110823IT

Page 17105

1 there be peace in this house and may God's will be done in these

2 proceedings today and not mine. Greetings to everyone present.

3 Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]

4 Q. [Interpretation] And Mr. Butler, too. Mr. Butler, yesterday we

5 discussed the conversation with Mr. Mladic and the threat that sanctions

6 would be imposed if UNPROFOR convoys were subject of attack? This is

7 something that we discussed. Do you remember?

8 A. I remember we had discussions related to this within the context

9 of General Smith's witness statement.

10 Q. That's correct. I'll read the relevant sentence. Smith said

11 that he spoke to Karadzic on the 9th of March.

12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Could you please indicate where we can find it in

13 the statement of Mr. Smith so that we can have it on the screen.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, my apologies,

15 Mr. President. We will find the relevant portion of General Smith.

16 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Can we show D193, page 13,

17 paragraph 2. That's page 12, penultimate or last paragraph of the page.

18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You mean page 12 in the English; correct?

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's correct. The last

20 paragraph, which reads:

21 "On the 9th May, I had a further private meeting with

22 Dr. Karadzic. The discussions covered the recent BSA attacks on Sarajevo

23 and the Bosnian Serb sanctions on the UN contingents in the eastern

24 enclaves."

25 Can we now show 65 ter 724. 7248, my apologies.

Page 17106

1 Thank you, Aleksandar.

2 This is another report about the interview that the OTP had with

3 General Rupert Smith on the 8th of November, 2011. Can we have page 4

4 displayed in both versions, paragraphs 1 through 3. It seems that we are

5 looking after paragraph 5, after all. Let me quote:

6 "I predicted under the thesis that the Serbs would neutralise

7 those enclaves to eliminate the need to place BSA forces.

8 "Then there was the routine denial of convoys. There was the

9 shooting down of two Bosnian helicopters flying one into Gorazde and

10 into Srebrenica.

11 "I thought to myself, what if I was Mladic? What would I do to

12 shift the balance of forces to advantage of the Serbs? I would squeeze

13 the enclaves, make them irrelevant, starve them."

14 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15 Q. This is my question: In this particular quotation, did

16 General Rupert Smith present his view as to what he would have done had

17 he been in the shoes of the Bosnian Serbs?

18 A. This particular -- this second statement which I believe you're

19 incorrect, it's not dated 2011, I believe it's dated 2002. I am not sure

20 if I've ever read it before, so I don't know the entire context of the

21 statement, but from the passage that you laid out, General Smith is

22 theorising that if he were General Mladic, how he would approach the

23 situation with respect to shifting, again, that balance of power and not

24 necessarily strength but the ability to free up forces to use them in

25 other parts of the country. That shifting, that balance of been -- of

Page 17107

1 forces to the advantage of the Serbs, how he would do it. In his case,

2 he's basically saying that he would deal with the situation in the

3 eastern enclaves. He recognised, as General Mladic did, that they were

4 an intolerable strain on the man power resources of the Army of the

5 Republika Srpska.

6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. General Smith goes on to say further

7 down:

8 "I would squeeze the enclaves, make them irrelevant, starve

9 them."

10 Was this, too, a view that he expressed? Thank you.

11 A. It's -- in the context of his witness statement, it's probably

12 not the most artful phrase that he might have used in describing the

13 situation, but what it says is what it says.

14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. If these eastern enclaves, which were

15 deep within the territory of Republika Srpska, and if they attacked the

16 territory of the Republika Srpska, is not the Army of Republika Srpska

17 entitled to use measures against them including UNPROFOR forces which

18 failed to enforce the demilitarisation to which measures they would be

19 entitled under the legal provisions arising from the Geneva Conventions

20 that we looked at yesterday?

21 A. As I've indicated before, I've always believed that the VRS had

22 the right to attack the elements of the 28th Infantry Division in both

23 the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves. Those represented legitimate military

24 targets. As for the second part of your question, whether or not they

25 were entitled to use measures against the United Nations protection

Page 17108

1 forces is a thornier question. For good or for bad, the United Nations

2 protection forces did not see themselves as a party to the conflict.

3 I understand that from the Bosnian Serb military perspective,

4 they were viewed as, at least tacitly, aiding the Bosnian Muslim forces

5 in the enclaves, or the enclaves with respect to the eastern enclaves.

6 So, again, there was never any problem conducting military operations

7 against the 28th Infantry Division. They represented a legitimate

8 military target as such. I am always problematic with respect to whether

9 or not anyone is entitled to attack the United Nations forces under those

10 same scenarios.

11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. A moment ago you said that they aided the

12 Muslim forces, and I mean UNPROFOR. Are not the Bosnian Serbs entitled

13 to restrict the aid arriving for the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

14 especially if the aid happens to be transiting the territory under their

15 control? Thank you.

16 A. What I said specifically was that I understand that from a

17 military perspective the Bosnian Serb side viewed that UNPROFOR was

18 aiding the Bosnian Muslim side. I have no first-hand knowledge whether

19 they were or were no it.

20 As to the second part of your question, the Bosnian Serb side

21 obviously did have the view that since they believed that the UNPROFOR

22 was aiding the Bosnian Muslim side, that by restricting supplies going

23 into the United Nations or for United Nations forces, that that would

24 have a follow-on effect and militarily impact or degradate the ability of

25 the Bosnian Muslim military forces to conduct further operations.

Page 17109

1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Yesterday and this morning we've been

2 discussing the mandate of the United Nations forces, specifically the

3 Dutch Battalion in the Srebrenica enclave.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now call up D20. It's a

5 report based on the debriefing which was published in 1995. We are

6 interested in page 9, paragraph 23 -- 223, which describes the mandate

7 of the Dutch Battalion in Srebrenica. This is the title: "Debriefing."

8 Can we have page 9, paragraph 2.23. Can we have the next page, please.

9 Thank you. We see there 2.23. You can see it. We are discussing the

10 mandate of the Dutch Battalion as expressed here:

11 "The tasks assigned to DutchBat were as follows, derived from the

12 aforementioned cease-fire and resolutions."

13 Under A:

14 "To monitor compliance with the cease-fire.

15 "B. To disarm the BiH.

16 "C. To support the provision of humanitarian aid."

17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18 Q. This is my question: Based on your knowledge and reading of the

19 relevant documents including perhaps this debriefing, is what I just read

20 out the basis for the mandate of the DutchBat that was present in

21 Srebrenica? Thank you.

22 A. In the context of this particular document and laying this

23 situation out, these were the three provisions that came out of the 1995

24 report, so this is what initially that they understood their mission to

25 be.

Page 17110

1 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us, was any of these tasks completed by

2 the UNPROFOR forces stationed in Srebrenica and Zepa?

3 A. With respect to the three tasks, I believe that task A,

4 monitoring the compliance, and task C, were tasks that were always going

5 to be ongoing, and the Dutch Battalion took measures to do that. I do

6 not believe that by the time we got to the third iteration of

7 Dutch Battalion, DutchBat III, that they were actively involved in task B

8 anymore, which was disarming the BiH forces within the enclave.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's look at D239 now. It's a

11 report from the sector of intelligence and security of the Main Staff of

12 VRS, dated the 19th of May, 1995. Can we show page 2, please, in

13 Serbian, and page 3 in English. We have it now. Thank you. The

14 relevant part reads:

15 "We have confirmed the information that the 28th Division is

16 undergoing intensive preparations for offensive activities in order to

17 link up with elements of the 23rd Division in the Han Pogled area. As

18 part of offensive preparations from the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves,

19 they have taken possession of important features to secure the corridor

20 linking the enclaves, and they have partially grouped the forces in the

21 western part of the enclaves. They have taken Podravanje, Ljeskovik,

22 Susica, Stublic, Brloznik, Sadilov Cair, Godjenje, Ljubomislje, and

23 Gusinac, which are outside of the so-called demilitarised zone, which is

24 also to create better conditions for offensive activities."

25 So this is document dated 19th May, 1995, which is two months

Page 17111

1 ahead of the VRS operations directed at Srebrenica.

2 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Tell us, should UNPROFOR know that they are leaving the

4 demilitarised zone and taking up positions, as indicated here, which were

5 part of the operation of linking up?

6 A. As you are aware, the UN Dutch Battalion forces did have a number

7 of observation posts around the perimeter of the enclave, along not

8 necessarily the demarcated border because the demarcated border was

9 disputed. I would again remind you that whether they should have known

10 or should not have known, the reality was that once restrictions of

11 movements were put into place by the BiH 28th Infantry Division in March

12 of 1995, and perhaps even as early as February, the actual ability of the

13 Dutch Battalion to monitor all of these types of operations would have

14 been greatly degraded.

15 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. You're probably thinking of this

16 particular document of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now show D142, please.

18 Thank you. We have the document in Serbian and we'll shortly have it in

19 English, I suppose. We are interested in paragraph 3, to summarise what

20 you discussed, and I'm quoting:

21 "The Corps command must agree with the UNPROFOR liaison officer

22 stationed there on the procedure when giving advance notice to the

23 commands of the brigades, battalions, and lines of defence of the BH Army

24 of movement and checks by groups, teams, patrols, and others from the

25 UNPROFOR contingent. UNPROFOR movement has to be channelled and reduced

Page 17112

1 as much as possible in places where they can observe and gather

2 intelligence."

3 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

4 Q. This is a document issued by the command of the BH Army of the

5 Corps in Tuzla, sent on the 4th of January, 1995, to Srebrenica. You are

6 right on that score. However, this is my question: Because of all this,

7 was UNPROFOR under the supervision of the BH Army in Srebrenica or was it

8 the other way around? Thank you.

9 A. I am not sure I can claim that the UNPROFOR was under the

10 supervision of the BH Army in Srebrenica, but, again, I certainly concede

11 what I've always said on this same issue which is that one these

12 restrictions on movement went into place, the ability of the

13 Dutch Battalion to effectively monitor ABiH military movements and

14 activities within the enclave were greatly restricted.

15 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Was it the case then that the Army of

16 Republika Srpska which had its territory in the area where the enclaves

17 are situated, aren't they entitled, in fact, to make sure that UNPROFOR

18 does what it was supposed to do; i.e., disarm the enclaves?

19 A. Again, that is a constant theme within the reporting of the VRS,

20 and particularly the Drina Corps, which is the fact that they do not

21 believe that the UN forces were living up to what they believe was the

22 mandate, and part of that mandate, under the cease-fire agreements, was

23 to disarm the Bosnian Muslim forces or to ensure that they remained

24 disarmed within the enclave. The Dutch Battalion and the UN forces, for

25 their reasons, elected not to force the issue with 1st Operations Group 8

Page 17113

1 and later the 28th Infantry Division. They allowed that status quo to

2 remain, and, as a result, that status quo permitted the

3 28th Infantry Division to conduct operations out of the enclave.

4 Q. Thank you. Does that mean, Mr. Butler, that UNPROFOR forces

5 deployed in Srebrenica failed to fulfill their mandate with regard to the

6 parties to the conflict and that they favoured one of the sides and, in

7 fact, allowed it to organise itself militarily?

8 A. Whether or not they failed to fulfill their mandate again

9 revolves around the question of what the United Nations from top to

10 bottom believed their mandate was with respect to the safe areas. As you

11 can tell even from this document that you have here, from the 2nd Corps

12 command, even the Bosnian Muslim military forces believed that the

13 UNPROFOR forces in the Srebrenica enclave were, in fact, gathering

14 information related to their military operations to their detriment.

