Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 16711

 1                           Monday, 18 July 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.18 p.m.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good afternoon to everybody in the courtroom.

 6             Welcome back.

 7             Mr. McCloskey, I see you on your feet.

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Good afternoon, Mr. President, Your Honours,

 9     everyone.  Yes we're ready to go.  I just wanted to let you know a couple

10     of things.  We have had a status change for three documents that I think

11     you'll want on the record, which is P2304, and that is from confidential

12     to public; and P2337, from public to confidential; and P2298, from public

13     to confidential.  That had to do with Witness PW-057.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  We will look into the

15     matter and come back to that.  Thank you.

16             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And, Mr. President, I was -- as you know, I am

17     about an hour and a half beyond actually what I'd estimated, and beyond

18     what I had taken on direct with Mr. Butler in the Popovic case which is

19     how I based my estimate, and, interestingly, Butler and I used 232

20     documents in the Popovic case, and I had reduced it to 190 in this case,

21     so I think the basic explanation is we went much faster in the last case

22     because most everyone was bilingual and represented by counsel.  So we're

23     absolutely fine with the pace, as I think everyone is, and we'll try to

24     keep to that, but I think that's basically the reason.  We may be talking

25     more this trial but I don't think too much more.  So that is the --

Page 16712

 1     that's the basis of -- of the -- I think the -- the estimate.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I'm not too concerned about the length of the

 3     examination-in-chief.  On the other hand, and it affects the whole trial,

 4     and, of course, the accused will have additional time for his

 5     cross-examination.  Just one correction:  You said at the beginning that

 6     you are about one hour and a half beyond your estimation.  In fact, it's

 7     more than 2 hours and a half, I was told by the Registry.

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.  Thank you for that.  I'm an hour and a half

 9     past what I had gone in the Popovic case, and I thought it was around the

10     same for this case, but it's even longer, so ...

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you, that was my misunderstanding.

12             The witness should be brought in, please.

13             Mr. Gajic.

14             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I wish everyone good

15     afternoon.  And I would just like to ask Mr. McCloskey to explain further

16     P2298, where he mentioned that the status of this document should be

17     changed from public to confidential.

18             I see that this document is a map, and I don't really understand

19     why the status has to be changed.

20                           [The witness entered court]

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

22             MR. McCLOSKEY:  The -- the initials of the witness are on the --

23     on the map, as far as I'm -- been told.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  We can come back to that matter

25     later.

Page 16713

 1             Now we should deal with the witness, I think.

 2             Mr. Butler, welcome back to the courtroom.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Good afternoon, sir.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We -- I have to remind you that the affirmation

 5     to tell the truth still applies today.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey is continuing his

 8     examination-in-chief.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

10                           WITNESS:  RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]

11                           Examination by Mr. McCloskey: [Continued]

12        Q.   And good afternoon, Mr. Butler.

13        A.   Good afternoon, sir.

14        Q.   We continue with the chronology of documents and intercepts.  I

15     will skip ahead a bit because some of the documents in the order you

16     either already discussed or are in evidence.  But let's go to 65 ter 889.

17     That should be 141 in the -- in the tab.

18             And as we'll see, this is an intercept synopsis that we obtained

19     from the Croatian government, and it's dated 13th July 1995 at 1125

20     hours.  And we can see here, I won't read it all out, it talks about

21     Colonel Ljubisa Beara of the Main Staff, that he sent to Kasaba four

22     buses, two trucks, one trailer-truck, for transportation of captured

23     Muslims.  Talks about sending to Batkovic.  And "a selection will be made

24     between the war criminals or just soldiers."

25             What is your analysis of this document, of this intercept?

Page 16714

 1        A.   Well, sir, in this particular context, just operating from the

 2     summary that we have, the particular intercept operators summarised the

 3     conversation relating to Colonel Beara in orders that they believe that

 4     he has given to send vehicles to bring people to the camp at Batkovica.

 5        Q.   Would this be consistent with what was going on, on the 13th of

 6     July?  Are you aware of any evidence that on the 13th of July anyone was

 7     sent to -- any of the Muslim able-bodied men were actually sent to

 8     Batkovic?

 9        A.   The presence of Colonel Beara and vehicles going to Kasaba to

10     pick up Muslims is consistent.  However, I'm not aware of any evidence

11     that was produced throughout the course of the investigation that

12     indicates that any prisoners were sent from the Srebrenica area to

13     Batkovica that early.  It is one of the issues that I am aware the

14     investigation did look at and came up with no evidence to suggest that.

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I'd offer this intercept into evidence.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, 65 ter document 889 shall be

18     assigned exhibit number P2537.  Thank you.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And if we could go to the next document, P842.

20        Q.   This is an intercept between X and Y at 1602 hours --

21             THE REGISTRAR:  This confidential document should not be

22     broadcast.  Thank you.

23             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.

24        Q.   And it talks about an extension down at Kasaba.  X then goes on

25     to say:

Page 16715

 1             "Where Malinic unit is.  They said that there are 1500 gathered

 2     at the stadium."

 3             Can you remind us who you believe Malinic is and what this is a

 4     reference to?

 5        A.   Malinic is it Major Zoran Malinic, who is the commander of the

 6     military police battalion of the 65th Protection Regiment.  The 1500

 7     individuals that they are talking about in this context and at this time

 8     would be those captured Bosnian Muslims who were attempting to cross the

 9     road between Konjevic Polje and Nova Kasaba who were being captured by

10     the VRS in that area and who were being held on the football pitch there.

11        Q.   And to remind us of the -- P125, the document that came out under

12     the name of Lieutenant-Colonel Savcic, in that document we'll recall that

13     it begins by stating that there are over 1.000 members of the former

14     28th Division of the so-called BiH Army captured in the area of Dusanovo

15     Kasaba.  Prisoners are under the control of the military police battalion

16     of the 65th Protection Regiment.  Is this intercept consistent with that?

17     The numbers are a little different.

18        A.   Yes, sir, other than the numbers, the general description of the

19     situation is accurate.

20        Q.   All right.  And P125 has a date delivered -- or excuse me, a time

21     delivered at 1510 hours.  This is 1602 hours.  Would an increase from

22     over 1.000 to 1500, would that be consistent with the events as you

23     learned of them?

24        A.   Yes, sir.  The investigation has detailed that prisoners were

25     being captured all through the day and, in fact, even through the

Page 16716

 1     subsequent days.  Although there are no known survivors on -- after the

 2     13th that I'm aware.  So the fact that the numbers would be increasing is

 3     certainly consistent with what I understand is happening in that area.

 4        Q.   All right.  And let's now go to P413A.  And I -- you've discussed

 5     this already in your earlier testimony so I won't go along, I won't go

 6     into detail.

 7             But we just note here that a few lines down the page, it says:

 8             "At each point there are roughly 1500 to 2.000."

 9             And this intercept is at 1730 hours today.  Is that consistent or

10     inconsistent with the previous document, two documents you just spoke of?

11        A.   It's consistent, sir.  They're all related.

12        Q.   All right.  Let's go to the next document, P1570A, which is an

13     intercept.

14             And can you relate this intercept to any other intercept that you

15     have already spoken about?  If you recall.

16        A.   Yes, sir.  I believe late last week, Thursday, I discussed an

17     intercept between General Krstic and Ljubisa Borovcanin that occurred at

18     roughly 2030 hours on 13 July 1995.  Here, at 1945 hours, prior to that,

19     this is a particular intercept where a correspondent is calling from

20     General Krstic looking for Ljubisa and, of course, the phrase "who has

21     gone to Bratunac."  And they're talking about one bus from Janja and

22     other parts of the Janja Detachment which -- in Doboj which leads me

23     again to the conclusion that Ljubisa in this context is Ljubisa

24     Borovcanin because these are all locations where MUP forces are coming

25     from.

Page 16717

 1        Q.   And is this consistent or inconsistent with the -- a conversation

 2     between Borovcanin and Krstic that you just referred to?

 3        A.   Yes, sir, this dove-tails right into that.  This is

 4     General Krstic saying he wants to talk to Borovcanin and roughly 45

 5     minutes later, Borovcanin calls back, you know, as requested.

 6        Q.   At 1945 hours where do you believe General Krstic was located?

 7        A.   I believe he was located in Vlasenica, given the fact that, at

 8     approximately 2000 hours, he is given command of the Drina Corps there by

 9     General Mladic.  So 15 minutes prior to when that ceremony or event

10     occurs he is at the Drina Corps hours in Vlasenica.

11        Q.   All right.  Let's go to P1601, which is from the Drina Corps

12     command, 13 July.  It's the regular combat report to the Main Staff.  We

13     see in the situation of the zone of responsibility notation that in

14     Konjevic Polje and also in Nova Kasaba reception of Muslim civilians and

15     soldiers whose surrender is being carried out, taken in an organised

16     fashion.

17             What -- can you relate this comment to anything you've been

18     talking about?

19        A.   This particular comment refers to the thousands of Bosnian Muslim

20     men, able-bodied men, who are being detained -- captured and then

21     detained at various locations; Nova Kasaba, Konjevic Polje and further

22     towards Bratunac, on 13 July.

23        Q.   We don't see a reference to prisoners detained at Kravica or the

24     nearby Sandici field.  Do you see any reference about that in there?

25        A.   Not specifically, sir.

Page 16718

 1        Q.   And by 1945 hours, had the Kravica warehouse massacre already

 2     been going on for some time?  I think you've testified about that

 3     recently.

 4        A.   Yes, sir.  My understanding is that the massacre began at

 5     approximately 1700 hours.

 6        Q.   So if we can go to page 3 in the English.  And it's the -- it

 7     should be the next page -- sorry, page 3 in the B/C/S as well.  And we

 8     can see a document signed and -- under the name of

 9     Commander Major-General Radislav Krstic.  And we see that some unit - I

10     can't tell from the stamp - had received this document at 1945 hours.

11             How does this part of this document fit into your evaluation

12     about where Krstic was and whether or not he was commander?

13        A.   Well, sir, it's consistent in so much as we know that on the 13th

14     July at approximately 2000 hours he went from being the Chief of Staff to

15     the commander of the Drina Corps, so the signature block is functionally

16     correct as it should be if he were the commander.  Whomever received this

17     document, whether it's the Drina Corps com centre or it's for another

18     unit, 15 or 20 minutes earlier from where I would believe, or at least

19     where I understand that the change of command took place at 2000, so I

20     don't see it as generally inconsistent.

21        Q.   Okay.  Now let's go to P1562.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  This is confidential and should not be broadcast.

23     Thank you.

24             MR. McCLOSKEY:

25        Q.   We see here, we have an intercept, between Deronjic and X, who is

Page 16719

 1     described as Karadzic's intermediary.  And it says in parentheses that

 2     that intermediary and Karadzic are sitting in the same room.

 3             Who do you believe this Deronjic is in this intercept?

 4        A.   I believe that the investigation has established that this is

 5     Miroslav Deronjic, who, at this time, is President Karadzic's designated

 6     civilian commissioner for the Srebrenica municipality.

 7        Q.   All right.  And as far as you know, has this intermediary ever

 8     been identified?

 9        A.   Not to my knowledge, sir.

10        Q.   All right.  So the intermediary says:

11             "I'm waiting for a call to President Karadzic.  Is he there?"

12             And B says:

13             "Yes."

14             Which, let me go back to the beginning, that it says Badem.  Can

15     you remind us what you believe Badem means, what this B would be?  Or,

16     sorry, what is Badem?

17        A.   Badem is the telephonic code-name for the Bratunac Brigade

18     headquarters.

19        Q.   And where in your analysis do you think Deronjic is when he is

20     speaking on this conversation?

21        A.   He would be at the Bratunac Brigade headquarters.

22        Q.   Okay.  Basically it says:

23             Badem says:

24             "Hello.  I have Deronjic on the line."

25             The intermediary, known as X, says:

Page 16720

 1             "Deronjic, speak up."

 2             Deronjic says:

 3             "Hello, yes.  I can hear you."

 4             And X, the intermediary says:

 5             "Deronjic, the president is asking how many thousands."

 6             What do you think in this context the president is asking about?

 7        A.   The only thing that numbered thousands at that juncture would be

 8     the numbers of Bosnian Muslim men being detained on 13 July 1995.

 9        Q.   And by 8.10, 2010 hours, can you remind us, were there men

10     actually staying in Bratunac town?

11        A.   Yes, sir.  By that time, men had been placed in an old hangar

12     facility.  They were in the Vuk Karadzic school and in a number of buses

13     and trucks, parked in front of other facilities to include Vuk Karadzic

14     because there was no more room.

15        Q.   And then Deronjic says, in response to how many thousands,

16     Deronjic says:

17             "About 2 for the time being."

18             Is 2.000 men consistent or in consistent with your knowledge of

19     the investigation?

20        A.   Given the number of prisoners taken, or at least being described

21     as taken, it would probably be a little low.  One of the factors is that

22     there were a group of men - I'm not sure of the number - who were also

23     held in vehicles in and around the village of Kravica.  So like I said, I

24     think 2.000 is a bit low for who was in Bratunac that evening.  Plus,

25     also taking into account that at around that same time, the first buses

Page 16721

 1     and trucks were going from Bratunac to facilities in the Zvornik Brigade

 2     zone.

