Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 17794

 1                           Monday, 12 September 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.26 p.m.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good afternoon to everybody in the courtroom and

 6     to those watching and listening our proceedings.

 7             We apologise for the late commencement of the trial today.  There

 8     were some unforeseeable circumstances which -- which caused this problem.

 9             Are there any procedural matters to raise at the beginning of

10     today's hearing?  I don't see anybody on his feet.  Then the witness

11     should be brought in, please.

12                           [The witness entered court]

13                           WITNESS:  JOHANNES RUTTEN

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good afternoon, sir.  Welcome to the Tribunal.

15             THE WITNESS:  Good afternoon.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Would you please read aloud the affirmation on

17     the card which is shown to you now.

18             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

19     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  Please sit down and make

21     yourself comfortable.

22             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Rutten, Mr. McCloskey for the Prosecution is

24     commencing his examination-in-chief.  Mr. McCloskey, you have the floor.

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Good afternoon, Mr. President, everyone.

Page 17795

 1                           Examination by Mr. McCloskey:

 2        Q.   Good afternoon, sir.  Could you first tell us your name and your

 3     rank.

 4        A.   My name is Jan Rutten and my rank is lieutenant-colonel.

 5        Q.   And you have testified both in the Popovic case and in the Krstic

 6     case; is that correct?

 7        A.   That's correct.

 8        Q.   And if you were asked those same questions that you were asked in

 9     those cases, would your answers be the same?

10        A.   Yes, my answers would be the same.

11        Q.   And did you testify in those cases truthfully?

12        A.   Yes, I did.

13             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Therefore, Mr. President, I would like to offer

14     the testimony of the colonel in the Popovic -- the Popovic case, which is

15     65 ter 7137.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 7137 shall be

18     assigned Exhibit P2629.  Thank you, Your Honours.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And, Mr. President, I would also like to add --

20     offer all the documents under the next heading associated exhibits

21     starting at 65 ter 7138, ending with 3361.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I take it that two of them are already in

23     evidence.  This is P1506 and P1491.  All the others will be received as

24     exhibits and given a P number by internal memorandum by the Registry to

25     save some time.

Page 17796

 1             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.  And, Mr. President, I now have a -- a

 2     summary to read, and -- given the importance of this witness, the

 3     four-hour estimate of the Defence, and the summary is a bit longer than

 4     normal, but I do not have any intention of asking the colonel any

 5     questions, so this should be the Prosecution's main presentation, this

 6     summary, aside from allowing the colonel to give us a brief update now

 7     before I get to the summary of his career since he's last testified.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes.  Please go ahead.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:

10        Q.   Colonel, can you just give us a brief update on your career since

11     the time you testified a while back in the Popovic case.

12        A.   Since the end of 2006, I was stationed in Munster, Germany, in

13     the 1st German Netherlands Corps as head of personnel affairs over there.

14     And during that period up to now, I was in a mission abroad in Iraq,

15     Baghdad, for the NTMI mission, NATO training mission Iraq, during the

16     elections in Iraq in 2010.  After that and during -- and the period

17     before, I also was stationed in Germany and had a job as a brigade

18     personnel affairs officer for the 1st German Netherlands Corps over

19     there.

20        Q.   Thank you, and we're glad you made it back from Iraq looking

21     healthy.

22        A.   Thank you.

23        Q.   I'm going to read to a summary and if I get anything wrong, you

24     can - I'm sure as you will - correct me if I have made a mistake.

25             Colonel Rutten testified in the Krstic trial as a viva voce

Page 17797

 1     witness and as a result 92 ter witness in the Popovic trial.  This

 2     summary reflects both trials.

 3             The colonel joined the Royal Dutch Army in 1979 as a conscript

 4     and served as non-commissioned officer in a variety of posts and places

 5     until 1991, when he entered the officers' training school which he

 6     completed in 1993 where he was commissioned as a 2nd lieutenant, and he

 7     served with the 41st Armoured Infantry Battalion.

 8             In 1994, he began his service with the 11th Air Mobile Brigade as

 9     an anti-tank platoon commander, and subsequently as a deputy commanding

10     officer of a company.

11             From January through July 1995, he served with DutchBat III as a

12     1st lieutenant during which time he was a patrol co-ordinator and

13     intelligence officer for Charlie Company.  During the seven months then

14     Lieutenant Rutten served with DutchBat III.  He saw and learned of a

15     decreasing movement of convoys to the enclave by the Serb forces.  The

16     decrease in the number of UNHCR convoys began around the end of February

17     or beginning of March, and the supplies in the warehouse in Srebrenica

18     were getting lower.  There was not enough food for the civilian

19     population, and the situation in the enclave became so bad that people

20     would go through DutchBat's garbage when it was taken to the dump site.

21     He identified a photograph he took while on patrol of civilians

22     surrounding the dump truck.

23             The DutchBat also had to minimise its consumption of supplies,

24     and this became more severe at the beginning of March.  In addition, from

25     April onwards, DutchBat did not have enough personnel for its activities

Page 17798

 1     within the enclave since the Serbs did not allow Dutch soldiers who had

 2     been on leave to return.  DutchBat was also insufficiently armed as it

 3     had not received sufficient ammunition supplies and that the ammunition

 4     was not safe any more and needed to be replenished.

 5             On 10 July 1995, he heard severe impacts behind the compound from

 6     a rocket launcher based in Bratunac.  Following the shelling, they found

 7     an unexploded rocket just behind the compound; that is, DutchBat did.

 8     The shelling became heavier in the following days and stopped during the

 9     late evening.  Colonel Rutten's view of the purpose of the shelling was

10     to intimidate DutchBat from leaving the compound and as an act of terror.

11             On Monday evening after the attack began, he and others heard

12     from Bravo Company that the situation in Srebrenica was getting out of

13     hand and that refugees were on the move towards Potocari.  He then

14     received an order to cut a hole in the rear side of the compound fence to

15     let the refugees in, if necessary.  Bravo Company soldiers arrived on the

16     evening of 10th July with the first refugees who were kept at the bus

17     compound, or as the colonel called it, the bus remise, because he had not

18     received an order permitting them on the compound and he closed up the

19     fence again.

20             On Tuesday, the 11th of July, Lieutenant Rutten was ordered to

21     re-open the hole in the fence.  Lieutenant Koster led a group of DutchBat

22     soldiers at the bus remise.  At this time, he, Lieutenant Rutten heard

23     that a large group of refugees were heading towards Potocari and that

24     Bravo Company had to leave Srebrenica because of the shelling and the

25     chaos there.  The first group of refugees began arriving at the rear side

Page 17799

 1     guided by Koster and his men at the bus remise.  Refugees arrived all day

 2     on the 11th until approximately 5.00 or 6.00 in the evening at which time

 3     Lieutenant Rutten was ordered not to let in my more refugees because the

 4     factory hall itself was completely filled.  He was then ordered by

 5     Major Otter to form three groups of ten men to secure the area of the bus

 6     remise where the refugees were.  There were many refugees in that area,

 7     and they placed white tape around the whole area as the only means

 8     available to make it clear that it was meant to be a secure area under UN

 9     surveillance.

10             On the morning of 12 July 1995, small-arms fire was followed by

11     mortar fire and Serb soldiers set fire to houses in the area near the

12     location of the refugees.  The first Serb soldiers to arrive were

13     described by the witness as more or less Rambo types.  He informed one of

14     the Serb soldiers who looked like the leader that they could not cross

15     the tape because it was UN territory.  That Serb soldier just laughed and

16     stepped over the tape, as did others.  Serb soldiers then stole equipment

17     and personal items belonging to his men securing the bus compound.

18             On 12 July, Lieutenant Rutten saw General Mladic and his

19     body-guards arrive followed by a truck carrying bread and a fire truck

20     with water.  The distribution of bread, water and candy was filmed.

21     Immediately after the filming stopped, the handing out of the bread,

22     water and candy stopped.  The Serb forces even took back some of it from

23     the refugees.  He did not see the Serb forces distribute anything else

24     after that to the refugees on 12 or 13 July.

25             Later on 12 July as the buses were arriving, Serb soldiers

Page 17800

 1     threatened him to give up his weapon, flak vest and radio sets.  He

 2     refused and told the soldiers that he needed to speak to their commander.

 3     Subsequently, a Serb soldier who appeared to be a commander arrived and

 4     again demanded the equipment while another Serb soldier grabbed

 5     Lieutenant Rutten's weapon.  He again refused until the soldier pointed a

 6     gun at his head and demanded his radio set.  He then gave up one of his

 7     radio sets and used the other to inform his superior office that he'd

 8     lost his weapon to the VRS.  His men then also gave up their weapons and

 9     vests at gunpoint.  He and his men were then taken to the bus compound

10     and placed under guard by two Serb soldiers.

11             He protested to a man he identified in a photograph as

12     Captain Mane that he -- that he was being held and that they had lost

13     their equipment, but Captain Mane sent him back to the rest of the group.

14     When Captain Mane returned a few hours later, Captain Mane sent

15     Lieutenant Rutten and his squad of ten men escorted by two Serb soldiers

16     back to the compound where they spent the night.

17             On the morning of 13 July, he was on duty in the Operations Room

18     where he heard that Lieutenant Versteeg saw two buses loaded with men

19     leave the vicinity of the white house.  He ordered Versteeg to follow the

20     two buses because they were not leaving with the larger group of buses

21     along the road.  Versteeg followed the bus to Bratunac, then radioed that

22     it was not going to Kladanj but turned in another direction and that he

23     was being instructed by Serb soldiers from following the bus.

24     Lieutenant Rutten instructed Versteeg to follow the bus, but the Serbs

25     grabbed Versteeg's car and then hijacked it.  Consequently, he never

Page 17801

 1     learned where those buses went.

 2             Because of this incident with Versteeg, Lieutenant Rutten decided

 3     to go to the white house himself under the pretext of delivering a

 4     wheelbarrow with packages of water, and he was accompanied by a sergeant

 5     major.  At the gate at the entrance to the white house he saw a huge pile

 6     of rucksacks and belongings.  A few metres further were all kinds of

 7     identity cards and passports on the ground.  The white house was well

 8     guarded by Serb soldiers who refused them entry, but he went around the

 9     side of the house and managed to get in.  Once inside he saw a Muslim man

10     hanging from the staircase by one arm, so he asked the Serb soldier to

11     lower him to the ground.  While this was being done, he tried to enter a

12     room on the right side from which he'd heard voices but was prevented by

13     a Serb soldier in a green uniform who -- using a gun to prevent him from

14     going in.

15             He then stepped outside and saw a Serb soldier at the gate

16     telling men arriving at the house to throw down their things, and a few

17     metres later telling them to throw their identity cards.

18     Lieutenant Rutten went back inside and upstairs where he found two rooms

19     filled with 50 men and boys from age 12 to 55.  He photographed both

20     groups of people but stopped because a Serb soldier was arriving with

21     more.  He then left the house.  It was clear to him that this was no

22     normal interrogation as normal procedure with POWs would require a system

23     of identifying the prisoners; whereas, it was very clear to him that the

24     men in the white house would not need their IDs or belongings.

25             Later that evening, the Serbs set fire to the belongings and IDs

Page 17802

 1     which were outside the house.  The fire burned for two days.  He

 2     identified a photograph he took of the smoke rising from the fire.  He

 3     did not see any signs of violence or torture during the times he visited

 4     the white house.

 5             After leaving the white house he went to an area where

 6     Lieutenant van Duijn was posted with a blockade of four APCs.  At that

 7     location, a local interpreter informed him that there were rumours that

 8     men had been killed near a well on the road on the Budak side.  He,

 9     Sergeant Major van Schaik, and Koster then passed through the APC

10     blockade and followed a dirt road.  In a very bushy area they found a

11     small stream on the left behind a house near a meadow.  As soon as they

12     saw the meadow they saw some bodies lying nearby the stream.  He

13     inspected the bodies which were nine men in civilian clothes lying with

14     their faces towards the stream.  All had small calibre gunshots to their

15     backs.  The men were approximately 45 to 55 years old.  He touched the

16     bodies which were warm.  The blood was still running and there were no

17     flies on them yet.  In his view they had not been shot long before that

18     time, and he said that there were no evidence that the bodies had been

19     moved to that location.

20             He told van Schaik to pick up the identification that was on the

21     grass in front of the bodies and he took a photograph of Koster kneeling

22     between the bodies.  He also photographed all nine bodies.  At that point

23     there was firing in their direction.  He told van Schaik to drop all the

24     identification which he had picked up and they had to leave.  He reported

25     that what he had seen -- he reported what he had seen to

Page 17803

 1     Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans who told him he would pass his report up to

 2     a higher level.  When he returned to Holland he turned his camera over to

 3     someone from the army intelligence branch but was later informed that

 4     something had happened during the development and the photos were never

 5     developed or seen.

