Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 16467

 1                           Tuesday, 12 July 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning to everybody in the courtroom and to

 6     those who are following our hearings.

 7             The witness should be brought in, please.

 8                           [The witness takes the stand]

 9                           WITNESS:  RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning, Mr. Butler.  Welcome back.

11             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, sir.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Again, I have to remind you that the affirmation

13     to tell the truth still applies for today's hearing.

14             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey is continuing his

16     examination-in-chief.

17             You have the floor, Mr. McCloskey.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.  Good morning, Mr. President,

19     Your Honours, everyone.

20                           Examination by Mr. McCloskey: [Continued]

21        Q.   And, Mr. Butler, I note you have binder 2, which I recall the

22     Judges would like binder 2, as we have them here.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, indeed, we are looking forward to receiving

24     them.  We are dreaming on them already.

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, that happens.

Page 16468

 1        Q.   And as we're collecting ourselves I'll -- we left off yesterday

 2     in the narrative of documents --

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Just for the record, I take it that the Defence

 4     is in the possession of the binder as well.  Is that correct, Mr. Gajic?

 5     I see you nodding.  Thank you.

 6             Mr. McCloskey.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.

 8             We had left off in the documentary narrative where the Srebrenica

 9     enclave had been created by the Security Council.  There was a VRS attack

10     planned for Zepa and Gorazde which, according to Mr. Butler, didn't

11     really go very far because the Zepa enclaves were -- the Zepa enclave and

12     Gorazde was created.  So now I would take us into the year, and we won't

13     spend much time in this year, in 1994.

14             If we could go to P2158.  It should be 44 of the tab.  And this

15     is a document the Trial Chamber has seen at least one or two times,

16     I think, so I won't spend a lot of time on it, but it is a document from

17     the Bratunac Brigade Command, dated 4 July 1994, entitled "Report for the

18     Brigade Members."  So we can see what that is.

19             And if we can go to page 2 in the English and it should be page 3

20     in the B/C/S.  Actually, it was the previous page in the B/C/S.  If we go

21     back one in the B/C/S, we should catch it.

22             Yeah, that's where it is.  And we're going to need to go to the

23     next -- well, soon the next page in English.

24        Q.   And it's this section that the Court has heard before that I want

25     to ask you about:  "We have won the war in Podrinje," and I think you've

Page 16469

 1     explained where that is already, "but we have not beaten the Muslims

 2     completely, which is what we must do in the next period.  We must obtain

 3     our final goal, an entirely Serbian Podrinje.  The enclaves of

 4     Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde must be defeated militarily."

 5             Now, Mr. Butler, briefly, to your knowledge, were there

 6     military -- Muslim military activities coming out of those enclaves

 7     during this time that the Serb forces felt like they needed to engage?

 8        A.   Yes, sir, there were.

 9        Q.   All right.  And then it goes on to say:

10             "We must continue to arm, train, discipline and prepare the

11     RS Army for the execution of this crucial task, the expulsion of Muslims

12     from the Srebrenica enclave."

13             I think that speaks for itself.

14             Then it says:

15             "There will be no retreat when it comes to the Srebrenica

16     enclave.  We must advance.  The enemy's life has to be made unbearable

17     and their temporary stay in the enclave impossible so that they leave the

18     enclave en masse as soon as possible, realising that they cannot survive

19     there."

20             In your view, does this include or not include a reference to

21     civilians?

22        A.   They're not specifically noting just the military forces, so as a

23     result I read this as they are also including the surrounding civilian

24     population.

25        Q.   Now, let's -- if we just look at the end of this document, we see

Page 16470

 1     that it's from the commander of the Bratunac Brigade at the time,

 2     Lieutenant-Colonel Slavko Ognjenovic.  As a brigade commander -- in your

 3     opinion, would a brigade commander be able to give this direction to his

 4     troops on his own?

 5        A.   No, sir.  He's receiving guidance from higher levels of command.

 6     And, again, when one looks at this particular document, it is drafted

 7     specifically to provide information not only to lower levels of the

 8     brigade, but actually to individual members of the brigade, as the

 9     leadership of the army explains out in detail, the objectives of the war

10     in a way and in a manner that each soldier can understand.  So this isn't

11     something that the brigade is doing in isolation.  This is something --

12     part of a larger strategy in order to positively influence the morale of

13     the soldiers, not only the Bratunac Brigade but of all the military

14     units.

15        Q.   Let's go to page 1 of this document.  And we can see that it

16     begins by saying:

17             "During his recent visit to the corps command, the commander of

18     the VRS indicated that he would soon visit some of the corps units,

19     including the Bratunac Brigade."

20             Now, you say this brigade commander would not have received

21     this -- would not have done this on his own.  Where, along the chain of

22     command, should he have received -- who should he have received this

23     direction from before he passed it on to his troops?

24        A.   In all probability, he would have received guidance relating to

25     this from the Drina Corps Command; more specifically, the Drina Corps

Page 16471

 1     assistant commander for Morale and Religious Affairs at the time.

 2        Q.   And would the Drina Corps, in your view, have been able to

 3     enunciate a policy to expel the Muslims of Srebrenica on their own or

 4     would they have -- would they have received direction from someone else

 5     or some other body?

 6        A.   No, sir.  My view is that they would have received their guidance

 7     in this regard from the Main Staff.

 8        Q.   And Lieutenant-Colonel Ognjenovic, can you tell us where he went

 9     after his stint as the Bratunac Brigade commander or where he was in

10     July 1995, to your knowledge?

11        A.   After completing his tour as the commander -- or his stint as the

12     commander of the Bratunac Brigade, and I believe it was May 1995, he then

13     went back to the Drina Corps, and he was an operations officer or a

14     member of their operations staff in July of 1995 at the Drina Corps.

15        Q.   All right.  Let's continue on to the next document, which I

16     believe is 65 ter 31.  And we're now -- or at last getting into 1995 in

17     our narrative.

18             And we can see that we have a document from the Main Staff,

19     Intelligence and Security Sector, dated 19 March 1995.  We can see from

20     the original that it's in the name of General Tolimir, and we see from

21     the initials "ZT" of the drafter, which, as I think you've told us, that

22     should be drafted by General Tolimir.  Is that correct?

23        A.   Yes, sir.

24        Q.   And we can see in this document, it's entitled "The Establishment

25     of the Security System and Control of the Territory," and the first

Page 16472

 1     paragraph talks about the area of Konjevic Polje and the forces based

 2     there to establish a security system.  It talks about Cerska, Udric,

 3     Glogova, places we're all familiar with.

 4             Then the next paragraph says:

 5             "Because of the need to engage the VRS units at the front of the

 6     SRK and the Drina Corps, we are forced to relocate the unit based in

 7     Konjevic Polje ..."

 8             Can you tell us what General Tolimir is doing in this document,

 9     what's happening here?

10        A.   At this particular point in time, particularly the Drina Corps is

11     completely stretched with regards to available manpower and units, and

12     particularly those units that are surrounding the enclaves, maintaining

13     the outer perimeter, if you will.  In March of 1995, a particular

14     situation arose on the Sarajevo battle-front where they had to

15     re-allocate units to the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, in effect creating a

16     gap between military positions held between the Bratunac Brigade and the

17     Milici Brigade, a gap which the Bosnian Muslim military forces can and

18     did exploit.  So in this context, the army, the Main Staff, is requesting

19     that the Ministry of the Interior be tasked to provide police forces to

20     cover that specific segment of the gap, in light of the security threat

21     that, you know, the opening of that gap has created to the surrounding

22     population.

23        Q.   Have you seen documents that indicate that the Bosnian Muslim

24     army had a particular policy and strategy to engage the military outside

25     of Srebrenica in order to tie down Serb forces, to prevent them from

Page 16473

 1     going to the Sarajevo front?

 2        A.   Yes, sir, that is correct.  The -- one of the stated missions of

 3     the 28th Infantry Division was to conduct military operations in such a

 4     manner that it would force the VRS to maintain military forces

 5     surrounding the enclaves rather than have the ability to redeploy those

 6     forces to what it considered to be more critical areas of the

 7     battle-field.

 8        Q.   Was the -- was this action by the 28th Division, inside the

 9     enclave, going outside the enclave, in your view, a violation of the

10     demilitarised agreement that was in place at -- when the enclaves were

11     formed?

12        A.   Clearly, it was, sir, yes.

13        Q.   Okay.  And if we look at this document, we see that the general

14     is referring to -- and I would say the second page in English is what I'm

15     looking at especially.  He's making very specific references to Birac,

16     Podrinje, Milici, Konjevic Polje.  What would this indicate to you about

17     General Tolimir's knowledge of the geography and the strategic importance

18     of this area?

19        A.   It reflects that he is quite well versed in the military

20     geography, where the Drina Corps units are, where there are potential

21     gaps in the line, and what the military threat those particular gaps

22     represent.

23             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I would offer this document into

24     evidence.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

Page 16474

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 31 shall be

 2     assigned Exhibit P2498.  Thank you.

 3             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  On the same subject, could we go to

 4     65 ter 00007.

 5        Q.   And as we're waiting for that to come up:  We will soon see that

 6     this is from the Republika Srpska Ministry of the Interior, the Cabinet

 7     of the Minister, and it's to the president of the Republika Srpska,

 8     Dr. Karadzic, and someone has signed for the minister, Zivko Rakic.  What

 9     is this, and how does it fit in with -- if at all, with what we just saw?

10        A.   This particular document is the response of the Ministry of the

11     Interior back to the president, and further through the army, informing

12     them that based on their request, the police have dispatched the 2nd PJP

13     or Police Company from the Zvornik Public Security Centre to that area,

14     where they will be responsible for establishing control over the security

15     of the various roads that are listed there.  So this is, in effect, the

16     Ministry of the Interior stepping up to provide forces to deal with the

17     previously-mentioned threat.

18        Q.   All right.  And we see a reference to:

19             "We have dispatched the 2nd Company of the PJP of the

20     Zvornik Public Security Centre."

21             Now, are we going to be hearing more information about the

22     2nd Company of the PJP as we get to the attack on Srebrenica?

23        A.   Yes, sir, particularly in the period following the attack on

24     Srebrenica.  Because of their physical location on the battle-field, that

25     particular unit has a number of interactions with individuals who are

Page 16475

 1     captured later.

 2        Q.   Can you tell us how a PJP unit is assembled?  What is it?

 3        A.   In addition to the normal police functions that were undertaken

 4     by the Ministry of the Interior, they were also expected, as a component

 5     part of the armed forces of the Republika Srpska, to be able to engage in

 6     combat activities, to a limited extent, when necessary.  In order to

 7     accomplish this, what each CSB or Sector for Security did was to take its

 8     existing municipal police forces and organise them in a series of

 9     mobilisation companies that could be called up at a time when they were

10     needed to perform combat or combat-related operations.  These were not

11     permanent establishments.  They were designed to be called up as needed.

12             The way that it was organised in the Zvornik Security Sector was

13     a total of six companies, the first company being organised out of the

14     youngest and fittest of the police officers, and by the time you got to

15     the fourth, fifth and final company, you're getting to the oldest and

16     least capable of the police officers.  So by organising in this manner,

17     you could quickly put together the requisite company-sized military force

18     that you needed, but you could also do so in a way that you did not

19     completely take all of the police out of a certain region.  Some of the

20     members of the company would come from Bratunac, some from Milici, some

21     from Vlasenica, Zvornik, so that when you mobilise one of these companies

22     for combat activities, you didn't denude a certain area completely of

23     police coverage.

24             So this was how the police in the sectors -- in the security

25     sectors -- or the public safety sectors organised themselves to be able

Page 16476

 1     to also perform military-related duties on an ad hoc basis.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I put one follow-up question to that.

 3             Sir, you just explained how these PJP units were composed and

 4     established.  Was that, in the Republika Srpska, done in the same way as

 5     in the former Yugoslavia?

 6             THE WITNESS:  I don't know the answer to that, sir.  I'm not

 7     aware of and I just haven't looked at the issue of how, in the former

 8     Yugoslavia, the police were organised or put into the military, so I just

 9     don't have the ability to answer that question, sir.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

11             Mr. McCloskey.

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:

13        Q.   We see, in this document, that the translation -- the translation

14     side in the English has noted that "PJP" meant "Special Police Unit," and

15     the Court has heard quite a bit of evidence about Ljubisa Borovcanin as

16     the deputy commander of the RS Special Police and their activities around

17     Kravica, the location there, and in Srebrenica, as he was the subject of

18     the Petrovic video in some degree.

19             Can you tell us, this English translation as "Special Police

20     Unit," has this anything to do with the Republika Srpska Special Police

21     units that were commanded at the time in Srebrenica by

22     Ljubisa Borovcanin?

23        A.   That particular Special Police Unit is part of the Special Police

24     Brigade that answered directly to the Ministry of the Interior.  So in

25     that sense, the best way, perhaps, to describe it is that the PJP units

Page 16477

 1     answered directly to the head of the Sector for Security, in this case

 2     the Zvornik CSB, while the Special Police units, if you've heard the

 3     2nd Sekovici Detachment Special Police Unit, those answered directly to

 4     the Special Police Brigade and then the Ministry of the Interior.  So

 5     while they're both Special Police units, they are subordinated to

 6     different people.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And, Your Honours, for your knowledge, the term

 8     "PJP" and the term "Special Police" are two different words in the

 9     Serbian language, but English ended up translating them as both

10     "Special."  So this lends to -- has lent to quite a bit of confusion over

11     the years, so we tried just to use the abbreviation "PJP" so we don't get

12     them mixed up with the Special Police, as Mr. Butler has described.  I'm

13     sure Mr. Gajic will agree with me on that point.  And we will get more

14     into the detail as we see some more documents on that.

