Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 17179

 1                           Wednesday, 24 August 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning to everybody.

 6             The witness should be brought in, please.

 7                           [The witness takes the stand]

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning, Mr. Butler.  Welcome back --

 9             THE WITNESS:  Morning, sir.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  -- for another day of hearing.  You know the

11     affirmation to tell the truth still applies today.

12             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir is continuing his examination.

14             Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I wish

16     peace to this house and for all those present.  And may God's will be

17     done in these proceedings and may the outcome be as God wishes and not as

18     I wish.

19                           WITNESS:  RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]

20                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]

21        Q.   [Interpretation] I wish welcome also to Mr. Butler.  We are glad

22     to have him here.

23             Yesterday, Mr. Butler, we talked about the abuses and eventually

24     the smuggling in connection with the convoys which were perpetrated by

25     the army in Srebrenica.  Please, have you reviewed any document that

Page 17180

 1     deals with these issues and the issue of the distribution of humanitarian

 2     aid?  Thank you.

 3        A.   The documents that I've reviewed in that respect, many of them

 4     which were discussed during my direct examination, some of them we've

 5     seen on cross-examination, reflect the view that the Bosnian Serb

 6     military and the Republika Srpska government had that UNPROFOR and other

 7     United Nations agencies, either wittingly or unwittingly, were providing

 8     supplies and military materials to the 28th Division and other

 9     Bosnian Muslim units within the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves.

10             It was a perception that the United Nations people were aware of.

11     There had been a number of cases in the past where those issues had been

12     flagged to their attention.  I believe there are at least one or two

13     cases where UN forces in and around Sarajevo were actually -- convoys

14     were actually stopped that had war materials in them that should not have

15     been there.  So it was a continuing theme within that respect.

16             Now, within the enclaves, as I've testified yesterday, certainly

17     the Republika Srpska and the Army of the Republika Srpska were aware that

18     once those convoys went into the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, they would

19     be powerless to control who the supplies went to.  I mean, obviously the

20     overwhelming predominance of the supplies were civilian materials for the

21     civilian populations, but there was black marketeering, there was clearly

22     diversion to the military forces of some of those supplies, and this was

23     well known by all the parties.

24        Q.   Thank you for this clarification.  Now, please, concerning the

25     supplies that were being sent to the army, something that you could read

Page 17181

 1     about even after the departure of UNPROFOR and the liberation of

 2     Srebrenica and Zepa and the exit of the BH Army and the civilian

 3     population from Srebrenica?

 4        A.   Specific to the issue of supplies to the army, and, again, as

 5     I've testified, most of the military supplies that were going to the

 6     28th Division were either brought in or smuggled overland by soldiers of

 7     the 2nd Corps going over known smuggling routes, or in some cases that

 8     they were brought in surreptitiously via helicopter flights into the

 9     enclave.

10             So again, in that respect, as I've noted, the goods that the

11     military could appropriate from the civilian population, food stuffs,

12     cooking oils, things of that nature, they did not bring in themselves.

13     They used the auspices of the UN, essentially, to let the UN handle those

14     civilian supplies and then appropriate them as they needed.  But the

15     strictly military technical equipment they had to bring in themselves

16     over known routes - it was a relatively active smuggling regime that was

17     going on over these routes - to allow the 28th Division to slowly bring

18     in ammunition, weapons, things of that nature.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please tell us who gave them permission to

20     bring that in, or did they do it illegally without anyone checking on

21     them?

22        A.   When you say "that," I'm not exactly clear what you're talking

23     about.  Are you referring to who gave permission for the civilian aid or

24     who authorised the transshipment of military supplies?

25        Q.   I meant military supplies, because you said that -- it seems that

Page 17182

 1     you said that it was permitted, even though it was not permitted.

 2        A.   The United Nations going into Srebrenica, to my knowledge, never

 3     wittingly, or to their knowledge, took military supplies in that were

 4     going to be used by the 28th Division in the Srebrenica enclave.  Now,

 5     the 28th Division itself undertook a programme with their headquarters in

 6     2nd Corps in order to smuggle military supplies from the larger

 7     Bosnian Muslim territory held by 2 Corps behind the Bosnian Serb military

 8     lines in order to get it into the hands of the soldiers in Srebrenica and

 9     Zepa.  Is that what you're referring to, sir?

10        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Please, have you ever seen any report

11     issued by a senior officer, commanders of UNPROFOR, relating to the

12     illegal bringing in of weapons into Srebrenica, whether it was done

13     illegally or through smuggling channels?  Thank you.

14        A.   I am aware that particularly during the months of January,

15     February, March of 1995 that many members of the United Nations forces in

16     Eastern Bosnia were picking up on bits of information that had to do with

17     outside military supplies coming into Bosnia, primarily through the Tuzla

18     airport.  Many of those supplies going to the 2nd Corps, some of those

19     supplies subsequently making their way to the 28th Division in

20     Srebrenica, and that the United Nations was reporting these

21     outside supply -- military supplies coming in, which they viewed as a

22     violation of the United Nations arm embargo.  So if that's the context

23     that you're referring to, I have seen those reports.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Have you perhaps ever seen a report on the

25     conversation done by Mr. Franken on the 31st of March, 1999?  We are

Page 17183

 1     going to show you in order to facility your answer.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And for that purpose we need an

 3     exhibit, 1D207.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We have on the screen the English and the Dutch

 5     version of this document.  Is there a B/C/S translation?

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It seems that we do not have a

 7     B/C/S translation, but I have a hard copy with me.

 8             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Tell me, have you ever seen this report that you are now reading

10     that's an interview with Mr. Franken who had been a deputy commander?

11        A.   I know that the OTP has interviewed Major Franken on a number of

12     occasions.  However, I am not sure that I've -- this doesn't look like an

13     OTP originated product.  I assume from the Dutch copy that I saw that

14     this may be an interview that he did pursuant to the Dutch parliament's

15     own investigation into Srebrenica.  So I don't believe I've ever seen

16     this particular document before.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, can you help us:  Who interview

18     Mr. Franken?  We can't see that from the text on the screen.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Thank you,

20     Mr. President.  Since the witness hasn't seen item number 1, let's see

21     what it says there.  But before that it says that the tape recording

22     failed; the text below is a reconstruction of what was discussed.  And

23     then it says, under number one:

24             "The ABiH army smuggled two combat armoured vehicles into the

25     enclave via Sarajevo.  This was notified by a Dutch OP.  They were never

Page 17184

 1     found.  Later it became clear that the Ukrainians in Zepa were missing a

 2     total of five.  Bought or stolen by ABiH?"

 3             And then under 2 it says -- no --

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Before you continue, please explain what kind of

 5     document we have on the screen.  Who did this interview with Mr. Franken?

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  This

 7     interview was done by NIOD, the institute for investigations, and a copy

 8     of that interview was provided to the OTP alongside other documents.  If

 9     you permit me, I would like to read item number 1 -- or, actually, I have

10     already read it.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The NIOD, the institution of investigations, is a

12     Dutch institution investigating the events in Bosnia; is that correct?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  That's

14     correct.  It's their institute for war documentation.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  Please carry on with your

16     examination.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

18             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Mr. Butler, after having read item 1, tell me, did you know

20     anything about the fact that even heavy weaponry such as combat

21     armoured vehicles were smuggled into Srebrenica?

22        A.   I am not aware that heavy combat vehicles such as BTR armoured

23     personnel carriers were smuggled into Srebrenica.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Do you trust this report by Mr. Franken?

25        A.   It's not a question of whether I trust it or not, I guess.

Page 17185

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  As we have heard from you, Mr. Tolimir, it's not

 2     a report.  It's a reconstruction of an interview of NIOD with

 3     Witness Franken.

 4             Mr. McCloskey.

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.  That's all I wanted to

 6     point out for the record.  But also, NIOD is a historical documentation

 7     centre; it's not really an investigative body.  But it doesn't really

 8     matter, just as long as that's clear.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We have seen some other documents in this trial

10     from NIOD, so we are quite familiar with this institution.

11             Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

12             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  When Mr. Franken testified here, we asked

14     him, on page 39, 3459, lines 15 to 19, and in the course of his testimony

15     he said that he himself had seen armoured vehicles, two of them, passing

16     through Srebrenica.  And after that the Ukrainian unit from Zepa, in its

17     logistical report, says - and this is information we received from the

18     UN - reported the disappearance of five APCs.  And then on page 3459,

19     lines 24 and 25, and 3401, he replied that these were vehicles that had

20     never been retrieved or found and that that was true.

21             Now, please, were other members of the UNPROFOR, whose statements

22     you've read, were aware of the fact that the BH Army was acquiring heavy

23     weaponry, APCs, and other pieces of equipment in an illegal way by means

24     of smuggling?

25        A.   Again, what I can tell you is that I'm not aware of this issue.

Page 17186

 1     Having -- you know, as someone who has gone over, through the years, the

 2     documents of the Army of the Republika Srpska related to Srebrenica, I'm

 3     not aware of any report where the military units talk about the fact that

 4     they have captured two BTR armoured personnel carriers from the ABiH

 5     pursuant to the fall of the enclave.  So if that fact happened, and those

 6     BTRs were ultimately taken over by the Army of the Republika Srpska after

 7     they were captured, it was never reported in their -- to their chain of

 8     command.

 9             I would also note the fact that with respect to the Ukrainian

10     United Nations detachment in Zepa, I would find that fact rather

11     difficult to believe in light of the very close known association between

12     the local VRS forces at Zepa and the Ukrainian Battalion.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.  We've reviewed what the general said, the

15     cites regarding his statement that Franken testified that he himself saw

16     armoured personnel carriers go through Srebrenica, and it -- we don't see

17     that.  So if the general could actually read the section he's referring

18     to.  There is a reference that Franken sees, in a report, that things

19     were missing from Zepa, but we can't see what he's talking about, and I

20     don't recall him saying he saw, you know, stolen personnel carriers going

21     through Srebrenica.  I mean, that -- perhaps I've forgotten that, but

22     that sounds very strange to me.  So if he can read what he's talking

23     about, I would appreciate it.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

25             Mr. Gajic.

Page 17187

 1             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I will help everyone

 2     with the reference.  That's the transcript of the 1st of July.  It wasn't

 3     Mr. Franken who said that he saw it himself, but it's, rather, on

 4     page 3461, lines 8 to 9, said:

 5             [In English] "My OP only saw them entering the enclave at the

 6     south border.  That is just a remark for the question before."

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I'm very sorry, we didn't receive a full

 8     interpretation of what you said.

 9             MR. GAJIC: [Microphone not activated] [No interpretation]

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Perhaps you can -- the best way is to have the

11     relevant part on the screen and then we can check it.  Page 3461, lines

12     8 to 9.

13             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And, Mr. President, if we could start it at 7.

14     You can see that that's a good place to start this.  Line 7.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Gajic.

16             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. McCloskey is right.  That's

17     what I said, that Mr. Franken didn't say that he saw it himself but that

18     that could be seen from the observation point.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Butler, you see it on the screen.  I will

20     read the text into the transcript.  Mr. Franken's answer is the

21     following, I quote:

22             "First, you concluded that I saw those vehicles in Srebrenica,

23     which is incorrect.  My OP," which means the observation post, "only saw

24     them entering the enclave at the south border.  That is just a remark for

25     the question before."

Page 17188

 1             I would like to invite you, Mr. Tolimir, to -- if you quote

 2     something from the transcript or a statement, you should be very correct

 3     if you put that part to the witness.  Please carry on.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  This is

 5     precisely my problem:  That I never received the transcript in my own

 6     language and I have to rely on my notes which need not be fully precise

 7     because of the speed.  So that's probably the reason why I wasn't

 8     precise.  My apologies to you and the witness.

 9             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   This is my question:

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, you have a team.  You have Mr. Gajic

12     and other team members and you have assistance for interpretation and

13     translation.  So that this is a question of a good preparation of your

14     cross-examination.

15             Please carry on.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I don't

17     want to go into the reasons why I have difficulties and why I do not use

18     all the facilities that I should.

19             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   I would like to put the following question to Mr. Butler:  What

21     you have just heard, does it confirm or change the position that you've

22     just expressed about the APCs?  Thank you.  The APCs, that is, which were

23     smuggled into Srebrenica.

