110829ED

Page 17338

1 are still under the same oath while you are testifying here in the

2 courtroom. We are slowly approaching the end of your testimony.

3 Mr. Tolimir is continuing his cross-examination.

4 Mr. Tolimir, you have the floor.

5 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We don't receive --

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May God's peace reign in this

8 courtroom and may his will be done in these proceedings, and not

9 necessarily mine.

10 Good afternoon, Mr. President.

11 Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]

12 Q. [Interpretation] I would like to wish Mr. Butler a warm welcome

13 in our midst.

14 Mr. Butler, we left off with the statement of Colonel Malinic

15 about recording.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's look at D289. That is his

17 statement provided on the 14th of December, 2005, pages 14 and 15 in

18 Serbian and English respectively, lines from 1 through 13. Thank you.

19 Thank you. We can't see it on the screen yet.

20 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Now we can see the statement. We can see lines 1 through 3.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is not the correct page. 14

23 in Serbian, please. Actually, I need page 15 in Serbian. Thank you. I

24 apologise, actually, I need 14. I was right. Page 14, lines 1 through

25 13, but I don't see it in front of me.

Page 17339

1 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

2 Q. This is what Mr. Malinic says:

3 "Did the teams arrive," he asks.

4 The answer is:

5 "Yes, they did arrive. And they shot, they recorded.

6 "Do you remember what teams arrived, from what channels?"

7 And Malinic answers:

8 "I think there were some foreign TV crews and also the crew from

9 Radio Television Srpska. So at least three crews all together. And

10 since we received the order that we were to allow them to tape anything,

11 there was no need to control them. We did not have the right to control

12 them, to check their IDs or anything. They all arrived together, all the

13 three crews.

14 "As far as I can remember, I believe that they did their job. I

15 believe that they also taped interviews with men who were together with

16 the detainees at the stadium. I can't remember exactly which TV crews

17 they were."

18 Mr. Butler, please. We have now read from General Mladic's [as

19 interpreted] statement. Would the Main Staff have sent TV crews to do

20 the recording if they had had the plan to kill people on the 13th? Thank

21 you.

22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, perhaps you misspoke or the

23 interpreter misspoke. In line 17 there is a reference to General Mladic,

24 but I think it was not General Mladic's statement but Zoran Malinic's

25 statement; is that correct?

Page 17340

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. This is

2 indeed Colonel Malinic's statement. He was a Prosecution witness in this

3 case.

4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He provided this statement on the

6 14th of December, 2005.

7 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Mr. Butler, if, on the 13th, the Main Staff sent crews to record

9 the detainees in Nova Kasaba, which is what Mr. Malinic stated, and if

10 they even taped interviews with them, would he have killed them after

11 they had informed the general public that they existed? Would they have

12 devised a plan to kill them before they sent the TV crews in? Thank you.

13 A. As I noted in response to this question last week, I can't

14 explain the motivation behind the Main Staff to allow for the use of

15 video cameras in and around this area. I am aware that there were a

16 number of camera crews that were filming events. One of them, of course,

17 was a camera crew from the VRS. So it is not an issue that I am able to

18 explain.

19 I do not believe that the issues are linked, and I would again

20 remind you of what I said last week which is that in the context of the

21 ongoing conflict, certainly the Main Staff would have had the ability

22 to -- regardless of what they were allowed to film at the time, before

23 the information was publicly broadcast, members of the Main Staff would

24 be allowed to review and censor as appropriate any video footage that

25 they deemed to be embarrassing to the VRS or any video footage that might

Page 17341

1 provided useful information to the ABiH military as it was struggling to

2 figure out exactly what was going on under the circumstances.

3 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Do you have a reference on which you base

4 what you have just said, or is this just your assumption? Thank you.

5 A. Colonel Milovan Milutinovic, if I have his name correctly, was

6 the Main Staff officer who ran the VRS public information centre. It was

7 his job -- it was his job to, one, work with the camera crews to take the

8 video coverage and to clear them to go into certain areas of the

9 battle-field, and at the same time he would work to make sure that images

10 that were not beneficial to the VRS would be edited out before they were

11 publicly broadcast. There is a number of documents which talks about the

12 fact that the VRS, particularly at the corps and at the Main Staff level

13 had to work diligently in order to ensure that information which could be

14 of benefit to the enemy at the time would not be inadvertently broadcast

15 over the television networks.

16 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. I kindly ask you to tell us whether you

17 have a reference showing that, on the 13th, Mr. Milutinovic or the

18 Main Staff were involved in the censorship of the material depicting the

19 detainees in Kasaba, yes or no? Is this just your assumption, in other

20 words?

21 A. Again, I have not seen video footage of anyone in Kasaba. And

22 while I know that Colonel Milovan Milutinovic was in and around the area,

23 I don't know for a fact that he was in Kasaba.

24 Q. Mr. Butler, you are an expert for some things, you were in war.

25 This is not what we are talking about. We are talking about concrete

Page 17342

1 events, concrete things, if you don't, you say no. If you do, you say

2 yes.

3 My next question is this: Did you see the footage from Kasaba?

4 Thank you.

5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.

6 MR. McCLOSKEY: That assumes a fact not in evidence. If the

7 general has any evidence of any footage or even a photo from any of these

8 people in Nova Kasaba, aside from the aerial images, I would like to know

9 about it, because he has concluded that such existed in his question.

10 Yet, as far as I know, nothing exists in this record. I don't know

11 anything about that. So if he has got something he's referring

12 Mr. Butler to, we need to know about it. If he's just asking is there,

13 that's another matter, but he was concluding that there was. And if

14 there is, I would like to see it or know what he is talking about.

15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, could you please rephrase your

16 question and ask the witness if he knows of any footage about the

17 prisoners in Kasaba.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, Mr. Malinic, who was

19 a Prosecution witness, testified that there was footage, that there were

20 TV crews, and Mr. McCloskey pretends that he has never heard it before.

21 I quoted from the reference. And now Mr. Butler says that all the

22 footages were edited, and I am asking him whether he ever saw that

23 footage, and what does he base his statement on when he says that the

24 videos were edited, that there were pieces cut out from the material.

25 Thank you.

Page 17343

1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I didn't hear any answer with this content of the

2 witness.

3 Mr. Butler, may I ask you a question to save some time: Do you

4 know anything about any footage, about any videotapes of the prisoners in

5 Kasaba?

6 THE WITNESS: No, sir. As I answered in the previous question, I

7 am not aware of any video footage of prisoners at Nova Kasaba. If it

8 exists, I've never seen it.

9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

10 Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

11 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Did you see Mr. Malinic's statement about

13 that? Did you look at the testimony that he gave in this courtroom? Did

14 you ever look into the things that he said? Did you do any research on

15 that? Thank you.

16 A. First off, I am not sure I was still here at the Tribunal when

17 Mr. Malinic was interviewed for the first time by the OTP. I did not

18 follow his testimony during this particular trial, but I can tell you

19 that during the course of my time with the Srebrenica investigation, the

20 almost seven-year period, the Office of the Prosecutor and the

21 investigators with the investigation team spent a considerable amount of

22 time looking to try and identify and obtain all video footage related to

23 the Srebrenica crime base.

24 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler, for this response. You must have seen

25 P125, because the Prosecutor showed it to you during the

Page 17344

1 examination-in-chief. The date on that document is 13 July 1995.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see P125.

3 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

4 Q. When the Prosecutor introduced this document, he said that these

5 were General Tolimir's proposal from Borike on the 13th of July. I

6 objected to this. I am now asking you this: Whose proposal is this?

7 Who wrote this, do you know?

8 A. It is under the signature of Colonel Savcic. However, at least

9 part of it is at least referenced back to a proposal from the assisting

10 commander for security and intelligence of the Main Staff of the VRS.

11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Let us now see what General Savcic said

12 about the document and about the event, the event being a video

13 recording. I am quoting from his statement, which is 1D744, page 42 in

14 Serbian and page 27 in English.

15 And I am now quoting:

16 "And second of all, the things that Major Malinic is doing with

17 this group of detainees differ considerably from the proposal, and the

18 proposal in this question is what we have just seen.

19 "And the difference is what?" says Mr. McCloskey.

20 And the answer is:

21 "Well, he asked for a medical crew from Milici to administer

22 first aid among the wounded to the detainees. He requested food and

23 water for these people, and he got both. They were in the football

24 stadium, and he allowed TV crews to make a video footage of these people

25 in the football stadium."

Page 17345

1 My question is this: Mr. Malinic and Mr. Savcic, did they both

2 know that TV crews recorded the detainees in the football stadium in

3 Kasaba, the same ones that were guarded by Malinic's men? Thank you.

4 A. I'm sorry, General Tolimir, I don't see -- either I'm missing the

5 wrong page or I don't see where you have read that passage from at all on

6 my screen.

7 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. I obviously made a mistake. I said

8 page 27. It should have been 28. It would have been displayed then. I

9 apologise again. It should be 28, lines 10 through 27.

10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Could you check the number of the lines again,

11 please.