15             So I would offer this document into evidence.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 7 shall be assigned

18     Exhibit P2499.  Thank you.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:

20        Q.   And now, Mr. Butler, if we could go to P1214, known as

21     Directive 7.

22             Could we go -- we see in the English that, if you recall, this is

23     where the translations got slightly mixed up.  Could we go to the next

24     page in the English, because that's the -- as you may recall, that's the

25     cover page by which this document was sent out.

Page 16478

 1             All right.  And the document was sent out -- the cover page, as

 2     you just saw, was dated 17 March 1995, but this first page, we can see,

 3     Mr. Butler, that this is dated 8 March 1995, and it's -- we see the title

 4     "Directive for Further Operations, OP Number 7."

 5             Is this related to the kind of directive that you talked about

 6     before when you talked about Directive 4?

 7        A.   Yes, sir, it's exactly a continuation of the series of directives

 8     that were published.

 9        Q.   And this document, I think we can all agree, at the last page of

10     the document we see that it's in the -- it was drafted by

11     Colonel Miletic, but it's in the name of the supreme commander,

12     Dr. Radovan Karadzic.  Can you explain why, I believe, Directive 4 was in

13     the name of the -- General Mladic, this is in the name of

14     President Karadzic, and what do you make of that, if anything?

15        A.   In the very early year of the war -- years of the war, the

16     political bodies, to a large degree, allowed the military to draft the

17     strategic plans based on very general political guidance.  As the war

18     progressed and as the Supreme Command, as it were, became more

19     experienced and took a greater hand in directing the war effort, they

20     took a larger role in overseeing the strategic -- the creation of the

21     strategic plans to ensure that they were aligned with the political

22     objectives of the state.  So in this particular situation, which made it

23     different from Directive 4, which was strictly the military drafted it

24     and published it, in this particular case you have Directive 7, which

25     although drafted by the military, is approved by the political leadership

Page 16479

 1     of the state.  And then what you'll see is a more detailed version of

 2     Directive 7, known as Directive 7/1, which the military itself then

 3     drafts to provide amplifying guidance to military units and corps

 4     commanders.  So, I mean, this is just a mature -- a maturing of the

 5     military/political apparatus of the Republika Srpska as time goes on.

 6        Q.   All right.  Let's go to page -- as we know, these are divided up

 7     by different tasks to the different corps.  Is that correct?  Like

 8     Directive 4, Directive 7 is setting out tasks for the various corps?

 9        A.   Yes, sir, in general terms.

10        Q.   All right.  Let's go to page 10 in the English and page 15 of the

11     B/C/S, which is the Drina Corps section, which the Court has seen many

12     times.  And just to call your attention to the section, in the middle of

13     the page:

14             "While in the direction of Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, complete

15     physical separation of Srebrenica from Zepa should be carried out as soon

16     as possible, preventing even communication between individuals in the two

17     enclaves."

18             Can you tell us what that means and why, if you know, the VRS

19     would have made this an objective, that one sentence?

20        A.   Yes, sir.  Because of the terrain and a lack of manpower, as

21     discussed earlier, particularly the Drina Corps could not completely

22     encircle both enclaves.  As a result, it was well known that individual

23     soldiers, civilians, military supplies, could travel over land through

24     various valleys and paths from the Srebrenica enclave to the Zepa enclave

25     and then back.  So as any part of ultimately militarily defeating the

Page 16480

 1     Muslim forces in the enclave, they recognised that they were going to

 2     have to block those paths to be able to keep people from being able --

 3     people and supplies from being able to physically move back and forth

 4     between the Zepa enclave and the Srebrenica enclave.

 5        Q.   What is your view on whether or not this objective was a

 6     legitimate military objective?

 7        A.   That particular aspect is certainly a legitimate objective, to

 8     cut the lines of communications between two military forces.

 9        Q.   All right.  Let me continue the next part:

10             "By planned and well-thought-out combat operations, create an

11     unbearable situation of total insecurity, with no hope of further

12     survival or life for the inhabitants of the Srebrenica and Zepa."

13             What, in your view, is this -- does this mean?

14        A.   Given that the phrase "inhabitants," in my view, encompasses both

15     military and civilian population, this is where you start to cross the

16     line and you start to make the civilian population in those areas part of

17     the objects of attack.

18        Q.   Now, when it says "by planned and well-thought-out combat

19     operations, create an unbearable situation," in your view, does that

20     include -- is that suggesting a plan to take out the entire enclaves is

21     an objective at this point?

22        A.   No, I don't -- at this point in time, I do not believe that their

23     intention is to actually physically take over the enclaves at this

24     juncture.  What I believe that they are attempting to do at this point in

25     time is to create the conditions similar to they had in April of -- May

Page 16481

 1     in 1993, whereby compressing the enclaves into smaller and smaller areas

 2     and creating that type of humanitarian crisis, it forces the

 3     United Nations, themselves, to declare that the enclaves are not tenable

 4     and to evacuate them themselves.

 5        Q.   Does this next sentence -- how do you read the next sentence in

 6     this -- in your evaluation?

 7             And we need to, I'm sorry, go over to the next page in English.

 8     Thank you.

 9             "In case the UNPROFOR forces leave Zepa and Srebrenica, the

10     Drina Corps Command shall plan an operation named Jadar with the task of

11     breaking up and destroying the Muslim forces in these enclaves and

12     definitively liberating the Drina Valley region."

13             So how does that fit into your previous opinion?

14        A.   I incorporate that line, as well as other language in

15     Directive 7, that I believe we're going to get into in a bit, as all part

16     of my analysis that at this point in time, the objective wasn't to

17     militarily conquer the enclaves, it was to create the conditions where

18     the United Nations forces would come to the conclusion that they could

19     not sustain the enclaves and that the impetus would then be on the

20     United Nations to end the enclaves and remove the populations themselves.

21     This, in fact, was just part of it, that the military was being

22     instructed that should the United Nations abandon the enclaves, that they

23     should be prepared to rapidly engage in military activities against any

24     remaining BiH Army forces.

25        Q.   All right.  You mention another part of the directive.  Let's go

Page 16482

 1     to -- should be Serbian page 21, page 14 in the English.

 2             But before we get to this section, let me ask you:  From that

 3     last section and the Drina Corps, in your military opinion, would

 4     General Tolimir, who was, as we know, the chief of Intel and Security at

 5     the time, would he have been aware of this directive and aware of the

 6     specific language that we've just gone over for the Drina Corps?

 7        A.   Yes, sir, he would have had to have been.

 8        Q.   Why?

 9        A.   Inherent in both Directive 7 and in the supplemental

10     Directive 7/1, there are a number of specific tasks which the security

11     branch will have to be a part of in order to realise these plans not only

12     for the Drina Corps but for all of the corps, so he has to be aware of

13     what the general political/military objectives are in great detail in

14     order to ensure that he can synchronise the work of the Sector for

15     Intelligence and Security to support those missions.

16        Q.   Remind us, just briefly, what it is that he would be doing to

17     support those missions, in particular?  I mean -- well, not particular

18     facts, but what would his job be?

19        A.   His portfolio, as the assistant commander for Intelligence and

20     Security, would cover all of those aspects related to, for example, with

21     the enclaves, monitoring the United Nations presence and their

22     willingness to continue to remain in those enclaves is going to be a

23     classic intelligence function.  The intelligence organs of the various

24     military units, and particularly the Main Staff, is going to be

25     responsible for obtaining information relating to the United Nations'

Page 16483

 1     willingness to continue these missions.  From the security perspective,

 2     one making sure that what the actual plan and intent of in the VRS

 3     remains camouflaged from the United Nations or the international

 4     community is going to require the work of his security sector and

 5     counter-intelligence to make sure that they don't leak information that

 6     would be of detriment to this plan.  So he has to be aware of what the

 7     plan is in great detail in order to ensure that the Sector for

 8     Intelligence and Security can implement all of the missions that they are

 9     going to be required to do in order to support these objectives.

10        Q.   Okay.  Now, that gets us to the next section which is under the

11     larger heading of "Support for Combat Operations," and the smaller

12     heading, "The Morale" -- or "Moral and Psychological Support."  If we

13     could go down to the fourth paragraph, and it says:

14             "The relevant state and military organs responsible for work with

15     UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations shall, through the planned and

16     unobtrusively-restrictive issuing of permits, reduce and limit the

17     logistics support of UNPROFOR to the enclaves and the supply of material

18     resources to the Muslim population, making them dependent on our good

19     will while at the same time avoiding condemnation by the international

20     community and international public opinion."

21             Now, the Trial Chamber has heard evidence about convoys and

22     supplies, and issues that were being faced in this regard.  Can you tell

23     us, Mr. Butler, who is being targeted by this paragraph?

24        A.   The declared target is the UNPROFOR and their ability to resupply

25     the enclaves, but it makes it clear that ultimately the target or the

Page 16484

 1     people who are going to feel the impact is going to be the Muslim

 2     population.

 3        Q.   What do you think they meant by "reduce and limit the logistics

 4     support of UNPROFOR"?

 5        A.   As time goes on, and it actually started, literally, a month or

 6     two earlier, what begins to become clear is a pattern where the UNPROFOR

 7     forces in the enclaves are -- their combat and other abilities to protect

 8     the enclaves are degradated [sic] as a result of a policy of not letting

 9     the UN units resupply personnel, resupply equipment that has been damaged

10     or is broken, and to resupply logistics, ammunition utilisation,

11     particularly personnel rotation through the units when their tour of duty

12     is completed.  And by doing this over a sustained period of time, you

13     greatly impact the combat ability of the United Nations units to perform

14     their missions.  That is what this particular paragraph discusses.  And

15     when one looks in the intervening months at what happened to the

16     United Nations Dutch Battalion in Srebrenica, you'll be able to see the

17     complete manifestation of that plan and how it impacted or limited the

18     Dutch Battalion's ability to do their missions.

19        Q.   Did fuel play a role in any of this?

20        A.   Yes, sir, it did.  In fact, fuel became so acute for the

21     Dutch Battalion that they were forced to abandon patrols of various areas

22     of the enclaves simply because they did not have enough fuel for their

23     armoured vehicles to go on patrol.

24        Q.   And what purpose does disabling UNPROFOR in this way serve, in

25     your view?

Page 16485

 1        A.   By limiting UNPROFOR's mobility, one, militarily UNPROFOR can no

 2     longer effectively police the safe area and prevent either Bosnian Serb

 3     or Bosnian Muslim military operations from occurring, and the second is

 4     that by degrading the UN's operations and its ability to protect itself,

 5     it has a significantly adverse impact on the UN's ability to sustain the

 6     civilian population within the enclaves.

 7        Q.   All right.  Let's go to the next document, P1199, and we can see

 8     that this is now Directive 7.1.  And is this what you had been referring

 9     to earlier?

10        A.   Yes, sir, it is.

11        Q.   And does this document in any way negate or undermine

12     Directive 7?

13        A.   No, sir.  It -- in fact, it is -- it amplifies and supplements

14     Directive 7 with more specific tasks for the units to accomplish.

15        Q.   And I think we'll all agree that in Directive 7/1 there's no

16     discussion specifically related to the enclaves, or making life

17     impossible for the Muslims, or reducing the logistics support and the

18     humanitarian aid in this document.  Does that suggest to you anything in

19     particular?

20        A.   No, sir, it doesn't suggest to me that they've abandoned the

21     mission.  It just simply is a reflection of the more specific military

22     tasks that are outlined in 7-1.  For example, when one discusses a

23     concrete military task, there's no way to perform a military mission

24     related to make life unbearable in an enclave.  That's not a military

25     sensical order.  Where that language will be incorporated is more

Page 16486

 1     specific tasks relating to, you know, limiting convoy amounts, or

 2     tightening security in certain areas, or closing certain areas.  So it's

 3     just a military -- it's just, again, more specific military language

 4     relating to how to accomplish those broader tasks, because some of the

 5     broader tasks don't lend themselves to military orders.

 6        Q.   All right.  And let me take you briefly back to that paragraph

 7     that talks about reducing support for UNPROFOR and the Muslim population.

 8     Would that be a section that General Tolimir would have known about?

 9        A.   Yes, sir.  In fact, when one looks at Directive 7-1, on, for

10     example, page 7 of the English language one, paragraph 6(3), there is --

11     6(2) and 6(3), there is specific tasks related to intelligence support

12     and security support.  General Tolimir obviously has to be aware of what

13     those tasks are.

14        Q.   Now, the convoy system supporting those enclaves, was there a

15     legitimate security element related to those that would be of interest to

16     General Tolimir and the security branch?

17        A.   Yes, sir, there would.

18        Q.   Can you explain that?

19        A.   Those particular convoys transited through the military areas

20     under the control of the VRS.  Many parties that made up the

21     United Nations were believed by the Republika Srpska and the VRS at the

22     time to be hostile to the interests of the Republika Srpska.  It would

23     certainly be within the realm of the intelligence and security branch to,

24     first of all, want to make sure that those UN forces transiting through

25     those areas would not be collecting information or intelligence that

Page 16487

 1     could be used later to the detriment of the Army of the Republika Srpska.