 3        Q.   All right.  And then it is goes on to say the intermediary says:

 4             "Two, Mr. President."  Then "(heard in the background)."

 5             Deronjic says:

 6             "But there will be more during the night."

 7             Where would more -- if they're talking about prisoners, where

 8     would the more be coming from, in your view?

 9        A.   Those would be prisoners detained in some of the more outlying

10     locations from Bratunac, which would includes Nova Kasaba.

11        Q.   All right.  Then Deronjic says:

12             "Do want me to come done there to Cerska?"

13             What do you make of that?

14        A.   The investigation has determined that Cerska is the location or

15     nickname that President Karadzic's offices were in the Pale area, so, in

16     this context, Deronjic is asking, if you want me to travel to that

17     location to personally brief you on the situation.

18        Q.   And then X the intermediary says:

19             "It's best that you send it by telegram."

20             Deronjic says:

21             "Can you hear me, President?"

22             The intermediary X says:

23             "The President can't hear you, Deronjic.

24             "This is the intermediary."

25             Deronjic says:

Page 16722

 1             "I have about 2.000 here by now and then ..." with a note that

 2     the teleprinter drowns him out.

 3             If Deronjic was speaking in the Bratunac Brigade coms room, would

 4     that be consistent with a teleprinter being in the same room, if have you

 5     any idea?

 6        A.   One would think so, yes, sir.

 7        Q.   Okay.  Now the intermediary says:

 8             "Deronjic, the president says:  All the goods must be placed

 9     inside the warehouses before 12.00 tomorrow."

10             Deronjic says:

11             "Right."

12             And then, X, the intermediary says:

13             "Deronjic, not in warehouses, but somewhere else.  Understood?"

14             What is your analysis of those few lines, all the goods -- the

15     president says:  "All the goods must be placed inside the warehouses

16     before 12.00 tomorrow"?

17        A.   In this particular context, the people speaking to Deronjic

18     appear to have some awareness that sometime after noon on 1400 or after

19     noon on the 14th of July, I should say, that some observers would

20     potentially coming through Bratunac, and there was a concern that whoever

21     those individuals would be, they did not want any outside observers

22     seeing the Muslim prisoners in facilities in Bratunac.  So, again, an

23     order to place them in other facilities and other locations where they

24     cannot be observed by whomever -- you know, the people representing

25     Karadzic are talking about.

Page 16723

 1        Q.   So by 12.00, let's -- on the 14th, where were the thousands of

 2     Bosnian Muslims that had been in Bratunac on the 13th, or in that area?

 3        A.   By 12.00 on the 14th, the final groups of those prisoners from

 4     Bratunac who were in the Orahovac facility at Grabovica were in that gym.

 5     At the same time, they were still moving people in the Petkovci, the

 6     old -- the school at Petkovci, and also further north in the facility at

 7     Rocevic.  However, given the sheer number of people who were being

 8     captured and stored in that location, they were still moving people out

 9     of Bratunac all through the day on the 14th.  And perhaps even as early

10     as the early morning hours of the 15th.  Some of the last people to

11     arrive in the Pilica area and subsequently there was no room at the

12     school in Pilica and they were actually put in the Pilica dom.

13        Q.   Let's go to next to the next one, 65 ter 2984, an intercept which

14     the case will show is from 14 July, 2227 hours.  That should be 2984A.

15     Thank you.

16             And I don't want to get into a lot of detail on this, but this

17     shows a General Vilotic and a Jokic, the Palma duty officer.  Can you

18     remind us what Palma is and who you think this Jokic is?

19        A.   Yes, sir.  Palma is the telephonic code-name for the Zvornik

20     Infantry Brigade headquarters, and on the 14th of July, 1995, the duty

21     officer of the brigade was Major Dragan Jokic, who was also the chief of

22     engineering for the brigade.

23        Q.   Have you heard of a General Vilotic?

24        A.   No, sir.  I believe, in this particular context, the

25     correspondent is in fact General Miletic from the Main Staff.

Page 16724

 1        Q.   How is it you come up with that opinion?

 2        A.   When -- well, first, I'm not aware of any other general officer

 3     named Vilotic in the VRS.  And, clearly, the context of this

 4     conversation, where it was intercepted and what they're talking about, is

 5     off of the army of the Republika Srpska radio telephone network.  We did

 6     actually even go as far as investigatively of trying to determine if at

 7     the same time there was potentially a General Vilotic with the federal

 8     republic of Yugoslav army, just to ensure that it wasn't a call coming in

 9     from perhaps Belgrade or something of that nature, and the investigation,

10     it failed to turn up anyone named General Vilotic in that particular

11     aspect.

12             So given my own knowledge of the communications systems, how it

13     is, you know, occasionally garbled, I believe in this context the

14     operator mistook the name Vilotic and instead it's Miletic.

15        Q.   And looking at that first line it says:

16             "Where is Obradovic?"

17             And P says:

18             "In the field."

19             And then as you look down we see references to the chief and

20     where the chief is.  What is your opinion -- and we later on see that

21     Jokic says:

22             "Obrenovic is really engaged to the hilt."

23             So what's your view on this first: "Where is Obradovic?"  Who do

24     you think that is?  Do you know of an Obradovic in the Zvornik Brigade?

25        A.   No, sir.  And, again, you know, I believe that the intercept

Page 16725

 1     operators mistook the name Obrenovic for Obradovic.

 2        Q.   All right.

 3             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I'll offer this document into evidence.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 2984A shall be

 6     assigned exhibit number P2538.  Thank you.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And could we go to P18.  And it's page 14 in the

 8     English, and it's dated -- it's for the dates 14 and 15 July of the

 9     B/C/S, I'm sorry, I don't have a page.  But if you flip through it, you

10     will see it goes by dates.  So if we could just go to 14 in English

11     and ...

12             Yes, that's the -- that's the English.  And the -- the Serbian

13     should have a marking pretty clearly.  Yes, right on the money.  Thank

14     you.

15        Q.   Can you tell us, if you can recall, I didn't stay on the front

16     page very long, what this is?

17        A.   This particular document is a log-book that was from the

18     Zvornik -- I'm sorry, the Bratunac military police platoon, and it is

19     their daily log-book where they note where all of the officers are on any

20     particular day and what activity that they are engaged in.

21        Q.   So this reference that we see:

22             "The police was engaged in the escort of Muslim refugees."

23             What is your opinion on who the police were and who these Muslim

24     refugees were?

25        A.   Yes, sir.  The police were the Bratunac Brigade Military Police

Page 16726

 1     Platoon.  On the 14th and 15th, there were no civilians to my knowledge

 2     being escorted out of Bratunac.  They'd all been removed by the evening

 3     of 13 July, and when I use the phrase "civilians" in this context it's

 4     the women, children, and elderly from Potocari.  The only people being

 5     moved on the 14th and 15th of July are the military-aged men who had been

 6     previously detained from Potocari, or who had been captured elsewhere.

 7        Q.   Okay.  Let's go to -- now to P124.

 8             Now, this is a document from the command of the

 9     1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade.  Remind us the town associated with

10     that command post?

11        A.   Yes, sir, this would be Rogatica.

12        Q.   It's dated 14 July, and it's sector for intelligence and

13     security.  Drina Corps Command.  Drina Corps IKM, personally to Krstic.

14     Command of the 65th Projection Regiment.  Entitled: "Situation in Zepa."

15     And from the second -- well, from the first page of the Serbian we can

16     see it's in the name of General Tolimir.  It's also noted in the English.

17             And what I want to ask you about is on page 2 of the English, in

18     the middle of the page, it says:

19             "Early this morning, since 0500 hours, in the area of

20     responsibility of the 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade and above the

21     Muslim enclaves of Zepa, Srebrenica, and Gorazde there is an unmanned

22     aerial vehicle whose flight path we can determine only by sound.

23             "It is probably recording the positions and ... movements of

24     units.  Radio communication interference is registered.  The orders for

25     camouflage measures and organisation of multiple communications

Page 16727

 1     systems -- system have been issued."

 2             And then it goes on.

 3             So can you -- just give us initially how would General Tolimir

 4     have come into this information?  Just generally, if you don't know

 5     specifically.

 6        A.   The tracking of these types of threats would be an event that

 7     would be reported up through the various command posts.  If

 8     General Tolimir is present at the -- one of the command posts, either the

 9     main or forward command post of the Rogatica Brigade, he is going to be

10     in a position to hear these reports come in, evaluate their significance,

11     and turn around and issue his own orders as a result of them.

12        Q.   From what you know from the investigation, were unmanned aircraft

13     used by any forces in Bosnia around this time-frame?

14        A.   Yes, sir.  The NATO forces did have access to several UAV

15     platforms that were operating in and around Eastern Bosnia at that time.

16        Q.   And, again, from your knowledge of the investigation, what is a

17     UAV platform?

18        A.   UAV simply stands for unmanned aerial vehicle.  It is a remotely

19     controlled pilotless aircraft.  Generally its primary function,

20     particularly back at this time-frame, was to provide aerial

21     reconnaissance of ground targets.

22        Q.   And General Tolimir is reporting that, among other places, this

23     craft is flying above the enclave of Srebrenica.  If General Tolimir is

24     down in the Rogatica, Zepa, Borike area on the 14th, how is it or why is

25     it in your view he would be concerned receiving information from the

Page 16728

 1     Srebrenica area and then passing on information from the Srebrenica area?

 2        A.   Well, there are two parts to the question, I guess.

 3             The first part is he would be -- you know, with respect to his

 4     receiving the information, command is -- in his integrated system, he is

 5     going to be in a position, just like all of the other units are in this

 6     respect, to receive the reports from various units.  They're all within

 7     the Drina Corps.  So his ability to monitor that, even though he is

 8     dealing with Zepa and the situations around Srebrenica, is -- is

 9     perfectly consistent with what the communications would allow.  I mean,

10     that's not a problem.

11             The second part of your question, why would he be concerned, is

12     because at this time this remains, still, an integrated operation.  The

13     military forces that are going to be taking place and dealing with Zepa,

14     many of them are coming from or just recently arrived from Srebrenica.

15     So, as a professional intelligence officer in this context, he is going

16     to understand that it's more than just what I have in front of me here at

17     Zepa with respect to being concerned about what information the enemy can

18     gain.  What information the enemy can glean over the Srebrenica enclave

19     with respect to where military units are or are not located, would give

20     whoever is doing that observation indications on where they might be in

21     other locations, such as Zepa.

22        Q.   Do you recall from the investigation any activity that was going

23     on on the ground around the village of Glogova and the Kravica warehouse

24     on the 14th of July?

25        A.   Yes, sir.  Beginning the morning of the 14th of July, there

Page 16729

 1     were -- or, actually, late evening, the 13th, if I recall correctly, but

 2     certainly during the day of the 14th, they were removing bodies from the

 3     Kravica warehouse, and they were being brought to the Glogova location

 4     where a mass grave had been dug, and the bodies from Kravica were being

 5     placed in the mass grave in Glogova.

 6        Q.   Would you say that receiving this information and then reporting

 7     it out to the people addressed here would be part of General Tolimir's

 8     position as assistant commander for intelligence and security?

 9        A.   Yes, sir.

10        Q.   And can you tell us what -- what part of his -- his job, what

11     label, if any, this activity that he is doing and reporting on would fit

12     under his job?

13        A.   This would be something that would fall on the security side,

14     given the context of trying to deny friendly information or information

15     about VRS military forces and the situation on the ground to potentially

16     hostile intelligence sources, which, given the UAV context, would be

17     NATO.

18        Q.   All right.  Let's go to the next document, which is P00128.

19             We see it's the -- from the same place.  Dated 14 July to the

20     Drina Corps Command from General Tolimir.  And handwritten it's 1045

21     hours.  I won't repeat it all, but it basically appears to be talking

22     about an unmanned aerial vehicle reconnoitring the area and jamming the

23     radio communications.

24             Do you relate this document to the previous document?

25        A.   Yes, sir.  This is -- it's a supplemental report directly to the

Page 16730

 1     Drina Corps on the same situation, essentially.

 2        Q.   And it talks about it a bit in the paragraphs, and then in the

 3     final paragraph, it says:

 4             "If spotted, the unmanned aerial vehicle must be destroyed

 5     immediately."

 6             How do you take that as -- as -- that statement?  Is that a

 7     proposal, an order, a request?  What is that in your view, militarily?

 8        A.   That would be an order, sir.

 9        Q.   Is that kind of an order consistent with his job as assistant

10     commander for security and intel that's working out of the Zepa area at

11     that time?

12        A.   It's not strictly consistent, but it again reflects his knowledge

13     of the broader plan, as well as the guidance that has been given to the

14     Drina Corps air defence forces relating to these types of situations.

15     Again, in the context that I read this, General Tolimir is not going to

16     give an order or a direction that he believes he's not authorised to

17     give.

18        Q.   All right.  Let's go to P129.

19             This is another document from Rogatica Brigade,

20     1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade.  14 July.  To several addressees

21     that I won't repeat.

