lieutenant-Colonel

13     Jovica Karanovic indicating on the authorisation of the chief.  And this

14     is the same Jovica Karanovic who authored a document that General Tolimir

15     showed you in which Mr. Karanovic, a member of the intelligence and

16     security sector in the VRS, was advising General Tolimir of developments

17     at the airport.

18             Do you remember that document?

19        A.   Yes, I do.

20        Q.   Okay.

21        A.   Yeah.

22        Q.   And we can see here that Lieutenant-Colonel Karanovic reports

23     that they have information that the NATO session was finished, how the

24     operation was allegedly going to be led, and then if we look at the final

25     paragraph, General, we see it states:

Page 11917

 1             "Familiarise commanders with this information and recommend that

 2     captured members of UN forces be placed in an area of a possible NATO

 3     air-strike."

 4             Can you please comment, General, on how this document corresponds

 5     or not with your prior conclusion that this was being centrally run.

 6        A.   Well, this fits that, you see, the intelligence and security

 7     sector of the Main Staff issuing from the -- from the -- the headquarters

 8     this information with the recommendation as to that's what they do, that

 9     they seize captured members of UN forces and put them into the area of

10     possible NATO air-strikes.

11        Q.   And what did you actually see happening, General, in the day or

12     two after the initial round of air-strikes?

13        A.   Much the same.  I mean, the initial hostages were put on -- one

14     on -- in the close vicinity to the target we had already attacked, and

15     from memory, on at least one other target around Pale.  And then the

16     others were moved, although much of our knowledge about where they were

17     moved came when they were debriefed on their return, but they were all

18     placed in -- in possible target locations.

19             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, the Prosecution would tender

20     65 ter 7265.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2140, Your Honours.

23             MR. THAYER:

24        Q.   Now, while on this same series of events during this period of

25     time in May, you testified that following that first round of strikes on

Page 11918

 1     the 25th, all of the safe areas were shelled.  And you mentioned in

 2     particular Tuzla being shelled, where scores of people were killed.  And

 3     General Tolimir put a number of questions to you, suggested that that

 4     shelling was not done by the VRS.

 5             Do you remember that question and answer?

 6        A.   Yes, I do, yes.

 7        Q.   Now, based on the reports you were receiving at the time of this

 8     shelling across all of the safe areas, again, did you come to any

 9     conclusions as to whether this shelling, following the first round of

10     air-strikes, was spontaneous, done by rogue elements or some other

11     conclusion?

12        A.   No.  I concluded that this was, again, centrally directed and

13     it -- not least part of that was that the targets were all safe areas.

14     And, secondly, the shelling all occurred in a relatively close tight

15     period of time.

16        Q.   And can you give the Trial Chamber some idea of when you say

17     close period of time are you talking about?

18        A.   My memory is that all the attacks occurred within about half an

19     hour of each other.

20        Q.   And at what level, General, would you -- based on your

21     observations at the time and your experience with artillery, and if you

22     need to explain a little bit, please feel free, what level in the VRS

23     would this have to have been co-ordinated from or by?

24        A.   As a general rule, and like all general rules and theories, this

25     can be broken.  But as a general rule, you command the artillery at a

Page 11919

 1     level that equates to its maximum range.  So if you've got a piece that

 2     fires, for sake of example, 20 kilometres, then the -- all the size of

 3     the formation that is within a radius of 20 kilometres would be the

 4     headquarters that would command the artillery.

 5             By and large, that equated to corps levels, in my observation, of

 6     the Bosnian Serb army.  The -- but it -- it all depended upon how much

 7     the area is in -- covered by the force, rather than just the size of the

 8     force, corps, division or whatever size it is.

 9             I want to draw a distinction though between the command of the

10     artillery and the application of its fire.  The -- you might command the

11     artillery at corps level, but you might tell a much more subordinate

12     commander that he can use that fire to support his attack, and then

13     you -- when he has finished that attack, you can allocate that fire to

14     another position, another target.

15             In this particular case, the -- the -- these weren't supporting

16     any specific attack.  This was what one would call in my service an

17     artillery raid.  You -- you were using your guns as though they were

18     airplanes, for example, in a bombing raid.  And in this case, I would

19     expect it to have been initiated by the artillery commanders in -- I beg

20     your pardon, the orders for firing to be coming from the artillery

21     commanders at the corps or possibly divisional level.  But to get the

22     co-ordination of time that they're all arriving within that, plus/minus,

23     half an hour, someone above them, the Main Staff, I think, would have

24     been the -- would have told them to -- You are to attack these targets at

25     this time or between these times, or some other centralised instruction

Page 11920

 1     that initiated the attack itself.