 6             Back in Potocari he then remained at the blockade where he took

 7     some pictures of what the Serbs were doing and observed a DutchBat

 8     lieutenant and some DutchBat soldiers actually what he viewed as

 9     assisting in the deportation of the population by doing their best to

10     help the Muslim refugees leave the area.  Because there were Serb

11     soldiers sitting all along the road with their weapons,

12     Lieutenant-Colonel Rutten felt that Dutch was helping in this process.

13     He told this to Lieutenant van Duijn who had a different point of view

14     and was just trying to help the refugees move out of the area.

15             On the other side of the line at the buses, Serb soldiers were

16     carrying out the separation of men from their families.  UN soldiers were

17     not working with the refugees at the point where the men were being

18     separated from the women.  The witness clearly saw the separation of men

19     from the women and children.

20             He was then ordered by his company commander to escort the last

21     bus that was leaving.  He and his driver prepared a jeep and parked it

22     next to the compound entrance while waiting for the last buses to leave.

23     As they waited, he told his driver to accompany them back to the white

24     house so that he could have as many witnesses as possible.  By that time,

25     the pile of belongings was huge and many more IDs and passports were

Page 17804

 1     laying on the ground.  They went to the previously empty left side of the

 2     house and saw two Serb soldiers on the staircase which was filled with

 3     Muslim men.  He could see the total fear on the faces of the Muslim men

 4     and boys.  They then walked back to the front of the house and saw the

 5     balcony totally filled with men and boys.  He estimates that almost 300

 6     men were in the house and on its balcony.

 7             By the time it was clear that the last buses were filled up later

 8     in the day on the 13th, the battalion had stopped escorting convoys

 9     because it was no use any more in his view.  He asked his company

10     ops room if he could make an attempt to escort the last buses and was

11     given the okay.  So he quickly drove to the head of the convoy which was

12     heading towards OP Papa.  After driving approximately 1 to 1.5

13     kilometres, a private car containing three Serb soldiers in green

14     camouflage uniforms came up behind him.  Next another car containing two

15     Serb soldiers came up from the side of the road and blocked the road.

16     The Serb soldiers pointed their weapons at them.  The actions of the two

17     cars appeared well organised.  At his instruction, his driver then made a

18     U-turn and returned to the compound.  As a result, the convoy was not

19     escorted.

20             When he returned to the compound he was told to accompany a truck

21     and some medical personnel who were going into Srebrenica to pick up the

22     last elderly people left behind along the road.  En route he was stopped

23     by Serb soldiers who ordered him, his driver and a sergeant in the back

24     seat out at gunpoint.  The Serb soldiers told him that they would have to

25     continue on in the truck.  When they reached the Bravo Company compound,

Page 17805

 1     he saw Serbs looting the compound and driving Dutch APCs filled with

 2     stolen material.  The Serbs had also emptied the weapons collection

 3     point.  Along the road they found a few elderly people whom they placed

 4     in the back of the truck and took back to Potocari with them.

 5             There were several more days in Potocari, as you know, but I will

 6     stop the summary there and turn the witness over to General Tolimir.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  I take it that there are no

 8     questions during the examination-in-chief by the OTP.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  That's correct, Mr. President.  And I -- as you

10     recognise, there was a bit more detail, and I think that has helped save

11     us some time and hopefully be as efficient as possible.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

13                           [Trial Chamber confers]

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Sir, Judge Nyambe wants to put questions to you.

15             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You have the floor.

17             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.  It's just a few clarifications.

18     Before the Defence starts asking you questions, I just need some

19     clarifications.  The first one is at page 11, lines 5 to 8, the statement

20     reads:

21             "The battalion had stopped escorting convoys because it was no

22     use any more in his view."  "In his view" means "in your view."  "And he

23     asked his company ops room if he could make an attempt to escort the last

24     buses and was given the okay.  So he quickly drove to the head of the

25     convoy which was heading towards OP Papa."

Page 17806

 1             I have some difficult to appreciate just how the sequence of

 2     events took place with regard to the escort of the convoy.  You have said

 3     you were of the view that battalion had stopped escorting convoy because

 4     in your view because it was of no use any more, and yet in the next

 5     minute you are seen ordered -- actually, you are seen asking if you could

 6     make an attempt to escort the last buses after you've already made

 7     that -- that conclusion that it is of no use.  So can you please just

 8     explain the sequence of events, how it happened.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  It's no problem.  It looks like now the

10     sequence is that it looks minutes later, but it took quite some time to

11     fill up the buses and trucks with people.  Approximately 60 till 70

12     persons were on a bus or a truck, and there was a long line of trucks and

13     waiting before it was filled up, so it was quite some time in between.

14     The moment I saw an opportunity to -- to get -- to escort the total

15     convoy as it was leaving, so there was some more time in between than it

16     looks like here now in the summary.  And it was to my own judgement that

17     I heard from my company commander.  So if there is a possibility, please

18     take the opportunity and try to -- to escort these convoy.  It was one of

19     the last convoys that was leaving with the last people, so that could be

20     an opportunity then to follow them as much as possible to get a clear

21     view of was -- of what was happening with the refugees that left the --

22     the enclave.

23             JUDGE NYAMBE:  The clarification I'm looking from you is the

24     impression created as if the idea to escort the convoy was your own.  You

25     gave up.

Page 17807

 1             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  That was my own.  We had to -- to make an

 2     estimation whether it was meaningful or even possible to try to escort

 3     the convoys because we -- we lost a lot of vehicles and personnel to try

 4     to escort previous convoys that left the enclave.  So -- and our people

 5     were held on the road two Kladanj in several houses, and I -- I was known

 6     before that a lot of DutchBat members were held there.  So -- but we need

 7     to had a clear view of what was really happening with the people, so that

 8     was the reason that I made another attempt to -- to escort the convoy.

 9             JUDGE NYAMBE:  [Microphone not activated] Forgive me.  Then at

10     line -- page 10, line 13 to 16, you are said to have said UN soldiers

11     were not working with the refugees at the point where the women were

12     being separated from the men.  Why were UN soldiers not working with the

13     refugees?  Do you know?

14             THE WITNESS:  I don't know exactly what you mean with this --

15     with this question, because there were -- with the APC blocking where

16     Lieutenant van Duijn was there were UN soldiers there, but it was not my

17     specific job to work with my men and the men under my command to assist

18     Lieutenant van Duijn at the APC blocking.  We were free.  We had free

19     movement, so we tried to make an estimate of what was happening exactly

20     near the white house and tried to get an overview to -- to inform my

21     company commander of what was really happening outside the gate.  So the

22     question that you're answering is to me not that clear, if I may say so.

23             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Okay.  Let me try to rephrase my question.  In the

24     context of what you've just said, you have said UN soldiers were not

25     working with the refugees at the point where the men were being separated

Page 17808

 1     from the women.

 2             By your statement, I understand that the UN soldiers were

 3     supposed to be working with the refugees; is that correct?

 4             THE WITNESS:  No.  I don't think that we were working -- my men

 5     were not working with the refugees, because it was not our job to collect

 6     the refugees and brought them to the buses -- and bring them to the

 7     buses.  That was my point of view, and that was in fact the basis of the

 8     argument that I had with my colleagues Lieutenant van Duijn.  So if

 9     you're aiming at that, that's a different situation.  Working together

10     with the refugees does not mean that we were not helping them or

11     assisting them.  We were there to -- just to monitor what was happening,

12     in my view, and not to be active in the role to help them get -- to get

13     out of the enclave.  That was not our job.  That was not our mandate, and

14     that's perhaps the difference in view on this topic.

15             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Okay.  Somewhere you have said you opened the hole

16     in -- in some building --

17             THE WITNESS:  No.  No.  It was -- sorry if I'm interrupting you.

18             JUDGE NYAMBE:  No, no.

19             THE WITNESS:  It was at the rear side of the compound.  There was

20     a small river and there was a bridge over that river, and that was

21     connected with a small dirt road to the bus remise.  There were a lot of

22     refugees collecting also the evening earlier.  So we tried the evening

23     earlier to make a hole in the fence that if it was necessary, that we

24     could immediately start to transfer the refugees to the compound itself,

25     but in the evening it was not necessary already, so we closed the fence

Page 17809

 1     later on the evening.  The next day, we opened the fence because the

 2     pressure was getting too much and we let in approximately 4- to 5.000

 3     refugees on the compound and they stayed in the factory itself.

 4             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.  Your action to assist the refugees to

 5     come in and enclose and open the following day, does that -- was that

 6     part of your mandate as you say you were monitoring?

 7             THE WITNESS:  I think that was part of our mandate, because our

 8     mandate was to protect the civilians of the enclave of Srebrenica, and at

 9     that point it was quite clear that there was a lot of pressure coming on

10     the bus remise and Serbian soldiers were coming in.  So there was a

11     larger threat to the refugees themselves.  So that was the moment I

12     checked by my superiors the next day and I said, "We have to leave in now

13     the refugees," because I got the message from the other colleagues that

14     were on the bus remise, and they said there were more refugees and the

15     pressure was getting higher and higher.  And that was the point that we

16     left and that we leave -- we opened the hole again and we left in the --

17     the refugees.

18             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Just one last question.  At page, I think, 10,

19     lines 9 to 11, you are saying:  Lieutenant-Colonel Rutten felt that Dutch

20     was helping in this process.  He told this to Lieutenant van Duijn who

21     had a different point of view and was just trying to help the refugees

22     move out of the area.

23             Can you clarify the difference of opinion between you and the

24     other lieutenant on this issue?  Thank you.

25             THE WITNESS:  During that process I was also making photographs

Page 17810

 1     of what was happening near the line of buses and trucks and on those

 2     photos clearly were some Serb -- Serbs that I photographed, this I make a

 3     picture of, and looking through the camera it was not a nice view that UN

 4     soldiers were, in fact, it looked like if they were in fact helping the

 5     evacuation of the refugees from the enclave, and that was surely at that

 6     point not in our mandate, because if you can't escort the convoys any

 7     more, it's out of hand.  You're not in control any more, and that was the

 8     reason that I saw that there was a larger trap to the refugees when they

 9     left the enclave.

10             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Mindua has another question for you.

12             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes.  The interpretation continued

13     so far.  That's why I'm waiting with the question.

14             Witness, Colonel Rutten, I with like to ask you something about

15     the photos.  When you returned to the Netherlands, you handed over your

16     camera to an army officer who told you that later they were unable to

17     develop the photographs.  I would like to ask you if you have kept any

18     photographs of the events you recorded after you left the white house

19     when you encountered Lieutenant van Duijn and by the roadside Budak.  Do

20     you mean to say that you have no photos left?

21             THE WITNESS:  I had a second roll of -- film roll of photos that

22     I took along also to the Netherlands, and I handed in only one film roll

23     with the specific photos I earlier spoke about of the nine killed

24     persons, but the other photos I handed also a few of them in here to the

25     court itself in earlier cases; for instance, the photograph of the

Page 17811

 1     garbage truck on it, and some other photos of burning of the documents

 2     outside of the white house.  I have some other photos, but they are

 3     actually of no interest.  That was -- that were the photos on the second

 4     film roll.  The photos on the first film roll, they were the ones that

 5     were destroyed.

 6             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] All right.  Thank you.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, Mr. President.  The photo of the garbage

 9     truck and the burning materials were within the -- the exhibits mentioned

10     that he had identified in the previous trial, and they -- I can -- I

11     think they're marked in -- in the exhibits, but I can double-check that.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

13             Judge Nyambe has an additional question.

14             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.  Just one -- just one more question, I

15     promise.  I just need to come back to the issue of the photographs.

16             At page 9 of today's transcript, you are stated as having said:

17             "He also photographed all nine bodies and at that point there was

18     firing in their direction.  He told van --" I'm sorry, I can't pronounce

19     the surname, "to drop all the identification which he had to pick up and

20     they had to leave."

21             I want you to clarify a bit about the issue of you telling the

22     other gentleman who was with you to drop all the identification which

23     were picked from the nine bodies.  Can you clarify what was going on in

24     your mind when you asked him to drop all the identifications and leave?

25             THE WITNESS:  That was not in the summary before that

Page 17812

 1     Mr. McCloskey gave, but the thing is that --

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Sorry, it was in the summary.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Yeah, it was in the summary, but not the

 4     explanation.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Oh, yes.  That's true.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Sorry.  Sorry for that.  But not the explanation

 7     for it.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You're absolutely right.  That is the reason for

 9     the question.

10             THE WITNESS:  The reason was that we -- we got fired at us, and

11     at the same moment I was taking the last picture, and you can tell

12     whether the firing is quite close or not, and it was quite close.  I then

13     gave immediately the order to drop the -- the documents, because we had

14     to go through the line with the APCs where the Serbs were to get back to

15     the compound, and so it felt not safe of having documents with us when we

16     had to go through that line again back to the compound.  And we actually

17     got to -- got through that line by picking up one of the stretchers where

18     one of the wounded people was on, and it looked like to the other ones

19     that we were helping to bring a stretcher along, when in fact we were at

20     the other side of the line and we saw something that might had some

21     effect later on and that was the -- the things that we saw with the --

22     with the nine bodies.  So it was to me it felt unsecure to have documents

23     on us of Muslim people that were killed already.