24        A.   No, sir, it does not.  Simply put:  Again, my knowledge of this

25     situation is based off of the military documents that I've read that

Page 17189

 1     cover the periods, obviously, before and after the fall of the enclave,

 2     primarily from the perspective of the Army of the Republika Srpska.  I'm

 3     not aware of any military documents that reflect that units of the VRS

 4     took custody of these two vehicles or that they were captured by them

 5     after the fall of the enclave.  I don't -- I hold open the possibility,

 6     obviously, that it occurred as Major Franken said, that his OP had

 7     reported this.  But that fact and that fact that those vehicles had been

 8     captured by the VRS subsequent has never been reported.

 9        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  I never said that the VRS seized the

10     vehicles or captured them, and that's not the point.  The point is, how

11     were the vehicles smuggled into Srebrenica to begin with?  How were they

12     smuggled past the observation posts that observed them, and how this was

13     not stopped?

14             Let's now look at item 6 of the interview with Franken, the

15     interview conducted by NIOD in 1999.  He says, and I am quoting:

16             "Weapons were regularly smuggled from Zepa straight through the

17     Serbian lines, and local BSA commanders were richly rewarded for this.

18     Occasionally, a BH army smuggling team ran into an ambush and several

19     Muslim fighters were shot.  But after this, the smuggling carried on as

20     normal.  Horses were sometimes used for this."

21             And I will read item 7, which states:

22             "Weapons were also regularly brought into the enclave from

23     Tuzla."

24             Was the VRS, therefore, rightly concerned about this and should

25     not the VRS have taken all possible measures to make sure that no

Page 17190

 1     weapons, ammunition, nor equipment arrived or reached the enclave, i.e.,

 2     a demilitarised zone?  Thank you.

 3        A.   I agree that not only was the VRS aware of the fact that weapons

 4     were being smuggled into Srebrenica, but that they were -- it was proper

 5     for them to be concerned and take the necessary measures to prevent these

 6     weapons from being smuggled in.

 7             I -- going back to point 6 on this, Major Franken's contention

 8     that local VRS commanders were complicit in this somehow, I'm not sure

 9     that I'm aware of that fact, at least from the VRS documents.  I suspect

10     that the intelligence and security branches of the VRS would have been

11     very involved in that particular process, had they gained any awareness

12     that local Bosnian Serb military commanders were somehow facilitating,

13     for profit purposes, the supplies of weapons, ammunitions, into the

14     enclave.

15        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  When reviewing the document 65 ter 05170,

16     you spoke of the various restrictions imposed on UNPROFOR convoys that

17     wanted to bring in supplies.  Tell us, was the population in any way

18     affected, adversely, by the restrictions that the VRS may have applied in

19     respect of UNPROFOR convoys?

20        A.   While it's difficult to quantify, I believe that there was some

21     impact with respect to the restrictions on the UNPROFOR convoys,

22     particularly related to medical care and certain other food stuffs.  It's

23     well documented by the Dutch Battalion that - as well as their own

24     logistics - they would often provide excess medical or food stuffs

25     supplies to the population, particularly segments of that population that

Page 17191

 1     were sick or that needed extra care.  So in effect by restricting the

 2     supplies going into the UNPROFOR forces as part of the VRS campaign, it

 3     had, whether by design or not, it had an impact on the civilian

 4     populations in the Srebrenica enclave.

 5        Q.   Are you aware of a case involving a fatality among the civilian

 6     population because of the shortage of medical supplies that the VRS may

 7     have prevented from entering into the enclave on an UNPROFOR convoy?

 8        A.   I can't speak beyond generalities on this issue only because the

 9     actual day-to-day activities of the Dutch Battalion in the enclave, how

10     they related to the civilian population, was not a focus of my analysis.

11     I just didn't deal with that issue.  My knowledge of that is based, in

12     part, off of my own hearing of various members of the Dutch Battalion

13     testify in certain situations here, so, again, I can't speak to that

14     first-hand.

15        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  In other words, you don't have a document

16     that you may have reviewed and which could be referenced here for the

17     Trial Chamber and which you would have used in expressing your basic view

18     that this practice affected the civilian population?

19        A.   The basic document that I used in reference in my narrative with

20     respect to the Dutch Battalion was the 1995 report that the Dutch

21     themselves did after Srebrenica, as well as the United Nations report

22     which also discusses aspects of the Dutch activities in the enclaves.

23     That's the basis of my particular knowledge.  I did not, because it

24     wasn't necessary for what I was doing, I did not go through the daily

25     activity reports of the Dutch Battalions -- or Battalion in Srebrenica to

Page 17192

 1     review what actions they did or did not take relevant to the civilian

 2     population there.  And I was not part of the NIOD process as well, so I

 3     have no knowledge of what information they may or may not have come up

 4     with in that respect as well.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Is my understanding correct, then:  This was on the

 6     basis of what you heard and not based on documents that you could speak

 7     to as an expert?  Thank you.

 8        A.   It is based on my understanding of those two reports.  It is not

 9     based upon -- as well as what testimony I've heard, it is not based upon

10     my own independent analysis.

11        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Tell me, did you find in these documents

12     information about a medical organisation existing in Srebrenica which

13     provided this sort of care for the population?  Thank you.

14        A.   The -- I believe the outside organisation you're referring to is

15     the team from the medicine without frontiers organisation; is that

16     correct?

17        Q.   Thank you.  I didn't want you to guess what it is that I was

18     thinking of.  I just wanted to know what it is that you know.

19        A.   My apologies.  But I am aware that there was an independent

20     medical organisation, the medicine without frontiers organisation, that

21     did have a medical team inside of Srebrenica.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Rather than looking at the document produced by this

23     team, let's look at paragraph 26 of the document we have before us so

24     that we could leave it once we are finished with it.  There we have

25     paragraph 26, and I quote:

Page 17193

 1             "The local situation for the population was, indeed, not great,

 2     but after the capture of the enclave, it turned out that there were huge

 3     food stocks there.  The ABiH even dumped two lorries full of ammunition

 4     in the river."

 5             Paragraph 27:

 6             "The bombardments were, indeed, no small thing," and when I

 7     say -- I mean shooting and small arms fire, "but there was never any

 8     deliberate targeted shooting at DB III soldiers.  Always right next to

 9     them.  The ABiH did always try to get the DutchBat into a fight, and

10     there were continuous attempts to maneuver the soldiers into a position

11     in which the DutchBat would attract the fire of the Bosnian Serb army,"

12     et cetera.

13             Based on the two paragraphs I've read, tell us, the statement

14     made by Mr. Franken, to the effect that there were huge food stocks

15     there, indicates that the situation in terms of food supplies was not

16     disastrous in the enclave?  Because he's talking about the situation as

17     found after the population left the enclave.

18        A.   It is what Major Franken says.  I mean, this is the report

19     derived from an interview with them.  I don't know that to be a fact one

20     way or another.  My analysis of the Srebrenica enclave did not include a

21     total of food accounting that was captured in the enclave.  My knowledge

22     of it is based off of the VRS reports afterwards, and I'm not aware of

23     VRS reporting that they are taking into custody these vast quantities of

24     food.  Whether they went into VRS custody, whether they went into

25     civilian custody by the civilian commissioner of Srebrenica, I don't

Page 17194

 1     know.  So I'm not in a position to comment one way or another on the

 2     issue of food and what was found after the fall of the enclave.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  One remark for the transcript.  Page 14, line 25,

 4     through the next line, the words, I quote:

 5             "And when I say -- I mean shooting and small arms fire ..."

 6             These words are not part of the document but added by

 7     Mr. Tolimir.  Just to have a clear record.

 8             Please continue.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I did

10     add this to clarify and I did not specify that I was doing that.  I was

11     just specifying what the word "pucanje," "shooting," means in Serbian.

12             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Mr. Butler, do you know anything about the delivery of American

14     weapons into the enclave?  Did you come across such documents or do you

15     have any sort of knowledge about it?

16        A.   I have no direct knowledge of it.  I am aware, from reading the

17     United Nations report related to Srebrenica, that there was

18     United Nations reporting on flights go in Tuzla airport where arms were

19     coming in.  And certainly there was speculation that the United States

20     had at least some role in those flights.  But I don't know anything more

21     than what is printed in the United Nations report related to that.

22        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Let us now look at paragraph 41 of

23     Franken's statement.  Let's see what he has to say about it.  He was the

24     deputy commander of DutchBat in Srebrenica.  I quote:

25             "Franken is certain that there were American weapons deliveries

Page 17195

 1     to the ABiH army.  These weapons were delivered in Tuzla and transported

 2     further from there."

 3             This is my question:  Were UNPROFOR members also aware of the

 4     fact that there were American weapons come from Tuzla and from Tuzla to

 5     Srebrenica, as indicated by Mr. Franken in this report of his?  Thank

 6     you.

 7        A.   With respect to the knowledge of the UNPROFOR members, as

 8     evidenced by the United Nations report on that subject, a number of them

 9     were aware, and I believe one of the documents that you showed me

10     yesterday that was authored by Mr. Akashi, in fact, noted also in that

11     document that they were aware that there were weapon resupply flights

12     coming into Tuzla.  So clearly the UNPROFOR members had a contemporaneous

13     knowledge of that event occurring.  I am not aware based on my analysis

14     of military documents, relating particularly from the VRS, that any US

15     weaponry was captured there.  Frankly speaking, it would be -- I would be

16     surprised to find that that would be the case.  Given that all of the

17     combatants were fighting with weapons that were related to the former

18     Warsaw Pact forces in the former Yugoslavia, putting weapon systems that

19     cannot be adequately supplied in an isolated part of the battle-field

20     doesn't make a lot of sense.  It makes more sense that if the Americans

21     were providing them weapons, they would be providing them weapons that

22     they may have obtained from non-United States or non-NATO forces, because

23     once you've provided them with these weapons, they could resupply

24     themselves from captured ammunition stocks.

25             So, again, I hold open the possibility, and it's well reported,

Page 17196

 1     that there were supply flights going into Tuzla, but I'm not aware of any

 2     American weapons being found in Srebrenica after the conflict -- or

 3     after, you know, captured by the VRS afterwards, and reported as such.

 4        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  You will see that even the Main Staff

 5     protested about this issue with the UN headquarters in Zagreb.

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Can Mr. Tolimir please --

 7             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] D196, yes, that's the number.  Can

 8     we have D196.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, are you tendering the document

10     1D207?

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Yes, I

12     would like it to be admitted with your leave.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 1D207 shall be

15     assigned Exhibit D305.  Thank you.

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] We already have the next document

17     on our screens.  It's a document by the VRS Main Staff, dated the

18     24th of February, 1995, entitled:

19             "Protest to the UNPROFOR Command in Zagreb, to

20     General de Lapresle and to the UNPROFOR command in Sarajevo, to

21     General Smith in person.

22             "At about 2010 hours on the 23rd of February, 1995, another

23     transport plane landed on the auxiliary runway at Tuzla airport, loaded

24     with weapons and military equipment and escorted by two NATO fighter

25     aircraft, which protected it during its flight and while it was being

Page 17197

 1     unloaded.

 2             "Unfortunately, this has happened on a number of occasions

 3     recently, right in front of the eyes and the ears of NATO and UNPROFOR

 4     forces, in the air and at Tuzla airport itself, who are doing nothing to

 5     prevent the violation of the relevant Security Council resolution

 6     prohibiting imports of weapons and military equipment."

 7             This is my question:  Mr. Butler, did you come across several

 8     documents and protests of the sort which cautioned about the fact that

 9     the resolution was being violated by NATO armed forces, the very same

10     forces which provided security to the air-space above Bosnia-Herzegovina?

11     Thank you.

12        A.   Yes, sir, I have seen United Nations documents which relate that,

13     as we've discussed, that were happening at the time these violations were

14     occurring, and I've read a number of witness interviews by United Nations

15     observers who reported these same instances and discussed them.  So I am

16     very familiar with the events and allegations related to these particular

17     violations of the cease-fire -- not cease-fire, but of the no-fly zone,

18     as well as the arms embargo.