15 Both sides perceived that the United Nations forces were not acting

16 impartially within the enclave. The Bosnian Serb side had their position

17 which was that the UNPROFOR was tacitly aiding the Bosnian Muslim

18 military forces: One, overtly by not disarming them; and, two, through

19 the convoy activities and humanitarian resupply which they believed was

20 being siphoned to some degree to support the 28th Infantry Division.

21 The Bosnian Muslims on their side, particularly as you get closer

22 to July of 1995, actually go as far as believing that the United Nations

23 mandate for the safe area should be defined as defending the safe area

24 from the attack by the Bosnian Serb military forces.

25 So in this particular context, the United Nations protection

Page 17114

1 forces were viewed very badly by both sides with respect to what they

2 were supposed to be doing within the Srebrenica enclave.

3 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Please, can you tell me this: If

4 UNPROFOR forces in the enclaves had the mandate to disarm the BH, did

5 they also have the mandate to collect intelligence data about the

6 developments in the enclaves with respect to the procedure of arming, and

7 were they entitled to confiscate such weaponry and put them in a safe

8 depot because according to the agreement, even paramilitary formations

9 were subject to disarming in the enclaves?

10 A. Dealing first with your question on intelligence information, I

11 would suspect that while the UN would never qualify it as collecting

12 intelligence on warring parties, the reality will be that the UN

13 commanders on the ground are going to want to keep and be informed as

14 much as possible about what is happening in the enclave, if for no other

15 reason than to assure the protection and security of the UN forces. So

16 there will be intelligence collection or reconnaissance activities going

17 on by the UN.

18 With respect to the collection of weapons, the UN DutchBat forces

19 there did, in fact, collect weapons, particularly early on in 1993, and

20 they were monitored. The problem that was ongoing was that the

21 United Nations would only monitor the weapons that were turned in by the

22 Bosnian Muslim military side. They would not actively go out and seek to

23 disarm those particular units.

24 So on the one hand, they guarded whatever material that was

25 turned over to them, much of it, as it turns out, was either inoperative

Page 17115

1 or obsolete; but on the other hand, they did not do anything with respect

2 to actively going out and confiscating military equipment or supplies

3 that they might have seen.

4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. If their main task was to effect the

5 disarming of all forces in the enclave, why were they then concealing

6 their task with regard to gathering intelligence about both the regular

7 military and paramilitary forces inside the enclave?

8 A. I don't believe they were concealing it as such. All parties

9 knew that the United Nations forces, as part of the monitoring the

10 enclave, were going to go out and conduct reconnaissance operations. In

11 fact, when you go back to this document that you have on the screen with

12 respect to the 2nd Corps command, it is precisely because of the fact

13 that the ABiH military forces are aware that the Dutch are doing this

14 that they seek to restrict their movement so they can prevent the Dutch

15 from gaining information on these military units and other such

16 information that they deemed would be vital to keep from the Dutch. So

17 it's not a secret that they are doing it. What I'm trying to get the

18 point across is that I would suspect that the UN would not ever claim

19 that they are actually conducting intelligence operations. I mean, they

20 are to be a neutral party. And in this particular context, I don't

21 believe, you know, doing reconnaissance of an area that they are

22 supposedly protecting or monitoring is going to qualify as intelligence

23 gathering.

24 Q. Thank you. Please, did you ever read any kind of document

25 containing information about the relationships between UNPROFOR and the

Page 17116

1 commands of staffs and the 28th Division or any other unit because this

2 is mentioned in this document? Was it allowed for a demilitarised side

3 to have liaison officers to communicate with UNPROFOR in Srebrenica?

4 A. I am aware from the various documents that I've read with respect

5 to Srebrenica, that both sides, not only the Bosnian Muslim side but the

6 Bosnian Serb military side, had protocols in place and officers who were

7 designated to be liaison officers, not only with the Dutch Battalion but

8 with the independent United Nations military observers within Srebrenica.

9 So there was, at least, a mechanism by which not only the UN observers

10 but the Dutch Battalion officers could contact both their counterparts

11 within the VRS as well as their counterparts within the ABiH.

12 Q. Thank you. Were units such as battalion and brigades supposed to

13 exist in Srebrenica, and if the proper demilitarisation had been

14 conducted, would the situation have been any different?

15 A. In answer to your first question, I suppose in the abstract that

16 the 2nd Corps could have decided to keep a military organisational

17 structure for Operations Group 8 and later the 28th Infantry Division and

18 still had them completely disarmed in full compliance with the agreement.

19 I don't know that that would have made much sense to do but they could

20 have done it.

21 The second question, I am not sure that I can answer. It

22 requires a bit of speculation on my part. I don't know whether or not

23 it's known or can be known if -- had the 28th Division been completely

24 disarmed, whether or not history would have happened the way that it did.

25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Given that UNPROFOR maintained legal

Page 17117

1 contact with a military organisation structure in a demilitarised zone,

2 have you come across any documents confirming that they provided them

3 with humanitarian aid even though they were dealing with a military

4 organisation?

5 A. I am not aware of any document specifically from the Dutch

6 component of the United Nations which reflects that UN supplies to the

7 Dutch Battalion were being siphoned off or provided to the ABiH. I am

8 aware that various civilian organisations within the enclave, at times,

9 did make complaints to the Dutch that various other humanitarian goods

10 that were brought in under other UN or international auspices were

11 stolen, siphoned off for military use, or being sold on the black market.

12 So I guess I differentiate between those supplies that are going directly

13 to -- and are manifested to the Dutch Battalion for their use versus a

14 broader pool of supplies that were going in to provide support for the

15 larger civilian population.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now please have in e-court

18 D80.

19 In the meantime, I would like to tender into evidence D142.

20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you, the last document, D142 was marked for

21 identification pending future identification. It will now be received as

22 D142 as a Defence document.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now please have D80 in

24 e-court. Thank you. This is a document produced by the Republic of

25 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Federation of BH, and their defence ministry,

Page 17118

1 specifically their defence secretariat of Tuzla, Srebrenica department,

2 submitted on the 5th of June, 1995, to the Tuzla defence secretariat in

3 which they are reporting about the situation and aid arriving in

4 Srebrenica. And it says:

5 "We hereby submit a list of the quantities of food, materiel, and

6 technical equipment and fuel issued to our military units in our area

7 from the month of May 1995."

8 Then it says:

9 "25.900 kilogrammes of flour, 596 kilogrammes of sugar, 1.423

10 litres of cooking oil, 619 kilogrammes of salt, 5.000 kilogrammes of

11 beans, 17.020 of cold cuts, 100 kilogrammes of powder milk, 62

12 kilogrammes of juice, 7.000 [as interpreted] of tins." Then it speaks

13 about, "Carrot, beans, 171 litres of fuel, engine oil, 1 litre.

14 "We wish to note that the above quantities have been separated

15 from the humanitarian aid contingent which arrived in the area through

16 the UNHCR, while some of the food was obtained from the Dutch Battalion.

17 "Till our ultimate victory!

18 "Chief of the Defence sector, Professor Suljo Hasanovic."

19 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20 Q. My question is: Can one infer from this document that the

21 Dutch Battalion was providing assistance to the Army of

22 Bosnian-Herzegovina as well in the Srebrenica enclave consisting of food

23 supplies, fuel, and other necessities and items listed here?

24 A. Within the context of this document it certainly does claim that

25 they obtained some of the food from the Dutch Battalion. It doesn't

Page 17119

1 specify that they obtained fuel or other such items. And I guess the

2 question that I would have before agreeing to a statement like that, is

3 whether or not the Dutch would ultimately have been aware that the food

4 that they were supplying was actually going to the military versus to

5 civilian needs.

6 So while I accept the fact from this particular document that the

7 28th Infantry Division and the military forces within Srebrenica are

8 getting food from these sources, one of which is the Dutch Battalion, the

9 question that I would have is whether or not the Dutch Battalion

10 personnel were aware that they were supplying food for the ABiH army as

11 opposed to providing food for civilians.

12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: One short remark, on my part. You have read into

13 the transcript the content of this document, Mr. Tolimir, in relation to

14 the 171 litres. You said -- or I heard in the interpretation the word

15 "fuel." In the English translation I see "heating oil" in relation to

16 171 litre. It may be a translation issue. I don't know. Just for the

17 record.

18 Please -- Mr. Gajic.

19 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, obviously there is a

20 slight mistake in the translation because in the original it says "oil,"

21 "171 litres of oil."

22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I see the word "nafta."

23 Please continue, Mr. Tolimir.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

25 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Page 17120

1 Q. In order not to dwell on these issues any longer since we see

2 that there were no activities leading to the disarming, and you said that

3 yourself.

4 Now let us look at task C. That is to say, did they provide

5 support in providing humanitarian aid? In other words, can you tell me

6 whether UNPROFOR provided support in providing humanitarian aid and did

7 they, themselves, provide humanitarian supplies? Thank you.

8 A. The UNPROFOR, within the context of the Srebrenica enclave, one,

9 their primary mission was to resupply their own United Nations forces;

10 the second one was to facilitate the movement of supplies by other

11 United Nations or international agencies to the enclaves for the general

12 population. It was not the UNPROFOR's job per se to supply the civilian

13 population within the enclave. It was the UNPROFOR's job to provide

14 security, to monitor the enclave, and create the conditions where other

15 United Nations and international agencies would do that.

16 So I mean, I guess it's a bit of an artificial distinction, but

17 from the United Nations' perspective it's probably an important one.

18 Q. Thank you. Now, please, since you spoke about the role of

19 UNPROFOR in delivering the relief, under the Geneva Conventions did

20 UNPROFOR have any right to check and control the ultimate destination

21 relief and to whom it was distributed?

22 A. I don't know the answer to that question. I am not sure of

23 how -- in enough detail how the process would have worked with respect to

24 what UN -- UN protection force procedures were in place to verify that

25 aid coming in from other United Nations agencies or other international

Page 17121

1 organisations were given strictly to civilians or noncombatants and did

2 not make their way to combatant forces. I just don't know enough about

3 how that process worked and what the protocols were to be able to comment

4 on it.

5 Q. Thank you. Well, were they entitled then to monitor or supervise

6 the distribution of this humanitarian aid to prevent it to going to the

7 places where it is not intended to go, such as smuggling channels, black

8 markets, and things of that sort?

9 A. Again, sir, I don't know if that was a specific mission mandate

10 of the United Nations protection forces or whether that remained a task

11 that the actual agencies providing the aid would be responsible for.

12 Q. Thank you. Please, do you know what the difference is between an

13 UNPROFOR convoy and a humanitarian aid convoy? Can you explain that to

14 that Trial Chamber?

15 A. My understanding was that while all convoys were generally

16 escorted by UNPROFOR, and as evidenced by the documents that I think I

17 discussed during the Prosecution case, you could see two separate classes

18 of convoys that would be moving via the roads. One set of convoys was

19 specifically limited to the supply and provisioning of the designated

20 United Nations military forces in the enclaves or in other areas of

21 Bosnia. And the other set of convoys were those by other United Nations

22 aid agencies or other humanitarian organisations that would be going into

23 the enclaves for their own purposes. So those are the two general

24 categories of convoys that I am aware of.

25 Q. Thank you. Do you know from which type of convoys was it

Page 17122

1 possible to extract certain quantities of fuel oil to be used by the Army

2 of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the enclaves?

3 A. I would presume that both. For example, in one of the documents

4 that was discussed related to an UNPROFOR convoy, the Bosnian Serb

5 military showed concern about wanting to verify the exact amount of fuel

6 in each military vehicle because of their concern that they would be

7 travelling into the enclaves with far more fuel than they actually needed

8 to complete one rotation in and out of the enclave. And the concern was,

9 you know, ABiH military forces would then just siphon off the extra fuel.

