Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 16629

 1                           Thursday, 14 July 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning to everybody in the courtroom.

 6             I think I should note the following fact:  I was told this

 7     morning that this is day 200 in this trial.  I think we did a lot of

 8     work, and I'm very grateful that we had such a good working atmosphere in

 9     the courtroom.  The contribution of the parties and the whole staff for

10     the successful trial is really appreciated.  We should note that, and we

11     should continue in that way and try to finish the trial successfully.

12             Is there anything to discuss before the witness will be brought

13     in?

14             Mr. McCloskey.

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.  Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours,

16     everyone.

17             Yes, Mr. President, I -- the Prosecution very much appreciates

18     the pace that the Court has set with this trial.  It's been a good, tough

19     pace, but I think it's been just right, from the Prosecution's

20     perspective.

21             I've had a chance to speak briefly with Mr. Gajic this morning

22     about a document Mr. Vanderpuye reminded me about.  Before General Savcic

23     left the stand, Mr. Vanderpuye was questioning him on a MUP statement he

24     had given.  It was on 23 June 2011, at transcript 15980 to 81, relating

25     to Mr. Pecanac.  Mr. Vanderpuye meant to offer it into evidence, but as

Page 16630

 1     you recall, General Savcic left and then we decided it wasn't needed to

 2     recall him.

 3             So if I could offer 65 ter 7440 into evidence.  And I've been

 4     able to discuss this briefly with Mr. Gajic.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Gajic.

 6             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, as far as the

 7     statement of Mr. Savcic is concerned, the Defence has no objection.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The document will be received into evidence.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 7440 shall be

10     assigned Exhibit P2523.  Thank you.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

12             The witness should be brought in, please.

13             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And just as a reminder, we left off at 65 ter 56,

14     which was at tab 103, and I'll be continuing on that for a bit.

15                           [The witness takes the stand]

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning, Mr. Butler.  Welcome back to the

17     courtroom.

18             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, sir.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The affirmation to tell the truth still applies

20     today.

21                           WITNESS:  RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]

22             THE WITNESS:  I understand, sir.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

24             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

25                           Examination by Mr. McCloskey: [Continued]

Page 16631

 1        Q.   Mr. Butler, we're still on -- it should be tab 103 in your

 2     binder.  We already have it in the e-court.  It's Mr. Vasic, the chief of

 3     the Zvornik CJB's report -- one of his reports of 12 July.  You told us

 4     briefly about point 1, who Miroslav Deronjic was.

 5             Point 2 is a reference to:

 6             "A meeting with General Mladic and General Krstic was held at the

 7     Bratunac Brigade headquarters at," I think it says, "0800 hours in which

 8     tasks were assigned to all those involved."

 9             How, if at all, does this fit into your opinion about General --

10     about the army and the command relationship between the MUP?

11        A.   Yes, sir.  I believe this particular sentence again reflects the

12     fact that the police forces there are taking their orders from the senior

13     army commanders on the ground.

14        Q.   All right.  And then let's just look down it.  We see number 3:

15             "The Turks are fleeing towards Suceska, while the civilians are

16     gathered in Potocari."

17             I think we've heard quite a bit about that.

18             Number 4 is talking about setting up a police station in

19     Srebrenica, which I don't think we need to go into.

20             Number 5, it's:

21             "A meeting will begin at 1000 hours with representatives of

22     UNPROFOR and the International Red Cross ..."

23             It talks about:

24             "... an agreement will be reached on the evacuation of the

25     civilian population from Potocari to Kladanj."

Page 16632

 1             What meeting, in your view, does this refer to?

 2        A.   This refers to what we call the third meeting that occurred at

 3     the Hotel Fontana between the VRS, the Dutch Battalion members, and the

 4     Muslim representatives from Srebrenica.

 5        Q.   All right.  And number 6:

 6             "Joint police forces are advancing on Potocari with the aim of

 7     taking UNPROFOR personnel prisoner, surrounding the entire civilian

 8     population and cleansing the area of enemy troops."

 9             So from the documents and your knowledge, have you an opinion

10     whether or not at this -- at this time, that joint police forces were

11     advancing on Potocari?

12        A.   Yes, sir.  And, in fact, at the time or shortly after this 8.00

13     meeting, Special Police forces did advance towards Potocari, breaching

14     the minefield with some help from the engineers, and their actions were

15     as described.

16        Q.   And was Mr. Borovcanin, who we've heard was a deputy commander of

17     the Special Police, involved in this action?

18        A.   Yes, sir, he was.

19        Q.   And will we, a little bit later on in our chronology, see some

20     reports from Mr. Borovcanin describing this?

21        A.   Yes, sir.

22             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I'd offer this into evidence.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 56 shall be

25     assigned Exhibit P2524.  Thank you.

Page 16633

 1             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And let's now go to 65 ter 2231.  It's a similar

 2     report from Mr. Vasic.  In fact, this last one was number 277.  This

 3     current one that's coming up is number 278.  It's two pages in English,

 4     and it's not very legible in the B/C/S.  So I have concluded it's from

 5     Vasic, but we do see, in the English, "The chief of the CJB."

 6        Q.   So can you remind us, who was the chief of the CJB, whose name

 7     should have been under that that we can't quite see?

 8        A.   That should be Dragomir Vasic.

 9        Q.   Okay.  And then looking at this report, we see it's in a similar

10     setup as the last one, and it talks about now:

11             "At 1030 hours, a meeting was held at the hotel in Bratunac,

12     attended by the following:"

13             And we see the group that it's talking about.  And is that the

14     meeting that we see parts of on this video that is an exhibit in the

15     case?

16        A.   Yes, sir, although I should note that the individuals listed in

17     line A representing the Serb side, there were clearly, as the video

18     shows, many more members of the VRS and the Drina Corps present at that

19     meeting than are actually listed by Mr. Vasic.

20        Q.   Can you remind us who some of those other key players are that

21     are seen in the video?

22        A.   Off -- off of memory:  General Krstic, I believe Colonels Kosoric

23     and Popovic, Colonel Jankovic is there, General Mladic is there.

24     That's -- from the military side, that's all I recall at the moment.

25        Q.   All right.  And, B, it says Colonel Karremans was there.  Was

Page 16634

 1     there some other DutchBat personnel there as well, in your view, if you

 2     recall?

 3        A.   Yes, sir, I do recall from the videotape that there were several

 4     other Dutch Battalion members.  I believe Major Franken was -- either

 5     Major Franken or Rava [phoen] or Boering was present, one of those two,

 6     and then Sergeant-Major Rava was also there.  I think it was -- Boering

 7     was the officer present with Colonel Karremans.

 8        Q.   All right.  Well, we've got the video for that.  And we see the

 9     Muslim representatives listed as well.  And can you remind us what

10     happened if you -- to Ibro Nuhanovic after these days, if you remember or

11     recall, and his wife.

12        A.   To be fair at this point, I don't recall what happened to

13     Mr. Nuhanovic and his wife at this juncture.  It's been too many years.

14        Q.   Okay.  Let's look at the conclusions:

15             "According to the Muslims ..."

16             We need to go over in the B/C/S, I believe:

17             "... there were 25.000 people in the base in Potocari (mainly

18     small children, women and elderly) and only 10 per cent are conscripts

19     from 17 to 60 years old."

20             What do you make of this comment to his superiors about men from

21     17 to 60 years old that Vasic is putting in this report?

22        A.   One of the critical underlying issues for the army at this point

23     in time and, in fact, for the previous evening hours, was trying to

24     determine where were the men of the 28th Infantry Division, what were

25     they doing, and a lot of efforts to get intelligence.  When one looks at

Page 16635

 1     the military dispositions, the VRS, going into the early-evening hours of

 2     the 11th of July and the early-morning hours of the 12th of July, was

 3     looking for the 28th Infantry Division and expected to find the remnants

 4     of the division in an area of the former enclave known as the

 5     Bardera [phoen] Triangle.  As we've indicated in earlier intercepts, in

 6     fact, they're not in the Bardera Triangle.  The division is starting to

 7     assemble into this column and start to excultrate [sic] from the enclave.

 8     This word and this realisation obviously takes time from the people on

 9     the ground who are observing it before it finally makes its way to the

10     leadership of the VRS so they can react to it.  Again in this particular

11     context, they are asking the Muslim representatives, Where are the

12     members of the 28th Division, where are all the able-bodied men?  And the

13     response is -- that they're getting back in Potocari is that there aren't

14     enough able-bodied men there and none of them are military members, as

15     far as they're able to determine.  So this is all part of this larger

16     question of:  Where are -- where is the 28th Infantry Division, where are

17     the military-aged men, and what actions are they doing right now?

18        Q.   And do you recall whether the evidence has indicated if Mladic

19     said anything at this 10.00 meeting about doing anything with the

20     able-bodied men roughly 16 to 60 years old, or thereabouts, if you

21     recall?

22        A.   Yes, sir, I do.

23        Q.   What is your recollection?

24        A.   General Mladic had indicated that there would be some form of a

25     vetting process for the men of this particular age group in order to

Page 16636

 1     ensure that they had not been involved in crimes against the Serbs.

 2        Q.   And a separation of able-bodied men to be interviewed, reviewed,

 3     and vetted for possible war criminals, is there anything wrong with that,

 4     in your view?

 5        A.   No, sir.  And, in fact, during the morning hours of 12 July, the

 6     Bratunac Brigade Intelligence and Security shop actually produced a list

 7     of Bosnian Muslims who they believed were involved with crimes against

 8     the Serbs, so there was actually a list by which to start vetting these

 9     people against.  That is a legitimate act.

10        Q.   Now, as evident in the case, that men were separated and

11     detained, is there any indication that they were provided with the

12     appropriate logistical support of food, water, medicine, support, that --

13     well, as you see was required by law?  And I'm talking about the Potocari

14     men, able-bodied men.

15        A.   No, sir.  The only -- the only people who were provided that were

16     those men who were wounded and were under the Dutch care, medical care,

17     and then were transported to Bratunac, where they remained under

18     observation of the Dutch.  If you weren't a member of that group, as the

19     investigation has determined, you were put in a number of facilities in

20     Potocari.  Your identification was taken away from you, as well as all

21     your other personal goods, and then you were part of that process that

22     ultimately went from Potocari, through Bratunac, and then to various

23     sites in Zvornik where they were subsequently executed.

24        Q.   All right.  Let's now look at this.  As we go down, number 2

25     says:

Page 16637

 1             "They want to leave the camp voluntarily and go to Tuzla or

 2     Kladanj, and they request assistance."

 3             We'll leave that for consideration to others.

 4             Number 3:

 5             "They also request free passage for able-bodied men because,

 6     allegedly, they are unarmed and they are not in contact with their army

 7     in the woods."

 8             So which able-bodied men are these, in your view?

 9        A.   These are Bosnian Muslim men from the enclave who fall within the

10     age bracket; in this case, 17 to 60.  Many [Realtime transcript read in

11     error "men"] of them are not associated with the 28th Infantry Division.

12     What the Muslim representatives are noting at this juncture is that there

13     are two separate groups.  One group is an army group, and another group

14     is just Bosnian Muslim men who are seeking to flee, but who are not

15     combatants.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I ask you for a clarification.

17             Did you say "many of them are not associated with the

18     28th Infantry Division" or did you say "men of them"?

19             THE WITNESS:  Many, sir.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

21             THE WITNESS:  Most of -- the size of the 28th Division, in terms

22     of manpower, was actually larger than the amount of weapons that the

23     units had available.  So, generally, they had more soldiers, and the

24     practice in the enclave was that when one group of soldiers went off

25     duty, another group of soldiers would come in and take those weapons.  So

Page 16638

 1     the fact that there are unarmed men in the woods is not the same as

 2     saying they're not soldiers, so that's why I have to be careful and

 3     differentiate between, you know, those individuals who are armed members

 4     of the 28th Division, those individuals who are soldiers -- who are

 5     members of the 28th Division but, because of circumstances, are not

 6     armed, and then the third body, which is men who fall into that able-body

 7     range but who are -- and have no association with the military.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.

10        Q.   And that third group you mentioned, were any of those in Potocari

11     at the 12th of July, if you know?

12        A.   Yes, sir.  I would say that many of those men in Potocari were

13     not associated with the military, and because they had no military

14     association, they chose to accompany their families to Potocari rather

15     than flee into the woods.

16        Q.   All right.  And number 4:

17             "It was decided to grant their requests, and with UNPROFOR

18     assistance (presence and provision of fuel for transportation) and the

19     trucks provided, boarding of vehicles will commence at 1400 hours and the

20     escort will be provided 'til Kladanj."

21             Do you recall yesterday a document from General Zivanovic, where

22     he did not know the final destination of the group?

23        A.   Yes, sir.

24        Q.   Does this indicate by the morning of the 12th there is a

25     destination?  Is this related to -- I should say:  Is this related to the

Page 16639

 1     same subject that Zivanovic was talking about?

 2        A.   Yes, sir.  I think if you look in time, General Zivanovic's

 3     message relating to acquiring the buses comes several hours prior to this

 4     particular document which reflects that a decision has been made where

 5     they are going.

 6        Q.   Okay.  And then this line:

 7             "After the inspection, depending on Mladic's decision,

 8     able-bodied men may be allowed to go in order to have the others from the

 9     woods to surrender, since our command urged them to do so."

10             Now, this idea mentioned here, that after the inspection of the

11     able-bodied men, depending on what Mladic decides, they may allow those

12     able-bodied men to go as some sort of impetus to get the men from the

13     woods to come down, is that shown on the video anywhere, these comments

14     from Mladic of this meeting?

15        A.   I don't recall the details of that in the video.  It may be there

16     are.  I just don't recall them at the moment.

