Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 5492

 1                           Tuesday, 26 January 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.09 a.m.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  This is case number

 6     IT-08-91-T.  The Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin.

 7             JUDGE HALL:  Good morning to all.  We have been alerted that the

 8     Prosecution has a preliminary matter to raise.  The Chamber itself has a

 9     preliminary matter which it wishes to address, but before that I take the

10     appearance, please.

11             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you, Your Honour.  For the Office of the

12     Prosecutor I'm Tom Hannis along with Crispian Smith.

13             MR. ZECEVIC:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Slobodan Zecevic,

14     Slobodan Cvijetic, Eugene O'Sullivan, Tatjana Savic appearing for

15     Stanisic Defence this morning.

16             MR. PANTELIC:  Good morning, Your Honours.  For Zupljanin

17     Defence, Igor Pantelic and Dragan Krgovic.

18             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.

19             The matter which the Chamber wishes to raise is this, yesterday

20     the -- we were apprised of the proposal of the Prosecution to place in

21     evidence, presumably through the witness at present on the stand, this

22     document which they only recently were able to tender -- to seek to

23     tender in evidence, notwithstanding that they would have been aware of

24     the possibility of this at an earlier stage, and as far as the Chamber is

25     aware, neither the Chamber nor the other side was alerted to this.  But

Page 5493

 1     be that as it may, there is a procedural difficulty in as much as the

 2     Prosecution having closed -- having completed its examination-in-chief of

 3     the present witness and documents not merely coming in by migration, as

 4     it were.  The Chamber suggests that the procedural rules be tweaked, as

 5     it were, to invite or to allow the Prosecution to interpose at this stage

 6     the -- or interpose is the wrong word.  To re-open its

 7     examination-in-chief interrupting the cross-examination of Mr. Zecevic

 8     which is in process to deal with that document, and then after which

 9     Mr. Zecevic, followed by Mr. -- would resume his cross-examination,

10     followed by Mr. Pantelic.  Before the Chamber formally so orders, do

11     counsel on either side have a view as to that procedure?

12             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honour, I had been thinking about that and

13     thought that I would probably have to seek leave to re-open if I wanted

14     to show this document to Dr. Nielsen.  I also thought about the

15     possibility that perhaps later on the Prosecution would try to introduce

16     this remaining document that we had to get provider permission to use,

17     that we try to do it through a bar table motion or with a later witness.

18     I can do it now as the Court suggests, that might be the most expedient.

19     I'm happy to do that if that's agreeable with the Defence.

20             MR. ZECEVIC:  Your Honours, it was our understanding exactly that

21     due to the fact that this document was provided under Rule 70 basis, that

22     is why it came out so late in the proceedings, and it was our

23     understanding that Mr. Hannis will not be using this document with this

24     witness.  However, if he intends to use this document with this witness,

25     and direct him through this, then the only applicable solution, I think,

Page 5494

 1     would be what Your Honours have suggested, that he re-opens the case and

 2     then we continue the cross-examination.  We wouldn't have a problem with

 3     that.  Talking on behalf of Stanisic Defence.

 4             JUDGE HALL:  I don't know why I thought that he would not be

 5     using it in respect of this witness, but I may be mistaken.  Perhaps he

 6     can confirm this.

 7             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honour, when we made our original application

 8     to add, I think it was 17 documents to use with this witness.  This

 9     document was on that list until we realised that it was a Rule 70

10     document that we hadn't yet received permission to use in this case.

11     Then we filed an amended application removing that one and seeking leave

12     to admit 16 other documents related to the issue of the Cutileiro plan

13     and discussions and communications about that.  So it was originally

14     intended to be part of that whole package, but because we didn't receive

15     it in time and didn't actually have permission until we completed direct

16     exam of Dr. Nielsen, I didn't know what to do other than to seek

17     permission to add it and then try and figure out the best time and way

18     and possible witness to introduce it through.

19             JUDGE HALL:  But bottom, you did intend to use it with this

20     witness?

21             MR. HANNIS:  Originally, because it seemed to me a logical part

22     of that whole --

23             JUDGE HALL:  At this point?

24             MR. HANNIS:  Yes.

25             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.  Thank you, Mr. Hannis.  How much time do

Page 5495

 1     you need?

 2             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honour, five minutes, I would just ask

 3     Dr. Nielsen if he had seen this document and how did he see it as fitting

 4     in with the other documents in his view of whether or not the proposed

 5     separation and creation of a new Serb MUP was part of a Cutileiro plan or

 6     something else.

 7             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.

 8             Mr. Pantelic, do you have a view on this?

 9             MR. PANTELIC:  Your Honour, we don't have objection to this way,

10     to this proceedings.  However, it's not being deal, I think Mr. Hannis

11     will be mindful in terms of timing if he -- Prosecution will take these

12     five or ten minutes, and we are still, I don't know, 15 minutes on,

13     maybe, then tomorrow we could reserve -- we should do our best to finish

14     today, but you know, every minute is counting.  Thank you.

15             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.  So the Chamber rules that the

16     Prosecution may be permitted to re-open its examination-in-chief in order

17     to put this document to the witness who is at present on the stand.

18             Could the usher escort Dr. Nielsen back to the stand, please.

19             MR. PANTELIC:  And, Your Honours, during this --

20             JUDGE HALL:  Written reasons for this ruling will follow in

21     course.

22             Yes, Mr. Pantelic.

23             MR. PANTELIC:  Sorry, in the meantime, Your Honour, with your

24     permission, I would kindly request the Chamber to allow us the same

25     position in approach with cross-examination like Stanisic Defence because

Page 5496

 1     we split certain topics, and Mr. Krgovic will take first part of

 2     cross-examination, then I will finish with the other line.  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE HALL:  Certainly, Mr. Pantelic.

 4             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honour, the other matter that I wanted to

 5     raise, and it seems somewhat --

 6             JUDGE HALL:  Sorry, I forgot -- when I asked for the witness to

 7     be returned, I forgot that you, yourself, had a matter.

 8             Yes, Mr. Hannis.

 9             MR. HANNIS:  I feel a bit ungracious raising it at this time, but

10     it relates to the disclosure of documents to be used and cross-examined

11     by the Zupljanin Defence.  Last night at 6.20 I received an e-mail

12     listing some 27 new documents that I had previously not been notified of.

13     The original notification was received on December 14th when Mr. Nielsen

14     started testifying, at that time there was a list of nine documents.  On

15     the 16th of December, three additional documents were notified.  But now

16     I have 27 new documents, and I just want to issue a complaint about this.

17     You know, it's been a month since he was here, I don't understand why it

18     had to wait until last night at 6.20 to be advised of these 27 new

19     documents.  And I note that two of them are listed as still awaiting

20     translation.  You will recall that witness Nielsen was delayed from

21     testifying in September until December for the reason that there were

22     hundreds of documents that the Defence said they needed to have

23     translated before they could do his cross-examination.  And frankly, I

24     haven't seen that many translated documents used in the cross-examination

25     so far.  Thank you.

Page 5497

 1             JUDGE HALL:  Yes, Mr. Krgovic.

 2             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, these documents

 3     notified as going to be used for Mr. Nielsen are mainly notes from his

 4     report, and I may be using them during cross-examination because they

 5     concern certain answers provided by Mr. Nielsen to Mr. Zecevic and

 6     Mr. Cvijetic.  All these documents that I will be using that are on that

 7     list are Prosecutor documents.  Ninety-nine per cent of them have already

 8     been exhibited in this case.  Nielsen in his report mentions them.  So

 9     the Prosecution is not really taken by surprise nor are they really going

10     to be prejudiced by my use of these documents.

11             I indicated in my initial submission that I will be also using

12     the Prosecution's documents for Mr. Nielsen.  Most of my documents are in

13     fact on the Prosecution list.  The list of documents the Prosecutor

14     indicated he would be using with Mr. Nielsen, and they are part of his

15     package, so I don't think the Prosecution's objection is really well

16     grounded.

17             JUDGE HALL:  What about the -- you said 99 per cent, what about

18     the maybe 1 per cent which Mr. Hannis says have not yet been translated?

19             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, those are documents

20     that were provided to the Prosecution back in December.  All the

21     documents I will be using have been translated.  This is just part of the

22     wider list and footnotes.  I went through them and noted that some have

23     not been translated, and those I will not be using.  Because when my

24     case manager was making up this list of documents, I did not know that

25     some of these documents do not have translations, and those I will not be

Page 5498

 1     using in my cross-examination today.

 2             It's not my habit to use many documents in my examinations,

 3     especially not expert witnesses of the Prosecution.

 4             JUDGE HALL:  So, Mr. Krgovic, would a fair summary of your

 5     response to the Prosecution be that Mr. Hannis' apprehensions have no

 6     real basis and we can proceed, there should be no difficulties?

 7             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] [Microphone not activated] I just

 8     received information from my case manager that all the documents on my

 9     list are in fact documents referenced in the footnotes of Mr. Nielsen,

10     even that one document which seemed to be a problem.

11             MR. HANNIS:  If that's the case, Your Honour, I don't have any

12     problem with that because I certainly need to be familiar with the

13     documents that are in Mr. Nielsen's report.  But when I receive a list

14     first thing when I come in, in the morning, and it's not in numerical

15     order, all I have is list of document ID numbers, I don't know what it

16     is, that's and why I raised my complaint.

17             JUDGE HALL:  Yes.  Could the usher escorted Dr. Nielsen to the

18     stand, please, thank you.

19                           [The witness takes the stand]

20             JUDGE HALL:  Good morning, Dr. Nielsen, I remind you that you are

21     still on your oath.

22             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honour.

23             JUDGE HALL:  Before Mr. Zecevic resumes his cross-examination,

24     the Chamber has ruled that the Prosecution be permitted to re-open its

25     examination-in-chief in order to deal with certain documents which they

Page 5499

 1     have only recently come to be in a position to put to you.  So I would

 2     now invite Mr. Hannis to deal with that matter.

 3                           WITNESS:  CHRISTIAN NIELSEN [Resumed]

 4                           Examination by Mr. Hannis: [Continued]

 5        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Nielsen, there's just one document I want to ask

 6     you about.  It's 65 ter number 3464.  Your Honours, I'm advised by my

 7     case manager it's not in e-court yet, but we can use Sanction to bring it

 8     up on the screen for the witness.  And this relates to the issue,

 9     Dr. Nielsen, that we talked about concerning the Defence position that

10     the separation of the MUP and the creation of a separate Serbian MUP was,

11     according to them, pursuant to an agreement or part of the Cutileiro plan

12     or agreement.  You recall that discussion?

13        A.   Yes, I recall that discussion.

14        Q.   And this document is one letter that we had that was not

15     available to us when you were doing your direct testimony back in

16     December.  Waiting to see if we can get it up through Sanction for you.

17             Do you see that on your screen now?  It's a document dated the

18     12th of June, 1992, from Mr. Cutileiro to Dr. Karadzic.

19        A.   Yes, I see the document now.

20        Q.   Do you recall if you had a chance to see that document before you

21     began your testimony?

22        A.   I do believe that that is a document that I have seen before

23     testifying, yes.

24        Q.   And based on the date of that document, 12 June 1992, and the

25     content, can you tell us what your view is regarding this letter in

Page 5500

 1     connection with the claim that the separation and creation of separate

 2     Serbian MUP was being done pursuant to the so-called Cutileiro agreement

 3     or plan?

 4        A.   Well, this is one of the documents upon which I base my

 5     conclusion that it is erroneous to refer to a Cutileiro plan or

 6     agreement.  As I stated repeatedly, I regard what Mr. Cutileiro was

 7     pursuing as a framework for further negotiations, and I think that

 8     Mr. Cutileiro's document or letter of the 12th of June, 1992, which we

 9     have in front of us here, confirms precisely that, in the sense that he

10     is telling Mr. or Dr. Karadzic that the only way to bring peace to Bosnia

11     and Herzegovina is through negotiation and that territorial claims which

12     have been pursued by force are totally unacceptable.

13             He also in the final paragraph alluding to Mr. Karadzic's

14     letters, notes that, "... no promises have been made and that we reached

15     an agreement on the 18th of March on a set of principles.  The validity

16     of that agreement, however," - he goes on it to say - "can only be upheld

17     if borders and competences of the contingent units be defined by

18     negotiated consensus and not by force ..."

19             Again that, to me, indicates that what Mr. Cutileiro thought was

20     in place was a framework for negotiations and not a final agreement to

21     divide the country internally.

22             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you, Dr. Nielsen.  I have no further

23     questions, Your Honour, I would tender document 3464 and close my direct

24     examination for the second time.  Thank you.

25             JUDGE HALL:  Admitted and marked.

Page 5501

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit P507, Your Honours.

 2             JUDGE HALL:  Yes, Mr. Zecevic.

 3             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 4                           Cross-examination by Mr. Zecevic:  [Continued]

 5        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Nielsen, since in view of this supplementary

 6     examination-in-chief, we have not learned anything new with respect to

 7     your views already expressed by you, I'm going to pick up where I left

 8     off yesterday.

 9             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Can you please look at P160.  Can

10     the witness please be given the binders with documents.  That's number 10

11     in your binder.  Can we please have page 21.

12        Q.   You have reviewed this document, sir.  It is a summary of a

13     meeting of senior officials held in Belgrade on the 11th of June, 1992,

14     and you have made several references to this document in your report; is

15     that correct?

16        A.   That is correct, sir.

17        Q.   On page 20 in B/C/S and 21 in the English, we have the

18     conclusions adopted at this meeting of the 11th of July.