19        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Was the VRS then left with any other

20     methods of control other than the methods of checks at check-points of

21     the cargo that would possibly slip without proper notification?  Was

22     there any other method that they could have applied?

23        A.   Well, sir, I believe that the VRS applied both the methods that

24     were available to it, militarily speaking.  The first one was the

25     inspection regime that was in place to ensure that the United Nations was

Page 17198

 1     not overtly carrying armed materials into the enclaves, which they did.

 2     And the second one was the creation of military positions and ambushes

 3     along the known smuggling routes to try and interdict, to the degree that

 4     they could, the smuggling of weapons and arms into the enclave.

 5             And I would note that not only was it smuggling on the ground,

 6     but on a number of occasions the ABiH sought to smuggle in weapons via

 7     helicopter.  And at least on one occasion that I'm aware of, the VRS was

 8     successful in shooting down a helicopter resupply flight.

 9             Now, with respect to the second avenue, the reality on the ground

10     was that, just as I have discussed on a number of occasions, the VRS

11     never had the adequate military manpower to completely seal off the

12     enclave so weapons and supplies could not be smuggled in, but they were

13     aware that the smuggling was occurring and that they were taking steps to

14     combat it as much as they could.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Let us look at D197.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, the document we just saw on the

18     screen, D196, was marked for identification pending translation.  I was

19     told that a translation is now available.  Are you tendering the document

20     now?

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Yes, we

22     are, with your leave.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will now be Exhibit D196, and I would

24     appreciate if, from time to time, the Defence could update us with the

25     completion of translations.

Page 17199

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] We now see D197.  It's a document

 3     issued by the Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its military economic

 4     mission in Zagreb, which was sent to their office in Bihac, in the area

 5     of the 5th Corps of the BH Army, intended to -- personally for the corps

 6     commander.

 7        Q.   In the letter they detail the items sent in the last dispatch, or

 8     shipment.  The items mentioned are, without exception, mines and

 9     explosives.  Is it possible for you to draw a conclusion as to how it was

10     possible for these mines and explosives to reach the Bihac area, having

11     travelled from Zagreb?  Thank you.

12        A.   No, sir, it's not.  The conflict that occurred in the far western

13     portion of Bosnia and Bihac is not an area that I've put any study into.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please look at this document, and just above

15     the stamp you can see the last sentence.  Now I hope you can see it.

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Actually, we need the next page in

17     English, and we can retain the current page in the Serbian.  Thank you.

18        Q.   You see, they just typed the license plate number of the truck

19     that delivered this ordinance, UNHCR, and it was signed by

20     Mr. Hajrudin Osmanagic, the military attache.  Thank you.

21             So can you see that this delivery came via the UNHCR?

22        A.   I have no way of knowing whether that's true or not, whether it

23     came under the auspices of the UNHCR or whether it was just a vehicle

24     with UNHCR markings that was stolen or however it was done.  I mean, I

25     just don't know.  I am not familiar with the area with respect to the

Page 17200

 1     military campaigns that were fought there, so I have no basis by which to

 2     offer an opinion as to how weapons were or were not being smuggled into

 3     the Bihac enclaves.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I note for the record that I only see a date in

 5     the stamp, which seems to be the 29th of May, 1993, although I'm not sure

 6     if that is really correct.  Could the stamp please be enlarged.  It is

 7     possible that the English translation is correct with the date of

 8     29th of May, 1993, although the original is not very clear.  It could be

 9     1983, although at that time there was no embassy -- no BiH embassy in

10     Croatia.

11             Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  But on

13     the first page one can see, under the heading "-93," which indicates the

14     year of 1993, which is the time of war.  And during the war there was a

15     military mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Zagreb, and also one can

16     see in the stamp that the date is the 29th of May, 1993.

17             I showed this document in order to demonstrate that it was the

18     UNHCR who was also smuggling weapons and ammunitions in their vehicles,

19     and Mr. Butler already commented on this.

20             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Can we now take a look at 1D198.

21     In view of the fact that the time and the place is in dispute, whether

22     this was during or before the war, in this document, again, we can see

23     that it's clearly dated the 19th of May, 1993, and the sender is the

24     Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

25             THE REGISTRAR: [Previous translation continued] ... one

Page 17201

 1     correction for the transcript:  The accused requested Exhibit D198.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please, please wait for the end of the

 3     translation and then give us the number, Mr. Registrar.

 4             Once more, please.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  The requested exhibit was D198.  Thank you.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Mr. Butler, you can see this exhibit which says that the

10     5th Corps of the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, strictly

11     confidential number 01/1-1690-2, 19th May, 1993, logistical report on

12     receipt of shipment of ubs through UNHCR, and below it is listed what was

13     carried by the UNHCR from Zagreb and delivered to the 5th Corps,

14     including 50.000 rounds of ammunition; then 20.000 rounds of

15     7.62 millimetre; 12.000 of detonating caps; nitroglycerin gun powder, and

16     so on and so forth.  And finally Hexogen-explosive and rocket fuel.

17             This was also shipped from Zagreb to Bihac.  My question is:  Was

18     the UNHCR also used for the transportation and smuggling of weapons and

19     ammunition for the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

20        A.   Just to clarify this document, the weapons that you list off are

21     not those that were actually delivered.  Those are subsequent to a future

22     request.  They're requesting those amounts of ammunition.  However, if

23     you go into the body of the first paragraph again, it does particularly

24     note that through the particular channel that they are receiving these

25     supplies, albeit through some mechanism of the UNHCR, they recognise that

Page 17202

 1     the maximum secrecy is necessary in order to protect the way that these

 2     supplies are being received.

 3             Again, whether large portions of the UNHCR are complicit in this

 4     or whether, you know, individual members of the UNHCR have been bribed or

 5     have been coopted to participate in this process is not clear from this

 6     document.  But, I mean, so we're not in dispute.  Certainly, the VRS by

 7     1995 had more than adequate reason in their mind to believe that military

 8     supplies could be smuggled in via those routes.  Which leads me back to

 9     my earlier conclusion that the VRS is justified -- or was justified at

10     the time in instituting an inspections regime to make sure that the

11     smuggling of military supplies in humanitarian goods was not happening.

12        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  It's correct.  One can see that from what

13     was written by the 5th Corps commander to the embassy in Zagreb.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Can we now see D199.  Thank you.

15        Q.   We can see this document on our screens.  It's another document

16     issued by the Embassy of the Republic of BH in Croatia.  And it speaks

17     about the delivery of 70 tons of D-2 fuel.  The haulier, as stated in the

18     fourth row, is UNHCR, or the entity carrying out the transportation.

19             My question is as follows -- or maybe first it would be better if

20     you read the document and then I can pose a question.  Or maybe I can

21     read paragraph 3:

22             "Should the UNHCR distribute the diesel to other institutions as

23     humanitarian aid, since they do not know where the diesel comes from,

24     these institutions must issue a specific quantity of diesel to the

25     5th Corps in accordance with the needs of the 5th Corps, and the rest

Page 17203

 1     must be reimbursed as agreed with the 5th Corps command.

 2             "The 5th Corps command shall send me a report on this matter."

 3             This was also signed by Osmanovic [as interpreted], and the date

 4     is -- I'm sorry, military attache Osmanagic, and it's dated the

 5     13th of May, 1993.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Just a correction:  It was not signed by

 7     Mr. Osmanagic, but signed by another person for the military attache

 8     Osmanagic.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, for this

10     correction.  It is correct.  It was signed by Ibrahim Hadzic, the

11     representative of this office.

12             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Mr. Butler, can one deduce from this document that the UNHCR is

14     supplying fuel by stating the civilians as recipient but in fact

15     providing it to the army?  Have you come across any similar documents

16     when you studied the papers relating to Srebrenica?

17        A.   With respect to your second question first:  I have not, with

18     respect to Srebrenica, come across any document which would reflect

19     something this overt as was occurring in Bihac.  I would also -- I'm not

20     sure what to conclude from the particular document also, other than the

21     fact that while I concur the UNHCR is part of the fuel distribution

22     process, at least the second and third lines of that last paragraph

23     reflect the fact that members of the UNHCR themselves don't know where

24     the fuel is coming from and who the final originator is supposed to be,

25     and it's actually holding open the possibility that they may

Page 17204

 1     inadvertently deliver parts of that fuel to humanitarian organisations

 2     since they don't know that it's destined for military aid.

 3             So, again, whether or not the entire UNHCR apparatus in

 4     Western Bosnia was complicit in this organisation or whether select

 5     members or parts of it were, obviously from these documents it lays out a

 6     situation where the ABiH and the government -- or through the embassy in

 7     Zagreb had created a pipeline to use a UN agency as a means of supplying

 8     aid to their forces in Bihac.

 9             Now, again, I agree with your -- you know, what I've said earlier

10     on this.  Certainly by 1995 the VRS would have had enough information

11     about these various schemes that they had more than adequate grounds to

12     institute an inspection regime.

13        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  If there were no troops in Srebrenica and

14     if there were no tanks that required this fuel, would you agree, then,

15     that the VRS was capable of precisely estimating the quantity of fuel

16     required by the population and to stop any surplus amounts that might be

17     used by the army, because the VRS knew exactly what quantity of fuel was

18     needed by the civilian population and what quantities were needed by a

19     military unit, for example?

20        A.   I would agree that based on the VRS's understanding of what the

21     ABiH had in the enclave, that they certainly did believe that they had an

22     ability to accurately calculate what fuel would be required going into

23     the enclave.  They should have had -- you know, setting aside the fact

24     that the ABiH would have been trying to deceive the VRS as to their true

25     strength, the VRS should have had an accurate picture of the materials

Page 17205

 1     that the UNPROFOR, as well as the various civilian agencies in the

 2     Srebrenica enclave, possessed, to include diesel/electric generators,

 3     things of that nature.  Not necessarily vehicles, but obviously machinery

 4     that's important for the civilian population that runs on that type of

 5     fuel.

 6             So, yes, the VRS should have been able to accurately assess,

 7     based on the information that they had at the time, what the normal fuel

 8     accountability should be.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  If the VRS had a criteria, for example, a battalion

10     needed this and this quantity of fuel for their vehicles, was it possible

11     for them to know the quantity needed by an UNPROFOR battalion and could

12     they assume that some of the quantities were shipped elsewhere and stored

13     elsewhere?

14        A.   The VRS could and did assume a number of things related to that.

15     The -- the VRS would have had an ability to seek to estimate the monthly

16     fuel usage of the UNPROFOR and to calculate, in their mind, how much fuel

17     would be needed.  The UNPROFOR DutchBat, as far as I'm aware, provided

18     their actual fuel usage to the UNPROFOR headquarters.  They did not --

19     that information was not available to the VRS.  So the first thing that

20     you will have is a gap between the VRS calculations of fuel being used by

21     the Dutch Battalion and the Dutch Battalion's actual fuel usage.

22             The other factor that I suspect would play in there is that,

23     particularly within the military, all military units, to include those in

24     peacekeeping forces, would like to establish and maintain a reserve of

25     fuel and other important technical items in the event of a supply

Page 17206

 1     disruption so they were not immediately impacted.

 2             While I suspect that the Dutch Battalion would liked to have

 3     created this reserve of fuel, it would not be uncalled for for the VRS to

 4     look at the creation of a fuel reserve by the Dutch as something that

 5     could be used by the ABiH potentially.

 6             So there is a lot of different ways that the VRS's calculations

 7     of the fuel that the Dutch would use or should be using versus the actual

 8     Dutch fuel consumption as well as their -- the Dutch requirements to put

 9     together a fuel reserve in case of disruption, and why the two parties

10     would not be able to agree on how much fuel was actually being used

11     versus what was needed.

12        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Do you know that or whether UNPROFOR of

13     Srebrenica provided fuel for the buses that transported the civilian

14     populations from Srebrenica to Tuzla in accordance with the agreement on

15     the evacuation?  Colonel Karremans from UNPROFOR himself proposed that

16     UNPROFOR provide fuel for those purposes.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Just to -- there is no facts in the record, and I

19     think it was just a mistake, that the general knows that the -- the buses

20     did not go from Srebrenica to Tuzla.  They went, and I'm sure as he'll

21     agree, to the Luka area right at the confrontation line, a good ways from

22     Tuzla.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. McCloskey.  That's

25     correct.  The buses couldn't go to Tuzla, but they did reach the border

Page 17207

 1     of that area, where it was decided that they would be offloaded from the

 2     buses and that the population would proceed on foot across the separation

 3     line until they were received in the BH territory.