24             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you for your answer.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, now it's your turn to commence your

Page 17813

 1     cross-examination, to put questions to the witness.  You have the floor.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I wish

 3     peace unto this house.  I wish that this day in court and the whole

 4     proceedings end in keeping with God's will, not mine.

 5             I would like to welcome Colonel Rutten and wish him a pleasant

 6     stay with us in this courtroom.

 7                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir:

 8        Q.   [Interpretation] Colonel, sir, let's begin with the last question

 9     when you were asked why you discarded the documents of the nine people

10     killed.  My question is:  Why did you throw away evidence that nine

11     people had been killed?  Was there any other reason other than fear from

12     the people at the check-point considering that you should have let the

13     Serb side know as well?

14        A.   It was not -- you mean -- you used the word "fear."  It was not

15     fear.  I used another word, and I -- and it was secure and unsecure, and

16     we felt unsecure to get through the Serb line to get to our own people

17     again.  It was pure a matter of protecting my two colleagues and myself

18     to get back again, and I'm well aware that it was evidence, but this is a

19     decision that you have to make in a split second.

20        Q.   Thank you, Colonel, could you tell the Trial Chamber was your

21     task to protect yourselves or to protect the refugees and the evidence?

22     Why did you throw it away?  What would have Serbs done to you if they had

23     seen passports on you?  They could have only seized them.  Did you fear

24     something else?  Did you feel something else would happen, or was there

25     any other reason why you discarded the passports?  Were there some real

Page 17814

 1     reasons or not?

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Tolimir's microphone be adjusted so

 3     he speaks closer into the microphone.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I count about five questions in that group and

 6     that's, I think, just too much for anyone to have to go through.  If he

 7     could break it down, I would appreciate it.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Indeed.  Indeed, Mr. Tolimir.  Quite a lot of

 9     questions in one, and therefore it's much better to split it up and to

10     put one question after the other, and please avoid repetitions.  Please

11     carry on.

12             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  Was your task to protect refugees and to

14     record all incidents, and did you have to throw away passports which were

15     evidence of the incidents?

16        A.   Our task was to protect refugees but not at all costs, and I

17     considered that as an unsecure situation.  So that was the reason that I

18     gave the order to the sergeant major to throw away these documents.  But

19     then again, were they of any significance later on, because in front of

20     the white house your people were collecting the documents and working

21     permits and passports from the Muslim people themselves, so -- and they

22     were burned afterwards.  So, yeah, I don't see the -- the reason of that

23     question then, sir.

24        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  On page 8 of today's transcript, line 10, if

25     I could note it down well because you spoke faster than the court

Page 17815

 1     reporter, you said:

 2             "And he saw that people were throwing onto the ground everything

 3     they were carrying."

 4             Did prisoners of war also throw away everything on the ground

 5     themselves, and did they also discard their IDs, passports, like you did?

 6        A.   Sir, it's not quite clear to me what people you are referring to.

 7     Do you mean the Muslim people, or do you mean other people, because

 8     that's not quite clear in your question.

 9        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  Could the colonel be shown the transcript on

10     page 8 beginning with line 10.  If I noted it down well, because I don't

11     know the language and the court reporter does not always follow the

12     speakers, and it says -- Mr. McCloskey was speaking:

13             "And he saw people throwing onto the ground everything they were

14     carrying.  He photographed both groups going behind the house."

15             That was page 8, Mr. McCloskey speaking.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I would like to assist you.  On page 8, line 12

17     through 14.  I read, I quote:

18              "He then stepped outside and saw a Serb soldier at the gate

19     telling men arriving at the house to throw down their things, and a few

20     metres later telling them to throw their identity cards."

21             This is slightly different from what you put to the witness now,

22     and again this is part of the summary Mr. McCloskey read into the record.

23             A Serb soldier at the gate telling the men to throw down their

24     things, the identity cards.  That is the essence of this sentence.

25             Please carry on.

Page 17816

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I said

 2     at the beginning that my stenogram might be different from the transcript

 3     because I was writing down the translation, the stenographic notes.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  No reason --

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But if you don't want me to ask the

 6     question, I needn't.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, you have just explained that and I

 8     just -- sorry.  I'm talking.  I just wanted to assist you and put that on

 9     the record and I know this is very difficult for you.  I understand that.

10     I'm not prohibiting putting questions to the witness, it's your right,

11     but I wanted to assist with you the right wording.  There's no need to

12     explain it further.  Please put the question to the witness.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, but I

14     need assistance while the transcript is running so that my notes are not

15     different to the transcript, because I put my questions on the basis of

16     my own notes, and Mr. McCloskey said in translation:

17             "He saw that people were throwing down on the ground all the

18     things that they were carrying with them."

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, to avoid any misunderstanding and

20     any conflict, I was assisting you.  Please understand that.  I read to

21     you what was to be found in this transcript, and now you know what is in

22     the transcript and now put a question and don't argue with me.  That is

23     guidance, and that was assistance for you.  Please put your question to

24     the witness.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I was

Page 17817

 1     just pointing out the difference between the translation and the

 2     transcript.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Now, Colonel, let me ask you this:  Did you see the things being

 5     thrown onto the ground?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  And why did you throw documents away?  Why did you

 8     discard documents?  What was the reason for that?  What would have

 9     happened to you if you had them on you?

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The first part of the question was already

11     answered twice, but the last question you should answer.  What would have

12     happened to you if you had them on you?

13             THE WITNESS:  We were searched earlier by Serb soldiers if we

14     were carrying anything, other things than -- than we -- than they could

15     see.  So that could be a threat that we have different documents with us,

16     different -- I mean, documents from Muslim people carrying along with UN

17     personnel.  So that could raise questions, and that could deliver an

18     unsecure situation for us at the moment.  At that very moment we were --

19     we had not any weapons or whatsoever on us, so that was the reason that I

20     made that decision.

21             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  Now, tell us, how could you have carried out

23     your assignment of documenting the fact that nine people had been killed

24     if you didn't have documents telling you who they were and what they

25     were?  How could you report back to the forces and your commander that a

Page 17818

 1     crime was being committed?  Thank you.

 2        A.   The reason for that is it's quite easy.  I made some photographs,

 3     and that was enough evidence for me to get back to my unit again.

 4        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  Now, could they have confiscated your camera

 5     and all that evidence?  Could the Serb soldiers have done that?  Yes or

 6     no?  Could they have confiscated all those things?

 7        A.   Yes, that was possible, but it was to me the most valuable thing

 8     to hide and that was possible, so -- and carrying a lot of documents with

 9     us was not that easy, because wearing only a trouser and a T-shirt and a

10     cap, there is nothing much to hide beneath your clothes any more.  So

11     that was the reason that I kept the most valuable thing, and that was my

12     camera at the moment, with me and not the documents.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Now, Colonel, your statement, is it valid if you have

14     no evidence from the scene itself, the so-called scene of crime, as you

15     call it?  Thank you.

16        A.   I think there was a lot of evidence, because I was with two

17     colleagues, a sergeant major of the Royal Netherlands Army and another

18     lieutenant from the Royal Netherlands Army.  So we were working there as

19     UN personnel, so we saw with our own eyes what we had seen at that scene.

20        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  Now, can you tell us this:  The UN soldiers

21     from the base, did they carry out dead Muslims around the base, and could

22     they then have portrayed the situation as having been caused by the

23     Serbs?

24        A.   That was simply not possible, because we had very less personnel

25     outside.  The personnel that was outside was small groups led by a

Page 17819

 1     lieutenant, small groups of ten personnel led by a lieutenant under close

 2     surveillance.  We had no manpower whatsoever to bring out dead Muslim

 3     people because we didn't find any dead Muslim people in the compound or

 4     next to the compound by UN personnel other than we reported.

 5        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  Now may we have 1D53 [as interpreted]

 6     displayed, please.  Thank you.  And while we're waiting for that to

 7     appear on e-court, tell us, please, whether you and your group, the group

 8     you went with to this location that you photographed, did you find any

 9     dead bodies, and did you report back to your command except for the ones

10     that you've mentioned?  Thank you.

11             I said 1D953, 1D953.  Thank you.

12             Now, my question was whether you and the officers who were with

13     you with those nine dead bodies, did you find any other bodies apart from

14     those dead bodies, and if you so, did you report back to your command?

15     Thank you.

16        A.   The occasion that I just spoke about and was earlier reported in

17     the summary, that was the only nine bed Muslim people that we saw on the

18     trip to the small stream in -- next to the meadow.  We found at that

19     specific timings no other dead people.

20        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  Now would you take a look at the document in

21     front of you.  It is dated the 21st of June, 2011, and it is the -- it

22     says "Defence minister to reveal secret grave."  And I quote:

23             "Defence Minister Hans Hillen agreed to reveal the whereabouts of

24     a mass grave in Srebrenica during an interview with TV programme

25     Nieuwsuur on Monday evening.

Page 17820

 1              "He was reacting to claims by a former DutchBat soldier that

 2     during the Bosnian war in the 1990s seven Muslims died in the Dutch

 3     enclave and were buried there.  The soldier, Dave Maat told the programme

 4     that the Defence Ministry has photos and a map with the co-ordinates of

 5     the grave but had refused to release them."

 6             And my question to you is this, Colonel:  Do you know anything at

 7     all about this grave, where is this located, what the co-ordinates are,

 8     and how it came into being?  Thank you.

 9        A.   I saw that same news footage on TV as well.  During the last two

10     days two people died on the compound, and that were the people that we

11     let enter the enclave -- the -- through the fence that I opened.  Two

12     people died over there as I know of.  They were buried on the compound

13     itself.  Now, this news item here refers to that situation that on the

14     12th or 13th of July, a few Muslims died and they had to -- they had to

15     be buried, and that happened on the compound itself.  I don't know where

16     the Defence Ministry -- why they are not disclosing this -- this fact,

17     because it was well-known also to that soldier that there were no more

18     people buried there.

19             And a lot of soldiers that have problems after -- years later

20     after this happenings, and I know this soldier myself because he was a

21     member of a company of the 3rd platoon and his name is David Maat, I even

22     know his first name, and I know also that he has some problems of coping

23     with the situation of the enclave and the situation that he had

24     afterwards.  So he has some mental problems as well.  So that is the

25     reason probably that this get in news now and then and is -- yeah, that's

Page 17821

 1     the only thing I can say about it.

 2        Q.   Colonel, but you still haven't answered my question in actual

 3     fact.  Do you know where the grave site is, the one that the Ministry of

 4     Defence refers to in the document I just read out and what the

 5     coordinates are, and do they coincide perhaps with the co-ordinates where

 6     you took photographs of those nine dead bodies?

 7        A.   As I stated earlier, the people were buried on the compound

 8     itself, and it were to my knowledge two people.  The site that I referred

 9     to of the nine bodies is near the Budak hill, near to a stream, and I did

10     some drawings myself here and on the maps where that exactly was.  So

11     this is much different than the situation you are describing, and if I

12     may say so, sir, I don't know the co-ordinates by heart.

13        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  Now, can you tell me whether it was by

14     chance that all the evidence was lost about the location where the dead

15     bodies were found, nine dead bodies, and that 16 or 17 years later what

16     the minister said has still not been disclosed about the grave that the

17     command of the Dutch Battalion dug while it was in Srebrenica?  Thank

18     you.

19        A.   I don't get quite your question, because you're referring now on

20     two different situations.  One I explained you already of the nine bodies

21     and where that was.  That was exactly not on the compound.  And the two

22     Muslim people that I am referring to and also in the Dutch news footage

23     that we see over here is on the compound itself.  And I don't know why

24     the minister isn't revealing this news if it is well known.  You better

25     ask the Ministry of Defence, because I'm only working as an officer for

Page 17822

 1     the Ministry of Defence.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Sir, may I ask you for one clarification.  We see

 3     on the screen this document of the 21st of June, 2011.  In the second

 4     paragraph it refers to seven Muslims died in the Dutch enclave and were

 5     buried there.  There is a difference between the two you are mentioning

 6     and these seven, and it is said here "in the Dutch enclave," and not "in

 7     the Dutch compound."

 8             THE WITNESS:  Yeah.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Have you any idea why this could happen, why this

10     is formulated in this way in this Dutch news document?

11             THE WITNESS:  What we see after all these years is that people

12     are not tracking the right words, and in the collective memory is --

13     enclave has been mentioned here in this news footage, but it's also --

14     but it's merely -- it has to be base or compound, because the two were

15     buried, at least to my knowledge, to -- on the compound.

16             The soldier that is describing of seven is to his knowledge that

17     there could be seven on the compound itself, but I have a colleague who

18     was then a captain, and we spoke about this, and he said that, "We never

19     buried seven people on the compound, only two."  And I spoke this

20     colleague only I think two or three weeks ago as I met him, because he

21     was then the company commander of the medical unit that came along with

22     us to the enclave.

23             So that is the only knowledge that I have mixing up words after

24     all these years and reporters telling something in a news footage that I

25     see over here on screen.

Page 17823

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you for that clarification.