19             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have page 20 in B/C/S

20     and page 21 in English in e-court.

21        Q.   Sir, you can see -- please, page 20.

22             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] When I opened e-court yesterday, I

23     noticed that it was page 20 in the Serbian version.  I have just been

24     told that it's actually 23.  I apologise.  The English page is okay.

25        Q.   You can see conclusion number 1.  And in this conclusion the

Page 5502

 1     second sentence begins by saying:

 2             "In doing so, complete constitutionality legality must be

 3     ensured, as well as independence without the influence of individual

 4     groups, [indiscernible], or parties."  Can you see that portion of this

 5     conclusion?

 6        A.   Yes, I can see that.

 7        Q.   You will agree with me that it is obvious that the Ministry of

 8     the Interior and the minister in particular had a problem with certain

 9     number of outside influences coming from individuals, groups factions in

10     the territory, and that is why they have highlighted this as a problem?

11        A.   That was indeed one of the major topics of discussion at that

12     meeting.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please look at page 27.  I

15     suppose that's page 30 in B/C/S and 27 in English.  I'm talking about

16     item 14.

17        Q.   I asked you yesterday about deportation, and it's been dealt with

18     in the last paragraph.  You can see that here as one of the problems that

19     is being discussed at this meeting of the 11th of July is the resolution

20     of the problem of residents of certain villages moving out who are not

21     within the jurisdiction of the MUP, but there is a desire to attribute

22     this to the MUP.  You would agree with me that that was also one of the

23     problems that was very seriously discussed at this 11th of July meeting;

24     is that right?

25        A.   I would certainly agree that that was a major topic of

Page 5503

 1     discussion.  I would agree that not only in this document, but also in

 2     numerous other documents that I quote in my report, the MUP complains -

 3     and this goes back to Judge Harhoff's question of yesterday - the MUP

 4     complains that the army is without any selection criteria rounding up

 5     large numbers of especially Bosnian Muslims and that MUP uses the term

 6     "dumping" them in facilities which the MUP is then forced to guard or

 7     take care of, and indeed Mr. Zupljanin mentions this at this meeting.

 8     It's also reflected a week later in the instructions that are issued by

 9     the minister pursuant to this meeting.

10        Q.   You will certainly agree with me, but thank you for this

11     exhaustive answer, you will agree with me that it is obvious that these

12     two facts that we have just discussed, that is the influence from certain

13     individuals and the situation on the ground which involved the bringing

14     in of a large number of Muslims and exerting pressure on the MUP to

15     provide securities for such collection centres, and the moving out of

16     people were problems, and that the MUP had a kind of negative attitude

17     towards this, actually, they were criticizing this kind of conduct?

18        A.   I, again, agree with you that this is one of the major problems

19     that is faced by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the summer of 1992.

20     It is a problem that is frequently discussed.  It is one of the reasons

21     why already in July 1992 the RS Ministry of Internal Affairs is trying to

22     transfer responsibility of detention facilities such as Omarska to the

23     army.  As I said, to get out of the business of running or being

24     responsible for detention facilities.

25             I would also note that it is of course the case that there are

Page 5504

 1     detention facilities established in the RS at this point which were

 2     established originally as police facilities and not by the army.

 3        Q.   Sir, yesterday you discussed this with my friend and you

 4     confirmed that Omarska, Keraterm, and the like had been set up pursuant

 5     to a decision issued by the Crisis Staff; is that right?  You said that

 6     the fact was that a member of the police, Mr. Simo Drljaca, was a member

 7     of the Crisis Staff.  Do you remember that response of yours?

 8        A.   Yes, Mr. Simo Drljaca as a chief of the public security station

 9     of Prijedor municipality was a member of the Prijedor Crisis Staff, and

10     he implemented not only that decision of the Crisis Staff but regularly

11     implemented decisions of the Prijedor Crisis Staff, just as did his

12     police colleagues at other Crisis Staffs in the country or in -- excuse

13     me, in Republika Srpska in the summer of 1992.

14        Q.   Well, that happened because that was done by the Crisis Staffs;

15     is that right?

16        A.   I'm not sure that I understand your question.  Are you saying

17     that people such as Mr. Drljaca made those decisions or implemented those

18     decisions because they were themselves appointed by the Crisis Staffs?

19        Q.   Yes, Mr. Simo Drljaca was appointed by the Crisis Staff and so

20     was Mr. Vrucinic as well as a large number of individuals who were chiefs

21     of public security stations; is that right?

22        A.   Certainly it is the case that a large number of police officials

23     at the municipal level were appointed by the Crisis Staffs.  However, the

24     Crisis Staffs also in many cases confirmed the existing SRBiH MUP

25     appointments of police officials, and most of the police officials who

Page 5505

 1     were appointed by the Crisis Staffs were later confirmed by RS MUP as

 2     employees of that ministry.

 3        Q.   Yes, in 1993 and 1994 and onwards.  Sir, isn't it true that in

 4     the instruction on the work of Crisis Staffs issued by the government of

 5     Republika Srpska - that's Exhibit P70, we don't need it on our screens -

 6     it is explicitly stated, and you have quoted this in paragraph 205 of

 7     your report, that "the command of the army and the police will remain in

 8     the hands of professional organs rather than the Crisis Staffs."  Do you

 9     remember that?

10        A.   Yeah, this is the case, and it is also the case that the role of

11     Crisis Staffs is one of the most frequently discussed topics at meetings

12     of the RS MUP in the course of 1992.

13        Q.   You certainly know that on the 23rd of May, that P270 requested

14     for the Crisis Staffs to be disbanded and abolished, are you aware of

15     that?  I apologise for the transcript, it's P217.  That's minutes of the

16     meeting of the government session.

17        A.   I'm not personally aware of that.  I would defer to my

18     colleague's report on the Crisis Staffs on that point.

19        Q.   Can you please look at this document, it's number 17 in your

20     binder.

21             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Exhibit P217.

22        Q.   Item 4 reads, the minutes of the meetings of the government of

23     the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, item 4:  "It has been

24     concluded to undertake measures to abolish Crisis Staffs."  Can you see

25     that?

Page 5506

 1        A.   I see that, that is what the document says.  We both know that

 2     the Crisis Staffs, nevertheless, continued to exist for quite some time

 3     after that date.

 4        Q.   I agree with you.  However, already on the 24th of May, there was

 5     an attempt to set up War Presidency and then on the 31st of May, Karadzic

 6     again ordered War Presidency to be set up, and then the Serbian

 7     Democratic Party on the 31st of May insisted on the Crisis Staffs to be

 8     abolished, and then on the 10th of June Karadzic came up with a new

 9     proposal or, rather, an order to establish war commissioner offices.  Is

10     this how this process concerning Crisis Staff developed?

11        A.   I believe that what you just summarised is reflected in the

12     report of my colleague, Ms. Hanson, and also the report of

13     Patrick Treanor.

14        Q.   The fact is also that in the September amendments to the

15     constitution, abolished the Crisis Staffs; is that right?

16        A.   I don't doubt that.  That would be accurately reflecting the

17     trend in the summer of 1992, which is to centralise power and to abolish

18     decision-making, or restrict decision-making, rather, at the municipal

19     and regional levels.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Just for reference, that the

22     amendment to the constitutions are Exhibit 1794 according to 65 ter.

23        Q.   Now, a slight digression, in paragraph 212 and your footnote 255,

24     we discussed yesterday the statements made by politicians and what kind

25     of influence it had and what kind of weight they carry with regard to

Page 5507

 1     other documents.  In paragraph 212 and the footnote 255, you quote a

 2     letter sent to the media written by Mr. Mico Stanisic in April 1992.  Do

 3     you remember that?

 4        A.   Yes, I remember that.

 5        Q.   In this letter, he speaks about -- and this is what you cite in

 6     your report, about over 4.000 active-duty policemen and several tens of

 7     thousands of reserve police officers who were keeping under control about

 8     70 per cent of the territory.  This is what the letter states; is that

 9     right?

10        A.   I don't have the letter in front of me, but, yes, that's how I've

11     quoted it.  Yes.

12        Q.   And you have quoted this letter of his; however, at the same time

13     several times in your report you cited 279 65 ter document.  It's 28 in

14     your binder.

15             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have it in e-court.

16     275 [as interpreted] according to 65 ter.

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the counsel please repeat page numbers.

18             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Mr. Zecevic, the interpreter is asking if you

19     could repeat the page numbers.

20             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise.  I was away from the

21     microphone.  It's page 6 in B/C/S and page 8 in English.

22             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Zecevic, number 28 in your binder is not 275

23     of the 65 ter list but is 279 of the 65 ter list.

24             MR. ZECEVIC:  I said 279, Your Honours.

25             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Okay.  In the record it's -- in the transcript

Page 5508

 1     it's 275.

 2             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm so sorry.

 3        Q.   [Interpretation] Sir, you remember quoting this document several

 4     times in your report; is that right?

 5        A.   Yes, in fact, I have an entire section of the report about that

 6     report.

 7             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Obviously in the Serbian version

 8     for some reason I have the wrong page.  But since I don't have much time,

 9     the English pages -- good, now I'm been told that this is page number 10

10     in B/C/S.

11        Q.   Mr. Nielsen, in the original document it's page 6, the last

12     paragraph, and in e-court it's the second paragraph from the top which

13     says:

14             "By the beginning of April, 12.000" --

15             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] No, the English page was good,

16     please, we had problem with the page in B/C/S.  Can we please have page 8

17     in English, second paragraph from the top.  We don't need anything else.

18     Leave it as it is.

19        Q.   It reads here that, in the final annual report of the MUP, that:

20             "By the beginning of April, there were under 10.000 reserve

21     police officers and almost 3.000 active duty policemen which makes a

22     total of 12.600."

23             Can you see that?

24        A.   Yes, I can see that.

25        Q.   This is apparently in contradiction with what Mr. Stanisic

Page 5509

 1     mentioned in his letter to the media, which he wrote as a politician.

 2     There's a huge difference.  He mentions several tens of thousands,

 3     whereas in this official document, we have the figure which is below

 4     10.000.

 5             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honours, I object.  That's misleading.  The

 6     statement by Mr. Stanisic was on the 18th of April.  The report is

 7     referring to the beginning of April.

 8             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Hannis, even if we are

 9     talking about early April or the first half of April, if you think that

10     in three days alone you can recruit many tens of thousands, then

11     obviously we have a problem.

12             Can the witness answer my question.

13             THE WITNESS:  I have it to admit that I'm a bit surprised that

14     you are characterising Mr. Stanisic as a politician, when I understand

15     that you are in fact trying to portray him as a professional police

16     officer.  The fact of the matter is that he said what he said on the 18th

17     of April, 1992.  If it is the case that he is exaggerating compared to

18     what is in the RS MUP 1992 annual report, then I certainly accept that

19     point.  I would point out that in paragraph 212, I do not comment at all

20     on Mr. Stanisic's statement.  I just say that that is what he stated.

21             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   I'm extremely grateful to you.  All I'm asking is why in your

23     paragraph 212 you did not provide any comment on these facts that I have

24     just put to you, unlike what Mr. Stanisic quoted in his letter to the

25     media, in this annual report we have completely different data.  That was

Page 5510

 1     my question.

 2        A.   On the contrary, it is I who am extremely grateful to you.  I

 3     look forward to incorporating that more subtle point in the next version

 4     of this report.

 5        Q.   Thank you very much.

 6             Mr. Nielsen, when you speak about Special Police units, primarily

 7     the Special Police brigade, isn't it true that this kind of formation as

 8     an anti-terrorist unit existed in the MUP of the Socialist Republic of

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina?

10        A.   That is correct, and I state so in my report.  There was one unit

11     that existed in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

12        Q.   And this Special Police brigade commanded by Mr. Karisik was

13     referenced by you in a document which is 1861, 65 ter, and that's number

14     30 in your binder.  That is, in fact, a list relating to this unit from

15     May 1992, and it is stated that it numbers 170 men.

16        A.   Yes, I remember that.  For purposes of clarity, we should just be

17     very precise and note that Mr. Karisik was the commander of the RS MUP

18     Special Police brigade and not the SRBiH MUP unit to which we previously

19     referred.

20        Q.   Thank you.  In item 220 of your report, you say that this

21     Special Police brigade of the RS MUP established its detachments in the

22     territory attached to CSBs in September 1992.

23        A.   What I wrote is that in the course of the late summer of 1992, in

24     the autumn of 1992, certain "Special Police units" that were swarming all

25     over the RS, also at the CSB level, were largely disbanded with the

Page 5511

 1     intent to centralise Internal Affairs and consolidate control of the

 2     remaining special units under the charge of Mr. Karisik and the

 3     Special Brigade of the police.

 4        Q.   Mr. Nielsen, you will agree with me that at the time, i.e., from

 5     April until the end of summer 1992, it was fashionable, as it were, for

 6     everyone in every municipality to set up special detachment, intervention

 7     detachments and things like that, and this was mainly done by the

 8     Crisis Staffs; is that right?

 9        A.   I agree with you that it was the case.  As I've stated

10     previously, that virtually any person with a bit of weaponry, a few

11     buddies, and surplus of testosterone was forming special units during the

12     summer of 1992.

13        Q.   Thank you very much.  You are aware that, for example, in

14     Trebinje there was a Special Police unit formed back in October 1991 when

15     neither the MUP of Republika Srpska or nor Republika Srpska itself

16     existed.  This unit was headed by Alija Delimustafic.  This unit actually

17     didn't have a proper structure.  They just gathered together, as you've

18     just described, those were armed individuals, they proclaimed themselves

19     to be Special Police units, and then they would go on to carry out

20     looting and plunder.