12 Mr. Gajic.

13 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, in English those are

14 lines 1 through 10.

15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

16 THE WITNESS: Okay, sir. Your question?

17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. The question was: Did both Malinic and

19 Savcic, in their testimony and their statements, say that the prisoners

20 of war at Kasaba had been filmed and was this documented?

21 A. Well, sir, I don't know what they testified to, but from this

22 particular statement, General Savcic is saying that he received the

23 information that TV crews were allowed to film them from Major Malinic.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please go back to P125.

Page 17346

1 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

2 Q. That's the document about the so-called order that has never been

3 signed and never been sent to the teletype operator. Have you read the

4 documents that speak to what Savcic said about this order?

5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.

6 MR. McCLOSKEY: I object to the second factual recitation the

7 general made. I agree with him that -- we all know that there is no

8 evidence of this being signed, but the evidence was specifically that it

9 was sent to a teletype operator, so I don't know why he said that or --

10 and I would object to that as being part of the -- as an argument on the

11 record.

12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please switch off your -- thank you.

13 As you are not giving evidence, Mr. Tolimir, we should reduce the

14 question to the first part of the question.

15 Have you read the documents that speak to what Savcic said about

16 this order? That was the question, Mr. Butler.

17 THE WITNESS: What documents would he be referring to? Is he

18 referring to a statement by Savcic or testimony? I am just not clear on

19 what he's -- what he means by the phrase "documents."

20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir?

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have nothing to say. You should

22 draw your own conclusions.

23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, are you in your question referring

24 to the document which is now on the screen, which means the document

25 signed by Lieutenant-Colonel Milomir Savcic?

Page 17347

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I can only ask the

2 witness --

3 Q. Can it be seen from the original that this document was signed

4 and sent to the teletype operator?

5 A. I am aware that it is the proposition of the Prosecutor that it

6 was. I am not -- I don't have any first-hand knowledge with respect to

7 the testimony related to that particular issue, so I can't confirm or

8 deny that. I don't exactly know if this is the document that you're

9 referring to. I mean, I guess I am just not understanding the question

10 here.

11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler, but when you were answering questions in

12 the examination-in-chief, you understood the telegram and the contents of

13 the telegram, and you even made appraisals, evaluations, how this meeting

14 occurred. I am asking you, have you reviewed documents and have you come

15 across a document where Milomir says he didn't sign it and it was never

16 sent by teletype?

17 A. I am not familiar with any documents. If he said that as part of

18 his statement or as part of his testimony, that is -- that is obviously

19 not my place to make a determination on whether he's being truthful or

20 not. But I am not familiar with another military document where it is

21 evident that that assertion is what's being made.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we look at the statement of

23 Mr. Savcic, 1D774 [as interpreted], page 41 in Serbian, and page 27 in

24 English. In Serbian it's lines 1 through 6.

25 THE REGISTRAR: One correction for the transcript: The OTP

Page 17348

1 statement with Mr. Savcic is 65 ter 1D744. Thank you.

2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I thank the Registrar.

4 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Let me quote from that statement.

6 Mr. McCloskey says:

7 "Well, teletypes never have signatures on."

8 And Mr. Savcic says:

9 "Well, that's precisely it. It is not a teletype. If it had

10 been teletyped, there would not be any problem."

11 Have you studied this statement? Do you see that he denies it's

12 a teletype document?

13 A. General, as I said in the very beginning of my testimony, the

14 purpose of my report is to lay out, with respect, what the documents say

15 and what they mean in that regard, and that as part of my analysis I

16 specifically do not engage in the issue of reviewing relevant witness

17 statements and making observations as to whether or not those witnesses

18 are being truthful. That is beyond my role as a military expert for the

19 Prosecution. I am aware that General Savcic has indicated that he does

20 not believe that that document was ever sent, and I am aware that there,

21 you know, the Office of the Prosecutor has raised the issue and has led

22 evidence that reflects that it was. I am not sure that I can go any

23 further beyond that.

24 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. We have here a document where we can see

25 what Savcic said. Let's not waste any more time. He said clearly even

Page 17349

1 how lower case and uppercase is used in teletype documents. But we'll

2 read what it says next:

3 "I don't know, I am not denying, I can't remember that. This is

4 really questionable, and why was this typewritten? I believe if it were

5 a teletype document, the signature would be here. You see? It makes a

6 lot of difference. And as for the contents, if it's my document I can

7 really not confirm now with 100 per cent certainty because, basically,

8 it's not mine. I am here, and on the assumption that I accept it's my

9 document, that means I am playing some sort of messenger. I don't know

10 why I would be doing that. Why General Tolimir wouldn't write it

11 himself? I don't know."

12 The Trial Chamber knows the rest of his testimony. But the

13 Prosecutor asked you, when reading from the document, he asked you on

14 page 8, line 7:

15 "Did General Tolimir know about the thousands of prisoners

16 mentioned in this document?"

17 And you said on page 8, 15:

18 "The officer who makes the proposal must have access to all the

19 information, all the documents. He must know the exact number of

20 prisoners and where they are held."

21 Do you remember that answer?

22 A. I remember generally what you're referring to, that if you're

23 making a proposal, there is a supposition that you're making a proposal

24 on the basis of established knowledge of not only the overall situation

25 but what various parties are capable of doing to influence that.

Page 17350

1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, in order to be able to find the

2 referenced part of the answers, could you please indicate on which day

3 Mr. Butler gave these answers? You said page 8, line 7 or 15, but you

4 didn't say which page of which document, which transcript.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, I didn't mention. It

6 was on the 8th of July.

7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

8 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

9 Q. My question to Mr. Butler is this: If General Tolimir had known,

10 as you claim, where the war prisoners -- the prisoners of war were on the

11 13th, would he be writing a telegram on the evening of the 13th, at

12 Borike, that they should be sent to Sjemec, to residential buildings,

13 when they had no longer been in Kasaba on the 13th. They had been sent

14 to Bratunac. Did you do any research into when exactly they were

15 transported from Kasaba to Bratunac?

16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.

17 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, it may be translation, but he said the

18 proposal to send to Sjemec was for residential buildings, and I'd --

19 that's the English that we got, and so I -- and I know the general knows

20 that that wasn't the proposal. It was something similar to that. So I

21 am thinking that was a translation issue, but we need to get that

22 obviously cleared up. It's an important point.

23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Would you please repeat the term you have used to

24 describe the buildings in Sjemec where the prisoners should have been

25 brought to.

Page 17351

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I used the term "facilities for

2 accommodating personnel," but let us see D49 and then we can see what

3 exactly I told him at that time on the 13th at 2213 hours. Can we look

4 at D49.

5 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

6 Q. We see it on the screen now. It says: "Command of the

7 1st Infantry Light Brigade, 13 July 1995." The telegram was transmitted

8 at 2230 hours on the 13th July.

9 It says:

10 "If you are unable to find adequate accomodation for all

11 prisoners of war from Srebrenica, we hereby inform you that space with

12 pallets has been arranged for 800 prisoners of war in the

13 1st Light Infantry Brigade quarters in Sjemec."

14 Do you know were the prisoners of war still in Kasaba at the time

15 when this telegram was written?

16 A. Again, sir, as I testified I believe on Friday, I don't know what

17 time you actually drafted this particular document. The only time

18 reference on it is when it was sent from the communications centre.

19 There were a number of locations that were holding prisoners all through

20 the daylight hours of the 13th, so the document here talks about

21 Srebrenica and you've discussed Nova Kasaba, but I would also remind you

22 that there were still prisoners being held at Konjevic Polje as well as

23 prisoners being held on the meadow at Sandici after 1800 hours on the

24 13th. So again, without knowing exactly when you drafted this particular

25 document, it's hard to go back and then correlate to where prisoners were

Page 17352

1 and in what potential numbers they were at the time.

2 Q. Thank you. I am now asking you - and this my question - do you

3 know where the prisoners were on the afternoon of the 13th and when they

4 left Kasaba?

5 A. I don't know specifically -- I don't recall specifically when the

6 last prisoners departed from Kasaba. I believe one or two witnesses may

7 have testified that, but again, I just don't recall at the moment when

8 that would have been.

9 Q. Thank you. Let us now look at the statement. But before that,

10 in the right-top corner it says the telegram was sent at 2230 hours. In

11 your opinion, did the author of the telegram need two, five, or ten hours

12 to write such a telegram and give it to the encrypting officer?

13 A. Depending upon where you were at the time that you wrote this

14 particular document, which particular headquarters or forward

15 headquarters, I don't expect that it would take more than two hours,

16 maximum, from the time that you wrote it to the time that it would be

17 sent out.

18 Q. So it's around 8.00 p.m. in your estimate. Did you see the back

19 of this telegram? You know that it was written in longhand and sent to

20 the encrypting section immediately, without being typewritten first.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's page 2 in e-court, if we

22 could look at it.

23 You see it's written in longhand, that same telegram. But that

24 is not so important anymore. Let's see what General Mladic [as

25 interpreted] says in his statement 02781.