 2     Also, it was believed by the VRS that much of the supplies that were

 3     supposedly going to civilians in the enclaves was somehow being diverted

 4     to the military forces of the Muslim side.  So as a result, the VRS had a

 5     vested interest in monitoring those convoys and monitoring, in great

 6     detail, the equipment that was going in there, to take whatever steps

 7     that they believed they could take to ensure that items that could be

 8     diverted for military use against them were either eliminated from those

 9     convoys or were reduced to as small amount as possible.  Obviously, some

10     issues, like food -- food is always going to be a two-use item, so to

11     speak.  It has military and civilian applications, depending on who it's

12     feeding.  Fuel is the same way.  It has both civilian and military

13     applications.  Obviously, the UN was not providing ammunition overtly to

14     the warring parties, but those were the issues that the VRS was concerned

15     with relating to those items which would be designated as for the

16     civilian population but could be diverted for use by the Bosnian Muslim

17     military.

18        Q.   So if we have a situation where, as you've just testified, the

19     VRS has a legitimate concern and responsibility to control illegal or

20     military goods into the enclaves, on one hand, and we have what was

21     mentioned very clearly in Directive 7, on the other hand, a policy to

22     reduce the logistics to the UNPROFOR and the Muslim population in such a

23     manner as to not -- as to make them dependent on their goodwill, but not

24     condemn them in the international community, or words to that effect, if

25     we have these two practices going on, one, the legitimate one that

Page 16488

 1     clearly would be a security responsibility, as you have suggested, would

 2     security know or be -- and/or be involved in the other one, the reduction

 3     as described in the Directive 7?

 4        A.   Yes, sir.  As you lay out, this is a rather sophisticated plan

 5     that the army is attempting to pull off to achieve this objective.  It's

 6     going to require a good amount of co-ordination at all levels of the

 7     intelligence and security organs and at the Main Staff in order to

 8     successfully do this without it becoming evident to the international

 9     community that it is part of a pattern of deliberate obstruction.  So,

10     yeah, given what's going to have to happen, it's going to require a great

11     deal of support and involvement by the Main Staff organs of intelligence

12     and security.

13        Q.   Okay.  Now, have you had a chance over the years now to review

14     and analyse what we refer to as convoy documents related to convoys going

15     in and out of the various areas, such as Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Gorazde,

16     and Zepa?

17        A.   Yes, sir, I have.

18        Q.   Can you give us the briefest description of your understanding

19     how this system worked?

20        A.   The process that had to be undertaken at the actual level where

21     the convoys were organised, put into motion to the enclaves, and then

22     returned, required a good deal of co-ordination between the Main Staff of

23     the Army of the Republika Srpska and the relevant organs of the UNPROFOR.

24     The UNPROFOR would be responsible for assembling a convoy and its

25     manifested equipment that it was going to take, identifying the

Page 16489

 1     personnel, and then notifying the Main Staff of the VRS as to the convoy,

 2     the equipment involved, the cargo, even the names of individual soldiers

 3     and the weapons that they would be carrying, and the fuel amounts that it

 4     would be carrying.  The UN had to do this in great detail.  The VRS then

 5     reviewed these requests for movement and could approve them as is, could

 6     disapprove them, or could modify the cargos by directing that certain

 7     amounts be increased, decreased, whatever.

 8             Once the VRS approved these convoys, the convoy departure times

 9     and routes would be transmitted to the UN, and at the same time the

10     various Republika Srpska military and police units that would have

11     check-points established along the various routes and the check-points

12     into the enclaves would be notified as to the identity of the convoy, who

13     was travelling with the convoy, what the cargo was, how long it could

14     remain in the enclave, and if any cargo or supplies were to be taken

15     back, what those were.  The intention, of course, from the VRS side was

16     to not only manage the cargo being brought into the enclaves, but at a

17     designated inspection site before entering the enclaves, they would

18     inspect the convoy to ensure that the United Nations, in fact, complied

19     with the approved manifest.

20        Q.   And as your review of these documents, and we'll go over some,

21     did you form a conclusion or an opinion as to whether or not there was

22     any restriction of logistics support reflected in these documents,

23     consistent with or not consistent with Directive 7's language that we've

24     talked about, reducing support to UNPROFOR and the civilian population?

25        A.   Yes, sir.  I believe that as some of these convoy documents come

Page 16490

 1     to light, it is evident that cargo that was disapproved or restrictions

 2     placed on cargo going in made it clear that those restrictions were being

 3     done in general compliance to the goals of Directive 7, in so much as

 4     they were directed, in part, if not completely, against the civilian

 5     populations.

 6        Q.   And what about UNPROFOR?

 7        A.   Certainly in the case of UNPROFOR, when one looks at these convoy

 8     documents, there will be many situations where the approval to move

 9     people or soldiers from the UN out of an enclave will be followed by the

10     disapproval to allow replacement soldiers in, or to allow fuel or

11     technical parts for vehicles into the enclaves, or to allow, for example,

12     some weapons - you know, the explosive or propellant in the weapons

13     expires at a certain point and the weapon needs to be replaced - you

14     know, by not permitting those replacements to take shape.  So as you look

15     at the convoy documents, you can see the pattern which I believe falls

16     right on track with what is outlined in Directive 7 and Directive 7-1.

17        Q.   All right.  Let's look at some of those documents.  If we could

18     go to tab 49, 65 ter 1784.  And we see that this is a document, the

19     original in the B/C/S, from the Main Staff of the Army of

20     Republika Srpska, dated 6 March 1995.  This is just a few days before the

21     8 March date of Directive 7, two days before, and it is to the SRK and

22     the Drina Corps Command.  And we see that it -- if we look at it, it's

23     page 3 in the English, but we can see in the B/C/S that it is sent out by

24     Colonel Miletic, who we know from previous evidence.  And Miletic talks

25     about -- in that first line, about UNPROFOR teams approved for

Page 16491

 1     7 March 1995, and he also notes that convoys have -- there are convoys

 2     that have not been approved.

 3             And I don't want to spend a lot of time on this, but if we look

 4     through this list in the English, we'll see references in number 2 to

 5     Sarajevo, where fuel was disapproved; number 3, Gorazde, where fuel was

 6     disapproved; number 4, to Zepa, where fuel was disapproved; number 6,

 7     Sarajevo, fuel.  If we go to the next page in the English, number 8,

 8     Gorazde, fuel disapproved; number 9.

 9             What do you make of these fuel disapprovals?

10        A.   These types of fuel disapprovals directly impact the ability of

11     the relevant United Nations forces in the enclaves to perform their

12     missions.

13             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I would offer that document into

14     evidence.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 1784 shall be

17     assigned Exhibit P2400.  Thank you.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It should be 2500, I think.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Thank you, Your Honours.

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And if we could go to P2162.  This is a document

21     the Chamber has seen before.

22        Q.   All right.  Two things I want to ask you about.

23             We see, in this document from the Main Staff, the Army of

24     Republika Srpska, dated 2 April, and in the text it says:

25             "We hereby inform you that we consent to the request of the

Page 16492

 1     RS Co-ordinating Body ..."

 2             Can you tell us what your understanding is of the co-ordinating

 3     body that's referred to here and the interaction between it and the

 4     Main Staff?

 5        A.   With respect to civilian or humanitarian goods, the UN wasn't the

 6     only body that was dealt with in that sense.  There was a civil body

 7     under the RS government, a commission, set up that would also deal with

 8     requests from the various non-governmental organisations or other

 9     humanitarian organisations that were also requesting access to the

10     enclaves or any access to the territory of the Republika Srpska either

11     from the Sarajevo side or from their bases in the former -- in the

12     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia out of Belgrade.  So the RS commission, in

13     and of itself, could not make unilateral approvals of these requests.

14     They also had you reach out and go to the Main Staff of the army in order

15     to co-ordinate these requests with the army to ensure that the army was:

16     one, aware of the requests and, two, that they would not be approving

17     anything that the army did not want them to approve.

18        Q.   So who, in your opinion, had final control in what made it into

19     the enclaves?

20        A.   On a day-to-day basis, the Main Staff exercised that final

21     approval.

22        Q.   All right.  And looking at this document, the handwritten note

23     that we can see in the English translation is -- it says:

24             "Not a single convoy or ICRC team or MSF may enter Srebrenica

25     without my permission and presence.  M. Nikolic."

Page 16493

 1             Who, in your opinion, is "M. Nikolic"?

 2        A.   That would be Momir Nikolic, who at the time, captain first

 3     class, was the assistant commander for Intelligence and Security for the

 4     Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade.

 5        Q.   And can you explain why Momir Nikolic would be in such a position

 6     to be able to make this statement?  Is it consistent or inconsistent with

 7     what you have been telling us about, Security's involvement in these

 8     convoys?

 9        A.   This is completely consistent with the role of the security organ

10     in monitoring the convoy movement.  There was a military police

11     check-point manned by the Bratunac Brigade at the Yellow Bridge, the

12     entrance to the Srebrenica safe area.  This was Momir Nikolic making it

13     clear to his subordinates, in this case from a technical chain, the

14     military police, that they were not authorised, without his personal

15     presence there, to allow any convoy or any other vehicles into the

16     enclave.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I note for the record that we have in the binder

18     only one page and three lines of English translation.  This is, in fact,

19     the translation of the first page of the B/C/S version.  The other pages

20     are missing in the English.

21             But could we please move to the last page of the English

22     translation on the screen to see if there is any.

23             That's all.  That means that the other pages are missing,

24     especially with the name of the person who is supposed to have signed it,

25     Manojlo Milovanovic.  And even in e-court, the other pages are missing in

Page 16494

 1     the translation.

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  That's correct, Mr. President.  We did that as a

 3     resource-saver.  The main thing we wanted you to see was the -- in fact,

 4     it's a convoy approval, and Momir Nikolic's comments on it, and who it is

 5     by, Milovanovic.  But we can have also have this translated.  It

 6     shouldn't a problem at this point.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think that was only a remark for the record,

 8     not a criticism.  And, therefore, we have now put on the record that this

 9     document was signed by Manojlo Milovanovic.

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It is sufficient.

12             Please carry on.

13             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Now, let's go to another document, 65 ter 4115,

14     getting away --

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             May this day of trial end in keeping with God's will.

18             I apologise to Mr. McCloskey for interrupting.  I would like the

19     Trial Chamber to be shown the whole document to see if this was ordered

20     by Milovanovic, this order given by Nikolic.  Is that the reason why not

21     the whole document was published?  Because according to the

22     interpretation, it says that this order is in keeping with Directive 7/1.

23     We should see whether it is, indeed, so in the documents.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I believe the full document in Serbian is present

Page 16495

 1     in the record, and --

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We see, on the left side of the screen, the last

 3     page with the name "Manojlo Milovanovic."

 4             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I don't see a reference to Directive -- a

 5     specific reference to any directive here, so I'm not exactly sure what

 6     the general's concern is.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, could you help us to understand your

 8     comment?

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  I can

10     assist you.

11             The witness, in his reply, said that this was consistent with a

12     directive - he literally said that on page 27 - and that these tasks were

13     carried out by security organs.  So now let's see whether that was,

14     indeed, contained in the order, that that's how it should be done at all

15     levels and all units, or whether Mr. Nikolic just took it upon himself to

16     order such a thing.  Thank you.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey, you may put a question in this

18     respect to the witness.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

20        Q.   Mr. Butler, in your view, did Momir Nikolic do this on his own,

21     or do you have any indications to the contrary?

22        A.   I'm not sure in the sense -- what you mean by "on his own."

23     Given the guidance of Directive 7 and 7/1 to undertake a programme, in

24     this case, the fact that Momir Nikolic is taking it upon himself to

25     personally oversee the convoys going through and would ensure that

Page 16496

 1     they're complying with orders, that may be, individually, his decision.

 2     It may be a decision that Colonel Popovic, his immediate superior in the

 3     security organ, has directed.  I'm not aware of any document which would

 4     indicate that one way or another.  My point is that whether he's

 5     personally physically present at the convoy site or has delegated the

 6     authority to inspect these convoys and allow them to go through or not go

 7     through if their cargo is what is authorised, is part of the broader

 8     theme outlined in the various Directive 7 and 7-1.  It's not an

 9     individual decision on the part of Momir Nikolic that contrary to any

10     guidance received from anywhere else, that he, individually, will hold up

11     international convoys going into a safe area.  He does not have the

12     authority to do that.

13        Q.   And I think -- do you recall a document that is, I believe, in

14     this binder where the Bratunac Brigade provides an annual report, where

15     they talk about this topic?

16        A.   Yes, sir.  As part of their report that they do assessing the

17     activities of the Bratunac Brigade, one of the issues that they note is

18     that they are complying with orders related to monitoring UN and other

19     international convoys going into the safe area.  I believe we'll see that

20     down the line at some point.

21        Q.   All right.  Let's go to this document that we now have.  We got

22     away, briefly, from the Main Staff convoy documents.  Now we're at a

23     regular combat report from the Zvornik Brigade, dated 2 April, under the

24     name of Vinko Pandurevic, and, of course, it's to the Drina Corps

25     Command.  And there is a section we can see on paragraph -- it's noted as

Page 16497

 1     paragraph 10, so we'd best go over to the next pages.