 2             Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  To avoid any misunderstanding, what I'm

 5     asking you is this:  Do you know what happened to those seven who were

 6     buried in the enclave that the Defence Ministry is referring to?  Thank

 7     you.

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness sit closer to the microphone,

 9     please.

10             THE WITNESS:  It's not to my knowledge that there were seven men

11     buried in the enclave or on the compound as I just spoke about.  The

12     mixing up in words between "enclave" and "compound," I think that here is

13     the question.  And that's the only thing that I can say about this.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Thank you.  Colonel, could the minister have misinformed the

16     public with imprecise data or is it some other -- other matter, some

17     other case that you don't know about?

18        A.   I simply can't -- can't answer this question to you.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Now take a look at what the soldier that you

20     mentioned says, Maat, where he says "16 years."  The title is "16 years,"

21     that portion.

22             "When Maat revisited the area recently, he discovered that the

23     families of the dead had been looking for the bodies of their loved ones

24     for the past 16 years.  On his return, he approached the Defence Ministry

25     and asked for information about the location of the grave but was told

Page 17824

 1     this information was confidential.  According to Hillen, the ministry

 2     misunderstood the question.  The DutchBat soldiers were debriefed on

 3     their return from Srebrenica, and what they said is confidential.  The

 4     minister thought Maat wanted this information."

 5             Now, my question to you is this:  Apart from these seven, were

 6     there any more, any others that were buried and which was confidential

 7     and whom they informed about upon their return from Srebrenica?  Thank

 8     you.

 9        A.   Not that I know of.  DutchBat or better the UN Battalion,

10     DutchBat III, to my knowledge has not buried any other Muslim people near

11     on the compound or in the enclave itself.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Other than the two you spoke of.

13             THE WITNESS:  Other than two.  Sorry, sir.  Yeah.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

15             Mr. Tolimir.

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Thank you.  Colonel, could be more precise -- or, rather, since

18     I'm speaking in court, would it be more precise to say that you know of

19     no others apart from those two, but since the minister spoke about it and

20     the soldier spoke about it, then we should ask them and seek information

21     from them?  This is fresh information dated the 21st of June, 2011.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, this is exactly what the witness

23     said.  "Not that I know of."  He is giving you his knowledge.  Please

24     proceed.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I didn't

Page 17825

 1     understand.  That's why I asked again.  So the colonel needn't answer

 2     that question.  Now could we have 07140 displayed on e-court, please.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I take it that this is a 65 ter number,

 4     Mr. Tolimir.  Do you tender the last document, the press report, 1D953?

 5             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  Thank you.  We are tendering document 1D953.

 6     Thank you.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter 1D953 shall be assigned

 9     Exhibit D320.  Thank you, Your Honours.

10             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Colonel, you can probably recognise the general Potocari area and

12     the base.  Could you mark where the location was where you photographed

13     those nine dead bodies.  Could you mark it in on the map.  It was

14     probably close to the base.  Thank you.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, please, with the assistance of the court

16     usher.

17             THE WITNESS:  Here.  It was here between the bushes, because the

18     bushes are hiding that road that follows through the woods here, and here

19     is a small stream as well, and this is the Budak hill area.  So it was

20     quite next to this road here what he -- I'm just marking it out again.

21     This is along the houses, the road, and it is in this wooded area.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Can we take it where you marked at the left

23     part -- wait a moment, please.  At the left part of your marking where

24     you made a circle, is that the place where you saw the dead bodies?

25             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  It's exactly down here.

Page 17826

 1             THE ACCUSED:  [No interpretation]

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, you don't have the floor.  Please

 3     wait until you get the floor.  I'm just talking to the witness.

 4     Please --

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise, Mr. President.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Sir, could you please put a number 1 near to this

 7     circle.

 8             THE WITNESS:  [Marks]

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

10             THE ACCUSED:  [No interpretation]

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Wait please.  Wait please.  You will get the

12     floor.  You know the procedure, Mr. Tolimir.

13                           [Trial Chamber confers]

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And in addition to that, could you please mark,

15     if you recall, where the two Muslims who died in the compound were

16     buried.

17             THE WITNESS:  That was in the back of the compound as I know of,

18     and it was at the rear side of the compound, and that was more or less at

19     the -- in this area.  And I mark a 2 over there.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much for that.

21             Now, Mr. Tolimir, you have the floor again.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Colonel, please, would you put a number 2 at the actual location

25     of the base.

Page 17827

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, this is not --

 2             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   -- thank you.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This is not preferable, because we have already a

 5     number 2.  Would you like that the witness uses a number 3 for that?

 6             The location of the base as Mr. Tolimir calls it.  A number 3,

 7     please.

 8             THE WITNESS:  That was a total blue marked area that was the

 9     compound of DutchBat.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  And you indicated that with a number

11     3.

12             Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   And thank you, Colonel.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this into

17     evidence now please and my next question is as follows.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please wait.  Please wait.  You are tendering a

19     document.  This marked photograph will be received as an exhibit.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 7140, which is

21     Exhibit P2632 marked in court by the witness shall be assigned

22     Exhibit D321.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Page 17828

 1        Q.   You were asked by Judge Nyambe, and we heard from the Prosecutor

 2     during the examination-in-chief, that you didn't work with refugees at

 3     the point where the men were separated from the women.  I'd like us to

 4     look at document D174 next, please, D174.  Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you to the technicians for

 6     the e-court material.

 7             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   We now have this document of the United Nations before us,

 9     received by Mr. Annan at the United Nations, and it was sent by

10     Mr. Akashi from the UN peace forces in Zagreb.  The date is the 11th of

11     July, 1995, and this document concerns UN policy.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have the second page of this

13     document displayed, please.  Thank you.

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please, Witness -- accused.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Do you see paragraph (d) [as interpreted], and below that it says

17     and I quote:

18             "After consultations with the Bosnian government and in order to

19     avoid a humanitarian catastrophe, the Bosnian Serbs will be asked to

20     allow all the inhabitants of Srebrenica, including the men, to go to

21     Tuzla if they so wish.  The Dutch will be instructed --

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Sorry for interrupting you.  In paragraph (d) I

23     can't find this part you are quoting or reading.

24             Mr. Gajic.

25             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Line 7 of paragraph (b).  Paragraph

Page 17829

 1     (b), line 7, or thereabouts.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  Mr. Tolimir, please

 3     continue.

 4             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Let me repeat -- or, rather, continue.

 6             "The Dutch will be instructed to remain in the Srebrenica enclave

 7     at least until arrangements have been negotiated and finalised with

 8     Bosnian Serb authorities for the departure from the enclave of those

 9     people.  Ideally, UNPROFOR will remain an armed and substantial presence

10     in the enclave at least until the departure from the enclave of all those

11     wishing to leave has been completed.  This preference will need to be

12     balanced against the Dutch government's desire to evacuate its forces

13     from Srebrenica with the shortest delay.  UNPROFOR will with the support

14     of the UNHCR will also endeavour to reach agreement with the Bosnian

15     Serbs to escort any convoy of refugees from Srebrenica to Tuzla."

16             Now, my question to you is this:  Was it UN policy to see that

17     the UNPROFOR command in Srebrenica should assist the evacuation of the

18     refugees from Srebrenica going to the territory where they wished to go?

19     Thank you.

20        A.   This is the first time I see this document, and it's quite clear

21     to me that UNPROFOR supports the evacuation of the Muslim people, and

22     that's the only thing I can say about this document.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Now, if this was indeed UN policy, your position was

24     it -- was it then contrary to UN policy at the time when you expressed it

25     and when you told Lieutenant Duijn what you told him?

Page 17830

 1        A.   This is a letter from the highest level of the UN.  The situation

 2     on the ground was much different as you're well aware of.  Your personnel

 3     were collecting and disarming UN personnel from their weapons, even

 4     myself.  I was disarmed by your personnel.  So there was quite a

 5     different situation than the statements here in the letter from the

 6     highest level from UN.  So on the ground, it was different from what is

 7     described here.

 8        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  Now, can you tell the Trial Chamber whether

 9     you were disarmed because previously you had opened fire on the Army

10     of -- the Republika Srpska Army, not only you but the whole UNPROFOR

11     unit?

12        A.   We did as -- the moment I was disarmed, I was not opening fire.

13     I was merely disarmed because I was a threat to them because I was

14     spreading news over what they were doing next to the road and in the

15     direct environment to the Muslim people.  So if you respect this document

16     on one hand and being one of the leaders of the Bosnian -- no, of the VRS

17     army itself, then we have here a typical situation, because your men, as

18     I encountered them, were differently instructed as what -- what I read

19     here in the letter, and they told me myself.  So VRS military personnel

20     acted differently from this UN document.

21        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  I'm asking you on the 8th, 9th, and 10th,

22     did you fire at the Army of Republika Srpska in keeping with the orders

23     you had received, in keeping with the green order?

24        A.   This question -- I myself was not firing, and I cannot comment

25     this question any more than that.

Page 17831

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, we started a bit later today that

 2     therefore we have our first break later, but I think now it's time for

 3     our first break.  We will resume 25 minutes past 4.00.

 4                           --- Recess taken at 3.55 p.m.

 5                           --- On resuming at 4.28 p.m.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Before we continue, I just want to raise one

 7     matter.  In the meantime, we received a CD with document Exhibit P1301,

 8     which was previously marked for identification pending the delivery of

 9     the CD.  Now it is in front of us.  The document is in evidence now,

10     P1301.

11             Mr. Tolimir, please continue.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

13             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Please, Colonel, you said here that you were disarmed, and I

15     asked you if before that you had been at war with the Army of Republika

16     Srpska.  You said you knew nothing about it, and you were not involved in

17     any such war.

18             My question is:  What about other soldiers who were subordinate

19     to you?  Did they really shoot at the VRS soldiers in keeping with order

20     green from the UNPROFOR command?

21        A.   First in what you say, in the first piece of your question, I

22     never said that I did nothing -- that I knew nothing about it, and I also

23     didn't say that I was not involved in any such war, because I was on the

24     ground and there was actually -- actually one of the witnesses on the

25     ground.  So I don't know where that came from.  But to your question,

Page 17832

 1     soldiers who were subordinate to me did not fire at the VRS army.  There

 2     were some soldiers in my company that fired at the VRS during the 10th

 3     and the 9th in the happenings around the blocking positions in the road

 4     south to Srebrenica.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Let us see what Major Franken says.  He knew what

 6     soldiers did, and he issued the green order.  He appeared as a witness in

 7     this trial, and in July 2010, and the 1st of July, 2010, on page 3473 the

 8     question is:

 9             "When did you issue order green?"

10             His answer was:

11             "It must have been on the night of the 9th July."

12             And on page 3475, lines 8 through 10, he says:

13             "As I said before, we were in a state of war with the VRS.  We

14     opened fire together with the Muslim army."

15             And to the question:

16             "Was your mandate to destroy VRS weapons and go to war with the

17     VRS, the Army of Republika Srpska, after the issuing of the green order?"

18             On page 3484, lines 1 through 3, he says:

19              "No, it was not within our mandate, but again my mandate changed

20     significantly from the moment when the UN ordered me to defend

21     Srebrenica, and that was the reason why I issued the green order.  So in

22     that sense, yes."

23             My question to you is:  You members of the UNPROFOR in

24     Srebrenica, did you have a mandate to take sides, to side with one of the

25     warring parties and wage war together with that side?

Page 17833

 1        A.   To the specific question from your side, I have to stick also

 2     what the Major Franken said.  The situation changed dramatically after

 3     the 9th of July, so we were forced to protect the Muslim people, to fire

 4     at the VRS.  So I think that Major Franken made also quite clear that

 5     there was a different situation than our initial mandate, and still we

 6     was not acting accordingly to the mandate to fire at one of the parties,

 7     but nevertheless, to protect the other party we had to do something.

 8        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  You are a military man.  If somebody's

 9     shooting at you, even if it is UNPROFOR, is it logical that at least the

10     minimum step of disarming them should be taken to disable that person or

11     persons from firing at you again?

12        A.   You could say that, Mr. Tolimir, but there is one big difference

13     to that, and that is if you disarm the other party, meaning in this

14     situation UNPROFOR, you have to disarm them all, and that was a thing

15     that you did not do with the VRS.  You armed [sic] only specific military

16     personnel, meaning UNPROFOR, the ones who got in the way.  For instance,

17     me myself, I got in the way of seeing something, of collecting

18     information, and that was the reason why I was disarmed.  So more

19     colleagues were disarmed because they saw something or got in the way of

20     the VRS actions.

21        Q.   Thank you.  And do you remember that in the examination-in-chief

22     you said you spent one night in isolation, you were put in isolation

23     which by the Army of Republika Srpska?

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, he was not examined during

25     examination-in-chief.  There was no examination-in-chief.  That was the

Page 17834

 1     summary read into the record by Mr. McCloskey, just for the record.

 2             Now the answer of the witness, please, about the isolation you

 3     were put by the Army of Republika Srpska in.

 4             THE WITNESS:  I was for a short period in isolation, the moment I

 5     got disarmed with my men, and shortly afterwards I was brought back to

 6     the compound, as earlier stated by Mr. McCloskey in the summary.