Page 17353

1 D289, Malinic's statement, page 20 in Serbian, and 21 in English.

2 Line 22 in Serbian.

3 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

4 Q. I quote:

5 "In the afternoon, the commander of the Main Staff arrived,

6 Ratko Mladic. I was not there at the time. I was called to come in by

7 radio. It was that internal communications system that we had with

8 General Ratko Mladic who held a speech at the stadium. He practically

9 walked through the prisoners who were sitting on the field. He told

10 them, briefly -- I mean, roughly, I can't remember his exact words, but

11 he said that they would be exchanged and there is no reason to be afraid.

12 They even applauded him. He said vehicles would arrive and all of them

13 would be sent out to be exchanged. He did not stay long, and immediately

14 after that speech, he went with his security detail in the direction of

15 Milici."

16 And then he talks about who was in the -- who was accompanying

17 Mr. Mladic. And then Malinic says that it was such a short time, he

18 didn't even manage to make the lists before they were shipped out to

19 Batkovic.

20 If the prisoners left Kasaba in the afternoon of the 13th, just

21 after Mladic's visit, would Tolimir need to write that telegram, knowing

22 about it on the 13th -- on the night of the 13th, if he already knew that

23 they had left Kasaba? Did he know it?

24 A. Well, sir, given the context of the telegram that you wrote, I

25 would again remind you that the phrase used was "war prisoners related to

Page 17354

1 Srebrenica," you did not specify - unless I am reading the document

2 incorrectly - Kasaba. So I am not sure why you're limiting the

3 applicability of that one particular document to only the prisoners at

4 Kasaba. As you're aware there were, on the 13th of July, a number of

5 other locations in and around that area, Konjevic Polje, Sandici, and

6 Bratunac, for that matter, where there were thousands of prisoners in the

7 custody of the VRS and there was a shortage of space for them,

8 particularly in Bratunac.

9 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. We won't waste time on that anymore. I

10 asked you and you answered as you saw fit.

11 Would Tolimir have to know where the prisoners are even on the

12 14th of July? If he didn't know on the 13th at 2230 hours, would he have

13 to know at least on the 14th, when not even those who were accompanying

14 them knew where they were leading them?

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 17362

1 to guard the prisoners because of the numbers, but I am not aware that

2 with respect to Srebrenica that at any point in time the collections of

3 prisoners left military custody and then were subsequently handed over to

4 civilian authorities.

5 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Did you come across Mr. Deronjic's

6 statement? Could you explain to the Trial Chamber why Beara and Deronjic

7 even talked, given the fact that Deronjic was not a soldier, an officer,

8 he was not a member of the military? Thank you.

9 A. As you know, on the late evening of 11 July, Miroslav Deronjic

10 was appointed to be, I guess, war president for the Srebrenica

11 municipality or the civilian commissioner for the Srebrenica

12 municipality. So in that context, Miroslav Deronjic would have had

13 reason, then, to talk to Colonel Beara on a number of issues.

14 Q. Thank you. Did he talk to him as a civilian commissioner for

15 Srebrenica or in a different capacity? Do you know that?

16 A. It has been a number of years since I reviewed the many

17 statements of Miroslav Deronjic so I don't know the details, but I take

18 it that in his capacities he was functioning as the civilian commissioner

19 for the municipality of Srebrenica.

20 Q. Thank you. Since he talked to him as a civilian commissioner,

21 could you remember that there was an issue in that in a conversation

22 about the location of the POWs in Bratunac or in Zvornik. A protected

23 witness of the Prosecution -- or, rather, he was not protected, it was

24 Momir Nikolic who said in his evidence that there was a dispute about

25 that involving Deronjic and Beara and that, as a result of that, the

Page 17363

1 order was changed and eventually they went to Zvornik. Although, Beara

2 insisted on POWs to be in Bratunac.

3 Do you remember that? Did you follow that testimony? Did you

4 read it subsequently? Do you remember it?

5 A. I did not follow Momir Nikolic's testimony in this trial. I am,

6 however, aware of his prior testimony in the Popovic case or even before

7 that, I take it, where he does raise the issue that there was a dispute

8 about whether or not to place prisoners in a certain facility in the

9 Bratunac municipality. It's been a number of years so I don't know the

10 details, but I am generally aware that there was a dispute on that issue.

11 At least according to Momir Nikolic's testimony.

12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. If he arrived on the 14th -- or, rather,

13 if the order was changed on the 14th after midnight, can you tell us

14 whether there was a plan at all, given the fact that the orders were

15 being changed as well as any decisions about prisoners of war? Thank

16 you.

17 A. Could you clarify, sir, who arrived, and on the 14th? I don't

18 understand who you are talking about.

19 Q. I am talking about the meeting at midnight between Beara and

20 Deronjic. Nikolic spoke about that. Beara wanted POWs to stay in

21 Bratunac. Deronjic wanted them to go to Zvornik. You mentioned that as

22 well. So if positions on -- on the location of POWs was changed after

23 that, would that be a testimony to a plan or to a change to the plan?

24 Thank you.

25 A. My information, based on my analysis and work, is that the first

Page 17364

1 prisoner convoys started leaving Bratunac at approximately 2000 hours on

2 the 13th of July, heading for the Zvornik Brigade area. Matter of fact,

3 those first convoys went to the school at Orahovac, and I believe that

4 there has been other testimony related to that. So I don't make a

5 connection between the events that I know occurred starting on 2000 hours

6 on the 13th, when the first convoys left Bratunac for the Zvornik

7 Brigade, and this supposed meeting between Deronjic and Beara as

8 recounted by Momir Nikolic.

9 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. We'll find this. Mind you, I did not

10 mean to discuss this, but now the matter has been raised in the answers.

11 I will ask my legal advisor to locate the exact page.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But now I would like to look at

13 something else, P126. Thank you.

14 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15 Q. On page 12, line 2, on the 8th of July, you answered that Beara,

16 Keserovic, Jankovic, were all under Tolimir's command and so on and so

17 forth. My question is this: Did Tolimir send those officers to carry

18 out the mission? Did they report to him about the accomplishment of the

19 tasks and missions that they were supposed to carry out? Thank you.

20 A. Sir, I don't know the first part of your question, which is: Did

21 you send these officers to carry out the mission, what mission are you

22 specifically talking about?

23 Q. In order not to waste time, look at the document in front of you.

24 It is headed: "The Main Staff of the Army Republika Srpska,"

25 17 July 1995, to the Drina Corps command, and so on and so forth. The

Page 17365

1 title of the document is: "Integration of operations to crush lagging

2 Muslim forces, order."

3 Under item 1 it says:

4 "Send three officers from the Main Staff of the Army of Republika

5 Srpska (Colonels Nedo Trkulja, Milovan Stankovic and Bogdan Sladojevic)

6 to the command of the 1st Zvornik Brigade to assist in the joining of the

7 VRS and MUP forces, the planning and co-ordination of combat operations,

8 to block, crush, and destroy lagging Muslim forces in the wider areas of

9 Kamenica and Cerska."

10 And then under 4 it says that:

11 "This will be done by Lieutenant Keserovic."

12 I don't want to read the whole document. You can see that

13 Keserovic is mentioned. Under bullet point 3, line 8, this is where

14 Colonel Keserovic is mentioned. And it says:

15 "For the execution of the aforementioned task, I hereby appoint

16 an officer from the administration of Colonel Keserovic."

17 My question is this: Did Stankovic and Keserovic and others who

18 were referred to by this order which was signed by General Mladic, were

19 they sent out by General Tolimir or by the commander?

20 A. I apologise, sir, when you previously mentioned Jankovic and

21 Beara as part of this, that's -- I kind of thought you might be referring

22 to a different document. Specific to this document, I agree. These

23 individuals were sent out by or at General Mladic's order. They were not

24 sent out on the basis of your order.

25 Q. Thank you. Was I in a position to send officers on a mission to

Page 17366

1 carry out combat and military tasks? Were they under the authority of

2 the commander or, rather, who were they supposed to report to after the

3 accomplishment of the task, to the person who originally sent them out on

4 a mission or to somebody who didn't send them out on a mission? Thank

5 you.

6 A. No, sir. In this context, the tasks given to Lieutenant-Colonel

7 Keserovic came from the commander of the Main Staff, and he would be

8 expected to report the results of those back to the commander of the

9 Main Staff upon their completion.

10 Q. Do you see that Mr. Stankovic's name is also referred to in this

11 order, Milovan Stankovic. You spoke about him in answering the

12 Prosecutor's questions. Thank you. Was he sent out by Tolimir or did he

13 go out on the order of the Main Staff? Thank you.

14 A. He went out -- just like Colonel Keserovic, he went out to

15 accomplish a discrete task at the direction of the commander of the

16 Main Staff.

17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I hope this is a convenient time for

18 our first break of today. We will resume at quarter past 4.00.

19 --- Recess taken at 3.45 p.m.

20 [The witness stands down]

21 [The witness takes the stand]

22 --- On resuming at 4.17 p.m.