17        Q.   And do you know for a fact where Vasic actually got this from?

18        A.   This particular line?

19        Q.   Yes.

20        A.   No, sir, I don't.

21        Q.   All right.  And then number 5, we see it's a discussion about

22     President Karadzic setting up forces for a police station in Srebrenica,

23     mentioning the 2nd Company of the Zvornik PJP.

24             He also, in number 6, if we go to the next page in English,

25     mentions the 1st Company is carrying out tasks.

Page 16640

 1             Now, you have mentioned the 2nd Company of the PJP and the

 2     1st Company, I think, in relation to Mr. Borovcanin.  Can you explain:

 3     How is it that Vasic is reporting on these folks, and is this different

 4     from Borovcanin's folks?  As much as you can tell us on that.

 5        A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, the command relationships between the police

 6     bear some discussion.  The 1st Company that he is discussing, of course,

 7     is the 1st PJP Company.  It is, at that point, under the direct command

 8     of Mr. Borovcanin, but they are still Vasic's police.  So it would be

 9     natural for him to discuss what their role was and what missions they

10     were performing.  Of the PJP companies, that is the only PJP company that

11     is specifically -- had been previously re-subordinated to Mr. Borovcanin.

12     The other PJP companies that have been mobilised and are operating

13     around -- in and around Srebrenica and other locations remain subordinate

14     at this juncture to Mr. Vasic, as the head of the CJB.  And, of course,

15     in this context, Vasic is taking his orders also from the army, and he's

16     keeping his chain of command and the police forces and police staff

17     informed in detail as to what those orders are.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I'd offer this document into

19     evidence.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 2231 shall be

22     assigned Exhibit P2525.  Thank you.

23             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And if we could go to P1565A.  And we'll see that

24     this is an intercept.  It's from 12 July, from other documents, but all

25     we see, really, is a transcript of the intercept here.  It's at 1240

Page 16641

 1     hours, and it's from Panorama, who is X, and Y, who is barely audible.

 2             And we see Y say:

 3             "We are starting the evacuation of those who want to go towards

 4     Kladanj."

 5             And X, from Panorama says:

 6             "Okay."

 7        Q.   What is Panorama?

 8        A.   Panorama is the telephonic code-name for the Main Staff

 9     headquarters.

10        Q.   Okay.

11             And Y says:

12             "Pass it on ... just let ... provide transportation."

13             X can't be heard.

14             Then Y says:

15             "And reinforce ... with trucks and buses, and a water tank should

16     be sent to give them water and food.  This morning we organised it here,

17     we'll give them everything.  I talked to them, and we'll accept all of

18     the civilians who want to and they can stay.  Those who don't want to can

19     choose where they'll go."

20             X can't be heard.

21             Y says:

22             "Goodbye."

23             First of all, who do you think Y is talking about here?  That is,

24     he's providing them with water and food and accepting that they can go or

25     stay.

Page 16642

 1        A.   I believe that Y is talking about the civilian population that is

 2     at this time presently in Potocari.

 3             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Okay.  Let's go to the next document.  That one's

 4     already in evidence.  This is another intercept 10 minutes later, 1250

 5     hours.  It looks like the same channel and the same frequency.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I interrupt you for a moment.

 7             There is something missing on page 13, line 4.  You said, sir,

 8     Panorama is the code-name for a certain headquarters.  Could you repeat

 9     that, please?

10             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  That would be the Main Staff

11     headquarters.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

13             Mr. McCloskey.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  P241 is the next exhibit.  It's an intercept,

15     12 July.  It's, as I mention, the same frequency, same channel as the

16     last one, but 10 minutes later, and it's identified by the intercept

17     people of the Tuzla CSB as a conversation between General Mladic and an

18     unidentified male they call X.

19        Q.   And X says:

20             "Go ahead, General."

21             Mladic says :

22             "Have these buses and trucks left?"

23             X says:

24             "They have."

25             Mladic says:

Page 16643

 1             "When?"

 2             X says:

 3             "10 minutes ago."

 4             Mladic says:

 5             "Good, excellent.  Continue to monitor the situation.  Don't let

 6     small groups of them sneak in.  They've all capitulated and surrendered,

 7     and we'll evacuate them all, those who want to and those who don't want

 8     to."

 9             X says:

10             "I understand, General."

11             Mladic says:

12             "Don't issue any statements, and don't interrupt them over the"

13     something" station.  We'll open a corridor towards Kladanj."

14             X can't be heard.

15             Mladic says:

16             "Indeed, let it pass there.  Take a patrol of ours to wait on the

17     road and move the mines and obstacles ... leave the territory."

18             Looking at both these intercepts together, what do you make of

19     them?

20        A.   General Mladic has already decided that everyone will be removed

21     from Potocari, regardless of whether they wish to remain or not.  In the

22     earlier conversation, the correspondents who were discussing it were

23     still discussing a situation and, clearly, were not yet aware of the

24     final instructions that General Mladic had issued in this regard.  It's

25     obviously natural, in not only a military sense, but in any bureaucratic

Page 16644

 1     organisational sense, that there is a certain time lag as orders are

 2     passed down the chain of command and that all the relevant individuals

 3     who will implement those orders become aware of them.

 4             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Let's continue in the chronology and

 5     go to 65 ter 67.  This is a new sort of document for us, I believe,

 6     that -- we see that it's from the Republika Srpska MUP, RDB, the

 7     State Security Department, Sarajevo.  We see who it's to; the deputy

 8     minister, personally.  And it's from the head of the RDB, Dragan Kijac.

 9        Q.   I believe you've mentioned this briefly, but can you tell us what

10     this is, who Kijac is?

11        A.   He is the head of the RDB, which is the state security apparatus

12     of the Republika Srpska.  It is part of the Ministry of the Interior.

13     Just like the army had an intelligence and security apparatus as part of

14     its structure, the Ministry of the Interior also had an intelligence

15     collection and security apparatus, which is the RDB.

16        Q.   Is there any indication that the RDB had agents or officers on

17     the ground in and around Bratunac and Potocari on the 12th of July?

18        A.   Yes, sir.  I am aware that the investigation has identified

19     several RDB agents in and around Bratunac and Potocari on those dates.

20        Q.   And this paragraph notes that:

21             "Representatives of international humanitarian organisations in

22     Srebrenica sent a report to their head offices on 12 July, saying that

23     that the morning humanitarian situation was 'worse than ever.'"

24             And then it says:

25             "According to the report, the population lacked food, medicine

Page 16645

 1     and clothing."

 2             Then it estimates the number of people around the battalion at

 3     30.000, and 8.000 more trying to get there.  According to military

 4     observers, there is not a single armed soldier of the so-called BH among

 5     these people.  A proposal by the UNPROFOR to provide 20 buses.

 6             What does this indicate the SDB has got their hands on when it

 7     says that "the humanitarian organisations sent a report" and "according

 8     to that report"?

 9        A.   It reflects the fact that they obviously have knowledge of what

10     various NGOs or the UN, if the NGOs were reporting through the UN

11     channels, the information that they're reporting up their particular

12     chain of command that somehow the RDB is getting access to that

13     information.

14        Q.   And do you know if it was intercepted, or gotten through an

15     agent, or found, or do you have any idea how they got this?

16        A.   No, sir, I don't.

17             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I'd offer that into evidence.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, it will be received.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 67 shall be

20     assigned Exhibit P2526.  Thank you.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Gajic.

22             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would just ask

23     Mr. McCloskey and the witness to slow down a bit, because it takes a

24     while before the interpretation is done or completed.  They are about six

25     lines behind the speakers.

Page 16646

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you for this advice.

 2             Mr. McCloskey.

 3             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.

 4             If we could go to P1566A.  It's another intercept from 12 July,

 5     1305 hours now, from Krstic and Sobat [phoen].

 6        Q.   Can you tell us who you think this Krstic and Sobat is?

 7        A.   In this particular context, "Krstic" is General Krstic, because

 8     as one reads further down the particular intercept, one of the

 9     correspondents does address him as "General."

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey, you called him, the other person,

11     Sobat, but I read "Sobot."

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I meant to say Sobot.  I see it the same way you

13     do.  I apologise.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Go ahead, please.

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:

16        Q.   Does that name, Sobot, ring a bell?

17        A.   Yes, sir, it does.

18        Q.   Who?

19        A.   He is an officer on the Drina Corps staff who's associated with

20     the logistics or rear services branch.

21        Q.   And we see "Krsmanovic."  In your view, is that the same

22     Krsmanovic you've already talked about related to buses?

23        A.   Yes, sir, it is.

24        Q.   And I don't want to go through all of this and who the various

25     folks are, Savo and Kosoric and all, but we see, as we get down, it's

Page 16647

 1     talking about a tunnel, and that's where they'll be disembarking, "take

 2     care that nothing must happen to them."  Can you tell us what it is you

 3     think General Krstic is discussing here?

 4        A.   In this particular intercept, General Krstic is discussing or

 5     being put through to various correspondents the route of the convoy,

 6     which brigade areas it will be passing through, and ultimately where the

 7     individuals will be dropped off, and then make that final I believe it's

 8     one- or two-kilometre walk through the tunnel between the territory of

 9     Republika Srpska to the BiH.  So this particular conversation is related

10     to making arrangements for those actions to occur.

11        Q.   Is it related at all, in your view, to that other conversation we

12     heard where -- that we saw, excuse me, where General Mladic said

13     something like, Clear the obstacles?

14        A.   Yes, sir.

15        Q.   What are the obstacles that would need to be dealt with?

16        A.   There were mines and other barriers that had been placed on the

17     road, since there's no traffic that goes back and forth between blinds on

18     that, and this was directions to start taking those barriers down so the

19     people could proceed.

20        Q.   And when Krstic says, Take care, nothing must happen to any of

21     them, do you relate that in any way to the -- what we heard from in

22     the -- in General Gvero's document, where he says, Take care of UNPROFOR,

23     there are multiple reasons?  Do you -- anything similar or related to

24     these two statements?

25        A.   Yes, sir, in the sense that while General Gvero was discussing

Page 16648

 1     UNPROFOR, in this particular situation General Krstic is seeking to avoid

 2     a situation where, particularly close to the demarcation point where the

 3     refugees will be placed -- are basically removed from RS territory, he

 4     doesn't want an incident or he doesn't want those civilians harmed where

 5     they will then immediately make comments and complaints about being

 6     harmed by the RS.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Let's go to the next document,

 8     65 ter 140.  This is a document from the Command of the Drina Corps, the

 9     Intelligence Department, on 12 July.  It's very urgent, for immediate

10     delivery to the Main Staff Sector for Intelligence and Security, the

11     Intelligence Administration, the Drina Corps Bratunac Forward Command

12     Post, and personally to Lieutenant-Colonel Kosoric.

13        Q.   You've told us who Kosoric is, and we can read the substance of

14     this, so I don't need to go through it.  We've heard things like this

15     before.  What, basically, is -- and we see this is in the name of

16     Pavle Golic -- "By authorisation of the chief," and it says

17     "Major Pavle Golic."  Remind us who Major Golic is.

18        A.   Major Golic is an intelligence officer assigned to the

19     Drina Corps Command.

20        Q.   And do we see his name popping up in other intercepts and

21     documents and the Zvornik Brigade duty officer's note-book related to

22     various projects that are going on?  I'll say that at this point.

23        A.   Yes, sir.

24        Q.   All right.  And it makes a reference to the Drina Corps duty

25     officer, a Lieutenant-Colonel Jovicic, and then the operations officer,

Page 16649

 1     Lieutenant-Colonel Ognjenovic.

 2             Now, if we go back to 1994 briefly and recall the commander of

 3     the Bratunac Brigade, a Mr. Ognjenovic, is this Ognjenovic anything to do

 4     with the commander of the Bratunac Brigade in 1994 that sent that report

 5     to his troops about making life unbearable for the Muslims?

 6        A.   Yes, sir.  It is the same person.

 7        Q.   And are there any documents or intercepts that give us any

 8     indication where or what Ognjenovic was doing on these days, 12 or 13

 9     July, that you recall?

10        A.   Yes, sir.  He is performing duties as an operations officer in

11     the Drina Corps Command, Vlasenica.

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Okay.  I would offer this document into evidence.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 140 shall be

15     assigned Exhibit P2527.  Thank you.

16             MR. McCLOSKEY:  If we could go to 65 ter 231.  And we now come to

17     the Bratunac Brigade Command daily combat report of 12 July that talks

18     about the enemy trying to break through in this particular direction that

19     we see, including Jaglici, Bokcin Potok, towards Tuzla.  I don't think

20     that bears any comment at this point.

21        Q.   And then number 7:

22             "The transport of the Turkish population (Muslim refugees) from

23     the village of Potocari towards Kladanj is in progress.  A large number

24     (10.000) of refugees are expecting to be transported from Potocari to

25     Kladanj."

Page 16650

 1             And we see a time handwritten on this, "1430 hours."

 2             Does this roughly reflect some of what is going on related to the

 3     Muslims of Srebrenica?

 4        A.   Yes, sir.  I would just note it's 12 July at 1630 hours, not 1430

 5     hours.

 6             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.  My eyes and mouth are not in sync,

 7     but hopefully we'll get them in sync.

 8             I would offer this into evidence.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, it will be received.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 231 shall be

11     assigned Exhibit P2528.  Thank you.

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And can we go to 65 ter 1985, hopefully briefly,

13     because we see that this is a Main Staff report to the president from

14     12 July.

15             And if we can go to the Drina Corps section, which is on page 3

16     of both languages.