21        A.   Well, I'm certainly aware of the existence of Special Police

22     units formed in the autumn of 1991 in the Trebinje east Herzegovina area.

23     However, I'm not aware that any such unit was headed by

24     Alija Delimustafic.

25        Q.   I said that it was created that at the time when the MUP minister

Page 5512

 1     of the SR B&H was Alija Delimustafic, and that is when neither the MUP

 2     nor Republika Srpska itself existed at that time.

 3        A.   That is correct.  And I believe that unit to which you are

 4     referring is in fact dealt with in the RS MUP draft annual report where

 5     it is noted that that unit was formed without the awareness of the

 6     officials in Sarajevo.

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Counsel, please wait for the interpretation.

 8             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] [Overlapping speakers] ...

 9     27th July, 1992, and that's 65 ter 307 in your binder 37.  An order from

10     Mr. Mico Stanisic dated 27 July.  It's your number 37.  Paras 4 and 5.

11        Q.   He orders that all special units established during the war in

12     CSB areas be disbanded immediately and placed under the command of the

13     Army of Republika Srpska along with all their members, and he says as the

14     process of replenishing police units was under way, that's the Karisik

15     brigade, all individuals who meet certain criteria may apply to be

16     admitted into the platoons of this Special Brigade; is that right?

17        A.   That is correct, and I cite that document in the report for that

18     reason.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             Let's move to a new subject.  The question of reporting, you deal

21     with it in paragraph 236 and onwards.  I must tell you that I found ten

22     documents, orders and intercessions by the Ministry of the Interior

23     beginning with 18 April, all the way up to October 1992, expressing

24     frustration over the problem of deficits in reporting.  Do you agree,

25     having seen all this documentation, that there was a huge problem with

Page 5513

 1     reporting within the MUP, lack of reports by Security Services Centre and

 2     police stations?

 3        A.   I agree with you that communication was one of the major

 4     structural hurdles that RS MUP faced particularly in the summer of 1992.

 5     That is reflected not only in the draft annual report, it is reflected

 6     amply in the minister's comments in the 11 July 1992 meeting, and in

 7     fact, in the very fact that they were meeting in Belgrade because it was

 8     the only place they claimed that they could in fact meet at that time.

 9        Q.   Thank you so much.  I'd like you to go back to 65 ter 279, the

10     one we just mentioned some time ago, the annual progress report.  English

11     page 28.

12             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I'm told by my colleagues that the

13     answer of Mr. Nielsen is written into my previous question.  I suppose

14     his answer begins with the word "I agree" at 21, 18.

15             Will this be enough to correct the transcript or shall I ask the

16     witness to repeat?

17        Q.   Sir, I asked you to go back to document 65 ter 279, and that's

18     your -- it's in your binder.  It's page 28, and in English it's page 23.

19     It says there that on the average in all lines of work in the seat of the

20     MUP, 15 dispatches were sent and 16 were received.  That's the third

21     paragraph on that page.  In English it's the second paragraph from the

22     top.  "On average, 15 dispatches a day were sent..." et cetera.

23        A.   Yes, I see that passage.

24        Q.   You will agree with me that bearing in mind that there were five

25     Security Services Centres, CSBs, and by the nature of things each CSB

Page 5514

 1     delivered its daily report at least once a day, and the CSBs also

 2     provided a daily report along the national security line, each CSB on

 3     average sent three dispatches or telegrams a day to the MUP?

 4        A.   I am quite sure that your arithmetic skills are better than mine.

 5     I would just note that helpfully the colleagues in RS MUP did the

 6     computations for us, and that still adds up to over 4.000 dispatches

 7     going in each direction over a nine-month period.

 8        Q.   I know, but that's precisely why I am presenting this to you.

 9     Two out of three every day are daily reports, so on all other issues only

10     one report a day was sent by a CSB to the MUP to deal with all the other

11     matters, all the other lines of work.  I'm talking about average values,

12     of course.

13        A.   I certainly understand your point.  I would just note that the

14     daily reports which you seem to be marginalising in your comments often

15     contained, and indeed were supposed to on the minister's instructions,

16     contain all of the critical information that the ministry needed to do

17     its work on a daily basis.  So I would not minimise the significance that

18     they were receiving such reports.

19             I would also note as an analyst that when we say one dispatch,

20     that could be one sentence, it could also be a much larger dispatch.  So

21     it's very difficult to generalise here.  My impression, certainly as an

22     analyst given the mountains of documentation I had to hike through, is

23     that there was a quite substantial amount of information exchange and

24     communication going on during this period.

25        Q.   When you were talking about these daily reports, have you ever

Page 5515

 1     compared the contents of these daily reports that arrived from the ground

 2     covering events and developments that were ongoing or had just happened

 3     on that territory, have you ever made that comparison?

 4        A.   Yes, I have in some cases, for the sake of my own curiosity, made

 5     such a comparison.  And I'm sure, like the minister, and as is reflected

 6     in the minister's admonishments to his subordinates, one can often be

 7     dismayed by the sparseness of the information provided.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Regarding discipline, Mr. Nielsen, you discuss it in

 9     paragraph 227 of your report.  Yesterday, my colleague mentioned 1D54,

10     the rules on disciplinary responsibility adopted by Minister Stanisic.

11     And you said, if I remember correctly, you had not reviewed these rules?

12        A.   I believe that I said that I was familiar with the document, but

13     that I had not reviewed the rules in detail in comparison to the earlier

14     SRBiH rules on disciplinary responsibility.

15        Q.   So we cannot really discuss it, but if I tell you that this

16     document, the rules adopted in the summer of 1992 on disciplinary

17     responsibility shortened the dead-line for starting disciplinary

18     proceedings and doubled the statute of limitations and simplified the

19     procedure for establishing disciplinary responsibility making it speedier

20     and more efficient, would you, from your expert point of view, consider

21     that an adequate step by the Ministry of the Interior?

22        A.   I don't think that I would like to comment on what I would

23     consider adequate or inadequate.  I would certainly agree provisionally,

24     as I did already yesterday in answer to your colleague's question, that

25     it does seem that they are streamlining the rules on disciplinary

Page 5516

 1     procedures, statutes of limitations and such.  From my point of view, the

 2     major innovation or the most interesting innovation seems to be point

 3     number 1 in the 23rd July confidential order which I cite in paragraph

 4     227 of my report, and that is, the move to transfer those employees of

 5     MUP who have committed criminal acts, except political and verbal

 6     misdemeanours, and to put them at the disposal of the VRS.

 7        Q.   But, sir, you are certainly aware since you quote from these

 8     documents, that the document does not say that they are amnestied from

 9     their criminal or disciplinary responsibility?

10        A.   I am aware that the document in question does not offer an

11     amnesty from criminal or disciplinary responsibility.  And I know that

12     this issue has been discussed previously in this trial.  I would just

13     note, and I give one very specific case, that of the deaths at

14     Koricanska Stijena in August 1992 where the RS MUP's own investigation is

15     effectively terminated merely because the officers suspected in

16     participating in the killings at Koricanska Stijena are currently

17     subordinated to the VRS and are involved in combat activities.  That is

18     the response that is given back up to the minister of Internal Affairs.

19        Q.   Sir, I'm sure that the Zupljanin Defence will discuss the matter

20     of Koricanska Stijena with you.  However, the fact is that the criminal

21     report about that event was filed to the competent prosecutor's Office

22     and competent court.  Do you know that?

23        A.   I recall from other cases at this court that that is the case,

24     and that those police officers who were already in August and September

25     1992 suspected in participating in those activities were not in fact

Page 5517

 1     prosecuted until much, much later.

 2        Q.   Sir, the gist is this:  The competent authorities did everything

 3     that they were duty-bound by the law to do at the time, and they filed a

 4     criminal report against an unidentified perpetrator long before they

 5     realised that there was police involvement in the event.  Do you know

 6     that?

 7        A.   Well, I am, again, aware that a criminal report was filed.  My

 8     account based on the available RS MUP documentation is to be found in

 9     paragraphs 327 and 328, but, yes, I am aware that such a report was

10     filed.  I note that on 14th September, 1992, Simo Drljaca, and I'm

11     quoting here from page 327 of my report "... responded that an

12     investigation could not be carried out because the officers who had

13     participated in the convoy on 21 August were currently deployed on the

14     battle-field."  So that is what I meant by my earlier statement.

15        Q.   As I said, you will probably discuss that with the

16     Zupljanin Defence.

17             The fact is that before the document you quote from, a criminal

18     report had already been filed to the prosecutor and the court, whereas

19     the police continued with their investigation trying to identify the

20     people involved.

21             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] However, the time that the Defence

22     team of Mr. Zupljanin generously granted me has expired.  I have no

23     further questions for this witness.

24             Thank you, Witness.

25             JUDGE HALL:  Mr. Krgovic, before you begin your

Page 5518

 1     cross-examination, there is a question which the Chamber in the person of

 2     Judge Harhoff has of Dr. Nielsen.

 3             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Thank you.  And the reason I put this question to

 4     Mr. Nielsen at this point is to allow you, Mr. Zecevic, before we go on

 5     for the break, to use the answers that Mr. Nielsen is going to provide to

 6     my questions if you so wish.

 7             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you very much, Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE HARHOFF:  And the question that I have for you,

 9     Mr. Nielsen, are two.

10             Namely, first, there seem to be a duplicity in the answers that

11     you gave to Mr. Zecevic regarding the information that was provided to

12     the ministry from the institutions below.  Namely, in your first answer

13     in which you said that the flow of communication was poor, it was a big

14     problem, it was discussed at every meeting throughout the summer and the

15     early fall of 1992.  And you ended up by saying that, well, maybe it was

16     poor, the information, but certainly a substantial flow of information

17     was in fact provided to the ministry from the institutions below it.

18     First of all, of course, the CSBs.

19             My second question is put to you as an expert on the MUP, namely,

20     what was the system of digesting information in the MUP at the time?  My

21     question is really, the daily bulletins that came from various bodies in

22     the field, so to say, and sent to the MUP, how were they treated and how

23     were they synchronised and synthesized up through the ministry levels to

24     the minister's desk?  Do you know how this worked, and can you tell us?

25             THE WITNESS:  Thank you for your questions, Your Honour.  The

Page 5519

 1     duplicity that you observe in the answers, as you put it, is in fact a

 2     duplicity that I'm reflecting as an analyst because it's present in the

 3     MUP's own documentation.  It is not the -- the problems concerning

 4     information are not unique in this respect.  There are a number of other

 5     problems that they discuss again and again and again, and clearly

 6     consider to be among the most substantial obstacles that they face.  But

 7     where you see that on a day-to-day basis, they manage to get by, they

 8     manage to get the information that they need, they manage to get the job

 9     done, as it were, I would note that the daily bulletins that came from

10     these various subordinate bodies in the field are only, as we discussed

11     earlier, one type of information that is sent to the RS MUP.  There is a

12     very, very substantial amount of documentation.  If you look at the

13     collections that the Office of the Prosecutor for Prijedor, for

14     Banja Luka, you can see on a daily basis things that start at the village

15     level in the Prijedor area being reported up to the municipality, the SJB

16     public security station level.  Being reported on to the regional level

17     in Banja Luka, and then being reported up to the ministry in Pale or

18     Bijeljina as was the case, and the other way around.

19             And of course, we see that things are being delivered by courier.

20     We see that innovations are being made, such as at one point the need to

21     bounce radio signals from eastern Herzegovina first through Montenegro

22     and then back into Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to be able to communicate.

23     But through various ingenious and creative methods such as these and the

24     sheer weight and amount of documentation that we have been able to find

25     for the period from April 1992 until the end of 1992, I, as an analyst,

Page 5520

 1     am left with the impression of a ministry in which communication was at

 2     times extremely difficult, but there was regularly ongoing communication

 3     because quick fixes and work-arounds were found to remedy a difficult

 4     situation on the ground.

 5             In response to your second question, without going into too much

 6     detail with specific respect to the daily bulletins, a lot of it was, as

 7     one can see, cut-and-paste work, so the -- once the reports start coming

 8     in the second half of April 1992, you can see a report that is being sent

 9     from Prijedor to Banja Luka, reporting on some incident or something

10     that's relevant for the security in that operational area.  The exact

11     same sentence, literally verbatim, is cut and pasted into the report that

12     the CSB in Banja Luka or Sarajevo or Trebinje sends up to the ministry,

13     and that again, that exact same sentence, is then cut and pasted into the

14     daily bulletin of the ministry itself, which the ministry was providing

15     and had been asked to provide to the Presidency of the republic and to

16     the government, and in some case, as I note in my report, this would also

17     be sent to Belgrade so that authorities in Belgrade would be aware of

18     what was ongoing.

19             These reports, these daily bulletins as well as other

20     information, was then collated, there was a specific analytical

21     department within the MUP that was responsible and that exists to this

22     day in the RS MUP, an analytical department which was responsible for

23     collating, storing, and preserving these reports and producing the types

24     of quarterly, semi-annual, and annual report that I also cite in my

25     report.

Page 5521

 1             That kind of analytical informational department is present in

 2     the ministry itself.  It's also present at the municipal and the regional

 3     level, and that's reflected in the rule book on internal organisation.

 4     So this is why we also at the municipal and regional level are getting

 5     quarterly and annual or, rather, in 1992 nine-month reports.  So there is

 6     an ongoing collation of information, and there are responsible officials

 7     in the ministry whose job it is to make sure that long-term trends in,

 8     for example, crime are spotted and are directed to the attention of the

 9     appropriate officials in the ministry.