 7             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Thank you.  I apologise for saying this, but it was said on page

 9     7 that Captain Mane took you back to the remise, but never mind.  Let's

10     not go back to that.

11             My next question would be:  Since you said here on page 4 that

12     you had seen people taking food from dumpsters -- sorry.  The Prosecutor

13     said that reading the summary.  My question is:  Is it the case that to

14     this day in all countries in the Balkans, all dumpsters containing waste

15     and rubbish are being gone through to find useful scraps, and it's not as

16     organised as it is in Western countries?

17        A.   To my knowledge, sir, it was well organised in Srebrenica before

18     it became an enclave, because we even used the formerly dumpster trucks

19     from the municipality of Srebrenica and used them to got rid our own

20     garbage.  So they got into the garbage of UNPROFOR because no convoys of

21     the UNHCR came into the enclave anymore because they were stopped by the

22     VRS.

23        Q.   Please answer this question:  Is it the case that to this day in

24     all the countries of the former Yugoslavia people look through dumpsters

25     and waste, generally, to separate various items unless that is organised

Page 17835

 1     by the state?

 2        A.   I've been recently not to -- to former Yugoslavia, and also

 3     before I was in the enclave I made some several vacation trips to

 4     Yugoslavia when it was one state, and it was always well organised.  So

 5     there were always people searching in dumpsters, but not for food, I

 6     reckon.  And your country was well organised before the war, the

 7     Yugoslavian war, started.

 8        Q.   Thank you, Colonel, for this answer.  My question is:  Does

 9     rummaging through rubbish indicate that somebody's hungry or that they

10     are looking for useful scraps that can be sold or used for another

11     purpose?

12        A.   Our estimation and our belief and what we saw daily happen when

13     we dumped the trucks also on my personal patrolling along that side to OP

14     Romeo and Quebec where we dumped our garbage that the people were looking

15     for food and not for other items they could use.

16        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  We won't deal with this any more, because

17     all things are possible in war.

18             Can we now look at 65 ter 07144.  That is your statement dated 23

19     July 1995, which is recorded as confidential.  I don't know if it's still

20     confidential.  Perhaps the Prosecution can tell us.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  This document is Exhibit P2636 now.  Thank you.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And I take it that it is not under seal.  Please

23     carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Page 17836

 1        Q.   Since we see it on the screen and it's not under seal, I will

 2     note again that it is an interview done with you on 23 July 1995, just 13

 3     days after the events in Srebrenica.  Here is what you say, I quote from

 4     the first line in the first paragraph towards line 13:

 5              "I am the patrol co-ordinator for Srebrenica.  On the morning of

 6     11 July 1995, there was a rumour in the local refugee camp that seven

 7     people had been shot and the bodies were near the well in Potocari.  As I

 8     was the patrol coordinator, I knew the area very well.  I drove with

 9     Lieutenant Koster and Sergeant Major Van Schaik to the well.  As we

10     approached the well I saw one man running from that direction, and a

11     Muslim woman whom we had asked about the bodies.  She pointed us to the

12     direction of the bodies.  On arriving at the scene, we saw nine dead men

13     who appeared to have been shot, lying face down with their heads almost

14     in the well.  Beside the bodies were passports and ID cards.  I gave

15     instructions to Sergeant Major Van Schaik to pick these up, which he did.

16     We then took photographs of the scene, including the bodies.  As we were

17     leaving the scene, we heard gunshots, and we saw a Bosnian Serb Army

18     soldier who appeared distracted.  I told the sergeant to get rid of the

19     passports and the IDs which he did.  The film has been sent to Holland to

20     be developed."

21             My question is:  Does this description reflect the actual scene

22     and the event as you experienced it?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   You go on to say:

25              "On Monday night, people started moving down from the mountains

Page 17837

 1     and other areas within the enclave into the DutchBat Compound.  The

 2     DutchBat housed approximately 25.000 refugees in two compounds.  On

 3     Tuesday, General Mladic came to the refugee camps with a camera crew."

 4             Does this description correspond to what you described?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  My next question:  If you had driven, as you say in

 7     line 4, with Lieutenant Koster and Sergeant Major van Schaik, where was

 8     your vehicle when you were passing by the barricades, as you said?

 9        A.   This report was translated from Dutch into English.  We never

10     drove, because we haven't -- we hadn't even got enough fuel for driving

11     because we were patrolling the last few months with donkeys to get to the

12     OPs.  So it must be a mistake in the translation of this document,

13     because we had no cars at that moment, and we were not driving with cars

14     from the compound to the site that I spoke about in this document.  It

15     was quite near.

16        Q.   Thank you.  If in line 4 we see a mistranslation, is it the case

17     also in line 10 which says:

18             "I gave instructions to the sergeant major to pick these up,

19     which he did."

20             My question is:  How did he them up, and what did he put them

21     into?  He couldn't just hold them in his hands.

22        A.   No.  That's quite true.  He picked them up and put these

23     documents -- he looked at them and put them in his camouflage uniform

24     trousers, because we have on even sides pockets on the camouflage

25     uniform.

Page 17838

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Would you agree with me that the way this is written

 2     this sounds as if you put these documents into some sort of vehicle?

 3     Right or wrong?

 4        A.   No.  I don't see that like -- no.  No.  It may be something about

 5     translation, but I don't see that.  There was simply no vehicle, so we

 6     couldn't put it in a vehicle.  It is just a mistranslation about walking

 7     or driving, and that is no thing that happened in this document, I think.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Is it then possible that in this part of the

 9     statement when it says:  "I driver with Lieutenant Koster and sergeant

10     Major van Schaik and I told him to pick them up," is it unclear from this

11     how you travelled there and how he picked these things up?  Can you

12     explain?

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This is again repetition.  The witness explained

14     in detail how that could have happened that the word "I drove" came into

15     this statement.

16             Please avoid repetitions.  It's a waste of time.  Move to the

17     next question.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

19             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Colonel, let us look at line 1 as the President says.  It says:

21              "I am the patrol co-ordinator for Srebrenica.  On the morning of

22     11 July 1995, there was a rumour in the local refugee camp that seven

23     people had been shot ..."

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You have read -- you have read all of this into

25     the transcript already.  There's no need to do that again.  Put a

Page 17839

 1     question to the within, please.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I read this out in

 3     order to ask my question.

 4             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   In the course of this discussion, it was said that you found this

 6     out from one of the interpreters.  So which version is true?  Was it a

 7     rumour that circulated around the refugee camp or was it something you

 8     found out from one of the interpreters?

 9        A.   In answer to your question, there were a lot of rumours.  That

10     morning there was a lot going on.  But specifically answering your

11     question, it came from an interpreter that we got the news of probably

12     the seven men that were shot.

13        Q.   Thank you.  If you were told that by an interpreter on the 11th

14     of July, 1995, do you know whether VRS soldiers were at that time at the

15     location where you found the bodies?

16        A.   As I described earlier and the moment that we came to the site

17     where we find the nine men, at that point where we had to leave, we saw

18     VRS soldier chasing a woman who was running away from a house.  And that

19     is in the my other statements as well.  So there were VRS personnel in

20     the immediate area that I described earlier.

21        Q.   Thank you.  You did not say that soldiers were chasing her.  You

22     said that close to that woman you saw a Serb who looked distracted.  You

23     did not mention in your statement that the woman was chased by VRS

24     soldiers.  Is that correct?

25        A.   That was correct what you're saying, but meaning Serb, there were

Page 17840

 1     no other Serbians not in uniforms around at that moment.  There were only

 2     VRS personnel around near the road and near the houses that I described

 3     earlier.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  If this happened on the 11th, as you say in your

 5     statement, is it possible that these men had been killed on the 10th

 6     during combat before the VRS came to the area of Potocari and Srebrenica?

 7        A.   Sir, if I may say so, I answered this question earlier, because

 8     the moment we came to the nine bodies, they were warm and the blood was

 9     still running, and a day later a body is not warm any more, and the blood

10     isn't running, because temperature at that moment was almost 30 degrees.

11        Q.   Yes.  Thank you, Colonel, but that was on the 11th.  If the

12     temperature was so high, was the VRS close to your base in Potocari,

13     because in the same statement, you say:  "On Monday night, people started

14     moving down from the mountains and other areas within the enclave," and

15     then three lines below you say:  "On Tuesday, General Mladic came."

16             If General Mladic came on Tuesday, could the troops have been

17     there on the 11th, on Monday?

18        A.   There was already VRS personnel in the enclave pouring down from

19     the hills as I described earlier.  This question was asked earlier for

20     the same dates.  So I'd -- they were around.  Your personnel was around

21     on the 11th already before the Mladic came to the bus remise.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell the Trial Chamber, when did the

23     air-strikes against Bosnian Serb positions in Srebrenica and around

24     Srebrenica occur, on what day?

25        A.   That was also on the 11th.

Page 17841

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us were you able to inform the VRS about

 2     it on the same day as well as your commander, and does that feature in

 3     your reports?

 4        A.   I don't understand your question, because you know as a soldier

 5     that I, as a UN member, the VRS is not in my chain of command.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  I know that, but were you able to report on that on

 7     the 11th and to keep in touch with the VRS while combat was going on and

 8     while -- while the air-strikes were still underway, while you were firing

 9     at the VRS?

10        A.   The reports that I made were directly to my commander and even to

11     the battalion commander, so everything was reported, but not to the VRS,

12     because as I stated earlier, the VRS was not in my chain of command.  I

13     don't see the -- I don't get your question quite well, sir.

14        Q.   Please, should the VRS be blamed for something that happened

15     before the 11th, before the VRS came to Potocari, or should this be

16     blamed on someone else who was there on the site?

17        A.   There were a lot of happenings before the 11th, and the

18     air-strikes came in in the early morning, and that was on their -- is the

19     VRS accountable?  Because the shelling of the compound and the -- they

20     came in from the south in the enclave, the VRS, was the days before the

21     11th.  So the VRS was actually entering the -- entering the enclave

22     before the 11th.

23        Q.   Thank you.  On what positions and at what time was the VRS bombed

24     in the enclave during the 11th?  Where were those positions?

25        A.   I don't understand your answer -- or your question, because

Page 17842

 1     you're saying, "At what time was the VRS bombed?"  I don't understand

 2     that.

 3        Q.   That's correct.  At what time did the air-strikes occur against

 4     the VRS positions in Srebrenica?

 5        A.   I don't have the exact timings right now by heart, I don't know,

 6     but it was in the early morning.

 7        Q.   Sorry, could you say for the record which day -- date it was?

 8        A.   To my knowledge right now, it's on the 11th.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  If the VRS was bombed on the 11th on access points to

10     the enclave, is it possible that on the 11th in the morning or just

11     before when you saw these bodies they were already in Potocari?  Could

12     these bodies have been victims or casualties of combat?

13        A.   As I described earlier in my statements, this was -- they were

14     shot quite nearby with small-calibre weapons, and as the way they were

15     laying in the meadow with their faces down to the -- to a small stream,

16     it was quite clear to us, not only to me but also to my colleagues, that

17     they were executed on that place, and it was nothing what looked like

18     that there was a fight going on or was going on at that point.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Is it possible that somebody killed someone on the

20     11th in the morning before you arrived, or during the night perhaps,

21     between the 10th and the 11th, because they didn't want to defend their

22     positions or because they weren't withdrawing from their positions or for

23     some other reason?  Might they have been killed at that way?

24        A.   I don't know.  I described earlier that these bodies were -- it

25     was -- they were -- I described it that the bodies were still warm and

Page 17843

 1     the blood running, so it couldn't happen the night earlier.  So I don't

 2     know where you're aiming at, but this couldn't happen earlier.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Did you hear that the Muslims in front of your

 4     UNPROFOR soldiers killed soldiers next to your APCs?  They killed their

 5     own soldiers right in front of your APCs.  Have you heard about that?

 6        A.   No, I'm not aware of that.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  And do you know about the case of the killing of

 8     soldier Rensen and whether any incident took place at that time between a

 9     BH Army soldier and a soldier belonging to UNPROFOR?  Thank you.

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Now, can you tell the Trial Chamber what this was all

12     about, this incident, what happened?

13        A.   At that time that that happened, it wasn't quite clear to us what

14     had happened exact -- exactly, but one of the soldiers that was above the

15     turret of the APC got injured at the moment the UN APC was withdrawing

16     from a position.  Later on we heard that possibly BH Muslim soldiers

17     could have been responsible for that.  And that was at the time that we

18     were in the enclave that I heard about this.

19        Q.   Thank you.  And the debriefing -- during debriefing, did you hear

20     statements by eyewitnesses, and did they say how the soldier was killed,

21     how soldier Rensen was killed?  Did you hear about that?  Thank you.

22        A.   I heard about that -- I heard about that, but I never heard --

23     personally spoke to the colleagues that were involved in that -- were in

24     that group.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Now, can you tell the Trial Chamber what you actually

Page 17844

 1     did hear, because you didn't talk to any eyewitnesses.