17        Q.   And we can see in one part that the enemy has been attempting to

18     withdraw from the Srebrenica enclave, with women and children, in the

19     direction of Ravni Buljin and Konjevic Polje, but ran into a minefield.

20     Is this an accurate report, as far as you know?

21        A.   Yes, sir.  That particular passage does reflect the knowledge

22     that the Drina Corps has of the current situation and the knowledge that

23     they're obtaining as a result of taking prisoners and interrogating those

24     prisoners for combat information.

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Let's go to the next page in English.

Page 16651

 1     It should still be on page 4 -- page 3 in the B/C/S, page 4 in the

 2     English.

 3        Q.   And under "The Situation in the Territory," it says:

 4             "In the Drina Corps zone of responsibility, the population is

 5     being taken from Srebrenica enclave to Kladanj in an organised manner.

 6     It is estimated on this day that there are about 10.000 Muslims to be

 7     transported."

 8             Is that, roughly, a correct statement of the situation as it was

 9     known by the Main Staff on that day at, roughly, this time-period?  We

10     see it's received at 2.00 a.m. on the next day, the 13th.

11        A.   Yes, sir, again in the context of they're accurately reporting

12     the information that is available to them.  I believe that as time goes

13     on, it's clear that the number of individuals leaving Potocari is well in

14     excess of 10.000, but at this juncture the people drafting this

15     particular report don't know that yet.

16             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And, Mr. President, I believe, as I'm noting,

17     that this document is P1215, and for some reason we gave it a 65 ter

18     number.  That's the next one in the binder, I see, so I don't think it

19     needs to be offered into evidence.  It already is.

20             So unless I'm wrong, could we go to 65 ter 232.

21        Q.   Still on 12 July, a document from the Command of the

22     Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade to the Drina Corps Command; attention,

23     Major Golic.  Is that the same Major Golic, in your view, that we talked

24     about last time?

25        A.   Yes, sir, it is.

Page 16652

 1        Q.   And we see some information that is being passed on to

 2     Intelligence Officer Golic by a Captain Pecanac.  What did you learn

 3     about who this Captain Pecanac was at the time?

 4        A.   My understanding from the investigation, as well as other

 5     documents, reflects that Captain Pecanac is an officer of the VRS

 6     Main Staff who is affiliated with the Intelligence and Security Sector.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I would offer that into evidence.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I'll skip over --

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  One moment.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 232 shall be

12     assigned Exhibit P2529.  Thank you.

13             MR. McCLOSKEY:

14        Q.   I'm going to skip the next tab and go to tab 115, which we have

15     seen before.  It's P2203.  It's the 12 July document from

16     General Tolimir, talking about various intel information and proposing

17     Muslims going through the woods be arrested?

18             And you've talked on that in a previous section.  It's just here

19     as a place holder, so I don't think we need to discuss it again.

20             I'll go on to the next document, which is D64.  And as the

21     previous document, this is a 12 July document from General Tolimir that

22     you've spoken before, where he talks about intel information and makes

23     proposals about capturing Muslim men.  And this is where he notes that

24     it's important to note down the names of all men fit for military service

25     who are being evacuated from the UNPROFOR base in Potocari.

Page 16653

 1             It's already been discussed, so if we could go past that now to

 2     65 ter 168?

 3             And this, as we will be able to see on the screen soon, is from

 4     the 1st Milici Light Infantry Brigade, the Security Affairs organ to the

 5     Drina Corps Command, the OB department.  And it mentions at 1600 hours,

 6     in the area of Buljim, the person got away from a group of soldiers

 7     heading away from Srebrenica, and it lists the person's name, Ibis Malic,

 8     son of Maso, born 1 January 1977, and it provides information.

 9             Can you tell us, just briefly, what this is?  I don't need --

10     we're familiar with the information now, but just what's the

11     Milici Brigade doing here?

12        A.   The Milici Infantry Brigade had defence positions around parts of

13     the former enclave.  This is just simply a reflection of a soldier who

14     surrendered to the Milici Brigade, his, you know, interrogation after

15     surrendering, where combat information is obtained from him, and the

16     reporting process by the Milici Brigade to their higher command, the

17     Drina Corps Command.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And, Your Honours, I would refer you to the

19     report of Dusan Janc and the ICMP identifications to find out the fate of

20     this particular man.  I will get a more specific reference for you.

21             But I would offer this document into evidence.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 168 shall be

24     assigned Exhibit P2530.  Thank you.

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And now, getting over to 13 July in the

Page 16654

 1     chronology, could we go to 65 ter 762.

 2        Q.   And we'll see, as we get to it, that this is another report from

 3     Dragomir Vasic of the Zvornik CJB, referring to a meeting with

 4     General Mladic that morning, where he says:

 5             "We were informed that the VRS was continuing operations towards

 6     Zepa ..."

 7             And in Vasic's words:

 8             "... leaving all other work of the MUP as follows:"

 9             Is this what happened, roughly?

10        A.   Yes, sir, that is correct.  At some point, at a meeting that

11     occurred at the Bratunac Brigade headquarters on the evening of 12 July

12     1995, various members of the Drina Corps and the Main Staff, at the

13     direction of General Mladic, begin to put together a plan that would

14     rapidly move military units from the areas in and around the former

15     enclave and pivot them, as it were, so they could very quickly undertake

16     military operations against the Zepa enclave.

17        Q.   And during the day on the 13th, did the VRS really understand, in

18     your view, in your opinion, how many Muslim able-bodied men, especially

19     those from the 28th Division, had made it across the

20     Milici-Konjevic Polje-Kravica road into the woods towards Erdut and on

21     towards Baljkovica?

22        A.   No, sir.  And if one looks at the reporting coming from

23     Major Obrenovic of the Zvornik Brigade and various intercepts that go

24     between the Zvornik commands, Vlasenica, the Drina Corps, and the

25     Main Staff, even, what does become evident is that the senior military

Page 16655

 1     officers in the Drina Corps and on the Main Staff have underestimated the

 2     number of men in the column, and of obvious most relevance to the

 3     Zvornik Brigade, armed men in the column.  So while you have a situation

 4     where the Zvornik Brigade is talking about a potential crisis, as they

 5     have expectations of a rather large military force approaching it and

 6     they have no available reserves left, Major Obrenovic's assessments of

 7     those situations are generally considered to be over-statements by other

 8     members of the army.

 9             In fact, Major Obrenovic's assessments are accurate as to the

10     size and the military threat the column posed, and you see that on the

11     late evening of the 14th and early-morning hours of the 15th, when the

12     Drina Corps is forced to start sending military formations from Zepa back

13     to Zvornik in order to reinforce the combat operations that are occurring

14     there.

15        Q.   All right.  And we see number 1 of the tasks that the MUP is

16     doing:

17             "Evacuation of the remaining civilian population from Srebrenica

18     to Kladanj ..."

19             Its estimate is about 15.000 by bus.  We see that according to

20     Vasic, petrol is still a problem.

21             And then number 2, it says:

22             "Killing of about 8.000 Muslim soldiers whom we blocked in the

23     woods near Konjevic Polje.  Fighting is going on.  This job is being done

24     solely by MUP units."

25             And if we look at the Serbian term, it's "likvidacija."

Page 16656

 1             What does this statement mean to you?  This is a report on

 2     13 July.  It's not clear exactly what time it went out, and I think we'll

 3     all recall the Kravica warehouse, in the later hours of --

 4     afternoon/evening hours of 13 July, but what has this meant to you over

 5     the years, and has your opinion changed at all?

 6        A.   Yes, sir.  What this particular phrase represents to me is the

 7     combat operations against the -- part of the Muslim column, a significant

 8     part of the column, that has not been able to cross the road at

 9     Konjevic Polje, between Konjevic Polje and Nova Kasaba, and continue on

10     the way to free territory.

11             "Liquidation" is an interesting phrase that's used.  And very

12     early on, because of what it potentially means in English, where it does

13     have a sinister connotation, I did engage with various translators and

14     language experts at CLSS to determine if it had the same sinister

15     connotation in the Serbo-Croat language.  They informed me that it, in

16     fact, does not.  It's just a term that they use to, you know, reflect

17     doing something, you know, completely -- doing it in its complete --

18     entirely.  So I've always made the point, when coming across those

19     phrases, particularly when it has to do with individuals were being

20     killed, to point out that in this particular context, they're merely

21     talking along the lines of, you know, combat operations to kill the

22     remaining soldiers.  It's not read as liquidating soldiers in a more

23     sinister context.

24        Q.   And have you seen the term "liquidating" used when, in fact, they

25     were talking about killing people in a summarily executive way?

Page 16657

 1        A.   Not that I recall since leaving.  I mean, normally the term that

 2     they use in that context with the intercepts that I'm aware of is they

 3     call that particular phrase "triage."

 4        Q.   All right.  And if we go back on an intercept, I believe it

 5     was -- yes, it was the evening of 13 July, where X and Y were talking

 6     about a total of 6.000 able-bodied men at three locations in the area.

 7     So if we give, roughly, some credence to those 6.000 that would be

 8     captured at that point, would those 6.000 be at all related to this

 9     reference much earlier in the day of 8.000?

10        A.   Yes, sir, it would encompass the column -- the general estimates

11     of the size of the column are, for a variety of reasons, very difficult

12     to estimate, but I believe I've always been consistent that the column's

13     between 10 and 15.000 people.  So those numbers, an 8.000 number, a 6.000

14     number, of individuals who are involved at that location on 13 July, even

15     those high numbers would be consistent with my understanding of the size

16     of the column.

17        Q.   But by the evening of 13 July, are a lot of those able-bodied men

18     now POWs?

19        A.   More than that, sir.  By the evening of 13 July, after the

20     Kravica warehouse, approximately a thousand of them are already dead.

21     There are probably another 2.000 who are on buses and trucks, in the

22     custody of the VRS and of the police, in other locations in and around

23     Bratunac, where they're being held on those vehicles or other locations

24     before they get sent to Zvornik.

25        Q.   And do those numbers in Bratunac increase as the evening goes on

Page 16658

 1     and more people are being brought in?

 2        A.   Yes, sir.  My understanding, based on the ongoing investigation,

 3     is that through that particular evening, more vehicles filled with

 4     prisoners are being brought in as each hour passes, and there's some

 5     manner of difficulty in finding appropriate places to park the vehicles

 6     and to properly guard them because they're getting so many of them.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I would offer this document into evidence.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 762 shall be

10     assigned Exhibit P2531.  Thank you.

11             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  If we could go to P2238.

12        Q.   We now see a report from the Special Police Brigade on 13 July.

13     We don't really see any time reference in the document, aside from what

14     could be gleaned from the document itself.  It's to the

15     Pale Police Staff, the Vogosca Police Staff, and the

16     Special Police Brigade, Janja, and it's from Ljubisa Borovcanin, the

17     deputy commander.

18             So, briefly, before we discuss some of the content, what is this?

19        A.   Just as Dragomir Vasic sent reports up detailing the situation,

20     so did Ljubisa Borovcanin.  This is a report that Mr. Borovcanin sent to

21     his police superiors, detailing the situation on the ground, as he

22     understood it, as well as what activities that the forces under his

23     command were engaged in.

24        Q.   Is this consistent with the similar topics mentioned by

25     Dragomir Vasic when he talked about joint police forces?  I think he said

Page 16659

 1     joint police forces are moving towards Potocari, something to that

 2     effect.

 3        A.   Yes, sir.  This -- this joint police force that moved towards

 4     Potocari was part of Mr. Borovcanin's unit.

 5        Q.   So when Borovcanin says in the course of the day, a MUP force was

 6     engaged in the direction of Zuti Most, towards Potocari, what day is he

 7     talking about?

 8        A.   This activity he is describing is the early-morning hours of

 9     12 July 1995.

10        Q.   And so when he says, There was no strong-armed resistance from

11     the Muslims, so we took control of Potocari by 13 [sic] hours, with the

12     right-hand flank, we took control of the Budak and Milacevici features,

13     was that also 12 July?

14        A.   Yes, sir, that is correct.

15        Q.   And his comment about:

16             "In Potocari, we sealed off the main UN base, where a throng of

17     between 25.000 and 30.000 civilians had gathered ..."

18             And he now notes that:

19             "... 5 per cent of whom were able-bodied men."

20             So we now have Vasic talks about able-bodied men on his 12th July

21     report, and now we have Borovcanin.  Is that the same able-bodied men

22     that they're both talking about?

23        A.   Yes, sir.

24        Q.   I think their percentages are a bit different?  Do you recall

25     Vasic's percentage?  If not, don't worry about it, that document is in

Page 16660

 1     evidence.

 2        A.   Yes, sir.  Vasic says 10 per cent.  Borovcanin says 5 per cent.

 3        Q.   He notes that:

 4             "A part of the MUP force was involved in the organisation of the

 5     evacuation of civilians from Srebrenica ..."

 6             And can that be seen from the video of 12 July and 13 July?

 7        A.   Yes, sir.  The videos do show that the various bus convoys are

 8     escorted by MUP forces, either Republika Srpska police or other MUP

 9     forces.

10        Q.   All right.  Then he talks about how the able-bodied Muslim men

11     set off through Konjevic Polje towards Tuzla, and that he urgently

12     dispatched forces with hardware to seal off the Kravica-Konjevic Polje

13     road.

14             We need to go over to the next page in English.

15             Did the investigation, and Petrovic video, and other information

16     bear out this statement?

17        A.   Yes, sir, it did.

18        Q.   Now he talks about the night between 12 and 13 July, that the

19     armed Muslim group launched an attack in the direction of Konjevic Polje,

20     and that combat lasted several hours and continued through the day.  So

21     what day is he now talking about?