10             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Just two questions, Your Honour.

11     If I may ask my two questions and then take the break.

12             JUDGE HALL:  Yes, Mr. Zecevic.

13             MR. ZECEVIC:  [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

14                           Further Cross-examination by Mr. Zecevic:

15        Q.   When you were looking at these daily reports submitted by the MUP

16     to the Presidency and on, didn't you notice that in a great number of

17     them there is a note, no reports available from two CSBs each day?

18        A.   Almost certainly there are periods of two, even five days where,

19     for example, Doboj would not be able to put a report through.

20        Q.   You know that there had been cases when some CSBs were not in

21     contact with the ministry for two or three weeks on end?

22        A.   I know that there are periods in which some CSBs were, for

23     example, without electricity.  And that is the cases in which, as I know,

24     previous witnesses have said who worked in the ministry work-arounds were

25     found through couriers, for example.

Page 5522

 1        Q.   I know, but some areas were not accessible, even to couriers, and

 2     if anything is sent by courier, it can arrive ten days later.

 3             Just one more thing, since war is raging throughout the

 4     territory, the ministry from a territory of one CSB covering ten police

 5     stations receives one report per day.  In your view does that really

 6     reflect the level of information available to the ministry in terms of

 7     its inadequacy?

 8        A.   Well, I'm not certain if -- which -- indeed if you are referring

 9     to a specific CSB in your question.  But I think the most appropriate

10     measuring stick is really if one goes through the analytical work of

11     assembling in a database, as I have done all the dispatches going one way

12     and going the other way, you see very considerable and regular traffic,

13     and the bottom line is that if we take as the measuring stick this

14     important 11 July 1992 meeting of all the leading officials of the

15     ministry in which they are discussing all the most pertinent problems, we

16     certainly see that in the middle of a raging war, as you put it, they are

17     aware of all the most considerable problems confronting the ministry

18     without the RS.

19        Q.   One last question.  That meeting of the collegium on the

20     11th July is the first meeting of the collegium?

21        A.   No, that is not correct because Mr. Zupljanin refers accurately,

22     It's been a long time since we've seen each other in Sarajevo, he says.

23        Q.   Well, I suppose he is referring to the time before the war, and

24     that's why he says it's been a long time.

25             Thank you --

Page 5523

 1        A.   Not precisely, because there was, in fact, and it's cited in my

 2     report, a collegium that did meet in, on, I believe, the 14th of April,

 3     in Sarajevo.

 4        Q.   That's the collegium meeting in Drace when none of the

 5     representatives of other CSBs were present.  I'm asking you about

 6     meetings of all CSB representatives together with the minister, that

 7     happened for the first time on 11th July?

 8        A.   Yes, with that consideration, I agree.

 9             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, no further questions.

10             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.  We take the break now and resume in

11     20 minutes.

12                           [The witness stands down]

13                           --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.

14                           --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

15             MR. ZECEVIC:  Your Honours, I'm sorry, due to the haste I was

16     cross-examining, I failed to -- I omitted to offer a certain document for

17     admission.  It's 65 ter 307, and I was commenting it with the witness and

18     then I moved on.  I would ask the Trial Chamber to admit this document as

19     an MFI document, and I discussed that with my learned friend

20     Mr. Tom Hannis from the Prosecution, due to the fact that there is a

21     certain problem with the English translation of the original document.

22     Therefore I would move the Trial Chamber to admit the document as an MFI

23     pending additional reconsideration by the CLSS on the translation of the

24     document.

25             JUDGE HALL:  Yes, Mr. Zecevic.  Which document is this, please?

Page 5524

 1             MR. ZECEVIC:  65 ter 307.  Thank you very much.

 2             JUDGE HALL:  Yes.  So marked for identification.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, the document will become

 4     Exhibit 1D176, marked for identification.

 5             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you very much, Your Honours, I appreciate it.

 6             JUDGE HALL:  Would the usher kindly escort the witness back to

 7     the stand, please.

 8                           [The witness takes the stand]

 9             JUDGE HALL:  Yes, Mr. Krgovic.

10             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.

11                           Cross-examination by Mr. Krgovic:

12        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Nielsen.

13        A.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Krgovic.

14        Q.   My name is Dragan Krgovic.  I'm on the Stojan Zupljanin Defence

15     team, and I'm going to ask you a number of questions relating either to

16     your report or to your evidence given so far in this case.  In order to

17     assist the Chamber since you understand our language, I would kindly ask

18     you for us to pause between questions and answers to avoid overlapping,

19     despite all the warnings coming from the Trial Chamber, I'm not very

20     disciplined in that area, but let us try and make life easier for

21     everyone.

22             Mr. Nielsen, as far as I could discern from your CV and from your

23     testimony so far, you have no formal education in the area of police

24     matters; is that right?

25        A.   That is correct.  My training is as a historian, not as a police

Page 5525

 1     officer.

 2        Q.   And you didn't finish a police academy or any other similar

 3     course that deals with police matters; is that right?

 4        A.   That is correct.  I've not taken any professional police

 5     training.

 6        Q.   And you have never worked in the police; right?

 7        A.   That is correct.  I have had the pleasure of working with the

 8     police, but not in the police.

 9        Q.   And you have never been brought in by the police and you didn't

10     have an opportunity to experience how the police operate, probably people

11     who have frequent contact with the police have more familiarity with

12     their work than ordinary citizens, wouldn't you agree with me?

13        A.   Well, I certainly don't have a criminal record, but I do have

14     some experience in how the police operates because I have on a number of

15     occasions executed search warrants together with police officers.

16        Q.   What I would like to establish before I ask you a question is the

17     following:  You also are neither a legal nor a military expert; is that

18     right?

19        A.   That is absolutely correct.

20        Q.   This is crucial because sometimes you use some police terms and

21     some military terms, and when you do so, how shall I put it, you construe

22     them and understand them as an educated person or a person who is well

23     educated.  But when you do so, you provide your interpretation of these

24     terms from your own angle; is that right?

25        A.   I do primarily look at these terms from the angle of a historian

Page 5526

 1     who, as I've noted previously, has extensively worked on police in the

 2     Yugoslavia -- former Yugoslavia.  Where I'm in doubt in terms of military

 3     or police terms, I look particularly at the way the RS MUP, for example,

 4     itself uses those terms, and as you will see in my footnotes, on a number

 5     of occasions, I make reference to a Serbian dictionary of police terms.

 6             I should note as well, I think this is the appropriate time, that

 7     I was on one occasion in 2008 retained by the organisation for security

 8     and co-operation in Europe as an advisor to the MUP of Serbia.

 9        Q.   In your report I have noticed in places that you are using the

10     term a "war crime."  Would you agree with me on that?  Shall I give you a

11     reference, a particular reference?

12        A.   I don't think a particular reference is necessary.  I quite

13     certainly recall that I did use that term, and my use of that term, as

14     far as I recall, is analogous to my use of the term legal or illegal,

15     that is to say, I'm not myself pretending or purporting to make any legal

16     findings, rather I'm noting that that is the word used in the documents

17     concerned.

18        Q.   In principle, as I understand your understanding of war crime,

19     this is a crime committed during a state of war or during war; right?

20        A.   No, that is not correct.  I have certainly an understanding of

21     what the legal definition of a war crime is.  Stealing a bicycle in

22     war time is, for example, as you well know, not a war crime, even though

23     it takes place during a state of war or during a war.  When I use --

24     again, when I use the term war crime, I do so, for example, in the

25     context of when Minister Stanisic orders an investigation of what he

Page 5527

 1     calls war crimes or crimes against humanity.

 2        Q.   And when a bicycle is stolen during a war by a Muslim or a Croat,

 3     would that constitute a war crime?

 4        A.   Certainly not.

 5        Q.   One of the indictments issued here is that aiding and abetting

 6     the destruction of Muslim houses was qualified as a war crime on the

 7     bases that nothing was done to prevent it.

 8        A.   Well, I am aware of the fact that plunder and looting, for

 9     example, is a war crime, and I suppose that the theft of a simple bicycle

10     could be lumped into that category, given a very specific context.  But

11     I'm referring to the mere stealing of a bicycle on itself, even though

12     it's war time, does not constitute a war crime.

13        Q.   We will go back to this issue.  My learned friend Zecevic asked

14     you yesterday about a portion of your report, that's your executive

15     summary, paragraph 11 in B/C/S.  I'm particularly interested in one

16     sentence from that portion where you say that the RS MUP was the only

17     armed force that was exclusively under the control of the authorities of

18     Republika Srpska.  Have you read this part of this findings of yours?  My

19     colleague Zecevic showed you yesterday and definitely in the course of

20     your research you could see that in addition to the RS MUP pertaining to

21     the period up to 12th of May 1992, there also existed the Serbian

22     Territorial Defence; is that right?

23        A.   Yes, I am aware of the existence of the Territorial Defence.

24        Q.   And it was also exclusively under the control of the authorities

25     of Republika Srpska; right?

Page 5528

 1        A.   That's a very good question, and the reason, again, that I'm

 2     using the term solely under the control of the RS authorities for the

 3     RS MUP is precisely because it is my understanding based on the findings

 4     of my colleague who is a military expert, that the control of the TOs was

 5     very much a disputed topic during this period until the formation of the

 6     VRS and that there was an ongoing struggle between certain officials in

 7     the JNA and certain officials in the TO and the civilian authorities

 8     about who exactly was in control of these.  I know that your colleague

 9     yesterday referred to the relevant military legislation which shows that

10     the TO was under control of the JNA, and the JNA was certainly not solely

11     under the control of the civilian authorities of the RS at this point.

12     But again on this point, I would most certainly defer ultimately to a

13     military expert.

14        Q.   I'm interested in the period up to the 12th of May when

15     Republika Srpska was established.  You are talking about control over the

16     TO, and Colonel Basara testified about this issue as well, you probably

17     had an opportunity to see his interview.  Later a decision was made to

18     resubordinate it to Army of Republika Srpska.  However, in this document,

19     the Territorial Defence, the Serbian Territorial Defence was a

20     significant factor and was to a great extent under the control of the

21     Serbian authorities.

22             When I say the Serbian authorities, I'm referring to Mr. Subotic

23     and the Ministry of Defence and the Presidency of Republika Srpska.

24     Would you agree with me?

25        A.   I agree with your statement that the Serbian Territorial Defence

Page 5529

 1     was a significant factor and was to a great extent under the control of

 2     the Serbian authorities.  My only disagreement with you is whether they

 3     were under the sole control of the Serbian authorities, that is the RS

 4     authorities.

 5        Q.   So in that respect would you like to amend your report by adding

 6     the Serbian TO which to a great extent was also under the control of the

 7     Serbian authorities?

 8             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honour, his report says that the RS MUP was the

 9     only one that was under the exclusive control of Serb authorities.  He

10     has just given his answer that the TO was not under the exclusive

11     control.

12             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   On the basis of the documents shown to you by Mr. Zecevic and the

14     ones that you have reviewed, did you find a single document, and I'm

15     speaking about the period from April, and that is the 16th of April when

16     the TO was formed, until the 12th May, 1992, have you found a single

17     document testifying to the contrary that the TO was not under the control

18     of the authorities of Republika Srpska?  Actually, I put it to you that

19     you didn't find any such document because you haven't -- otherwise you

20     would have included it in your report.

21        A.   Well, in fact, there are such indications in the intercepts that

22     I've quoted in which you can see that the RS's civilian leadership, for

23     example, is complaining about the fact that not all of the TO is doing

24     precisely what the RS leadership might wish it to be doing, but

25     ultimately, again, and I think this is the main point, I would certainly

Page 5530

 1     defer to the military expert on this issue.  It is my understanding, and

 2     part of my conclusion in paragraph E11 is based on that, from his own

 3     report that there were disputes regarding the control of the TO during

 4     this period.

 5             I'm not disputing at all, I reiterate, I do not dispute that the

 6     Serbian civilian authorities had very extensive control of the TO during

 7     this period.  I am disputing only and only disagreeing with you whether

 8     they had sole control of the TO during this period.

 9        Q.   And when you speak about these disputes, that was, in fact, a

10     conflict to the effect that the Serbian TO was not obeying Subotic but

11     rather the local officials and Crisis Staffs, and that they were acting

12     in accordance with their instructions and orders?

13        A.   That was certainly one form of concern.  There's also concern

14     expressed frequently by the RS leadership during this period that the TO

15     is, to some extent, under the control of what they called "komunjara,"

16     old school communist cadres in the JNA.

17        Q.   You are certainly aware, I'm talking about the Banja Luka Krajina

18     and all the other municipalities mentioned in the indictment and referred

19     to my client, such as Sanski Most, Banja Luka, Donji Vakuf, Teslic,

20     Kljuc, Prijedor, that the Serbian TO did exist?

21        A.   Well, I'm aware that a TO existed in all of those municipalities

22     and that in many cases it adopted the monicker Serbian TO during this

23     period.

24        Q.   And that in all of these municipalities, and let me remind you of

25     the testimony given by the police station commander in Sanski Most, and

Page 5531

 1     the documents from the Sanski Most Crisis Staff which show that the

 2     control over the Serbian TO goes along the line Crisis Staff, the Serbian

 3     TO, and then upwards towards the level of the republic?

 4             MR. HANNIS:  If we are going to have a reference to the testimony

 5     of a witness, can we have a page reference, please.

 6             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I was speaking in general terms

 7     because it was mentioned at least 50 times and many documents were shown

 8     to that effect.  I'm just asking the witness whether he is generally

 9     aware of this.