22             And if we see on the bottom of the Serbian, it's -- it's, again,

23     from General Tolimir.  It is entitled: "Placing the UNPROFOR check-points

24     under control."

25             And could we go to page 2 of the English.  Just leading up to

Page 16731

 1     page 2 it says:

 2             "For the time being, we have taken full control over the

 3     check-point number 2 at Boksanica where the command of the UNPROFOR

 4     forces is located.  We have wire connection with it.  The check-point

 5     will remain functioning as it is not blocked -- as if it is not blocked

 6     and surrounded by our forces.  We plan to direct the work of the other UN

 7     check-points through this check-point.  We have instructed the UNPROFOR

 8     command to issue instructions to their check-points not to open fire on

 9     VRS units and instead -- and to instead simulate the action by shooting

10     in the air if forced to do so by the Muslims."

11             What's going on here, in your view, that General Tolimir is

12     reporting on?

13        A.   At some juncture of time, the VRS had approached the

14     Ukrainian Detachment related to Zepa and had effectively co-opted them to

15     assist the VRS by providing information and not resisting VRS military

16     moves into the Zepa enclave.

17        Q.   Do you know clearly one way or another whether this co-option

18     you're talking about was by force or by plan or some other means?

19        A.   I don't know the answer to that.  No, sir.

20        Q.   All right.  Let's go to P480.

21             Another Rogatica Brigade document from the 14th.  In the name of

22     General Tolimir.  Personally to General Miletic.  Is this the same

23     Miletic you were talk being earlier in your discussion about Vilotic?

24        A.   Yes, sir.

25        Q.   And it is entitled: "Protection of Secret Military Information,"

Page 16732

 1     known as TVP.

 2             And in here, we see that General Tolimir is saying it's necessary

 3     to incorporate the Main Staff of the VRS in the work-plan of the

 4     Drina Corps.  And he is talking, I won't repeat it all, about getting

 5     these radios.

 6             Can you explain why General Tolimir in his position, if he is in

 7     the Rogatica area, would be dealing with this subject matter?

 8        A.   General Tolimir is seeking to effectively align the Main Staff,

 9     at least their knowledge of what the Drina Corps is doing, as well as the

10     subordinate brigades related to Zepa, and wants to be able to monitor the

11     Drina Corps communications network that was established for the Zepa

12     operation.  Clearly he doesn't have the appropriate equipment to do that.

13     One would think that as a general he can just tell the Rogatica Brigade

14     to give up their equipment.  In fact, he can't.  The brigade commander

15     needs that particular equipment in order to effectively command his

16     brigade.  He doesn't have the right to just take that type of equipment

17     away from him.  So his obvious logical process here is that he is going

18     to go back to his headquarters, the Main Staff, and request that they

19     send down the appropriate equipment so he has his own set to be able to

20     listen to these communications functions.

21             It is, again, as I've said before, a process of integrated

22     command.  General Tolimir, for him to give effective orders as to what is

23     going on and what actions need to take place from his perspective on the

24     Main Staff, needs to have a detailed knowledge of what subordinate

25     formations are doing, what they're involved in, and what orders they've

Page 16733

 1     received.  Otherwise, the risk again is that General Tolimir is giving

 2     orders that are contrary to -- or -- or, actually, will damage the

 3     situation on the ground because he doesn't have a complete and accurate

 4     picture of what needs to happen.

 5             So this is all part of, you know, a completely integrated command

 6     and control system.

 7        Q.   In your view, would he need to know about what his subordinates,

 8     Beara and Jankovic and other security officers, are doing up in the

 9     Zvornik and Bratunac area at the same time?

10        A.   Yes, sir, he would.

11        Q.   And just briefly, why?

12        A.   First off, he is still responsible for them and their activities.

13     He is their direct superior.

14             Second, they are carrying out the commander's orders [realtime

15     transcript read in error "offices"], and, in fact, so is he.

16             So for him to effectively do that, to know what orders to issue,

17     and perhaps as importantly, what orders not to issue, he has to be aware

18     of what the plan is, as well as what other people's roles in the plan

19     are.

20        Q.   Well, you've concluded that let's say Beara, Jankovic, Popovic

21     are carrying out the commander's, Mladic's orders, but how can you

22     conclude that he is?  How do you know he is not just dealing with Zepa

23     and hiding or ignoring the murders that are going on, on the 14th, 15th,

24     and 16th of July by his -- under the organisation of his people, Beara,

25     Jankovic and others?

Page 16734

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 3             May God's peace reign in this house and may God's will be done in

 4     these proceedings.

 5             Could Mr. McCloskey give us the exact reference, showing what it

 6     is that I'm hiding or covering up when he talks about murders and

 7     killings.

 8             Or perhaps he could tell us that all these things are just his

 9     assumptions, his evaluations, and his opinions.  Thank you.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Before you get the floor, Mr. McCloskey, in page

11     22, line 16, I read, I:

12             "Second, they are carrying out the commander's officers, and so

13     in fact so is he."

14             Just going to disappear from the screen.

15             Were you really, sir, talking about the commander's officers, or

16     what was your answer?

17             THE WITNESS:  No, sir, that should be the "commander's orders."

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you for this clarification.

19             Mr. McCloskey.

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:  My question was not that General Tolimir was

21     hiding.  My question was:  How do you know when you say General Tolimir

22     is following the commander's orders that he was not just ignoring those

23     orders or not doing anything, or -- and in fact, hiding from them.  How

24     do you know that.  Why do you conclude he is following the commander's

25     orders, how do you know he wasn't avoiding them or ignoring them.  That

Page 16735

 1     was the question.

 2             I don't mean to suggest General Tolimir is hiding.  That may have

 3     been a bad choice of words.  More ignoring or avoiding.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you for this clarification.

 5             Mr. Butler, are you able to respond?

 6             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

 7             As I discussed earlier, I believe it was last week, the

 8     underlying foundation, when I look at the roles and activities of various

 9     individuals, is on the basis of the fact that, as professional military

10     officers - and in the context of all of the people that we're discussing

11     they are - they're going to perform their duties in an efficient and

12     diligent manner.

13             As I also said, even in the context of an unlawful act, like the

14     massacre of thousands of prisoners, being that it was a military

15     organisation that they were going to do so in the military manner in

16     which they had been trained.  And, in fact, the information that has been

17     developed through the years of investigation substantiates that, to a

18     large degree, all of the military processes related to collecting the

19     prisoners, transporting the prisoners, moving the prisoner, the execution

20     of the prisoners, the resources needed for that, the burial of the

21     prisoners, and even the reburial of the prisoners, was accomplished in a

22     large degree by soldiers and officers, many of whom are actually

23     cataloguing their participation in various aspects of this broader

24     massacre, because fuel and ammunition and other things had to be

25     accounted for.

Page 16736

 1             So when the situation occurs as the question has come up from

 2     Mr. McCloskey, how would I conclude that, I look at it from the

 3     perspective of General Tolimir's role within the army and the diligent

 4     and responsible function of his duties.  The fact that his subordinates

 5     are heavily engaged in this particular criminal aspect dealing with

 6     Srebrenica, they're doing so in a synchronised manner and that

 7     General Tolimir's responsibility as their first immediate superior is to

 8     know what they're doing and what orders that they are carrying out.  It

 9     would be a completely irregular situation to have, where a particular

10     officer's subordinates are engaged in activities, military or unlawful,

11     on the basis of an order from somebody else and that the officer who

12     directly supervises their activities and directs their activities,

13     then-General Tolimir would be ignorant of that situation.

14             The last part of Mr. McCloskey's question, the wilful ignorance

15     issue, I guess in the abstract it would be possible that even though all

16     of the mechanisms for command existed and that as noted by the volume of

17     information that I've discussed so far relating to who was talking to who

18     about what, you know, it is conceivable in the abstract that

19     General Tolimir could have elected to remain wilfully ignorant of what

20     was going on for whatever reason.  Other individuals who have been before

21     previous Trial Chamber have made the same argument.  That, of course,

22     becomes an area outside of my particular expertise.  It's just all I can

23     say about that, is that, he obviously had all of the necessary

24     communications means to be informed as to what was going on, why it was

25     going, and whose orders.  And if he were diligently exercising his

Page 16737

 1     responsibilities as the assistant commander for intelligence and security

 2     on the Main Staff, I guess I would find it staggering, frankly, that he

 3     wouldn't know and have no idea of the scope and scale of the massacres

 4     that were occurring.

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:

 6        Q.   That's the point of knowledge.  Can you remind us what his

 7     responsibility would be, if any, regarding the -- once he is -- knows

 8     that his subordinate, Beara, Jankovic, and others are carrying out this

 9     material, what would his responsibility be in monitoring, working with,

10     overseeing, directing these people in their tasks, if any?

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, thank you.

13             These are -- this is just speculation.  Could Mr. McCloskey

14     please give a reference as to where he finds that General Tolimir knew of

15     these events and what he was describing as his knowledge.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

17             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I can provide him a short outline.  If you'd

18     like.  It's evidence in this case.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, if you look at the transcript,

20     Mr. McCloskey decided to use another formulation.  He said:

21             "Can you remind us what his responsibility would be, if any,

22     regarding -- the" and then he reformulated, "... knows that the

23     subordinate, Beara, Jankovic, and others are carrying out this material,

24     what his responsibility be in monitoring," and so on.

25             This is slightly different wording of the question.

Page 16738

 1             Mr. McCloskey.

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes Mr. President.  This is, of course, as you've

 3     pointed out in the form of a hypothetical.  And it's up to the Court to

 4     determine the issues, as Mr. Butler is -- has I think just said.  So the

 5     best way to ask this question, in my view, is the way I did it.

 6     Hypothetically, if the General knows about his subordinates doing these

 7     things, what would be his normal duties and responsibilities regarding

 8     them and their work.  It's a hypothetical and not a conclusion.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You should carry on.

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:

11        Q.   Mr. Butler, can you answer that hypothetical?

12        A.   Yes, sir.  I guess in two different scenarios.

13             It would depend on what his normal duty in that sense would be.

14     If he were conducting his duty completely within the framework of his

15     responsibilities as the assistant commander of intelligence and security,

16     and in accordance with the laws of the Republika Srpska and the relevant

17     regulations on the application of the laws of war within the army, then

18     once he were to receive knowledge that his subordinates were

19     participating in this crime he would have duties to have them arrested,

20     presumably, or, otherwise, relieved from that their posts and undertake

21     an investigation because law enforcement in that context is a function of

22     the intelligence and security branch.  It's the military police.

23             If normal is to facilitate the commander's orders, then his

24     knowledge of what his subordinates were doing would be important.  So

25     again he knew what orders he might need to give in order to facilitate

Page 16739

 1     that work, as well as what orders not to give so it did not interfere.

 2     So in this particular situation, I mean, he -- he has two hypothetical

 3     tracks that he could go down.  One hypothetical track is based on gaining

 4     knowledge of the crimes that are occurring and doing his duty within the

 5     context of the laws and regulations; and the other one is the

 6     hypothetical track of finding out about the crimes and doing his duty to

 7     fully implement his commander's orders and to make his subordinates

 8     available, as required, and to give any other orders necessary in order

 9     to ensure they complete their work in the most effective and efficient

10     means possible.

11        Q.   So if - again, with a hypothetical - if General Tolimir becomes

12     aware that his subordinates are involved in criminal conduct and allows

13     them to continue in that criminal conduct, is he in fact making his

14     people available to Mladic, as you've said?

15        A.   Not -- not only as I've said in this context, but as outlined in

16     the SFRY regulations on the laws of war and their applicability.  It

17     talks about the situation where, as a superior officer, you gain

18     knowledge of a war crime occurring and if you fail to take measures to

19     prevent it or to mitigate the damages from it, if you have the ability to

20     do so, you incur at least in that context a legal responsibility for the

21     actions.  That's not inconsistent with most other aspects of command.

22             When a commander or superior recognises his subordinates are

23     engaged in any activity, if he fails to stop that activity, not even

24     supposing it's unlawful or not I mean, but not giving any orders to those

25     particular subordinates, the subordinates are free to interpret that the

Page 16740

 1     actions that they are involved in, they are doing in compliance with the

 2     wishes of the superior.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Nyambe has a question.

 4             JUDGE NYAMBE:  All right.  I just wanted an explanation.  Just

 5     now you have stated that:

 6             "When a commander or superior recognises his subordinates are

 7     engaged in any activity, if he fails to stop that activity, not even

 8     supposing it's unlawful, or not, I mean, but not giving any orders to

 9     those particular subordinate, the subordinates are free to interpret that

10     the actions that they are involved in, they are doing in," I suppose, "in

11     compliance with the wishes of the superior."

12             Does that apply even to an activity that is unlawful, which they

13     must know as subordinates that it is unlawful.  Are they entitled to

14     assume that it is okay for them to do that with the wishes of the

15     superior?  Thank you.