 2             Actually, we -- I guess I'm still waiting for 65 ter 4115.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The reason why it took some time is that you

 4     didn't give the number.

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.  We're fine in the B/C/S.

 6        Q.   And paragraph 10, we can see there's a section on humanitarian

 7     convoys, and it -- is this something that is normally reported on by the

 8     Zvornik Brigade?

 9        A.   Yes, sir.  The daily combat reports are a reflection of the daily

10     activities that occur within the Zvornik Brigade, or at least those

11     activities that the command deems is necessary for the superior command,

12     in this case the Drina Corps, to be aware of.

13        Q.   And if we could go to the next page in the English, we can see

14     here a reference to an UNPROFOR convoy, the Dutch Battalion, en route

15     from Banja Koviljaca to Srebrenica.  Two vehicles, four soldiers.  They

16     left at 1900 hours on 1 April.  And it says:

17             "One Veld steriliser," and it gives a number, "was seized from

18     the Dutch Battalion."

19             What do you make of that, a sort of sterliser being seized?

20        A.   Yes, sir.  It's a medical device.  Either it was not properly

21     manifested or the army just decided to appropriate it for themselves and

22     their own medical centre.  They're noting, as a routine course of

23     business, that they've done this.

24             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I would offer that into evidence.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

Page 16498

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 4115 shall be

 2     assigned Exhibit P2501.  Thank you.

 3             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And one last document, I think, before the break,

 4     41 -- 65 ter 4116.

 5        Q.   And this is another combat report from Pandurevic dated 4 April.

 6     And it's the second page of the English that I wanted to refer you to,

 7     and that is the bottom part that talks about an MSF team going to

 8     Srebrenica, and it states that they confiscated the following from the

 9     team of MSF.  And we can see it's laundry detergent, floor detergent,

10     shampoo, towels, beer, wine, vodka, coffee, cigarettes, lighters, rolling

11     papers.  What's your comment on seizing this kind of material?

12        A.   A reflection, first of all, that it confirms that these convoys

13     are being inspected, and, presumably, items that are not properly on the

14     cargo manifest and have not been approved are being pulled off of

15     vehicles and are being confiscated by the Army of the Republika Srpska.

16        Q.   On this one, can you tell whether or not this material was not --

17     not on the manifest or not or whether it was just being pulled?

18        A.   No, sir, it's unclear as to the reason why this material is being

19     pulled.

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I would offer this into evidence.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 4116 shall be

23     assigned Exhibit P2502 [Realtime transcript read in error "P2402"].

24     Thank you.

25             Correction for the transcript.  It's P2502.  Thank you.

Page 16499

 1             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And I see it's 10.30, Mr. President.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Indeed.  We should have our first break now, and

 3     we will resume at 11.00.

 4                           --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

 5                           --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey, please continue.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 8             If we could go, staying on the topic of convoys, to P2411.  It

 9     should be in the 53 tab.

10        Q.   And we'll -- as we get there, we'll see that we now have a

11     main -- we're back to the Main Staff of the VRS, dated 7 April.  And if

12     we go to the end, we see this is in the name of General Milovanovic.  And

13     this is to the Command of the Drina Corps, and that we can see that this

14     is a -- it begins as a concurrence with the co-ordinating body, and we

15     see it sets out some of the concurrence.  We also see handwritten, up in

16     the right-hand corner, "OB."

17             Mr. Butler, do you see -- we can see that it's been -- is a

18     possible translation of "Security Organ."  Do you make anything of "OB"

19     written up here?

20        A.   Given the context of the electrical message or the telex going to

21     the Command of the Drina Corps, they are being passed over to the

22     security branch of the Drina Corps so they are aware of these convoy

23     clearances.

24        Q.   All right.  And we see, in that first paragraph, that:

25             "... we concur with the implementation of permits of the

Page 16500

 1     Co-ordinating Body ..."

 2             Does this fit into your opinion, one way or another, about who

 3     was actually controlling these -- the final say for these, the body or

 4     the Main Staff?

 5        A.   Yes, sir, it does.

 6        Q.   And how so?

 7        A.   As I indicated in my prior testimony, the co-ordinating body for

 8     the Republika Srpska could not, in and of themselves, authorise these

 9     movements.  They would have to forward them to the Main Staff.  The

10     Main Staff would then either concur or non-concur.  So, again, in this

11     particular case, they're allowancing that, you know, they are concurring

12     with the requests by the co-ordinating body of VRS to do this and, in

13     effect, granting them the authorisation.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I apologise to

16     Mr. McCloskey, but it would be good to clarify with the witness what is

17     "approval" and what is "authorisation," because the two words have been

18     used.  And, second, to see whether the security organs received this

19     telegram or what we see up above are the initials of someone to who it is

20     addressed, because it doesn't say "Security Organs" at the top, it says

21     "The Drina Corps."  Where can Mr. McCloskey show us that it was sent to

22     the security organs of the Drina Corps?

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

24             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. President, I stand by Mr. Butler's answer to

25     the questions.  This is the evidence.  There is a reflection of

Page 16501

 1     "OB/Security Organ" on this, and it is what it is.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, you should take notice of the fact

 3     that nobody suggested that this typewritten document was sent to a

 4     security organ, and Mr. McCloskey dealt with a handwritten entry.

 5             Mr. Tolimir asked you, Mr. McCloskey, to discuss the words

 6     "approval" and "authorisation."  If you would do that at this point in

 7     time, that's fine.  Otherwise, Mr. Tolimir may do that during his

 8     cross-examination.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.

10        Q.   Maybe, Mr. Butler, could you just reiterate what -- which, if

11     either term, is more appropriate for the Main Staff's action or

12     authority?  Are they approving, or are they authorising, or are they

13     both, or are they neither?

14        A.   I guess I don't split the two terms up, "approving" and

15     "authorising."  The -- under the methodology used with respect to

16     convoys, it was the responsibility of other organs to propose which

17     convoys would travel and what their cargo are, and ultimately it was the

18     responsibility of the Main Staff to approve those requests.  Now, whether

19     one calls them "approval" or whether one calls them "we concur with that

20     request," in my understanding of the phraseology, it's the same thing.

21     The ultimate authority as to whether or not a convoy travels is vested

22     with the Main Staff.

23        Q.   All right.  Let me ask you something.  We see that -- on that

24     first page, for example, we see that it's approved to send flour both to

25     Gorazde and to Srebrenica, and I think it has been shown or mentioned in

Page 16502

 1     this case that there's a video of ammunition being pulled out of flour on

 2     one of the convoys to I can't recall which enclave.  Would the security

 3     branch be concerned about ammunition going to the enclaves inside flour,

 4     as apparently occurred based on a video that is believed part of this

 5     record?

 6        A.   Yes, sir, it would be absolutely prudent for them to inspect even

 7     those types of cargos to ensure that elements of the UN or ABiH had not

 8     gotten access to those goods and had sought to smuggle in weapons.  So

 9     the fact, particularly, that the VRS had evidence that it occurred in the

10     past is a good indicator that they should continue to look for evidence

11     of that and inspect the cargos in the future.

12        Q.   Okay.  And I don't want to be repetitive, but to make sure

13     General Tolimir understands your opinion:  Given, as you've just said,

14     there is a legitimate security concern for the security branch to control

15     what goes in these convoys, is it militarily possible or practical that

16     the security branch would be cut out of a system that actually restricted

17     humanitarian and support for UNPROFOR?

18        A.   No, sir.  They would have to be involved in the process in order

19     to perform that duty.

20        Q.   Couldn't General Mladic or Milovanovic appoint a special task

21     force to be involved in the restrictions of -- the illegal restrictions

22     of convoys that was totally separate and apart from the legitimate

23     controlling and restrictions of illegal goods?  Is that imaginable in a

24     military context?

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

Page 16503

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Your microphone.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I was about to ask, could we have a

 4     reference?  Where are security organs controlling convoys?

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

 6             MR. McCLOSKEY:  That is part of the process of the evidence, and

 7     Mr. Butler has talked at length about it already.  And I think that's a

 8     good point for cross-examination.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We agree.

10             Please continue.

11             MR. McCLOSKEY:

12        Q.   Do you remember my question, Mr. Butler?  It basically comes down

13     to:  Can you have security involved in this legitimate control of

14     material and have some other -- complete other unit acting -- doing the

15     same fundamental thing, but illegally restricting?

16        A.   General Mladic or Milovanovic could organise it, obviously, any

17     way that they elect to, but it doesn't make sense that you would have

18     two separate organs essentially involved in the same act, which is

19     dealing with the issues of cargo, and the inspection of that cargo, and

20     the dealing of convoys.  It seems to be -- it seems to be repetitive.

21     And given the fact that the security organ, you know, has an ability to

22     accomplish these missions, it would make sense for them just to allow

23     them to do both.

24        Q.   All right.  Let's go to page 2 in the English.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

Page 16504

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I apologise for

 2     objecting again, but it says here -- or, rather, in the question just

 3     asked by Mr. McCloskey on page 37, line 5, he says, Can you have security

 4     involved in control?  Can we get a reference where exactly are security

 5     involved in the control of convoys?  And then he goes on to say that

 6     Milovanovic and others could organise it, and the witness answered that

 7     question, but we need to see first where exactly and how the security

 8     organs controlled the convoys.  I want to establish the facts.  Maybe the

 9     question could be rephrased to sound something like, Can we suppose that

10     security organs, and so on and so forth, but we need to establish the

11     facts.  We need to stick to facts.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, the Prosecution is trying to

13     establish facts.  It's their examination of the witness, and later on

14     it's your turn to cross-examine the witness.  This is not a real

15     objection, and there's no foundation for this objection to the last

16     question, which is already answered.

17             Please continue, Mr. McCloskey.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, untruths are being

20     presented here, and you approve.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I ruled on that.  The witness has

22     given his answers, and Mr. McCloskey may continue.  Please don't

23     interrupt in that way.  If that is in your opinion, and this is -- you

24     are absolutely entitled to see it as untruths, you should and you have

25     the opportunity for that, to challenge this part of the

Page 16505

 1     examination-in-chief during your cross-examination.

 2             Mr. McCloskey, please continue.

 3             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.

 4        Q.   And just to remind us all, Captain First Class Momir Nikolic,

 5     when he made the comment that we saw on the convoy document, was -- in

 6     what capacity do you believe he was acting when he made that comment

 7     about no convoys would go through without his approval?

 8        A.   He made that comment in his capacity as his role as chief of

 9     security for the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade.  He's exercising his

10     authority, as it's been delegated to him, to ensure that the contents of

11     those convoys contain no more cargo than is authorised on the manifest.

12     So, I mean, maybe I'm not saying it as clearly as I need to with respect

13     to control, but, I mean, at that point at that Yellow Bridge, at that

14     point where the convoy goes into UN territory, Captain Nikolic is

15     exercising control over that convoy.  If he were to find material that

16     was not in compliance, he would be within his authority, as granted to

17     him by the Main Staff, to inform the Main Staff that the convoy does not

18     contain material as manifested and leave it up to the Main Staff as to

19     whether or not that convoy should continue to go forth, or whether or not

20     that convoy will be turned around, or, as we saw in the case of the

21     Zvornik Infantry Brigade, whether or not the material that was not on the

22     manifest would be off-loaded.

23        Q.   Let's -- we should be on page -- are we on page 2?  Yes, we are,

24     of the English.  And the B/C/S may be the next page.  The important part

25     that I want to go for is a comment that says "Remark," and:

Page 16506

 1             "We did not approve the following in this weekly plan."

 2             So we started --

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  That is still on the first page of the B/C/S

 4     version.

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 6        Q.   We started with an approval that we've noted, and now we're

 7     seeing material that is not approved.  And it says:

 8             "Material for the Swedish construction project for Srebrenica and

 9     Drinjaca on 9 April, 11 April and 13 April for Srebrenica, until we

10     receive the position of the state committee for co-operation regarding

11     this matter."

12             Can you remind us what this Swedish construction project is?

13        A.   It's often referred to in documents as the Swedish shelter

14     project as well.  It was an NGO programme where this particular group was

15     constructing temporary housing for those individuals residing both inside

16     the Srebrenica area as well as Bosnian Serbs who had been displaced

17     outside, temporary housing, rather than -- because they were refugees.

18     So, I mean, this NGO was involved in that project of the construction of

19     temporary housing.

20        Q.   And then it says:

21             "In addition to the above, we did not approve beef, salt, oil and

22     clapboards for the enclave ..."

23             And it gives several dates.

24             These basic foodstuffs, salt, oil, beef, was hunger an issue in

25     the enclave in the summer, in June and July of 1995 for the civilian

Page 16507

 1     population?

 2        A.   Yes, sir.  I understand that as a result of the investigation,

 3     there were a number of issues that were raised with the fact that the

 4     food stocks within the enclave were at dangerously low levels as the year

 5     was wearing on because the food products weren't being brought in as fast

 6     as they were being consumed.

 7        Q.   And what's your understanding of this term "clapboards"?

 8        A.   I take it at this juncture we're talking about drywall,

 9     construction material type of --

10        Q.   Okay, all right, and that is already in evidence.

11             Let's now go to 65 ter 1925.  This is also a document from

12     7 April, and we see again it's from the Main Staff, in the name of

13     General Milovanovic, and we again -- if we see the Serbian, we see "OB"

14     up in the right-hand corner.  Again, tell us what's your understanding of

15     what "OB" stands for.