10        Q.   That was my general question because I understood that you read

11     certain witness statements and other documents, therefore, I concluded

12     that you are aware of that without going into any specifics.  I just

13     wanted to ask you whether you agree with me or not.

14             MR. HANNIS:  Can we clarify the question.  It means is the

15     witness generally aware of the specific situation in Sanski Most?

16             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I'm talking about these specific

17     municipalities in general.

18             MR. HANNIS:  Well, the question was referring specifically to the

19     Sanski Most witness and Sanski Most.  Now if he is expanding it to

20     Donji Vakuf, Teslic, Kljuc, Prijedor, and Banja Luka, I think he needs to

21     lay some more foundation.

22             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I'm only asking the witness whether

23     he was aware of that, he agreed with me that the situation was as

24     described, and just as a reminder, I mentioned Sanski Most.

25        Q.   Sir, can you answer my question.

Page 5532

 1        A.   Well, I am aware that testimony on that point has been heard

 2     before this Chamber.  I don't want to comment on the testimony of other

 3     witnesses.

 4        Q.   But in the course of your research, you would agree with me that

 5     TO existed in all those municipalities and that it was under the control

 6     of the local Crisis Staff, or rather, subject to co-ordination?

 7        A.   I am aware from the expert report of my colleague on

 8     Crisis Staffs that the Crisis Staffs were quite involved in the work of

 9     the TOs during this period.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Mr. Krgovic, before we move on to something

12     else -- and I don't know if you are indeed moving on to something else,

13     but that's the way it looked to me.  But before we do so, I would like to

14     solicit from the witness some indication of how did this work out in

15     practice.  You say that the TOs were partly, and perhaps even mostly,

16     under the control of the Crisis Staffs and the local political

17     authorities, and yet they were also to some extent under the control of

18     the JNA.  How did -- what was the practical way in which this could

19     function?  I mean, it sounds very complicated to have two such different

20     organs both being in control of the same body.  So how, what sort of

21     co-ordination was in place in order to secure reasonable control over the

22     TOs?  Can you clarify.

23             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, I -- with respect I'm not certain that

24     I'm very well placed to answer your question.  I base my knowledge of

25     that subject on my reading of the expert reports of my colleagues

Page 5533

 1     Ewan Brown and Dorothea Hanson who have written respectively on the TOs

 2     and the Crisis Staffs, and as well on the MUP documents where I see a

 3     veritable tug of war going on during this period.  I note that on direct

 4     examination we even saw one example of Mr. Stanisic issuing an order to

 5     the TO.  So this is a period, up until the formation of the VRS, is a

 6     period in which everyone, Crisis Staffs, civilian leadership, police,

 7     military, are sticking their fingers, as it were, into the work of the

 8     TO.  And it's only clarified, as counsel has noted, with later decisions

 9     and legislation passed by the RS.

10             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Thank you.

11             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Let me conclude, Mr. Nielsen, when you spoke about the

13     Serbian MUP as the only force that was under control, since you are not a

14     military expert, you didn't deal very much with the Serbian TO, the

15     control of it, and its functioning; is that right?

16        A.   That's correct, and that's why my report only on a few occasions

17     alludes to the TO.

18        Q.   And from that I deduce that your report in this part where you

19     say that the Serbian MUP was the only organisation under the control of

20     the RS should be taken with a certain reservation, and --

21             MR. HANNIS:  I object to the form of the question.  He needs to

22     include the term "exclusive" or "sole" control of the RS.

23             MR. KRGOVIC:  I did.  It's not in the transcript.

24        Q.   [Interpretation] So you heard this, when you were writing your

25     report you didn't take into consideration the position of the TO, and its

Page 5534

 1     place within this hierarchy, you didn't analyse the Serbian TO in that

 2     respect?

 3        A.   I repeat that this is a conclusion that I base on my reading of

 4     police and civilian documentation, particularly the discussions in the

 5     RS Assembly at the time.  And to the extent that this -- that you

 6     disagree with my conclusion, I think it's most appropriate to put that

 7     question to the military expert to whom I would at any point defer.

 8             Again, I'm not disagreeing at all that there was extensive

 9     civilian control of the Serbian TO at this point.  I am making a very

10     narrow point here, which is just that, as far as I can see, the RS MUP --

11     and based on the apparently controversial statements of Mrs. Plavsic and

12     other politicians, they treat the RS MUP as the only organisation under

13     their exclusive control during this period.

14        Q.   Further in the next paragraph, 13, there is another conclusion,

15     the last sentence:

16             "Towards the end of June 1992 in the MUP of Republika Srpska

17     there were only six non-Serbs working."

18             That's your conclusion, and you refer to paragraphs from 192 to

19     207.  In these paragraphs you referred to a few documents on the basis of

20     which you made this conclusion.  Have you had the opportunity to look

21     also at other documents mentioning different numbers as to the non-Serb

22     employees in MUP?  Without, however, including them into your report,

23     without mentioning them?

24        A.   I'm very grateful for that question.  The specific number of six

25     non-Serbs is taken from a specific RS MUP document which I cite in that

Page 5535

 1     passage in which I believe five of the six were actually working in

 2     Kalinovik of all places.  But it is correct that having had time to

 3     review all of the documents that I cite in my own report, I have since

 4     finishing this report encountered a couple of other passages which

 5     suggest, in contradiction of this RS MUP document, that there may have

 6     been as many as, I forget the exact number, I'm sure you can give it to

 7     me, as many as 140 or -- it's a number in the low hundreds were allegedly

 8     still working in the ministry at that time.  And those numbers would

 9     certainly tend to contradict the RS MUP document which mentions only six

10     non-Serbs.

11             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Like my colleague, I prepared a

12     binder of documents, and I would like to ask the usher for assistance.

13     Could we call P160 in the meantime.  In your binder it's document

14     number 3.  In B/C/S it's page 5.  In English it's 8.

15        Q.   It's a speech by Mr. Zupljanin in the Serbian.  It's the fourth

16     paragraph from the top.  In English third paragraph from the top.

17             Mr. Zupljanin says there are about 8.500 active duty and reserve

18     members in the region at the moment including 142 members of other

19     ethnicities.  I apologise to the interpreters for speaking too fast.

20     This is that much-talked-about meeting on the 11th of July in Belgrade.

21     Do you agree that it's mentioned in the report that Mr. Zupljanin indeed

22     said this?

23        A.   Yes, I agree, and that was the approximately 140 number that I

24     thought you were going to mention, so.

25        Q.   So that we don't have to take Stojan Zupljanin at his word, let's

Page 5536

 1     look at 2D02-0503, and in your binder it's number 2.  We received this

 2     document officially from the Banja Luka CSB this last autumn, and it is a

 3     list of employees and payroll dated October 1992.  Only the first page

 4     and the last page have been translated, as is the custom with our

 5     translation service, and the names have not been translated.

 6             However, my assistant underlined all the names of non-Serbs who

 7     were employed in the MUP in October 1992.  Therefore, I will ask to you

 8     look at the B/C/S version, and you will find a lot of Muslim and Croat

 9     names.  And I assume if you see names like Anto or Muhamed or Selem, you

10     recall be able to identify them as people of Croat or Muslim ethnicity.

11             So please look at the underlined names.  Those that are marked,

12     could you confirm that they are Muslims or Croats.

13        A.   Well, I can confirm that many of the highlighted names in the

14     B/C/S document are Croat or Muslim.  I cannot say that all of them are

15     because, as you know, you cannot always make that determination solely

16     based on a name.

17        Q.   Then on the basis of this document, would you be prepared to

18     correct your report in the place where it says that only six non-Serbs

19     were employed in the MUP at that time?

20        A.   Well, I'm certainly again grateful to you for this opportunity.

21     As you know, the October 1992 pay lists are not ones that I've seen

22     previously.  But I agree with you that Mr. Zupljanin's statement with

23     the, I think, 142 non-Serbs which, you know, theoretically could include

24     Hungarians and Ukrainians as well as Muslims and Croats is valid.  So I

25     think that again that paragraph of the executive summary should be

Page 5537

 1     modified accordingly.  I do want to underline, and this is very

 2     important, that the statement about six, only six non-Serbs being in

 3     RS MUP at the end of June 1992 is directly quoted from an RS MUP

 4     document.  So that is obviously an open question why they were so off on

 5     their own count.

 6        Q.   Most likely the minister was misinformed like you were as to the

 7     number of non-Serbs.  That speaks a little about the accuracy of the

 8     reports that reach the minister from lower levels.  But this was not a

 9     question, just my comment.

10             Earlier today my colleague Mr. Zecevic --

11             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Excuse me, could we get an exhibit

12     number for this last document.

13             JUDGE HALL:  Admitted and marked.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit 2D34, Your Honours.

15             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   My colleague, Mr. Zecevic, asked you about the event at

17     Koricanska Stijena, and you discussed it with him a little, but I will go

18     a little deeper.  Since you worked at one time in the Office of the

19     Prosecutor and you are familiar with procedures from your work, you are

20     familiar with the police procedure of detecting and investigating and

21     prosecuting.  I mean, as a person who has had access to documents like

22     this and to people who deal with this matter?

23        A.   Yes, one attains familiarity with such procedures from looking at

24     these documents and the relevant laws and regulations, that's correct.

25        Q.   Then you might agree with me that the first thing to do when

Page 5538

 1     bodies are found and on-site investigation is carried out, the

 2     appropriate service identifies the bodies and then the site, the

 3     crime scene is secured?

 4        A.   I agree.

 5        Q.   After that an on-site investigation is carried out by the

 6     prosecutor and the investigating judge in order to continue with the

 7     proceedings?

 8        A.   It is you who is the expert here, so yes, I agree and I am guided

 9     by your knowledge.

10        Q.   And then after these first steps have been taken, a criminal

11     complaint is filed so that the prosecutor's office can get involved, and

12     then under the leadership of the prosecutor and the investigating judge,

13     perpetrators are identified as well as the circumstances under which the

14     crime was committed, and then the whole criminal procedure continues from

15     there.

16        A.   I agree.

17        Q.   The investigating judge and the prosecutor after receiving the

18     criminal complaint issue instructions to the police as to what steps to

19     take and how to gather information and evidence on the case, and they

20     practically lead the case.

21             Just a little correction:  The investigating judge and the

22     prosecutor, I said.

23        A.   I agree.

24             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we show the witness

25     1D00-2693.

Page 5539

 1        Q.   Mr. Nielsen, that's a criminal report that you don't have in the

 2     binder.  I'll hand it to you now with the help of the usher.  I believe

 3     you have seen this document before.

 4        A.   I'm not sure that I've seen this particular document before.

 5        Q.   Could you just scan it, please.  It's a criminal complaint filed

 6     to the prosecutor's office by the Security Services Centre signed,

 7     Stojan Zupljanin.

 8        A.   That is correct.

 9        Q.   And if you look at this criminal complaint bearing mind the

10     standard procedure prevailing in Republika Srpska at the time, you will

11     agree that this whole procedure has been fully observed?

12        A.   This does seem to conform to the procedure that you described,

13     yes.

14        Q.   And there is no doubt that these criminal charges referred to

15     here are charges of a war crime?

16        A.   Again with the caveat that I'm not a lawyer, I see that the

17     charge here is murder.

18        Q.   We are not talking about the qualification.  The criminal charges

19     are of murder, but the perpetrator hasn't been identified yet, and the

20     bodies have not been identified yet.  It's practically a criminal

21     complaint for a war crime regardless of what it's called here.

22             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honours, that's argumentative.  The document

23     speaks for itself.  It says murder under a particular provision of

24     Criminal Code; it doesn't say war crime.  This witness has said he is not

25     a lawyer, not a legal expert.

Page 5540

 1             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I'll try this another way.

 2        Q.   Do you know that my client Stojan Zupljanin, among other things,

 3     is charged with this incident, Koricanska Stijena, and this Prosecution

 4     calls it a war crime?

 5             MR. HANNIS:  Yes, because we are operating under a different

 6     statute.

 7             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, but my question was only

 8     whether this crime concerning which my client filed criminal charges is

 9     the same incident as described in the indictment against my client, that

10     was the point of my question, just the yes or no.

11             JUDGE HALL:  Is the witness able to answer yes or no to that

12     question?  If so, he may answer the question.

13             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, I cannot answer that with a yes or no.

14             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Are you aware that this incident at Koricanska Stijena is

16     included in the indictment against my client?

17        A.   Yes, I am ware that that incident is named in the indictment.

18        Q.   And that he is charged with failure to take appropriate steps or

19     to file a criminal complaint, that that is the charge against my client?

20             MR. HANNIS:  He is not charged with failing to file a complaint.

21     He is charged with failing to take adequate measures against the

22     perpetrators.  And again, these are legal submissions and things for

23     Your Honours to decide, not something for this witness.

24             JUDGE HALL:  In any event, having regard to the expertise of this

25     witness, I'm not sure that I follow your -- where you are going,

Page 5541

 1     Mr. Krgovic, with this line of questions.  This is addition to

 2     Mr. Hannis's point about the submissions and arguments which the document

 3     in question may form the basis of at an appropriate stage.  How can -- as

 4     I said, I'm not sure how this witness can assist by addressing the point

 5     you are making on this document.

 6             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this expert, police

 7     expert in his paragraph 353 says that the Security Services Centre failed

 8     to file reports or a criminal complaint against anyone but one suspect in

 9     war crimes and that there are no mention -- references to war crimes in

10     the relevant period of the indictment.  And that's why I believe it's

11     relevant, because he deals with it in his report.  And if you look at

12     this report and admit it into evidence, the Trial Chamber will have his

13     report before them including this statement that the CSB or the national

14     security centre did not start a single case to prosecute war crimes.