10 It would just come right out of the military fuel tanks.

11 In the case of the other UN convoys, one, the same method would

12 apply as well as other more overt situations where fuel and other things

13 would be improperly manifested so that it would show a lesser amount on

14 the manifest document that was actually carried. Those were both

15 concerns that the Bosnian military had with respect to a means of getting

16 fuel into the enclaves.

17 Q. Are you referring to ABiH army when you said the Bosnian army?

18 Thank you.

19 A. I guess I am referring to both. As you're aware, certainly

20 within the context of the VRS at Srebrenica, the Bosnian Muslim military

21 was perceived as getting fuel from UN sources and by their own documents

22 in the Zepa enclave, the Bosnian Serb military was obtaining fuel from

23 the Ukrainian Detachment there that was also operating under

24 United Nations auspices. So I guess within the context of fuel, both

25 parties were surreptitiously obtaining fuel from United Nations sources.

Page 17123

1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Judge Mindua has a question.

2 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes. I did understand the

3 difference between the two types of convoys, but I would like to know all

4 those convoys from humanitarian convoys had they to be escorted by

5 UNPROFOR elements or not?

6 THE WITNESS: Generally speaking, the convoys originate from

7 Sarajevo, and those areas did pick up a UN escort. I am not sure whether

8 or not humanitarian convoys, and many did originate from Belgrade to the

9 eastern enclaves, whether they actually had a United Nations escort or

10 whether they were allowed to travel independently. So I don't know the

11 answer to the second part of the question with respect to convoys coming

12 out of Serbia.

13 JUDGE MINDUA: [No interpretation]

14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Thank

16 you, Judge Mindua.

17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Now, Mr. Butler, you have moved on to black marketeering.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at D607 and see what

20 the UNPROFOR deputy commander in Srebrenica has to say about it,

21 Mr. Robert Franken, who was also chief of logistics. It's P607. P607.

22 Thank you. That's Mr. Franken's statement. We need page 2 in Serbian,

23 paragraph -- paragraphs 3 and 4; and page 1, paragraphs 3 and 4 in

24 English. He says:

25 "In that period of time, the Serbs suggested to the Muslims that

Page 17124

1 they should trade with the Muslims based on the prices that existed on

2 the black market in the enclave. When I say 'trade,' I mean trade with

3 all -- all [indiscernible] except for the weapons. After several rounds

4 of negotiations, the civilian authorities of the enclave gave their

5 approval for the goods to be supplied by the Serbs to the enclave. We

6 insisted that the goods be sold in the enclave for roughly the market

7 price and that DutchBat should claim no commercial role in this."

8 This next paragraph:

9 "This fitted well with our idea of bringing the relations between

10 the warring parties back to normal. Rumors spread that the initiative

11 was not viewed well by the groups that controlled the black market. The

12 trade was put a stop to by the military leadership. It was said by the

13 local military leadership that the prohibition had come from the top of

14 the military leadership, although such things worked well in Gorazde, and

15 I presume that the initiative to boycott the trade had really come from

16 the military leadership of the enclave."

17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18 Q. This is my question: Did you come across any documents relating

19 to the two parties trading, and can you tell us why did the Srebrenica

20 military leadership accommodate the requests coming from individuals

21 involved in the black market?

22 A. I did come across documents as well as statements from various

23 individuals which did discuss the proposals to kind of normalise trade in

24 and out of the enclaves. My understanding is not only for their purposes

25 the Bosnian Muslim side did not agree to that, and I suspect that black

Page 17125

1 marketeering would be a motive. There are a number of reports that

2 members of the 28th Infantry Division in general, and Naser Oric in

3 particular, were making a very good living with respect to black market

4 operations in the enclave.

5 From the Bosnian Serb side, the idea of normalising trade with

6 the civilians with -- inside the enclave kind of ran counter to their

7 idea of creating the conditions necessary to force the people out of the

8 enclave. So while I take it that the local civilians on both sides of

9 the enclave would be in support of this proposal, I understand that the

10 military leadership on both sides was not eager to engage in a more

11 normalising of commercial and trade relationships.

12 Q. Mr. Butler, I do understand that you were looking at the two

13 sides in parallel, but you see that the document states that this system

14 was in place in Gorazde and that they applied market prices. Was it the

15 case that the market prices would not be agreeable to the black market

16 operators, or, in fact, to the leadership of the VRS and the ABiH? We

17 looked at the document which arrived from the Ministry of Defence of

18 Srebrenica. What Franken says here, he is speaking as UNPROFOR deputy

19 commander and chief of logistics, and he's referring to market prices.

20 Should a parallel be drawn in every answer or should the document

21 be rightly consulted for a proper answer?

22 A. No. What I mean in this particular case - and to be clear - from

23 the ABiH side, their military leadership was accused of being the people

24 who controlled the black market economy within the enclave. Their

25 reasons were not broader than economic as to why they did not see a

Page 17126

1 normalisation of trade activities. The military leadership of the VRS

2 didn't view this in the context of black market or making themselves

3 richer in the way that the ABiH military leadership in the enclave did.

4 They were looking at it as more of a policy issue of not necessarily

5 trading with the members of the enclave because in making their lives

6 potentially easier, they were running counter to their own policy of

7 wanting to create the conditions to leave. Both sides shared the motive

8 of not wanting to see trade normalised but for entirely different

9 reasons.

10 Q. Thank you. And did you, yourself, come across a document

11 originating from the Serb side which discusses this issue? Can you refer

12 to a document that you reviewed?

13 A. It's been a number of years, but I seem to recall there was at

14 least one document. I don't know whether it was authored by

15 Momir Nikolic or he was just part of the conversation where the issue was

16 discussed -- or he was aware the issue was discussed relating to

17 normalising trade and that the local community in Bratunac -- the

18 civilian leadership in Bratunac was not necessarily opposed to that

19 because they believed that by trading with the civilians in the enclave,

20 they could actually get supplies and goods from them that they could not

21 obtain from Serbia due to the embargo, particularly fuel. And as part of

22 those discussions, the military leadership indicated that they were not

23 prepared to permit that. So I'm aware of at least one document, like I

24 said, it's been few years, where those issues are discussed.

25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. My request of you was to refer us to any

Page 17127

1 document which indicates that the Serb position was, as indicated by

2 Mr. Franken here -- and if you could do so at any point during your

3 testimony.

4 Now, let's go back to the issue at hand which is the control of

5 convoys by UNPROFOR, and I'm referring to humanitarian aid convoys. Can

6 you tell us -- or, rather, let me put it differently: Who was it who had

7 the right to control UNPROFOR humanitarian aid convoys and humanitarian

8 aid convoys organised by various international organisations? I mean,

9 who within the UN had the right to control these convoys to make sure

10 that they did not include weapons? Thank you.

11 A. Again, referring to my previous answer on that, I am not aware

12 under every circumstance who was responsible for ensuring that every

13 single convoy was properly manifested and that weapons were not being put

14 in. I assume that for those UNPROFOR convoys that were going to resupply

15 their own units that those responsibilities would be taken by the

16 UNPROFOR forces that were organising the convoys.

17 With respect to the other humanitarian aid convoys, I don't know

18 whether or not those organisations were themselves responsible for

19 insuring that weapons did not get into those convoys, or whether or not

20 they had to submit their vehicles and manifests for inspection by

21 UNPROFOR before those requests were consolidated and sent to the

22 Republika Srpska for approval.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us now look at document P10111

25 [as interpreted] in e-court.

Page 17128

1 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Before it appears, can you tell us this: Did UNPROFOR control

3 UNHCR convoys as they emerged in the enclave? Thank you.

4 A. I don't know, again, the actual specifics of whether or not they

5 were controlled by UNPROFOR, whether they were merely escorted by the

6 UNPROFOR, or how much or how little control that the UN protection forces

7 exerted over the actual UN convoys. I just don't know the detail of

8 that.

9 Q. Thank you. On our screens we have the Agreement on Complete

10 Cessation of Hostilities. Under 3 the agreement reads -- I'm sorry,

11 Article 5:

12 "Full freedom of movement with appropriate procedures shall exist

13 for UNPROFOR and other official international agencies, in particular

14 UNHCR, in order to complement this agreement, to monitor human rights and

15 to deliver humanitarian aid, including medical supplies and evacuations.

16 The parties commit themselves to full respect for the safety and security

17 of UNPROFOR and related personnel. UNPROFOR shall continue to prevent

18 any abuse of freedom of movement by its personnel or convoys which might

19 be of military benefit to either party."

20 The article I've read out deals with a number of issues, but we

21 were only interested in the abuse of convoys. So my question is: Who

22 has it within their authority to monitor the abuse of convoys of

23 humanitarian aid organised by either UNPROFOR or other international

24 organisations?

25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Just for the record, this document is P1011 and

Page 17129

1 not P10111.

2 Now your answer, please.

3 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. And again maybe it's a matter of

4 translation, but when I read the last sentence it says:

5 "The UNPROFOR shall continue to prevent any abuse of freedom of

6 movement by its personnels or convoys which might be of military benefit

7 to either party."

8 I take that that the UNPROFOR is responsible for the conduct of

9 its convoys and personnel. I don't know if I'd link that to the first

10 sentence which is that the UNPROFOR would also ensure that UNHCR

11 personnel and convoys also did not conduct the same. It may be the case.

12 I just -- I don't know and I don't think it's clear from this particular

13 passage.

14 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Thank you. Does this mean that UNPROFOR was able not to prevent

16 the abuse of UNHCR convoys or its own convoys if they happen to find that

17 mines and explosives are being smuggled in them?

18 A. Again, sir, I don't know enough of how that process worked to be

19 able to give you or the Court an answer as to whether or not there was a

20 regime available that the UNPROFOR actually inspected other agency

21 convoys to ensure that that was not happening, or whether those other

22 international agencies were expected to police themselves.

23 I have to assume that if the UNPROFOR became aware of a UNHCR or

24 other international convoy that was carrying prescribed military

25 equipment instead of carrying humanitarian or civilian goods that they

Page 17130

1 would not have let that travel, but I don't know that they viewed that as

2 their job that they were going to inspect each and every convoy.

3 Q. Thank you. But was it possible for UNPROFOR to find anything out

4 if they did not conduct checks? And what sort of method was employed by

5 UNPROFOR in respect of the convoys they escorted?

6 A. Again, from the UNPROFOR side, their particular convoys, as

7 evidenced by the manifests that we have, they were required in a great

8 amount of detail to lay out the entire cargos and personnel manifests of

9 each convoy going into the enclaves, submit them to the Republika Srpska

10 and the Main Staff for approval, and they understood that at some point

11 those convoys were also going to be subject to inspection, and that if

12 there was excess equipment or fuel or equipment that was not properly

13 manifested that the convoy could be turned around or those possessions

14 confiscated.

15 I don't know how that process worked with the other aid agencies,

16 whether or not they had as sophisticated an apparatus to verify what was

17 going into those vehicles or not, and I don't know what the inspection

18 regime would have been until it got into the Republika Srpska. Now,

19 obviously, just with the UNPROFOR convoys, the humanitarian convoys from

20 other agencies had to manifest their equipment and were also subject to

21 inspection by the VRS at various check-points. And as we know from

22 various documents, in cases where equipment was identified that was not

23 properly manifested or wasn't manifested at all, the VRS confiscated that

24 equipment.