16             THE WITNESS:  Under the SFRY, later adopted the RS law, legally

17     you're correct.  They are not permitted to assume that.  In a practical

18     sense of command, however, what happens frequently is that subordinates

19     will often take their queues from a superior.  One particular

20     hypothetical situation might be that a group of soldiers would take a

21     prisoner and shoot that particular prisoner.  They would then look down

22     the road, be aware that their commander has witnessed that act.  The

23     question is what happens next.  If the commander takes immediate action,

24     the lesson that the subordinates draw is that that type of conduct will

25     not be condoned.  If the officer, once he becomes aware of that act,

Page 16741

 1     turns and walks away, the practical reality for the subordinates is that

 2     they understand that that type of behaviour will be condoned by the

 3     command and that they're free to continue on to do it without fear of

 4     retribution.

 5             So I do take your point, ma'am.  Obviously there is a legal

 6     responsibility not to engage in this.  But certainly, from a practical

 7     command point, soldiers might not -- at the lower levels certainly might

 8     not have that same appreciation as officers should.

 9             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey, it's time for the last question

11     before the break.

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, just one more document quickly I think we

13     can get to quickly.  It's 65 ter 2204.

14        Q.   It's a document, this time under the name of General Mladic,

15     dated 14 July.  And it -- it speaks about the request of the Dutch

16     Battalion to move out of the area.

17             Mr. Butler, is this roughly consistent with what you know

18     eventually occurred; DutchBat leaving the area under the authority of

19     General Mladic?

20        A.   Yes, sir, it is.

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I'd offer this into evidence, Mr. President, and

22     then a good time to break.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 2204 shall be

25     assigned exhibit number P2539.  Thank you.

Page 16742

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

 2             We must have the first break now, and we will resume quarter

 3     past 4.00.

 4                           --- Recess taken at 3.45 p.m.

 5                           --- On resuming at 4.18 p.m.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.  Please carry on.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 8        Q.   I would like to now go out of order slightly and go back to

 9     P1459.  This is the duty officer notebook of the Zvornik Brigade.

10     Mr. Butler it will be up on the screen, only I -- given some of what you

11     were just saying I want to go through a few of the days --

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Where can we find it in the binder?

13             MR. McCLOSKEY:  There's a couple of pages here and there,

14     Mr. President, but -- so I would say it's not in the binder, because I'm

15     just going to decide if I'm -- to keep it all together, I'm going to try

16     to keep it with the related subject matter.

17             So if we could start at page 41 in the English.  It should be 40

18     in the B/C/S.  And it's the Prosecution's position, as you will see from

19     this so-called teacher's edition, that this is the 14th of July.  We need

20     to get the B/C/S which should be able to be up at the same time.  Oh,

21     thank you.

22        Q.   And what I want to you ask about Mr. Butler is this bottom

23     section, 14 July.  Prosecution's position is that it's -- Dragan Jokic is

24     the duty officer on the 14th of July, and you've just testified about

25     that.  Do you stay with that?

Page 16743

 1        A.   Yes, sir.  It is my understanding that he is the duty officer on

 2     the 14th of July.

 3        Q.   And this reference, "Colonel Salapura called, Drago and Beara are

 4     to report to Golic."

 5             And can you briefly tell us who you think these people, what unit

 6     they belong to?

 7        A.   Colonel Salapura is a subordinate of General Tolimir.  He is the

 8     chief of the intelligence administration.  Drago, in this case, I believe

 9     it's Drago Nikolic, the security officer for the

10     Zvornik Infantry Brigade.  And Beara, again, is a direct subordinate of

11     General Tolimir.  He is the chief of the security administration.  Golic

12     is Major Pavle Golic who is an intelligence officer with the Drina Corps.

13        Q.   And can you tell us from your review, for several years here, is

14     Salapura a name, a common name?  Do you see any other Salapuras involved

15     in these events in any way?

16        A.   I can't answer if it is a common name in Serbian naming context.

17     But with respect to the VRS, I'm only aware of one Colonel Salapura.

18        Q.   All right.  Now let's go to page 45 in the English, and page 44.

19     I won't ask you what's going on on the 14th in the Zvornik area.  That's

20     part of the record.

21             Here we see, if we're still on the 14th, and at 1500 hours it

22     says:

23             "Colonel Beara is coming in order to Orahovac, Petkovci, Rocevic,

24     Pilica."

25             Is that -- that Colonel Beara, who is he, in your view here, in

Page 16744

 1     this context?

 2        A.   Same officer we previously discussed, the chief the security

 3     administration.

 4        Q.   And what do you take this to be a reference to, what I just read?

 5        A.   Given the locations are all - Orahovac, Petkovci, Rocevic,

 6     Pilica - are all known schools where prisoners were detained prior to

 7     their execution, this is -- Colonel Beara is coming in the

 8     Zvornik Brigade area with the intent of either visiting or dealing with

 9     the issues related to those locations.

10        Q.   All right.  Now let's go to page 55 in the English, 54 in the

11     B/C/S.  We're still on 14 July.

12             This reference, Beara to call 155.  What do you make of this?

13        A.   I'm aware from the investigation that 155 is the main phone

14     number at the Main Staff, Panorama.  So in this particular context, Beara

15     is calling 155, or calling the Main Staff.

16        Q.   Well, tell us how this would work.  We see this again, it's

17     Dragan Jokic.  So if this is a note from Dragan Jokic, what can we glean

18     from how Jokic ended up writing this, if anything?

19        A.   Well, sir, one of the functions of the duty officer, because he's

20     performing his duty in the duty operations centre, and because that has

21     to be by the phone, for his -- you know, for his tour -- duty officer, he

22     is usually the person that all incoming and outgoing issues for the unit

23     go through.  In this context, either Dragan Jokic personally or the

24     assistant whose helping him during the performance of his duty is taking

25     phone messages or other orders that have come in from outside the

Page 16745

 1     brigade, it's customary that they write them down so they don't forget

 2     them and pass them on.

 3             The military switchboard only goes as far as with respect to the

 4     radio telephone to the Zvornik headquarters.  If a call or if an order

 5     comes in for not only Beara but any other officer who is around there,

 6     they're going to have find an alternate means to get the word to him.  So

 7     again they're -- that's why they write things down so these issues aren't

 8     forgotten.

 9        Q.   All right.  Let's go to the next page, number 57.  In English,

10     56.  And we see written in large letters on the left-hand side in the

11     Serbian.  We still need the Serbian.  Thank you.

12             Dragan Jokic is still noted as the duty officer.  And it says:

13             "From Beara, Drago to report, Mane Djukici [phoen]."

14             And then it is says in very large print:

15             "0900 Beara is coming."

16             Who do you think these folks are?

17        A.   Beara is the same officer we discussed, Colonel Ljubisa Beara.

18     Drago, Drago Nikolic.  I -- there are a -- Mane is, I know, a very common

19     name, so I don't want to speculate on that particular one.  And, of

20     course, the notation at 0900 Beara is coming, given the context of this

21     is the third or fourth page of the 14th of July, I'm reading this to

22     assume that this is a notation that Beara is coming tomorrow, in that

23     context, the 15th of July, at 0900 hours.

24        Q.   All right.  Let's go to 74 in the B/C/S, and I hope 75 in the

25     English.  It's ERN 761 in the English, the last -- yes, that's correct in

Page 16746

 1     the English.

 2             We see at the top of the page:

 3             "Drago and Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic are to report to Major

 4     Golic early in the morning?"

 5             Are these the same people that you've been talking about?

 6        A.   Yes, sir, they are.

 7        Q.   And looking down the page, we see under requests - and we know

 8     it's the position of the Prosecution that this is Drago Nikolic as duty

 9     officer - for the 1st Battalion, can you tell us, we see 50 litres of oil

10     for transport of troops to Kula.

11             Do you know where Kula is?

12        A.   Yes, sir.  That's the actual village that the school is

13     located -- we call it the Pilica school.  It's actually physically

14     located in the village of Kula.

15        Q.   And also 20 litres of gasoline.  Has the investigation revealed

16     any -- any troops around that school where Muslims were held?

17        A.   Yes, sir.  I am aware that members of, in part, the 1st Battalion

18     were at that location guarding the prisoners around the school.

19        Q.   All right.  Now let's go to 85 in English.  84 in the B/C/S.

20             We're now on -- clearly on 16 July.  That last communication

21     notation -- oh, I'm sorry.

22             Can we go to page 79 in the English and page 78 in the B/C/S.

23             And we see that Milorad Trbic is the duty officer.  Can you

24     remind us who he is?

25        A.   Milorad Trbic is the assistant chief of security.  He worked for

Page 16747

 1     Drago Nikolic in the Zvornik Brigade.

 2        Q.   And we see this entry:

 3             "0855 Golic asked Popovic to call him."

 4             And who do you think that is, Golic and Popovic?

 5        A.   Major Golic from the Drina Corps; and Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic

 6     from the Drina Corps.

 7        Q.   And why do you say that, as I think Golic and Popovic are

 8     relatively common names?

 9        A.   In my context of trying to identify through the years all of the

10     officers and all of the individuals involved in the crimes, we do run

11     into these.  I mean, I obviously hold open the possibility that there are

12     dozens, if not hundreds, of soldiers from the Drina Corps with the last

13     name of Popovic.  The issue then becomes, given the context of what we're

14     talking about, as well as, you know, the rank of the individuals -- I

15     mean, the reality is that all of those other Popovics aren't going to

16     have access to military telephones and wouldn't be calling the

17     Zvornik Infantry Brigade.  So the most logical people to presume these

18     conversations are involved with are going to be the officers who are

19     directing the issues related to the Drina Corps.  Again, whether they're

20     lawful or not.

21             So that's why I take this as Major Golic and

22     Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic calling the duty officer, as opposed to

23     Private Golic and Private Popovic.

24        Q.   So as this note says Golic -- we can glean from the note that

25     Golic has called and said, and I quote:

Page 16748

 1             "That he can forget what he asked for and what he wrote about.

 2     He knows what he is supposed to do according to the agreed procedure ..."

 3             Do you know the specifics of what they're talking about?  For

 4     example, do you know what he wrote about, that Golic is now saying he can

 5     forget about what he wrote about?  Do you have any idea what it was that

 6     Popovic wrote about?

 7        A.   I'm not sure I recall or I ever knew what Popovic might have

 8     written back on 15 July.  I don't know if I've ever seen an order from

 9     Popovic in that context.

10        Q.   And this comment:

11             "He knows what he's supposed to do according to the agreed

12     procedure.  Boss, from Panorama, 01."

13             What is this boss, remind us what Panorama 01 would be?

14        A.   Panorama is the telephonic code-name for the Main Staff.  What

15     officers would frequently do in order to give a clue to the people who

16     they were talking to on the phone who was actually the person giving the

17     order or something of that nature, was that if they wanted it -- people

18     to understand that it was from the commander, it would be 01.  So if you

19     have a call from the Zvornik Brigade in -- you know, you want to talk to

20     Zlatar -- or, I'm sorry, you want to talk to Palma 01, everyone

21     understands that you're looking for the brigade commander.  Panorama 01

22     [Realtime transcript read in error "Palma"] is the commander of the

23     Main Staff, which would be General Mladic.

24        Q.   And this agreed procedure glossed from -- agreed procedure from

25     General Mladic, what procedure would Golic, Popovic, Mladic have to do

Page 16749

 1     with on the 16 July, in your view?  If any.

 2        A.   If one extrapolates the conversations and the issues that we

 3     talked about previously on the 17th and the 18th, the particular

 4     intercept where the two correspondents are talking about what the

 5     procedure was and in detail what happens to those males who are between

 6     the 16 to 60 military age group, this is another reference to the agreed

 7     procedure.  The fact that the boss is giving directly these orders, if

 8     one goes back in time to intercepts that occur on the 15th, Colonel Beara

 9     makes it clear in his discussions with General Zivanovic and shortly

10     thereafter, General Krstic, about these -- you know, the orders coming

11     from the boss personally on this.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Butler you spoke about the extension of the

13     commander.  Could you please repeat the code-name of this extension.

14             THE WITNESS:  It is -- the suffix that they use is 01.  So, for

15     example, if you're talking about over these radio telephones what the

16     normal military discussion was, was if you wanted to talk to the brigade

17     commander of the Zvornik Brigade, you would want to speak to Palma 01,

18     and it was generally understood that that was the commander.  Zlatar 01

19     is the commander of the Drina Corps.  Panorama 01 is generally understood

20     by everyone to be the commander of the Main Staff.  It is just a military

21     slang terminology people would use.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I understand.  Palma 01 is referring to whom?

23             THE WITNESS:  Palma in this case is the telephonic code-name of

24     the Zvornik Infantry Brigade.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I ask this question only because of the record.

Page 16750

 1     On page 37, line 12, which has just disappeared from the screen, you are

 2     recorded to having said if you want to talk to Palma 01, everyone

 3     understands that the Main Staff, which would be General Mladic.

 4             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry.  Somehow that didn't get transcribed

 5     correctly or I misspoke.  I apologise.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  No, you didn't misspeak.  You said Panorama 01, I

 7     think.  I just wanted to correct the transcript.

 8             Thank you.

 9             Mr. McCloskey.

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

11        Q.   And we also see that this message referred to above conveyed to

12     Popovic at 0910.  And the bottom of the page:

13             "Beara to call Panorama 155 at 0930 hours."