15     Therefore, I'm trying to establish what this expert understands to

16     constitute a war crime, and I want to put specific examples before him.

17             And the Court, and this is already a legal submission, is bound

18     by the factual description of the Prosecutor, not that provided by a

19     policeman.  You have heard about this from witness Delic.

20             And the Court in deliberating back in our system is not bound by

21     anything but the factual description.  That was the point of my question.

22     Because at the beginning when I established that when the witness

23     mentions war crimes, he speaks of war crimes not as an expert but as a

24     regular person, and that is why I want to show some more documents to

25     this witness regarding his finding in paragraph 353.

Page 5542

 1             MR. HANNIS:  Well, Your Honour, then my objection is the question

 2     should be more directed specifically to what is in 353 and where it came

 3     from.  This criminal complaint is for murder, and all it says is that

 4     unknown perpetrators were involved and there are a hundred bodies in the

 5     bottom of the canyon.  At this point in time, that's not identified as a

 6     war crime.  That could be 100 bodies in the bottom of the canyon as a

 7     result of some combat activity in the area possibly.  But the CSB, the

 8     police, had the opportunity to identify certain crimes as war crimes and

 9     file them as such because apparently they did file one such crime, but

10     this one was not one of those, as least not in this document.

11             JUDGE HALL:  Mr. Hannis, I suspect that the quickest way out of

12     this is to allow Mr. Krgovic to proceed.  Clearly there is room for

13     disputation here.  But I think I understand the basis on which

14     Mr. Krgovic is asking this question.  And if I appear to be tentative,

15     it's because I am, because I heard what he has it to say, and I think I

16     follow him.

17             So please proceed, Mr. Krgovic.

18             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Mr. Nielsen, on the first page of this document you will see a

20     reference to a convoy of refugees who were going from Prijedor and

21     Sanski Most towards Travnik.  Do you agree with me?  You nodded, but it

22     was not recorded.

23        A.   I agree that that is what the document says.

24        Q.   And on page 2 of this document it is said that the employees of

25     the CSB will take all the operative measures to identify and apprehend

Page 5543

 1     the perpetrators; correct?

 2        A.   Again, I agree that that is what the document says.

 3        Q.   In your report you mentioned several dispatches following this

 4     event, and this happened on the 8th of September, 1992.  In your report,

 5     you mentioned a letter that my client Stojan Zupljanin sent to Prijedor

 6     to find out who was in the escort of this convoy.  Do you remember

 7     mentioning this?  The page -- that page is missing in my copy of the

 8     report.  Do you remember that?  You answered a question by Mr. Zecevic

 9     about this.

10        A.   Yes, I remember that.  Stojan Zupljanin, as I state in my report,

11     asked for information about the killings on several occasions in orders

12     to Simo Drljaca.

13        Q.   And as you said today to Mr. Zecevic, the response came that

14     these persons were now involved in combat activities and they were not

15     available?

16        A.   Yes, that's correct.  It should be noted that it was at that

17     point in time, that is to say, in the second half of August 1992, clear

18     to both Mr. Drljaca and to Mr. Zupljanin that these unknown perpetrators

19     were employees of the RS MUP.

20        Q.   Are you aware that based on this criminal complaint and based on

21     the evidence gathered at the time, the prosecution was started after the

22     war against the perpetrators and they were tried in Banja Luka or

23     Sarajevo, I'm not sure but you mentioned it earlier in your evidence.

24        A.   Yes, I mentioned that I am aware of the fact that many years

25     later, there were arrests and trials of those who were alleged to have

Page 5544

 1     participated in these killings.

 2        Q.   And speaking of criminal complaints and the taking of measures,

 3     are you aware that the normal practice in the MUP of Republika Srpska,

 4     specifically in Banja Luka, in view of the specific circumstances of war,

 5     the practice was that professional members of the MUP would do their job

 6     and produce certain documents that could serve as a basis for Prosecution

 7     later on when the right conditions are created with no statute of

 8     limitations or fear thereof because the crimes concerned were grave?

 9        A.   I assume that that is the logical corollary to what Mr. Zecevic

10     referred to and Mr. Cvijetic referred to as the dropping of the statute

11     of limitations for crimes committed by police officers.

12             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Since I'm not going to deal with

13     this criminal report any longer, can we please have an exhibit number.

14             JUDGE HALL:  Admitted and marked.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit 2D35, Your Honours.

16             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please call up Exhibit 280

17     65 ter.

18             And it's number 7 in your binder, Mr. Nielsen.

19        Q.   Can you please look at page 1.  That's an analysis of the work of

20     the public security station of Banja Luka in 1992, that's Banja Luka CSB.

21     Can you please look at the signature on the last page.  This is a report

22     submitted by inspectors, and you reviewed this document when drafting

23     your report; is that right?

24        A.   That is correct, sir.

25             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we now please have page 5 in

Page 5545

 1     B/C/S and page 6 in English.  In B/C/S it's the first paragraph from the

 2     top, and in English it's the second paragraph from the top.

 3        Q.   This is precisely what I spoke about, and you agree with me that

 4     the practice was such that we have a description here of the procedure

 5     applicable in investigating crimes.  Would you agree with me that this is

 6     what it says in this report, that this was a widespread practice in the

 7     area covered by the Security Services Centre of Banja Luka; is that

 8     correct?

 9        A.   I agree that this document paints a portrait of what crimes were

10     taking place in the operational area of SJB Banja Luka during this period

11     and that it also discusses what was done to combat such crime.  Excuse

12     me, CSB Banja Luka.

13             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have an exhibit

14     number for this document.

15             JUDGE HALL:  Admitted and marked.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit 2D36, Your Honours.

17             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Mr. Nielsen --

19             MR. KRGOVIC:  Is this a convenient time for the break, Your

20     Honour?

21             JUDGE HALL:  It is near that time, but in as much as we started a

22     little late, if you have one or two questions to run it for another five

23     minutes, we can take the break then.

24             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Mr. Nielsen, you will agree with me, and by reading your report,

Page 5546

 1     I noticed a number of problems that affected the work of MUP of

 2     Republika Srpska in 1992, including the Banja Luka CSB.  And I'm going to

 3     enumerate these problems and ask you whether you would agree with that or

 4     not, but generally speaking there were quite a few problems that

 5     disrupted the work of the MUP during the war.

 6             First of all, let's begin with the first specific problem which

 7     was the lack of professional personnel as a result of the separation of

 8     MUP into the Muslim and Serb portions, and that a number of Muslim

 9     members of the MUP ceased to work there by either joining the Muslim MUP

10     or simply by resigning; is that correct?

11        A.   That certainly was one of the problems faced.  I don't think I

12     would in it's entirety agree with your characterisation of why the Muslim

13     members of the MUP ceased to work there.  But certainly the fact that the

14     CSB was, with the exceptions you have mentioned, largely without Muslim

15     and Croat employees meant a deficit that was, to some extent, remedied by

16     an influx of Serbs, police officers from Croatia where they had been

17     fired.

18        Q.   Among those peoples who were admitted into MUP, this was done

19     indiscriminately without any vetting procedure?

20        A.   As I note in my report, for the ministry as a whole and certainly

21     also in the area of CSB Banja Luka and with specific reference to a

22     statement made by Mr. Stanisic, the unfortunate fact was that the

23     ministry as a whole was quite indiscriminate in admitting people into

24     employment in 1992 without appropriate vetting procedures.

25        Q.   The next problem that considerably made the functioning of the

Page 5547

 1     MUP difficult refers to this Rump Banja Luka CSB which means that police

 2     units were often taken by the army, resubordinated to the army, and used

 3     for combat operations instead of for carrying out regular police work; is

 4     that right?

 5        A.   All reports of the RS MUP throughout 1992 including on the

 6     territory of CSB Banja Luka reflect the enormous strain placed on the

 7     police by it's extensive involvement in combat activity which left

 8     logically comparatively little time and resources for traditional police

 9     work.

10        Q.   In addition to the participation of the organs, the courts and

11     other organs, particularly with reference to public law and order, the

12     misdemeanour courts were virtually non-functioning, therefore, the

13     commission of misdemeanours most often committed by conscript could not

14     have been properly sanctioned by misdemeanour courts.  I'm referring to

15     this same document, page 3 in B/C/S, where it speaks about public law and

16     order.  It specifically speaks about law and order, and I'm going to read

17     it out to you.

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the counsel please indicate which

19     paragraph he is reading.

20             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Mr. Krgovic, the interpreters are asking you to

21     identify which paragraph you are reading out from.

22             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] That is page 3 in B/C/S, second

23     paragraph entitled "Public Law and Order."

24             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Thank you.

25             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 5548

 1        Q.   "Often under the influence of alcohol and with the usage of

 2     fire-arms, they disturb public law and order and thereby jeopardise the

 3     safety of citizens, and frequently they oppose as a group or individually

 4     anyone who tries to stop them.  Since these are conscripts, members of

 5     the OUP are very often reluctant to undertake any measures or are very

 6     slow or inefficient, and which is even worse, they express solidarity

 7     with the perpetrators which has devastating effects on the public law and

 8     order."

 9             JUDGE HALL:  Have you formulated -- sorry.  I wasn't sure whether

10     you had formulated the question.

11             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] No, I haven't.

12        Q.   Would you agree that this picture portrayed in this report and

13     you, yourself, partly mentioned it in your report is a true portrayal of

14     the situation prevalent on the ground at the time?

15        A.   I agree that this is an accurate portrayal of the situation on

16     the ground.  It's a portrayal which goes again and again in numerous

17     RS MUP reports.  And just to wrap up on a previous point, when you talk

18     about the military involvement on the territory of the police, on the

19     territory of CSB Banja Luka, it is worth noting that the RS MUP draft

20     1992 annual report states that the CSB Banja Luka had by far the most

21     extensive combat involvement of any CSB in the RS in 1992.

22             JUDGE HALL:  Could we take the break at this point.

23                           [The witness stands down]

24                           --- Recess taken at 12.12 p.m.

25                           --- On resuming at 12.35 p.m.

Page 5549

 1                           [The witness takes the stand]

 2             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Before I begin with the witness, I

 3     was rather hastily putting my question, 56, line 13, I said that security

 4     organs were very slow and inefficient.  I was reading this very quickly,

 5     and that changed the whole meaning of my question.

 6        Q.   But I guess Mr. Nielsen, you understood what I wanted to say in

 7     light of this recent correction that I've made?

 8        A.   I agree with you, and we see that in the document that we were

 9     looking at that in the opinion of the -- of CSB Banja Luka, the military

10     organs were ineffective.

11        Q.   And if you look at the next paragraph that deals with crime

12     rates, this more or less repeats your answer given to Mr. Cvijetic, that

13     is to say, it describes who are mainly the perpetrators of these crimes,

14     that these are actually members of the military, and there is a

15     description of how they are being processed.

16        A.   According to this report, certainly military conscripts are a

17     major source of crime.  Other groups that are frequently mentioned are of

18     course members of paramilitary groups and just the general rise in

19     criminality because of a very bad security situation.

20        Q.   Mr. Nielsen, you would agree with me if I say that these issues

21     mentioned in this report were mentioned for the first time at the meeting

22     of the 11th of July held in Belgrade?

23        A.   That may have been the first time that those issues were

24     mentioned at that high a level of the ministry.  However, documents from

25     April, May, and June, and the first half of July show that the officials

Page 5550

 1     in the police were permanently concerned about the deteriorating security

 2     situation, in particular about the enormous explosion in criminal

 3     activity.

 4        Q.   In his speech delivered on the 11th of July, Stojan Zupljanin was

 5     the first person to raise these issues.  To that end, could you please

 6     look at P160.  Page 5 in B/C/S and page -- actually, pages 7 to 8.  It

 7     starts on page 7 and then goes on, on page 8 in English.

 8             Would you agree with me that Mr. Zupljanin speaks here about the

 9     work of the army and Crisis Staffs and says that they are collecting

10     Muslim population and placing them in the camps and then the MUP is

11     requested to provide security, and this is the first time that someone

12     without any pressure from the international community highlighted the

13     problem of the conditions in these detention centres, and proposed -- and

14     initiated this problem to be resolved; isn't that right?

15        A.   As an analyst, it's my job to be very specific, so yes, I agree

16     with you that Mr. Zupljanin speaks about the issues that you mentioned,

17     and that is reflected in the document we have in front of us.  As to

18     whether that is indeed the first time that someone, as you say, without

19     any pressure from the international community highlighted this problem,

20     that is a finding that I'm unable to concur with because I don't have the

21     information that would lead me to such a conclusion.  He certainly does

22     highlight the issue though.

23        Q.   And in preparing your report, you haven't found any proof that he

24     [as interpreted] was done under the pressure of the international

25     community and that that problem had already been in the public domain?  I

Page 5551

 1     am talking about the Banja Luka Krajina, specifically.

 2        A.   I do not have any information to suggest -- that suggests that

 3     Mr. Zupljanin was making his comments under duress or pressure of any

 4     sort.

 5        Q.   In one of the following paragraphs, it's the fourth one from the

 6     bottom, he speaks about the army and says that the army is -- are asking

 7     for resubordination of the entire force.  And then he tackles other

 8     subjects as well, and you said that these issues stretch throughout the

 9     whole period, but the gist of my question was that all these issues were

10     for the for the first time raised by Mr. Zupljanin, and in order to avoid

11     the influence of the local authorities who are actually paying the

12     police, try to interfere into the chain of command over the MUP.  You

13     would agree with me that this is the essence of the objections concerning

14     the system of financing the MUP?