 2        Q.   Just a couple of more questions, General.

 3             General Tolimir asked you a number of questions about

 4     Colonel Palic.  And he showed you a document, and I won't show you the

 5     document now.  But in the process of asking you these questions, he

 6     claimed that Colonel Palic was not finally killed, to use

 7     General Tolimir's words.  And this is a transcript page 11762.

 8             Do you remember him saying that in one of his questions, that

 9     Colonel Palic was not finally killed and he was going to show you some

10     documents?

11        A.   I do remember him saying that, yes.

12        Q.   And you testified about seizure of Colonel Palic, as witnessed by

13     Ed Joseph.  General, do you know what happened to -- and I'm going to

14     start with the hodza, the cleric, Mr. Hajric, one of the signatories to

15     that 27 July decision that General Tolimir spent so much time showing

16     you.  Do you know what happened to him, sir?

17        A.   I don't, no.

18        Q.   How about Mr. Imamovic, one of the other of those three

19     signatories, the civil protection chief?

20        A.   I don't remember.  If I knew, I have forgotten, and I don't know

21     now.

22        Q.   General, would it surprise you to know that their remains, along

23     with the remains of Colonel Palic, were all found in a single mass grave

24     just a couple of kilometres from Rogatica?

25        A.   It wouldn't surprise me.

Page 11921

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, this was not subject

 3     of cross-examination.  The witness is being asked to speculate.

 4             Thank you.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Indeed, Mr. Thayer.  We are not persuaded that

 6     putting this question to the witness is helping to clarify the fate of

 7     these individuals.

 8             MR. THAYER:  Well, Mr. President, if I may just ask, because

 9     General Smith was about to, I think, provide some more information.  I

10     would like to ask why it wouldn't surprise him to learn that those three

11     men were found in the same grave.  I think that would be helpful to the

12     Trial Chamber.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I put a question to the witness.

14             Do you know anything about the fate of these individuals, sir?

15             THE WITNESS:  No.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, we are beyond the time of today.  We

17     wanted to finish by the end of today's hearing with this witness, to

18     enable him to leave, as he indicated earlier.  But Judge Nyambe has again

19     a question for the witness -- at least one or two questions for the

20     witness.

21             MR. THAYER:  That was my last question, Mr. President.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much, Mr. Thayer.

23             Judge Nyambe.

24             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Just one short question.

25             At page 44 of today's transcript, in answer to a question about

Page 11922

 1     Pale, you have stated that:

 2             "I was rung up and threatened with the murder if the bombing

 3     didn't stop.  And from memory, it was there that I spoke on the telephone

 4     with Mladic."

 5             Who rang you up?  Do you remember?

 6             THE WITNESS:  The initial telephone call was by -- it was a

 7     Canadian voice, in that, that was the accent and so forth.  Either

 8     immediately after that, in other words, the telephone was handed to

 9     Mladic, or subsequently that day, I think I had a conversation with

10     Mladic, and he was at Pale.

11             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.  The last question.  Just a few lines

12     down from that portion I have quoted, you are reported as saying:

13             "Oh, in the reporting of them being taken, that they were being

14     seized by VRS people and also it was noteworthy that the Russian units

15     were not being afflicted in the same way."

16             THE WITNESS:  It was noteworthy.  Yes, there were two Russian

17     battalions in my command, and there was something of a special

18     relationship between those battalions and the Bosnian Serbs, and it was

19     observable that in the general taking of hostages none of the Russians

20     were being taken.  And I considered that to be indicative also of someone

21     being in central control.

22             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.  Thank you very much for your answers.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Sir, you will be pleased that this finally

24     concludes your examination and your testimony here in the courtroom.  The

25     Chamber would like to thank you for your attendance again in The Hague

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 1     that you could help us with your testimony, and now you are finally free

 2     to return to your normal activities.

 3             I think it is still in time for you to get your flight wherever

 4     you are going.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

 7             We have to adjourn for the day, and we will resume tomorrow in

 8     the afternoon in this same courtroom, at 2.15.

 9                           [The witness withdrew]

10                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.06 p.m.,

11                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 29th day of March,

12                           2011, at 2.15 p.m.