25 Q. Tell us, please, as a military analyst, the inspection of

Page 17131

1 humanitarian convoys and UNPROFOR convoys at check-points, was it not one

2 of the methods of preventing abuse? Thanks.

3 A. Correct, sir. The Bosnian Serb military saw the ability to

4 inspect these various convoys at various places as an important means by

5 which they could assure themselves that prescribed military equipment or

6 other dual-use type of supplies or supplies that were not -- or that were

7 being sent in excess of what the perceived civilian needs were could be

8 controlled. So they were very much involved in that process because they

9 saw it as an important way to control the amount of supplies that went

10 into the eastern enclaves.

11 Q. Thank you. A moment ago, we quoted Article 5 of the Cessation of

12 Hostilities Agreement. As a military analyst, do you find it acceptable

13 that this should be the basis for an agreement between UNPROFOR and the

14 VRS? Because it does provide in great detail the freedom of movement to

15 be accorded to UNPROFOR convoys. In other words, is it the basis for the

16 freedom of movement of convoys?

17 A. This particular agreement does lay out the principles relating to

18 freedom of movement. And, again, with the fact that the expectation is

19 that, you know, all parties would allow for the freedom of movement on

20 the one hand, and on the other hand that with respect to the UNPROFOR and

21 the other aid agencies, that they would not allow their offices to be

22 used for military purposes by either one of the warring parties.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now call up document D77 in

25 e-court. It's an agreement which was signed on behalf of UNPROFOR by

Page 17132

1 General Brinkman and on behalf of the VRS, General Zdravko Tolimir. We

2 see here item 1 which reads:

3 "These principles define the appropriate procedures regarding

4 freedom of movement, as stated in paragraph 5 of the Agreement on

5 Complete Cessation of Hostilities, signed on the 31st of December, 1994.

6 These principles specifically refer to UNPROFOR movements on Serb held

7 territory."

8 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

9 Q. This is my question: Is this first item completely based on

10 Article 5 of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, is that the case?

11 And you did look at the other agreement.

12 A. Yes, sir, I mean, and I believe that's explicitly laid out in

13 paragraph 1.

14 Q. Thank you. Let's move on to paragraph 2 which relates to the

15 obligation of mutual reporting, that is to say, the obligation of

16 UNPROFOR to notify issues to the Main Staff. So we're dealing with

17 notification in A; we're dealing with movement in B; and in C, with the

18 approval for movement which is to be given by the Main Staff.

19 Did the Main Staff, in fact, grant approval to UNPROFOR vehicles

20 to transit the territory under their control?

21 A. Yes, sir. As we've noted from the documents during the

22 Prosecution case, there were various lists of convoy movements projected,

23 many were approved, some were disapproved, many others had their cargos

24 modified but they were given subsequent approval. So within that

25 context, the process did work.

Page 17133

1 Q. Thank you. You can see that under 3 the agreement envisages

2 control, and it reads:

3 "Convoys may be checked only once by a Serbian Army check-point,"

4 or "for an army. This regards both the incoming and outgoing convoy

5 movement. The inspection of the convoy will last as short as possible.

6 If goods not stated on the notification are found, a more detailed check

7 will be made.

8 "Goods not mentioned on the notification will be allowed to

9 return on their convoy to their starting points. Goods which are not

10 notified and for which transport is forbidden will be taken into secure

11 storage."

12 And the reference here is to mines and explosives:

13 "A joint control by the warring parties," that's to say the two

14 armies and UNPROFOR, on the other hand, "will discuss the final decision

15 regarding these goods. A list of forbidden goods will be handed over to

16 UNPROFOR by the Serbian army HQ, Main Staff."

17 Tell us, was the Army of Republika Srpska entitled to fully

18 inspect convoys both the humanitarian convoys and United Nations convoys?

19 Is this not regulated herein?

20 A. Again, from the part of this document I can see, what they are

21 discussing here is the UNPROFOR convoys. I don't know how limited this

22 particular document is. I mean, one of the things that strikes me is

23 that it talks about there being a separate agreement, even within the

24 United Nations framework, between this document which is covering the

25 UNPROFOR and a subset of the UN forces which is the United Nations

Page 17134

1 military observers.

2 So again, I take that this document deals specifically with the

3 UNPROFOR. I don't know if its provisions broadly extend to all UN

4 agencies.

5 As to your second question, yes, as discussed, it sets up a

6 framework by which the Army of Republika Srpska will have an opportunity

7 to inspect convoys going in and out in order to ensure that there is no

8 abuse of the process and that the convoys are carrying only their

9 manifested cargo.

10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think it's time for the break. Mr. Tolimir,

11 before we break, I would just like to note that you have read, especially

12 paragraph 3, into the record, but not literally, especially in relation

13 to this abbreviation "SA." We see in the first line "SA check-point,"

14 and later on, second part of paragraph 3, "A joint SA UNPROFOR

15 commission."

16 Your interpretation of that was of the word "warring party."

17 That might be right, that can be wrong. At the end in the last line we

18 see:

19 "UNPROFOR by the Serbian army HQ."

20 SA could be an abbreviation for Serbian army which is, in the

21 context of our discussion, quite strange. I just put it on the record to

22 make sure that we all check the real meaning of SA.

23 We have to adjourn now and we will resume at five minutes past

24 11.00.

25 [The witness stands down]

Page 17135

1 --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.

2 [The witness takes the stand]

3 --- On resuming at 11.08 a.m.

4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, Mr. Tolimir. Or, I see Mr. McCloskey on his

5 feet.

6 Mr. McCloskey.

7 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, thank you, Mr. President. I was just

8 informed -- well, in the last session via e-mail that literally as I was

9 standing withdrawing those four witnesses, one of the witnesses finally

10 contacted our person and said that they would be available any time. And

11 that is Witness number 95, PW-29, and we have been able to schedule that

12 witness September 12th. It's a 92 ter witness. It should be very short,

13 but an important witness. So if I could move the Court to withdraw my

14 previous withdrawal and place that witness back on the witness list, and

15 we'll put him in the schedule as we're confirming with him right now, I

16 would appreciate that. I apologise. It's just one of those things.

17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Is there any concern by the Defence?

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. We have

19 no objection to this witness appearing in the court.

20 [Trial Chamber confers]

21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey, your withdrawal of the withdrawal

22 is accepted. You may call the witness.

23 Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

25 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Page 17136

1 Q. Mr. Butler, since before the break we were looking at the

2 Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities and we quoted Article 5

3 therein, do I need to show the document again to you or can you answer my

4 question now? Was the Agreement on Complete Cessation of Hostilities

5 stipulate the forming of a central joint submission in order to oversee

6 the implementation of the agreement and was that carried out in practice?

7 A. I believe, as the document has come up, paragraph 2 of that

8 agreement calls for the creation of a central joint commission. Taking

9 that on to the following document, that appears to be at least with

10 respect to -- at least -- I'm sorry.

11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We need the previous page in B/C/S, please.

12 Mr. Gajic.

13 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, Mr. Tolimir is not

14 receiving the translation into B/C/S; therefore, he did not hear the

15 answer provided by Mr. Butler.

16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Butler, could you be so kind to repeat your

17 answer.

18 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. The document that is currently up on the

19 screen, paragraph 2, calls for the establishment of joint commissions. I

20 believe the following document is the attempt to implement that with at

21 least respect to the Bosnian Serb military and the UNPROFOR.

22 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please now see this

25 document, D250, which speaks about the forming of a joint central

Page 17137

1 commission as well as regional commissions. Thank you. Let's see how

2 and at whose initiative the agreement was drafted, the agreement that was

3 signed. Here we see a document produced by the Main Staff dated the 5th

4 of January, 1995. It is addressed from the meeting of the central state

5 commission to the addressees as listed herein, and on the last page we

6 can see that the document was signed by General Tolimir.

7 Now, please, I am interested in item 5 of this agreement which

8 reads that:

9 "UNPROFOR will prepare a draft of an agreement to be agreed by

10 the signed."

11 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note that the item read by

12 Mr. Tolimir does not correspond to item 5.

13 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

14 THE INTERPRETER: Can Mr. Tolimir please repeat the question.

15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please repeat your question. The

16 interpreters didn't interpret it.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Mr. Butler, in this item 5 that I have just quoted, does it

20 specify the manner in which the agreement had been concluded on freedom

21 of movement, concluded on the 31st of January, 1995, between

22 General Brinkman, the representative of UNPROFOR, and General Tolimir,

23 the representative of the VRS?

24 A. If I'm looking at the same paragraph 5, it -- all it specifically

25 says is that the UNPROFOR will prepare a draft agreement on complete

Page 17138

1 freedom of movement which will be agreed bilaterally with the parties.

2 Q. Thank you. That's correct. And I would like to hear your

3 opinion because this is a report from a meeting by a joint commission

4 which says, under 5, that it was agreed for UNPROFOR to prepare a draft

5 agreement on freedom of movement to be agreed bilaterally. Was this

6 agreement agreed bilaterally between Brinkman and Tolimir? Thank you.

7 A. I am not sure that I accept your proposition that this is merely

8 a report of a meeting. There are other portions of the document which

9 you appear to have added a considerable amount of commentary with respect

10 to what you believe that various negotiating positions would be, as well

11 as what the position of the VRS should be or would be in response. I

12 take it that at some juncture the agreement was signed, but I don't --

13 like I said, I mean, just looking at spots of this document rather than

14 having the entire document, it's very difficult for me to conclude

15 exactly what it is in its entirety and what it means.

16 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. I was not asking you about the contents

17 of the whole document. I was specifically asking you about item 5,

18 whether it specifically determines the manner in which this agreement on

19 complete freedom of movement of UNPROFOR was to be achieved. Does it say

20 who is to prepare the draft of this document? And I am talking about

21 item 5?

22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.

23 MR. McCLOSKEY: The nature of that question requires Mr. Butler

24 to be able to understand the document, and it does no good for the

25 witness to just repeat what is said in the paragraph. So if the General

Page 17139

1 wants a serious evaluation I would allow him to let Mr. Butler review the

2 document.

3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I would suggest that we go back to the other

4 document, to the agreement itself, to see if this item 5 of this document

5 is from the content reflected in the agreement itself. Can we go back

6 to -- I suggest that you call for that document again, D77.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 77.

8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, indeed, I said D77. To which part of this

9 agreement do you refer, Mr. Tolimir? That would be helpful for the

10 witness to answer your question.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I made reference to the

12 manner in which an agreement was reached between UNPROFOR and the VRS

13 concerning the territory of the VRS, and for that purpose I proposed the

14 previous document in order to see what was the role of UNPROFOR.

15 On several occasions there was discussion before about the fact

16 that the VRS was said to have imposed this and that checks -- what I

17 wanted to prove was that it was something that was requested or required

18 by the UNPROFOR. I could show the witness the whole document, however, I

19 cannot quote it in its entirety. I can only quote specific items. For

20 example, item 1 --

21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Let me interrupt you. This was not my intention.

22 You put a question to the witness:

23 "Does it say who it was to prepare the draft of this document?"

24 That was your question put to the witness. It would be helpful

25 for the witness to know to which part of the agreement you are referring,

Page 17140

1 to understand item 5 of your letter.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I am talking about

3 the whole agreement proposed to the VRS to be signed regarding the

4 freedom of movement of UNPROFOR throughout the whole territory of

5 Republika Srpska, and I am talking about the manner in which it was

6 constructed, and I demonstrated that by quoting item 5.