23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please go ahead with your

24 cross-examination.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 17367

1 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Mr. Butler, as a military analyst, would you say that those

3 officers were supposed to report to Tolimir or to the person who sent

4 them out on the mission in the first place? Thank you.

5 A. These individuals would be expected -- in the sense of

6 Colonels Trkulja, Colonel Stankovic, and Colonel Sladojevic, they would

7 be expected to report back to General Mladic as the person who ordered

8 them to go out, at the completion of their mission to the Zvornik area.

9 Lieutenant Colonel Keserovic would be -- upon the completion of

10 his specific mission would also be expected to report back to the

11 individual who gave him that mission afterwards which, again, would be

12 General Mladic.

13 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Let's look at the document that's still

14 on the screen, paragraph 3 of this document, the last four lines from the

15 bottom.

16 The dead-line for the accomplishment of this mission is not later

17 than 2000 hours on the 19th of July, 1995. The order for further

18 engagement towards Cerska will be proposed by Lieutenant-Colonel

19 Keserovic on the 19th of July.

20 My question is: If they were supposed to file their reports only

21 on the 19th and a proposal for further action, were they able to inform

22 Tolimir before the 19th on any of these assignments on the situation on

23 the ground, or were they supposed to report to their superior?

24 A. Sir, if you look the document, the tasks given to the first three

25 officers, Colonel Trkulja, Colonel Stankovic, and Colonel Sladojevic, is

Page 17368

1 different than task given to Lieutenant-Colonel Keserovic. The first

2 three officers were to go up to the Zvornik Brigade zone, ascertain the

3 situation, and then report back to the Main Staff as to -- or in this

4 particular case report back to General Mladic, presumably through the

5 Main Staff, what the results of that inspection was.

6 Colonel Keserovic was given the task to take control of a number

7 of combat units to complete different set of tasks, and his task was to

8 be completed by 2000 hours on the 19th of July, 1995. The three officers

9 who went to the Zvornik Brigade zone could have reported back through the

10 Main Staff to General Mladic and, consequently, you could have learned of

11 it as early as the evening hours of 17 July 1995, had you been informed

12 of it.

13 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Could you tell us how can assignments or

14 reports be proposed through the Main Staff? Wouldn't they rather be

15 proposed directly and filed directly?

16 A. In this particular case, while one might expect in the case of

17 the three colonels listed in paragraph 1 that there would be or could be

18 a written report, the expectation would be that these officers, upon

19 returning from Zvornik, would verbally brief those individuals who were

20 responsible for sending them out on this fact-finding or on this

21 inspection mission. If General Mladic is absent, the next person who

22 would presumably be briefed by these individuals would be

23 General Miletic. And through that, other members of the Main Staff would

24 learn of issues that's pertinent to them.

25 Q. Mr. Butler, in your previous answer you said General Tolimir

Page 17369

1 should have been informed on the 17th. Look at this document, now,

2 please. It was written on the 17th and it was filed on the 18th. Was I

3 supposed to know before these officers completed their assignment, in

4 your view, or is it just your assumption? Is it the way you interpret

5 this document?

6 A. My understanding is that the three colonels who are mentioned in

7 paragraph 1 went to the zone of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade on the

8 17th of July, 1995, sometime during the morning or afternoon hours, and

9 that as a result, by the evening hours they would have assembled the

10 information that they had and that information would have been available

11 back to the people who sent them at the Main Staff. That's why I am

12 saying that information that they had collected up in the Zvornik area

13 would have started becoming available to the members of the Main Staff

14 presumably after General Mladic or Miletic had been spoken to on this

15 issue, whoever was there. So that is why I say as early as the evening

16 as 17 July.

17 Q. Mr. Butler, have you seen that report if you make such claims?

18 Just "yes" or "no," please.

19 A. I have never seen the results of this particular -- a written

20 document reflecting these. I am aware of the testimony related -- or the

21 statement related to one of the individuals involved with respect to

22 this -- in this inspection, which is Colonel Sladojevic.

23 Q. Thank you. Please give me as brief answers as possible. I did

24 not ask for information about Sladojevic.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's look at 65 ter 668. On

Page 17370

1 page 10 in Serbian. 65 ter 668.

2 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

3 Q. On page 10, you said, in the last line -- last two paragraphs:

4 "Members of the army are required to execute orders of the most

5 senior officer present when their immediate superior is not present."

6 And then you said:

7 "After the execution of each order, first the immediate superior

8 is informed or, rather, the officer who issued the order."

9 Now, I am asking you, if Tolimir was not in the area where these

10 officers are executing their assignments, could they have informed him

11 about completing a mission given them by the commander of the Main Staff?

12 A. We are still referring to the three officers in the 17 July

13 document, sir?

14 Q. I mean the four officers, because four are mentioned, and you

15 mentioned that General Tolimir issued orders to them. I want to see who

16 issued orders and to whom they reported.

17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.

18 MR. McCLOSKEY: That assumes facts not in evidence, that these

19 officers were where he says they were, and that assumes facts not in

20 evidence and is objectionable as a result.

21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Butler, are you able to respond?

22 THE WITNESS: I am not -- I don't recall ever testifying that

23 General Tolimir issued orders to Colonel Sladojevic or Colonel Trkulja.

24 I do recall testifying that Colonel Stankovic and Lieutenant-Colonel

25 Keserovic were subordinate to General Tolimir.

Page 17371

1 I think the question that General Tolimir is raising is that

2 would he have been informed, either before or after. My answer, as based

3 on the normal military protocols, is that even though General Mladic

4 personally gave them this order, as reflected in the document, whether it

5 was him personally or whether he relayed that through General Miletic,

6 the officers that are subordinate normally to General Tolimir should have

7 at least informed, if possible, General Tolimir that they had been given

8 a specific task by General Mladic which, at the minimum, would take them

9 away from their otherwise specified duties. So he would be informed of

10 that.

11 Afterwards, depending upon the circumstances, and again in the

12 case of Colonel Stankovic, when the mission was completed for

13 Colonel Stankovic on the evening of the 17th, after he had finished his

14 inspection in the Zvornik area, he should have notified General Tolimir

15 that he was back, finished with the task that was given to him by

16 General Mladic. The same way for Colonel Keserovic when he completed his

17 task.

18 Again, whether or not those two officers then informed

19 General Tolimir as to what General Mladic's task was and what the results

20 of their work was or not is a matter of speculation. Normally, there

21 would be no reason why they wouldn't have, because General Tolimir would

22 need to know these things even after the fact.

23 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler, for this professional opinion. Tell me,

24 officers who received an assignment from the commander, would they report

25 to Tolimir on everything or just on the technical issues that concern

Page 17372

1 him?

2 A. The expectation as professional intelligence and security

3 officers was -- would be that, you know, based on their own knowledge and

4 training, they would inform you of all of those issues which they felt

5 you needed to be aware of.

6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. I know that this answer fits with your

7 report.

8 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Tolimir please repeat the number.

9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please repeat the number.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 00651 is the 65 ter number.

11 Page 25, paragraph 5.5, the last two paragraphs.

12 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13 Q. It says:

14 "Members of the army are required to execute the orders of the

15 most senior officer present in the absence of their immediate superior."

16 "Upon completion of a task, they report to the commanding officer

17 who issued the order."

18 What does this mean? If the commanding officer was not in the

19 area where the tasks were completed, if he did not issue the order, would

20 they report to him or would they report to the officer who issued the

21 task and to whom they were seconded?

22 A. In the case of the three officers mentioned in paragraph 1 of

23 that 17 July 1995 document, it would be expected that they would offer

24 their report, whether it be written or verbal, to General Mladic, who was

25 the person who sent them down. If General Mladic was not available, they

Page 17373

1 would provide their report to his subordinate, which would be

2 General Miletic. Again, that is how these individuals as professional

3 staff officers and officers within the VRS would react to that. They

4 would understand what their reporting requirement back would be.

5 Again, you're not in that particular document, so those officers

6 would not have an obligation to report everything back to you because you

7 did not give the order to go out there. However, particularly

8 Colonel Stankovic, on the 17 July document, was a subordinate officer in

9 the intelligence and security branch of the VRS and would have informed

10 you of particularly those issues that he observed up at the

11 Zvornik Brigade that would have fallen under the competence of the

12 intelligence and security branch and which he believes that you would

13 have needed to be aware of.

14 Now, whether that occurred directly on the 17th of July or in

15 subsequent days, I don't know. But you would have been informed to some

16 degree what the results of that particular discussion were, particularly

17 in light of what the actual purpose of that investigation commission was

18 that General Mladic sent out on 17 July 1995.

19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Judge Mindua has a question.