 4             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   But I'm asking you, do you know if United Nations provided fuel

 6     for the buses to transport the populations into the Muslim territory from

 7     the territory of Republika Srpska in compliance with the signed agreement

 8     and that this instruction was issued personally by Colonel Karremans?

 9        A.   My knowledge is that they did not.  From the review of documents

10     that I have done related to the buses and truck transports, the fuel that

11     was used in those vehicles primarily came from civilian commercial stocks

12     that were at the Vihor Transportation Company in Bratunac.  Now, the UN

13     did send down a tanker with fuel and several days later it reached there,

14     and what happened was that that fuel that in fact went to Vihor was used

15     to restock that supply there.

16             So potentially three or four days afterwards, the fuel was

17     reimbursed.  But the fuel that primarily filled up the buses and the

18     trucks through the various days of the 12th and 13th originated from

19     existing fuel supplies at the Vihor Transportation Company.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know --

21             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Tolimir please repeat the name of the

22     battalion.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [No interpretation]

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, could you please repeat the whole

25     question, and especially the name of the battalion.  The interpreters

Page 17208

 1     didn't catch it.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Mr. Butler, do you know what happened with the reserves of fuel

 5     at the Dutch compound in Potocari; to whom was it distributed; or was it

 6     used to fill the tanks of the buses that were transporting the Muslim

 7     population from Srebrenica after the signing of the agreements?

 8        A.   Again, sir, I don't know what did or did not happen with respect

 9     to the fuel reserves of the Dutch Battalion.  I do know that the Office

10     of the Prosecutor is in possession of particularly detailed lists of

11     civilian buses that were filled up at the Vihor commercial plant -- or

12     commercial transportation company in Bratunac that were used as part of

13     the movement of the civilians out of Srebrenica.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And if the general has evidence that there were

16     fuel reserves of DutchBat, as he's built into that question, I think it

17     would be appropriate for him to reference us to what he is talking about.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I asked

20     Mr. Butler if he knew what happened with the fuel reserves of the

21     DutchBat and he gave the answer that he gave.  It is up to me to put

22     questions, not to provide proof and evidence.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

24             MR. McCLOSKEY:  The objection would be that his question assumed

25     a fact not in evidence.  And that is a standard objection.  And I don't

Page 17209

 1     generally go technical on that, but if he's going to assume something

 2     like that, he is -- it's incumbent upon him to either ask about that, was

 3     there reserves, or establish that there were reserves.  Given the answer

 4     that Mr. Butler gave, it's not necessarily objectionable, but Mr. Butler

 5     said he was not aware of that, so that's why that's an appropriate

 6     objection, in my view.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, your question was if Mr. Butler knew

 8     what happened with the fuel reserves of the DutchBat.  It would be more

 9     appropriate to ask Mr. Butler if he knows anything about fuel reserves,

10     and then the next question could be to ask if he knows anything about

11     what happened to these reserves.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Thank

13     you, Mr. McCloskey.  My question was about the reserves.  Since I did not

14     get an answer, we are going to show a video-clip of the discussion

15     between Mr. Mladic and Mr. Karremans, and in this video clip

16     Mr. Karremans is offering to provide fuel.  So --

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We may do that, but after the break.  We must

18     have our first break now, and we will resume at 11.00.

19                           --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

20                           --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, please go ahead.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Mr. Butler, we were able to see that there were many

25     possibilities for smuggling weapons, ammunition, fuel, et cetera.  Let us

Page 17210

 1     now look into the rights of the party which let's these items pass

 2     through, the rights arriving from the Geneva convention.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D1004, this is the

 4     4th Geneva Convention, relative to the protection of civilian persons in

 5     times of war.  We are interested in Article 23 which is at page 8 in

 6     English and 5 in Serbian.  My apologies, the other way around, page 8 in

 7     Serbian and 5 in English.  Thank you, Aleksandar.

 8             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Let me read the article, Article 23:

10             "Each High Contracting Party shall allow the free passage of all

11     consignments of medical and hospital stores and objects necessary for

12     religious worship intended only for civilians of another High Contracting

13     Party, even if the latter is its adversary.  It shall likewise permit the

14     free passage of all consignments of essential food stuffs, clothing and

15     tonics intended for children under 15, expectant mothers, and maternity

16     cases.

17             "The obligation of a High Contracting Party to allow the free

18     passage of the consignments indicated in the proceeding paragraph is

19     subject to the condition that this Party is satisfied that there are no

20     serious reasons for fearing."

21             Under a:

22             "That the consignments may be diverted, used for different

23     purposes, and not -- so that the consignments might be used for purposes

24     other than the ones they intended for.

25             "b. That the control may not be effective; or

Page 17211

 1             "c.  That a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts

 2     or economy of the enemy through the substitution of the above-mentioned

 3     consignments for goods which would otherwise be provided or produced by

 4     the enemy or through the release of such material, services, or

 5     facilities as would otherwise be required for the production of such

 6     goods.

 7             "The power which allows the passage of the consignments indicated

 8     in the first paragraph of this Article may make such permission

 9     conditional on the distribution to the persons benefitted, thereby being

10     made under the local supervision of the Protecting Powers.

11             "Such consignments shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible and

12     the power which permits their free passage shall have the right to

13     prescribe the technical arrangements under which such passage is

14     allowed."

15             My question:  In view of the provisions of Article 23, the VRS,

16     as a party which has allowed the humanitarian aid to transit the

17     territory under its control on its way to Srebrenica, was it entitled to

18     exercise full control, including the control of the distribution of the

19     humanitarian aid, with a view to ensuring that it not be abused?  Thank

20     you.

21        A.   They were, as specified here, and my understanding, again, is

22     that the -- if one assumes that the United Nations functions as the

23     protecting power in Bosnia and that the High Contracting Parties are, in

24     fact, the warring parties, the Republika Srpska can and did use the

25     offices of the protecting power to manage the distribution of those

Page 17212

 1     civilian supplies.  So I believe that both, as a matter of law, in fact,

 2     what happened in Bosnia, with respect to the humanitarian supplies,

 3     happened in compliance with this.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             Let us now look at paragraph b of this particular article, "that

 6     the control may not be effective."  This is one of the conditions based

 7     on which it may not be permitted.  Are the conditions, a, "that the

 8     consignments may be used for different purposes, other purposes," and, c,

 9     "that the enemy may use them for military purposes."

10             So please, if these three conditions were not met based on the

11     indications arising from situations, did the VRS have the right to deny

12     passage of humanitarian aid?  Thank you.

13        A.   Again, I would note that I'm not an international law specialist,

14     so I don't want to provide anything that gets couched as legal advice,

15     but certainly within the confines of these articles the VRS - not

16     necessarily the army but certainly at the political level, the government

17     of the Republika Srpska - could have seen fit to terminate the

18     arrangements by which the United Nations protection forces acted as a

19     protecting power.

20             Now, I suspect that you're going to have an interesting legal

21     discussion with the rights, as specified in the Geneva Conventions,

22     between High Contracting Parties to conduct conflict, versus the legal

23     obligations of those same High Contracting Parties to follow the

24     obligations and resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and

25     how they're binding and under what circumstance, and that is something

Page 17213

 1     that is well above my head to comment on.

 2             So while I take your point as to what Article 23 says in its

 3     face, I would just remind you and the Court that there were other factors

 4     in play with respect to the United Nations and Security Council

 5     resolutions seeking to be implemented along the same lines.

 6        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  The VRS across which territory these

 7     convoys travelled, did it have reason to doubt that some of the aid would

 8     end up in the hands of the BH Army, given the fact that a military unit

 9     was stationed in Srebrenica?

10        A.   No, sir.  As I've indicated from my review of the VRS documents,

11     they believe that they had adequate information available to them that

12     established the basis that some of the aid that was being given to

13     civilians was being diverted for military purposes.  I mean, the VRS was

14     very clear about that.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Yesterday we saw documents indicating that some of

16     the humanitarian aid was set aside for the military.  We saw it yesterday

17     in the report D80 drawn up by a municipality president.  It was indicated

18     that this was done on a monthly basis.

19             This is my question:  The percentage of aid which was set aside

20     for the military, be it 20 or 30 per cent - let's leave that

21     aside - could it have been withheld by the VRS given the fact that it was

22     aware of this aid being shipped every month?

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

24             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Could Mr. Butler be allowed to see the document

25     that this question appears to be based on?  I mean, it -- the question

Page 17214

 1     appears, on its face, to be based on a document and then there are

 2     percentages that are actually mentioned, so I would ask that we be able

 3     to see that.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Let's have D80 on the screen, please.

 5             THE WITNESS:  To answer your first assertion:  I'm not sure that

 6     this document alone makes the case that humanitarian aid was set aside

 7     for the military.  I -- it reflects the fact that the military is

 8     acquiring the supplies.  Whether it's being set aside deliberately or

 9     whether it's been appropriated without the approval of civilian organs or

10     because the civilian organs are powerless to stop it is an open question,

11     but it is coming off civilian supplies.

12             Answering your second question - and agreed, I have no way of

13     knowing what the percentage could or is - could the VRS have been aware

14     of these factors and have then sought to decrement the supplies coming in

15     accordingly, I have no idea if the VRS could have been aware of this

16     specific information and diversions.  My reading of the VRS documents

17     does not reflect that they had this specific level of awareness of the

18     supplies being diverted.  They had a general knowledge that they were

19     being but certainly nothing to this level of specificity.

20             Whether or not they could have consequently decremented that is,

21     quite frankly, more a political decision than a military one.  The --

22     politically, VRS could have made an argument that the supplies, if they

23     could provide a percentage, should be decremented by that such to ensure

24     that they did not follow into military hands, and, of course, I expect

25     the United Nations humanitarian organisations would have significantly

Page 17215

 1     pushed back against that assertion, because of the impact that it would

 2     have had against the civilian population.

 3             I would also note that as a practical aspect it would have

 4     probably not been an effective measure for them to take, because, as both

 5     you and I are aware, in a military environment most often our needs come

 6     first, before the civilian population.  Which means that in order to

 7     maintain the military capacities of fighting forces, it's not like the

 8     military would go without the military supplies that they felt that they

 9     needed.  What would in fact happen is that they would continue to take

10     those supplies from the civilian population and that it would, in fact,

11     simply function to increase the hardships that the civilian population

12     was operating under.

13        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  This was a document you saw yesterday.

14     Below the heading it says, To the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

15     5 June 1995.

16             Now I will show you a different document, on the basis of which

17     you will be able to make an accurate calculation of the percentage of aid

18     set aside for the military.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look D213 in e-court.  We

20     can see the document now.

21             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   In the Serbian version we can see that all the months were

23     covered in terms of aid reaching the enclave.  Captain Slavko Novakovic

24     signed it.  He was charged with humanitarian aid in the Drina Corps.  The

25     heading does state the Drina Corps command.  This is a document which

Page 17216

 1     relates to 1994, and one can use it to conclude that the situation was

 2     more or less the same in 1993, because the size of the population did not

 3     vary much between the two years.  I will show you another list for 1995

 4     for the months for which calculations were made.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Before we move to another document, I would like

 6     to see the full heading of this document in English.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There, it says: "The Command of the

 8     Drina Corps," and there's nothing else there.  The items missing from the

 9     English translation are numbers.  They didn't copy them.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I wanted to see the full headline.  Now I see it,

11     the description, what kind of list it is.  And it's related to 1994.

12     Thank you.  Please go ahead.

13             Mr. McCloskey.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I just also see that the B/C/S goes up to 38,

15     this goes to 25, so there must be more to this.  If we could get at some

16     idea of how much there is on this list.  Does it go on and on, is there

17     more text, or is it just a few more numbers?

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We see here the last item is number 52.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

21             Please go ahead, Mr. Tolimir.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  We can provide the

23     originals for the Trial Chamber to look at, and then you can get the

24     clear picture of the document in the originals.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The document is already in evidence and we have

Page 17217

 1     it on the screen.  That is quite sufficient.  I just wanted to see the

 2     full description of the document in English.  Go ahead, please.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Your microphone is off.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The first list related to Zepa.