15        A.   I agree that the financing of the MUP by Crisis Staffs and other

16     local authorities was a major issue during this period.  I don't know if

17     it was Mr. Zupljanin or another participant at this meeting, but someone

18     at had meeting certainly said that he who pays the piper chooses the

19     tune, and that was one reason why MUP needed to be financed at the

20     ministerial and state budget level and not at the local level.

21             I would point out that Mr. Zupljanin's statements are somewhat at

22     odds with his instructions in June 1992 to his own subordinates that they

23     should very faithfully follow the instructions of the local and regional

24     Crisis Staffs.

25        Q.   In paragraph 2 it says that the function -- the system of

Page 5552

 1     functioning has been broken up.

 2        A.   As I noted previously, communications issues were -- and

 3     difficulties with communications were certainly discussed at this

 4     meeting, including by Mr. Zupljanin, that is correct.

 5        Q.   Concerning your previous answer when you mentioned a letter and

 6     the execution of police tasks, have you found any document?  And I'm

 7     talking about later period July, he sent a letter to the police stations,

 8     instructed them not to carry out the orders of local authorities that

 9     refer to the security of detention centres and other tasks of that

10     nature.

11        A.   As I've stated several is times, it is generally the case that

12     after June 1992 there is a major policy change in MUP regarding whether

13     or not to take orders from Crisis Staffs.  And as we see at this meeting

14     and in the conclusions that follow out from this meeting, and

15     Mr. Zupljanin emulates this in his own orders, the trend after June 1992

16     is to centralise decision-making within the organs of Internal Affairs

17     and to tell the Crisis Staffs that they are no longer to give orders or

18     otherwise interfere with the work of the police.

19        Q.   That was primarily for the reason of many police stations being

20     under the influence of their local Crisis Staff and their environment

21     that they didn't follow MUP instructions, but rather followed the

22     instructions of the Crisis Staff who were on many occasions in

23     contravention with the instructions received from the MUP; is that

24     correct?

25        A.   It is definitely the case that the minister as well as

Page 5553

 1     Mr. Zupljanin wished to prevent situations which had been occurring in

 2     which the Crisis Staffs had been ordering the police do things that they

 3     should not be doing according to, for example, the Law on Internal

 4     Affairs.  So that this is, again, after June 1992, part of a concerted

 5     effort to rectify that situation.

 6        Q.   And later on you could see and you mentioned it in your analysis

 7     concerning the proposals put forth by Mr. Zupljanin, certain concrete

 8     measures and steps were taken in order to implement them; is that right?

 9        A.   That is correct.  As I've noted previously, this meeting of the

10     11th of July resulted in a very specific document issued, I believe, on

11     the 17th of July in which various organisations within MUP were

12     specifically tasked to implement the conclusions of this meeting, and of

13     course, Mr. Zupljanin participated in such implementation.

14        Q.   One of the problems that I noticed that you mentioned, but not so

15     emphatically, was that certain public security stations did not obey the

16     orders, or let's say guide-lines and instructions received either from

17     the centre of the securities because the structure and the organisation

18     of the MUP was somewhat different from the one of the army.  Although,

19     you are not an expert in this particular field, one often uses terms

20     control, co-operation, harmonisation, et cetera, which in war time can

21     only make the functioning of the MUP difficult, the usage of such terms

22     and such approach in operation.

23        A.   I think that one of the problems that contributes to this

24     situation at the level of the municipal public security stations is that

25     for the period until the 11 July meeting, they are being told certainly

Page 5554

 1     in the northwestern Bosnia, the Bosnian Krajina, by Mr. Zupljanin as the

 2     top police official that they are to heed and implement instructions,

 3     orders, that are issued to them by the Crisis Staffs at the municipal and

 4     regional level.  Whereas after the 11th of July, they are told that they

 5     should only receive orders and implement instructions that are coming

 6     through the police organs.

 7             So this was a situation that was changing, and it was certainly a

 8     situation that was in contradiction of the way in which they had been

 9     operating from the beginning of April until the end of June.

10        Q.   Because the situation was out of control, and that was one of the

11     conclusions of the 11th of July meeting, that is to place all police

12     forces under centralised control and to bring some order into the

13     functioning of the MUP.

14        A.   When one says that something is out of control, that seems to me

15     to suggest that no one was in control.  What I'm saying is, rather, that

16     for the period from early April until the end of June, it was in many

17     cases the Crisis Staffs that were in control.  And I remind the Court

18     again that police officers were members of these Crisis Staffs.  The

19     problem that accumulated was that the Crisis Staffs in many cases were

20     asking the police to do certain tasks without first consulting with the

21     Ministry of Internal Affairs, and in some cases, as I said, they were

22     tasking them to do things that were outside the jurisdiction of the

23     police.

24             In line with what I call re-centralisation or centralisation of

25     Internal Affairs in the RS, after June 1992 this situation had to be

Page 5555

 1     remedied and everyone in the ministry seemed to agree about that.

 2        Q.   However, the situation did not improve significantly.  Therefore,

 3     I would like you to look at document 266 from 65 ter list.  It's a minute

 4     of the meeting of an extended collegium of the minister of the interior.

 5     It's your number 5.

 6             You have mentioned this document in your report.

 7             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Can you please move, or, rather,

 8     turn to page 4 in the Serbian version and page 5.

 9        Q.   Can you look at the fifth paragraph from the top below this

10     encircled one.  It says that from -- within the remit of the work

11     organisation and internal organisation of units and the job description

12     of employees, such formulations such as co-ordination and dovetailing,

13     et cetera, should be removed and emphasis should be laid on direct

14     command and control role of superior officer as well as the

15     responsibility of each employee for the tasks that he or she is supposed

16     to carry out.  This is basically what I asked you about a minute ago.

17     That is to say, to chuck out all these terms that lower units used as an

18     excuse to avoid the implementation of the instructions received from the

19     superior organs; is that right?

20        A.   I agree that this reflects this ongoing struggle to stream-line

21     and make more consistent the way in which the ministry functioned.  As

22     with, for example, the ministry's protracted struggle with paramilitary

23     organisations, so it was with the Crisis Staffs.  This was a procedure

24     which was often going two steps back, one step forward, but was moving in

25     the direction that you highlight.

Page 5556

 1        Q.   In 1992, you would agree that it was very difficult, or rather

 2     difficult for the MUP to operate and carry out its general duties as

 3     provided by the law?

 4        A.   I agree that the way in which you just characterised the

 5     situation conforms with the way the RS MUP characterises the overall

 6     situation in which it operated in 1992 in all its analytical summary

 7     reports including the draft 1992 annual report.

 8        Q.   Mr. Nielsen, in your report you described the functioning of the

 9     national security service, and it relates to a number of reports that you

10     refer to.  You said that from April 1992 until the end of that year, the

11     security sector at the CSB accused only one individual for war crimes.

12     And that in the relevant annual report for 1992, there is not a single

13     mention of any war crimes committed against non-Serbian population.

14             You would agree with me that regardless of these two documents,

15     there is evidence that the state security service was very much involved

16     in detecting crimes against the Muslims; is that right?  If you look at

17     other documents that are not strictly related to this specific paragraph.

18        A.   I want to make it very clear that the statement in paragraph 353,

19     which you allude to, is purely a statement about what the SNB, the

20     national security service was doing with respect to war crimes, and not a

21     statement about what CSB Banja Luka, as a whole, of which the SNB was

22     only one part, was doing.

23             This is just a finding that comes straight out of the document

24     that I cite in footnote 532.  I agree with you that the SNB in the course

25     of 1992 did look into war crimes on a regular basis, including on several

Page 5557

 1     occasions war crimes, alleged war crimes committed against the Muslims

 2     and Croats.  And I note that I have cited a number of reports, mostly

 3     from early 1993, in which the national security service in the Banja Luka

 4     and Prijedor areas among other things catalogue the destruction of

 5     mosques and Catholic churches in northwestern Bosnia.

 6        Q.   Would you kindly look at 2D27.  It's number 1 in your binder.  I

 7     don't know, Mr. Nielsen, if you had occasion to see this document before.

 8     The B/C/S copy is a bit illegible.  There is a translation in the

 9     attachment.  But first of all tell me, did you see this before?

10        A.   I believe I have seen this before, I note that it's from Teslic

11     municipality.  This may have been, although my memory is vague on this

12     point, among the documents related to the group popularly referred to as

13     the Mice.

14        Q.   Precisely.  And this is a criminal complaint against several

15     persons, I believe there are sixteen of them, plus their leader, who is

16     on the run, and they are reported for widespread looting and plunder

17     against Muslims and Croats, that's on page 3 in B/C/S; illegal arrests,

18     that's on page 4 in B/C/S; and page 5, keeping large numbers of Muslims

19     and Croats in inhumane conditions, beatings, illegal arrests, and finally

20     the killing of a number of persons of Muslim and Croat ethnicity by this

21     group on the premises of the public security station and some other

22     locations.  This is my summary, but I see that you are following because

23     you read very fast.

24             It's all in the attachments, I don't have them, but all these

25     statements are indicated there.  It's a very voluminous and detailed

Page 5558

 1     criminal report, if you will agree with me.

 2        A.   I agree with that, yes.

 3        Q.   Look at the B/C/S version, please and the signature.  We can't

 4     see it in the English, but the name is Predrag Radulovic.  It's only in

 5     the B/C/S.

 6        A.   On the last page of the document?

 7        Q.   Yes.  Sorry, the last but one.  It's enlarged on the screen in

 8     front of you.  Predrag Radulovic was a member of the state security

 9     service; correct?  And you will find him in those reports about the Milos

10     group.  He signed those dispatches.  Do you remember?

11        A.   Yes, I recall long discussions about Mr. Radulovic and his

12     association with the group that called itself Milos.

13        Q.   And he was a member of the state security service, later national

14     security service?

15        A.   Well, until about 1994 when he then, I believe, offered his

16     services to the Serbian state security services in Belgrade.

17        Q.   This concerns an event from July 1992 when he was a member of the

18     state security service; correct?

19        A.   I believe that is correct, yes.

20        Q.   Would you then modify your findings in paragraph 353 where you

21     said that the state security service, later national security service,

22     never filed a single criminal complaint concerning a war crime?  Would

23     you -- perhaps not modified, but supplemented, I'm sorry if I misspoke.

24     You don't need to modify it, but perhaps supplement your report to say

25     that at least one criminal report against a number of persons was filed

Page 5559

 1     concerning a war crime?

 2        A.   Well, I note that in at least the English version of

 3     paragraph 353 which I wrote, I stated that "from April 1992 until the end

 4     of that year, the SNB sector at CSB Banja Luka pressed charges against

 5     only one individual for suspected war crimes."  Now --

 6        Q.   There are at least 16 of them?

 7        A.   That is certainly correct.  Where I would perhaps take issue with

 8     your characterization or the need to rewrite or amend my finding is

 9     whether these people in this document are actually charged with war

10     crimes, just as we discussed earlier, the one for Koricanska Stijena

11     where it says murder, I don't see the word war crime.  Again, let me be

12     very clear that the finding, if that's what you want to call it, that the

13     SNB sector at CSB Banja Luka pressed charges against one individual is

14     their finding not mine.  I'm just quoting it from their document.

15        Q.   Precisely for that reason I asked my first question, if you

16     remember, what exactly you understand war crime to mean.  I did not mean

17     to offend you, I just wanted to find out to what extent we agree on the

18     terms, although the Prosecutor objected and I could not continue.  That

19     was the point anyway.  Basically this is a war crime, that's the whole

20     story.

21        A.   Well, sir, in testifying here, and again hyper-conscious of the

22     fact that I'm not a lawyer as yourself, I'm not making any findings at

23     any point in time and do not wish to make any findings about whether any

24     act constitutes a war crime or not.  I may have my own opinions about

25     that.  I'll keep those to myself.  But at any rate, I'm trying to

Page 5560

 1     adequately and accurately tell the Court what these documents say.  So

 2     when they say war crime or when they say illegal, then I quote that.  I

 3     make no finding about whether that was actually case.  I do find again,

 4     as we note, we are dealing with professional police officers unlike

 5     myself, and I assume that they have some idea about what was legal and

 6     illegal and what constituted a war crime.

 7        Q.   Yes, and since you are not qualified properly for police terms,

 8     you quote them in the documents as you find them without interpreting

 9     them and going deeper into their meaning.

10        A.   That is correct, because ultimately this is a report about what

11     the police did and how they perceived their own work, and I'm very glad

12     that you raised that point because in December I was asked about

13     so-called loyalty oaths.  Your colleagues told me and instructed me

14     hopefully that that was not an official term being used.  But if you see

15     the police documents themselves, the police themselves use that term,

16     statements of loyalty, even though it apparently has no legal

17     significance.

18        Q.   And you will agree with me that this event and these incidents in

19     Krstici are part of the indictment against my client?

20        A.   I have not read the indictment for quite some time, but if you

21     say that is in the indictment, I'll take your word for it.

22        Q.   Basically we agreed on this passage that -- I understood you were

23     saying that -- are saying that when SNB did not prosecute a war crime,

24     when you say that, you don't mean that the SNB did nothing to collect

25     evidence or did not take any steps et cetera, and in that sense you would

Page 5561

 1     modify this particular passage in your report?