14             You've mentioned the Main Staff switchboard 155 in your view.

15     Where in particular, or who was picking up on that line, as far as you

16     knew, during this time-period?

17        A.   My understanding is the 155 line rings in the operation centre of

18     the Main Staff.

19        Q.   And do you recall who you see on intercepts or on other documents

20     that are speaking from the Main Staff?  Any high-ranking officers on

21     these days?

22        A.   The most logical person who would be the senior-ranking officer

23     there would be General Miletic, the chief of operations for the

24     Main Staff.  Other generals would be in and out of there, but that's

25     General Miletic's primary duty position.

Page 16751

 1        Q.   All right.

 2        A.   Or duty location, would probably be a better description of it.

 3        Q.   Let's go to page 85 in English in the same document.  We're still

 4     on 16 July.  84, B/C/S.

 5             Trbic is still the duty officer.  And it says:

 6             "At 1400 hours, Popovic requested a bus with a fuel [sic] tank

 7     and 500 litres D2.  Zlatar duty officer and Golic informed."

 8             What does your analysis bear, if anything, about Popovic

 9     requesting a bus with a fuel tank and 500 litres of D2.  First of all,

10     tell us what D2 is?

11        A.   D2 is diesel fuel.

12        Q.   And how do you interpret this line?

13        A.   Well, don't have to interpret it much, in so much as there is

14     actually significant corroborating documentation as well as intercepts,

15     which discusses an entire episode of Colonel Popovic requesting fuel

16     related to the job that he had to do and that there was an entire process

17     that went on related to what procedures had to be followed so that the

18     fuel could be appropriately signed over to Colonel Popovic, could be

19     brought out to him, the fuel would be consumed, and then he'd sign for

20     the remainder of the fuel that went back.  There are intercepts which

21     talk about that process to various members of the Drina Corps rear

22     services staff, as well as documents from the Zvornik Brigade, from their

23     rear service, which reflect the actual withdrawal or disbursement of the

24     fuel and the various officers who had to sign off on that.  I think, as I

25     discussed earlier, in this particular context, the use of the fuel and

Page 16752

 1     for what -- we're aware it was being used with, is obviously unlawful

 2     connected to the mass execution and burial thereafter, but the process is

 3     occurring along the same military manner that it would be if it were fuel

 4     going for any other variety of reasons.

 5        Q.   We'll get to the documents and intercepts you mention as we go

 6     through the chronology.  But do you recall the location that this fuel

 7     was taken to to be used by Popovic?

 8        A.   Yes, sir.  It's Pilica.

 9        Q.   And what, in your opinion, was this fuel being used for by

10     Popovic at Pilica on 16 July?

11        A.   My understanding is that they needed it for the buses that were

12     taking people from the school at Pilica and taking them to the location

13     in which they were executed in Branjevo.

14        Q.   All right.  And then this other line underneath that is:

15             "Zlatar duty officer and Golic informed."

16             We again hear from Golic.  Which Golic do you think that is in

17     this context?

18        A.   Major Golic from the Drina Corps, sir.

19        Q.   And the Zlatar duty officer?

20        A.   I think, on 16 July, if I recall correctly, the Zlatar duty

21     officer is Colonel Cerovic.

22        Q.   We'll check.  I think there's a document related to that to see

23     if that's true.

24        A.   That would be Cerovic, with a C, for the transcript.

25        Q.   All right.  That was just the -- I wanted to get us back to the

Page 16753

 1     work being done by some of the people involved here.

 2             And so now if we could go back to the chronology, and I thank

 3     everyone for bearing with me, could we go to P373B.  And we now see,

 4     we're on the -- we're on the 14th July.  We have an intercept.

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Shouldn't be broadcast.

 6             Before we go to this, could we go to 65 ter 111.

 7        Q.   And I'm not sure it's in the binders.  I couldn't find it, but it

 8     will come up on the screen.  It was on the list, though.  I may have

 9     skipped over it by accident.

10             Now, Mr. Butler, if you could take a look at this noting it's

11     from the Drina Corps on the 13th July, received by someone at 20 hours --

12     or 2000 hours.  What is this, and how does it fit into your analysis,

13     briefly?

14        A.   Yes, sir.  As an important component obviously of the military

15     aspect of command, everybody in all of the relevant military units has to

16     be made aware when there is a significant change in command of a military

17     formation.  Everyone has to be on the same sheet of paper as to who the

18     commander is.

19             This is a particular document signed by

20     Lieutenant-Colonel Jovicic to -- from the Drina Corps Command to all of

21     the relevant units of the Drina Corps informing them that

22     General Zivanovic has been relieved of command of the Drina Corps and is

23     being reassigned to new duties, that General Krstic is assuming the post

24     as corps commander, and that, to replace him, Colonel Svetozar Andric,

25     who at that time is the commander of the 1st Birac Brigade, is now taking

Page 16754

 1     General Krstic's place as the corps Chief of Staff.

 2             So this is the formal notification so all of the subordinate

 3     formations are aware of this development.

 4             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Okay.  I would offer that into evidence,

 5     Mr. President.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, it will be received.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 111 shall be

 8     assigned Exhibit P2540.  Thank you.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:

10        Q.   Now let's go back to P373B, an intercept from 14 July not to be

11     broadcast.  But we can see that it's -- the participants are

12     General Zivanovic, at Zlatar, which you've told us is the code-name for

13     the Drina Corps Command.  And Major Jokic, the Palma duty officer.

14             And we can see this, as consistent with your testimony that Jokic

15     was the duty officer that day.  And we see that General Zivanovic is

16     passing on information to Jokic but he is saying:  Take this as an order.

17             Then -- and says:

18             "Surround the location."

19             How do you interpret General Zivanovic from the Drina Corps

20     Command issuing an order to Major Jokic when we have just seen him being

21     replaced as corps commander the night before?

22        A.   Yes, sir.  If I recall, General Krstic's Defence counsel asked me

23     that same question.

24             This is the second of two intercepts related to this particular

25     issue.  There's a previous intercept where Obrenovic and the

Page 16755

 1     Zvornik Brigade is seeking to find the corps commander.  They're

 2     unsuccessful in doing that.  At some point in this context,

 3     General Zivanovic, who is still in Vlasenica at the Drina Corps Command,

 4     and who, on the 14th, is now realizing that there is a significant

 5     adverse military situation developing at -- or in the zone of the

 6     Zvornik Infantry Brigade, does reach out through the Zvornik Brigade duty

 7     officer and informs him of the situation and what he ought to do.  And in

 8     this context, he gives an order, as a general.  Tells Jokic to tell

 9     Obrenovic to take this as an order.

10             It is, perhaps, one of the few orders which, in reality,

11     General Zivanovic might not be authorised to give; but, having said that,

12     he is still a general in the Army of the Republika Srpska.  He has

13     recognised a situation that could have a potentially significant adverse

14     impact, and he is taking steps to deal with it.  The fact that he does

15     this order in this context is -- is somewhat extraordinary, but, as a

16     general who has an awareness of what's going on and who knows all of the

17     people involved, he -- he gives that order, and for all anybody knows

18     because I don't think we've ever been able to confirm or deny this one

19     way or another, he could even be passing on the order of General Krstic.

20             So it is an outlier in the context of the normal course of how

21     orders are given and why.  Obrenovic obviously is engaged in this and

22     takes this as an order, as it's passed down.  But I don't -- for the

23     context that we've discussed before, this doesn't offset the fact that on

24     the 14th of July General Krstic is not the corps commander and

25     General Zivanovic has somehow reassumed command.

Page 16756

 1        Q.   And can you very briefly tell us what is this emergency that has

 2     got General Zivanovic involved in issuing an order.  Just very briefly.

 3     I think you have referred to it already, but ...

 4        A.   Yes, sir.  As I've discussed, the -- during the -- primarily the

 5     evening of the 12th and through the day of the 13th, the

 6     Zvornik Infantry Brigade as well as the MUP units in and around

 7     Nova Kasaba, Konjevic Polje, as reflected by Dragomir Vasic's reports,

 8     and Borovcanin's, recognise that the armed head of the column could

 9     number as high as 3.000 to 4.000 soldiers.  Other evidence that I've

10     discussed reflects the fact that the senior levels of the Drina command

11     on those days believe those numbers are wildly exaggerated, that the

12     military threat is nowhere as significant as Obrenovic has been stating

13     it has been.

14             What this particular intercept and the response of

15     General Zivanovic is, is a recognition that Obrenovic has in fact been

16     very accurate with his estimates of the size of the column and

17     consequently the military threat that it poses to not only the Zvornik

18     Infantry Brigade by the actual town of Zvornik.

19             So at this point in time, you begin to see a series of intercepts

20     reflecting how that knowledge of the military situation being worse than

21     everybody anticipated in Zvornik being passed around and the measures

22     that various command-level elements to include the Drina Corps will be

23     taking over the subsequent hours to combat that threat.

24        Q.   Now, let's go a little later in the evening to 2102 hours.  It is

25     P16A.  It's the next document in the tab.

Page 16757

 1             This is 14 July from the other intercept records in the case in

 2     evidence.  And we see that it's between Palma duty officer, Major Jokic,

 3     and Badem, X and Y, and we see early on someone is asking to talk to

 4     Beara.

 5             Badem again is who, or what?

 6        A.   Badem is the telephonic code-name for the Bratunac Infantry

 7     Brigade.

 8        Q.   So we see this.  I won't read it all out.  The Palma duty officer

 9     who we know is Jokic wants -- says:

10             "Beara is needed urgently.  Somebody needs him.  The higher house

11     urgently needs him ..."

12             And then it says:

13             "But he has to call me."

14             Then as we look down the intercept, we see that Jokic and BE

15     actually start speaking to each other and that Jokic says:

16             "We were together, Colonel, sir, number 155 called you and asked

17     you to call him urgently."

18             So can you tell from this where Jokic is calling from and where

19     he is calling to, looking for Beara?

20        A.   Jokic is calling from his duty location, which is the

21     Zvornik Brigade, where he is the duty officer that day, and he's calling,

22     if he's calling through Badem, he is calling to the Bratunac Infantry

23     Brigade, where he finds Beara.

24        Q.   And the "higher house"?  What do you think that is a reference

25     to?  It's mentioned I see at least twice in this intercept.

Page 16758

 1        A.   It depends on whose reference -- I mean, in the case of Palma,

 2     the higher house or the next level of command would be the Drina Corps.

 3     In the case of Beara, it would be the Main Staff.

 4        Q.   Well, this line in the middle that says -- where Jokic says:

 5             "Number 155, that's, I mean, the higher house, you go ahead and

 6     call them, you have, so I don't speak like this."

 7             What's Jokic says?

 8        A.   Well, I mean, again, putting it in context of how he is speaking,

 9     Jokic, like most other officers, are aware that their telephonic

10     conversations can be monitored by the enemy.  So he is attempting to

11     speak cryptically.  But he is, as we know, 155 is the number for the

12     Main Staff operations centre.  So what he is trying to do in this context

13     is relay to Colonel Beara that he needs to call back to the Main Staff

14     operations centre.

15        Q.   And then Beara says something, or BE says something according to

16     this that we only have ... for.  And Jokic says:

17             "Yes.

18             A:

19             "We have huge problems over here."

20             Then BE, we can't hear anything from BE, or they couldn't.  And

21     then Jokic says:

22             "There are big problems, well, with the people -- I mean, with

23     the parcel."

24             And he goes on to say Drago is nowhere around and then he

25     reiterates to call the higher house, 155.

Page 16759

 1             What does your analysis reveal Jokic is referring to when he says

 2     "We have huge problems, big problems, well, with the people -- I mean,

 3     the parcel"?

 4        A.   As is evident in other intercepts, parcels was what they would

 5     euphemistically call people or, in this particular context, prisoners.

 6     Again, not wanting to mention the phrase prisoners over a potentially

 7     unsecure line that could be intercepted.

 8        Q.   And have you -- and has -- seen any particular problems that

 9     Jokic may be referring to at this time in the evening?  Any idea what he

10     is talking about?

11        A.   At this point in time on the 14th, you have a situation where

12     they are still just finishing up, they're actually still executing

13     prisoners at the Orahovac killing fields.  They haven't quite started at

14     Petkovci yet.  They're still prisoners up to other locations.  But, in

15     context, you have the military column which has now broken through the

16     first line of defence on the late evening of the 13th and is pushing

17     actually relatively close to Orahovac and further on.

18             So it's a mixed conversation where Jokic is trying to deal with

19     issues and explain problems with the prisoners and, at the same time,

20     they have a worse -- worsening military situation with respect to actual

21     combat activities.

22        Q.   Was there any indication in the public testimony of

23     Dragan Obrenovic in the Blagojevic case that Jokic informed him of any

24     problems with the prisoners at some point?  If you recall.

25        A.   It's been a lot of years, sir.  I don't think I recall anymore.

Page 16760

 1     I'm sorry.

 2        Q.   All right.  Fair enough.

 3        A.   It's been a while since I've read that testimony.

 4        Q.   Fair enough.  Let's go to the next document, 65 ter 2996A.  A

 5     one-line intercept that you've -- believed talked about many times over

 6     the years.