 7     Can we look at 1D704, which is the shipment of the humanitarian aid for

 8     the enclave of Srebrenica in 1994.  Thank you.

 9             Yet again the translation includes only -- oh, there is no

10     translation at all.

11             Can we see both pages.  The table relates to the entire year,

12     medical supplies, medication, and it was signed by

13     Captain Slavko Novakovic, who drafted the document and was charged with

14     these issues within the Drina Corps.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   This is my question:  Based on the two documents about the needs

17     of the civilian population in Zepa and Srebrenica in 1994, could the VRS

18     make an assessment of the required quantities of food stuffs and other

19     necessities in the enclaves?

20        A.   I take it, from an abstract perspective, that any professional

21     logistician - and certainly there were some on the VRS Main Staff -- or

22     VRS Main Staff and Drina Corps Main Staff - could have made a general

23     assessment as to how much general civilian and humanitarian supplies a

24     set civilian population might have required under the circumstances.

25             The -- there are obviously a lot of variables involved.  Knowing

Page 17218

 1     the number of the civilian populations, having accurate figures with

 2     respect to the ages and medical requirements of various segments of that

 3     population are going to be important.  I don't know that the VRS

 4     specifically had those numbers.  But I suspect that you could make a

 5     ballpark, as we say in America, estimate as to what the supplies -- what

 6     a basic civilian population might need.

 7        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can these documents be admitted

 9     into evidence, please, and we will then present a different document

10     relating to the same issues but from the perspective of the Muslim side.

11     Thank you.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The document D213 is already in evidence.  For

13     the second one, 1D704, we don't have an English translation; therefore,

14     it will be marked for identification pending translation.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 1D704 shall be

16     assigned Exhibit D306 marked for identification pending translation.

17     Thank you.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

19             Can we now look at D212 in e-court.

20        Q.   Let us see how these humanitarian needs were viewed by the Muslim

21     side.  Thank you.  We have the document now.  It was sent to -- it was

22     sent from Sarajevo on the 27 of February, 1995, to the Zepa municipality,

23     the president of the municipality.

24             And it reads:

25             "Dear sir.

Page 17219

 1             "We have received a UNHCR report on humanitarian aid deliveries

 2     to Zepa for the period between the 1st of December, 1994, and the

 3     15th of February, 1995.  The report shows that on average 85 per cent of

 4     the aid was successfully delivered, which is satisfactory.  This is the

 5     breakdown of the articles delivered".

 6             And we have quantities in tonnes.  Listed are leguminous plants,

 7     meet, fish, cheese, rice/flour ... milk, oil, salt, sugar, and there are

 8     various columns listing various figures.  And the last column reads

 9     percentage achieved.  You can tell that in five cases, five articles,

10     let's start from the bottom, salt, 120 per cent was the percentage

11     achieved in -- against the needs expressed.  Then we have rice/flour,

12     meat, et cetera.

13             Let's read through to the end of the document:

14             "In the days ahead, a relatively good supply of sugar is expected

15     since large quantities have arrived in Belgrade.

16             "It can be concluded from the above data that the UNHCR is

17     providing a relatively good supply of goods to Zepa, and we continuously

18     monitor this and maintain permanent contact with them.

19             "Yours faithfully.

20             "Dr. Hasan Muratovic.

21             "Minister."

22             This is a minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

23             This is my question:  Wasn't even the minister -- a minister of

24     Bosnia-Herzegovina happy with the distribution of the humanitarian aid by

25     the UNHCR in the course of -- sorry, not -- 1995 -- or, rather, from

Page 17220

 1     December to February 1995?

 2        A.   Yes, sir, this document reflects that from the period

 3     1 December 1994 through 15 February 1995 that it is their view that the

 4     aid delivered was satisfactory.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Did you, as an analyst find any documents testifying

 6     and confirming that the aid received by Zepa across the territory

 7     Republika Srpska was sufficient?

 8        A.   I did not review documents with respect to aid going into the

 9     Zepa enclave per se to determine whether or not the aid going into the

10     Zepa enclave was sufficient.

11        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Was this being monitored by

12     Minister Muratovic and did he express his satisfaction in this document

13     by claiming that the deliveries supplied to Zepa are at a satisfactory

14     level?

15        A.   Yes, sir, as I've indicated in my prior answer, between the set

16     period Dr. Muratovic was satisfied with the aid coming in.

17        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, can we look at another

19     document in e-court, which is D209.

20             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Since this document covers the period from December 1994 until

22     February 1995, let us look at the situation in March and April of 1995.

23     It pertains to Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde.

24             We see here that this document was produced by the Drina Corps on

25     the 3rd of May, 1995.  This is a breakdown of humanitarian aid to the

Page 17221

 1     Muslims enclaves for March and April 1995.  We have various columns.  In

 2     the first one is the description of goods; the next one indicates the

 3     quantity in tonnes, and it relates to the months of March and April and

 4     the enclaves of Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Zepa.

 5             Now, please, if we look at the quantities.  Let's take just one

 6     example of one of the staple items, such as flour or beans, which is

 7     under number 2.  Did you ever analyse whether these quantities were

 8     enough to meet the needs of the Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Zepa enclaves?

 9        A.   No, sir.  As I indicated before, I am not a professional

10     logistician, and as a result I have no -- I do not have the professional

11     background in order to make those kinds of -- the analysis, let alone

12     judgements, behind them.  So with respect to analysing whether these

13     delivered amounts would be sufficient for whatever the population, I just

14     have no basis to make those calls.

15        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Could a logistics person be able to

16     decide whether 32 tonnes of flour --

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  300 tonnes of flour.

18             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   -- would be enough to feed three -- 35.000 people?

20        A.   I would like to believe that there are people on UNHCR staff as

21     well as other professional logistical organisations who can make those

22     calculations.  I assume there are, I just -- I don't know.

23        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Have you ever found a document in which

24     it says that the enclaves were suffering from shortages of flour and

25     other staple foods as well as baby formulas, medical supplies, hygiene

Page 17222

 1     items, and things of that nature?  Do you have any reference in that

 2     respect?

 3        A.   No, sir, I don't.  I did not review UNHCR documents related to

 4     supplies going into Srebrenica.  The best people to ask that question to

 5     would obviously be those UN officials as well as the Dutch Battalion

 6     people who were there who were making their own independent observations.

 7        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Let me show you another document from

 8     1994 sent to the Drina Corps.  It relates to potentially contentious

 9     issues with regard to the distribution of UNHCR humanitarian aid.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D852.  Thank you.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   We have the document, but I've just been told that there is no

13     English translation.  I'm going to read it out.  It is stated in the

14     heading:

15             "Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, confidential number

16     10/14-29, 16th January, 1994.

17             "Assessment of the order of the president of the RS."

18             Then there is a reference to this order.  And then it goes on to

19     say, I quote:

20             "Pursuant to the order issued by Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president

21     of RS, item 3, confidential number," this and this, "shall be amended to

22     read as follows:

23             'All contentious issues that might arise with representatives of

24     UNPROFOR and military observes shall exclusively be resolved through

25     Corps commands and the Main Staff of the VRS.  As for international

Page 17223

 1     humanitarian issues, these issues shall be resolved through the

 2     government co-ordinating body for humanitarian aid.'

 3             "Signed, Commander Lieutenant General Ratko Mladic."

 4             My question is:  From this stamp can we see who the sender of

 5     this telegram is, and does this confirm that this is an authentic

 6     document dated the 16th of January?

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Excuse me, Mr. President.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Ms. Stewart was able to find an English

10     translation of this document, just so everyone knows that.  I'm not sure

11     how we can use it.  One sec.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It is a Defence document.  Perhaps it could be

13     uploaded as well.

14                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I was told by Mr. Registrar:  If Ms. Stewart

16     would send this translation to the Registrar, it could be uploaded and

17     displayed on the screen together with the B/C/S original.

18             There we have it on the screen thanks to the OTP.

19             Mr. Tolimir, please continue.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]

21             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am grateful to Mr. McCloskey and

23     his team.

24             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Mr. Butler, now you can see the English version of this document.

Page 17224

 1     Now, based on this document can one draw a conclusion that the president

 2     of Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadzic, and the commander of the

 3     Main Staff, Ratko Mladic, resolved all the issues through the organs

 4     responsible for monitoring and analysing the delivery of humanitarian aid

 5     to the enclaves?  Thank you.

 6        A.   I am not sure, off of a solitary document, I can draw a

 7     conclusion.  What this document appears to be is part of the ongoing

 8     process.  This document - and at this point I don't have the English

 9     translation yet up on my screen - I --

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The Court Usher will assist you to get it on the

11     screen.

12             Do you have it now?

13             THE WITNESS:  What this document appears to be is a response to

14     the president of Republika Srpska who has issued an order regulating

15     these contacts and disputes, and this appears to be General Mladic is

16     responding to that order, essentially making an amendment to that order

17     back to the president with his recommendation of what the text should

18     read in that particular item.

19             Without having the base item to go behind and looking at it in

20     its entire context, I can't answer your question whether I can conclude

21     whether all of these issues are solved or regulated or whatever.  I mean,

22     this is just one fragmentary piece.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  I understood from your answer that it was

25     Mladic who was amending something and sending it to Karadzic.  Couldn't

Page 17225

 1     it be the other way around?  I think that Mr. Karadzic is instructing

 2     Mr. Mladic how to solve the problems.

 3        A.   Again, without seeing the base document and understanding the

 4     genesis behind it, it's difficult to say exactly what this is.  I'm only

 5     operating off of this one particular document.  Again, what it appears to

 6     me to be is that there is -- has been published by the president of the

 7     Republika Srpska some definitive guidance on these issues in that base

 8     document, which is 01 [sic] 128/94 and that president -- or that

 9     General Mladic is looking for having at least one of those particular

10     issues amended.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, can you help me:  This document,

12     signed by Ratko Mladic, to whom was it sent?  I can't see an addressee of

13     this document.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He is sending this to all the units

15     so as to inform them about the amended procedure for solving the dispute

16     with UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations, and he is passing on the

17     solution as provided by President Karadzic.  Although it's not stated,

18     but when you have a document of this kind, that means that it's being

19     sent to all the units.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you for this assessment.  Please carry on.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

22             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Mr. Butler, have you found any document saying that the

24     population was leaving the enclaves and that the humanitarian aid that

25     was taken in early 1994 as a criterion for the needs to be met in the

Page 17226

 1     course of 1995, did it reach the population?

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

 3             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Could that be broken down?  I mean, "is there any

 4     document that they were leaving the enclave."  I mean, there are so many

 5     documents about them leaving the enclave.  I'm sure the general has

 6     something more specific in mind.  But if he could be more specific, it

 7     would be helpful.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. McCloskey.  I will

 9     call up a document produced by the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Which

10     is D144.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, are you tendering 1D852?

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Thank you for reminding

13     me.  We do tender it.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Due to the help by the Prosecution, there is a

15     translation.  I hope that the parties and the Registry will be able to

16     connect the translation with the original B/C/S document and then it will

17     be received as a document in evidence.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 1D852 shall be

19     assigned Exhibit D307 marked for identification pending translation.

20     Thank you.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think we have a translation.

22                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I take it the parties will communicate about the

24     uploading of this document.  It is not in e-court yet.  It should be --

25     it is the duty of the Defence, in co-operation with the Prosecution.

Page 17227

 1             Please carry on.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   This is a document that I asked for.  Can you look at line 13

 5     from the top, which begins with the words:

 6             "All the individuals complaining about the shortage of food and

 7     for that reason intend to leave these areas.  We have found possibilities

 8     for providing assistance in this regard.  However, in the summer months

 9     it is as if some unknown wave flows through the people, suddenly creating

10     a euphoria, that the best solution is to leave for Tuzla.  This literally

11     causes waves throughout the entire area, and the majority of people are

12     then ready to leave.  Such has been the case in recent days.