22        A.   At this juncture, he's now talking about the 13th of July.

23        Q.   And he notes that the enemy sustained a loss of 200 soldiers who

24     were killed, and he notes that:

25             "... we captured or had surrendered to us around 1500 Muslim

Page 16661

 1     soldiers."

 2             And:

 3             "This number increases by the hour."

 4             Now, you have discussed the document of 13 July in the name of

 5     Savcic, where, according to that document, General Tolimir issues a

 6     proposal, and there's a discussion of over 1.000 -- or there's a mention

 7     of over 1.000 prisoners in the Kasaba area.  Is Borovcanin -- are his

 8     units in the Kasaba area at all?

 9        A.   No, sir, they are not.

10        Q.   Can you tell us where his guys are, where they're getting these

11     1500 Muslims in relation to Kasaba?

12        A.   The police forces under Borovcanin's command are essentially

13     staged, literally, in a very long series of lines along the road from the

14     town of Konjevic Polje, back towards Bratunac, to the Sandici Meadow and

15     actually a little bit further towards Kravica in that regard.  So the

16     prisoners that he's talking about, because of the territory that he

17     controls, are different from the prisoners that are being accounted for

18     at Nova Kasaba.

19        Q.   And he notes that:

20             "The number increases by the hour."

21             And then he says:

22             "According to all indications, the number of Muslim soldiers who

23     did not manage to break through is on the rise and is approximately

24     between 5.000 and 6.000, which means that we have intense combat ahead of

25     us."

Page 16662

 1             So we had just heard that -- I think from Vasic that they were

 2     fighting 8.000.  Is this 5.000 and 6.000 that he's talking about the same

 3     group that Vasic is talking about, or is this a group that's already gone

 4     past the road and is on their way towards Zvornik, or some other group?

 5        A.   No, sir.  I believe this is the same group that Vasic was talking

 6     about.  When one compares the reports of Vasic and Borovcanin, it's clear

 7     that they have a pretty common view of what the battle-field situation

 8     looks like at that particular time.

 9        Q.   Yes.  And something just I wanted to clear up.  I asked you about

10     the previous document, where Vasic makes this reference to liquidating

11     8.000 people, and I asked you, Had your view of that changed over the

12     years?  And I recall that you said, Yes, sir.  But when you said, Yes,

13     sir, did that mean your -- what did that mean, when you said, Yes, sir,

14     just so we can clear that up?

15        A.   I said, Yes, sir, as my predicate to answering the question.  I

16     did not mean that my opinion of that had changed over the years.

17             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I didn't think it had, so I thought I

18     better clear that up.

19             And I would offer this document into evidence.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think it's in evidence.  It's P2238.

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Absolutely correct.

22             And the next document is a more lengthy report, so I think this

23     is the -- and it is the time to break.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Indeed.  We must have our first break now, and we

25     will resume at 11.00.

Page 16663

 1                           --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.

 2                           --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey, please continue.

 4             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Could we now go to 120 tab, and it's P1335.

 5        Q.   And as we're waiting, I'll note that this is from the

 6     Republika Srpska Ministry of Interior, Special Police Brigade Bijeljina.

 7     It's got a date of 5 September 1995 up in the left corner, and it's

 8     entitled:

 9             "Report on the Combat Engagement of the Special Police Brigade

10     and Other Police Forces in Operation Srebrenica 95 in the Period from

11     11 July to 21 July 1995."

12             If we can go to the last page.  I don't think we really need to.

13     It's page 5 of the B/C/S, 6 of the English.  It says:

14             "Report submitted by:  Ljubisa Borovcanin."

15             So, Mr. Butler, I know you've had a chance to review this report.

16     What is this report, briefly?

17        A.   In September 1995, Mr. Borovcanin is tasked to write a report

18     pertaining to the activities that both he and the units under his

19     direction took related to Srebrenica.  This particular document is his

20     report of that situation and the activities that he undertook.

21        Q.   All right.  And let's start with it should be page 1 in the

22     English translation - I believe it's page 2 of the B/C/S - where he

23     starts getting into the detail.  I want to ask you about a few of these

24     things.  It says -- begins:

25             "By order 64/95 issued by the deputy minister of the interior on

Page 16664

 1     10 July 1995, I was sent with some MUP forces to participate in the

 2     Srebrenica operation ..."

 3             And then it goes on and it lists the forces.

 4             Have we seen this order he's referring to?

 5        A.   Yes, sir.  That is the order by acting Minister Kovac.

 6        Q.   All right.  And we see, as we go down the page, he describes the

 7     units that the order entailed, and then he starts describing, in the

 8     first paragraph, during the night of 10/11, he came to Jahorina, and

 9     starts describing his dealings with people.  And can you remind us where

10     he was coming from?

11        A.   At this point in time, he and the police units he was commanding

12     were engaged at the Trnovo battle-front.

13        Q.   And we see he notes at the bottom of this page that Spaso Skoro,

14     assistant commander for the Special Police Brigade, took over command of

15     the police forces in Trnovo.  Was -- how did that relate to Borovcanin?

16        A.   Once Borovcanin, who was commanding those forces, was ordered to

17     a different assignment, there was a requirement to designate somebody

18     else to command the remaining police forces at Trnovo.  That would be

19     him.

20        Q.   All right.  And we see on this first page that he basically

21     describes the units that were in the order, and he does mention the

22     Serbian MUP.  As you go through this document and he talks about the

23     various units that came with him and what they are up to, do you ever see

24     him report again about anything to do with the Serbian MUP?

25        A.   No, sir.

Page 16665

 1        Q.   So what would that indicate to you whether or not they are came

 2     with him?

 3        A.   That indicates to me that they did not accompany him.

 4             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Let's go to page 2 in the English.

 5     It should be still page 2 in the B/C/S.

 6        Q.   He talks about arriving in Bratunac at 1200 hours on the 11th.

 7     He became acquainted with the situation on the front at Srebrenica town,

 8     in the direction of Pribicevac.  Then he says:

 9             "From the observer post in Pribicevac, I contacted

10     General Mladic, who personally commanded over the operation."

11             Is that information consistent with what you had learned about

12     the location of General Mladic on this date?

13        A.   Yes, sir.  Pribicevac was the forward command post that the

14     Drina Corps was using for this particular operation, and at some point

15     General Mladic did personally arrive at Pribicevac for the -- at this

16     particular juncture, it would be the last half -- or the last part of the

17     operation, which would include the actual capture of the town of

18     Srebrenica.

19        Q.   All right.  And it says:

20             "On receipt of combat papers, he ordered me to that same day with

21     all available manpower and equipment from the direction of Zuti Most to

22     Potocari and Milacevici, which was an unrealistic task in view of the

23     fact that the envisaged police forces had still not arrived in this area

24     or could not be used."

25             Now, going back to the issue of whether or not Borovcanin was

Page 16666

 1     under the command of the army at this period, does this statement in his

 2     report give you any indication on that issue?

 3        A.   Yes, sir.  I believe it's not unambiguous at all that Borovcanin

 4     believes he's under the command of the army and is taking orders from, in

 5     fact, General Mladic, the commander of the army.

 6        Q.   But we will recall his 10 July order that said he was to, I

 7     believe, make himself available to General Krstic.  Does this change your

 8     analysis, or how would you incorporate that?

 9        A.   No, sir.  General Krstic is the chief of staff of the

10     Drina Corps.  And at the time the order was written, he was the man --

11     the senior army person directing military operations.  When

12     General Mladic, as the commander of the army, shows up, by default he is

13     now the senior army officer, and it would be completely customary for

14     Borovcanin to report to General Mladic in this sense.

15        Q.   And what about his statement, saying that Mladic's order was

16     unrealistic because his forces -- Borovcanin's envisaged forces had not

17     arrived or could not be used?

18        A.   Again, General Mladic gave him an order of what he wanted to

19     occur.  Borovcanin, in this statement, appears to have made the reply

20     that regardless of what he may have told General Mladic, he didn't feel

21     that he had the ability to accomplish that mission, simply because the

22     available forces hadn't arrived in the area yet.  He -- in this sense, he

23     obviously went ahead in order to receive his orders.  As one notes

24     further in time, as those forces become available, he does undertake this

25     mission, or the mission is modified by General Mladic in the coming

Page 16667

 1     hours.

 2        Q.   Remind us what that mission is that he actually did eventually

 3     do.

 4        A.   Beginning the morning of 12 July 1995, those particular MUP

 5     forces do begin to advance towards -- from the Yellow Bridge area to

 6     Potocari, so he's following General Mladic's order.  He's just having to

 7     wait until he assembles his forces to do so.

 8        Q.   And then he describes this MUP company from the training centre

 9     who you described yesterday.  I think you said they had also been

10     referred to as the deserter unit, led by Dusko Jevic and

11     Mendeljev Djuric.  Can you tell us briefly about those two folks and

12     whether or not there's other evidence that they were in the area and

13     involved, just very briefly.

14        A.   Yes, sir.  These were the previously-discussed individuals who

15     were undergoing police training at the Jahorina Training Centre.

16     Initially, one company of these police recruits was put together to

17     accompany the forces designated in the 10 July order from Minister Kovac.

18     As it turns out, they were later joined, I believe on the 12th of July,

19     by a second company from the Jahorina Training Centre.

20        Q.   And remind us, where did Dusko Jevic, as assistant commander, and

21     Mendeljev Djuric, company commander, fit into this, as he notes here?

22        A.   Dusko Jevic at this time is in charge of the training centre.

23     Mendeljev Djuric is one of the designated deserter company commanders.

24     The name Nedjo Ikonic will also come up.  He is another one of the -- he

25     is the 2nd Company commander.

Page 16668

 1        Q.   Do you remember the shortened name for Mendeljev Djuric?

 2        A.   Yes, sir.  He's referred to as Mane.

 3        Q.   And do you remember the name of Dragomir Vasic's deputy for the

 4     Zvornik CSB?

 5        A.   He's the same name, Mane Djuric.

 6        Q.   Is it the same person?

 7        A.   No, sir, it is not.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Could you please pause between question and

 9     answer and the next question.

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Okay.

11        Q.   And we see that he is ordering the 1st Company of the Zvornik PJP

12     to gather.  Do you remember the nickname of Dusko Jevic, as learned by

13     the investigation and, actually, acknowledged by Dusko Jevic?

14        A.   Yes, sir.  His nickname is Stalin.

15        Q.   All right.  I won't go through all of this.  But in that

16     paragraph, it's talking about the 1st Company, and he also makes

17     reference to clearing a passage through the minefield, and that there was

18     a team of pioneers from the Bratunac Brigade to clear the passage through

19     the minefield; is that all correct, as far as you know?

20        A.   Yes, sir.

21        Q.   And then he makes reference that:

22             "At about 2000 hours, negotiations began between Mladic and a

23     representative of UNPROFOR and the Srebrenica Muslims."

24             So this would be 2000 hours.  What day is he talking about here?

25        A.   11 July 1995, sir.

Page 16669

 1        Q.   So what do you think he's referring to?

 2        A.   There were two meetings on the 11th of July.  The first one was

 3     strictly between General Mladic, the VRS, and representatives of the

 4     Dutch Battalion, which took place at approximately 2000 hours.  The

 5     second meeting, which took place at 2200 hours, included a

 6     representative -- a civilian representative of the Bosnian Muslims in

 7     Potocari.  So since he is talking about Srebrenica Muslims, I take it

 8     he's talking about the second meeting that occurred on 11 July 1995.

 9        Q.   And then he says:

10             "General Mladic ordered me to launch an attack in the early hours

11     of the following morning."

12             Is this a reference to what Mladic said at Pribicevac, or do you

13     think that it's something later that Mladic has said to him, or can you

14     tell from this?

15        A.   I take this to read that sometime after receiving his initial

16     orders at Pribicevac, he met with General Mladic again later at the

17     Hotel Fontana, I presume, and General Mladic modified the original order

18     and then told Borovcanin that the attack that his forces needed to

19     undertake, you know, could take place in the morning.

20        Q.   All right.  And then we see that he describes one of these units,

21     the 2nd Special Police Detachment that arrived around 0300 hours.  That

22     would have been on the 12th.  And that was one of the -- was that one of

23     the units referenced in the original 10 July order?

24        A.   Yes, sir.  It is a somewhat complicated military activity to

25     withdraw a unit that's engaged in combat operations, reorganise them, and

Page 16670

 1     then send them to a different location on the battle-field.  You just

 2     can't leave a gap in the line.  Somebody has to fill that position.  So

 3     the fact that it would take a number of hours in order to accomplish

 4     this, and then make the unit available to be sent to Srebrenica, is not

 5     unsurprising.

 6        Q.   All right.  And then he describes what happens in the

 7     early-morning hours and going through the minefield, and that a member of

 8     the Bratunac Brigade set off a mine and died.  And then he mentions the

 9     first task was to take control of the UN check-point on Zuti Most, and

10     that was completed without any incidents, and that the Dutch members did

11     not react.  Is that consistent with a similar comment he made in that

12     just brief report we saw on the 12th and 13th by this same author?

13        A.   Yes, sir, it is.

14        Q.   All right.  Then he describes the estimate of the number of

15     civilians.

16             And if we go to the next page in English, he talks about this --

17     the next page in B/C/S as well.  He talks about the civilians being

18     transported to Kladanj in an organised way, that it was organised by the

19     army, and that the MUP forces had a supportive role, such as regulating

20     traffic and maintaining public law and order.

21             Then later on, they received information from State Security that

22     12- to 15.000 able-bodied, mostly armed Muslims were moving from

23     Srebrenica towards Konjevic Polje, Cerska and Tuzla.  Is that the group

24     that you've just given your own estimate, based on your experience, was

25     between 10- and 15.000 moving in that direction?