7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Are you able to answer this specific question in

8 relation to item 5 of the document signed by Mr. Tolimir, D250,

9 Mr. Butler?

10 THE WITNESS: I believe, if I am correct, what General Tolimir is

11 referring to is that in paragraph 5 of that document it states that the

12 UNPROFOR will draft the principles for the agreement of movement, and

13 then what we are now looking at on the screen is, in fact, the

14 manifestation of that draft. I take it -- I hope that's what

15 General Tolimir was referring to.

16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

18 Can we go back to D254. Thank you.

19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think this is the wrong number. We saw D250;

20 correct?

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I said that we should go back to

22 D254 before we go to the one that we have on the screens. All right.

23 Now we have it and we have item 5. Now let us look at the first page of

24 this document --

25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, just to clarify so that we have a

Page 17141

1 clear record. This is D250 which we have on the screen with item 5. If

2 you want to have on the screen another document, you should not say

3 "let's go back" to that document, because we didn't have it on the screen

4 yet.

5 Mr. Gajic.

6 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] You're right, Mr. President. We

7 hadn't had D254 before. It was just a minor administrative error, so we

8 are seeking to look at 254.

9 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Mr. Butler, here we see a document made by the Main Staff of the

11 VRS, the sector for intelligence and security affairs. It was produced

12 on the 12th of February, 1995. It was sent to all the commands, and it

13 speaks about the movement of UNPROFOR around the territory of

14 Republika Srpska. In paragraph 1, it says:

15 "Through the regional joint commissions UNPROFOR representatives

16 are constantly bringing up the issue of greater freedom of movement for

17 UNPROFOR across the front line, with the aim of getting authorisation to

18 cross the front line and move within the territory of Republika Srpska on

19 the lower regional levels while not having to notify the Main Staff and

20 not to having to wait for authorisation by the Main Staff of the VRS

21 before doing so.

22 "This kind of approach indicates that UNPROFOR wanted to avoid

23 the obligation undertaken by them in the agreement signed on the

24 principles of freedom of movement signed on the 31st of January, 1995,

25 between the UNPROFOR command and General Tolimir, and the text of that

Page 17142

1 agreement is attach hereto."

2 Now, what comes next is the agreement that we already looked at.

3 Now, let's move to this portion where you say that I was making

4 some comments.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So we need page 2 where we see --

6 we need page 2. Thank you. Can I have page 2 in e-court, please. In

7 English, it's page 3. And can we scroll down the text in the Serbian

8 because I would like to read the last sentence on page 2. Thank you.

9 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

10 Q. "UNPROFOR representatives during -- concluding the agreement,

11 insisted that their goods not be seized, that is possibly not listed in

12 the notification due to an administrative error, and they conceded that

13 under such circumstances they would return the whole convoy to its points

14 of departure. We agreed as -- with that as can be seen from the

15 agreement, but we emphasised that the items that were not listed in the

16 manifest and whose transportation is forbidden would be confiscated and

17 kept in our depots until a conclusion reached about what to do with them

18 by the joint commission."

19 My question is: These joint military commissions, were they

20 authorised to inspect the routes and the checks and the arrival of

21 UNPROFOR convoys that had previously been notified to the Main Staff?

22 A. If I understand this particular document correctly with the last

23 one, it was not the joint military commissions themselves which conducted

24 the inspections, it was the joint military commission that created the

25 framework agreement. The actual inspection of the materials would be

Page 17143

1 left to each individual party. So, you know, in that context it was not

2 like there was a joint United Nations Republika Srpska military

3 check-point which cleared each convoy -- or physically inspected each

4 convoy. The military commission created the framework as to how it would

5 be done, but, you know, the UN was left to manifest the convoy, the VRS

6 Main Staff approve the convoy, and it would be inspected by a VRS

7 check-point at an agreed upon location.

8 Q. Please, after reading this item in the last question which says

9 that the final decision -- pending final decision, the goods would be

10 kept in our depots; that is to say, the pending decision to be taken by

11 the joint commission. So does that mean that these joint commissions had

12 to be notified about any cargos that had been seized and stored in

13 depots? Thank you.

14 A. The way that this particular document lays that out goes into,

15 first, laying out that there will be lists that will be made as to what

16 cargos -- or the transport of cargos that are prohibited. The third

17 paragraph from the end notes a request from General Tolimir to

18 subordinated formations requesting that they forward a draft list of the

19 cargos that they think need to be banned, and that once this is done they

20 will actually public the full list.

21 The last part of the process will be: Should cargos be pulled

22 off of convoys? This document does call for them to be put into a depot

23 and maintained in that depot until such a point in time as a joint

24 decision has been made as to what the status of the cargo is. So this

25 document kind of lays out an ongoing process in light of the fact that it

Page 17144

1 lays out a broader process on here's how this cargo will be handled, but

2 acknowledges in the very next paragraph that at the point in time that

3 this document is written there is not a list yet of what that prescribed

4 cargo is.

5 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Can you please answer me this: Who is to

6 take the decision relating to the items confiscated at check-points and

7 toward in depots? Was that decision to be taken by the joint military

8 commission or somebody else? And I'm referring to the decision that you

9 talked about.

10 A. I believe from the contents of the document that the decision to

11 actually remove cargo from a convoy and place it in a depot would be made

12 by the party that was inspecting the convoy. The ultimate disposition of

13 that cargo once it got to the depot as to whether or not it would be

14 brought back to United Nations custody or whether it would be allowed to

15 continue on to the enclave or its destination, or a third option that it

16 remains in the depot, would presumably be made by that joint military

17 commission.

18 Q. Thank you. Were then members of the joint military commission

19 who were supposed to decide on this required to be informed about all the

20 items that were banned, seized, confiscated, stored, et cetera? Did the

21 members of the joint military commission have to know about this?

22 A. I would expect that at some point after the publication of this

23 document that once a list was established by the VRS and once cargo was

24 being -- one, that list would have obviously been passed to the joint

25 military commissions so all parties would know what cargo could not

Page 17145

1 travel through. And then to the next step in instances where such cargo

2 was confiscated, in order to come to a conclusion as to what to do with

3 that cargo, one would think that members of the joint commission would

4 have to be informed of its seizure, the circumstances of its seizure, and

5 the fact that the cargo was, in fact, part of the list of banned cargo.

6 Q. Thank you. If General Tolimir was a member of this joint

7 commission and a signatory to this agreement, was it necessary for him to

8 be informed about the documents that indicated that parts of convoys were

9 banned, seized, or in any other way hampered with? Was it necessary for

10 him to be informed fully about that and sign any kind of documents in

11 that respect?

12 A. While you could have taken a personal interest in this, it would

13 also have been appropriate for you to delegate the responsibility for

14 implementing this to another member of the Main Staff. It could have

15 been within the security branch or intelligence branch or it could have

16 even been with the approval of General Milovanovic or General Mladic,

17 another member of the Main Staff who might have been more suited to the

18 role. So I don't believe that you would have had to personally do this,

19 but it could have been delegated.

20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Butler, I think this was not the question.

21 Mr. Tolimir asked you:

22 "If Mr. Tolimir was a member of this joint commission, should he

23 be notified about this specific cargo which was seized?"

24 THE WITNESS: If he were the functioning member, he would have to

25 be notified, yes.

Page 17146

1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Indeed, that was the question.

2 Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

4 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

5 Q. My question is: Does this agreement signed by Tolimir and

6 Brinkman on freedom of movement of UNPROFOR regulate the movement of

7 convoys belonging to other humanitarian organisations? Thank you.

8 A. I am not sure. I believe that if you go back to the agreement it

9 did specifically make a differential between the UNPROFOR and the UNMO

10 convoys. So, again, I am not sure from the parts of the agreement that

11 we've reviewed whether or not that agreement covered the entirety of

12 other humanitarian organisation convoys.

13 Q. Thank you. Let us please look at the last paragraph of the

14 document, just above the signature block. It reads:

15 "These freedom of movement principles refer only to convoys and

16 single UNPROFOR vehicles and not to convoys of international humanitarian

17 organisations. Regarding convoys of international humanitarian

18 organisations, they should implement the procedure and checks agreed upon

19 so far."

20 So, therefore, my question: The agreement signed by Tolimir and

21 Brinkman, did it refer only to individual UNPROFOR convoys? I mean,

22 convoys and individual UNPROFOR vehicles. Thank you.

23 A. Yes, sir, I take it from this last paragraph that the

24 interpretation of the VRS and of General Tolimir was that this particular

25 agreement was limited only to UNPROFOR.

Page 17147

1 Q. Thank you. As a military analyst who has been able to read the

2 agreement in the course of your testimony today, so is it only my

3 interpretation that this agreement relates to UNPROFOR alone? You are of

4 a different opinion? Thank you.

5 A. No, sir. I believe that you're speaking on behalf of the VRS

6 when you're making this interpretation of what this agreement covers. I

7 don't believe it's just singularly your interpretation.

8 Q. Thank you. And did UNPROFOR interpret the agreement as written

9 in the various items that it contains?

10 A. I can't speak to the context by which UNPROFOR believed the

11 agreement, whereas what it covered or what it did not. I mean, all I can

12 tell you, again, going back to the agreement, was that as a context of

13 the agreement the UNPROFOR covered their convoy movements and it

14 specified out that the UNMOs would be separate. If there is a

15 separate -- or if there is a third or fourth page in the basic agreement

16 that notes that you -- the international convoys were covered, that's one

17 thing. If it's not, I would assume that they are not covered there.

18 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Let's go back to D77 in order for you to

19 see what we are discussing. Thank you. Have a look at the document

20 which relates to the freedom of movement principles. It was issued by

21 the Main Staff of the BH command in Sarajevo. You can see that there is

22 their letterhead. It speaks of the aims -- the aim, under 1;

23 notification, 2; control, under 3, and the way it is to be exerted; under

24 4, the notification of roots.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the next page please.

Page 17148

1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.

2 MR. McCLOSKEY: I would ask in this situation that these

3 documents be printed out, these multipage documents be printed out, and

4 Mr. Butler have a chance to review them. I can't follow what is going on

5 here. This electronic way of going from one page to the next, to the

6 next and back, Mr. Butler is trying but -- and then being quizzed on the

7 last paragraph of one document.

8 If he wants a serious evaluation or analysis of this document, I

9 would ask that it be printed out, to have him allowed to have two

10 different documents printed out for him so he can do some sort of

11 reasonable analysis. This is completely confusing. I don't know what he

12 is being asked about, where he is going from, which document. This

13 computer, unfortunately, doesn't make this very easy.

14 And I know Mr. Butler is trying, but he cannot be expected to be

15 able to answer questions clearly in this kind of a format.

16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I see that Mr. Registrar already printed it out,

17 the agreement. It should be handed over to the witness if everybody

18 agrees with this procedure. I don't see any objection.

19 Yes, please hand it over to Mr. Butler. This is the agreement

20 itself, D77.

21 Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. We'll

23 give Mr. Butler a chance to review the agreement, and we'll ask him to

24 tell us if it relates to UNPROFOR convoys and vehicles alone or to others

25 as well.

Page 17149

1 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

2 Q. It's a simple question: Who does the agreement apply to?

3 A. Based on the absence of any language in this particular agreement

4 relating to other humanitarian convoys, I take it that the agreement

5 specifically deals with the issue of the UNPROFOR convoys.

6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now show 65 ter 5717. Thank

8 you. It has appeared. It's a VRS Main Staff document, dated the 21st of

9 August -- or, rather, 31st of August. Apologies. Thank you, Aleksandar.

10 The 31st of August. It is signed by deputy commander

11 Lieutenant-Colonel Milovanovic, and it is titled: "Order Regarding

12 Movement of Humanitarian Aid Across Separation Lines."

13 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14 Q. I will quote from paragraph 1 and then we can discuss it. It

15 reads:

16 "You know that the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska no

17 longer has any jurisdiction or responsibility concerning approval of

18 entry and movement of teams and convoys of organisations through the

19 territory of Republika Srpska.