 7             We're now on the 15th of -- of July, according to this intercept.

 8     And it says:

 9             "Colonel Beara was looking for General Zivanovic, but he was not

10     there.  He said he was to call him at extension 139."

11             What's -- what's going on here?

12        A.   It is a summary of a conversation where Colonel Beara is calling

13     from a location looking for General Zivanovic, not reaching him

14     immediately, and leaving a message that Zivanovic was to call him or

15     could reach him - him being Colonel Beara - at extension 139.

16        Q.   Do you recall what extension 139 is?

17        A.   Yes, sir.  Extension 139 is the phone line for the phone in

18     Drago Nikolic's office in the Zvornik Brigade.

19        Q.   All right.

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I offer that into evidence.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 2996A shall be

23     assigned Exhibit P2541.  Thank you.

24             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Just skip over the next one.  It's another

25     version of that.  So let's go to 65 ter 2997B.

Page 16761

 1        Q.   This is, again, 15 July 1995, at 0954 hours, just two minutes

 2     after that last little one-line synopsis, and the participants are

 3     General Zivanovic and Colonel Ljubo Beara, according to the intercept

 4     operators.  I won't read all of it.  We see that there are some initial

 5     hellos and some comments.  And then Beara noted as B says:

 6             "Okay then.  Listen Bro."

 7             Zivanovic says:

 8             "Yes?"

 9             B says:

10             "You know that day?  I informed the commander about it.  Furtula

11     didn't send Lukic's intervention platoon."

12             And Lukic is waiting at Blagojevic.  Sorry, Zivanovic says:

13             "And Lukic is waiting at Blagojevic."

14             And then Beara says:

15             "Lukic is here with me and his driver and we urged them on that."

16             Can you tell us, based on your review of this entire intercept

17     and the other information, what do you believe he is talking about and

18     who are these people, the commander, for one; Furtula, for the other;

19     Lukic and his intervention platoon, another?  Who are these guys?  What's

20     he talking about in your view?

21        A.   Furtula is Major Radomir Furtula is the commander of the

22     Visegrad Light Infantry Brigade.  In this context Lukic has been

23     identified by the investigation as Milan Lukic, and they're talking about

24     instructions that his particular platoon was supposed to be sent up on

25     the commander's orders.  Again, in this context, I take the commander to

Page 16762

 1     be General Mladic.

 2        Q.   And we haven't heard much about the Visegrad Brigade.  What corps

 3     do they belong to?

 4        A.   The Visegrad Brigade is also part of the Drina Corps Command.  Or

 5     part of the Drina Corps, more accurately.

 6        Q.   Do you remember its formalised name?

 7        A.   Yes, sir.  It should be the 5th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade.

 8        Q.   All right.  And Zivanovic says:

 9             "And Lukic is waiting at Blagojevic."

10             What Blagojevic do you think he would mean in this context?

11        A.   Blagojevic being the commander of the

12     Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade.  He is trying to say that Lukic is

13     supposedly waiting at the Bratunac Brigade headquarters or somewhere in

14     Bratunac where he can be reached.

15        Q.   And Beara says:

16             "Lukic is here with me and his driver and we urged them on that."

17             And where do you think based on the context of these intercepts

18     Beara is at this point?

19        A.   Going back to the previous intercept, if he's asked for

20     General Zivanovic to call him at 139, and General Zivanovic has called

21     him there, then, at the time of this intercept, Colonel Beara is sitting

22     in Drago Nikolic's office at the Zvornik Brigade headquarters.  It's the

23     Standard facility.

24        Q.   And then Beara continues:

25             "And yesterday Furtula sent one soldier without an arm and

Page 16763

 1     another one that Lukic knows as a drunkard."

 2             And then he says:

 3             "Fuck him."

 4             Zivanovic says:

 5             "Yes."

 6             Beara says:

 7             "Instead of a platoon."

 8             Zivanovic says:

 9             "Oh dear."

10             Beara says:

11             "Simply, he doesn't give a damn about the commander's

12     orders [sic].  Well, now that platoon has 60 men."

13             Who do you think Beara is referring to when he says "commanders"

14     here?

15        A.   Yes, sir.  I believe, again in this context, the commander he is

16     referring to is General Ratko Mladic.

17        Q.   Then Zivanovic says something we can't hear.

18             Beara says:

19             "Have him send at least half."

20             Zivanovic says:

21             "Yes, yes."

22             Beara says:

23             "Say again?"

24             Zivanovic:

25             "To send them immediately.

Page 16764

 1             "Yes."

 2             And then Zivanovic says:

 3             "I can't order that anymore."

 4             What do you take Zivanovic's comment about "I can't order that

 5     anymore" to refer to; and do you have an opinion on why he is saying

 6     that?

 7        A.   Yes, sir.  What Zivanovic is doing is, in this case, informing or

 8     reminding Colonel Beara that since he is no longer the commander of the

 9     Drina Corps, he has no authority or right to issue commands to

10     subordinate brigade commanders, or -- because they're not his

11     subordinates anymore, in that nature.

12             So he's just saying I'm no longer empowered to make orders like

13     that, and when you look at the next line he is basically giving Beara a

14     phone extension to call.

15        Q.   And who do you believe that phone extension is?  We see 385.

16        A.   385 is the phone extension associated with the Drina Corps

17     commander.  Not only in Vlasenica, but when the Drina Corps commander is

18     in a different location, for example, at a forward command post, if

19     they're going to be there for a few days, they will actually trunk --

20     electronically trunk that line so it rings out wherever the corps

21     commander is located.  You call 385, you're going to get whomever the

22     corps commander is.

23        Q.   And we'll get to this in a minute, but is there another intercept

24     right after this between Beara and Krstic?

25        A.   Yes, sir.

Page 16765

 1        Q.   All right.  Explain, if you will, how it is a colonel like Beara,

 2     who you say the evidence indicates is at the Zvornik Brigade, how is it

 3     that he is calling up and asking General Zivanovic for troops?  He is a

 4     colonel, he is from the Main Staff, he is the chief of security.  Can you

 5     explain how, in your view, this works in the military, the appropriate

 6     military context?

 7        A.   Yes, sir.  As I've frequently noted, officers performing their

 8     duties are going to give the orders that they're lawfully entitled to

 9     give.  In many cases, they will be supplemental orders to a broader order

10     that they have received.  In this manner, you have Colonel Beara having a

11     discussion with General Zivanovic.  From this particular intercept, it's

12     clear that both of them understand what the commander's orders were and

13     that various units of the Drina Corps were supposed to send, in this

14     case, at least one intervention unit, in furtherance of the commander's

15     orders.  And, in this case, the commander being General Mladic.

16             So it's not improper for Colonel Beara to call General Zivanovic,

17     particularly since, in this conversation, Colonel Beara is -- is unaware

18     that General Zivanovic, for whatever -- you know, at this point can't

19     give orders like that anymore.  It's -- it's not improper for

20     Colonel Beara to call General Zivanovic to remind him of what

21     General Mladic's orders were in this issue and to ask General Zivanovic

22     to give the necessary orders to his brigade commander to ensure that

23     General Mladic's orders are carried out as he gave them.

24             That is an appropriate role for what a staff officer would do in

25     furtherance of ensuring his commander's orders are fully carried out.

Page 16766

 1        Q.   Why couldn't, under these rules, Beara, as a colonel, just order

 2     the troops from the Zvornik Brigade?

 3        A.   Because General -- or because Colonel Beara does not have the

 4     right to command those soldiers from the Zvornik Brigade.  That right is

 5     vested solely in the brigade commander.  Or, at this point in time, the

 6     brigade deputy commander.  The fact that Colonel Beara is following the

 7     boss's orders does not give him unlimited authority to command soldiers

 8     from other units.  He has to exercise proper command and staff channels

 9     and relationships.  Colonel Beara is within his rights to relay to

10     Colonel Zivanovic that General Mladic's orders are not being followed and

11     that General Zivanovic should give the orders necessary to ensure that

12     General Mladic's orders are complied with.

13             But Colonel Beara does not, in and of himself, possess the

14     authority to bypass General Zivanovic or, as you'll see in the next

15     intercept, General Krstic, and directly contact or phone down to the

16     5th Podrinje Unit and order Major Furtula to send that platoon

17     immediately.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I'd offer this intercept into evidence.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, it will be received.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 2997B shall be

21     assigned Exhibit P2542.  Thank you.

22             MR. McCLOSKEY:  So now if we could go to P506B.  It's the same

23     date, 15 July.  The time is now 10.00, about five or six minutes after

24     the last one.  Bless you.  The participants are noted.

25     Colonel Ljubo Beara and -- bless you.  Colonel Ljubo Beara and

Page 16767

 1     General Krstic.

 2        Q.   And we see Beara saying:

 3             "General, Furtula didn't carry out the boss's order."

 4             Who do you think the boss is in this context?

 5        A.   Since we're talking about the exact same context of the last

 6     intercept, the boss is General Mladic.

 7        Q.   Krstic says:

 8             "Listen, he ordered him to lead out a tank, not a train."

 9             Beara says:

10             "But I need 30 men, just like it was ordered."

11             Then Krstic says:

12             "Take from Nastic or Blagojevic."

13             Who do you believe Krstic is referring to when he says Nastic or

14     Blagojevic?

15        A.   Blagojevic is the commander of the

16     Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade.  Nastic is the commander of the

17     Milici Light Infantry Brigade.  So what he is telling Beara to do is he

18     is authorising Beara to contact those two units and have them pull --

19     have them send the people as requested.

20        Q.   Krstic doesn't suggest Pandurevic or Obrenovic.  Any reason why

21     he wouldn't have in that situation?

22        A.   By this time, 1000 hours on 15 July, General Krstic is now well

23     aware of the dire military situation in the Zvornik municipality, and, in

24     fact, has already sent back Colonel Pandurevic and the two battalions

25     worth of soldiers -- or the two tactical groups worth of soldiers from

Page 16768

 1     Zepa to return back to Zvornik so they can militarily deal with the

 2     column.

 3             So clearly, knowing that -- General Krstic is not -- knowing

 4     what's happening in Zvornik, he is not going to suggest that troops be

 5     taken from the combat line in Zvornik.  He is basically saying take them

 6     from units that are less militarily involved right now and, you know,

 7     basically identifying the Bratunac Brigade or the Milici Brigade as

 8     possible sources of those troops.

 9        Q.   After suggesting Nastic and Blagojevic, Krstic goes on so say:

10             "I can't pull anything out of here for you."

11             Where is Krstic at the time; and what is he doing?

12        A.   At the time of this intercept, General Krstic is at the IKM, I

13     believe, it's pronounced Krivace, and is engaged in the military

14     operations related to Zepa.  So, again this is an example of what I mean,

15     how they've run extension 385 out to the forward command post so it can

16     reach General Krstic.

17        Q.   Would that IKM be Krivace?

18        A.   Yes, sir, that's a more accurate pronunciation of it.

19        Q.   All right.  And then Beara says:

20             "But I don't have any here.  I need them today and I'll give them

21     back tonight.  Krle, you have to understand, I can't explain it to you,

22     like this."

23             What's this term, "Krle"?

24        A.   Krle was a nickname that various senior officers had for

25     General Krstic.

Page 16769

 1        Q.   And when he says "I can't explain it to you like this," what's

 2     your view of what that mean, if anything?

 3        A.   Well, sir, he's -- as the chief of Main Staff, the security

 4     administration, he probably knows better than anyone else the

 5     vulnerabilities of the telephone system to potential compromise and is

 6     making it clear, I can't really go into the details of the conversation.

 7        Q.   And Krstic says:

 8             "I'll disturb everything on his axis if I pull them out, and a

 9     lot depends on him."

10             What does that mean?

11        A.   The Visegrad Brigade was involved in the Zepa operation, coming

12     in from a separate angle from the main attack.  Part of the military

13     operation for these units was to draw forces away or keep forces pinned

14     down so the main forces attacking from the north would find less

15     resistance in this context, basically what General Krstic is telling

16     Beara is that, I can't weaken that particular axis of the attack.

17        Q.   And then Beara says:

18             "I can't resolve anything without ..." and that should read 15 to

19     30 men.

20             That's a misprint in the English translation.

21             And Boban Indjic is how it is spelled in the B/C/S, not Djindjic.

22             Do you know who this Boban Indjic was at the time?

23        A.   Yes, sir.  He's a member of the Visegrad Brigade.  And actually

24     at this time he is a subordinate to Milan Lukic.

25        Q.   Do you recall an intercept on the 13th that had something to do

Page 16770

 1     with a unit with -- from Visegrad coming up to the Srebrenica area?

 2        A.   Yes, sir, I do.  If I recall correctly, the intercept notes that

 3     they were on their way but due to a mechanical problem the bus carrying

 4     them broke down, so they could not complete the journey.

 5        Q.   All right.  And I believe that's in evidence, but I will check on

 6     that intercept.  All right.  So Beara says:

 7             "I can't resolve anything without 15, 30 men, and Boban Indjic."

 8             Krstic says:

 9             "Ljubo, this is not protected."

10             Beara says:

11             "I know, I know."