Page 16671

 1        A.   Yes, sir, that is correct.

 2        Q.   Okay.  And then he tells us he's received an order from

 3     General Mladic to send half of his men and available technical equipment

 4     to that axis so as to block the area and fight the aforementioned

 5     formations.  Can you describe to us where, from the evidence, the videos,

 6     the documents, Borovcanin took his units?

 7        A.   Those particular units moved up to the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje

 8     road, and as video footage of -- the Petrovic video shows, the bulk of

 9     his forces, including a tank and several anti-aircraft vehicles, are in

10     and around the area we refer to as the Sandici Meadow.

11        Q.   And we see that he says the 2nd Special Police Detachment and the

12     1st Company of the Zvornik PJP, with two tanks, a BOV, a Praga -- and a

13     Praga.  The translation describes what a Praga is.  It's a self-propelled

14     anti-aircraft gun.  Can you tell us what a BOV is, in your view, and what

15     a Praga is?

16        A.   Those are self-propelled -- they're basically self-propelled

17     crew-serve weapons.  The Praga is an anti-aircraft gun.  I think the BOV

18     in this particular context that they are referring to is also -- has an

19     anti-aircraft gun mounted on it, if I recall the Petrovic video

20     correctly.

21        Q.   All right.  And then in this, he talks a bit about the deployment

22     along the road there, and then he says:

23             "It's estimated that 3- to 4.000 enemy soldiers managed to pass

24     along this segment towards Cerska and further to Sapna and Crni Vrh."

25             You, of course, now have been able to view material after the

Page 16672

 1     fact.  Who are these estimated 3- to 4.000 people that he's talking

 2     about?

 3        A.   More importantly than me, Mr. Borovcanin has had two months to

 4     review materials after the operation occurred as well, so he is aware

 5     that these 3- to 4.000 soldiers represent the bulk of the armed members

 6     of the column that were able to successfully cross the road during the

 7     evening hours of the 11th and 12th of July.  As, I believe, the evidence

 8     has borne out certainly in earlier trials, the military leaders in the

 9     column made the decision to place as many of the armed soldiers as they

10     could at the -- or towards the front of the column in anticipation of the

11     fact that that would be where the heaviest combat would be.

12        Q.   And does -- that 3- to 4.000 number that made it through and

13     headed up in that direction, is that consistent with what you've learned

14     about what Obrenovic was reporting and any other indications from your

15     time in the case?

16        A.   Yes, sir.  It is consistent with the numbers that Obrenovic and

17     other members believed were the forces that were approaching the Zvornik

18     area.

19        Q.   All right.  Now we get to 13 July, which should be page 3 in the

20     B/C/S.  It's got a very short section, we see, relative to the other

21     days -- to the previous day - excuse me - where he says that the

22     situation was getting more complex because of the advance of the Muslim

23     formation who had managed to break through, so they engaged other forces.

24     I think you've made a reference to that.  Traffic was stopped along that

25     road.

Page 16673

 1             Then the next paragraph is:

 2             "Forces of the Army of Republika Srpska mostly regrouped in order

 3     to go to Zepa."

 4             Was that correct?  Was that what they were doing -- the VRS was

 5     doing on the 13th?

 6        A.   Yes, sir, that is correct.

 7        Q.   And it says:

 8             "One member of the Skelani Platoon of the 2nd Police Detachment

 9     was killed in the fighting with the enemy."

10             Are you aware of one member of the Skelani Platoon of the

11     Special Police Detachment being killed along that road between

12     Konjevic Polje and Kravica?

13        A.   Yes, sir.  He was killed at Kravica.

14        Q.   Do you remember his name at this point?

15        A.   No, sir, I do not.

16        Q.   Okay.  And what do you recall the circumstances, just very

17     briefly, of his killing?  You say "Kravica."  Where?

18        A.   He was -- according to the information derived from the

19     investigation, as well as other information pertaining in medical records

20     or military medical records, he was killed in the town of Kravica.  There

21     was no combat in the town of Kravica, but as the evidence of the

22     investigation has noted, he was killed in conjunction with the Kravica

23     warehouse massacre which occurred approximately 1700 hours that day.  The

24     information that the investigation is aware of is that he, reportedly,

25     was killed by Muslim soldiers seeking to escape the warehouse.

Page 16674

 1        Q.   All right.  There's quite a bit of material in the record on

 2     that, so I think we'll just leave that where it is.

 3             In his regular -- or his 13 July report that referenced the 12th

 4     and 13 July, he particularly had mentioned that on the 13th of July,

 5     around 1500 Muslim soldiers had been captured or surrendered to his

 6     forces, and that the number increases by the hour.  We don't see any

 7     reference to that in this 13 July portion.  Do we see any reference to

 8     all those surrendered or captured men along that road anywhere in this

 9     report?

10        A.   No, sir.  By September 1995, I suspect that that's an

11     inconvenient fact, and, as such, it was omitted.

12        Q.   What do you mean by that?

13        A.   By September of 1995, the news of the involvement of the Army of

14     the Republika Srpska, and in this context the MUP units of the

15     Republika Srpska serving with the army at Srebrenica, and their

16     association with the massacres had become public.  It had started

17     becoming public as early as August of 1995.  So for individuals who were

18     involved in that, it wouldn't make much sense for them to create official

19     documents reflecting their association or knowledge of prisoners whom

20     they knew to be dead.  And, in fact, not just dead, murdered, in the case

21     of the Kravica warehouse, murdered by forces under his command.

22        Q.   All right.  We see, as we continue on page 3 of both languages, a

23     brief comment on the 14th.  We've got to go to the next page in B/C/S to

24     catch the 14th - thank you - where he talks about new problems arising,

25     that Zvornik threatened by these Muslim forces from Cerska.  Then he

Page 16675

 1     talks about the 15th, gives a description of his units and what they're

 2     doing, and then again refers to the enemy forces were estimated at 3500

 3     to 4.000 men moving towards Nezuk, was coming behind the soldiers of the

 4     Zvornik Brigade along the axis toward Baljkovica.  Are these 3500 to

 5     4.000 the same men he's referred to that made it over the road?

 6        A.   Yes, sir, they are.

 7        Q.   Then he talks about fighting throughout the day on the 15th along

 8     all the aforementioned axes, and considerable losses were inflicted on

 9     the enemy.  He says:

10             "All the units remained on the lines reached during the night."

11             Then he says:

12             "The blockade of the area was organised by the Zvornik Brigade."

13             And he says:

14             "We did not 'like' the basic idea because the latest

15     developments, the artillery of the Zvornik Brigade was relocated in a

16     hurry, so that it was still not operational."

17             What's he talking about, if you -- in your opinion?

18        A.   Well, sir, there's a bit of a back story to this particular

19     passage.

20             Sometime during the late evening hours of the 14th of July and

21     the early morning hours of the 15th of July, 1995, Borovcanin and the

22     police forces under his command are ordered to leave the area where they

23     are on the road between Bratunac and Konjevic Polje and deploy into the

24     area of Zvornik, the Zvornik Brigade in order to deal with, as he says,

25     the military threat.  At the same time this is occurring, units of the

Page 16676

 1     Zvornik Infantry Brigade who are deployed at Zepa, under the command of

 2     Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic, are also being ordered back to Zvornik

 3     because of the growing military threat.

 4             At approximately noon on the 15th of July, at the headquarters of

 5     the Zvornik Brigade, there was a meeting of the relevant military and

 6     police commanders.  Colonel Pandurevic, Major Obrenovic, Mr. Borovcanin,

 7     was part of that meeting.  Dragomir Vasic was part of that meeting.  I

 8     believe the commander of the 2nd Sekovici Detachment was also part of

 9     that meeting.  It was a quick council of war, if you will, where

10     Colonel Pandurevic was updated on the situation that was -- the military

11     situation in his brigade, and where they determined what acts and actions

12     they would take in order to counter that particular situation.

13             From my awareness of previous testimony of Mr. Vasic and

14     statement of Mr. Borovcanin, the police's position was not that they

15     should engage in a military battle against a force that vastly

16     outnumbered even their assembled forces at this point, but that they were

17     advocating that perhaps the Zvornik Brigade should allow the armed head

18     of the column to safely pass between the lines and reach ABiH territory.

19     At that particular meeting, at least according to the recollections of

20     these individuals and Major Obrenovic, Colonel Pandurevic rejected that

21     proposal and, instead, made a determined effort to seek to militarily

22     engage and defeat the column.

23             So where he's talking about, We did not like that basic idea,

24     this is Borovcanin now, two months later, expressing the fact that the

25     police leadership at that meeting did not agree with Colonel Pandurevic's

Page 16677

 1     plan, although they were obligated to carry it out.  And, in fact, they

 2     did so to the best their ability.

 3        Q.   All right.  And in his report, we now come to the 16th, where he

 4     describes fierce fighting with the Muslim forces in the area of

 5     Krizevici, Tisova Kosa and Baljkovica.  And just briefly, did that

 6     include Muslim forces from the 28th Division coming from the direction of

 7     Srebrenica as well as Muslim forces from the 2nd Corps from the direction

 8     of Nezuk?

 9        A.   Yes, sir, that is correct.

10        Q.   He describes the Muslim forces capturing three 57-millimetre

11     self-propelled guns of the VRS and firing upon the VRS forces.  Then he

12     describes that the VRS had about 40 killed and more than 80 wounded, that

13     1 member of the 1st Company of the Zvornik PJP was killed and 5 members

14     wounded, and that at about 1500 hours, the bulk of the enemy column,

15     about 2500 soldiers, managed to break through to Nezuk.

16             We need to go to the next page in the B/C/S.

17             But then as he goes on in the English, which is page 5 in the

18     English, if it's the correct translation, he goes back in time and says:

19             "At 1300 hours, the commander of the Zvornik Brigade,

20     Vinko Pandurevic, and the commander of the Muslim side, Semso Muminovic,

21     agreed to open a one-kilometre-wide corridor in the area of Parlog and

22     Baljkovica to allow Muslim soldiers to get out."

23             That this truce would be in force for 48 hours, et cetera, as we

24     read through it.

25             So how do you take this?  Do you -- from your knowledge of the

Page 16678

 1     reports on this, do you know where large amounts of soldiers -- Muslim

 2     soldiers able to break through before this corridor was opened up, or is

 3     this a reference to people getting through after the corridor was opened

 4     up, but if you know from the -- of course, from the documents,

 5     intercepts?

 6        A.   To a large degree, Borovcanin's description of the ferocity of

 7     the combat is accurate, and as well as the members of the army killed and

 8     wounded.  My understanding, based on my analysis of the other military

 9     documents, is not that they were able to break through prior to the

10     cease-fire and the agreement made between Pandurevic and Semso Muminovic.

11     My understanding of the combat situation was that until and up to the

12     point that Colonel Pandurevic agreed to that, the column still had not

13     successfully broken through the VRS lines.  So in this particular

14     context, my view has been that Colonel Pandurevic, in making a

15     calculation as to the casualties that his particular unit was incurring

16     against the column, and the reasonable expectation that he would be able

17     to still prevent the column from achieving its mission, he made the

18     decision, and one that was not authorised by his superiors, to allow the

19     column to pass through his lines and go to ABiH territory.

20     Colonel Pandurevic, for his part, attributes a different motive to his

21     reason as to letting the column go.

22        Q.   Well, what do you believe -- or what, in your view, did

23     Pandurevic say regarding his motive for letting the column go, and in

24     what context did he say it?  What are you basing that on?

25        A.   Well, sir, Colonel Pandurevic, now General Pandurevic, did

Page 16679

 1     testify on his behalf during the Popovic trial, and his position was that

 2     he allowed this column to pass through, and his decision on the 16th was

 3     strictly a humanitarian gesture and had nothing to do with the scope and

 4     scale of combat activities that had occurred on the 15th and the 16th.

 5     It is, from my perspective, difficult to square that in light of the fact

 6     that less than 24 hours prior to the decision to let the column go,

 7     Colonel Pandurevic was vetoing advice by police and other individuals

 8     that they should let the column go in the first place.  In context, he

 9     believed that he could make a fight out of it and inflict significant

10     casualties on the enemy.  He did.  But, in turn, the enemy inflicted

11     significant casualties, in both manpower and materiel, to his brigade.

12     And only when faced with that situation on the afternoon of 16 July, did

13     he unilaterally make the decision to allow the remainder of the armed

14     column to pass safely through his lines.

15        Q.   Okay.  Can you put this in a little context for us?  Can you tell

16     us, and just very briefly:  What was going on, as well as this fight with

17     the column, in the area of the Zvornik Brigade on the 14th, the 15th and

18     16th, you know, as charged in the indictment?  I don't mean for you to be

19     giving evidence on that.  The Court has seen plenty of evidence.  But can

20     you remind us:  As charged in the indictment, what is going on on the

21     14th, the 15th and the 16th, in terms of non-combat activity and the

22     involvement or non-involvement of Zvornik -- excuse me, and the

23     involvement of Zvornik Brigade troops?

24        A.   Yes, sir.  As it's laid out, not only is the Zvornik Brigade,

25     during this period starting on the evening of the 13th of July, beginning

Page 16680

 1     to engage in combat activities against the armed column, but starting the

 2     evening of the 13th July, the first convoy loads of buses and trucks,

 3     filled with men from the Bratunac area and those who had been captured,

 4     start arriving in the zone of the Zvornik Brigade and are starting to

 5     fill up schools in Orahovac, Petkovci, Rocevic and Pilica.  So in this

 6     particular context, not only is the Zvornik Brigade having to deal with a

 7     significantly adverse military situation that is developing in its zone,

 8     it is also having to deal with obligations related to guarding and later

 9     participating in various aspects of the executions of thousands of

10     Bosnian Muslim prisoners that were in the brigade zone.  It created, from

11     a military perspective, a situation where the Zvornik Military Brigade

12     had completely exhausted its reserves and abilities.  They were -- to use

13     a phrase, they were flat-out committed.  They had no reserves or nothing

14     left.