13             "Pursuant to the Order of the commander of the

14     28th Army Division ... dated 27th May, 1995, all movement by individuals

15     or groups of people, particularly soldiers, between the Srebrenica and

16     Zepa enclaves is forbidden without prior written permission from the unit

17     commander in the case of members of the armed forces, for which the

18     consent of the division command is also required.  Pursuant to the same

19     Order, the commands of all units in the division zone of responsibility

20     are obliged to make use of the intelligence and military security service

21     organs to gather information on all persons intending to leave the safe

22     area for other free territories ..."

23             So in this first paragraph, where the order of the command is

24     being referred to, does it say that people are complaining about the

25     shortage of food and that that was the reason for their intention to

Page 17228

 1     leave the areas but that solution has been found to provide assistance?

 2     Did the command decide that that was not a sufficient reason for people

 3     to leave the area and that they have found a way of getting around this

 4     issue by increasing the reserves?

 5        A.   What it says, sir, is that for all those who complain of a lack

 6     of food and for that reason intend to leave these areas, we have found

 7     possibilities for providing assistance in this regard.  It does not

 8     specify, at least the part of the document that I can see, how they were

 9     going to deal with that issue and whether or not increasing food reserves

10     are a part of that, assuming food reserves even existed.  What it says is

11     what it says.  There's not enough to read into what they actually mean

12     behind that particular line, in my opinion.

13        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  But this was written by the 28th Division

14     which is there together with the population; therefore, they are capable

15     of finding a solution and offering assistance in that respect.  Is that

16     true or not?  Thank you.

17        A.   I agree with your assessment that they're there and they are in a

18     position to offer a solution.  What I'm just saying is that they don't

19     specify in the lines that you've talked about -- there's no -- there is

20     no details as to what those potential solutions are.  It just says that

21     possibilities -- you know, that we have found possibilities for providing

22     assistance in this regard.  I mean, I take your assumption that it could

23     mean distributing more food, but it doesn't say that.  So, I mean, that's

24     my answer to your question.  What it says is what it says.  It does not

25     specify what the measures are.

Page 17229

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Butler, please, could that problem have been

 2     solved in any other way other than by giving food to those who are

 3     complaining that there was the shortage of food?

 4        A.   I suspect that from a military disciplinary point of view there

 5     were other ways that the issue could have been solved.  For example,

 6     given the context of this document that people are leaving, in part, with

 7     their families or in extended groups, by putting more rigorous measures

 8     on the members of the military to keep track of them and potentially even

 9     put those in detention who they suspect may flee, that would cause those

10     individuals and their families to remain in the enclave, because they

11     would have no other means of getting out.  So there are more harsh

12     measures that could have been put into place beyond the simple aspect of

13     increasing the food supply to certain individuals or groups.

14        Q.   Thank you.  I'm sorry, Mr. Butler.  Maybe we were mistranslated

15     when we quoted this, but this is a report from the 28th Division, saying

16     that all those complaining about the food were taken care of.  And the

17     only way that they could have been taken care of was by giving them food.

18             Can we please look at the first paragraph of this document, in

19     view of the answer that you gave us.  The document which was sent on the

20     19th of June, 1995, it was sent to the command of the 2nd Corps, and

21     paragraph one states:

22             "The problem of members of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and

23     Herzegovina and civilians leaving the Srebrenica and Zepa safe areas in

24     the direction of Tuzla, Kladanj, and Serb has been present since the

25     first days of demilitarisation of this area."

Page 17230

 1             In other words, this was a steady process that did not only take

 2     place in 1995.

 3             "During this entire period, the military and civilian authorities

 4     in Srebrenica have taken a number of measures to prevent such departures,

 5     yet all of these measures have not yielded significant practical

 6     results."

 7             And he goes on to say that this was due to a shortage of food but

 8     that they had been successful in providing food to all those who

 9     expressed a shortage of it.  He goes on to say:

10             However, in the summer months it seems that suddenly some unknown

11     wave flows through the people, a craving of departures.

12             So this is my question:  Were there permanent departures of the

13     civilian population from Srebrenica to Central Bosnia as is stated here?

14     Thank you.

15        A.   That question I can definitely answer.  As you will note, and as

16     this document notes, the issue of civilian population within the enclave,

17     many of them wanting to leave, was an issue that began from the very

18     beginning of the creation of the enclave.  The enclave was, in fact,

19     created in part because people who had been forced out of the Kamenica

20     and Cerska areas by the Bosnian Serb military offensives in early 1993,

21     January, February, March, and had been pushed into Srebrenica, were, in

22     fact, in April of 1993 being put on trucks by the VRS and evacuated out

23     of that town.  That evacuation out of the town of Srebrenica in 1993 was

24     stopped by the BiH government, which viewed that as --

25             THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation] [Overlapping speakers] ...

Page 17231

 1             THE WITNESS:  -- by allowing those people -- by allowing those

 2     people to depart, was making themselves complicit in an ethnic cleansing

 3     campaign.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, please switch off your microphone.

 5     Please switch off your microphone, thank you.

 6             THE WITNESS:  So to that degree it has been well established that

 7     a large percentage, and perhaps the majority of the people, who were

 8     actually in the Srebrenica enclave were not actually from Srebrenica.

 9     They were refugees who had been pushed out of their village and home

10     areas and other parts of Eastern Bosnia.  So there was always a desire on

11     their part to leave the Srebrenica enclave.

12             I mean, from a political perspective, there was always a desire

13     by the ABiH government to not allow them to leave the enclave, because if

14     that portion of the civilian population left the enclave, it would

15     presumably directly impact any legitimacy to the argument that they had

16     that those safe areas needed to be maintained.

17             So I agree with General Tolimir's assertion that from the very

18     beginning of the enclave, for a variety of reasons, civilians who were

19     trapped in those enclaves wanted to get to Central Bosnia or out to

20     Tuzla.

21             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  We will be discussing this issue later in

23     some of the questions, but let's complete this issue.  Was the problem so

24     comprehensive that even the division commander had to apply restrictive

25     measures in 1995 to prevent the population from moving out of the

Page 17232

 1     enclaves?

 2        A.   It was an ongoing problem.  Much to the same degree that it was

 3     always an ongoing problem of manpower for the VRS.  The family men -- the

 4     males of the families who were trapped in the Srebrenica enclave were, in

 5     fact, conscripted into the 28th Infantry Division.  If they were to

 6     escape with their families, that would obviously have a corresponding

 7     negative impact on the material and the military ability of the

 8     28th Infantry Division to do what it had to do.

 9             It was a classic situation of a military unit operating behind

10     enemy lines but within a friendly population.  The military unit depended

11     heavily on that civilian population for a lot of the resources and

12     personnel in order to do that job.  And so they recognised as long as

13     they could keep a handle on the civilian population within the enclave,

14     that many of the men would not leave their families and as such would be

15     available for military service.

16        Q.   Do you have information to the effect that the army, because it

17     wanted to have its units at full strength, prevented the population from

18     leaving Srebrenica in accordance with the agreement on free movement?

19        A.   I have not seen any specific ABiH documents that note that.

20     However, I've -- as part of my own research, I've probably come across

21     enough anecdotal information which would support that conclusion, which

22     is that it was not in the interest of the ABiH government to allow the

23     civilian population to slowly bleed out of the enclave, because of the

24     impact that it would have on the military units within the enclave.

25        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Did you come across information that even

Page 17233

 1     the humanitarian aid was --

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Can Mr. Tolimir please repeat his question.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, the interpreters asked you to repeat

 4     your question, please.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Mr. Butler, as you reviewed various material, did you come to

 8     learn that the army in Srebrenica and Zepa compelled the civilians to

 9     work for the purposes of the army in order to receive humanitarian aid --

10     in exchange of which work they would receive humanitarian aid?

11        A.   When you're -- when you use the phrase "compelled the civilians

12     to work for the purposes of the army," are you referring to -- I mean,

13     just to be clear, are we referring to actual physical labour or are we

14     referring to the idea that the men would have to serve in the military,

15     at least part time, in order to be eligible for humanitarian aid?

16        Q.   I don't need the answer merely for the sake of an answer.

17     Perhaps we should look at a document -- or, rather, I will put another

18     question to you and then we will have before us a document which deals

19     with this issue.

20             Here, on page 2, the last paragraph of this document, wasn't this

21     problem in Zepa resolved by the application of restrictive measures and

22     even by the deployment of units to Zepa which were to prevent the

23     population from moving out?  Let's look at the last paragraph on this

24     page.  Perhaps in your language it's not the last paragraph.

25             "In addition to other measures, I decided to send to Zepa

Page 17234

 1     elements of a unit attached to the staff and the commander of the

 2     281st Light Mountain Brigade, Major Zulfo Tursunovic, to use his

 3     authority to try and bring back some of the individuals who hailed from

 4     these areas who we believe left in the direction of Zepa in the last

 5     couple of nights with a view to crossing over to the Kladanj area.  As

 6     appropriate, the members of this unit will, in co-operation with the

 7     military police of the 285th Light Mountain Brigade, arrest these

 8     individuals and return them to Srebrenica by force.

 9             "We believe that the 2nd Corps should, in co-operation with other

10     authorities, take more severe repressive measures against all these

11     individuals, which would be a deterrent to all those who wished to move

12     out of Srebrenica and Zepa."

13             This was signed by Major Ramiz Becirovic.  This is my question:

14     In the course of 1995, was it not the case that the problem had become so

15     serious that the army had to prevent individuals from leaving the

16     enclaves?  They even had to resort to oppressive measures, and even the

17     involvement of the corps was required to make sure that these people are

18     prevented from fleeing the area?

19        A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, as this document reflects, the military

20     leadership of the 28th Division recognised the adverse impact that these

21     desertions were having on its military units, much the same way that they

22     impacted the military units of the VRS and other units.  And along the

23     same lines, they were engaged in measures to try and apprehend these

24     individuals, even if they had successfully left the enclave, and then

25     return them to their military units, in part, as is noted, as a

Page 17235

 1     deterrent.

 2             So that if these people who had thought they had successfully

 3     deserted were brought back, in the future other people would recognise

 4     that attempts to desert would be futile and that they should just stay

 5     and perform their military service.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Please, can we have your comments as a military

 7     expert and military analyst how this reflected itself on the humanitarian

 8     needs in the enclaves?  Were they greater or smaller as a result of this?

 9        A.   I'm not sure I understand your question, because I'm not sure I

10     understand how a correlation between military members deserting from the

11     28th Division -- I mean, I'm not sure how it connects to the overall

12     humanitarian situation in Srebrenica.  If you could clarify your

13     question, maybe I can assist.

14        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Was the number of beneficiaries of the

15     humanitarian aid reduced with the departure of the people from the

16     enclaves?  Thank you.

17        A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, obviously every mouth that's no longer

18     required to be fed makes it the same amount of supplies go further among

19     the remaining population.  If those families were to abandon their

20     residence in Srebrenica, those facilities would then become available to

21     other people who may not have had a place to stay or things of that

22     nature.  So, you know, arguably, as people departed the enclave, and if

23     one assumes that the supply remained constant, those people remaining in

24     the enclave could expect to enjoy a slightly higher quality of life, or

25     at least a slight -- not quality of life, certainly a slightly increased

Page 17236

 1     ability for food and housing and other services.

 2        Q.   Were humanitarian organisations aware of this?  Did they, due to

 3     these departures, reduce the amount of the humanitarian aid they

 4     delivered or not?

 5        A.   I don't know.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             Let us look at D209, a document dating back to 1995, and let's

 8     make a comparison of it.

 9             Mr. Butler, look at the table relating to Srebrenica and the

10     months of March and April.  The figure for March is 305.  And in April it

11     had 387 tonnes.  So it increased from 305 to 387 tonnes.  And then flour,

12     which is in the first row, also increased.  So from -- in Gorazde, 362 to

13     531.  Zepa, 72 -- from 72 to 77.  So that's just the first row.  In other

14     words, regardless of the fact that the size of the population was

15     reduced, the needs increased.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  What is your question?

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   My question was this:  If we look at the first row in this table,

19     can we conclude that the quantities of humanitarian aid increased despite

20     the fact that the population decreased?