16        A.   The notation for "OB" would define as "Security Organ."

17        Q.   And in your view, the fact that someone would write

18     "Security Organ" on this document, does that have any meaning to you?

19        A.   Again, sir, while, obviously, the compliance of all orders is

20     with respect to, you know, the role of the commander, in these particular

21     cases monitoring convoy movements and ensuring compliance would be a

22     security function.

23        Q.   All right.  And let's just see this.  We see that this really --

24     this starts out as a document where they have not approved several

25     UNPROFOR convoys and teams.  And I won't go over it all in detail, but

Page 16508

 1     number 1, we see to Sarajevo, fuel; Sarajevo, diesel, number 2; number 3,

 2     Gorazde, fuel, kerosene, unleaded fuel and gas; number 4, Sarajevo, and

 3     it talks about 27 vehicles and 63 persons which was supposed to transport

 4     12 containers with humanitarian aid, bed, food, clothes, medicines, and

 5     school supplies.

 6             If we go to page 2 in the English, still on B/C/S page 1, I

 7     believe, it talks about more Sarajevo material, oil, solvents,

 8     maintenance supply, and it says:

 9             "In view of the fact that UNPROFOR did not deliver a drop of the

10     agreed 13.000 litres of oil for the winter season for road maintenance

11     work in winter, we demanded that they fulfill their obligation and said

12     that we would then discuss approving oil for their needs."

13             What do you make of that?

14        A.   Well, sir, as part of the various access agreements, one of the

15     agreements made was that UNPROFOR would provide fuel to -- or oils to the

16     Republika Srpska which, in their view, would be used, in part, in order

17     to keep the roads clear for UN convoys as well their own traffic.  In

18     this particular document, it reflects the fact that their view is that

19     none of the promised oil supplies from the UN have been delivered to the

20     Republika Srpska, and, as a result, they're going to retaliate by cutting

21     the supply of fuels going to the UN until such time as the UN makes good

22     on their promise.

23        Q.   All right.  If we continue to go down, we see that number 9,

24     Srebrenica, on April 8th, a convoy compromising seven vehicles and

25     eighteen persons which were supposed to transport diesel fuel, it got

Page 16509

 1     denied.  And according to this paragraph, Milovanovic says:

 2             "We told them that they had 79 tonnes of fuel with Oric."

 3             What does that mean, that last comment?

 4        A.   Naser Oric is the commander of the 28th Infantry Division inside

 5     the Srebrenica enclave.  This is a rather flippant remark that the

 6     Main Staff is making to their Drina Corps counterparts which essentially

 7     is telling them that from their perspective, they're not approving fuel

 8     going into the enclave because the military forces of the ABiH already

 9     have more than enough fuel, and they're not going to provide them any

10     more.

11        Q.   Do you have any indication that the BiH had such amounts of fuel?

12        A.   I would certainly hold open the possibility that the ABiH, and

13     specifically the 28th Infantry Division, was seeking to divert fuel going

14     to either UNPROFOR or to civilians in Srebrenica for military use, but

15     I've not come across anything which reflects that at any given time they

16     had this much fuel on hand.

17        Q.   Were you aware of any military vehicles they had that would use

18     fuel?

19        A.   The 28th Infantry Division was primarily light infantry because

20     they did not have very many vehicles.  They couldn't, under the

21     demilitarisation, actually be driving vehicles back and forth in front of

22     the Dutch, so in this particular context, just not a military use.  I

23     suspect that if the 28th Military Division was using fuel in these

24     quantities, it was primarily for the purpose of selling it on the black

25     market.

Page 16510

 1        Q.   And who would be the consumer in Srebrenica for 28th Division

 2     fuel black market, if there was such a thing?

 3        A.   The civilian population would be the primary consumer.  It

 4     certainly wouldn't be unheard of to find out that some elements of the

 5     28th Infantry Division might have even been selling fuel back to the

 6     Bosnian Serbs.

 7        Q.   All right.  Let's look at paragraph 10.  This is page 3 of the

 8     English, page 2 of the B/C/S.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  One moment, please.  Judge Mindua would like to

10     put a question.

11             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, indeed.  In fact, I wanted to

12     put a question now because I thought that the Prosecutor wanted to get to

13     the next document.  But, nevertheless, since I was given the floor, I

14     will put a question now.

15             So, Mr. Witness, you just talked about the black market.  And if

16     I look at the document that I have before me, 1925, paragraph 4,

17     General Milovanovic says the following:  He's, in fact, not authorising

18     the passage of convoys, number 07-181/04, because the activities by the

19     UNPROFOR are already carried out by a great number of international

20     organisations, or NGOs, actually.  So according to him, according to

21     General Milovanovic, the UNPROFOR is supposed to take care or carry out

22     tasks within its mandate.  So here we see that the UNPROFOR, or at least

23     when it comes to the convoy we're talking about, was composed of

24     12 containers with humanitarian aid, beds, food, clothes, medicines, and

25     school supplies.  So could you please tell us:  How do you explain this

Page 16511

 1     attitude by General Milovanovic?

 2             THE WITNESS:  From the document, it reflects that their view,

 3     particularly in Srebrenica, you know, what they believed to be the

 4     limited mandate of the United Nations forces there, the Dutch Battalion

 5     forces, which were to essentially maintain the boundaries, as undefined

 6     as they were, of the Srebrenica enclave and to enforce the

 7     demilitarisation of the 28th Infantry Division inside the enclave, not

 8     necessarily that it was the UNPROFOR's job to maintain and support the

 9     civilian population.  That's about as much as I can read into that

10     particular comment.  I mean, obviously General Milovanovic would be a

11     better source of information on that.

12             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, I understand.  I understand,

13     in fact, because the problem, in fact, is the following, and this is what

14     the Prosecutor is seeking to establish: is that the VRS was attempting to

15     block various convoys in order to create an impact on the Muslim

16     population, and here we have General Milovanovic who's supporting

17     something else or who says something else, so this is why I wanted to get

18     your opinion.  But according to you, only General Milovanovic can explain

19     his own thoughts.  Is that what you are saying?

20             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir, in the sense that General Milovanovic is

21     the best to explain his own thoughts.  What I would reiterate again for

22     you, sir, is that as part of the plan that the VRS is undertaking, it

23     wasn't just enough to restrict the flow of goods going into the enclaves.

24     As articulated in Directive 7 and 7/1, it had to be done in such a manner

25     that the Republika Srpska would not be unduly criticised in the way that

Page 16512

 1     they did it.

 2             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much indeed.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

 4             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.

 5        Q.   Just one last paragraph in this document, paragraph 10, and this

 6     is a convoy that was refused to Srebrenica, comprising 13 vehicles and

 7     24 persons, which were supposed to transport various goods; a water

 8     trailer, a large quantity of field beds, hospital beds, an X-ray machine,

 9     beams for construction, nails, light fittings, a satellite telephone

10     system and cables, signalling equipment, roofing material, office

11     supplies, and cleaning goods.

12             In your understanding, Mr. Butler, did UNPROFOR share their

13     medical abilities with -- by helping provide medical treatment for the

14     Muslims of the enclave?

15        A.   Yes, sir, I believe that a number of the Dutch medical personnel,

16     who've testified, I'm not sure in this trial but certainly in other

17     trials, have indicated that they often shared their medical supplies and

18     support and treated the civilian population.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.  I offer this into evidence.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 1925 shall be

22     assigned Exhibit P2503.  Thank you.

23             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Now, I'd like to temporarily --

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  One moment, please.

25             Mr. Gajic.

Page 16513

 1             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, excuse me, but I

 2     cannot help noticing, on page 44, line 7, where Judge Mindua asked the

 3     question, and the witness's answer begins with line 23 and straddles

 4     page 45, I think there was a slight misunderstanding because the number

 5     mentioned by Judge Mindua relates to the convoy from Kiseljak to

 6     Sarajevo, and the witness's answer makes it looks like it was related to

 7     Srebrenica, because he also mentioned the 28th Division.  I believe it

 8     would be good to have a clear record on this issue, because Judge Mindua,

 9     on page 44, line 14, mentioned Convoy 07-181/4, and the document says

10     this convoy was supposed to go from Kiseljak to Sarajevo on the

11     8th of April.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think this is a correct statement.  Number 4 in

13     this document -- or item number 4 is related to a convoy from Kiseljak to

14     Sarajevo.

15             Mr. McCloskey.

16             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. President, to me, it was very clear that

17     General Mindua was -- excuse me, His Honour Judge Mindua --

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  He's not a military judge.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  -- was referring to the Srebrenica section, where

20     General Milovanovic had made the remarks that he didn't feel that this

21     humanitarian material was part of the mandate.  I think that was very

22     clear on the record.  If there was a mistake in the reference, I think we

23     can all -- we all remember what the question was about, and I think it

24     was very clear.  So I prefer not to go back there, unless someone thinks

25     it's necessary.

Page 16514

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think we have the different views on the

 2     record.  Everybody is able to check the document, itself.

 3             You may continue, Mr. McCloskey.

 4             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.

 5        Q.   Now I would like to temporarily go past many of these documents

 6     and save them for the end, and go now to tab 60, which is 65 ter 1933.

 7     And we see that this is a -- from the Main Staff, dated 22 April.  It's

 8     to the Command of Military Post 7111.

 9             Mr. Butler, do you remember which military post that is?

10        A.   Military Post 7111 should be the Command of the Drina Corps, sir.

11        Q.   Thank you.  And we note that this says:

12             "We wish to inform you that we have approved the travel of the

13     following UNPROFOR convoys and teams:"

14             And then it lists that under number 1.  And then it goes on to

15     say:

16             "At the same time, we wish to inform you that we have not

17     approved travel of the following convoys."

18             And then we see, on the English, number 1 is a Sarajevo convoy

19     for fuel.

20             Then we need to turn the page, and we see a long list of convoy

21     disapprovals for -- as we take a look at this, we see that there's

22     Sarajevo for fuel - I won't read them all out - Gorazde, Gorazde,

23     Gorazde, Zepa regarding the transfer of UN VP from Zepa.

24             What do you take "VP" to mean?

25        A.   "VP" in this context is "Military Police."

Page 16515

 1        Q.   And that's from General Milovanovic.

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Now, if we could go to -- and if we note -- try

 3     to remember the numbers that we're seeing here, "23-309/04" is the first,

 4     and then we see "23-331/04," in sequence.  If we go to the next document

 5     under tab 61, we see the Main Staff is sending this to UNPROFOR.  The

 6     last one went to the Drina Corps, and we see some of the same numbers.

 7     The first ones that have not been approved is "23-309/04," and describes

 8     various -- and it's a list.

 9             And I want to go over Convoy 1, Convoy 6 and Convoy 10, which we

10     will find as we go through the B/C/S.  So if we could first go -- it

11     should be page 3 of the English, page 2 of the B/C/S.  And this should

12     be, if I didn't say it - I'm sorry, it may have been the

13     problem - 65 ter 5243.  I apologise.  That was covered up.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Now we have it on the screen.

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.  And if we could go to page 2 in the B/C/S,

16     page 3 in the English.

17        Q.   And if we -- this is number 23-309/04, which was number 1 on the

18     first page which was not approved.  And for this question, Mr. Butler, I

19     will tell you that the top of the B/C/S page, where we see in Cyrillic

20     "ne" or "no," and initials, it's the Prosecution's position that those

21     initials are those initials for General Tolimir.  So in this particular

22     document, we see that fuel is being disapproved.  If the Prosecution is

23     correct and these are, in fact, General Tolimir's initials with a "ne"

24     next to it, would this -- his involvement in the approval or disapproval

25     of convoys be consistent with his position as chief of Intel and

Page 16516

 1     Security?

 2        A.   Yes, sir, I believe it would.

 3        Q.   All right.  Now, let's go to Convoy 6, which should be page 7 of

 4     the B/C/S, page 13.  This is number 23-349/04, which is another document,

 5     Kiseljak to Gorazde, that was refused.  And we can see what the request

 6     was that was refused; the British convoy, supplies for the British

 7     soldiers.  And if we look at the B/C/S, we see "ne" up at the top written

 8     in, and it's the position of the Prosecution that those initials that

 9     look something like a coat hanger are those of General Tolimir.  And as

10     we look down at the B/C/S, we see various comments and "ne" written

11     throughout that document.  And if we turn the page in the English, we get

12     the translation's effort to reproduce those "ne"s, and we can see the

13     materials here; tools, wire, 11.000 litres of packed water, a music

14     system.

15             Would this be consistent with General Tolimir's position, as

16     chief of Intel and Security, in your view ?  Why would a general be

17     involved in disapproving such a -- such a request, or, excuse me,

18     proposing a disapproval?

19        A.   I believe the document is a reflection of the importance that was

20     placed on the monitoring of materials going into various enclaves that

21     the Main Staff placed upon itself, that they paid very close attention to

22     detail.  Each individual item was examined with respect to where --

23     whether or not it was justified to be on the manifest, in their view.

24     And as you'll note, in some cases where even requests are approved,

25     amounts might be reduced.  So, again, I believe this is a reflection of

Page 16517

 1     how important this particular job was within the Main Staff and that

 2     General Tolimir is personally involved in the monitoring of the cargo

 3     that is potentially going into these enclaves.