12             What's going on here?

13        A.   Again, now General Krstic is reminding Beara that this particular

14     line is liable to intercept.

15        Q.   And then Krstic says:

16             "I will see what I can do but it will disturb a lot.  Have a look

17     down there at Nastic and Blagojevic's."

18             I think that's self-explanatory.

19             Beara says:

20             "But I don't have any.  If I did, I wouldn't still be asking for

21     the third day."

22             Krstic says:

23             "Again, check with Blagojevic.  Take his Red Berets."

24             What are the Red Berets, in your view?

25        A.   The Red Berets unit was an intervention platoon, part of the

Page 16771

 1     Bratunac Brigade.  Normally it was assigned to the 3rd Infantry Battalion

 2     but because most of the particular individuals to that unit were younger

 3     and fitter soldiers, they were often used in a number of other places

 4     during the war.

 5        Q.   All right.  Well, we see what Beara says about that, "they're not

 6     there.  They took off."  I won't repeat it all.

 7             Krstic again says:

 8             "I will see what I can do."

 9             Beara says:

10             "Check it out and have them go to Drago's."

11             In this context, who is Drago and where is Drago's, in your view?

12        A.   Drago is Drago Nikolic, the chief of security for the

13     Zvornik Brigade.  If Beara is telling them to go to Drago's, they're --

14     what he is basically saying is, Send them to the headquarters of the

15     Zvornik Infantry Brigade, have them report to Drago Nikolic where I

16     happen to be sitting at the moment.

17        Q.   Krstic says:

18             "I can't guarantee anything."

19             Beara responds:

20             "Krle, I don't know what to do anymore."

21             Krstic says:

22             "Ljubo, then take those MUP men from up there."

23             What's that a reference to?

24        A.   As we've discussed over the last couple of days, there were a

25     number of MUP units who were under military command related to this

Page 16772

 1     operation and in this context, General Krstic is throwing out the idea of

 2     potentially MUP or police officers being used by Beara for his task.

 3        Q.   Beara responds:

 4             "No, they won't do anything.  I talked ..."

 5             That's fairly self-explanatory.  And then he says there is no

 6     other solution but for the 15 to 30 men with Indjic.  The thing that was

 7     supposed to arrive on the 13th but didn't.

 8             Krstic says:

 9             "Ljubo, have you to understand me too...," then "you've done

10     fucking all sorts to me.

11             Then Beara says:

12             "I understand, but have you to understand me too, and had ...

13     these men [sic] been done then, we wouldn't be arguing over it now."

14             What do these exchanges mean to you?

15        A.   General Krstic is obviously not happy about having to figure out

16     where he's going to find additional people for the task that Beara is

17     undertaking, and Beara is reminding him that, had the people showed up

18     like they were supposed to, we wouldn't be having this conversation

19     today.

20        Q.   So now Krstic says:

21             "Fuck it.  Now I'll be the one to blame."

22             Blamed for what, in your view?  What is Krstic being worried

23     about being blamed for?

24        A.   The fact that given what Colonel Beara is involved in,

25     General Krstic is worried about the fact that he will get blamed because

Page 16773

 1     the executions that are supposed to be occurring are taking longer than

 2     they're suppose to because individuals who were supposed to be sent

 3     haven't been send.  Now he is the corps commander.  The fact that they

 4     weren't sent from the Visegrad Brigade ultimately is his responsibility.

 5        Q.   And Beara responds:

 6             "I don't know what to do.  I mean it, Krle.  There are still 3500

 7     parcels that I have to distribute and I have no solution."

 8             What do you take it -- this term "3500 parcels to distribute"

 9     means?  What are the parcels?

10        A.   The parcels in this particular context is the euphemism that they

11     were using for prisoners.

12        Q.   And we see this intercept is at 10.00 a.m. on the 15th.  Do you

13     remember what prisoners are still alive in the Zvornik Brigade area of

14     responsibility at 10.00 a.m. on the 15th?

15        A.   Well, sir, by this time, the prisoners from the Orahovac school

16     and the Petkovci school have already been killed, but there are still

17     prisoners alive in Rocevic and Pilica, as well as the overflow prisoners

18     that are going into the Dom of Kulture.

19        Q.   And so in that context, when Beara says this, and this it's

20     this -- "that I have to distribute and I have no solution."  What does he

21     mean by, "that I have to distribute and I have no solution"?

22        A.   It's, in my opinion, a clear reference to the fact that these

23     prisoners have to die and at the moment he doesn't have the means to

24     undertake executions.

25        Q.   Okay.  The other version of that intercept which is already in

Page 16774

 1     evidence so I won't go there.

 2             Let's go to 65 ter 114.  We're still in our chronology.  And what

 3     we have here is a document from a person named Colonel Ignjat Milanovic.

 4             I'll remind the Trial Chamber, you have heard General Keserovic

 5     talk about this document a bit, but it was a while back.

 6             And this is 15 July.  It is entitled: "Engagement of Forces in

 7     Searching the Terrain in the Direction of Zepa and the

 8     1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade."

 9             Thank you for getting that handwritten version up for us.  I

10     think that they should be in the binder.

11             It's entitled: "Proposal."  And the proposal is to authorise and

12     appoint the commander of the 1st Bratunac Brigade to command all the

13     forces searching the terrain.

14             Can you just give us a synopsis briefly of what's going on here

15     and who this Ignjat Milanovic is?

16        A.   Colonel Ignjat Milanovic is an officer on the Drina Corps

17     Command.  His normal role is that he is the chief of the air and air

18     defence forces for the corps.  What this particular document is, is a

19     reflection of a normal and often-exercised practice of the VRS of sending

20     various staff officers to locations in order to gain a clear picture of

21     what's going on and to ensure various orders are being forwarded --

22     sorry, followed and were necessary to make proposals for changes in

23     orders if the circumstances change.  In this context, he is replying

24     that, based on the order of the Drina Corps commander, I went to these

25     various locations and acquainted myself with the situation.  He is now

Page 16775

 1     reporting back to the Drina Corps commander and saying, Here are the

 2     things that I of my own authorities have ordered based on what he

 3     believes he is authorised to give orders against.

 4             And then he makes an additional proposal related to some various

 5     command resubordinations, which clearly he doesn't believe he is

 6     authorised to undertake, and needs the approval of the Drina Corps

 7     Command.

 8             So this is a relatively typical role that a staff officer would

 9     play in the context of a military operation.

10        Q.   And does - one last question - this proposal have anything to do

11     with the column and the Muslims from Srebrenica that you had been talking

12     about, that moved through the area earlier?

13        A.   Yes, sir, in the sense that these are the remnants, the back end

14     of the column that had been cut off by the 13th of July and in subsequent

15     days, the 14th and 15th, they're still engaged in operations against

16     them.  And what is apparent to Colonel Milanovic under the circumstances

17     is that they're having problems with successfully dealing with the battle

18     because the various military forces that are engaged in it are under

19     independent commands and that he believes that because there's not one

20     overall commander, co-ordinating this situation and directing the

21     activities of the units, that they're not being as successful as they

22     should be in this regard.

23        Q.   Does that include MUP units?

24        A.   Yes, sir.  There, at this point in time, there were still two

25     companies of the Jahorina MUP on the road between Sandici and Konjevic

Page 16776

 1     Polje.

 2        Q.   And do you recall their -- their immediate commander?

 3        A.   Their immediate commander was Ljubisa Borovcanin.

 4        Q.   And his subordinate commander?

 5        A.   Well, in this case, it would be Mendelav Djuric and Nedjo

 6     Ikonic -- I'm sorry, Dusko Jevic.  And then below him would be Mendelav

 7     Djuric and Nedjo Ikonic.

 8        Q.   And what officer was Milanovic proposing take over command of all

 9     these units?

10        A.   His proposal was that it was the commander of the

11     1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade.

12        Q.   Who was?

13        A.   Colonel Blagojevic.

14        Q.   And I would offer that -- that document into evidence.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.  But I would like to ask you

16     to repeat one answer.  Page 62, lines -- line 16.  You have mentioned

17     several names which are not recorded.  Could you please repeat them.

18             THE WITNESS:  The question was related to the subordinate

19     commanders of Ljubisa Borovcanin, sir?

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, indeed.

21             THE WITNESS:  The next subordinate commander would be Dusko

22     Jevic, and then subordinate to Dusko Jevic were the two actual company

23     commanders, Mendelav Djuric and Nedjo Ikonic.  That's I-k-o-n-i-c,

24     N-e-d-j-o.

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I guess we have gone past the break five minutes.

Page 16777

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Now we have it on the screen.  Thank you.  It

 2     will be received.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 114 shall be

 4     assigned exhibit number P2543.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  We must have our next break

 6     now, and we will resume 20 minutes past 6.00.

 7                           --- Recess taken at 5.49 p.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 6.23 p.m.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  At the outset of today's hearing, you,

10     Mr. McCloskey, indicated a change of status of three documents.  The

11     Chamber checked these indications, looked into the details, and I can

12     confirm that P2304 should now be public.  Instead of that, P2337 and

13     P2298 should be under seal.

14             Mr. McCloskey, please continue.

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

16        Q.   Okay.  Mr. Butler, let's now go to P2218.  We left off with the

17     last document, the proposal by Colonel Milanovic for Colonel Blagojevic

18     to take over command of these units searching this terrain coming out of

19     the enclave area.  Now we can see we actually have a document.  It's a

20     daily combat report in the name of the commander of the Bratunac Brigade,

21     Blagojevic.  From his command to the commander of the Bratunac Brigade,

22     Blagojevic, from his command to the command of the Drina Corps.  And

23     while it doesn't say anything specific on that point, we do see in the

24     middle of paragraph 2, we've got the handwritten version, there's also a

25     typed version in the B/C/S, but we see in the middle of paragraph 2 it

Page 16778

 1     says:

 2             "During the day the brigade commander visited all units which are

 3     blocking the enemy retreat."

 4             And it lists all these different units, brigades, the

 5     65th Protection Regiment; the Milici Brigade, the 65th Protection

 6     Regiment, parts of the MUP, and the 5th Engineering Battalion.  And it

 7     says he defined their tasks and organised their joint action and

 8     communications.

 9             What do you make of that, that the brigade commander did this?

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I would kindly ask you to slow down again.

11     Because some parts of your reading into the record is missing.

12             Mr. Butler.

13             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  In this particular document, it reflects

14     that the proposal made by Colonel Milanovic the day prior has been, to a

15     large degree, accepted by the Drina Corps commander, General Krstic, and

16     subsequently he'd ordered Colonel Blagojevic, the Bratunac Brigade

17     commander, to implement these as far as at least visiting all of the

18     units, defining their tasks, and organising their joint actions and

19     communications.  Does not specifically say take command, but clearly

20     Colonel Blagojevic has been given an order to all to synchronise all of

21     the operations of these units.

22        Q.   All right.  Now, if the next day, the 17th, Colonel Blagojevic

23     was sent off to Zepa at some point, what situation would that create, if

24     these units were -- were still searching the area?

25        A.   It would, in effect, be the same situation that was in existence

Page 16779

 1     on the 15th, and there would be a requirement for somebody else to take

 2     control of synchronising all of these units and integrating their

 3     operations against the remnants of the column.

 4        Q.   All right.  Let's go now to P -- it's 126.  This is a document we

 5     spent some time with, with another witness, but let me ask you a bit

 6     about it, Mr. Butler.

 7             We see that it's from the Main Staff.  17 July.  And we see that

 8     it's in the name of Ratko Mladic.  And the entitled:  "Integrating of

 9     Operations to Crush Lagging Muslim Forces."  And it's to the Drina Corps

10     command for information and to the Zvornik Brigade, the Bratunac Brigade,

11     the Milici Brigade, and the 67th Communications Regiment.

12             And the first paragraph talks about sending three officers, and

13     it names them, from the Main Staff to assist -- to the Zvornik Brigade,

14     and I'll read it slowly:

15             "To assist in the joining of the VRS and MUP forces, the planning

16     and co-ordination of combat operations to block, crush, and destroy

17     lagging Muslim forces in the wider area of Kamenica and Cerska."

18             Can you tell us, if you recall, who these people were, Colonels

19     Nedjo Trkulja?

20        A.   He was the chief of armoured forces for the Main Staff of the

21     VRS.

22        Q.   Milovan Stankovic.

23        A.   He was another intelligence officer with the Main Staff of the

24     VRS.

25        Q.   Under who?

Page 16780

 1        A.   In that context, he would be under General Tolimir.  Although,

 2     more accurately, under Colonel Salapura.

 3        Q.   And Bogdan Sladojevic?

 4        A.   He was an officer who had just been reassigned from the federal

 5     army, the VJ, to the VRS, and he was on temporary duty at the Main Staff

 6     before assuming his job as the chief of operations for the

 7     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  He just happened to be there at the time.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             Please, Mr. President, could you instruct Mr. McCloskey to give

11     us the reference where it shows that that officer was subordinated to me.

12     If they were deployed pursuant to an order issued by somebody else, where

13     does it say that he was subordinated to Tolimir?

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, that was the answer of the witness

15     and not any suggestion of Mr. McCloskey to the witness.  Mr. McCloskey

16     just asked who was that person.