15        Q.   All right.  To finish up this report - I think we're still on

16     page 5 of the English - as we review briefly the rest of these dates, we

17     get down to the 20th of July, the final entries, where he talks about the

18     various people that commanded the units that he was working with;

19     Dusko Jevic, Mane Djuric -- and when he says "Mane Djuric" there, which

20     one do you think he means?

21        A.   He is referring to his subordinate, Mendeljev Djuric, sir.

22        Q.   All right.  And Nedjo Ikonic, Milos Stupar, and if we go to

23     page 6 in the English, Rado Cuturic, and the others.  Do you recall

24     anything happening to Rado Cuturic on the 13th of July?

25        A.   Yes, sir.  Also at the Kravica warehouse, at the same time that

Page 16681

 1     the first soldier was killed, he was injured and later taken to the

 2     Bratunac Medical Centre, where he received treatment.

 3        Q.   Do you remember how he was injured or what part of him was

 4     injured, if --

 5        A.   If I recall correctly, he received a burn on his hand or arm.

 6        Q.   And did Mr. Borovcanin tell the investigation how that happened?

 7        A.   Again, if I recall correctly, Mr. Borovcanin stated that he was

 8     injured in this way when he grabbed the rifle barrel of a weapon that a

 9     Bosnian Muslim prisoner had obtained while attempting to depart from the

10     Kravica warehouse.

11        Q.   All right.  And that document is already in evidence, so -- now,

12     that got us a bit out of our chronology because it went all the way

13     through the 20th, so we need to, unfortunately, go back to catch our

14     chronology, which was still on the 13th of July.  And if we could do that

15     by getting to P1560B, an intercept.

16             And this is an intercept dated 13 July 1995, at 2040 hours, and

17     it's identified --

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It should not be broadcast because it's

19     confidential.

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:

21        Q.   It has been identified as being from General Krstic, and X, who

22     they put in parentheses, is "Borovcanin from the specials."

23             Who do you think this "Borovcanin from the specials" would be?

24        A.   This is Ljubisa Borovcanin, sir.

25        Q.   And we see the conversation between Krstic -- I won't read it

Page 16682

 1     all.

 2             Borovcanin says:

 3             "Hello, this is Borovcanin, General.  How are you?"

 4             And Krstic says:

 5             "Well, where are you, fuck it?"

 6             Borovcanin says:

 7             "I'm here at the command post."

 8             Where would that be, in your view, if you could tell, on the

 9     evening of 13 July at 24 [sic] hours?  Where would Borovcanin's command

10     post be, in your view, if you have any knowledge?

11        A.   Well, sir, given the fact that this conversation is intercepted

12     over the military telecommunications network, the command post that he

13     would be referring to would be the actual -- or former IKM and, in fact,

14     the headquarters of the Bratunac Infantry Brigade in Bratunac.

15        Q.   Okay.  Well, you say the military network.  Could he be at the

16     police command or the police station in Bratunac?

17        A.   My understanding from the investigation, as well as from the

18     statements by Mr. Borovcanin, was that he was in and around Bratunac and,

19     at one point, at the police station.  However, the fact that he's on the

20     military communications network, which I do not believe the police

21     station in Bratunac has access to - they have their own police

22     network - and the fact that it's Krstic calling, you know, is what I use

23     to base my assessment that at this point in time that this conversation

24     is occurring, Borovcanin is at the headquarters of the Bratunac Brigade

25     and not at the civilian police station.

Page 16683

 1        Q.   How do we know that the Bosnian Muslims are not intercepting

 2     radio or telephone communications from the police station?

 3        A.   Well, sir, most of the police communications in that respect

 4     tended to go over already-established land lines of the PTT, which would

 5     make them more difficult for them to intercept.  My knowledge of the

 6     intercept project and the various networks related to it reflect the fact

 7     that the PTT was a separate network from the military telecommunications

 8     network, and these intercepts that we're discussing at some juncture

 9     passed over the military network and thus made them liable for

10     interception.

11        Q.   Okay.  We see this brief conversation.

12             Krstic says:

13             "How's it going?"

14             Borovcanin says:

15             "It's going well."

16             Krstic says:

17             "Don't tell me you have problems."

18             Borovcanin says:

19             "I don't, I don't."

20             What is this, militarily, if anything, besides two friends

21     chatting, or what do you make of this?

22        A.   I make of this General Krstic, who at this time has just become

23     the commander of the Drina Corps, speaking with Borovcanin and getting a

24     situation report from Borovcanin as to what has been occurring and

25     whether or not his forces are having any issues.

Page 16684

 1        Q.   Where do you put the Kravica warehouse massacre, in terms of 2040

 2     hours on this day?

 3        A.   My understanding, again based on the investigation, is that the

 4     massacre began at 1700 hours and continued in spurts, or in pulses, so to

 5     speak, for an hour or two afterwards.  This conversation occurs after

 6     most of the people in the Kravica warehouse are dead.

 7        Q.   So do you incorporate that, if that's the case, would it be

 8     consistent, and if Borovcanin knew about that, since we know from the

 9     case that he was there with Petrovic, do you -- what do you make of him

10     telling Krstic it's going well and that he doesn't have any problems, if

11     anything?

12        A.   Well, sir, I mean, not only to infer these issues, you have to

13     understand what Borovcanin was dealing with, you also have to note what

14     General Krstic, himself, was personally aware of.  And in that respect, I

15     am aware that, you know, as part of the earlier investigation and as

16     noted in testimony during the Krstic trial, that during the late

17     afternoon hours, General Krstic, himself, did travel the road

18     Bratunac-Konjevic Polje-Nova Kasaba-Milici in order to get to his

19     headquarters at Vlasenica, first to begin the planning for the Zepa

20     operation and, second, that's where he received his promotion to the

21     commander of the Drina Corps.  So General Krstic had a first-hand

22     knowledge of the situation not only militarily along that road, but was

23     aware by sight of the thousands of prisoners who were being taken.  So in

24     this context, and given that General Krstic is aware of that situation,

25     that's how I read this particular intercept.  He's aware that prisoners

Page 16685

 1     are being captured, that there is a plan to kill those prisoners, and

 2     he's discussing this issue with Borovcanin, both the military aspects of

 3     the security of the road as well as the killing of the prisoners.

 4        Q.   Well, we don't see any discussion about any killing going on

 5     here, so how do you -- how do you make that statement?

 6        A.   With very few exceptions, you don't see references to the killing

 7     in documents or intercepts.  It, again, goes back to the context of

 8     General Krstic being aware of General Mladic's order related to the fate

 9     of the prisoners.

10        Q.   All right.  Let's go on to the next document, which is an area

11     that is a subject of the indictment which we have referred to, in the

12     Prosecution, as the Milici patients and their situation.  Have you

13     reviewed documents and materials associated with the Milici -- what we

14     call the Milici patients?

15        A.   Yes, sir, I have.

16        Q.   And can you give us a very brief outline of what you've learned

17     from the documents and other materials about the -- tell us -- what I

18     mean -- what am I referring to when I say Milici patients?

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think are you referring to P1542A.

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, A.  That's correct.  I haven't gotten to

21     that yet, but that's what we're getting to.

22        Q.   If Mr. Butler could give us the broader picture of what he's

23     learned from the documents, the intercepts, and then we'll go through

24     some of them.

25        A.   Yes, sir.  From my review of the documents, and, again, while I

Page 16686

 1     was part of the investigation team, there was evidence collected that

 2     reflected that on the evening of the 12th and through the 13th of July

 3     1995, a number of Bosnian Muslim soldiers or military-aged men, who were

 4     captured by the VRS and the affiliated police forces, were wounded and in

 5     need of medical attention.  A number of these individuals - I believe the

 6     number is approximately 13 or 14 - were sent to the medical facility in

 7     Milici, where they were treated by the doctors at that facility.  Those

 8     patients, because very rapidly it taxed out the ability of the medical

 9     facility to care for them, were ultimately -- or were first transferred

10     from the Medical Centre in Milici to the Medical Centre in Zvornik.  They

11     were subsequently transferred from the Medical Centre in Zvornik to the

12     Zvornik Infantry Brigade, where they were then kept in that particular

13     brigade's infirmary.

14             At some point after they were transferred to the Zvornik Brigade

15     Command and kept in the infirmary there, they disappeared and are

16     currently missing.

17             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Let me first go to 65 ter 1316 and

18     come back to the intercept we were looking at.  But 1316, that's under

19     tab 123.

20        Q.   And this is a document that we see dated 24 July, and the

21     Republika Srpska War Hospital Milici, to the Drina Corps Command, to

22     General Krstic personally, entitled "Medical Support for Operation

23     Srebrenica 95," and it's from the War Hospital director,

24     Dr. Radomir Davidovic, neurosurgeon.

25             Is this a document you've had a chance to review?

Page 16687

 1        A.   Yes, sir, I have.

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And if we could just go to page 2 of the English,

 3     and it's probably the page 2 of the B/C/S as well.  It's right near the

 4     bottom of the page, where the signature name is.  In fact, it may be the

 5     next page in the B/C/S.  Yes, I think -- well, I think we have to go one

 6     more page.  Yeah, I think that's where this would be.

 7        Q.   I just want to note -- I mean, we see, generally, as we look

 8     through this, it talks about medical support, and then very near the end

 9     he says:

10             "Eighteen wounded enemy have undergone surgery and have been

11     transferred to the hospital in Zvornik on the orders of the Main Staff."

12             What do you think that is a reference to, given your knowledge of

13     the investigation?

14        A.   That is a reference to wounded prisoners who were being treated

15     at the Milici facility and then were subsequently transferred to Zvornik.

16             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And I would offer this document into evidence.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 1316 shall be

19     assigned Exhibit P2532.  Thank you.

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I'm going back to P1542A, this very short

21     intercept between X and Y at 1236 hours, and this is on 13 July, from our

22     intercept records.

23        Q.   We see X saying --

24             THE REGISTRAR:  This is a confidential document.  Thank you.

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:

Page 16688

 1        Q.   -- "Don't send me any more Muslims to Milici because the hospital

 2     is overcrowded.  Send them to Zvornik."

 3             And it says:

 4             "All right.  Professor Davidovic is down there, and he's been

 5     sending them."

 6             This other document we just saw was in the name of

 7     Dr. Radomir Davidovic, neurosurgeon.  Can you connect this intercept and

 8     that other document?

 9        A.   Yes, sir.  I believe the Professor Davidovic that they are

10     talking about is, in fact, Dr. Davidovic.

11        Q.   All right.  And just one line I forgot to ask you about.  When

12     Dr. Davidovic says that 18 soldiers have been transferred to Zvornik, he

13     says "on orders of the Main Staff," what do you make of that?  How is it

14     that the Main Staff is involved in 18 wounded Muslim soldiers?

15        A.   In the context of military operations, the Main Staff monitors

16     all aspects of what's going on.  As noted in Dr. Davidovic's reports, you

17     know, there are a number of wounded soldiers coming in -- a fairly good

18     number of wounded soldiers during the period coming in, and it's not --

19     not only is it not unreasonable; it would be a duty of at least medical

20     members of the Main Staff and other organisation to be monitoring what is

21     happening at the military medical facilities and ensuring that those

22     facilities continue to have the capability to treat wounded and injured

23     soldiers.

24             At some point, Milici becomes overcrowded, and a decision is made

25     by somebody at the Main Staff that in order to alleviate that

Page 16689

 1     overcrowding, the wounded prisoners will be sent from Milici to Zvornik,

 2     where, presumably, they had ample space at that time to deal with them.

 3        Q.   Now, these 18 people -- wounded people that come to the

 4     Milici Hospital, are they coming from the same or a different area of

 5     captured prisoners than those over 1.000 prisoners that are mentioned in

 6     the Savcic memo, where, according to that memo, Savcic is saying that

 7     Tolimir is making proposals and talking about the over 1.000 prisoners

 8     located around Kasaba?

 9        A.   At this juncture, I don't recall.  I do know that the

10     investigation has spoken with the doctor.  It's been a number of years,

11     so I don't recall what he said exactly as to where the prisoners came

12     from.

13        Q.   What is the general area?  Is the general area around

14     Milici Hospital associated with the general area around Kasaba to

15     Konjevic Polje, for example?  Just help remind us of the geography.

16        A.   Well, yes, sir.  I mean, from Milici, if you continue eastward

17     along the highway, the next town of consequence is Nova Kasaba, and then

18     beyond that is Konjevic Polje.  So they are geographically linked by the

19     highway.

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Let's go now to 65 ter 1318.

21        Q.   And do you recall, sir, whether the invest -- and not to be

22     broadcast, please.

23             Sir, were you aware from the investigation whether or not any of

24     those Milici patients that we've been talking about were -- were there

25     any records that those patients were -- provided to the investigation by

Page 16690

 1     the Milici Hospital?

 2        A.   Yes, sir.  I'm aware that at some juncture as part of the

 3     investigation, OTP investigators did go to the Milici Hospital and were

 4     able to obtain records which reflect the intake of the wounded

 5     Bosnian Muslims as well as medical records relating to the care that they

 6     received.

 7        Q.   And looking at this exhibit, are these, to your knowledge,

 8     records relating to those patients?

 9        A.   Yes, sir, they are.

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I would offer this document into

11     evidence.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 1318 shall be

14     assigned Exhibit P2533, admitted under seal.  Thank you.