20 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, Witness. I understand the

21 principle that we saw in a document a moment ago, 65 ter 668, that

22 stipulates how interrelations function in the VRS and the process for

23 orders given and received. I've understood all that well. But I would

24 like to come back to P126, the document dated 17 July 1995. And there we

25 see, and correct me if I'm wrong, that General Mladic does not give any

Page 17374

1 orders to Colonel Trkulja, to Stankovic, or Sladojevic. The general

2 issues orders to the command of the Drina Corps, and the general tells

3 the command of this corps to send these colonels, Trkulja, Stankovic, and

4 Sladojevic, to a certain mission.

5 In my understanding, if I understand the principle you explained,

6 when they come back from that mission, don't you think that these

7 three colonels have to report to the corps command, and the corps command

8 in its turn would report to General Mladic? Because you seem to be

9 saying that the three colonels should be reporting back to

10 General Mladic. I wouldn't agree with that, if my understanding is

11 correct. What do you think?

12 THE WITNESS: Well, sir, looking at the document, and I agree

13 that the addressee listing is somewhat confusing, but these three

14 officers are Main Staff officers. They are not members of the

15 Drina Corps. The three officers in question are being sent from the

16 Main Staff. The Drina Corps and subordinate formations are being -- are

17 listed here not primarily for the purposes of paragraph 1 and 2, but they

18 are listed here primarily for the purposes of paragraph 3.

19 There -- I don't think there is any question that the officers --

20 those three officers, you know, are going down there at General Mladic's

21 order and are expected to report back to the Main Staff.

22 Paragraph 3, where Colonel Keserovic is being directed to take

23 command of various military formations that are subordinate to the

24 Drina Corps is why, primarily, that this is going out to other members of

25 the Drina Corps so that they are aware that when Colonel Keserovic

Page 17375

1 arrives, that he will be assuming command of those various formations.

2 So while the distribution list of this particular message lends

3 to a little bit of confusion, I think paragraph 1 and 2 make it clear

4 that these are officers from the Main Staff who are going to go directly

5 to the Zvornik Brigade area to report on a certain situation and that

6 their report is expected to go back to the Main Staff.

7 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, I agree with you that the

8 listed addressees in this order are confusing, and maybe it really is

9 something that is included for the purposes of the third paragraph.

10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This answer by Judge Mindua and your response

11 triggered another question by me. I see that this document was sent to

12 the Drina Corps command for information purposes. And then there are

13 some addressees, some brigade commanders. And then we look at item

14 number 1 of this order: "Send three officers," which are listed then.

15 To whom is this order addressed, "Send these officers"? It's a strange

16 wording. Who is the correct addressee of this order by General Mladic,

17 in your understanding?

18 THE WITNESS: Yes, the way that I read this, it is sent to the

19 Drina Corps and then also for the information of the subordinate brigades

20 of the Drina Corps who will be directly impacted by parts of this order.

21 Again, the way that this document is actually drafted it discusses

22 two separate and distinct operations. The first one, in paragraph 1 and

23 2, discusses an inspection team from the Main Staff. So this particular

24 document would at least serve to make the Drina Corps and the

25 Zvornik Infantry Brigade aware that an inspection team would be coming

Page 17376

1 from the Main Staff.

2 The other parts, paragraph 3 and paragraph 5, refer to

3 Colonel Keserovic's assumption of command, and of course the

4 Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade and the Milici Brigade and elements of

5 the 67th Communication Regiment would have an interest in knowing that

6 because he would be assuming command of some of their potential forces.

7 So again, in a perfect world it would be two separate documents;

8 one of them just encapsulating paragraph 1 and 2, informing the

9 Drina Corps and the Zvornik Brigade that an inspection team would be

10 coming; and then a separate document which would encapsulate the last two

11 paragraphs, 3 [Realtime transcript read in error "4"] and 5, where it

12 discusses the fact that this officer will be taking command of various

13 units. They chose to do it in one particular document, and it does lend

14 a little bit of confusion in reading it.

15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: One correction for the transcript, you said

16 paragraph 3 and 5, because there is no paragraph 4. The other thing is

17 your understanding, if I understood you correctly, is that the words "for

18 information" don't relate to the Drina Corps command but to the brigade

19 communications -- no, the brigade commands; is that correct? The words

20 "for information purposes"?

21 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. The way that I take that they're -- they

22 are sending it directly to the corps command, but because of timeliness

23 issues and the fact that it will impact other units, they are also

24 sending it to those units for their information so they have an awareness

25 of what's going on. It's not necessarily -- it would be an abnormal use

Page 17377

1 of the chain of command, so to speak, for the Main Staff to send orders

2 directly to the brigade and then inform the corps that they are doing

3 this. It's normally customary that it's the other way around.

4 And it seems -- it's just generally viewed as a time-saving

5 device, and it saves the time necessary for then the corps to have to

6 turn around and take that same order and re-publish it to its brigades.

7 This way, everyone who is concerned or will be impacted receives the

8 order in as timely a manner as possible.

9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you for that comment.

10 Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

12 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Mr. Butler, since this order was issued on the 17th, and we don't

14 know when the report was filed, you said you didn't read it, my question

15 is: Do you think that by the 17th, all the killings that you mentioned

16 in your expert report had been finished?

17 A. By the -- my understanding is that by the 17th, most of the mass

18 executions will have been completed. From the period of the 18th

19 through, roughly, the 22nd, there were of course a number of smaller

20 executions, but not anything on the scale that one saw from the 14th

21 onwards.

22 Q. Thank you. And answer me this question: Was then

23 General Tolimir able to know that there had been violations of

24 international law if he had not ordered those violations and if he hadn't

25 ordered the perpetration of those crimes and he had received no report on

Page 17378

1 their perpetration?

2 A. I am not sure that I can answer that, one, because it gets to the

3 actual heart of the matter. My belief is that based on where you were

4 and the communication means available to you, you had the ability at some

5 juncture before the 17th to know what was going on. At what point you

6 learned about it is, of course, you know, one of the key questions. My

7 understanding, again, of your role within the army, and given the gravity

8 and the scope of these executions, is that I can't see a scenario where

9 you wouldn't have gained some awareness of this before the end of the

10 executions -- the mass executions on the 17th, in light of your position

11 and in light of the participation of your subordinates in this.

12 Q. Mr. Butler, do you have any proof of that, or is this just your

13 assumption or your opinion? Thank you.

14 A. I do not have a document which lays out that you,

15 General Tolimir, were informed of the fact that prisoners were being

16 executed on a certain time. All I can do, based on the documents that I

17 have reviewed, is lay out various points and times where I believe

18 circumstances would lead to that. For example, at what point in time you

19 gained an awareness of prisoners being taken. Later on, at what point in

20 time your documents reflect the fact that you're aware that it's not just

21 dozens of prisoners, it's, you know, according to your 13 July document,

22 over 800 prisoners you are minimally aware of, and how the number

23 800 prisoners being captured in one day by the Army of Republika Srpska

24 should have piqued your professional curiosity at a minimum. I am not

25 aware of the Army of Republika Srpska ever taking that amount of

Page 17379

1 prisoners in one day, for any reason.

2 So again, it is a constructive basis by which I make my opinion.

3 I do not have a specific document which says that General Tolimir was

4 briefed by a subordinate or by anybody else at this date and time that

5 the prisoners would be murdered.

6 Q. Thank you. The document you mention dated the 13th, where I

7 mentioned that facilities -- or, rather, instruments should be placed in

8 facilities, isn't that the proof that I wanted them to be placed there

9 and not killed?

10 A. I -- without more I don't take it as such. For example, the

11 first thing - and I have discussed this before - is what other provisions

12 were being put in place for those individuals. For example, and again I

13 am just moving this hypothetical forward, if General Tolimir knew at that

14 time that all they were looking for was a location to kill the prisoners,

15 such as picked in Orahovac, then the issue would have simply been nothing

16 more than finding individuals who could guard and execute them.

17 If the scenario was that they were going to be cared for for a

18 long time in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, then there would be

19 indications of that by orders going out from the commander of the

20 Rogatica Brigade, to his subordinates, which would reflect the necessary

21 steps to order food for these 800 people, which were beyond the means of

22 the Rogatica Brigade itself to deliver, medical care, water, and

23 registration of these individuals.

24 The other issue that I would lay out with respect to that

25 particular document is what, if any, follow-on actions you took when

Page 17380

1 these 800 prisoners didn't show up. I presume at some juncture somebody

2 would have informed you that the proposal that you made with regard to

3 where to house these prisoners was not being adopted because they were

4 being sent somewhere else or because there had been another plan made for

5 them. And again, that's not laid out in the documents anywhere, so

6 unfortunately, my ability to pass judgement on what that 13 July 1995

7 document means is very limited because I have no way of knowing the

8 various other intentions and various other orders that occurred in

9 relation to it.

10 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Did you see a statement by the protected

11 witness who said that when he took the prisoners of war away, he took

12 them there to be exchanged, a fact that he was proud of. Did you see

13 that?

14 A. I recall you showed me that statement. Yes, sir.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us now look at a document that

16 you also authored, 00651.

17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Your own document.

19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This is now the document P2470. It's already in

20 evidence, and at this point in time I would like to draw your attention

21 to 65 ter 668 we have seen earlier. I would like to ask you if you are

22 tendering that one.