20 "This approval is issued by the co-ordinating body for

21 humanitarian aid and the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Social Welfare."

22 This is my question: While reviewing the documents as part of

23 your preparations, did you contemplate what the competence was of the

24 Main Staff and what the competence was of other bodies, such as the

25 co-ordinating body for humanitarian aid?

Page 17150

1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.

2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, this is a three-page document in

3 English. We heard that it was from some lieutenant-colonel. Could

4 Mr. Butler be at least allowed to see the whole page -- the whole

5 document if he is going to be asked about it and see who it is from?

6 Because it is hard for me to imagine that this is from a

7 lieutenant-colonel, but perhaps it is. I can't see the last page.

8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Indeed it would be --

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. McCloskey. This is

10 not --

11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: -- helpful for the witness to see the whole

12 document. If you put such a broad question about the whole content of

13 this document to the witness, then the witness should have the

14 possibility to look at it.

15 Mr. McCloskey.

16 MR. McCLOSKEY: And of course, we do see it is from

17 Lieutenant-General Milovanovic. So just if we could have the whole

18 document so he can do it, because otherwise between the translations and

19 the piecemeal approach it's going to be very difficult.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. McCloskey and

21 Mr. President. As I was announcing the document, I said that it was sent

22 by a deputy commander, Lieutenant-General Manojlo Milovanovic. Perhaps

23 the witness did hear it or perhaps it wasn't interpreted. And then I

24 quoted from paragraph 1.

25 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Page 17151

1 Q. Because of the discussions we've had, I would like to repeat my

2 question. Did the VRS Main Staff give approval for the movement of

3 humanitarian convoys or was it only competent to issue such approvals for

4 UNPROFOR convoys?

5 A. Again, this kind of illustrates exactly why I would like to look

6 at the whole document. If you look at that paragraph or that page in

7 isolation, you can make that assertion. If you look at the last page

8 where we looked at the signature, there looked like an order from

9 General Milovanovic that part of it looked like they were specifically

10 issuing orders that were not in compliance with that, and there is a

11 middle page that I haven't even seen. So context matters, and to be able

12 to make an assessment as to, you know, based on one line of a three-page

13 document that this is the way it was, when I'm looking at the third page

14 of the document and it appears they are trying to subvert that, it kind

15 of seems like to be a bit of a pointless exercise.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, you should take that comment of

18 Mr. Butler into account and try to rephrase your questions or give the

19 witness the opportunity to look through the entire document, otherwise

20 it's not helpful for your Defence.

21 Please carry on. One moment, please.

22 [Trial Chamber confers]

23 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]

24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please carry on your examination and

25 take into consideration the best way to get a good answer from this

Page 17152

1 witness.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

3 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Mr. Butler, what was the authority of this co-ordinating body for

5 humanitarian aid at the time this document was written on the 1st

6 [as interpreted] of August, 1994?

7 A. I am not sure of the specific responsibilities for the

8 co-ordinating body for humanitarian aid. It was not an issue that I

9 looked very deeply into.

10 Q. Thank you. On the 21st [as interpreted] of August, 1994, as

11 General Milovanovic states in the introductory part of its order, the

12 approval would be given by the co-ordinating body for humanitarian aid in

13 the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Social Welfare. Was this body indeed

14 authorised to give approvals?

15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You were interpreted to having said "21st of

16 August, 1994." The document is from the 31st of August, 1994. I don't

17 see a reference to another date in the document as we see it on the

18 screen. Could you [Overlapping speakers] ...

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I sometimes do not

20 articulate clearly what I say, so the interpreters may have misheard what

21 I said. The date is the 31st of August, 1994.

22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

23 Mr. Butler, do you recall the question?

24 THE WITNESS: No, sir, I can answer it. As noted in the

25 paragraph on the first page, it specifically notes that the approval is

Page 17153

1 now issued by the co-ordinating body. So I take it from

2 General Milovanovic's authorship of this document that they are the

3 accepted authority to issue approvals.

4 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Thank you. As we can see in item 3 where the obligations of the

6 Army of Republika Srpska are listed, can you tell us did the VRS have the

7 right to control and inspect such convoys moving along the territory

8 under the control of the VRS? It's paragraph 3, I misspoke when I said

9 item 3.

10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You are referring to paragraph 3 of the first

11 page; is that correct?

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. That's

13 correct.

14 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, you're correct that paragraph 3

15 specifically states that the Army of Republika Srpska has the obligation

16 to check teams and convoys of humanitarian organisations.

17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Thank you. You are now able to see the preamble to the order.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 2 so that

20 Mr. Butler may have a chance to look through the entire document as

21 requested by the Prosecutor. Thank you.

22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, your question, please.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

24 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Mr. Butler, having examined the document, can you tell us does it

Page 17154

1 clearly transpire from the document that all the information concerning

2 the humanitarian convoys, the VRS should be conveyed to the VRS through

3 the notification sent to them from the co-ordinating body for

4 humanitarian aid and the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Social Welfare?

5 A. What the document specifically notes in paragraph 1 of the order

6 is that regardless of the circumstances, that military forces are not to

7 permit convoys to go into territory under the control of Muslim or

8 Croatian forces if the crossing has not been announced in writing by the

9 Main Staff of the VRS.

10 So I take that to mean that even if the humanitarian

11 co-ordinating body -- if such a convoy has the authority of the

12 co-ordinating humanitarian body, unless there is also confirmation of

13 that issued by the army that the army is not to allow these convoys to

14 pass.

15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I would like to put a question to the witness at

16 this point in time to understand the discussion more clearly.

17 I take it that this is an order of the deputy commander of the

18 Main Staff of the VRS to subordinate units.

19 Mr. Butler, can you help us, is this exactly in accordance with

20 an agreement between the VRS and UNPROFOR? Have you any idea about that,

21 the connection --

22 THE WITNESS: I don't.

23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: -- between this ... [Overlapping speakers]

24 THE WITNESS: I don't believe they are connected. This

25 particular document, I belive, refers strictly to other humanitarian

Page 17155

1 convoys that were run by either other UN agencies or other international

2 agencies. I don't believe that this particular document -- and it's

3 tough to tell because this is August 1994 and the agreement we are

4 talking about is dated January 1995. But I believe that these protocols

5 are dealing strictly with humanitarian goods that would be more under the

6 purview of control of civilian organs of the RS as opposed to the

7 UNPROFOR which would be more under the purview of control of the VRS.

8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Is my understanding correct that this document is

9 an internal order from the Main Staff of the VRS to subordinate units in

10 the VRS?

11 THE WITNESS: Correct, sir.

12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we go back to page

14 1 of the document in e-court to paragraph 4. I would like to quote it

15 for the witness.

16 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Have a look at this. I did ask you if the notifications were the

18 source of information for the Army of Republika Srpska and for the

19 check-points conducting these checks. Thank you.

20 A. I'm sorry, I don't understand what you are asking with respect to

21 this question.

22 Q. Did the VRS receive information about humanitarian convoys from

23 the co-ordinating body in order to be able to check the cargo the convoys

24 carried and if it was indeed the cargo that had been approved?

25 A. Yes, sir. In the context of this document, page 1, I mean, it

Page 17156

1 notes that they are receiving information, as you said in paragraph 4.

2 And it also notes that in the following paragraph that they acknowledge

3 that the information that they are receiving is often incomplete and they

4 are doing the best that they can in order to receive the additional

5 information that they believe that they and the corps need in order to

6 allow these things to pass.

7 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In order for us to move to another

9 document, I would like first to tender this document into evidence and

10 then I would seek another document to be shown to the witness.

11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.

12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter 5717 shall be assigned

13 Exhibit D303. Thank you.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have in e-court P689.

15 As we can see this is an Official Gazette. We need page 2 in the Serbian

16 and keep page 1 in English, please. This is about in -- as it says in

17 Article 1, that a decision was taken to set up a state committee for

18 co-operation with United Nations and international humanitarian

19 organisations. And then in Article 3, it is said:

20 "Decisions and orders from the committee's jurisdiction are

21 obligatory for all state organs of Republika Srpska."

22 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Based on this, my question is as follows: Did you know that

24 there was a commission existing in Republika Srpska, a state committee

25 for co-operation with the United Nations and international humanitarian

Page 17157

1 organisations and that its decisions were binding for everyone, including

2 the Army of Republika Srpska? Did you see anything to that effect in the

3 documents that you reviewed and studied?

4 A. Could I ask you to go to page 2 in the English language of this

5 please, for a second? The next page. The next page down, please, also.

6 Third. Okay.

7 I guess where I am confused is -- and that's why I wanted to

8 check the actual date of the decree, was that we are discussing from the

9 prior document something in 31 August of 1994, and we're referring now to

10 a decree published on 15 March 1995, and I am not sure if they are even

11 related or not. I mean, I understand generally your question, Was there

12 an organ to do that? Yes, there was. But I am not sure that this

13 particular document which is published five -- six months after the

14 August document that you referred to relates to it, or relates to maybe a

15 prior iteration of that organ. So I am not sure where you are getting at

16 with the question.

17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: May we please see the top of the page in B/C/S.

18 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Thank you. Maybe if we read Article 6 that would be helpful for

20 Mr. Butler because he wants to understand the whole document. Let's see

21 what Article 6 of this decision says, and I quote:

22 "Permits for the movement of convoys and employees of the

23 United Nations and humanitarian organisations on the territory of

24 Republika Srpska shall be issued by the co-ordinating body for

25 humanitarian operations, pursuant to this committee's decisions."

Page 17158

1 Now we can take a look at the decision taken by the committee

2 with respect to the co-ordinating body, and I would like to hear whether

3 there was a link between the co-ordinating body and this committee.

4 A. I am not sure. I go to Article 11 where it specifically notes

5 that:

6 "On the day of the publication on this decision, the decision on

7 forming a state committee for co-operation with the UNPROFOR and all

8 previously adopted enactments relating to the work of the committee shall

9 become null and void if they are contrary to this decision."

10 So I gather the answer to the question is if the Republika Srpska

11 authorities did not consider the work of that commission or committee to

12 be contrary to this decree, they would be related, and if they did

13 consider the work to be contrary, they would not be related. And I don't

14 know the answer to that question one way or another.

15 Q. Thank you. My question is: Did all the state organs have an

16 obligation to co-ordinate their work with regard to international

17 humanitarian organisations in compliance with this decision? Thank you.

18 A. I don't know that I have the ability to answer that question. I

19 did not study the workings of the state organs with respect to this

20 particular regulation or document and how they worked with the UN.

21 That's outside my area of expertise.

22 Q. Thank you. Since you dealt with the issue of convoys, and you

23 said that in examination-in-chief, did you study all the laws and bylaws

24 that pertain to this area and governed the movement of international

25 organisations and their convoy across the territory of Republika Srpska?

Page 17159

1 A. No, sir. What I had studied was the practical application of the

2 process whereby which the United Nations protection forces would submit

3 convoy clearances to the Main Staff and the decision-making process of

4 the Main Staff in granting the clearance for the convoy to move or making

5 changes in the manifest or denying permission for the convoy to travel.

6 That was the focus of my review of that material. It was not to

7 encompass all of the other legal and diplomatic ramifications beyond

8 that.