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And staying with this same topic for a bit, can

16     we go to 65 ter 326.

17        Q.   And we'll see that this is an interim combat report from the

18     Zvornik Brigade, dated 22 July, in the name of Vinko Pandurevic.  To your

19     knowledge, is Pandurevic back to the Zvornik Brigade now on the

20     22nd of July?

21        A.   Yes, sir.  Colonel Pandurevic arrives back in the brigade zone

22     approximately noon on 15 July, and he remains there at least during this

23     period.

24        Q.   All right.  And I just want to ask you about this line in

25     paragraph 3:

Page 16691

 1             "We request from the corps command that the Exchange Commission

 2     start work as soon as possible."

 3             And especially this line:

 4             "We also require instructions as to what to do with the

 5     prisoners, where to put them, and to whom we should hand them over."

 6             What do you make of this last line about asking for instructions,

 7     what to do with the prisoners, that we see that he's referring to some

 8     prisoners taken on the 22nd of July in this document?

 9        A.   Well, sir, as the investigation has borne out, the

10     Zvornik Infantry Brigade has been taking prisoners daily as a result of

11     its combat with the column.  And with the exception of one prisoner, who

12     happened to be a high-ranking communications official with the

13     28th Infantry Division, those prisoners are never accounted for and are

14     presumed to have been killed shortly after capture at some juncture.

15     Those types of prisoner accountings are not included in the daily combat

16     reports of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade during the period.  This combat

17     report on the 22nd of July is the first written report from the

18     Zvornik Brigade where they are talking about prisoners that they have

19     killed -- or not prisoners that they have killed -- enemies that they

20     have killed, i.e., liquidated, again using that phrase, as well as

21     soldiers who are being captured, and only at this date, the 22nd of July,

22     is the Zvornik Brigade requesting the Drina Corps Command provide

23     guidance as to what to do with prisoners that they're capturing.

24        Q.   So what?  What's your point?  Pardon the bluntness.

25        A.   The point is:  By the 22nd of July, the commander of the

Page 16692

 1     Zvornik Brigade understands that, We're not killing prisoners as we

 2     capture them anymore, and that, Since we're not doing that, I need

 3     instructions as to what I'm supposed to do with the prisoners that I am

 4     capturing.  That is how I take this particular issue and the point behind

 5     it.

 6        Q.   Okay.  On a related point, since you've mentioned this, can you

 7     tell the Chamber -- and I believe this document's in evidence and they've

 8     seen it, but I don't need it up right now.  Do you recall an 18 July

 9     report that Vinko Pandurevic sends to the Drina Corps, where he talks

10     about Muslims coming to his area?

11        A.   Yes, sir.

12        Q.   Can you tell us your recollection of what he says and what you

13     make of that, since I think it's relate to do what you've just said?

14        A.   In that particular report, that interim combat report of 18 July

15     1995, Colonel Pandurevic is sending to the Drina Corps a rather detailed

16     discussion as to not only the issues related to combat that his unit has

17     just undergone and the casualties that his unit has taken, not only in

18     the Srebrenica battle, but in the previous months of combat, as well as

19     raises the issue that, you know, in spite of everything else related to

20     combat, his brigade had to deal with the -- I believe the number he uses

21     is 2- or 3.000 prisoners that somebody made a decision to put in his

22     brigade area.  There's a rather complex back-story related to this

23     interim combat report that I don't know that I need to go into, but

24     these -- Colonel Pandurevic, again, his awareness of the prisoners, that

25     they were brought into his zone, and what happened to them.

Page 16693

 1        Q.   All right.  Let me get back on point to the Milici patients, if

 2     we could.

 3             I'd offer that last document, 65 ter 326, into evidence.  It

 4     refers to the question about what to do with prisoners.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I would like to put one question to the witness

 6     in relation to this document.

 7             I see Pandurevic, in his report, mentions 23 Muslim soldiers

 8     captured, and then, in addition to that, the unit from Osmaci captured 17

 9     Muslims along its own line.  You were discussing the capturing of these

10     prisoners, and you were referring to these altogether 40 captured Muslim

11     soldiers; is that correct?

12             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry, sir.  I don't understand the question.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  If you -- I would like to refer you to the second

14     paragraph under item 1 of this document.  I see there 10 enemy soldiers

15     were liquidated, while 23 Muslim soldiers were captured.  And then the

16     next sentence, there's an indication that 17 Muslims were captured along

17     its own line.  All together, 40, I take it.  And you were discussing this

18     document, and you were especially referring to these 40 soldiers,

19     captured soldiers; is that correct?

20             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  This -- in this document, this is the

21     first time that one sees, in a Zvornik Brigade combat report, a reference

22     to Bosnian Muslims.  These -- at this point, these are people who are now

23     trapped behind the line and are being captured by -- the 23 by the

24     Zvornik Brigade and, as you note, Tactical Group Osmaci, not technically

25     part of the Zvornik Brigade, but an adjacent unit, and Colonel Pandurevic

Page 16694

 1     is aware of those as well.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

 3             This document will be received as an exhibit.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 326 shall be

 5     assigned Exhibit P2534.  Thank you.

 6             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And one last question before the break,

 7     Mr. President, that Mr. Butler may or may not be able to help us with.

 8        Q.   Mr. Butler, there's been evidence in this case that the first

 9     group of Srebrenica prisoners arrived at Batkovic from the Bratunac area

10     on 18 July.  You may remember that.  Do you recall, aside from that 18

11     from Bratunac, what date we first see other Srebrenica prisoners start

12     arriving at Batkovic, but if you can remember?

13        A.   As I recall from both documents and the conduct of the

14     investigation, I believe those prisoners don't start arriving in Batkovic

15     until the 24th or 25th of July.

16             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Well, we've got those records and

17     we'll double-check them.

18             And I think it's time for the break, Mr. President.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Indeed.  We will have our second break and resume

20     at 1.00.

21                           --- Recess taken at 12.31 p.m.

22                           --- On resuming at 1.01 p.m.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please continue, Mr. McCloskey.

24             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.

25             If we could go to P850B, still on the topic of the -- no

Page 16695

 1     broadcast - of prisoners and Milici patients.

 2        Q.   This should be an a intercept of 23 July, where Pandurevic,

 3     Vinko, is mentioned as a participant, and a question mark is for the

 4     person that he is talking to.

 5             And I just want to ask you, Mr. Butler, I know you've had a

 6     chance to review this, but what was see the first question:

 7             "How are you?"

 8             And Vinko Pandurevic says:

 9             "I'm all right, not too bad."

10             Then someone says:

11             "What's new with you?"

12             Pandurevic says:

13             "We are catching Turks still.  I have prisoners ..."

14             Now, this is -- as we see, it's a 23 July intercept at 0800

15     hours.  Do you relate this comment by Pandurevic of "I have prisoners"

16     with the -- it's the 22 interim combat report that we just went over,

17     where he required instructions on what to do with prisoners?

18        A.   Yes, sir, I do.

19        Q.   He also says:

20             "I have the wounded, so I don't know what to do with them, where

21     to send them."

22             Do you believe in this he's referring to wounded Serbs, or

23     wounded Muslims, or can you tell ?

24        A.   In this context, it's my opinion he's referring to the wounded

25     Muslims.  I don't believe he would have any questions or doubts as to

Page 16696

 1     what he should be doing if they were his own soldiers who were wounded.

 2     There's well-established practices for how those people will be treated

 3     and where they will be evacuated to in Belgrade.

 4        Q.   And from the investigation, are you aware of what wounded Muslims

 5     he would have -- had been referring to on this date, 23 July?

 6        A.   Yes, sir.  These would be the wounded Bosnian Muslims who had

 7     started in Milici, who were transferred to the Zvornik Medical Centre,

 8     and then were subsequently transferred to the Zvornik Brigade Infirmary

 9     at the Standard Garrison.

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Okay.  And if we could go to what is marked as

11     P85A, a conversation that happens at -- five minutes later.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Is it possible that it is P851?

13             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, that's what I meant to say, Mr. President,

14     851A.  We see the same conversation on this English translation, but --

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It's also confidential.  It should not be

16     broadcast.

17             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.  So if we could go to P851A.

18        Q.   Five minutes after this conversation where Pandurevic asks about

19     what to do with the wounded, it says:

20             "The participant '?' in the previous conversation called and

21     asked for Vinko again ..."

22             So who would Vinko be in this conversation?

23        A.   That would be Vinko Pandurevic, the commander of the

24     Zvornik Infantry Brigade.

25        Q.   And this participant noted as "?," that's the same way the

Page 16697

 1     previous person in the conversation was noted as, as well; correct?

 2        A.   That is correct, sir.

 3        Q.   So we see:

 4             "The participant '?' in the previous conversation called and

 5     asked for Vinko again, but Ljubo answered, and '?' told Ljubo to pass on

 6     to Vinko."

 7             Now, "Ljubo," any idea who Ljubo is?

 8        A.   Yes, sir.

 9        Q.   Who do you think Ljubo is?  And I think we all understand at this

10     point that Ljubo is a relatively common Serb name.

11        A.   I believe that he's referring to a staff officer on the

12     Zvornik Brigade.  If I recall correctly, his name is Ljubo Bojanovic.

13        Q.   And why do you -- why do you think this is Ljubo Bojanovic?

14        A.   He -- his name appears in other aspects of the investigation as

15     the officer who was sent out from the Zvornik Brigade to relieve

16     Drago Nikolic, who was performing functions as the duty officer of the

17     Zvornik Brigade IKM, or forward command post, on the evening of 13 July

18     1995.  And in that context, I'm familiar with his name as being a staff

19     officer in the brigade, so he is the only one I'm aware of with the first

20     name of Ljubo.

21        Q.   Could you be mixing that up with Mihajlo Galic, on the 13th of

22     July, from the IKM?

23        A.   I don't believe so.  It's been a while since I've looked at the

24     IKM documents.  I know he's not there on the 13th, I know he's there on

25     subsequent days.

Page 16698

 1        Q.   All right.  Well, let's continue on in the intercept.

 2             It says -- what "?" says:

 3             "What Vinko and I were just talking about, will arrive at your

 4     place by 1700 hours.  The boss, Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic, will arrive

 5     and say what needs to be done regarding the work we talked about."

 6             What do you make of that?

 7        A.   Coupling this with the previous intercept and the role of

 8     Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic, I take it that Popovic will be coming up and

 9     will have some dealings with the prisoners that are being taken by the

10     Zvornik Brigade, inclusive of the wounded prisoners.

11             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Now let's go to it should be P1459,

12     and I have page 143.

13        Q.   This is an entry from the Zvornik Brigade duty officer note-book

14     for the period 23 July.  Had you reviewed the duty officer note-book as

15     part of your analysis?

16        A.   Yes, sir.  With respect to my past testimonies, that particular

17     document did not come into the possession of the OTP until after the

18     publication of the revised narrative.  But I have seen it since then, and

19     I have read it, of course, and testified related to it.

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And I hope I've got the right numbers.

21        Q.   Can you remind us who normally wrote many of the entries in the

22     duty officer note-book?

23        A.   Customarily, it was either the duty operations officer or one of

24     his assistants.  They were on duty -- they were, essentially, the 24-hour

25     duty operations officers, and they would, and they would note information

Page 16699

 1     in the note-book that was important, relevant, passing of messages,

 2     things of that nature.

 3        Q.   And in looking at that short intercept that we just talked about

 4     that mentioned Ljubo, that "Ljubo answered," have you seen it where the

 5     duty officer on duty at the command answers the telephone, that is noted

 6     down by the intercept operators?

 7        A.   Yes, sir.

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And this should be page 142 in the B/C/S.

 9        Q.   And the English document we are looking at now is the version we

10     call the teacher's edition, and it's the position of the Prosecution that

11     the duty officer that day on the 23rd was Ljubo Bojanovic.  Would that be

12     consistent with your analysis that the previous intercept, P851A, the

13     Ljubo mentioned would have been Ljubo Bojanovic?

14        A.   Yes, sir, it is.

15        Q.   All right.  And that conversation, as we note, is noted at 0805

16     hours.  And now, in the duty officer note-book, we see it as:

17             "0830 hours.  Lieutenant-Colonel Cerovic relayed a message for

18     commander that Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic will arrive by 1500 [sic]

19     hours."

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think you misspoke.  In the English

21     translation, it says "1700 hours."

22             MR. McCLOSKEY:  You're absolutely correct, Your Honour.  I know

23     it's 5.00, and I put a "5" in there.  I apologise about that.

24        Q.   1700 hours, which, of course, is what we saw from the previous

25     intercept.  Do you relate this notation at all with the previous two

Page 16700

 1     intercepts?

 2        A.   Yes, sir.  This is the duty officer's notation of the accounting

 3     of the previous two phone conversations.

 4        Q.   Can you tell us who Lieutenant-Colonel Cerovic is?

 5        A.   Yes, sir.  He is the assistant commander of Morale, Religious and

 6     Legal Affairs for the Drina Corps.

 7        Q.   And in your view, would he be any of the people or -- persons

 8     from the previous intercept, if you connect these two, like you say, who,

 9     if anyone, would he be?

10        A.   If you were able to connect all three, he would be the

11     correspondent identified by the question mark.

12        Q.   All right.  And it says "relayed a message for commander."  If

13     Ljubo Bojanovic is a staff officer receiving this at the Zvornik Brigade,

14     who would the reference to "commander" be, in your view?

15        A.   It would be his commander, Lieutenant Pandurevic.

16        Q.   And Lieutenant Colonel Popovic, in the context of this

17     conversation with Cerovic passing on this message, who would

18     Lieutenant-Colonel or "LTC" Popovic be?

19        A.   He is the chief of security for the Drina Corps.

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  And let's go now to 65 ter 190.