 4        Q.   The Trial Chamber has seen evidence of these convoy requests with

 5     the initials.  Witnesses have testified identifying the initials of

 6     Ratko Mladic on them, I think General Milan Gvero, and others.  Would it

 7     be consistent for other senior members of the Main Staff, including

 8     General Mladic, himself, to be involved in this -- in this process?

 9        A.   Yes, sir.  Given the gravity of the situation as it was

10     approached by the Main Staff, the fact that other senior members of the

11     Main Staff are taking a hands-on approach to this would be consistent.

12        Q.   All right.  Let's go to number -- which is --

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Can we for a moment stay with this document,

14     please.  I would like to put a question to Mr. Butler, and I would like

15     to ask him to make some markings on this, with the assistance of the

16     Court Usher.

17             Mr. McCloskey referred to some handwritten parts of this

18     document.  We see, in the top, the "ne," and then a slash, and then some

19     handwritten markings.  Could you please indicate which part of these

20     handwritten marks you suppose that they are from General Tolimir?  Please

21     encircle these parts.

22             THE WITNESS:  [Marks].  I understand that that particular set of

23     initials the investigation has attributed to General Tolimir.  Those are

24     the only comments that I can personally attribute to.  I note that -- the

25     writing here, the "no," and that is consistent, but I don't know

Page 16518

 1     General Tolimir's handwriting to any degree necessary to be able to

 2     conclude that those individual comments are, in fact, his handwritten


 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  How do you know, if at all, that these initials

 5     on top of that page are from Mr. Tolimir?

 6             THE WITNESS:  Again, sir, my understanding of whom that signature

 7     comes to is derived from the work of the investigation, that they have

 8     sourced that through a variety of methods.  I don't have personal

 9     knowledge that that is his signature.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you for this explanation.

11             Mr. McCloskey, are you tendering this marked map --

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, please.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  -- to have a consistent record?

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, please.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This marked page will be received as an exhibit.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, e-court page 7 of the

17     65 ter document 5243 shall be assigned Exhibit P2504.  Thank you.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

19             Now please continue, Mr. McCloskey.

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

21             And my question was -- it was the position of the Prosecution

22     that that was the initials, and that's the reason why I did that.  And I

23     would refer you to the testimony of General Milovanovic, who you may

24     recall identified initials.  I don't think he identified this particular

25     page, but he -- you will recall him identifying that General Tolimir had

Page 16519

 1     two sets of initials, Cyrillic and Latin.

 2             All right.  Then if we could -- I believe we need to now go to

 3     number 10 on this initial list, which is number 23/03 on the Serbian

 4     document, and that should be B/C/S page 11 and page 21 in the English.

 5        Q.   And we know to refer you back to the front page of 5243 that this

 6     is one of the numbers that was disapproved by the VRS.  And again,

 7     Mr. Butler, if we look at this, we see that this is a request from -- or

 8     to the Main Staff, from Nicolai - if we go to the second page on the

 9     English - requesting this, which was disapproved.  Number 1 was the

10     movement from Sarajevo to Zepa.  The journey will take place en route

11     from Sarajevo via Pale.  The purpose of the movement was to transfer to

12     Zepa.  And then it identifies the persons that are travelling in this

13     movement as UN military observers.

14             So can you just tell us what this is, and is it consistent or

15     inconsistent with any knowledge you had of what was going on at

16     Srebrenica related to military observers?

17        A.   Yes, sir.  This is consistent with the overall plan to reduce the

18     effectiveness of UN military monitors and observers, in part, by not

19     allowing personnel replacement of observers who finished their tour of

20     duty.

21        Q.   And like you did the last one, could you circle -- and, again,

22     it's the Prosecution's position that we see the initials next to the "ne"

23     up in the top.  Can you circle what you have learned from the

24     investigation to be, according to the investigation, the initials of

25     General Tolimir?

Page 16520

 1        A.   [Marks]

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And now could I offer that into evidence?

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This marked page will be received as an exhibit.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, B/C/S page 11 in e-court of the

 5     65 ter 5243, marked by the witness in court, shall be assigned

 6     Exhibit P2505.  Thank you.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And to be consistent, let's go to the first

 8     document.  It should be page 2 in the B/C/S, page 3 in the English, I

 9     believe.

10             I'm not good at going backwards, but I think we've got it.

11        Q.   And for this, can you circle what you have learned the

12     investigation has identified as General Tolimir's initials?

13        A.   [Marks]

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.

15             And I would offer this into evidence.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This marked page will be received as an exhibit

17     as well.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, B/C/S page 2 of the 65 ter 5243,

19     marked by the witness in court, shall be assigned Exhibit P2506.  Thank

20     you.

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And I would offer the whole exhibit, 65 ter 5243,

22     into evidence.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 5243 shall be

25     assigned Exhibit P2507.  Thank you.

Page 16521

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey, and what about 65 ter 1933?

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Excuse me.  Apparently I've forgotten one of the

 3     documents that we've just spoken to.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I just asked you.  What about 65 ter 1933?

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.  Ms. Stewart got me at the same time.  I

 6     apologise.  I would offer that into evidence.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received, too.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 1933 shall be

 9     assigned Exhibit P2508.  Thank you.

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Now, I'm going to go forward but -- and I will

11     continue to discuss with Mr. Gajic the possibility of saving some time

12     with these documents.  But he has very fairly said to me that he thought

13     it was important for each of the documents to be seen and commented by

14     Butler, so it is my intention to come back.  But it's a time-consuming

15     effort, so I'd like to get on with the chronology and come back to the

16     convoy documents, if that's necessary.

17             So I'd like to skip ahead to tab 70, and it's P2167.

18        Q.   And as we're waiting for that to come up:  We'll see that it's

19     from the Command of the Bratunac Brigade on the 4th of July, 1995, and

20     it's entitled "Analysis of combat readiness in the first half of 1995,"

21     and it's delivered to the Drina Corps, and it's in the name of

22     Commander Colonel Blagojevic.

23             Now, this is -- we've seen combat readiness reports from the

24     Main Staff, from the Drina Corps.  Is this similar to those in some way?

25        A.   Yes, sir.  But rather than in this context of being an annual

Page 16522

 1     evaluation, this particular report is a semi-annual evaluation, covering

 2     the first six months of 1995.

 3        Q.   All right.  And let's go to page 16 in the English and page 29 in

 4     the B/C/S.

 5             And we can see that this is the chapter on intelligence and

 6     security support, and would Momir Nikolic have played a role in the

 7     drafting of this section of the report?

 8        A.   Yes, sir.  Given that it relates to intelligence and security

 9     support, I would expect that he would be the primary drafter of this

10     particular section.

11        Q.   All right.  And I won't go through all of it, but as we see

12     six paragraphs down from the top, there's a mention of intelligence data

13     is collected through reconnaissance of combat dispositions by

14     reconnaissance squads, interrogations of prisoners of war, and

15     surveillance of forward positions.  So would the security support, under

16     the rules and practices, as you've talked about, include interrogation of

17     prisoners of war, as noted here?

18        A.   More under the intelligence function of it, but generally as part

19     of the intelligence and security branch, that's correct, sir.

20        Q.   Okay.  And it also -- the last paragraph on the English talks

21     about:

22             "The Military Police Platoon has been engaged as planned on the

23     orders of the brigade commander.  Training was also planned and completed

24     in accordance with the possibilities and appropriately to the situation."

25             So now here is -- we have a section under the intel and security

Page 16523

 1     support of the mention of the military police, and its use and training,

 2     on orders of the brigade commander.  Can you just wrap that up for us a

 3     bit and -- it's something that we've heard a lot of, but how does the

 4     brigade commander and the security support connect into the command

 5     structure of the military police, and based on this practical application

 6     that we see in this document?

 7        A.   The application in this document, how it was, again, practically

 8     applied reflects how it was envisioned under the broader regulations that

 9     were published under the SFRY with respect to their regulations on the

10     military police, their use and functions.  The police, as part of that

11     organisational formation, are ultimately subordinate to and responsible

12     to the commander of that unit; in this case, the brigade commander.

13     However, it is the security officer who is responsible for proposing

14     methods of training, the employment of the use of the police, and all of

15     those other associated technical issues, one, to the commander for his

16     approval, and subsequent to the commander's approval, carrying them out.

17        Q.   When you say "subsequent to the commander's approval, carrying

18     them out," what are you saying is the responsibilities of the security

19     officer, vis-a-vis the military police, in carrying out the commander's

20     orders, just specifically?

21        A.   When -- after the commander approves a proposal, the security

22     officer or, in fact, across the staff, any officer at any of those

23     technical services, you know, is going to issue supplemental orders in

24     order to more concretely define the tasks that have to be done and how

25     those will be accomplished.  He is doing so -- he is giving those orders

Page 16524

 1     as a security officer, but he's doing so in light of the orders that he

 2     has received from the commander.  So in a practical sense, where you will

 3     have instances of Momir Nikolic, for example, giving orders directly to

 4     the military police, you know, in the competent performance of his

 5     duties, he is giving those orders in the light of the guidance and

 6     directions he has received from his superiors, in this particular case

 7     related to training and implementation of the military police, from the

 8     brigade commander.

 9        Q.   Do the rules envisage him receiving directives from his superior

10     in the security chain or branch; in this case, Vujadin Popovic?

11        A.   Yes, sir, they do.

12        Q.   And where would Vujadin Popovic be getting his orders from along

13     the command chain?

14        A.   Along the command chain, Vujadin Popovic would be receiving his

15     orders from the Drina Corps commander.

16        Q.   On the evening of 13 July and afterward, who would that have

17     been?

18        A.   From 2000 hours onwards on 13 July 1995, his commander would have

19     been General Radislav Krstic.

20        Q.   And for Popovic, aside from his commander, Krstic, could he be

21     receiving, under the rules, directives and instructions from his superior

22     along the security branch chain, Ljubisa Beara?

23        A.   Yes, sir.

24        Q.   And who was Ljubisa Beara's direct supervisor and superior?

25        A.   July of 1995, that would have been General Tolimir.

Page 16525

 1        Q.   Now let's go to page -- it should be 17 of this same document.

 2     We're still under the "Intelligence and Security Support" section.  It

 3     should be page 31 of the B/C/S, and I hope this will help General Tolimir

 4     in the question he had earlier.

 5             This says:

 6             "In the brigade's area of responsibility, a check-point was

 7     established for the control of all international organisations entering

 8     and leaving the enclave of Srebrenica.  This check-point functions in

 9     accordance with the orders of the Main Staff of the VRS and instructions

10     and orders of the brigade commander."

11             Now, does this paragraph suggest in any way to you that there is

12     any intel or security involvement in the control of the check-point?

13        A.   Yes, sir.

14        Q.   How so?

15        A.   From the lowest level, the check-point is manned by the military

16     police, again, under the command of the brigade commander, but, from a

17     technical perspective, answerable to the security officer as to how they

18     conduct their activities.  This particular paragraph is a good reflection

19     of how that works.

20        Q.   We see this paragraph is under the section of "Intelligence and

21     Security Support."  Could it have been anywhere or, in your view, is it

22     under this section for a reason?

23        A.   It's under this section because it belongs here, because these

24     are classical duties and responsibilities of these types of officers.

25        Q.   And taking us back to that document that we recall, a convoy

Page 16526

 1     approval, where there's a note where Momir Nikolic says, No MSF can go in

 2     without my approval, something to that effect, how does that fit into

 3     this brigade report and your conclusion you've just given us?

 4        A.   I believe it's consistent with it.

 5        Q.   All right.  Now we're going to change gears a bit and go away

 6     from convoys and their control, back to the narrative of -- where you

 7     have identified various documents occurring and the chronology as we go

 8     towards July 1995.  And the first one I'd like to take you to is tab 71.

 9     It's 65 ter 2094.

10             And as we're waiting for that, I will note that this is from the

11     Drina Corps Command.  It's a regular combat report identified as

12     "Urgent."

13             If we go to the last page in English, we don't need to for these

14     purposes, but we'll see it's under the name of Deputy Commander

15     Colonel Radislav Krstic.  And I don't want to go into all the detail of

16     it, but I do want to ask you about this one reference under paragraph 2:

17             "We are continuing with preparations for stabilisation of defence

18     around the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa, in accordance with your

19     order.  We are currently unable to implement your order to fully close

20     off the enclaves and carry out attacks against them because we do not

21     have sufficient forces ..."

22             Then it goes on.

23             Now, we see that this regular combat report is to the RS and the

24     forward command post of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska,

25     so can you tell us, in a nutshell, what you believe Colonel Krstic at

Page 16527

 1     this point is telling the Main Staff?

 2        A.   In this particular segment of the report, Colonel Krstic is

 3     alluding to the fact that they've been given previously orders to fully

 4     close off the enclaves, and he's informing them that based on the current

 5     situation, and specifically the fact that they do not have enough

 6     resources, military units in this particular context, that they're unable

 7     to comply with that particular mission.  But what they are attempting to

 8     do is to still interdict, at least sporadically, those lines of

 9     communication back and forth and attack those enemy forces.

10        Q.   All right.  This reference to "your order to fully close off the

11     enclaves" --

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  I see Mr. Tolimir.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  I didn't see it.

14             Mr. Tolimir.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

16             My apologies to Mr. McCloskey, but could he explain where it is

17     that mention is made in this document of "Muslim forces attack"?  Can

18     that be cleared with the witness, please?

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.