17             Please carry on Mr. McCloskey.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But the context was this:  Who

19     would that person have been subordinated to?  That's what Mr. McCloskey

20     asked.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes --

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise to you, but ...

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, you may deal with that during your

24     cross-examination.  It is absolutely correct and there's no criticism if

25     Mr. McCloskey asks who a certain person is subordinated to.  That's all.

Page 16781

 1     And that is an absolutely correct question.

 2             Please carry on, Mr. McCloskey.

 3             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 4        Q.   Mr. Butler, do you recall upon which document or authority or --

 5     you base your opinion regarding the placement of Milovan Stankovic?

 6        A.   It's been a while.  I'd have to research that myself.  But to be

 7     clear, I'm not implying that in this order that Milovan Stankovic was

 8     sent to the Zvornik Brigade on the order of General Tolimir.  I'm just

 9     noting that Milovan Stankovic is an intelligence officer with the VRS.

10        Q.   All right.  And this says, number 2:

11             "The team from the VRS ... shall assess the situation on the

12     brigade's front line and in the rear, the available forces, and hear out

13     the proposal and opinion of the commander of the Zvornik Brigade.  On

14     this basis, they are to draw up a plan together with the brigade

15     commander to comb the terrain, block, crush, and destroy the straggling

16     parts of the [sic] armed Muslim groups in the wider areas of Kamenica,

17     Cerska, and Udrc."

18             Now, we have jumped a little bit ahead of our chronology because

19     of the second part of this document and the previous documents we've been

20     related to.  But can you put these two paragraphs into context?  What --

21     what had gone on in the Zvornik Brigade area, in terms of the military

22     situation, and what, in your view, based on your review of the materials,

23     do 1 and 2 have to do with?

24        A.   As I previously discussed, the military situation in the

25     Zvornik Brigade, on 16 July 1995, and the combat that was occurring with

Page 16782

 1     the column, Colonel Pandurevic made an agreement with the commander of

 2     the 28th Infantry -- or not the commander, I'm sorry, with

 3     Semso Muminovic to allow the column to pass through the lines and into

 4     Bosnian Muslim-held territory.  As noted, that was not an act that was

 5     authorised by either the Drina Corps Command or the Main Staff, and as

 6     word spread that Colonel Pandurevic had made this agreement, there are

 7     various documents, intercepts, which reflect that a lot of people were

 8     very disturbed by hearing this.

 9             The following day, this -- these two paragraphs reflect

10     General Mladic wanting to send and, in fact, he did send these three

11     officers to talk to Pandurevic, and they also spoke to Obrenovic, in

12     order to make an independent evaluation of the situation and later

13     potentially make a recommendation back to General Mladic what, if any,

14     actions might be taken against Colonel Pandurevic for his decision.

15        Q.   Are you aware of any negative recommendation or action that was

16     taken against Pandurevic for his decision to open up the corridor?

17        A.   No, sir.  And, in fact, when I discussed earlier the

18     18 July interim combat report, I had noted that there was a bit of a back

19     story to why Colonel Pandurevic felt a need to lay out a detailed

20     accounting of not only his actions with respect to the most recent combat

21     but the previous burdens that the Zvornik Brigade had been asked to

22     shoulder.  That interim report to General Krstic was motivated, to a

23     large degree, by the visits of these three officers, and

24     Colonel Pandurevic's feeling that he needed to really lay out his case

25     and wanted to make it directly to General Krstic.

Page 16783

 1             In any event, for whatever reason, General Mladic did not

 2     sanction or relieve Colonel Pandurevic for his decision.

 3        Q.   All right.  Now let's take a look at paragraph 3 that speaks:

 4     "As of 17 July," and then it lists these forces, the Bratunac Brigade,

 5     and I won't list all of them.  But are those the same forces that were

 6     spoken about by Ignjat Milanovic and in Blagojevic's daily combat report

 7     that we've just seen on this same topic?

 8        A.   Yes, sir.

 9        Q.   And it talks about discovering and destroying the lagging Muslim

10     groups in this area.  And it says:

11             "I hereby appoint Lieutenant-Colonel Keserovic, the officer of

12     the military police of the [sic] Main Staff security administration, as

13     the commander of all the aforementioned forces."

14             And then it gives it various other tasks related to that.

15             And if, in fact, Colonel Blagojevic left the area on the 17th of

16     July, would this order fill in that gap that you spoke of previously?

17        A.   Yes, sir.

18        Q.   Now let's go to 65 ter 249.  This is a document from the command

19     of the Bratunac Brigade on 17 July to the Drina Corps Command.  It is in

20     the name of Colonel Blagojevic, and it says:

21             "Among the Muslim prisoners, there are four underage children

22     (aged between 8 and 14) who are being held in a military custody in

23     Bratunac.  One of them told the commander of the unit that was searching

24     the area about a large number of Muslim troops committing suicide or

25     killing each other.  We propose that this testimony be recorded by

Page 16784

 1     cameras of your press centre."

 2             Now, this reference to "units searching the area," do you connect

 3     this "units searching the area" reference with any -- any of the

 4     information set out in the previous document where Keserovic is put in

 5     command of the forces regarding the lagging Muslims from Srebrenica?

 6        A.   Yes, sir.  The Bratunac Brigade forces, who were engaged in these

 7     activities, would have been under his direction.

 8        Q.   And can you describe what you recall, if anything, about what --

 9     what the forces did that day, on the 17th, that resulted in these

10     prisoners?  Just roughly.  If you recall.

11        A.   I understand from the investigation that a composite unit of the

12     Bratunac Infantry Brigade and the MUP forces of the Jahorina MUP

13     companies, on the 16th and 17th, were conducting sweep operations.  And I

14     believe that individuals who participated in this talk about, somewhere,

15     of approximately 180 Bosnian Muslim men from that particular sweep

16     operation being captured.  Among them were these four underage, or four

17     children.

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20        A.   Yes, sir.

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I would offer this document into

22     evidence.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes.  It will be received as an exhibit.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, 65 ter document 249 shall be

25     assigned Exhibit P2544.  Thank you.

Page 16785

 1             MR. McCLOSKEY:

 2        Q.   Okay.  Getting back to our chronology, which is really on the

 3     15th of July.  We could go to P13, if we could.

 4             And this is the interim combat report from Vinko Pandurevic from

 5     the Zvornik Brigade to the Drina Corps Command.  It's got a sent/received

 6     stamp of 1925 hours.

 7             Can you -- before we get into this document, can you set the

 8     scene for us?  The early evening hours of 15 July.  Where was Pandurevic

 9     that day, and what is he doing, as far as you know, from the

10     investigation in this early -- at this time that this document was

11     drafted and sent to the Drina Corps.

12        A.   Yes, sir.  As I've testified earlier, during the early morning

13     hours of the 15th of July, Colonel Pandurevic and the two tactical groups

14     that made up the formations of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade were directed

15     to go from the Zepa battle-front and return to Zvornik, in order to deal

16     with the unfolding military issue they were having.  He arrived

17     approximately 11.30, and by 12.00 was meeting with individuals at the

18     Zvornik Brigade and other units that were involved - Major Obrenovic,

19     Mr. Borovcanin, Dragomir Vasic - and discussed how they came together,

20     and that Colonel Pandurevic had laid out a plan by which he wanted to

21     block the column.

22             This document is his interim combat report reflecting, in part,

23     what the situation was in the Zvornik Brigade, what orders he had given,

24     and at the time that he's drafting this, he is at his forward command

25     post where he is co-ordinating the larger defence operations against the

Page 16786

 1     column.

 2        Q.   And these first three paragraphs that describe the situation, did

 3     you find them to be roughly accurate when comparing various other reports

 4     and information?

 5        A.   Yes, sir.  I believe this is a -- an accurate recounting of the

 6     information that everyone was aware of at the time on 15 July with

 7     respect to the battle-field situation.

 8        Q.   So he -- in that third paragraph, talks about the attack on

 9     Memici is still in progress, that all targets deep inside the territory

10     and the suburbs and town of Zvornik have been under artillery fire.  Who

11     can hit them with artillery fire at that point?

12        A.   That would be artillery fired from the positions of the ABiH

13     2 Corps on the other side of the confrontation line.

14        Q.    "All attacks have been repulsed successfully so far.  So far,

15     according to information received we have four dead and a dozen or so

16     wounded.

17             "With all available forces, we have sealed off the wider area of

18     Crni Vrh and Planinci, and partially the area of Kamenica.

19             "All brigade forces are fully engaged and we have no reserves."

20             Now this next small paragraph I want to ask you about.  It says:

21             "An additional burden for us is the large number of prisoners

22     distributed throughout schools in the brigade area, as well as

23     obligations of security and restoration of terrain."

24             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And for Your Honours, it says:

25             "... as well as obligations of security and 'asanacija terena,'"

Page 16787

 1     which is a term you've heard before which got translated as "restoration

 2     of the terrain."

 3             Now, this large number of prisoners distributed throughout the

 4     schools in the brigade area, by 7.00 p.m., the evening of 15 July, are

 5     there any prisoners alive at Orahovac?

 6        A.   No, sir.  Save the four survivors.

 7        Q.   And Petkovci school?

 8        A.   No, sir, they are all dead except for the survivors there.

 9        Q.   And the Rocevic school?

10        A.   They were being killed during the day on the 15th.  I don't know

11     that we have any survivor accounts which reflect how late that was going

12     on, but by 7.00 p.m. most of them should have been dead already.

13        Q.   And the Kula school in Pilica and the cultural centre in Pilica

14     on the evening of 15 July, can you remind us what their status was based

15     on the investigation?

16        A.   Yes, sir.  The group -- the groups at Pilica and at the Dom of

17     culture were still alive and being detained.

18        Q.   So what do you believe that Pandurevic is referring to when he

19     says:

20             "An additional burden for us is a large number of prisoners

21     distributed throughout the schools in the brigade area, as well as

22     obligations of security and 'asanacija terena'"?

23        A.   My opinion is that Colonel Pandurevic understood within the

24     context of what was happening that the requirements to, first, guard the

25     prisoners, deal with their executions, and then to burry the bodies, as

Page 16788

 1     well as continuing to guard the prisoners at Pilica and the Dom of

 2     culture was having an adverse impact on his ability to deal with the

 3     combat situation which was occurring at the same time.  The key phrase is

 4     that all brigade forces are fully engaged and we have -- he has no

 5     reserves.  These forces that could have been available had they not been

 6     involved in these activity would have potentially given

 7     Colonel Pandurevic at least a minimal reserve force, but it was otherwise

 8     engaged on what were, you know, the tasks relating to prisoners.

 9        Q.   And when you say "obligations of security," how is it that you

10     say that this is guarding the prisoners?

11        A.   To my knowledge, the actual identities of who was responsible for

12     the executions is still a little unclear.  I am aware that members of the

13     4th Infantry Battalion in Orahovac were involved in the executions at

14     that site.  I do not know whether or not 6th Battalion members were

15     involved in the executions at Petkovci; although, they were clearly

16     involved in guarding the prisoners at the school.

17             Most of the investigative work related to Rocevic occurred after

18     departed from the ICTY and the Office of the Prosecutor, so I don't know

19     that I'm fully clear on all of the elements that were involved in the

20     executions at Rocevic, although I am aware that some members of

21     potentially the 5th or 2nd Battalion were involved.  And while the

22     killings that were done at Branjevo were done by a combination of the

23     10th Sabotage Detachment and later on a group of men who had come up from

24     Bratunac.

25             And then later the final killings at the Dom of cultural which

Page 16789

 1     I'm not sure at this date who ultimately was responsible for executing

 2     those.  But again, with respect to the 1st Battalion, they were engaged

 3     in the process of guarding them as well as the process of having to

 4     remove the bodies, particularly from the Dom of culture since it was in

 5     the middle of the town at Pilica, and bring them to where they would be

 6     buried at Branjevo.

 7             So again in that particular context it's all a reflection of the

 8     numbers of soldiers and units that had some involvement in the whole

 9     wider aspect of the crime or multiple crimes in this case.  At the same

10     time, there's also a pitched battle going on in other locations of the

11     Zvornik Infantry Brigade.

12        Q.   And, Mr. President, it's -- there's a translation issue here.

13     And it's the position of the Prosecution that the term "obligations of

14     security" has to do with securing or guarding the prisoners, that the

15     term related to security branch is a different term, and so it would not

16     be appropriate to view this as obligations of the security branch.  I

17     believe Mr. Gajic and General Tolimir will agree with us on that.  It's

18     been the subject of agreement for many years.  But, of course, I'll wait

19     to hear from them on that.

20             There's a bit more time to discuss this document, Mr.  President.

21     We can talk about it tomorrow or finish it tonight, whatever is -- you

22     wish.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think we have to adjourn for today.  You may

24     continue tomorrow.

25             We are sitting in the afternoon.  Therefore, we resume at 2.15 in

Page 16790

 1     the afternoon in this courtroom, number III.

 2             We adjourn.

 3                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.00 p.m.,

 4                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 19th day of July,

 5                           2011, at 2.15 p.m.