 2        A.   I heard that BH soldiers possibly could have killed soldier

 3     van Rensen at the APC.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  If the soldiers of BH killed UNPROFOR soldiers for

 5     withdrawing from their positions, is there the possibility that they

 6     might have killed their own soldiers, members of the BH Army, their own

 7     combatants, to prevent them from withdrawing faced with the Army of

 8     Republika Srpska?

 9        A.   You say UNPROFOR soldiers.  It was just one soldier, but one too

10     many, I think.  So I have to correct that.  And then I'm not aware of, as

11     I earlier stated, that BH soldiers shot down their own man.  So that is

12     enough questions.  I don't think that it's the right point now, 16 years

13     later, to do an estimation of what BH soldiers could have done then.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Very well.  Since you say that, why do you think that

15     they must have been killed by the Serbs if you have not a shred of

16     evidence as to who shot at them and if there are no eye-witnesses?  How

17     is that possible, then?  How can you arrive at that conclusion then?

18     Thank you.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Are you now referring again to the nine dead

20     bodies the witness testified about?

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  That's right, Mr. President.

22     Thank you.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   If it was your conclusion that the nine bodies were killed by the

25     Serbs, did you have any evidence that they were actually killed by the

Page 17845

 1     Serbs, or did you have any eye-witnesses which would lead to that

 2     conclusion?

 3        A.   I explained earlier that we saw Serb soldiers running around

 4     quite near to that area.  There were no other Muslim armed personnel that

 5     we saw in the direct vicinity of that area, and clearly Serb forces were

 6     in control of that area.  There was no other military personnel in the

 7     direct vicinity.  So -- and what I earlier stated, they were shot a few

 8     minutes ago, the moment we came.  So -- or shortly.  So it is -- yeah.

 9     It is to me quite unbelievable, because we never encountered any Muslim

10     military personnel around that area on the 11th any more.  So I never

11     said that I'm sure that VRS personnel could have done that, but all the

12     things that I said earlier lead -- leads to this conclusion, and that was

13     the question you asked me earlier, if I could -- on what basis I made

14     this conclusion.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Now, did you protect the woman that the Serb was

16     chasing, as you said, who had been distracted, according to you?

17        A.   We had no -- at that time she was running away, we had no

18     possible means to protect her, because we were unarmed ourselves at that

19     very moment.

20        Q.   Thank you.  And on the 11th in the morning, were you disarmed or

21     did you have weapons?  Thank you.

22        A.   We were already disarmed.

23        Q.   Can you tell the Trial Chamber at what time you were disarmed on

24     the 11th in the morning and who disarmed you?  Thank you.

25        A.   I said earlier that a group of the Captain Mane disarmed me.  I

Page 17846

 1     don't have the exact timings any more.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Now, Captain Mane, did he come to Potocari, to your

 3     base on the 11th in the morning to disarm you, or was the situation

 4     different?

 5        A.   He was already on the 11th near the road to the place where the

 6     blocking positions were.

 7        Q.   On the 11th in the morning, was there a blockade along the road?

 8     Was there a blockade put up on the road?  Thank you.

 9        A.   There was a blockade southward to -- in the direction of

10     Srebrenica, and that was formed by APCs, and it was controlled by the

11     Lieutenant van Duijn.

12        Q.   Are we talking about the place that you marked right next to the

13     base?  Is that what you're talking about, or are you talking about

14     another location controlled by the colonel and some other -- the captain

15     and some other barricade?

16        A.   It was somewhat southwards, because it was just in front of the

17     bus remise, if you know the exact point.

18        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  But according to what you've said so far,

19     all the witnesses and everything else, nobody says that Colonel Mane was

20     there and the Army of Republika Srpska was by the base.  Everybody says

21     that that was on the 12th, after the agreement had been signed on the

22     evacuation, the agreement between the Muslim civilian population,

23     General Mladic, and Colonel Karremans.  Do you remember that perhaps?

24     Thank you.

25        A.   No, I'm not aware of that.  No.

Page 17847

 1        Q.   And do you remember when Colonel Karremans had a meeting with the

 2     Muslims to inform them that there would be bombing of the Army of

 3     Republika Srpska?

 4        A.   That was earlier than the 11th.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Might that have been the 10th, in the evening?

 6        A.   It could have been, yeah.

 7        Q.   If it was indeed on the evening of the 10th and the incident with

 8     the nine dead bodies on the morning of the 11th, do you remember whether

 9     it could have been the Army of the Republika Srpska who was next

10     to your -- which was next to your base and had control points at the time

11     of the bombing?  Thank you.

12        A.   Sorry, what is your question, sir?  I don't see the question

13     here.

14        Q.   The question is:  The Army of Republika Srpska, could it have

15     held the control point, the check-point, with its APC in Potocari right

16     next to your base on the 11th in the morning, when you on the 11th were

17     by the nine dead bodies?  Thank you.

18        A.   You're bringing everything out of context, because I walked

19     through that blockade to get to the position of where the nine -- where I

20     found the nine people somewhat higher uphill to the Budak area.  So I

21     don't see your point right here.

22        Q.   Thank you.  I apologise for having to repeat.  On the 11th of

23     July, 1995, in the morning, rumours went around the camp saying that

24     seven people were killed and that their bodies were next to the stream by

25     Potocari.  Since I was the co-ordinator of the patrol, I knew the area

Page 17848

 1     well, and I drove off with Colonel Konings [phoen].

 2             Now, is it possible that you could have gone there since there

 3     was no Army of Republika Srpska and that that might have been in the

 4     morning before the bombing?  Thank you.

 5        A.   No, that was not the case.

 6        Q.   Well, thank you.  I'd like to remind you, could the soldiers of

 7     Republika Srpska have been in your base with NATO deciding to bomb the

 8     Serbs later?  Would that have been an absurdity or not?  Thank you.

 9        A.   I don't see the question.  I don't understand the question here.

10     He's asking me something that I don't understand.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Let me put it this way -- or, rather, let's look at

12     D20.  It's the debriefing on Srebrenica.  Page 38, please, paragraph

13     3.58.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Sir, at this point in time may I ask you, had

15     been the VRS in the UN compound, in the base itself, at that point in

16     time when the NATO bombing started?

17             THE WITNESS:  No, they were not in the compound itself on the

18     11th.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  Mr. McCloskey.

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. President, if we could -- I mean, the

21     testimony and the summary of the testimony and the dates thereof have

22     been completely left out, and we're concentrating on a early statement

23     where July 11th was mentioned.  If the questions can be put in the

24     context of what's happening on the ground, I think this will be -- make

25     more sense for the Trial Chamber and everyone else, because the dates by

Page 17849

 1     themselves can be confusing.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, try to make clear to which specific

 3     time you are referring and continue your cross-examination.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, and thank

 5     you, Mr. McCloskey, for your assistance.  I'd like to ask the witness to

 6     take a look now at paragraph 3.58 that we have on our screens, and since

 7     I can't read English very well, perhaps he could read the text from the

 8     third sentence on, and then I'm going to tell him how I understand this

 9     passage.  Perhaps I misunderstood.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, you should explain for the witness

11     on which kind of document he is looking now so that he can understand the

12     context.  You're just saying "debriefing," but you should explain to him

13     what kind of document it is.

14             Mr. McCloskey.

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:  If he could also briefly see the 11th and the

16     12th so we can put this in the context of -- of -- of what this is about

17     as opposed to just a few lines that says the 10th, because I -- it's easy

18     to say particular dates, but without the context it doesn't mean much.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  What is the witness looking at, Mr. Tolimir?

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What the witness is looking at is

21     debriefing on Srebrenica provided by the members of his battalion when

22     they arrived in Assen, and it was conducted in Assen in 1995.  Thank you.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Now, we're reading what actually happened on that 11th of July.

25     It says:

Page 17850

 1             "At around noon on Tuesday, the 11th of July," the fourth line

 2     down.  I'm reading from the fourth line.

 3             "At around noon on Tuesday, the 11th of July."

 4             May I continue, Mr. President?

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, please.

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   And I quote:

 8              "At around noon on Tuesday, the 11th of July, a number of shells

 9     struck the area near the armoured vehicle.  The abandoned OP (Observation

10     Post) was also shelled.  Chaos prevailed among the BH.  Internal fighting

11     broke out once again.  That evening, the OP crew were permitted to leave

12     because they were willing to take the wife and children of a local BH

13     leader with them," and so on.

14             My question is the following:  Can we see from this that on the

15     11th fighting was still going on right up until the evening, as it says

16     here?  Is that evident from this passage?  Thank you.

17        A.   Yes.  This is OP Mike where you're referring to.  I know

18     personally the sergeant who was commanding that APC and this OP.  We had

19     given him the order by our operations room to leave OP Mike because a lot

20     of VRS shelling was going on, and it is exactly what's described here,

21     because it was VRS shelling that he had to fall back again from the

22     OP Mike, and he took along family members of the BH leader.  There was

23     chaos going on at that moment, and it was quite clear to us in the

24     operations room as well.

25        Q.   Further down it says:

Page 17851

 1             "When the two BiH soldiers with the anti-tank weapons attempted

 2     to prevent their departure, they were shot in the head by the BH leader."

 3             So the BH leaders shot their own soldiers; is that right?  That's

 4     my question.  Did the BH leaders shoot their own soldiers in the head?

 5        A.   This is a statement, I think, from Sergeant Mueller who was then

 6     the OP commander at the spot.  I know him very well, and he made that

 7     decision to leave OP Mike, and -- and there were people shot amongst BH

 8     personnel, yeah.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Did that happen on the 11th of July?  And everything

10     described here in this paragraph, did it all happen on the evening of the

11     11th of July?  Thank you.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

13             MR. McCLOSKEY:  This is a problem with the 92 ter.  The testimony

14     of this witness as it came into court is that these bodies happened on

15     the 13th of July, and that's what the summary says.  Now, there has been

16     one statement which General Tolimir has fairly brought up where this

17     witness has said on the 11th of July, but there's clearly just a mix-up

18     in numbers, and -- and I think that needs to be addressed now.  I've --

19     I've not objected up until this time, but now it's getting beyond --

20     beyond any -- any sense.  He needs to address the issue, I believe, of

21     his testimony in this court along the lines that he's always testified

22     into what happened the 11th, 12th, and 13th, and that's when the bodies

23     happened.  So that's what's on -- that's what it's in his evidence.  If

24     he's going to question him on that, he needs to put that to him.  Fair

25     enough that he can put the statement from the debriefing where he says

Page 17852

 1     11th to him as well, but it's only fair to the witness to put both to him

 2     and let the witness sort it out as opposed to assuming that the 11th is

 3     the date each time.

 4                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey, the Chamber understand your

 6     position.  However, it's the right of the accused to put different

 7     documents to the witness and to conduct his cross-examination the way he

 8     wishes, and especially this witness seems to be very capable to

 9     distinguish between different events happened -- which happened in July

10     1995 in this area.  You may deal with that again in your re-examination.

11             Sir, but I would like to refer you again to the question of

12     Mr. Tolimir:  Did that happen on the 11th of July?  And you may explain

13     what is your recollection on that, if you recall the context.

14             THE WITNESS:  Could I -- could Mr. Tolimir put up this question

15     again, because --

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Let me do that.

17             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It's no problem.  Your last answer was:

19             "This is a statement," you think, "from Sergeant Mueller," I

20     think you said.

21             THE WITNESS:  Mueller.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  "Mueller, who was then OP commander at the spot.

23     I know him very well, and he made that decision to leave OP Mike.  And

24     there were people shot amongst BH personnel, yeah."

25             That was your response.  And Mr. Tolimir asked you:

Page 17853

 1             "Did that happen on the 11th of July?"

 2             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 4             Mr. Tolimir, please go ahead.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   My question is this:  If this was on the 11th of July, this

 8     situation at the OP, could the base have been blocked on the 11th of

 9     July, of your command and your unit in Potocari, blocked by Captain Mane

10     and the other Serb soldiers?  Thank you.

11        A.   It's difficult for me to -- to say something about the sequence

12     of the blockings, because on the night earlier, I was also outside at the

13     bus remise.  So it's difficult for me to say something about the exact

14     timings after 16 years.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Now, please, since you said a moment ago that on the

16     11th you threw away these documents, can documents be thrown away -- or

17     if the Serbian soldiers did not confiscate them from you, and did you

18     throw away documents that were evidence of some event that had taken

19     place or were hiding something, or were they thrown away for some other

20     reason?

21        A.   I don't understand this question.

22        Q.   I'll repeat the question and make it shorter.  On the 11th, the

23     morning of the 11th, in -- when you returned from the location where you

24     had photographed the dead, did you have to give up their -- throw away

25     their passports and ID cards if there was no check-point between there

Page 17854

 1     and Potocari to confiscate the IDs and passports?  Thank you.

 2        A.   I said earlier about the timings and dates.  It's quite difficult

 3     for me to -- after 16 years to get that exactly in timings, as you are

 4     asked specifically right now referring to other documents.