21        Q.   I think the general's asked you to explain what you meant by your

22     last -- I think the last comment, that you said that -- something about

23     the Drina Corps was continuing to attack the enemy.

24        A.   Reading back my last answer, and that's -- I don't think I said

25     "Muslim forces attack."  My last answer was that in this particular

Page 16528

 1     segment of the report, Colonel Krstic is alluding to the fact that

 2     they've been given an order previously to close off the enclave, and he

 3     is informing them, based on the current situation, he does not have

 4     enough resources or military units to complete that mission.  And then

 5     the next thing I said was what they are attempting to do is to still

 6     interdict, at least sporadically, those lines of communication back and

 7     forth and attack those enemy forces.  And where I derive that from is the

 8     line in paragraph 2 of the document, which specifically says:

 9             "... but we are continuing to take specific measures to uncover

10     enemy groups in the gap ..."

11             The presumption that I have being if they are able to identify

12     those groups infiltrating back and forth into Srebrenica, between

13     Srebrenica and Zepa, that once identified, if they have the ability, they

14     will attack them.

15        Q.   All right.  And back to my question.  This language there that

16     says that they're unable to implement the Main Staff order to -- well,

17     that's my language.  What I want to ask you about is:  This language

18     about "fully close off the enclaves," that particular language, do you

19     tie that in or relate that to anything from Directive 7 or some other

20     documents previous to this that we've looked at?

21        A.   Yes, sir.  That's those tasks or those tasks articulated in

22     Directive 7 or 7/1.

23        Q.   Do you remember the wording -- I don't want to go back to those,

24     but do you roughly remember the wording of Directive 7?

25        A.   I think it specifically said to ensure the physical separation of

Page 16529

 1     the enclaves.

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I would offer this document into

 3     evidence.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 2094 shall be

 6     assigned Exhibit P2509.  Thank you.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. President, this is a good stopping time, if

 8     you will.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Indeed.  We must have our second break now, and

10     we'll resume at 1.00.

11                           --- Recess taken at 12.29 p.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 1.01 p.m.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey, please carry on.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:

15        Q.   Mr. Butler, we left off with this document where Colonel Krstic

16     tells the Main Staff they're unable to attack Srebrenica and Zepa.  It

17     was on 16 May.  I'll jump ahead a bit, but at some point later on did the

18     Drina Corps -- was the Drina Corps able to gear up for an attack on the

19     Srebrenica enclave?

20        A.   Yes, sir.  By the end of May of 1995, the Drina Corps did

21     undertake a limited military operation against the enclave, particularly

22     the military operation related to the capture of what's known as

23     UN Observation Post Echo.

24        Q.   All right.  And we'll get to that momentarily, but I want to get

25     to another document that relates to some prisoners and the intel branch.

Page 16530

 1             So could we go to P2140.  It should be 72 tab.

 2             And we see -- I hope people have a better B/C/S version.  I know

 3     it's a very bad version all the way around.  But we see that this is from

 4     the VRS Main Staff, Intelligence and Security Sector.  That's

 5     General Tolimir's sector; is that right?

 6        A.   Yes, sir.

 7        Q.   And it's in the name of Lieutenant-Colonel Jovica Karanovic?

 8        A.   Correct, sir.

 9        Q.   Do you remember who he was?

10        A.   He was an officer on the Main Staff.  He worked in the

11     Intelligence Department.

12        Q.   All right.  And this is entitled "NATO air-strikes," and it talks

13     about:

14             "We have information that the NATO session was finished on 27 May

15     at around 1600 hours, and it was decided that massive NATO air-strikes

16     against VRS positions and features would continue."

17             It talks a bit more about that and where they believe that the

18     attacks will occur; on ammunition dumps, fire positions, anti-aircraft

19     defence equipment, artillery, and such.  And it says, the last line:

20             "Familiarise commanders with this information and recommend that

21     captured members of UN forces be placed in an area of a possible NATO

22     air-strike."

23             What do you know about that?

24        A.   Well, sir, towards the end of May of 1995, related to issues

25     around Sarajevo, NATO launched a series of air-strikes against military

Page 16531

 1     positions of the Army of Republika Srpska, primarily fixed positions,

 2     ammunition bunkers, communications facilities.  In retaliation to these

 3     attacks by NATO, the VRS, where they had the opportunity to do so, took

 4     members of UN military forces into custody.  What this particular last

 5     line of the paragraph reflects is that those individuals who are captured

 6     should be placed at facilities or installations which they believe will

 7     be targets of attack.

 8             I'm aware that there is video footage that exists which, in fact,

 9     shows members of UN forces, restrained by handcuffs or other means, at

10     VRS military installations, and that those videos were publicised as a

11     way to convince NATO to not bomb those particular facilities.

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Now, can we try to blow up the B/C/S, where we

13     have the signature block?  It's to the left of the stamp.  Not the stamp,

14     the -- yeah.  Maybe one more time, because we have an English translation

15     that says:  "On the authorisation of the chief," and then:

16     "Lieutenant-Colonel Jovica Karanovic."

17        Q.   Do you have an opinion on who the chief is in this sentence?

18        A.   Yes, sir.  I believe in this context, the head of the sector,

19     which is General Tolimir, he is the assistant commander for Intelligence

20     and Security Sector.

21        Q.   Could this be Mladic as well, the chief?

22        A.   I don't recall ever seeing any written document, the context of

23     "the chief" and being General Mladic.  In Main Staff documents of that

24     nature, I would more likely attribute the phrase, if it's from the

25     Main Staff directly, "the chief" to be General Milovanovic.  So I've

Page 16532

 1     never seen General Mladic associated with the phrase "the chief."

 2        Q.   And does this document reflect work that would be associated with

 3     intel and security work?

 4        A.   Yes, sir.  The fact that it's talking about the receipt of

 5     strategic intelligence, that information they have received from the NATO

 6     session, and that the decision has been made that NATO will continue

 7     air-strikes on the VRS.  And the second paragraph, an intelligence

 8     assessment of what the potential targets are in the future.

 9        Q.   And how about the third paragraph?

10        A.   Captured members of the UN forces would, presumably, be handled

11     along the same measures that they would handle other detainees or

12     prisoners of war, which, as you're aware, did fall under the purview, to

13     some degree, of the Security Sector.

14        Q.   All right.  Let's go to the next document.  It's 65 ter 3277.

15     This on the same subject.  It's from the Main Staff, "Very Urgent," to

16     the command of various corps, including the Drina Corps, entitled "The

17     reception and deployment of the UNPROFOR members in the corps area of

18     responsibility."  This is in the name of the deputy commander,

19     Lieutenant General Milovanovic, and he is ordering -- we see in number 1:

20             "I hereby order corps commands and the VIPVO --"

21             Can you tell us what "VIPVO" is, if you recall?

22        A.   Yes, sir.  It would be Air and Anti-Aircraft Defence Forces."

23        Q.   All right.

24             "... shall in agreement with commanders of the logistics bases

25     place the captured UNPROFOR staff, as well as the staff of other

Page 16533

 1     international humanitarian organisations, in their areas of

 2     responsibility ..."

 3             And it talks about various places.

 4             And if we go to the next page in English under paragraph 4 it

 5     mentions:

 6             "The Command of the Drina Corps shall place the captured UNPROFOR

 7     troops and members of the other humanitarian organisations at the

 8     installations in its area of responsibility."

 9             Do you in any way relate this order by General Milovanovic on the

10     27th of May with this document by Karanovic that was made, according to

11     him, on the authorisation of the chief?

12        A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, they are related documents.  The first

13     document reflects the proposal.  The second document reflects the command

14     of the VRS acting on that proposal and, in effect, adopting that proposal

15     and issuing implementing orders.

16        Q.   Now, we see this document that we're looking at now in the name

17     of Deputy Commander Milovanovic, but the Court has learned, as I'm sure

18     General Tolimir will agree with me, that his title is chief of

19     staff/deputy commander.  So going back to the Karanovic document, and it

20     says:  "On authorisation of the chief," could this be Milovanovic?

21        A.   Are you referring to the first document where the phrase is

22     "Chief"?

23        Q.   Yes, that Karanovic writes up.

24        A.   I don't believe it is, sir, no.  And one of the reasons why that

25     I think is relevant is if you were to look back at that particular

Page 16534

 1     document, which is P2140, and look who originated it, it comes from the

 2     Intelligence and Security Sector and it has their coding number on it,

 3     12/45-596.  So it is a document originated by the Intelligence and

 4     Security Sector.  Their chief is not General Milovanovic.  Their chief is

 5     General Tolimir.

 6             The second document is not -- which is, I guess, what, Papa 3277,

 7     the second document is not originated by the Intelligence staff.  It's

 8     directed -- it's issued by the Main Staff, their operative branch, and it

 9     has the number 03-4.  And, of course, on this particular day, they're

10     both dated the same day, and General Milovanovic is identifying himself

11     specifically on that day as the deputy commander.

12        Q.   All right.  In any event, Karanovic's document, P2140, would

13     General Tolimir, in your view, be fully aware of this document and

14     approve its content?

15        A.   Again, given the gravity of this particular situation, where they

16     are taking UN personnel hostage, they're involved in being bombed by

17     NATO forces, General Tolimir should very much be involved in at least

18     knowing what is in this document and what the ramifications of it are.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I would offer 65 ter 3277 into

20     evidence.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter 3277 shall be assigned

23     Exhibit P2510.  Thank you.

24             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Let's go to tab 74.  It should be

25     65 ter 3981.

Page 16535

 1        Q.   And this is a document from the Main Staff of the VRS, Sector for

 2     Intelligence and Security, 13 February 1995, to the East Bosnia Corps,

 3     the Drina Corps, and to the chief of the Intelligence and Security

 4     Department of the East Bosnia Corps by messenger, the chief of the

 5     Security and Intelligence Department, the Drina Corps, by messenger, and

 6     the Krajina Corps Command.  It's called "Demarcating the front-line,

 7     instructions."  And if we go to the last page, page 4 of the English,

 8     which we don't need to as yet, we'll see that this is in the name of

 9     Assistant Commander Major General Zdravko Tolimir, and we'll see his

10     initials, "ZT," under the document.

11             Just looking at the first page of this document, we see that it

12     starts out with:

13             "The Drina Corps Command will not mark the front-line around the

14     Muslim enclaves in Zepa and Srebrenica, since these enclaves have been

15     marked and defined with the agreement on the demilitarisation of Zepa and

16     Srebrenica."

17             And then it says:

18             "You are to explain to the representatives of UNPROFOR and the

19     Muslim forces in the ZRK that the status of Zepa and Srebrenica will be

20     resolved in accordance with the agreements on their demilitarisation."

21             It goes on and talks about that a bit and then makes references

22     to a hamlet, Podraveno [phoen], and a village with a trig point.  And he

23     says:

24             "In addition, it is unclear who is in control of the Zeleni Jadar

25     factory, considering its significance and the fact that only the UNPROFOR

Page 16536

 1     check-point is located inside it and that the Muslim forces are

 2     approximately one kilometre away from the factory ..."

 3             Now, you had just mentioned Zeleni Jadar as an important

 4     location.  Does this reference by General Tolimir have anything to do

 5     with what you were talking about, in terms of the strategic location, or

 6     is this the same place or something different?

 7        A.   It is the same place, sir.

 8        Q.   And when the general says "considering its significance," what do

 9     you believe that means?

10        A.   When one looks at the terrain in and around the Srebrenica

11     enclave, and the logical routes by which an attacking force can get to

12     Srebrenica, perhaps the most important one, from the Bosnian Serb

13     military perspective, was the road leading from the south through

14     Zeleni Jadar and then onwards to Srebrenica.  In early January 1995, then

15     Drina Corps commander, General Zivanovic, had actually made a comment to

16     UN observers that he had at the Drina Corps, that they would know when

17     the Serbs were ready to take Srebrenica, because the first thing that

18     they would do is take Zeleni Jadar.

19             When one looks at the military operations in 1993 against

20     Srebrenica before the enclave was established, the main axis of attack

21     came through that route.  And if one looks at how the main military

22     attack occurred in July of 1995, you will again note that the main axis

23     of attack came through that particular area.  So the Bosnian Serb

24     military was well aware that controlling Zeleni Jadar was an important

25     precursor to the ability to launch a military operation against

Page 16537

 1     Srebrenica.

 2        Q.   And so does General Tolimir note what the problem is regarding

 3     Zeleni Jadar here, or as he describes the location, does he identify what

 4     units are there?

 5        A.   In this particular document, what he's referencing is the fact

 6     that apparently, according to the map graphics that were forwarded, it's

 7     not clear to the Main Staff who's actually controlling the facility or

 8     the town of Zeleni Jadar.  He notes that they have the UN check-point

 9     there, but that the lines seem to reflect the fact that the Muslims don't

10     control the town, certainly the Serbs don't control the town, so, again,

11     this is his response back to the Drina Corps saying, in a sense, that,

12     The graphics that you have sent me are not accurate, to my knowledge.

13        Q.   And then as we look at this document on the next page in English,

14     I just note that as you look through it, talking about the -- as he talks

15     about the area and the demarcation lines, there is an amazing amount of

16     detail.  There's trig points, there's villages, there's streams,

17     elevations.  And if we go to the next page, page 3, similar amazing

18     detail.  And this is actually drafted by General Tolimir.