21        A.   I believe that all you can conclude based on this document is

22     that from the month of March and April that, with respect to looking at

23     line 1 as an example, flour, that the amount increased between March and

24     April.  I don't believe that - based on this document and one or two

25     others - that anybody can draw a meaningful conclusion as to why the

Page 17237

 1     amount increased and, more importantly, that it was directly as a result

 2     of a -- or that the population was decreasing at the same time, and by

 3     how much.

 4             I mean, just looking at the dates between March and April, right

 5     offhand one reason that I could possibly attribute to the increased

 6     delivery would be the fact that March still falls at the end of winter

 7     and April begins the month of spring when the weather is more temperate;

 8     that might have allowed for better conditions for convoys to move in.  I

 9     don't know that that's the case, but it is another explanation.

10             So the practice of taking one or two data points and trying to

11     extrapolate a conclusion out of that in this regard is just not an

12     exercise I'm going to engage in.  There are ways to come to these

13     conclusions through proper analysis, but this isn't it.

14        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Did you yourself make any sort of an

15     assessment or analysis of the shipments of humanitarian aid received on a

16     monthly basis in the course of 1995?

17        A.   I believe you've asked me that question before, and my answer

18     again remains the same:  It was beyond the scope of my analytical work to

19     analyse UN supplies going into the convoys and -- or UNHCR supplies going

20     into the enclaves.  I did not do that.

21        Q.   Thank you.  But in the course of your examination-in-chief, you

22     expressed views and positions about the humanitarian aid being on a

23     steady decrease; whereas, we can see on the basis of this document that

24     it was on the increase.  So did you look into the validity of your

25     answers from that perspective?

Page 17238

 1        A.   The testimony that I made with respect to the

 2     examination-in-chief was the result of, one, the fact that I was being --

 3     I was reviewing documents which showed that the Main Staff was reviewing

 4     convoy orders and, for their reasons, were making reductions in the

 5     amount of material supplies that they were allowing UNPROFOR and the

 6     United Nations UNHCR organisation to bring into the enclaves.  That was

 7     the point that I was trying to make.  I did not correlate that to the

 8     point that you're looking at, is whether or not those actual reductions

 9     that was being made by the Main Staff in fact resulted in a net increase

10     or decrease in the amount of supplies going into the Srebrenica enclave

11     or the Zepa enclave.

12             That analysis can be done.  It wasn't within my purview to do it.

13     Many of the documents that you're bringing up now were not available to

14     me when I did my initial analysis.  So, again, the purpose of my

15     testimony in direct with respect to those convoy documents was to show

16     the Court the involvement of the Main Staff of the Army of the

17     Republika Srpska in that process.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Butler, please have a look on the screen

19     again.  Mr. Tolimir dealt with item 1, flour.  If you have a short look

20     at the other items, do you see an increase or a decrease or a stable

21     amount of food being delivered in the months between March and April?

22             THE WITNESS:  Well, again, sir, as soon as you go to item 2, you

23     see an increase.  In item 3, looking at the Srebrenica column, you see a

24     decrease.  Item 4 remains stable.  And this is the point that I'm trying

25     to make:  You can't make what's logically known as an ipso facto

Page 17239

 1     analytical conclusion, which is an analytical trap, I mean, you can't

 2     draw these types of conclusions just like this.  I mean, if you're going

 3     to do a sustained analysis of what food was reaching the enclaves and

 4     what the conditions were, yes, you can do that, but this is why I cannot

 5     agree to General Tolimir's conclusion simply off of one or two data

 6     points and that they may or may not support a conclusion.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

 8             Mr. McCloskey, I don't see you any longer on your feet.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I was -- I can't really make much sense of the

10     B/C/S that's covering the English, and you and Mr. Butler are so, and so

11     I'm not going to -- I won't worry about that.  But if we were going to go

12     into that any more, we're just asking if we can see the entire image.

13     But we're fine.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I received the response I was asking for.  Thank

15     you.

16             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, some minutes left before the second

18     break.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Mr. Butler, the staple foods -- aren't flour and beans such

22     staple foods, and isn't that the sort of food stuff you would need to

23     consume every day?

24        A.   It would be a rough diet if it were just those two, but, yes, I

25     take your point, flour and beans are staple items.

Page 17240

 1        Q.   And what about powdered milk?  Isn't that the criterion based on

 2     which one would assess the needs of a population for each of the month?

 3        A.   Again, without knowing more details as to the overall situation,

 4     within the enclave -- and I -- just at this point let's take Srebrenica,

 5     you know, without knowing the number of total people that they're trying

 6     to supply the existing food stocks and consumption rates, this is kind of

 7     the same discussion that we had a number of days ago when you asked me

 8     the question about whether or not, if I were to look at a list of

 9     ammunition, whether that was enough, and my same answer applies:  Enough

10     in context to what?  Without knowing what is already on hand and how fast

11     it's being consumed, there's no way to make any kind of informed

12     assessment as to whether or not the supplies that are being received are

13     enough.  All you can do is exactly what you're doing here, which is

14     pointing to two specific data points on a month-by-month basis and making

15     a calculation that, you know, between the months of March and April one

16     data point increased and one data point decreased.  That tells you

17     nothing.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, we must have our second break now.

19     I would like to invite you to consider if you could leave to another --

20     move to another matter after the break, because Mr. Butler clearly

21     indicated that he is not an expert on these matters you have put

22     questions to him.

23             We adjourn, and resume at 1.00.

24                           --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

25                           --- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.

Page 17241

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Tolimir.  Please carry on.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Mr. Butler, let us look at 65 ter document 05179.  When I asked

 5     you yesterday, on page 16492, about document P162, you gave me more or

 6     less this answer, as recorded in the transcript.  When I asked you about

 7     your position and your understanding about the role of the co-ordinating

 8     body mentioned here and its relationship with the Main Staff, you gave

 9     your answer in lines 2 to 19 on page 16492.  You said that the UN was not

10     the only agency involved in these matters.

11             Now, in order to avoid repetition:  At the end of your answer, I

12     asked you about your opinion as to who had control about what was

13     entering the enclave -- actually, that was the Prosecutor who asked you

14     this, and you said that it was the Main Staff who issued specific

15     approvals and permissions on a daily basis.

16             Now, please, let us look now at 65 ter 05178.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, and as the general appears to be asking

19     Mr. Butler about a specific question that I did, and his specific answer,

20     and he paraphrased it, could he -- could we actually go to that, if he

21     intends to do that, so we can see what the question was and what the

22     answer was?  It's, I think, a rather important area.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Up to now we didn't hear any question from

24     Mr. Tolimir.  He referred to a previous part of the examination --

25             THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]

Page 17242

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] When document P2162 was shown, on

 3     transcript page 16492, lines 12 to 19, the Prosecutor asked:

 4             "Can you explain how you understand the role of the co-ordinating

 5     body ...?"

 6             And I would like to read the answer that you gave, lines 2 to 19.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Perhaps it's a waste of time to read that into

 8     the transcript again.  We have all the transcript in front of us in the

 9     English version.  The witness can see it and read it again.  Perhaps you

10     put a question in relation to that, and then Mr. Butler is in the

11     position to read the relevant part of his previous answer.

12             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   In the second answer to Mr. McCloskey about who had the final

14     control, you said that it was the Main Staff who issued definite --

15     definitive orders on a daily basis.

16             Now, my question was:  Did you have control in mind or approvals?

17     Because Mr. McCloskey asked you about control and you spoke about

18     approvals.  So let us clarify to what your answer exactly refer.  Which

19     term should we use, whether it be "control" or "approval"?

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And this is in relation to the lines 18, 19, 20,

21     and 21 of page 16492.

22             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  I stand by my answer.  My opinion is

23     that on a factual basis ultimately the Main Staff exercised the final

24     control, because the fact is that regardless of any decisions made by the

25     civilian body, it would ultimately have to be the army that would permit

Page 17243

 1     the convoys to transit through what were then military areas to get into

 2     the enclaves.

 3             So while I take General Tolimir's point that ultimately the

 4     approval body was the civilian body, the reality on the ground was that

 5     the civilian body could approve requests as they saw fit; but ultimately

 6     if the Main Staff did not allow the convoy to transit through for a

 7     variety of military reasons, the Main Staff was exercising control over

 8     that process.

 9             I hope that clarifies, sir -- that clarifies the meaning behind

10     my answer.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Butler, I recall that you described that in

12     more detail later on in your examination-in-chief, but could you make a

13     distinction between the word "control," final control, which was used by

14     Mr. McCloskey, and your answer "the final approval."  Because now you

15     said you stand by your answer but use the word "control" instead of

16     "approval."  Could you please clarify.

17             THE WITNESS:  I guess -- I guess to be very -- as clear as I can

18     on it:  Again, the civilian agency approves the request from UNHCR.  That

19     request then goes to the Main Staff.  The Main Staff ultimately controls

20     the access that that convoy is going to have to the enclave, because

21     first it has to also review that material.  It has the option of, as we

22     saw in a number of documents, writing down some of the supplies that were

23     going through and potentially sending them back to the civilian

24     commission for them to reconsider that those degradations could take

25     place.  It is also responsible, if it approves or concurs with the

Page 17244

 1     approval of Republika Srpska civilian commission, ultimately it's the

 2     army that's responsible and for ensuring that clearance is delivered so

 3     the convoy can go into the territory of the Republika Srpska and be

 4     delivered.

 5             So the Main Staff and the military controls that aspect of the

 6     process which will ultimately result in delivery of the convoy and the

 7     goods to the enclave.  But in the sense of the UN civilian goods, as

 8     we've discussed, again, I take General Tolimir's point that, you know, it

 9     is a civilian body that is that approval authority.  I agree that, in

10     theory, the civilians are going to approve it and the military is just

11     going to follow orders and do that; however, for a variety of reasons the

12     military may seek at points in times to delay those convoys, to reroute

13     those convoys, things of that nature.  So, I mean, there's a de jure

14     process and then there's what actually happens on the ground.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you, for that.

16             Mr. Tolimir, please go ahead.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Mr. Butler, was it possible for the army to prohibit a convoy to

19     pass through if it had been given an approval to do so by the state

20     committee?

21        A.   I would say that from the experience of the documents that I have

22     seen that if the state committee wanted the convoy to go through, and if

23     the military objected to it, that the military could come up with

24     necessary pretexts which might delay that convoy or might, again, push it

25     in time or maybe even deal with the issue of the -- how much cargo was in

Page 17245

 1     the convoy.  But I would say that at the end of the day, if the civilians

 2     approved that convoy going through, the VRS - unless they could actually

 3     show sustained combat activity in an area - would ultimately have to

 4     accede to that and allow that convoy to pass.

 5        Q.   Mr. Butler, let us look at 65 ter document 05178.  It's a

 6     document from the Main Staff of the VRS, dated the 21st of March, 1995.

 7     It is addressed to the state committee for co-operation with the UN and

 8     international humanitarian organisations to the chairman of the

 9     committee, Professor Koljevic, personally.  And the document reads as

10     follows:

11             "On the 20th of March, we received a letter from the chief of

12     convoy operation of the UNPROFOR BH command, Lieutenant Leviv [phoen],

13     who, in response to our letter regarding the reduction and

14     rationalisation of the movement of convoys in order to ease the burden on

15     our roads, sent the follow answer: 'That he appreciates the concern on

16     the part of the VRS army concerning the safety of UNPROFOR personnel on

17     the roads and accepts the proposal for the traffic to be reduced as much

18     as possible by establishing fixed schedules for convoys.'

19             "That is why they want to introduce a shuttle bus line for the

20     main company of BH command in order to transport only those UNPROFOR

21     personnel who are going on leave or are on rotation and travelling from

22     Sarajevo to Split and vice versa.  The cargo accompanying these convoys

23     would only consist of personal belongings and mail pouches.  Depending on

24     the number of passengers, a convoy may be made up of one minibus or one

25     jeep or a bigger bus or a combination thereof.  I propose the following

Page 17246

 1     days where they would travel:

 2             "Tuesday, Sarajevo-Split.  And then back on Wednesday.

 3             "Saturday, Sarajevo-Split.  And then back on Sunday.

 4             "The request for these movements shall be submitted to the

 5     Main Staff of the VRS through regular procedure through military

 6     observers at Pale.