21        Q.   And this is a vehicle log for a Golf from Vlasenica.  That's for

22     July 1st through 31st July 1995.  And under the box that says "Rank," and

23     "Full name of driver/user," we first see "Dusan Vucic" [sic] and

24     "Lieutenant-Colonel Vujadin Popovic."  So can you tell from this front

25     page who whose vehicle this should be on this day and this month?

Page 16701

 1        A.   Looking at the context of the document, this monthly accounting

 2     sheet reflects that this vehicle operates under the direction of the

 3     security organ of the Drina Corps.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey, perhaps you misspoke again.  I see

 5     a different name of the driver, "Dusan Vucetic," and not "Vucic."

 6             MR. McCLOSKEY:  No, you're absolutely correct.  My Serbian lost a

 7     syllable there, and it is much easier than I made it sound.  So you're

 8     correct, "Vucetic."  And after 15 years, I have no excuse.  I apologise

 9     for that.

10        Q.   But, Mr. Butler, can we go to the section in this document that

11     is -- covers the use of the vehicle for 23 July, this date that we have

12     been talking about related -- in the last few exhibits.  I believe it's

13     the fourth page in the English and the same in the B/C/S.

14             And if we blow that up a little bit.  I think we should be fine

15     with the B/C/S because it's in Latin.

16             We note that if we go to the 23rd, we see "Time used from," and

17     it starts out at "0900 hours," that's all it says there, and then "7111,"

18     and then it describes the route "Vlasenica-Zvornik-Vlasenica."  Is that

19     consistent with the -- your analysis with regard to

20     Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic going to the Zvornik Brigade to deal with

21     prisoners and wounded?

22        A.   Yes, sir.  It's evidence that he, in fact, did so.

23        Q.   Can you remind us where the headquarters of the Drina Corps is?

24        A.   Vlasenica, sir.

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I would offer this document into

Page 16702

 1     evidence.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 190 shall be

 4     assigned Exhibit P2535.  Thank you.

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Now we are getting back to our

 6     chronology, because the Milici patients took us a bit out of that

 7     chronology, but let's go back to P2143 -- or on to P2143, back to 13 July

 8     1995, a Main Staff report to the president.  And if we could go to page 3

 9     in the English, page 3 in the B/C/S.

10        Q.   Under the section that says "The Enemy," looking at the part that

11     talks about Srebrenica, it says:

12             "The enemy from the former enclave of Srebrenica is in a state of

13     total disarray, and the troops are surrendering in large numbers to the

14     VRS.  A 200- to 300-strong group of soldiers managed to break through the

15     general sector of Mount Udrc, from where they are trying to break through

16     to the territory under Muslim control."

17             So the first part about this, that the enemy in Srebrenica -- the

18     enemy from the former enclave is in total disarray and are surrendering

19     in large numbers to the VRS; is that correct?  Anything to add to that?

20        A.   No, sir.  That's accurate.

21        Q.   And you've said who was in control of the area from Nova Kasaba

22     to Konjevic Polje, and you've also said from Konjevic Polje to Kravica

23     was MUP forces, so how would you explain that in this document, that

24     those prisoners surrendering along the Konjevic Polje to the Kravica

25     road?  Were there VRS involved in those surrenders as well, do you know?

Page 16703

 1        A.   Again, the troops at Nova Kasaba and Konjevic Polje were members

 2     of the VRS.  In this context, while technically they are surrendering to

 3     Special Police and not army soldiers, this is, again, a reflection that

 4     all of the combat forces there, to include the police forces, are

 5     operating under military control.

 6        Q.   All right.  And going down to the situation in the corps, there's

 7     a mention of combat groups from other corps units are in the final stages

 8     of the preparation aimed at settling the issue of the Zepa enclave.  Do

 9     you -- is that a correct statement in this report?

10        A.   Yes, sir.  As the documents and other information sets out at the

11     time, as this is occurring on the 13th, elements of the Zvornik Brigade,

12     the Birac Brigade, and other associated army units are moving from the

13     Srebrenica battle-front area to the Zepa area, where they are going to

14     begin to undertake combat operations there.

15        Q.   I note I forgot to ask you about this line in paragraph A, the

16     part that I'd mentioned:

17             "... a 200- to 300-strong group of soldiers managed to break

18     through to the general sector of Mount Udrc."

19             Now, you have just spoken at length, I believe, about the Muslims

20     that broke through, and from the documents from the MUP.  Does this 2- to

21     300 group, is that a different group?  Is it the same group?  Is this

22     correct?  What do you make of this reference that's going to the

23     president?

24        A.   I believe this is a manifestation of the situation that I talked

25     about previously, where Major Obrenovic and other lower-level commanders

Page 16704

 1     of military and police units view these numbers as far higher, yet senior

 2     commanders at the Drina Corps and at the Main Staff are seeing a

 3     situation differently and have the numbers listed a lot lower.  Just as I

 4     talk about in some cases commanders having a common view of the

 5     battle-field, this is an example where, you know, they don't have a

 6     common view of the battle-field.  As it turns out, the Drina Corps and

 7     the Main Staff significantly underestimated the number of armed Muslim

 8     fighters in the column.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Let's go now to P626.

10        Q.   And this should take us back -- as I recall, Judge Nyambe asked

11     you a question related to your knowledge about the whereabouts of

12     Colonel Jankovic back in -- when you were talking about the 17th/18th of

13     July documents and the MSF workers, it's my recollection, and you made a

14     reference to something in your response to Her Honour.

15             This particular document, what is it, and was that, in your

16     recollection, related to anything that you gave to the Judge in answering

17     her question, or am I mistaken on that?

18        A.   Well, sir, this particular document is authored by

19     Colonel Radoslav Jankovic from the Drina Corps forward command post in

20     Bratunac.  On the 13th of July, it lays out his knowledge and report back

21     to the Main Staff of the situation regarding the evacuation of the entire

22     Muslim population, the status of wounded prisoners, and lays out what he

23     anticipates will be occurring in the upcoming days, or at least in this

24     case the 14th, and proposals that he has made.  He -- from the videotape

25     evidence related to the meetings, he is in Bratunac as early as 13

Page 16705

 1     July -- I'm sorry, as early as 11 July 1995.  And to my knowledge, again

 2     based on documents and investigation, he remains in Bratunac during this

 3     entire period, dealing with these respective types of issues.

 4             I don't remember the exact details of Her Honour's questions, so

 5     I am not sure whether I responded to it or not.

 6        Q.   Does this --

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Nyambe has a question.

 8             JUDGE NYAMBE:  It's not a question.  It's just to retrace my own

 9     recollection of what was talked about at that point.

10             I think your reference, as I understood it, was a reference to

11     the Secretary-General's report on the fall of Srebrenica, I thought,

12     but ...

13             THE WITNESS:  I think in that context, we were talking about air

14     power and things of that nature, so, yeah.

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:  My memory is -- we'll check the record and make

16     sure we get that straight, Your Honour, and make that -- maybe

17     Mr. Gajic's memory is better.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  He's a young man.

19             Mr. Gajic.

20             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if I'm not mistaken, and

21     I believe I do recall this well, this was to do with a document which

22     bore the initials of Mr. Jankovic.  It was a handwritten document.  And

23     there was another identical document that had a typewritten

24     "Momir Nikolic" signature, and I believe that this is document led to the

25     discussion that we are now trying to recall.

Page 16706

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you for this assistance.

 2             Mr. McCloskey.

 3             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.  And in that discussion, I recall Mr. Butler

 4     saying something along the lines of, Yes, you will -- we will have seen

 5     documents from previous days from Colonel Jankovic.  So thank you.

 6     I think it will be made clear.  Thank you very much, Mr. Gajic.

 7        Q.   Okay.  Just one -- one question about this.  We see that he is

 8     talking about, in the middle of paragraph 1, that there are 54 wounded at

 9     the UNPROFOR base, a list of names has been taken from the UNPROFOR, a

10     doctor from the UNPROFOR has stayed in the hospital in Bratunac, at the

11     request of the hospital staff, to make sure that the patients are

12     properly treated.  It says:

13             "I intend to send him away tomorrow, under the pretext that his

14     help is not necessary."

15             Do you have any information or any knowledge of what he's talking

16     about here, why he would need a pretext or why he has a pretext to send

17     away a doctor that's looking after patients?

18        A.   He would need to invent a pretext to send the doctor away,

19     claiming his help was not necessary, if it is his intention that he does

20     not want Dutch or other international observers to be in a position to

21     see and monitor what is happening with those particular group of wounded

22     prisoners.

23        Q.   As far as you can recall from the investigation, were the -- this

24     group of prisoners eventually transported to Batkovic?

25        A.   Yes, sir.  With the exception of one of the wounded prisoners who

Page 16707

 1     was identified as a suspect in crimes against Serbs and placed in police

 2     custody, the remaining prisoners were transported to Batkovica.

 3        Q.   And do you remember if that one person you talked about survived?

 4        A.   Yes, sir, he -- in fact, because he was in police custody, he did

 5     survive.

 6        Q.   Do you remember his name?

 7        A.   It's been some time since I've seen that particular document.

 8     No, sir, I don't.

 9        Q.   Okay.  And on that same topic, when we were talking about the

10     local staff for MSF and the UNMO staff - that was the discussion of

11     the -- both in the documents and the intercepts - and they were listed in

12     the intercept, and finally we saw the document that listed their names

13     from the MSF, I failed to ask you:  Did the investigation reveal whether

14     those men and some women survived?

15        A.   Yes, sir.  If I recall correctly, all those individuals were

16     ultimately allowed to depart from the former enclave.

17             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Okay, thank you.

18             All right.  Could we go to P1225.

19        Q.   And we see a document here from the Drina Corps Command at the

20     now forward command post called Krivace, dated 13 July, speaking of some

21     Srebrenica events.  And on that first English page and the B/C/S, we see:

22             "Combat readiness at 8.00 a.m." or "800 hours on 14 July."

23             We see the Krivace Command Post and some things, and on the next

24     page in the English, the command post in the village of Podzeplje, and

25     various other tasks and things.

Page 16708

 1             What is this?  And it's in the name of, excuse me,

 2     Major-General Radislav Krstic.

 3        A.   Just as Krivaja-95 was the name of the detailed operations plan

 4     related to Srebrenica, this document is the detailed operations plan

 5     relating to what would be VRS military operations against the Zepa

 6     enclave.  In a near-identical manner to how the army laid out all of its

 7     objectives and tasks for individual units for Srebrenica, it does the

 8     same thing for Zepa.

 9        Q.   And we see, on the first page, it appears to be handwritten

10     "Military Secret, Stupcanica-95."  What's that?

11        A.   That was the designated code-name for the Zepa operation.

12        Q.   Does this have anything to do with the order from General Mladic

13     that you will recall us seeing - I believe it was dated 10 July - about

14     getting ready for Zepa?

15        A.   Yes, sir.  To -- to some degree it is, because it details tasks

16     for some of those units that he had previously given orders to on 10 July

17     in order to prepare or create the circumstances to begin these

18     operations.  So in the military planning process, you have General Mladic

19     already thinking about the next objective even before the first objective

20     has been taken.  And as the situation dealing with the first objective,

21     Srebrenica, comes to pass, he is already rapidly transitioning the

22     military forces, through his order and through that planning process

23     that's being undertaken at the Main Staff in the Drina Corps, to move on

24     to the next objective in an extremely rapid manner.

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Let's go on to the next document.

Page 16709

 1     It's 65 ter 109.

 2        Q.   And this is, we can see, an order from the Drina Corps, dated

 3     13 July, entitled "Search of the Terrain," to various brigades.  I won't

 4     read it.  We see that it's in the name of -- and it says

 5     "Commander Major-General Radislav Krstic," and we see a stamp at 13 July,

 6     20 [sic] hours, and then below that, "13 July, 2030 hours."

 7             At the time of the execution of this document or when it was

 8     made, in your view, was General Krstic the chief of staff of the

 9     Drina Corps or was he the commander of the Drina Corps?

10        A.   At the time this document was created and signed, General Krstic

11     had just been appointed the commander of the Drina Corps, replacing

12     General Zivanovic.

13        Q.   And did you, as part of the investigation, learn from any witness

14     or witnesses, or documents, the circumstances or the place upon which

15     General Krstic was made commander of the Drina Corps?

16        A.   Yes, sir, I did.  As a component of the investigation and trial

17     of General Krstic, one of his primary defences was that he was not the

18     corps commander, so there was a significant priority placed on gathering

19     evidence related to when, where, and how he assumed command.  As a result

20     of the evidence obtained, it reflects that General Mladic appointed

21     General Krstic as the commander of the Drina Corps at approximately

22     2000 hours on 13 July 1995 at the corps headquarters in Vlasenica, and,

23     in fact, did so on the signed orders of President Karadzic.

24             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I see that we've reached the end of

25     the day, and there is a trial after ours, Mr. President.

Page 16710

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Are you, at this point in time, tendering this

 2     document?

 3             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, I should.  I still have a question on this

 4     topic, but, no, I actually -- yes, I would tender this, please.  Thank

 5     you for reminding me.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 109 shall be

 8     assigned Exhibit P2536.  Thank you.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

10             We have to adjourn for the week, and we will resume on Monday,

11     2.15 in the afternoon, in this courtroom.

12             And, again, Mr. Butler, no contact with either party about the

13     content of your testimony during this break.

14             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We adjourn.

16                           [The witness stands down]

17                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,

18                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 18th day of July,

19                           2011, at 2.15 p.m.