9 Q. Thank you. Since you answered several questions in

10 examination-in-chief about humanitarian convoys and the approvals and

11 denials of their passage, my question is: The decisions and orders

12 issued by this commission or committee, did they apply to everyone in

13 Republika Srpska that had anything to do with humanitarian convoys and

14 humanitarian organisations? Thank you. As a jurist, I would like you to

15 answer this question.

16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The witness answered this question already. He

17 said he didn't study all the internal regulation and beyond this area of

18 his investigation. Please carry on.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

20 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Mr. Butler, do you think that in order to analyse humanitarian

22 convoys, it is essential to be familiar with the legal provisions

23 pertaining to a specific territory that you are studying?

24 A. In the context of what I was asked to do by the Office of the

25 Prosecutor, the legal underpinnings and the diplomatic underpinnings of

Page 17160

1 convoy movements, in my mind, were not necessary to know. What I was

2 asked to do was to look at particular convoy documents with the first

3 goal of making a determination as to whether or not the VRS Main Staff

4 was actively involved in the process of reviewing them and clearing them,

5 which my assessment is that they were; and secondly, were the convoys

6 that were not being cleared or was the materials that were being not

7 manifested or being reduced, did they coincide with the stated policy of

8 the VRS and the Republika Srpska with respect to Directive 7 and 7(1).

9 For me to do that, I don't believe it's necessary for me to understand

10 the legal and political aspects of negotiations between the

11 Republika Srpska and the United Nations as to what laws are in effect

12 covering convoy clearance and how the Republika Srpska civilian organs

13 somehow interface with the Republika Srpska military organs.

14 Q. Mr. Butler, I quoted Article 3 to you on the forming of this

15 state committee and I am going to repeat it:

16 "The decisions and orders from the purview of the committee are

17 binding for all the state organs of Republika Srpska."

18 So if this committee gave its approval for a convoy to cross the

19 territory of Republika Srpska, was that binding for the Army of

20 Republika Srpska as one of its organs? Thank you.

21 A. The article says what it says. The decision and order from the

22 committee's jurisdiction are obligatory on all state organs. The armed

23 forces of the Republika Srpska would qualify as a state organ in this

24 context. So in theory, what should have happened is if the committee

25 improved in its entirety a particular convoy movement or a particular

Page 17161

1 manifest by virtue of this document, the Main Staff would not have had

2 the authority to modify manifests or to deny convoys that were cleared by

3 this.

4 Q. Thank you. I also quoted Article 6, which speaks about the

5 issuance of approvals for the movement of humanitarian convoys and UN and

6 international organisations personnel through Republika Srpska is within

7 the remit of the co-ordinating body. My question is: When we talk about

8 issuing permits for the movement of convoys through Republika Srpska, was

9 it something that the Main Staff was to be consulted or was it

10 exclusively within the purview of the co-ordinating body mentioned

11 herein?

12 A. As a practical matter, the Main Staff would have had to have been

13 consulted in this process because, ultimately speaking, the Main Staff

14 and the military controlled access to the enclaves. They were -- as

15 noted before, the enclaves had a significant military character. So the

16 Main Staff, as the military arm of the Republika Srpska, has to be

17 involved in this process very closely.

18 Q. Thank you. My question is as follows: In that case, did the

19 state committee notify the Main Staff about what they approved or not

20 approved because they were controlling the territory where the convoys

21 travelled and whether they were crossing the lines into another

22 territory?

23 A. As evidenced by that 31 August 1994 document, they had to have

24 co-ordinated that with the Main Staff because that document already lays

25 out circumstances where convoys which had been cleared by various

Page 17162

1 co-ordinating bodies, but not cleared by the Main Staff, were showing up

2 at various parts of the battle-field. So there had to have been a

3 process established; whereas, after a decision made by a civilian body on

4 a humanitarian convoy was made, that ultimately that was co-ordinated

5 with the military organs of the state because only the military organs of

6 the state could ultimately ensure that the convoy could be cleared to

7 pass through the territory and into the enclave.

8 Q. Thank you. In that case, was the Army of Republika Srpska

9 supposed to tell the committee whether it was safe or not safe for a

10 certain convoy to go down the specified route for which the committee

11 gave its approval?

12 A. I take it that would be one purpose. One of the things that the

13 committee would have to tell the army -- or that the army would be

14 expected to tell the committee as to what routes that the convoy could

15 take and at what times they would be cleared to be on those routes.

16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I think it's time for our second

17 break. We adjourn and resume at 1.00.

18 --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

19 [The witness stands down]

20 [The witness takes the stand]

21 --- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.

22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, Mr. Tolimir. Please continue.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

24 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Mr. Butler, can you tell me when you were reviewing the documents

Page 17163

1 relating to the convoys, did you come across any document testifying to

2 the fact that the Main Staff failed to act in accordance with the

3 decisions of the state committee and that it acted contrary to its

4 decisions when it came to humanitarian convoys?

5 A. I don't recall that I did off the top of my head. The general

6 process, as I understand it, was the committee would -- once they

7 approved a convoy, would then pass the material on to the Main Staff

8 where they would ultimately clear the convoy for travel. There may have

9 been cases where that has occurred, but I don't recall any off the top of

10 my head.

11 Q. Thank you. Are we talking about a permission or about an

12 approval, and was the Main Staff obliged to abide by the decision taken

13 by the committee regarding the passage of a convoy?

14 A. I think it's on a more technical basis. For example, along the

15 lines of a convoy that may have been approved for a certain date did not

16 travel or was not permitted to travel because they were entering into the

17 Republika Srpska at a different check-point than had been cleared

18 previously by the Main Staff. I know there were a number of cases like

19 that. I don't believe it was the Main Staff itself overruling permission

20 for convoys that had already been previously approved by the commission.

21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Can you tell the Trial Chamber what the

22 difference is between the permission for movement across Republika Srpska

23 and the approval for movement across front lines?

24 A. I think you -- in your question you've kind of laid out the

25 differential. One process involved the actual approval of a convoy and

Page 17164

1 its manifest. The second process revolved around gaining the necessary

2 permission to cross the front lines or to enter the Republika Srpska at

3 certain territories, most of which was controlled by the army; therefore,

4 the VRS's involvement in that process, even with civilian United Nations

5 agency convoys, was vital because as evidenced by the 31 October 1994

6 document -- I'm sorry, August 1994 document, they had to be appropriately

7 cleared because you couldn't have a situation where United Nations

8 convoys found themselves in a battle-field environment and nobody was

9 aware that they were coming or that they were in the place that they were

10 supposed to be.

11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Did you have an opportunity to look at

12 documents in which the secure conditions are provided for a convoy and

13 where solutions are provided for some extraordinary situations that

14 involved a degree of danger, if such situations occurred?

15 A. I am aware, generally, that particularly with respect to convoys

16 around Sarajevo, that that was a factor. I did not examine that

17 particular issue closely given the fact that my primary focus was on

18 convoys going into the eastern enclaves. So I -- and particularly

19 Srebrenica and Zepa. So I agree in context. There were cases where the

20 VRS refused to allow various convoys to pass because of claims of combat

21 activity that was ongoing. But that was often not the issue with

22 Srebrenica and Zepa. Those routes to those enclaves did not have

23 constant combat in them.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have D186, please. It's

Page 17165

1 a document of the Main Staff dated the 12th of March, 1995, and it speaks

2 about the prevention of plunder and looting because such things were

3 happening. I am not going to read the whole document, only the first

4 sentence from the introductory part. And it says:

5 "The National Assembly of Republika Srpska and the highest organs

6 of authority in Republika Srpska have verified the mandate of UNPROFOR in

7 Republika Srpska. Since UNPROFOR is on a peace mission to Republika

8 Srpska, (despite the fact that we - the Army of Republika Srpska and its

9 Main Staff - as well other institutions in Republika Srpska have many

10 objections to the biassed behaviour of UNPROFOR members, and there are

11 regular discussions of this at the meetings held with the representatives

12 of UNPROFOR) ..." And so on and so forth.

13 And then it goes on to say at the end -- so in this introductory

14 part it says that:

15 "Regardless of the problems that we are facing, UNPROFOR is

16 afforded legitimacy when it comes to its passing through the territory of

17 Republika Srpska."

18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: What is your question, Mr. Tolimir?

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My question was whether this

20 indicates that legitimacy is being afforded to UNPROFOR in the territory

21 of Republika Srpska by invoking the authorities that granted them

22 approval for deployment.

23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.

24 MR. McCLOSKEY: Can we at least see who has written this

25 document?

Page 17166

1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Let's go to the last page in both versions.

2 Signed by Colonel-General Ratko Mladic.

3 Mr. Butler.

4 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. In this context, it reflects the fact

5 that while the Main Staff has issues with the UNPROFOR, the political

6 powers of the state have affirmed the UNPROFOR's mission to be there and

7 that they are to be accorded the respects and authorities that they are

8 supposed to have under their mandate. So he acknowledges, you know -- on

9 behalf of the army, you know, he acknowledges the status of the UNPROFOR

10 in that respect.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]

12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Your microphone.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 1 of the document

14 back on our screens so that I can put my question to the witness.

15 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Does paragraph 2, if you've read it, make reference to robbery

17 being committed against members of UNPROFOR in the territory of Republika

18 Srpska? In fact, that's how the paragraph starts:

19 "There have been cases of UNPROFOR members being robbed in the

20 past ..."

21 A. Yes, sir, and, in fact, if you read that with the first paragraph

22 on the second page, it lays out the proposition that there are not only

23 individual acts of criminality perpetrated against the UNPROFOR but also

24 groups of individuals who are doing that, and that because of the

25 perception that the UNPROFOR is not neutral, that authorities within the

Page 17167

1 army are not taking -- either not taking those reports seriously or not

2 moving forward seriously to suppress banditry against the UNPROFOR

3 because I think the phrase was people who are robbing UNPROFOR are

4 actually true patriots. So it does lay out in the second paragraph the

5 problems that they are having with these criminal bands.

6 Q. Thank you. Does not the order issuing authority condemn the sort

7 of conduct you've referred to in paragraph 2?

8 A. Yes, sir. I mean, in the context it lays it out. I don't know

9 if he specifically in that paragraph, you know, General Mladic condemns

10 his actions, but certainly that's the point that is made that, you know,

11 the military will not tolerate this behaviour. It's made in both

12 paragraph 2 and paragraph 3. I would guess the top paragraph of the

13 second page.

14 Q. Thank you. We'll read paragraph 3 as well:

15 "This and similar acts of robbery have in an inexplicable and

16 unacceptable way become expressions of 'heroism' and manifestation of

17 'real' patriotism."

18 In other words, he is drawing the attention to these problems.

19 And now I'm moving on to read the order itself.

20 "I hereby order --" thank you. I am unable to read the entire --

21 part 1. Yes, thank you:

22 "Engaging all available forces, corps commanders shall order that

23 searches be conducted and other actions taken in uncovering procedures

24 with the aim of locating the perpetrators of these serious crimes,

25 documenting the crimes, launching criminal proceedings against the

Page 17168

1 perpetrators and returning UNPROFOR property."

2 Does not item 1 of the order express in clear terms that all the

3 envisaged criminal actions be taken against the perpetrators of such

4 acts? Thanks.

5 A. Yes, sir. That -- the first part or paragraph 1 of that order

6 lays out the corps commanders are responsible for dealing with the

7 investigation issues related to locating the perpetrators of these

8 crimes, documenting them, initiating criminal proceedings, and when

9 recovery, obviously, to return the UNPROFOR property.