 7             "We are forwarding this to you for your information, and we are

 8     asking the state committee for co-operation with the UN to adopt a

 9     decision regarding the said requests, and we need to have it in writing.

10             "Chief of Staff, Manojlo Milovanovic."

11             I'm sorry for having to read this because we don't have a

12     translation.

13             My question is:  Does this document suggest that

14     Lieutenant General Manojlo Milovanovic is asking Professor Koljevic, the

15     chairman of the committee, not to take any decision but, rather, just to

16     implement it?  Thank you.

17        A.   What I take this document to be is, first of all, a note from

18     Lieutenant General Milovanovic that lays out the issue of UNPROFOR

19     traffic and wanting to standardise it, that they have proposed a solution

20     on how travel will be made in this particular case.  And it sounds like,

21     again, from the last two paragraphs, that General Milovanovic is

22     forwarding this proposal up to the civilian leadership for them to

23     ratify, and the presumption being, once the civilian leadership ratifies

24     this formally in writing it will be implemented.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Have you noticed that this is not the only thing that

Page 17247

 1     he is forwarding but that in the last two paragraphs he is seeking a

 2     decision to be made on the said requests, and I am going to quote again

 3     the last two lines:

 4             "We are forwarding the above to you for your information, and we

 5     are kindly asking the state committee for co-operation with

 6     United Nations to take a decision on the said request, which needs to be

 7     sent to the Main Staff of the VRS in writing.

 8             "Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Manojlo Milovanovic."

 9             So is he asking the state committee to make a decision or not?

10     Thank you.

11        A.   Yes, sir.  Maybe I wasn't clear with what I said back or there

12     was a translation issue, but I believe that is exactly what is happening.

13     He is making this proposal to the state commission and he is requesting

14     that they make a formal decision on the matter.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Let us now look at P689, Article 6.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, are you tendering this last

17     document?

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Yes, we

19     would like to tender this, and my apologies for not stating that right

20     away.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be marked for identification pending

22     translation.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 5178 shall be

24     assigned Exhibit D308 marked for identification pending translation.

25     Thank you.

Page 17248

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We need the second page of this

 2     Official Gazette in the Serbian version so that we can see what we are

 3     reading.

 4             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Now, could you please look at Article 6, which reads:

 6             "Permits for the movement of convoys and employees of the UN and

 7     humanitarian organisations on the territory of Republika Srpska shall be

 8     issued by the co-ordinating body for humanitarian operations, pursuant to

 9     committee decisions."

10             My question is:  Did General Milovanovic strictly abide to all

11     rules and regulations in light of this decision that was published in the

12     Official Gazette?

13        A.   It certainly is consistent with the language in Article 6,

14     reflecting, in a practical sense, that the military is going to lay out

15     the option in this particular case and send it up for a final decision by

16     the civilian leadership.  So taking the last exhibit in this one in

17     context, General Milovanovic appears to be operating within the framework

18     of the spirit of Article 6.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have P2162, please.

21             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   While we are waiting, let me tell you that it's a document

23     produced by the Main Staff entitled -- or, actually, sent to subordinate

24     units of Drina Corps, Eastern Bosnia Corps, and Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

25     The original says 2nd of April, 1995.

Page 17249

 1             With respect to this document, you commented this handwritten

 2     remark made by Mr. Nikolic, and I'm going to read it:

 3             "Not a single convoy or the ICRC team or MSF may enter Srebrenica

 4     without my permission and presence.

 5             "Signed, Momir Nikolic."

 6             Now, my question is:  Did Momir Nikolic make this remark and

 7     address it to the Main Staff prior to the convoys entering Srebrenica?

 8        A.   I don't believe that in the context of this document

 9     Momir Nikolic is making this remark to the Main Staff.  I believe that my

10     testimony related to this is that this document was sent by the

11     Main Staff to the subordinate formations, to include the Drina Corps, and

12     made its way to Captain First Class Nikolic of the Bratunac Brigade who

13     was responsible for the inspection of those vehicles is going into the

14     enclave.  And that this notation on the document is for the benefit of

15     the individuals at the yellow bridge and at the Bratunac Brigade

16     headquarters so that they would know that in the event that one of these

17     convoys were to come in and seek to enter the enclave, that they were not

18     authorised to grant permission for that convoy to continue on unless

19     Captain Nikolic was personally present there and gave his authorisation.

20             I believe I've also testified that this is an example of the type

21     of inspection regime that was in place so that the VRS had the ability to

22     inspect these convoys.

23        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Can you please tell me this:  Did Nikolic

24     write this because he wanted to obey orders to the letter and exercising

25     conduct control in a proper way, or was his intention to impose some kind

Page 17250

 1     of his personal authority?

 2        A.   No, sir.  Your first supposition is what I believe is the correct

 3     one.  Captain Nikolic wrote these orders because he himself had received

 4     orders through the chain of command to ensure the proper inspection and

 5     clearance of these convoys at the last possible place that they could be

 6     inspected before they entered the enclave.

 7        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  The first sentence reads:

 8             "We hereby inform you that we agree to the requests of the

 9     co-ordinating body for humanitarian aid as follows."

10             And then they are citing the requests.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Can we move to the next page,

12     please.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I would just note - and I know it's difficult for

15     the interpreters to always read the translation, but it says "we --" the

16     official translation says:

17             "We hereby inform you that we consent ..."

18             So "agree"/"consent" is the issue here.  So I just wanted to

19     point that out.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

21             Mr. Tolimir.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we please move to the last

23     sentence of this document.

24             Let's see what else General Milovanovic has to say.  This is

25     page 3 of the document, and the last.

Page 17251

 1             Can it be shown in e-court, please.

 2        Q.   I'm reading:

 3             "Chef d'équipe," or head of team, "will be carrying the cargo

 4     manifests as well as the manifests of the individuals being transported,

 5     conduct inspection, and ensure a smooth passage."

 6             "Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Manojlo Milovanovic."

 7             My question is:  Does this part of the document speak of any

 8     restrictions --

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I have to interrupt you.  The English page

10     doesn't correspond to the B/C/S.

11                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I was told that only the first page of the

13     English version is uploaded into e-court so that that part is not

14     available in English.  But you read it into the transcript and you may

15     put, now, your question to Mr. Butler.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Mr. Butler, did General Milovanovic ask that inspection be

19     strictly carried out as well as that the convoy be allowed unhindered

20     passage?

21        A.   It's a two-part process.  Yes, he directed that the inspections

22     be carried out; and by noting the fact that, one, he transmitted down

23     what the Main Staff's understanding of the cargo was going to be, and he

24     also indicated that the convoy commander is going to be carrying a copy

25     of the manifest, this way Captain [sic] Milovanovic had a way of not only

Page 17252

 1     making sure that the cargo in the vehicle matched the cargo that the

 2     convoy commander had on the manifest, but that that cargo also matched

 3     what the Main Staff understood was being set down.

 4             If all of those conditions are met, then the second prong of that

 5     goes into effect, which is:  Yes, ones these conditions are satisfied,

 6     the expectation is that Captain Momir Nikolic will allow the convoy to

 7     pass unhindered.

 8        Q.   This is my question for you:  Was Captain Nikolic able to deny

 9     passage to a convoy that had been granted approval by

10     General Milovanovic, a convoy which had a complete cargo manifest?

11        A.   If the cargo manifests matched, then Captain Nikolic would not,

12     if he were properly exercising his authority, be able to stop the convoy

13     on that basis.  If the cargo manifests did not match or there were some

14     other problem that was identified, I suspect the practical application

15     would be that Captain Nikolic would contact, through the Drina Corps, the

16     Main Staff, he would explain what the discrepancies were as they existed,

17     and he would request instructions from the Main Staff as to what to do

18     with the convoy.

19        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  Since we are running out of time, let us

20     move to a video-clip concerning the ammunition found on a humanitarian

21     convoy at Rogatica.

22             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Which is P212.  The transcript is

23     1D234.  And it has been distributed to the interpreters.  Can it be

24     played, please.  P2126.  I omitted number 6.  Can it be played, please.

25                           [Video-clip played]

Page 17253

 1             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Representatives of the UNHCR

 2     transported --"

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Can we note, the interpreters:  We have

 4     received a transcript, but we don't know where the tape is being played

 5     for and cannot read the transcript.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We should stop the video.  The interpreters

 7     indicated they don't know where the tape is being played for and cannot

 8     read the transcript.  Can that be checked by the Defence, please.

 9             Mr. Gajic.

10             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I am told by the

11     Case Manager that the transcripts of the video "UNHCR Convoy - Rogatica

12     (Zepa)" were distributed to the interpreters.

13             THE INTERPRETER:  The interprets note that the portion heard on

14     the footage so far is not reflected in the transcript that we have.

15             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] The video fully reflects the

16     transcript, and nothing has been left out or added.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  In that case, I would like to receive the

18     transcript in hard copy to be able to check it.

19             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] We have copies ready and are able to

20     do so.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The only way to resolve this problem is that the

22     video should start exactly where the transcript is beginning.  And it

23     should be noted for our transcript, for the record, where the video will

24     start.  One moment, please.  Don't start.

25             Mr. Gajic, could you please check with your colleague that we

Page 17254

 1     really start with where the words can be heard: "Along with food for the

 2     people of the Muslim enclave of Zepa ..."

 3             And please indicate, for the record, where we start with the

 4     video.

 5             Mr. Gajic.

 6             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I'm afraid that we

 7     will have to start from the beginning because the Case Manager doesn't

 8     have the headphones.  And the video starts, of course, from 00.00, and we

 9     will play the entire video footage.  It is short.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Go ahead, please, and the interpreters will only

11     be able to interpret that portions we have -- they have available.

12                           [Video-clip played]

13             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Along with food for the people of

14     the Muslim enclave of Zepa, the UNHCR representatives were transporting

15     ammunition for Muslim soldiers.

16             "At the Rogatica check-point, a routine inspection of the convoy

17     loaded at the UNHCR -- loaded at the UNHCR warehouse in Pancevo, turned

18     up ammunition of various calibres hidden among the goods, mainly in the

19     flour, and in the cabs of the trucks.

20             "VRS soldier:  While inspecting the convoy, in about the fifth

21     sack I checked using a knife, I noticed there was something in the flour.

22     When I carried out a regular inspection, I discovered ammunition.

23             "Without a doubt this sort of conduct represents the severest

24     form of criminal activity and is utterly in contradiction with the

25     mandate and nature of humanitarian missions.

Page 17255

 1             "Whether or not they felt caught in the act by the ammunition

 2     found in the convoy, the leader and one of the drivers reacted as

 3     follows:

 4             "Convoy member:  I don't know anything about the ammunition found

 5     in the flour, and I have nothing to say.

 6             "Convoy member:  I don't know where the ammunition in the truck

 7     came from; I don't know what to say.  I cannot say anything really.

 8             "Commander of the Army of Republika Srpska,

 9     Colonel General Ratko Mladic, sent protests to the UNHCR offices in

10     Zagreb, Belgrade, and Pale, and asked that competent officials there take

11     immediate measures to avoid similar incidents in the future.

12             "General Mladic also informed the UNHCR representatives about the

13     fate of the convoy that was stopped and its personnel.  General Mladic's

14     statement said that the goods will be confiscated and appropriate legal

15     measures taken against those responsible.

16             "What else can we say as we watch the images from Rogatica that

17     best testify to the human nature of international humanitarian

18     organisations?

19             "Need we remind them that they have always been welcome and safe

20     on the Serbian side in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina?

21             "Need we remind them that the food for the Muslim population

22     arrives in these convoys above all because of the understanding of the

23     Serbs?

24             "Need we remind them how many times this understanding has been

25     abused?

Page 17256

 1             "Should they ask themselves who has the right to transport

 2     ammunition and weapons along with food?"

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With your leave, we will play P2125

 4     as well.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You don't get the leave.  Look at the clock.  We

 6     are at the end of today's hearing.  Everybody saw what we saw on the

 7     screen, and you may play another video tomorrow and then put questions to

 8     the witness with respect to these videos.

 9             I'm sorry for that, but we have to adjourn for the day.  And we

10     will resume tomorrow morning at 9.00 in this courtroom.

11                           [The witness stands down]

12                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,

13                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 25th day

14                           of August, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.