23 Mr. Tolimir.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Yes.

25 And now can we look at P2470 -- or D2470. I don't know anymore.

Page 17381

1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It's P2470. And again, are you tendering

2 65 ter 668?

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you, Mr. President.

4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.

5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 668 shall be

6 assigned Exhibit D309. Thank you.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar. Let us

8 now look at P2470. This is Mr. Butler's report on the command

9 responsibility of the VRS Main Staff.

10 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Under 7.5, bullet point A, on page 35 in Serbian.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I have the relevant page in

13 English? Thank you. It is chapter 7.5, paragraph 2, also in English,

14 7.5 -- I can't see it. Paragraph 20. Thank you. We are now looking at

15 paragraph 20.

16 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Where you say:

18 "Personal responsibility for the violations of the laws of war:

19 "Every individual (military or civilian) shall be personally

20 accountable for breaches of rules of the law of war, if he/she commits a

21 violation him/herself, or orders one to be committed. Ignorance of the

22 provisions of the rules of the law of war does not exonerate the

23 transgressors of responsibility."

24 You said that --

25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please slow down while reading.

Page 17382

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

2 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

3 Q. It is important to say that in paragraph 20 it says that those

4 who committed such crimes may be held responsible by an international

5 criminal tribunal if such a tribunal has been established. And you also

6 state in this paragraph that you referred to the regulations on the

7 application of the rules of international law of war in the armed forces

8 of the SFRY which were in -- despite the fact that somebody committed a

9 war crime, although Tolimir sent a document prohibiting that, would that

10 be a personal responsibility or would that be Tolimir's responsibility?

11 If somebody violates the law of war, is he personally responsible or is

12 there another person who is responsible for the transgressions comitted

13 by the former person? Thank you.

14 A. I think some of your question dropped out -- or wasn't caught on

15 the transcript, so could I ask you to repeat it again just so I am clear

16 what you are asking, sir?

17 Q. Is every individual personally responsible for the commission of

18 war crimes which are prohibited according to rules and regulations which

19 forbid such crimes, and if such crimes are comitted, is that person's

20 superior responsible for the commission of crimes by an individual who

21 was aware that he was not supposed to commit such crimes? Thank you.

22 A. To your first question, sir, yes, as envisioned under these

23 particular regulations, every individual would incur a form of

24 responsibility -- individual responsibility for their involvement in war

25 crimes.

Page 17383

1 As to your second question, depending on the circumstances,

2 superior officers can also incur responsibility for the acts or omissions

3 of their subordinates with respect to war crimes.

4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Let's look at paragraph 2 as it was

5 regulated by the regulations on the application of the rules of

6 international law of war in the armed forces of the SFRY that you quoted

7 from, and I will also quote from it. And this is paragraph 20, personal

8 responsibility for violations of the laws of war, that's the following

9 page in English. And I'm reading:

10 "A military officer is personally responsible for the

11 transgressions of the rule of law if he knew or was in a position to know

12 that an inferior in a different -- a subordinate in a different unit or

13 subordinates were preparing to commit such crimes, and if they did not

14 take any measures to prevent such crimes when that was still possible

15 before the crimes were committed."

16 My question: Was Tolimir in a position to know at the time when

17 those measures of a crime were committed and was he in a position to

18 prevent those crimes if he knew of those crimes? Do you have any

19 information about that? Do you have any opinion on that?

20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.

21 MR. McCLOSKEY: This is the umpteenth question about what

22 General Tolimir knew. I think Mr. Butler's answers on those, while they

23 go to your decision, have been exhausted. The part about what

24 General Tolimir could have done or would have done about prevent, I

25 think, is new, and I have no objection to that part. But if we go into

Page 17384

1 the knowledge aspect of it, we're just starting over again, which we've

2 already spent hours on.

3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Indeed, we should avoid repetitions.

4 Mr. Butler, are you able to provide us with your knowledge?

5 THE WITNESS: Are you just looking for the answer related to the

6 potentials for General Tolimir to have prevented the commission of such

7 acts?

8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Indeed, you should answer that question and then

9 Mr. Tolimir may put additional questions in that respect.

10 THE WITNESS: I understand, sir. In that context, when if one

11 assumes that General Tolimir receives notice of the commissions of crimes

12 and, in this particular hypothetical, his subordinates are involved,

13 General Tolimir's first action would be or could be to order his

14 subordinates, as a first instance, not to participate and, at the same

15 time, from his subordinates get an understanding of who issued the

16 particular order.

17 His next step upon following -- or finding out who would issue

18 the order would be conceivably to call that individual, in this case

19 General Mladic, and get a clarification to determine whether or not

20 General Mladic is really giving an order which General Tolimir, as his

21 assistant commander for intelligence and security, would believe is

22 unlawful at face value and seek clarification of that. If General Mladic

23 insists that this is his order, General Tolimir is still not without

24 recourse. General Tolimir could seek to use his offices to directly

25 contact the leader -- the president of the Republika Srpska and

Page 17385

1 General Mladic's superior, President Karadzic, and to lay out the

2 situation, to lay out not only the legal aspect, which is that

3 General Tolimir believes that this order is illegal and that

4 General Mladic should not be giving it, and that President Karadzic

5 should countermand it, and that General Tolimir could also lay out the

6 practical consequences for the state of the Republika Srpska if

7 President Karadzic doesn't countermand this particular order.

8 General Tolimir has a number of those options. President Karadzic could

9 then issue his particular orders, one of which might call for relieving

10 General Mladic of his command.

11 Along the same vein, President Karadzic may very well find

12 himself in a situation where he agrees with General Mladic and does not

13 agree with General Tolimir, in which case the law calls on, and as an

14 honourable man one would expect, that General Tolimir would immediately,

15 if he did not agree with the conduct of the order, resign his position

16 within the army so he would take no part of that particular order.

17 So in that context, even though General Tolimir is not the

18 commander of military forces, by virtue of his senior position on the

19 Main Staff and his access to the highest levels of the military and

20 civilian government within the Republika Srpska, as well as the highest

21 levels potentially of the military and civilian government of the nearby

22 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which could potentially influence

23 General Mladic, he has some options.

24 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler, for your assumptions. And now start from

Page 17386

1 the assumption that Tolimir didn't know and was not in the area. What

2 should have happened then? He wasn't there, he was in no position to

3 know. What was your assumption then? What should have happened?

4 A. Under that particular hypothetical, if we assume that

5 General Tolimir has no knowledge of these issues until after the fact,

6 once General Tolimir learns of these issues, he then, particularly with

7 respect to his role as the chief of intelligence and security, which has

8 a law enforcement function, by position he has the ability to begin

9 undertaking an investigation by members of the military police and the

10 security branch in order to determine what happened, the scope of the

11 crimes, and who was involved in them.

12 Now, that becomes slightly problematic under this scenario if we

13 assume that some of the individuals involved with them are

14 General Tolimir's subordinates or General Mladic, his superior. But

15 again, in the same way that he has the options before, he also has

16 additional options as well. He can go to the president of the republic

17 based on what he's learned and request other authorities within the

18 Republika Srpska take over portions of the investigation. He can go and

19 relieve officers that are under his command, at least temporarily. He

20 may be overruled ultimately by General Mladic or not. But he has -- he

21 has a responsibility, particularly in his position, to take those active

22 steps to investigate the crimes that occurred afterwards and seek to hold

23 individuals responsible for those criminal acts or, at least, move their

24 investigation forward to such a state that charges could potentially be

25 referred by the military prosecutor in the Republika Srpska or, for

Page 17387

1 officers who were also serving as members of the federal Yugoslav Army,

2 by maybe a military prosecutor in Belgrade.

3 And if at the end of that process General Tolimir is still not

4 able to effect any of those issues because the participation of his chain

5 of command, both his subordinates and superiors, are so pervasive --

6 again we go back to the option of, you know, his last course would be --

7 in order to show his disagreement would be to potentially resign from the

8 army to demonstrate that he is totally taking himself out of any

9 responsibility for that after giving his best efforts that he is able to

10 do.

11 So those -- under that scenario, those are a list of the

12 potential actions that he could have taken.

13 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. In the examination-in-chief you were

14 asked whether there was an investigation and you said, "Yes, Beara did

15 it." My question is this: Did the Main Staff carry out an investigation

16 on the crimes comitted in Srebrenica? Did an investigation take place

17 after that? Thank you.

18 A. No, sir. No meaningful investigation was taken by the Main Staff

19 to my knowledge.

20 Q. Thank you. I am going to find the reference to the page where

21 you were asked and what you were asked, and you answered that Beara

22 carried out an investigation.

23 Let me ask you this: In answering the Prosecutor's questions on

24 page 16364, line 22, through 16365, line 3, you say:

25 "It is an interesting question, and it is interesting that

Page 17388

1 according to military rules, even in the VRS an officer or a soldier were

2 not duty-bound to carry out an order which they deem to be unlawful. For

3 example, such as this one, you know that Colonel Beara obviously carried

4 out an order and what his next step would have been was to inform his

5 superior, General Tolimir, of the order that he had received, from whom

6 he had received it, and how he intended to carry it out."