10 Q. Thank you. Since corps commanders are mentioned here as the

11 relevant structures, is that the case because they are the ones in charge

12 of the entire territory through which UNPROFOR -- or, rather, convoys are

13 supposed to pass?

14 A. In part that is correct. The corps are the military units that

15 ultimately control the territory. They are the geographically based

16 ground forces. I would also direct your attention to paragraph 3 of that

17 order because it's implied as part of the paragraph 3 that the other

18 reason why the corps are involved is because there is at least the

19 inference by the Main Staff that it may well be subordinate military

20 commanders at the corps who are encouraging such acts. And as their

21 commanders, the corps commanders would be expected to take active

22 measures against these individuals.

23 Q. Thank you. Does this mean that the Main Staff was able to

24 make -- or give responsibility upon each and every corps commander if an

25 act of robbery was committed in his area of responsibility to confer upon

Page 17169

1 the responsibility to locate the perpetrators?

2 A. If I understand your question correctly, I don't know that it's

3 the Main Staff had to give responsibility. It is my understanding under

4 law that -- Republika Srpska law that existed at the time that the corps

5 commanders themselves already had the authority to do that.

6 But to the next point, General Mladic, as the commander of the

7 army and whom the corps commanders were directly subordinate to, was

8 making it clear personally, and when you look at paragraph 5 that he

9 expected that the corps commanders would actively work to undertake this,

10 these measures, and ensure that acts of robbery were not committed

11 against the UNPROFOR.

12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Was it based on this that the army had

13 its responsibilities in respect of convoys across the territory that it

14 controlled, across Republika Srpska?

15 A. I guess the answer is in part. I mean, when we go back to the

16 issue of Directive 7 and Directive 7(1) where the issue of restricting UN

17 convoys is discussed, it makes it clear that that is a thought out

18 process of state and military policy. That's one aspect. This is an

19 aspect dealing with individual and collective acts of criminalities.

20 When you lay these two issues together it makes it clear that, you know,

21 while the Army of Republika Srpska was going to engage in some activities

22 as part of its state policy and part of its military programme against

23 the United Nations protection forces, it was not, on the other hand,

24 prepared to accept individual acts of criminality by rogue soldiers or

25 rogue commanders in doing that.

Page 17170

1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. We will have time to look at what it is

2 that Directive 7 and 7(1) have to say. Yesterday we were able to see

3 that even General Smith received the announcement that -- of the fact

4 that sanctions were going to be imposed in relation to the eastern

5 enclaves. We will have an opportunity to discussion this. Let me ask

6 you in relation to this specific document: Was this the reason why the

7 army was supposed to receive announcements of the time, date, and route

8 of convoys in order to timely redress any possible shortcomings or

9 failures to take proper action in respect of convoys?

10 A. It may have been a reason, but I do not believe it was the

11 primary reason. This is, again, simply put, the army taking actions to

12 ensure that the UNPROFOR was not subject to criminal acts, particularly

13 by members of the VRS. Now, obviously would the fact that the corps are

14 advised as to when these convoys are going through or not, would that

15 help in their crime prevention efforts? Certainly. But having said

16 that, the fact is that the corps already had this information from well

17 before March of 1995, so the fact that they are notifying the corps as to

18 these issues of when these convoys pass and where, while potentially

19 helpful to the crime prevention activities -- was more important for

20 protecting the convoys and assuring their clearances through combat

21 areas.

22 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. That's a different issue. My question

23 had to do with something else, but let's not waste time on this. I'd

24 like to move to a different document. I don't want to waste time.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D924 shown in e-court.

Page 17171

1 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Meanwhile, I should tell you that it's an -- it's a coded

3 telegram sent by Akashi to Annan on the 1st of March, 1995, and it's

4 entitled: "Attitude of the Bosnia Government to UNPROFOR."

5 Paragraph 1 on page 1 reads:

6 "The BiH has been increasingly intransigent toward the peace

7 process and to UNPROFOR. Despite their acceptance of the cessation of

8 hostilities agreement on 31st December 1994, and of the accords of

9 several joint commissions held at the various command levels, the BiH has

10 obstructed attempts by the UNPROFOR to improve liaison, observe

11 confrontation lines, and separate forces by refusing to attend regularly

12 the joint commission process. They have applied significant additional

13 restrictions on UNPROFOR movement ..."

14 This is my question: Did you have occasion to see a single

15 document which would speak to the restriction imposed by the BH Army on

16 the movement of UNPROFOR?

17 A. I may have seen individual documents related to that, but given

18 the context of my particular analysis, the issue of movement restrictions

19 by the BiH Army on the UNPROFOR, in any aspect outside of how it impacted

20 the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves would not have been an area that I

21 focussed on.

22 Q. Thank you. Did you perhaps examine the issue from the

23 perspective of the fact that the central state commission is referred to

24 as a central body through which the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement is

25 being implemented as indicated by Mr. Akashi? He refers to the agreement

Page 17172

1 of the 31st of December, 1994, and states that there were additional

2 restrictions imposed on UNPROFOR movement. He also states that they no

3 longer co-operated or worked with the joint commission. Did you have an

4 opportunity to come across something like this?

5 A. Again, sir, while I may have come across it, the focus of my

6 analysis in this area would have been related to the more tactical issue

7 of restrictions of movement placed on the UNPROFOR forces within the

8 enclaves and their impact on the ability of the UN forces within the

9 enclaves to monitor all the activity in those enclaves. Those issues

10 outside the enclaves wouldn't be relevant to me.

11 Q. Thank you. Yesterday we spoke of the restrictions of movement of

12 liaison officers who were instituted as part of those cessation of

13 hostilities agreement, and I'm quoting what Mr. Akashi has to say:

14 "Numerous restrictions were imposed on UNPROFOR. The trend is

15 that such restrictions are imposed at a time when armed activities are

16 planned or when increased pressure is intended to be put on UNPROFOR."

17 The last sentence says that they forced liaison officers to

18 withdraw from Tuzla to Gornji Vakuf. We can see that in paragraph 3.

19 And it was also indicated that those who were in Gornji Vakuf had to be

20 transferred to the territory of Republika Srpska.

21 This is my question: Since all these activities aimed toward

22 restricting the movement of UNPROFOR and the control to be exerted by

23 UNPROFOR over the BH Army were well known to both Annan and Akashi, does

24 this mean that they did receive information from UNPROFOR units on the

25 ground and UNPROFOR commanders about the activities of the BH Army and

Page 17173

1 the violations of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement that they

2 committed?

3 A. If one presumes that the information in this particular document

4 is based on reporting from the ground commanders at the lowest levels in

5 the UNPROFOR, and I believe it is, the notification inherent in this

6 document would confirm what you've said, which is that that information

7 that is occurring -- or those facts that are occurring on the ground are

8 receiving visibility at the highest levels of the United Nations.

9 Q. Thank you. Let us look at paragraph 4 on page 3. Thank you. It

10 reads:

11 "There have also been several indicators which suggest that the

12 BiH is considering an offensive in the near future."

13 Under A:

14 "The refusal of the BiH to accept the BSA liaison officers is

15 referred to."

16 Under B, it reads there are indicators that the BiH is improving

17 its efficiency through reorganisation, rearming training and force

18 standardisation. Mobilisation of large numbers of troops continues in

19 the major centres of Zenica and Tuzla. There has been unusually heavy

20 troop movement and resupply towards the northern regions. Hospitals on

21 the western confrontation line have been warned to expect casualties.

22 This is my question: Did the United Nations precisely identify

23 which was the side that refused to continue complying with the cessation

24 of hostilities agreement and that continued with combat activities on the

25 territory under its control? Thank you.

Page 17174

1 A. This document specifically lays out the notification, many of the

2 issues which we discussed yesterday. When one looks at the date of this

3 document, looks at what happened in context afterwards, it's clear that

4 just like other notifications, you know, at some point even the UN senior

5 leadership became aware that the BiH was intending to break the

6 cease-fire and to resume offensive activities. I think this document is

7 a reflection of that, and given where this document -- who authored it

8 and where it was sent to, it's fair to conclude that that notification

9 went to the highest levels within the United Nations within the

10 department of peacekeeping.

11 Q. Bearing in mind the documents that we saw yesterday about the

12 activation of the armed forces in Zepa and Srebrenica, as a soldier would

13 you consider it justifiable to take steps preparing for combat activities

14 in the territory of an enclave where armed forces were not supposed to

15 exist to begin with? Thank you.

16 A. Justifiable in a sense of the Bosnian government's military

17 objectives, yes. Justifiable in the sense of legal obligations in a

18 cease-fire zone is a different question. As you noted, it was supposedly

19 demilitarised; therefore, if they were properly demilitarised you

20 wouldn't have the situation where in the enclaves those forces are

21 mobilising and preparing for combat activities. As we know, that was not

22 the case. So, again, since this --

23 Q. And was the least that the Army of Republika Srpska could do to

24 prevent the army that UNPROFOR failed to disarm in the demilitarised

25 zones of Zepa and Srebrenica from arming -- from arming -- to prevent

Page 17175

1 them from arming through various restrictions. That's what should stand

2 at the end of my question.

3 A. Now it's clear. Yes, sir, from a military perspective, the idea

4 that the Army Republika Srpska would take steps to ensure that their

5 adversary -- their armed adversary within the enclave was not

6 surreptitiously receiving weapons is something that they would have been

7 actively involved in and were actively involved in.

8 Q. Thank you. Was the Army of Republika Srpska able to have any

9 impact on the distribution of humanitarian aid in the enclaves and

10 prevent the aid from being distributed to the army?

11 A. The Army of Republika Srpska was able to control the flow going

12 into the enclaves by virtue of convoys and inspections. Once a convoy

13 passed through that final check-point and went into the enclave, they

14 obviously had no material ability to affect where in the enclave that

15 material went and whom ultimately consumed it.

16 Q. Thank you. Since the army that had not been disarmed in the

17 enclaves did require some sort of logistics, do you happen to know in

18 what way the BH Army received food supplies and other logistical supplies

19 in Srebrenica and Zepa?

20 A. I think the pattern that has been established is quite clear.

21 Those supplies that were overtly military, such as weapons, grenades,

22 mine, ammunition, were smuggled in over land or, in select case, brought

23 in by helicopter. Those items that were considered to be dual-use, that

24 had both military and civilian applications, such as food, such as fuel,

25 things of that nature, the military within the enclave was content to be

Page 17176

1 able to appropriate from the general supplies that were going to the

2 civilian population.

3 Q. Thank you. The supplies intended for the civilian population

4 that you mentioned in your answer, did they come from the various

5 humanitarian convoys arriving in the enclave, such as UNPROFOR and UNHCR

6 convoys among others?

7 A. Probably to a larger extent from UNHCR convoys, to a lesser

8 extent the UNPROFOR, since it wasn't their specific mandate to provide

9 food to the larger civilian populations. So that is why in the context

10 of those convoys there was attention paid to the amount of materials

11 going in to try and ensure that the amount of materials there were going

12 in were suitable for the civilian population but would not be in such

13 excess that it would be diverted to military use. These are the -- the

14 attention being paid to it was by the Army of Republika Srpska.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Since we are at the end of our

17 work-day, I would ask that 1D924 be admitted into evidence. That's the

18 report by Mr. Akashi.

19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. I take it there is no B/C/S

20 translation. If you don't insist to receive a translation into B/C/S, it

21 will be -- or, I should ask you if you want to have a translation. Have

22 you contacted a translation unit? Mr. Gajic, what is your position?

23 Otherwise we just receive it as a document.

24 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] I think that the process is underway.

25 The Case Manager is dealing with some issues, and I have taken on,