 5        Q.   Thank you for this answer and for all the answers given in this

 6     statement 07144, but you gave that statement on the 23rd July 1995, just

 7     after the events when your memory was fresh.  That's why I just wanted to

 8     confirm yes or no.  Was this statement given on 23rd July 1995?  Could we

 9     please display 65 ter 07144.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Which is now P2636.  P636.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Lieutenant.  Did you give this statement on 23rd

13     July 1995?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I with like to

17     tender this statement.  Oh, I see.  It is already an exhibit with a P

18     number.  Thank you.  I apologise.

19             I thank Mr. Rensen, and I don't want to discuss this statement

20     any more.  Mr. Rutten.  I'm sorry.

21             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Now I should like to move to a different set of questions.  You

23     have been asked here whether you had a difference of opinion with your

24     mates about the involvement of UNPROFOR in the evacuation.  I should like

25     to take a look together with you at what Mr. van Duijn says and then to

Page 17855

 1     hear your comment.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we display 65 ter 07162.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Let us look at page 9 in e-court.  It's page 13 in English.  Page

 5     9 in Serbian.  The first line.  Paragraph 2 in English.

 6             "The witness made contact with Captain Groen who said that he

 7     should arrange it."

 8             Now, let us look at the last line on page 8.  It says:

 9             "The first option was that the Serbs organise the deportation,

10     and the second option that the UN organise it.  The witness made contact

11     with Captain Groen who said that he should arrange it."

12             My question to you is:  Did Captain Groen order van Duijn to

13     organise this evacuation from Srebrenica as we see in this statement on

14     the page that is displayed on the screen?

15        A.   I wasn't aware of that at the time I was in the enclave.

16        Q.   Did Mr. Van Duijn tell you when you asked him who ordered it that

17     he had no time to explain it to you?  Do you remember that?

18        A.   Yes, I remember that.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Could we now look at page 10, under "14 July."  It

20     begins on page 14 in English and continues on page 15.

21             I quote -- third page in Serbian.

22              "The buses came rather quickly. "

23             It's the next page in English.

24              "The Serbs were still not there.  They started filling the

25     buses.  Men were boarding the buses, too, while there were no Serbs

Page 17856

 1     there.  This lasted for about two and a half hours.

 2             "At this point, some MSF personnel had arrived who had set up a

 3     facility for the wounded."

 4             My question is:  Did UNPROFOR members themselves organise the

 5     evacuation from Potocari without any Serbs?

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, you left out two small sentences

 7     while you were quoting from this document.  I will read that.

 8             "The Serbs arrived at 8.30 hours.  They just went on."

 9             Now you may answer the question of Mr. Tolimir.

10             THE WITNESS:  There were already Serbs there.  That's the thing I

11     wanted to stress.  And my colleague, van Duijn, started to organise in a

12     correct manner that the Muslim refugees could leave the enclave as they

13     were eager to leave the enclave, because they were in a rather nasty

14     situation at the moment.  And that was what I witnessed that morning.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us, from 6.30 to 8.30, did your

17     colleague Mr. van Duijn organise the boarding of buses and the evacuation

18     alone, without any presence of Serbs, and the men were boarding buses at

19     that time as well?

20        A.   At that moment I wasn't present because that was the same morning

21     that I was in the operations room, and later on I -- that morning I went

22     outside to go to the blocking positions where van Duijn was.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Tell us, please, did your colleague van Duijn

24     participate together with Serbs in putting people on buses, those

25     refugees how were leaving Potocari to the territory of the Federation of

Page 17857

 1     Bosnia and Herzegovina in keeping with the agreement?

 2        A.   He with his UN personnel, and "he" I mean Lieutenant van Duijn,

 3     wasn't actually putting Muslim people on buses.  He was just looking at

 4     it and to guide it in an orderly manner, that no one would get harmed by

 5     VRS personnel.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Doesn't he say that for two full hours -- two and a

 7     half hours, in fact, he organised the evacuation himself?  Is that what

 8     he says or not?

 9        A.   That is a statement that he made himself, so he is responsible

10     for his own statements, I think.

11        Q.   Let us then look at another statement where he says the same

12     thing, and before that I should like to tender this one.  07 --

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this statement that we see on

14     the screen be admitted into evidence?

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.  This is the statement of

16     the witness van Duijn.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 7162 shall be

18     assigned Exhibit D322.  Thank you, Your Honours.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I now call up 65 ter 07159.

20             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   That's another statement of Mr. van Duijn's given to the

22     International Tribunal for Criminal Prosecution on the 25th of October,

23     1995.  And since you see this cover page, let us go to page 5, paragraph

24     6.  That's page 6 in English.

25             Thank you, Aleksandar.

Page 17858

 1             Paragraph 4.  In fact, let's first see who is the man he was

 2     talking to.  He's talking about a certain Mane.

 3             "By talkie-walkie, I informed Captain Groen.  Soon after, a man

 4     in camouflage approached me.  His assistants introduced him as Mane,

 5     commander of the military police battalion --

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Platoon, interpreter's correction.

 7             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   "He was about 1.85 metres tall with a corpulent build and short

 9     brown hair.  He was 29 years of age.  We conferred about the deportation

10     of the refugees.  At that stage a number of trucks and buses were already

11     parked in readiness on the road outside the compound.  I arranged with

12     him that we would concern ourselves with the refugees.  He would tell us

13     how many people could be allowed through to the buses.  When the moment

14     came, we co-operated in this way, and as the contact between us had gone

15     quite well, I was able to ensure that families were kept together as much

16     as possible."

17             My question is:  Are you aware that there was an understanding

18     between van Duijn and Captain Mane, military police commander, that the

19     evacuation would be organised by UNPROFOR; whereas, Mane would only

20     determine the number of people allowed to board the buses?

21        A.   I was aware of that, but the problem here is my colleague

22     van Duijn, and that was the dilemma we had together and we spoke about,

23     that he got in a situation where he did not see the total context of what

24     was really happening along the road.  So working together with the VRS

25     expelling - or evacuate - people from the enclave could have been easily

Page 17859

 1     seen as UN helping to work together with the VRS for ethnic cleansing.

 2     So that was the discussion I had with my colleague, and as colleagues

 3     among each other, I tried to coach him in a way that he would understand,

 4     but at that very moment he was not in a situation that he could

 5     understand that.  And that was what I tried to do down the road, because

 6     I had a perfect overview of what was really happening, and he was right

 7     in the middle of that situation.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, we must have our second break now,

 9     and we will resume quarter past 6.00.

10                           --- Recess taken at 5.48 p.m.

11                           --- On resuming at 6.19 p.m.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Colonel, sir, you here, and the Judges asked their questions, but

16     anyway, you objected to your colleague van Duijn for co-operating with

17     the evacuation.  Now, did you know whether that was perhaps an order

18     given by Major Franken and other superior officers?  Thank you.

19        A.   Later I heard that that was an order, but not at that specific

20     moment.

21        Q.   For the record, thank you.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But let's look at 65 ter 07160 on

23     e-court, please.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, we have still on the screen 65 ter

25     7159.  Are you tendering it?

Page 17860

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  Thank you.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 7159 shall be

 4     assign Exhibit D323.  Thank you, Your Honours.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             Let's look at 65 ter 07160 next, please.  Page 17 in English.

 8     It's a report, a conversation with van Duijn conducted by Mr. Bakker on

 9     behalf of the parliamentary commission engaged in the investigation of

10     Srebrenica on the 11th of November, 2002, in Holland, in The Hague, the

11     parliament in The Hague.

12             And may we take a look at page 17 in English now, please, and

13     it's page 14 in Serbian.  It's the fourth entry.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   And I quote Mr. van Duijn:

16             "When five minutes later things calmed down, I contacted the

17     operative centre of the battalion straight away and asked for

18     Major Franken.  I then pointed out what I have actually already said,

19     that we would stay there, and he said that he agreed with that because it

20     fitted in with humanitarian aid.  He also asked whether I still needed

21     any more equipment and people.  It was clear to him that at the time I

22     was still -- it was still not clear to me that the refugees would have to

23     go away.  So he therefore said, 'I know about it.  Stay there and just

24     say when you need anything.'"

25             Now, since you answered in the affirmative to this question

Page 17861

 1     already, all I can ask you is this -- or, rather, put the question a

 2     different way.  From this does it follow that Major Franken ordered

 3     van Duijn to remain during the evacuation of the refugees, to remain at

 4     the location where the evacuation was taking place?  Thank you.

 5        A.   This is the first time I see this document and I read it, what

 6     you already read in to this courtroom, and I heard it, and that's what

 7     I'm just seeing here.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we now take a look

 9     at page 19 of this same statement, 65 ter 07160.  Or, rather, it's 19 in

10     the Serbian and 23 in the English.  Thank you, Aleksandar.  And then we

11     can move on to page 24 of the English when we've looked at page 23.

12             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Let's look at the entry where van Duijn is talking and -- talking

14     about the problem, how it came about in relations between him and those

15     with photographs.

16             "Of course --"

17             I'm reading the third line from the top.

18              "Of course, but that wasn't the intention of -- of course, but

19     at the time that was not the intention which I got from the man who I

20     sent away then; Lieutenant Rutten did not have a camera round his neck

21     when he came.  He didn't, in fact, tackle me then, and --"

22             Next page, please.

23             "I said I was ready to explain everything to him but that I

24     didn't have time.  He then got into a discussion with the Serbian

25     fighters who were standing there.  The result of this was that I had to

Page 17862

 1     explain to the Serbian commander why the Serbian fighters were called

 2     Nazis.  He also reacted very emotionally to this.  He said to me, 'My

 3     father fought with Tito's Partisans against the Nazis, so I don't want to

 4     be called a Nazi.'"  That is what a Serb soldier said.  I forgot to

 5     emphasise that.

 6             Now, my question is this:  Did you really call the Serbian

 7     soldiers Nazis, and was that why there was a conflict between you and the

 8     soldier and that is what van Duijn refers to here?

 9        A.   It was actually a discussion that I had with my colleague, and

10     the Serbs were interfering at that very point, yeah.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us whether this was proper for you to

12     call Serb soldiers Nazis or not?  So were you biased in your reactions

13     there, or were you guided by something else to refer to them in that way?

14     Thank you.

15        A.   I was guided by something else.  I said earlier that I did some

16     discoveries along the road, and van Duijn was not aware of my

17     discoveries.  He said that also in the same statement that is here in

18     front of us that he thought that I was quite clean when I came to that

19     point, but the thing was I wasn't clean as he described it.  I earlier

20     saw things happen that to me seemed to me quite differently than as he

21     estimated the situation.

22        Q.   I'm sorry, let's see what Mr. van Duijn says about that on page

23     20.  It's the same page in English.  We're reading the second entry.

24     Asked by Mrs. Heringa, van Duijn says:

25              "After Lieutenant Rutten had tackled me, he started talking to

Page 17863

 1     the Serbian soldiers saying, 'This is like what happened 50 years ago

 2     with the Nazis.'  The Serbs understood this as being branded as Nazis.

 3     They thought this was unacceptable.  That was why one of them pointed out

 4     that his father had fought with the Serbian troops with Tito against the

 5     Nazis.  I got Colonel Kremer to escort Lieutenant Rutten back to the

 6     camp.  Then I was confronted by the Serbian commander asking me, 'Why are

 7     you branding us as Nazis?'  The result of all this was that the

 8     transportation had to be stopped for one and a half hours.  Because of

 9     this, our soldiers had to intervene because people were collapsing at

10     temperatures of about 30 degrees Centigrade.  This caused a lot of

11     problems."

12             Did Colonel Kremer take you away from this place where you had a

13     confrontation with the Serbian soldiers over the use of the term "Nazi"?

14        A.   I came along with Colonel Kremer and I spoke with him, and he had

15     the same opinion as I had, but he said he cannot do something else at

16     this very moment.  And we spoke about that, about the situation that was

17     along -- happening along the road.

18        Q.   Did you have any other personal confrontations with your

19     colleague van Duijn, or was this clash over your difference of opinion on

20     this one issue?

21        A.   We had a clash of a difference of opinion, and I tried to explain

22     him what I was seeing through the camera when I was along -- alongside

23     the road, and that was not a good view if you look through the camera in

24     what the -- what the UN personnel was, in fact, could have been seen

25     actively helping to -- to -- with the deportation of the UN -- with the

Page 17864

 1     Muslim refugees.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  But Mr. van Duijn says that he had managed to save

 3     many families from being separated, and when he objected, only those who

 4     were older than 18 were separated or below age 60, according to his

 5     agreement with Captain Mane; is that correct?

 6        A.   That's not correct, because I was in the white house, and I made

 7     some pictures of very young men who were in the house, even boys that

 8     were in the house in -- in the second floor of the white house in the

 9     opposite of the compound.

10        Q.   Since you said that it was not so, tell me, how many soldiers in

11     total were taken away from the white house?  How many prisoners of war

12     were removed from there, just to determine how many were separated.

13        A.   Let me first correct something.  They were not prisoners of war,

14     because when we in military establish a line to clarify who is a prisoner

15     of war, we have an exact procedure of identify who is combatant and

16     noncombatant.  If -- as we know of in earlier statements, you saw in

17     front of the white house every man that came in had to throw down his

18     belongings and also the sets of ID.  So that's the reason I object to the

19     word "prisoners of war," because to my opinion we have there in military

20     a different procedure for that.  That's the first thing.