7 My question is this: An officer or a soldier, are they, A, not

8 obliged to carry out an unlawful order; or B, are they obliged, do they

9 have to refuse to carry out an unlawful order? There is a significant

10 difference between the two, so I am waiting for your answer.

11 A. Yes, sir. Going back to your last point first, again, I am aware

12 that Colonel Beara was given a role to investigate, but I stand by my

13 answer that no meaningful investigation was done. Colonel Beara

14 obviously, given his role in the crimes, wasn't going to seriously

15 investigate them.

16 As to your second question, under the SFRY regulations and, in

17 fact, under the law that was applicable within the Republika Srpska, an

18 officer or a soldier who recognises at its face that an order that he is

19 receiving is unlawful has a legal responsibility not to carry out that

20 order. And again, the question there becomes the ability of a particular

21 soldier or an officer to recognise that an order that he is given by a

22 superior is patently unlawful. I mean, it is a line that has to be

23 walked because obviously all military organisations require, you know,

24 the immediate and full compliance with orders given by superiors to

25 subordinates. They don't have the option of questioning orders. But

Page 17389

1 under law - and this includes the law that was in place at the time

2 within the RS - it was recognised that some orders that would be given

3 would be so patently unlawful that any soldier or any officer would

4 recognise the unlawfulness of those orders and, as such, would not be

5 expected to carry them out.

6 Q. Can I then conclude that everyone is required to execute such an

7 order? Is that your answer? Is everyone under obligation to refuse to

8 execute such an order?

9 A. Yes, sir. If an order is recognised by the person who receives

10 it that it is clearly an illegal order or an unlawful order, they have an

11 obligation to not obey it. That is their legal obligation.

12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. In that case, if an offender, somebody

13 who violated some military rule, does not refuse to carry out an illegal

14 order, as it happened in this case, and if he's aware that such an order

15 is unlawful, is it then reasonable to expect that person to inform others

16 who are not in the know that he had done it, that he had carried out an

17 illegal order? Would it be reasonable to expect that person to inform

18 the Main Staff, for instance?

19 A. Again, I would say that it would be dependent upon the situation.

20 In an individual or an isolated instance, obviously one would expect that

21 the individual -- or the small group of individuals who carried it out

22 would seek to keep the fact that they participated in this crime quiet

23 for fear of being identified and subsequently held responsible.

24 In the particular crime base, the Srebrenica crime base, the

25 sheer number of people who were involved, hundreds of soldiers and police

Page 17390

1 officers of the Republika Srpska and the Army of the Republika Srpska,

2 the widespread involvement of various commands, the Main Staff, the

3 Drina Corps, the Zvornik Brigade, the Bratunac Brigade, various police

4 units, would have made the fact that it would have been patently obvious

5 who was participating and the fact that they were doing so under orders.

6 So the fact that an individual like Colonel Beara, who was deemed

7 to have been significantly involved in much of the implementation of

8 this, it's not going to take much of a rocket scientist on anybody's part

9 at the Main Staff to figure out what his potential involvement may or may

10 not have been during the period of the 13th of July until the

11 18th of July, whether he personally informs them or not.

12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Do you remember the telegrams that were

13 introduced into evidence in the examination-in-chief? Who did Mr. Beara

14 contact when he ran into problems, did he contact Tolimir or Krstic?

15 A. To be clear, we are not talking telegrams. We are talking the

16 intercepts of 15 July. Is that the documents you're referring to?

17 Q. That's correct. I mean P5065, shown to you by the Prosecutor.

18 Does he address me in that document, Beara?

19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: There is no document P5065.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise. 506B. My mistake.

21 THE REGISTRAR: This is a confidential exhibit. It should not be

22 broadcast. Thank you.

23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I didn't call for it. I am just

25 asking Mr. Butler.

Page 17391

1 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Who is being addressed in that document?

3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.

4 MR. McCLOSKEY: I think with such specific questions it's only

5 fair to allow Mr. Butler to see this document. Make sure we know we are

6 on the same page as well.

7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It's on the screen now.

8 Which is the part you are referring to, Mr. Tolimir?

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I mean precisely this document,

10 it's very short, where he says in line 5:

11 "... Krle, please understand, I cannot explain it like this."

12 And then he says, line 7 from the bottom -- sorry, 8:

13 "Krle, I am at the end of my wits. I don't know what to do

14 anymore."

15 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Is he addressing Tolimir or the corps commander? And who is he

17 asking for help in dealing with these problems, Tolimir or the corps

18 commander?

19 A. In this particular intercept and in the one prior with a

20 conversation with General Zivanovic, the context is that a unit of the

21 Drina Corps did not send individuals that they were supposed to send who

22 would ultimately participate in executions. So because those orders

23 haven't been carried out, Colonel Beara contacts the commander of the

24 Drina Corps, General Krstic at this point in time, because he is the

25 person following the chain of command that should be able to order his

Page 17392

1 subordinate, Major Furtula, to send the appropriate troops as necessary.

2 So in this particular light, you are correct. He is not

3 addressing General Tolimir. He is addressing General Krstic because

4 General Krstic is the superior of the officer who was supposed to send

5 the aforementioned soldiers to participate in the task.

6 Q. Is he the superior or the subordinate? And did I hear it wrong

7 in the interpretation or did you make a mistake?

8 A. General Krstic is the superior to Major Furtula, so in this

9 context Colonel Beara is contacting General Krstic so that General Krstic

10 will subsequently direct Major Furtula to carry out the earlier order and

11 ensure that the individuals are made available.

12 Q. Does he report here about problems and the tasks to Krstic or to

13 Tolimir?

14 A. In this intercept he is reporting the problems that he is having

15 to General Krstic.

16 Q. Thank you. Did Krstic report to the Main Staff about that? Did

17 you see it anywhere in daily and interim combat reports, or did he fail

18 to report about that completely?

19 A. If General Krstic did report these issues, he did not do so in a

20 written format.

21 Q. Mr. Butler, how could General Tolimir know anything if he was

22 unable to read any documents and he had not received any calls from the

23 participants directly involved in these problems?

24 A. Again, sir, I don't know that General Tolimir did not read any

25 documents or that he did not receive any calls from the participants

Page 17393

1 discussing these issues. General Tolimir obviously had means to

2 communicate on a variety of levels to individuals who were involved in

3 this. So the problem that I have is, again, with respect to verbal

4 communications, there is often not a record of those outside of the

5 intercepts. So I can't necessarily agree to the hypothetical that you've

6 laid out because I don't know all of the documents that you've read and I

7 don't know all of the conversations that you had.

8 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler, for this assumption. I have the following

9 question for you now: If an offender or offenders, violators of laws and

10 regulations, do not refuse to carry out unlawful orders, would it be in

11 their interest to keep such acts secret?

12 A. Yes, sir. As I have stated before, in the context -- in the

13 conduct of crimes, you know, it is generally in the interest of the

14 criminal not to advertise his participation in them. The more people who

15 become aware of his participation, in a perfect world, the higher the

16 likelihood that law enforcement authorities would be able to apprehend

17 him and ultimately he would be charged for those crimes.

18 Q. Thank you. You were saying a moment ago what General Tolimir

19 should have done if he had known. What about those offenders, would they

20 report their actions to General Tolimir if they were aware what he could

21 have done if he had known, or would they keep secret their unlawful

22 conduct?

23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.

24 MR. McCLOSKEY: Could he be more specific? The number of

25 offenders from the Main Staff, the Drina Corps, the various units, is

Page 17394

1 immense and so this question needs to be specific, in my view.

2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think this witness is capable to distinguish

3 between the different possible groups Mr. Tolimir is referring to.

4 Mr. McCloskey.

5 MR. McCLOSKEY: But we don't know from the question which group

6 he's referring to. If he's referring to everyone, we'll be here forever

7 answering it. I mean, even if it's a person from each one of the various

8 units or strata, it could be a different question.

9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Let's hear the answer of Mr. Butler, and then

10 Mr. Tolimir may put additional questions.

11 THE WITNESS: Well, again, in part Mr. McCloskey did nail it. I

12 mean, given the -- and as I've said before, given the fact that so many

13 people at so many levels were involved in the commission of this crime,

14 and again I don't want to be flippant, but it wouldn't take a rocket

15 scientist to figure out that something had happened. But even at the

16 Main Staff level, for example, setting aside General Mladic, other

17 officers clearly had involvement, many of them general officers;

18 General Miletic and General Gvero, for example. Various numbers of

19 colonels had degrees of knowledge or involvement. Colonel Beara,

20 Colonel Jankovic, Colonel Salapura had knowledge of some of these issues.

21 Lieutenant-Colonel Keserovic had knowledge of some of these issues.

22 I mean, when you start widening out the circle of all of these

23 individuals at just the Main Staff level who would have had some

24 knowledge, maybe not the whole story but some knowledge, and if you were

25 to actually just lay out a chart of all of the senior officers and start

Page 17395

1 circling them, at some point you are going to have very few officers left

2 who had no knowledge whatsoever.