19             What, if anything, can you say about the amount of detailed

20     knowledge that is going into this document from General Tolimir for such

21     a small place?

22        A.   Certainly, if one assumes that General Tolimir, personally, did

23     not spend hours parsing over these things and that one of his

24     subordinates did, it certainly reflects the fact that these graphics,

25     when they came in from the corps to the Main Staff, someone paid a great

Page 16538

 1     deal of attention to them to make sure that they were very accurate.

 2     General Tolimir was made aware of this long laundry list of inaccuracies

 3     in the lines and felt it was of enough significance to send a response

 4     back to the Drina Corps and the East Bosnia Corps, requesting that they

 5     send more accurate graphics or positions to more accurately reflect where

 6     the front-lines are and who's in control of what particular points of

 7     territory.  So it does -- it reflects an amazing attention to detail.

 8        Q.   On whose part?

 9        A.   If not General Tolimir, certainly his subordinates.

10        Q.   What about General Tolimir?  Does this show that he has an

11     attention to detail, or can you separate him from the document in some

12     way?

13        A.   I don't separate from -- him from the document, in the sense that

14     he has signed it and he is sending it forward.  The whole reason why a

15     military -- or that staff officers exist to support their superior

16     commanders is because it is recognised that commanders don't have time to

17     handle everything personally.  So, again, I mean, I don't exclude the

18     possibility that General Tolimir, personally, spent the necessary time to

19     come up with this type of detail, but I think it's more likely that one

20     of his subordinate staff officers was directed to do so by him, came up

21     with this particular response, and when General Tolimir was appraised on

22     the large number of inaccuracies, he took it upon himself to then go back

23     to the Drina Corps and East Bosnia Corps and request clarifications.

24             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I would offer this into evidence.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

Page 16539

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter 3981 shall be assigned

 2     Exhibit P2511.  Thank you.

 3             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And can we now go to P625.  This is a document

 4     the Trial Chamber has seen more than once.  It is from the Command of the

 5     Drina Corps, Forward Command Post Pribicevac, dated 2 June 1995, entitled

 6     "Restoration of the control over the facilities and the Zeleni Jadar

 7     asphalt road," and it's an order in the name, as we can see from page 2

 8     of the English and of the B/C/S, that it's the commander of the

 9     Drina Corps, General Zivanovic.

10        Q.   And it starts out:

11             "Considering, from the military/security aspect, that the

12     conditions have been created for the entry into Zeleni Jadar industrial

13     facilities ..."

14             And it goes on and describes the background, and then it gives an

15     order that we're familiar with about taking down the UN OP that is there.

16             Is -- does this relate to the area of Zeleni Jadar that you were

17     talking about previously?

18        A.   Yes, sir.

19        Q.   And what does this indicate?  And I don't mean the particulars of

20     it.  We've all seen how they -- what the recommendation is on how Legenda

21     and the troops are to act.  But what does this indicate is going on at

22     this time or planned to go on?

23        A.   This, in general, indicates how the Drina Corps Command expects

24     elements of the Bratunac Brigade and the Drina Corps Manoeuvre Battalion,

25     in this case the Drina Wolves, to successfully capture the town, and how

Page 16540

 1     to successfully neutralise the United Nations' check-point there using as

 2     little violence and risk of casualties to the UN as possible.

 3        Q.   And what, in your view, is the overall objective to taking

 4     control of this area at this time?

 5        A.   The objective is to take control of Zeleni Jadar, again with the

 6     knowledge that controlling Zeleni Jadar is a precursor to launching

 7     larger operations against Srebrenica.  Was that in the mind of the two

 8     lieutenants or captains who were part of this operation at the low end?

 9     No.  But certainly it was in the mind of the Drina Corps Command at the

10     time.

11             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Let's briefly go to P2199, another

12     Drina Corps Command -- a document from the Drina Corps Command, forward

13     command post.  It's a regular combat report, and it's under the name of

14     Major Milenko Jevdjevic.

15        Q.   Can you tell us who Jevdjevic is?

16        A.   Milenko Jevdjevic is the chief of Communications.  I believe, if

17     I recall correctly, he was the chief of Communications for the

18     Drina Corps.

19        Q.   And can you explain why his name would be on a daily combat

20     report from the Drina Corps, from the forward command post?

21        A.   Just like in the context of the Main Staff sending officers down

22     to subordinate command posts to observe the military actions, the corps

23     did the same thing.  It was not uncommon for the Drina Corps Command or

24     any of the other corps to send corps staff officers down to subordinate

25     brigade or lower formations in order to personally observe the operations

Page 16541

 1     that were being carried out and to ensure that they were being carried

 2     out in compliance with the orders from, in this case, the corps command.

 3     So the fact that Major Jevdjevic would be there as part of a forward

 4     command post and would write this report is not remarkable.

 5        Q.   And I just call your attention, in the first page of the

 6     document, to the Drina Corps -- to the Command of the Drina Corps, to the

 7     chief of staff personally.  And the chief of staff at that time was who

 8     of the Drina Corps?

 9        A.   I believe at that time the chief of staff was -- June, it would

10     probably still be Colonel Radislav Krstic.

11        Q.   Okay.  And it says:

12             "After a successful operation and the forceful expulsion of

13     UNPROFOR from the Zeleni Jadar post, the enemy was observed building up

14     large forces and moving them from Srebrenica sector towards the general

15     sector of Zeleni Jadar.  Their formation included two armoured personnel

16     carriers and one tank."

17             Did the Muslims ever have armoured personnel carriers or a tank

18     that was actively being used?

19        A.   Not to my knowledge, sir.

20        Q.   Do you remember a Drina Corps formation called the

21     5th Communications Battalion?

22        A.   Yes, sir.

23        Q.   Do you remember who the chief of that was?

24        A.   I think I just got confused.  Nedjo Blagojevic was the chief of

25     communications, which meant Milenko Jevdjevic would have been the

Page 16542

 1     commander of the 5th Communications Battalion.

 2        Q.   Okay.  So what does this first sentence indicate to you?  Is it,

 3     in your view, related at all to General Zivanovic's instructions on how

 4     to approach an OP?  And I mean after the successful operation and

 5     forceful expulsion of UNPROFOR from the Zeleni Jadar post.

 6        A.   I'm sorry, I'm not sure I understand that particular question.

 7     If you could ...

 8        Q.   What does this sentence mean?  What do you think it's referring

 9     to, aside from the obvious?  Is it related to the previous order of

10     General Zivanovic?

11        A.   It's related to the order in so much as it's reporting about

12     events in Zeleni Jadar and around Zeleni Jadar after they have captured

13     it, and what, in this respect, given where it's relating to the enemy,

14     they're talking about a potential build-up of what might be a

15     counter-attack force.

16        Q.   All right.  And going to the next page in English, it should be

17     near the -- it's identified as paragraph 3 right near the bottom of the

18     document in B/C/S.  Probably have to go to the next page in the B/C/S.

19             Yes.  Number 3, it says in the English:

20             "We have had no casualties.  We have expended small amounts of

21     ammunition and three Zoljas," which the interpreters say are hand-held

22     rocket-launchers.

23             Can you tell us what your understanding of a Zolja is?

24        A.   It's a manned portable rocket-launcher primarily used for

25     anti-armour purposes.

Page 16543

 1        Q.   Is it anything like what we've heard of an RPG, rocket-propelled

 2     grenade?

 3        A.   Yes, sir.

 4        Q.   All right.  And if we look back to the Zivanovic document, P625,

 5     we see, referring to UNPROFOR:

 6             "If they do not comply with this order, fire a hand-held

 7     rocket-launcher" - "Zolja," actually, is what he said - "at the

 8     generator, and be ready to neutralise the APC," the armoured personnel

 9     carrier, "paying attention to not hurt physically UNPROFOR soldiers."

10             So firing a Zolja at a generator or an APC, how significant is

11     that to the members of the APC crew or the OP?

12        A.   If you're firing at a stand-alone generator, you're going to get

13     hit, you're going to lose electricity.  Depending on where the generator

14     is, it's going to appear, potentially, that you're being fired on

15     directly.  When you're firing at an APC and there's a crew inside the

16     armoured personnel carrier, they're certainly going to take it as they

17     are being directly attacked.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I'd offer that into evidence, 2199.

19     Oh, I'm sorry --

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  There's a P number.

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I see a "P" in front now.  Thank you.

22             All right.  If we could go now to 65 ter 4034.  It should be 78.

23     I've skipped one on the -- in the book.

24        Q.   And we see that this is a Main Staff Security and Intelligence

25     Sector document from Chief Major General Zdravko Tolimir, is how the

Page 16544

 1     English translation has it.  And can you tell us what this is?  I don't

 2     need a whole lot of detail, but can you just tell us what purpose this

 3     serves, if any, in the work of the -- General Tolimir's sector?  We see

 4     that it's sent to Forward Command Post 2 of the Main Staff,

 5     General Milovanovic personally.  That's in the last page.  Where is that,

 6     as far as you know?

 7        A.   At this point in time, I believe this IKM is either physically in

 8     Banja Luka or somewhere in the Krajina area.

 9        Q.   All right.  So just generally tell us what this is coming from

10     General Tolimir.

11        A.   This is -- you know, just like the corps commands had to publish

12     their daily operational reports, the Intelligence Sector -- Intelligence

13     and Security Sector published a daily intel report which laid out, for a

14     variety of customers, all of the relevant intelligence that had been

15     collected, analysed, and was being again sent out for operational

16     purposes by -- not only to the Main Staff, but to the civilian

17     government, to the Ministry of the Interior, to the corps commanders, and

18     to other customers which would include, in this particular instance,

19     members of the Main Staff of the Serb Krajina Army, and, I believe at

20     this juncture, even members of the Security Administration of the federal

21     army in Belgrade.  So this was their daily intelligence report.

22        Q.   All right.  And what I want to direct your attention to is page 4

23     in the English and probably about the last page or the second-to-the-last

24     page -- second-to-the-last page, page 2, in the Serbian, and that middle

25     paragraph in the English that begins:

Page 16545

 1             "In the area of Srebrenica," thank you, "there is increased

 2     distrust among the population in relation to the military and civilian

 3     leadership, and also accusations that they have caused the reprisal of

 4     the VRS by the infiltration and action of the sabotage and terrorist

 5     groups in Serbian territory.  The 28th Division Command is circulating

 6     disinformation that the VRS carried out a sabotage attack on civilian

 7     features, wanting to cause condemnation by the international community.

 8     According to unverified information, they have blocked UNPROFOR units,

 9     accusing them that they are not protecting the so-called demilitarised

10     zone."

11             Now, this is dated June 25th, 1995.  Are you aware, Mr. Butler,

12     of any sabotage action by the 10th Sabotage Detachment into the

13     Srebrenica area?

14        A.   Yes, sir, I am.

15        Q.   All right.  Let's quickly go to P961.

16             And I see we're running out of time, but this is a UN document

17     dated 24 June 1995, the day before the last one, and we see this, that it

18     talks about a group of unknown strength came in through a mine and fired

19     upon an area and killed a woman.

20             Does this UN report have anything to do, to your knowledge, with

21     this action by the 10th Sabotage Detachment?

22        A.   Yes, sir.  This particular document is describing the attack that

23     took place by the 10th Sabotage Detachment, although, obviously, they're

24     not aware of who the actual perpetrator was at the time.

25        Q.   So if the 10th Sabotage Detachment, on the day before Tolimir's

Page 16546

 1     intelligence report, had gone into the enclave and made this attack,

 2     would this be a correct statement of General Tolimir, that the

 3     28th Division Command is circulating disinformation about the VRS

 4     carrying out a sabotage attack on civilian features?

 5        A.   It raises one of two possibilities.  The first possibility is

 6     that it is a form of disinformation, and given the fact that there are

 7     customers for this report outside the Republika Srpska, to influence

 8     their opinions in that regard.  The second is that the person who drafted

 9     the report might not have been -- read into the fact that the

10     10th Sabotage had conducted this act and, in fact, it had occurred as

11     such.  One kind of discounts the second course of action only because

12     somewhere along the line during the review process of this document, it

13     should have reached a level where somebody who was aware of it, as

14     obviously Colonel Salapura would and General Tolimir would be aware of

15     it, would notice that, you know, that was incorrect and direct it to be

16     changed.

17        Q.   When you say "this is disinformation," what do you mean is

18     disinformation or could be disinformation?

19        A.   "Disinformation," in a military sense, is the production of

20     incorrect or false or misleading materials or statements that are

21     designed to cause an adversary to look in a different direction, to focus

22     resources in a different area, or even, in a more political sense, to

23     hold an opinion that's not correct.

24        Q.   So would General Tolimir be sending disinformation out to

25     possibly these -- his own people or other entities, as the address list

Page 16547

 1     shows?

 2        A.   It is a possibility, sir, yes.

 3             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I would offer this into evidence,

 4     65 ter 4034.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter 4034 shall be assigned

 7     Exhibit P2512.  Thank you.

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And the UN document is already in evidence.

 9             And we're five minutes past, but I'm told there's nobody after

10     us, so I don't think we've interfered with anyone.  Thank you,

11     Mr. President.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much, Mr. McCloskey.

13             We have to adjourn for the day, and we will continue our hearing

14     tomorrow morning at 9.00 in this Courtroom III.

15                           [The witness stands down]

16                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m.,

17                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 13th day of

18                           July, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.