21             The moment I got into the house, as you said, they were not

22     youngsters that were in the house.  I myself, together with the Sergeant

23     Major van Schaik saw that there were youngsters on the second floor in

24     that house.  So the situation that van Duijn describes is his statement,

25     and I am now saying what my opinion was along the road, and history now

Page 17865

 1     is saying to me - and we can read it all - that the 8.000 peoples or

 2     7.000 were found dead afterwards, so I don't see the point here right

 3     now.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Let me ask you, those 7- or 8.000 people, did they

 5     pass through the white house?

 6        A.   Not all, but a few hundred did pass the white house, because you

 7     asked me exact figures.  I didn't count them.  It were a few hundred,

 8     because several times buses full of men left the white house, and that is

 9     also in my statement.

10             The other men, as you're well aware of, were leaving earlier the

11     enclave on their own on another road near the Jaglici area and near

12     Milici area.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Nyambe has a question at this point in

14     time.

15             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Just a clarification really.  At page 70, lines 13

16     to 16, you said:

17             "They were not prisoners of war, because when we in military

18     establish a line of -- a line to clarify who is a prisoner of war, we

19     have an exact procedure of identifying who is a combatant and

20     noncombatant."

21             So what were they, these people, according to your military

22     procedure?

23             THE WITNESS:  These people to me were all refugees and people who

24     lived -- civilians who lived in the enclave.

25             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

Page 17866

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Please let us look at 65 ter 07142 to see what you exactly said

 5     in your statement because I was unfair asking you about numbers that you

 6     said you can't recall now.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

 8     statement on the screen.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You are tendering 65 ter 7160; is that correct?

10     Because that was not a statement but an interview by a parliamentary

11     commission.  It will be received.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 7160 shall be

13     assigned Exhibit D324.  Thank you, Your Honours.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I would like to note that the last two documents

15     were not on the list of documents to be used during the cross-examination

16     of this witness.

17             Please carry on.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If the statement was on the list,

19     65 ter 07142, we could see it in e-court, if not, then we don't need to.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 07142 has already

21     been assigned Exhibit P2634.  Thank you, Your Honours.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I was referring to the last two

23     documents.  They were not on the list.  Please carry on.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Could we

25     now look at P2364 [as interpreted].  Here it is.

Page 17867

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This is P2634.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we now look at

 3     page 5 to see what the witness told the Prosecution on page 5.  Paragraph

 4     2 in Serbian.  That's page 5 in English, page -- sorry, paragraph 3.

 5             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   "It was clear that this could not go on.  I went to see

 7     Major de Haan, the Dutch UNMO official, but it was to no avail.  Together

 8     with Sergeant Major Rave, I tried to arrange the release of some of those

 9     in the house.  The Muslim men held until the house were frightened to

10     death.  My impression was that the evacuation of some would not improve

11     the situation, but as it was, the situation was untenable.  I then went

12     to one of the Serbian leaders and told him that he aught to arrange

13     something for the evacuation of the Muslim men.  The Serb arranged for

14     two buses to be driven to the house.  The men from the house filled the

15     buses, and I think there were 60 to 70 in each.  I heard later that the

16     men were taken to Bratunac.  The house remained full even after this

17     evacuation."

18             My question is:  If there were two bus with 60 to 70 men in each,

19     does that mean that the total was between 120 to 140 men taken to

20     Bratunac?

21        A.   On this specific occasion, yes, you could say that.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Were you talking about 13th here, 13th of July?

23        A.   That could be the case, yes.

24        Q.   If that many people left on the 13th, was it possible that some

25     more left on the 13th if you had your soldier monitoring the buses and

Page 17868

 1     escorting the buses?

 2        A.   I don't understand the question, please, no.

 3        Q.   Did you have a soldier whom you assigned to monitor the buses and

 4     to determine how many were leaving on buses towards Potocari?

 5        A.   Yes.  There was a driver who was standing on call.  That was a

 6     Private Verbugt who was -- I asked him to count the number of buses and

 7     trucks, yes.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Now, my question is this:  Since they didn't --

 9     weren't evacuated with the civilians, were they prisoners of war and

10     taken from the white house?

11        A.   These were to me, as I earlier stated, they were civilians.  They

12     were men and youngsters and were earlier separated along the bus line by

13     the VRS.

14        Q.   Thank you.  I agree with your opinion, but once they'd separated

15     them, did they tell you why they were separating them, why they weren't

16     going with the civilians?  Did they give any reason for this?  Thank you.

17        A.   Because they were males between the age of 12, 13 years old and

18     60, I think, in total, yes.  And that was the reason.  All men that could

19     have been BH soldiers.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Did any of the Serb soldiers answer the question of

21     why they were being separated, the men from the women?  Thank you.

22        A.   They said that it was for interrogation purposes.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED:  May we now go back to 65 ter 07160.  It is D324

25     now.  It's the stenographic report of the Hearing of the Parliamentary

Page 17869

 1     Committee of Inquiry on Srebrenica held on Monday, the 11th of November,

 2     2002, in the old Assembly room of the Lower House of the States General

 3     in The Hague.  And I'm interested in page 25.  Actually, it's page 30 in

 4     English and 25 in Serbian.  Thank you.

 5             Let's look at van Duijn's answer to Mr. Bakker's question.  It

 6     says:

 7              "Yes.  It says in the report that I had driven over people were

 8     my armoured vehicle.  That is not correct.  It's not true.  It is true

 9     that during the return trip, people fell off two armoured vehicles.  This

10     was not my armoured vehicle but the other armoured vehicle that, together

11     with mine, took over more and more small blocking positions to protect

12     the convoy of refugees.  As soon as the armoured vehicles were

13     stationary, people fell off the front of the vehicle."

14             Now, my question to you is this:  Did you -- were you blaming

15     Mr. van Duijn of this as he said earlier on in response to Mr. Bakker's

16     question?  Do you blame him for that?  Thank you.

17        A.   This is at hindsight what I'm reading now, so that's -- in the

18     week in July that we speak about, I was not aware of the fact that --

19     that this happened, but I was aware of the fact that APCs from our

20     company were trying to protect the civilians that were coming out from

21     Srebrenica towards Potocari to the bus remise and later on as part of

22     them to the compound, and that was a very chaotic situation, but what

23     exactly is described down here, I wasn't aware of that in the moment --

24     in the first week of July in the enclave.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Could you explain to the Trial Chamber what you mean

Page 17870

 1     by the term "remise"?

 2        A.   The remise is the bus -- the old bus remise, bus station, you

 3     could call it, quite near to the UN compound near Potocari.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know anything at all about whether somebody

 5     was run over or whether it was as Mr. van Duijn describes it?  Was

 6     anybody run over when the refugees were transported from the firing

 7     positions to the base?

 8        A.   At that moment in July, I wasn't aware of that.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  And do you know now at this point in time whether

10     anybody was run over when the refugees were transported?  Thank you.

11        A.   No, but there was another occasion when they fell back from

12     OP Mike with an APC there.  People were hit by an APC I heard later.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us the number?  How many, and what was

14     the fate of those people?  Were they just hit, or did they die as a

15     result?

16        A.   I'm not exactly aware of these happenings any more.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Now, can you tell me this:  Does UNPROFOR and the

18     Dutch Battalion, does it have any records showing how the people were

19     killed, the people they know were killed, and that they were on the spot,

20     on the actual spot?

21        A.   Not that I'm aware of.

22        Q.   Thank you.  And can we have a list of names found in the grave

23     that the ministry referred to?  Is there a list?  Thank you.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  What kind of grave are you referring to,

25     Mr. Tolimir?  I would like to understand your question.

Page 17871

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm referring to the grave that was

 2     mentioned on the 26th of July this year by the minister.  He said that it

 3     was confidential, and we admitted the document into evidence.  Thank you.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, this is the reason why I asked.

 5     First you refer to the ministry instead of the minister, and the second

 6     was I think you heard a lot of answers by this witness.  He can't give

 7     you a list of more than at the most two buried people there because he

 8     doesn't know anything about others.  You should rephrase your question.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I won't

10     rephrase it, because I've already received an answer.

11             I have no further questions for this witness.

12             So, Colonel, thank you for coming and answering my questions.  I

13     thank you for all that, and I wish you every success in your military

14     career, and I'm happy to see you here in uniform, because you're the

15     first -- actually, the second witness who has come into this courtroom in

16     uniform.  So thank you.

17             The Defence rests.  We have no further questions for this

18     witness, Mr. President.  We thank all the participants in today's

19     proceedings, and that concludes my cross-examination.  Thank you.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much, Mr. Tolimir.

21             Mr. McCloskey, do you have re-examination?

22             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, Mr. President, and I will try to -- to get

23     through this in the time we have.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes.  Please go ahead.

25                           Re-examination by Mr. McCloskey:

Page 17872

 1        Q.   Yes, Colonel, you were very -- on the chronology and the dates,

 2     the general showed you, I think it was the first report you made just a

 3     few days after your experience in the enclave where you suggest on the

 4     11th of July you see the bodies, and we went over your summary of your

 5     previous testimony where you had been consistently [sic] with your

 6     chronology of the bodies happening on the 13th of July.  Is it possible

 7     you've been confused a bit by the actual dates of these events?

 8        A.   The problem is, and I reckon this to my own responsibility, that

 9     16 years later, it's hard to define whether it was on the 11th, 13th, or

10     12th, but the sequence of happenings was as I described here in front of

11     the Court.

12        Q.   And as the summary reflected those sequences on the 10th, the

13     11th, the 12th, the 13th, to the best of your recollection, was that

14     correct?

15        A.   Yes, it is.

16        Q.   And you also said on page 70 that you had a different procedure

17     for POWs, and when you were telling the general that the Serb soldiers

18     were making the men and boys throw their -- their belongings and ID away.

19     Can you just describe us briefly how your forces would appropriately

20     determine whether someone was a combatant or a noncombatant?

21        A.   Yes.  We -- we put up a line to identify whether they have

22     personal belongings that could relate to if they are military or not, and

23     that could happen with ID cards, with tags, with everything that relates

24     to if you're working within the military or not.  If you have other IDs,

25     meaning that you could be a civilian, for instance, you collect working

Page 17873

 1     permits of local personnel, then it's quite clear that they were not in

 2     the military.  So we set up this line of identifying who is military or

 3     not to later on use it in the interrogation that follows that first

 4     identifying moment of people that you collect and military that you

 5     collect during a -- an action so to get a perfect view of what units are

 6     involved and what personnel is involved in the action that has military

 7     been taken.

 8        Q.   So by requiring the men to dispose of their IDs and then burn

 9     them like you've described, would that reflect any serious interest in

10     determining whether or not the men were in the military?

11        A.   No.  Then you -- in fact you are saying that you don't have any

12     interest at all in identifying who you are collecting.  The only reason

13     that I can imagine to do that is to get rid of not only the personal

14     belongings by burning it and the ID cards by burning it but also of the

15     people itself, because that is the natural way of -- to get rid of every

16     piece of evidence that you have from the people that you're collecting

17     and actually deporting from the enclave.  That was my opinion at that

18     very moment.

19        Q.   If your army took several busloads of young boys and men into

20     custody, would you also be required under -- well, any sense of humanity

21     as well as the Geneva Conventions to provide them with food, water

22     medical help?

23        A.   Yes, we are obliged to.

24             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.  I have nothing further,

25     Mr. President.

Page 17874

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Mindua has a question for the witness.

 2                           Questioned by the Court:

 3             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, Witness.  Colonel Rutten, a

 4     moment ago you said it is - 84, page 84 [as interpreted] of the

 5     transcript, line 13 - that there were boys aged 12 and 13.  How were you

 6     able to establish the age of these boys?  Did you have access to proof by

 7     which you could establish how old they were with certainty?

 8        A.   I refer to what I saw in the white house, and these were sons of

 9     the men who were also in the white house, and the moment I make -- made

10     pictures on the second floor in that white house, I could easily see that

11     there were youngsters and by the age that I already referred to.  So I

12     was -- my own age was then, in 1995, 35 years old, and I can easily see

13     then who is approximately 12 or 13 or 14 years old.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think we all agree that it was a reference to

15     page 74 and not 84, just to have a clear record.

16             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes.  That's right.  I said page

17     74, line 13.  And it's where the witness was speaking about boys age 12

18     and 13.

19             But thank you for your answer, Witness.  Thank you.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Sir, you will be pleased to hear that this

21     concludes your examination here in this trial.  Thank you very much that

22     you came here to testify and to help us with establishing the truth.

23     Thank you very much again, and now you are free to return to your normal

24     activities.  Thank you very much.

25             We have to adjourn for the day, and we will resume tomorrow

Page 17875

 1     morning at 9.00 in this courtroom.  We adjourn.

 2                           [The witness withdrew]

 3                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.02 p.m.,

 4                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 13th day

 5                           of September, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.