3 So again at some point in time, an individual, particularly the

4 army's head of intelligence and security, should theoretically be able to

5 piece this all together at some point. I mean, again, not to sound

6 flippant, you know, General Tolimir all the way up to July 1995, as

7 demonstrated in a number of the documents that the Office of the

8 Prosecutor has laid out, has shown an interest in the exchange of

9 prisoners.

10 Well, General Tolimir, on 13 July is aware of a minimum number of

11 800 prisoners who are in the custody of the VRS. He's no longer

12 interested in them anymore? I mean, with 800 prisoners, every single

13 VRS soldier who was captured by the ABiH could have been returned back to

14 the army and exchanged. And certainly in the months of August and

15 September, other units of the VRS are asking for accountings of the

16 prisoners captured at Srebrenica and later Zepa for precisely that

17 reason.

18 So, even in an abstract hypothetical that General Tolimir does

19 not know that the prisoners are all executed by the 18th, there is no

20 evidence of any professional curiosity on his part, on the 19th or on the

21 follow-on days, to get a number of all the prisoners that were taken, to

22 find out if the number of prisoners they have taken are all fitting in

23 the Batkovic detention centre or does he have to make other arrangements

24 for them. Who are those prisoners who are senior officers of the

25 28th Infantry Division and would be of high value to the Army of the

Page 17396

1 Republika Srpska for interrogation as well as exchange.

2 So -- and I guess and I don't mean to the prejudiced in my own

3 view of this, because I am also a professional intelligence officer,

4 these are things that intelligence officers do. We do them because we

5 are trained to do them. We are trained to be aware of these issues

6 because they benefit us as intelligence officers providing support to our

7 commanders.

8 So, again, you know, it would be stunning, as a matter of a

9 professional intelligence and security officer, that General Tolimir gets

10 back to his headquarters and has absolutely no questions of anybody about

11 what happened to all of the prisoners that were supposedly taken at

12 Srebrenica.

13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, now you see the result of such a

14 speculative question you have put to the witness. To remind everybody of

15 that question:

16 "What about those offenders, would they report their actions to

17 General Tolimir, if they were aware, what he could have done, if he had

18 known, or would they keep secret their unlawful conduct?"

19 My problem with this question was that it was highly speculative,

20 and you see -- you have heard the answer of the witness. Please carry

21 on.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

23 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Do you know, Mr. Butler, that from Zepa, General Tolimir went to

25 Krajina immediately to counter the NATO aggression against

Page 17397

1 Republika Srpska and that he only returned in October after the signing

2 of the Dayton Accords after the conflict was ended. Did you find that in

3 the documents?

4 A. No, sir, I don't -- I did not follow your -- where you were

5 physically located within the Republika Srpska post Zepa.

6 Q. You said this was the plan. Were the killings in Kravica part of

7 that plan or did they result from an incident?

8 A. I am aware that a number of individuals have testified, not only

9 before this Court but in other legal forums, that the Kravica warehouse

10 was not part of the overall mass executions but it was part of a specific

11 incident. For a variety of reasons, I do not believe that that's the

12 case and that I believe that the Kravica warehouse, while perhaps not the

13 intended location for all the prisoners to be killed, that it was part of

14 the overall executions. Had it merely been a result of an incident where

15 one or two prisoners were seeking to escape, you know, while the army

16 would have been able to lawfully use appropriate force to prevent those

17 escapes, the fact that every single person held in the Kravica warehouse,

18 save three survivors -- or four survivors were killed, seems to be a

19 disproportionate use of force with respect to the actions of several

20 prisoners seeking to escape.

21 So for me to accept the idea that it was merely an incident and

22 not part of the larger plan, I would have to see evidence that once the

23 incident was controlled, the remaining prisoners were safe-guarded. I am

24 aware from my own research on that particular issue that, while

25 Serbian -- or Army of the Republika Srpska and police forces were treated

Page 17398

1 at the Bratunac medical centre, surprisingly, there were no Muslim

2 wounded. Everyone was killed in the escape attempt, which is a bit of a

3 statistical challenge to get to unless the goal was to kill everybody.

4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, we need the second break now and we

5 will resume quarter past 6.00.

6 --- Recess taken at 5.45 p.m.

7 [The witness stands down]

8 [The witness takes the stand]

9 --- On resuming at 6.18 p.m.

10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please continue.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

12 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Mr. Butler, you mentioned an execution plan. Did that include

14 those who were killed by Pobudjanksa Kamenica and at all those other

15 places en route followed by the column?

16 A. I have always differentiated the killings with respect to those

17 that occurred in various mass execution sites with those that occurred

18 with respect to the activities of the column fighting itself -- fighting

19 its way out from Srebrenica to then free territory near Tuzla. In that

20 particular context, while there are clearly a number of civilians who are

21 part of that column, and a large number of civilians that are part of

22 that column, I believe that overall the character of that column is

23 military in nature. And as a result, when I view that particular issue,

24 I have always testified that it is my view that with respect to the

25 column, it did represent a military threat to the VRS as it was fighting

Page 17399

1 its way through the rear territory of Bratunac Brigade and later the

2 Zvornik Brigade, and as a result, the VRS was justified to use military

3 force against that column despite the presence of civilians accompanying

4 the column.

5 Q. Thank you. In your statement on the events surrounding the

6 breakthrough near Baljkovica, did you say that the Muslims refused to

7 separate civilians from the troops as was proposed by Pandurevic? Did

8 you come across reports to that effect? I am sure I found it in your

9 expert reports and analysis.

10 A. Yes, sir. In that particular context I was commenting on an

11 interim combat report, I believe, where Colonel Pandurevic -- excuse me,

12 was discussing the fact that he was in contact and -- he was in contact

13 with his counterparts on the ABiH side and that, as part of various

14 proposals that were going back and forth, he had raised the issue of the

15 fact that the ABiH, you know, military and civilians split, so to speak,

16 and that the civilians would be free to leave but the military would not.

17 And, of course, the ABiH's position was that they wanted the entire

18 column containing both military and civilian personnel to be allowed to

19 go to free territory.

20 Q. Thank you. Mr. Butler, in that case, if civilians become part of

21 the military column, if they don't want to separate from that column,

22 would the person who ordered that be responsible for making them a target

23 pursuant to the Geneva Conventions?

24 A. Presumably to the extent that that decision was made, there would

25 be some assumption of responsibility. It's a particularly murky issue

Page 17400

1 with the column given the fact that, under past experience, many of the

2 civilians accompanying the column chose to do so because they did not

3 want to fall in the custody of the VRS.

4 So from my perspective, and again why I always am careful in

5 dealing with the column, because of the very mixed nature of it, was --

6 is the issue of not necessarily what happens in the column, but what is

7 the fate of individuals who, from the column, do elect at some point to

8 surrender to the VRS and what happens to them afterwards. So that is how

9 I -- when I look at the column as to the context of what happened and

10 why, it's not necessarily related to the fighting of the column, it's

11 what information happens afterwards when individuals are captured or are

12 wounded from the column and then ultimately fall into the custody of the

13 VRS or the Republika Srpska police, who were also operating in the

14 Zvornik area starting the 15th of July.

15 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Do you know that there were a lot of

16 victims at the very beginning of the breakthrough and the very end of the

17 breakthrough? I am talking about the victims within the column. Were

18 those victims also taken into account as victims of the execution, and if

19 so why was that the case? Thank you.

20 A. My understanding of the methodology involved by the Office of the

21 Prosecutor in determining a number of individuals who were victims for

22 the crime is that those are individuals who can be categorically excluded

23 from being potential combat casualties. So in that context, we are

24 talking about those individuals who were in the major mass graves or the

25 identified secondary or tertiary graves that were installed after the

Page 17401

1 main primary grave sites were dug up in the subsequent months. I am not

2 aware that the Office of the Prosecutor has ever included individuals

3 who -- I believe we categorised them as surface remains at the time

4 because they were never found in a mass grave, they were just left on the

5 surface after the battles. I do not believe that they have ever included

6 surface remains as the overall number of victims for the Srebrenica

7 crimes.

8 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's look at D207 now.

10 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11 Q. This is a statement. The statement provided by the person whose

12 name I am not going to mention because he was protected; however, he

13 signed each page and he signed at the end of the statement. He provided

14 it on the 1st of February, 2006. If we look at the second paragraph,

15 which starts with the words, "Near Kamenica."

16 "... before the asphalt road leading from Konjevic Polje to Nova

17 Kasaba, in the village of Kaldrmica, fire from Praga self-propelled

18 anti-aircraft guns, artillery and infantry weapons was opened on the

19 column from all sides. In some places the Chetniks were very close, from

20 which I deduced that we were surrounded. After organising ourselves we

21 put up resistance and broke through the encirclement, opening a narrow

22 passage through which the majority of people passed. In my estimation

23 about 1.000 people were killed as a consequence of the Chetnik attack and

24 several hundreds more were wounded. Since it was already getting dark, I

25 was unable to see or recognise any of those who'd been killed."