 2             MR. HANNIS:  Well, Your Honour, that assumes a fact I think is

 3     not in evidence yet.  He is referring to paragraph 353 of Mr. Nielsen's

 4     report where cites from April 1992 until the end of the year, the SNB

 5     sector at CSB Banja Luka pressed charges against only one individual.  He

 6     hasn't established that this document that appears to have the signature

 7     of Predrag Radulovic was from the SNB sector at CSB Banja Luka.  You may

 8     recall some evidence that we've had already, and I'm sure you'll hear

 9     more, that there was a dispute about whether Teslic pertained to

10     Doboj CSB or Banja Luka CSB.  The English translation I've seen of the

11     document says the signature, Predrag Radulovic's signature is "on behalf

12     of," and then it says, "illegible."  So we don't know if it's on behalf

13     of CSB Banja Luka or CSB Doboj or some other organisation.  So we haven't

14     established that fact yet to warrant asking this question.

15             MR. KRGOVIC:  Your Honour, my learned friend is wrong, we did ask

16     to the witness, the protected witness which I cross-examined him and it's

17     related, he confirmed that Predrag Radulovic was member of SNB

18     Banja Luka, if you remember.  And he spoke with Mr. Radulovic during the

19     inspection of the -- and if we can go to the private session, I can tell

20     the name of this witness, just to remind the Prosecution if it's

21     necessary.  But if Mr. Nielsen agree with me that -- oh, he is under the

22     oath, I mean, Mr. Nielsen.  So, he signed the undertaking, so I think I

23     can do that in front of him.

24             JUDGE HALL:  Mr. Hannis, do you continue in your objection?

25             MR. HANNIS:  Yes, I do, Your Honour, because no matter what that

Page 5562

 1     answer is it doesn't change the fact that the source of Mr. Nielsen's

 2     statement is a report from CSB Banja Luka.  And until he establishes that

 3     somebody in CSB Banja Luka has considered Mr. Radulovic as being a member

 4     of the SNB in Banja Luka at the time that this report was submitted and

 5     he was working on behalf of CSB Banja Luka, then that doesn't make

 6     Mr. Nielsen's statement inaccurate.

 7             MR. KRGOVIC:  Is that dispute, that Mr. Radulovic didn't work in

 8     SNB Banja Luka on that period of time?

 9             MR. HANNIS:  I don't know where all Mr. Radulovic worked, and on

10     -- in what position he was doing this.  I seem to recall seeing some

11     document where he was acting as SJB chief for Teslic for a brief period

12     of time.  So I don't know on whose behalf and in what capacity he is

13     writing this document at this time.  I don't think that's been

14     established.

15             MR. KRGOVIC:  If you look in the appendix of your indictment you

16     can find the position of Mr. Radulovic very clear within the organisation

17     of the SNB.

18             JUDGE DELVOIE:  It's in the prosecutor's chart that he is SNB

19     Banja Luka Milos group.  Isn't that enough, Mr. Hannis?

20             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honour, I think you'll need to hear some

21     further testimony about what Mr. Radulovic was during at certain periods

22     of time to determine whether or not when this criminal report was filed

23     whether it was filed on behalf of SNB Banja Luka or on behalf of some

24     other organisation, such as headquarters or SNB in Doboj, because

25     Mr. Nielsen's report is referring to a report from CSB Banja Luka.  And

Page 5563

 1     whoever wrote the report in CSB Banja Luka either didn't consider

 2     Mr. Radulovic as part of the SNB or else they didn't have this report in

 3     front of them when they wrote their report.

 4             MR. KRGOVIC:  Mr. Nielsen, just answer my first question, if he

 5     is aware where Mr. Radulovic is working, if he confirmed he was in SNB

 6     until 1994.  I mean, so he has knowledge about it.  So I can't see any

 7     sense of this objection.  If you look at two pages before, I clearly

 8     asked Mr. Nielsen what was the position of Mr. Radulovic on this period,

 9     relevant period of time, I mean, July 1992.  And he clearly said, yes, he

10     was working in SNB.

11             JUDGE HALL:  Without further confusing the issue and getting lost

12     in all these details, the question --

13             MR. KRGOVIC:  Yeah, we are wasting time.

14             JUDGE HALL:  No, no, I was going to say, Mr. Krgovic, as the

15     question is originally phrased by you before Mr. Hannis intervened, would

16     the witness -- as I understand your question is whether the witness would

17     modify his answer in the light of this document.

18             MR. KRGOVIC:  Yeah.

19             JUDGE HALL:  It's a question that he may or may not be able it to

20     answer so let's deal with that and move on.

21             MR. HANNIS:  Just to indicate, Your Honour, it was my

22     understanding that Mr. Radulovic was temporarily appointed as chief of

23     the SJB Teslic I think at the time this criminal report was charged.  And

24     therefore he is issuing the report on behalf of the SJB and not the SNB

25     in Banja Luka.

Page 5564

 1             JUDGE HALL:  Unless I've lost the point of Mr. Krgovic's

 2     question, Mr. Hannis, it seems to me that the identity of the individual

 3     is less important than the -- than what the document purports to say and

 4     whether the witness would modify his answer in light of the contents of

 5     the document.  Isn't that the question, Mr. Krgovic?

 6             MR. KRGOVIC:  Yes.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Looking at the document which you've provided to

 8     me, it is the case that it's a criminal complaint for things that, as you

 9     state, some may construe as war crimes.  It is issued by, if you look at

10     the letterhead, the public security station in Teslic and signed by

11     Mr. Radulovic.  It does not mention in the document, as far as I can see,

12     the national security service, even though I do not contest that

13     Mr. Radulovic was at that time also an employee of the SNB.  But

14     ultimately, it does not really modify my one sentence in paragraph 353

15     because all I'm saying is a simple case of an analyst saying, This is

16     what that document says, period.  Now, the authors of that document might

17     be wrong, but that should be put to the authors of that document.

18             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Which brings me to another thing.  When you made that conclusion,

20     you did not look at other documents than the two you mentioned; correct?

21        A.   Well, in the context of discussions of the RS MUP's interest in

22     prosecuting individuals for war crimes, I, as an analyst, thought that it

23     was salient to quote the Banja Luka SNB sector's report on its own work

24     for 1992 which includes that sentence.

25        Q.   Mr. Nielsen, among other things, your report deals with Manjaca.

Page 5565

 1     You will agree with me that Manjaca was a military camp under the

 2     exclusive jurisdiction of the VRS?

 3        A.   I agree that Manjaca was a military detention facility.

 4        Q.   And it was exclusively the corps commander and the army that had

 5     responsibility for this detention facility; correct?

 6        A.   That is my understanding, and it is my understanding based on

 7     police documentation that the corps commander on occasion allowed police

 8     personnel to interrogate individuals detained in Manjaca together with

 9     the military investigative and police authorities.

10        Q.   And in the functioning of Manjaca camp, that was the only police

11     role if we set aside the dozen or so policemen who provided security?

12        A.   I agree that besides very limited guarding of Manjaca providing

13     security, as you put it, and the interrogation of prisoners at Manjaca by

14     the SNB together with their military colleagues, the police's role at

15     Manjaca was very limited.

16        Q.   And the police had no influence whatsoever of the organisation of

17     the camp, the way it operated, the conditions inside.  It was solely

18     within the purview of military authorities; correct?

19        A.   To the best of my knowledge, the -- as you state, the conditions

20     and the way in which Manjaca operated was under the control of military

21     authorities.

22        Q.   On the other hand, the army made efforts to exert influence and

23     to control other detention facilities; right?

24        A.   I don't agree with that.  From the police's perspective, as we

25     discussed earlier today, the problem was rather that sometimes the army

Page 5566

 1     did not show any interest in some of the other detention facilities and

 2     left the police to operate them instead.

 3             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we show the witness 1D12.

 4     That's 65 ter 503.

 5             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Krgovic, the previous one and the one before

 6     that, the one before that being 65 ter 266, you don't tender them?

 7             MR. KRGOVIC:  Not at this stage, Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

 9             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I am sorry, it's not in your

10     binder.

11             [In English] Usher, can you provide this to the witness.  I

12     apologise, I didn't get this because I was concentrating on the question.

13             JUDGE HALL:  Mr. Krgovic, while we are sorting out this document,

14     I note that we have 20 minutes left before we rise for the day.  You

15     would recall that this witness is only available until tomorrow, and

16     tomorrow is reserved for re-examination by the Prosecution.  And I am

17     reminded that you had indicated that Mr. Pantelic also had questions in

18     cross-examination, and I am appreciative of the fact that about

19     30 minutes of today's session at the very beginning was taken up with

20     certain procedural matters, but the -- well, I don't really have a

21     question, but I'm just alerting you to where we are in terms of time, in

22     terms of what the completion of the cross-examination of this witness on

23     behalf of Zupljanin and the fact that tomorrow is reserved for the

24     Prosecution.

25             MR. KRGOVIC:  Your Honour, this is my last question, so if I am

Page 5567

 1     going to count, I still have one hour to complete this cross-examination,

 2     meaning Zupljanin team in total has one hour, if I'm correct, so this is

 3     my last question.  So Mr. Pantelic will continue, so we'll see how far we

 4     come to.

 5        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Nielsen, have you had occasion to see this

 6     document before?

 7        A.   I believe I've seen this document because it's cited by Mr. Brown

 8     in his report.

 9        Q.   This document shows that Mr. Talic is ordering Manjaca,

10     Trnopolje, Omarska, and Prijedor that an inspection is pending.  He gives

11     them orders what to do in preparation and issues an order basically;

12     correct?

13        A.   That is correct.

14        Q.   And this is precisely on the issue of army interest and

15     involvement.  It is the army here who is seeking to control and to

16     instruct these detention facilities that are not within the system of

17     military detention facilities, but the army is still trying to exert

18     influence?

19        A.   Well, whether it's an order or not, what he is doing is he is

20     informing CSB Prijedor which is obviously -- which actually is not a CSB

21     at that point but is rather an SJB.  But he is informing the police in

22     Prijedor that he has approved the visit of the international commission,

23     what is the -- the international commission for visiting prisoners

24     detained at detention camps at Manjaca, Trnopolje, Omarska, and Prijedor,

25     and he is informing them that they better get their house in order by the

Page 5568

 1     time this commission shows up.  That, to me, does not mean that he is

 2     asserting exclusive control of those authorities, and the very fact that

 3     he sends to the police in Prijedor, shows his knowledge of the fact that

 4     the police are involved in running some of those facilities.

 5        Q.   He is doing that, in fact, pursuant to a verbal order by the

 6     commander of the Main Staff who approved this visit.  It seems from the

 7     document that it was General Mladic who approved this visit to detention

 8     facilities?

 9        A.   Yes, that is correct.

10        Q.   And in addition to the CSB Prijedor, this document is sent to the

11     security organ which, if you are aware of the whole structure, is

12     involved in guarding duties and security in detention facilities?

13        A.   Yes, that's correct.  The organs of security of the 1st Krajina

14     Corps are among the recipients of this.

15             MR. KRGOVIC:  Can I have an exhibit number for this document,

16     Your Honour.

17             JUDGE HALL:  Admitted and marked.

18             MR. KRGOVIC:  Thank you so much, Mr. Nielsen, I have no further

19     questions.

20             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  This document has already been assigned

22     Exhibit 1D12, Your Honours.

23             MR. KRGOVIC:  I didn't know that.  Thank you for the correction.

24                           Cross-examination by Mr. Pantelic:

25        Q.   [No interpretation]

Page 5569

 1        A.   Good day.

 2        Q.   [No interpretation]

 3        A.   Your Danish is impeccable, Mr. Pantelic.

 4        Q.   Like your Serbian language.

 5             Mr. Nielsen, you stated on many occasions during the

 6     examination-in-chief and cross-examination and in earlier proceedings

 7     that you are not an expert in legal matters; am I correct?

 8        A.   Yes, and as we say in Danish, I'm now stating that for the 117th

 9     time.

10        Q.   And you are not an expert in military issues?

11        A.   Ditto.

12        Q.   And you are not an expert in political issues?

13        A.   Well, that certainly depends on what you mean by political

14     issues.  I have written extensively on political matters.

15        Q.   You are not a political analyst?

16        A.   I have a degree in political science and in international

17     relations, and so political analysis is certainly part of my purview.

18        Q.   So I can take that you are an expert for political life in Bosnia

19     and Herzegovina; am I correct?

20        A.   Well, for the purposes of that case that's not the way I

21     understand that I'm being proffered as a witness particularly because, as

22     I stated previously, the political landscape and situation in

23     Bosnia-Herzegovina was dealt with in a complimentary report by

24     Mr. Treanor.

25        Q.   I take it that you are not an expert for political life in

Page 5570

 1     Bosnia?

 2             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honour, he has not been tendered by the

 3     Prosecution in this case as a political expert, he is being tendered as a

 4     police expert.  Many of these questions have already been asked and

 5     answered.

 6             MR. PANTELIC:

 7        Q.   And, Mr. Nielsen, you stated that you are not an expert in

 8     international public law, I believe?

 9        A.   That is correct.

10        Q.   So you are historian, you have a PhD degree in philosophy; am I

11     right?

12        A.   No, you are wrong, I have a PhD in history, which is called a

13     doctor of philosophy, as are all PhDs.

14        Q.   So would you agree me, Mr. Nielsen, that having in mind that all

15     these issues that you just mentioned, that it would be fair to actually

16     extract from your report everything which is related to police matters,

17     to political issues, to military issues, or constitutional law issues; am

18     I correct?

19             MR. HANNIS:  Argumentative, Your Honour.  That's matter for you

20     to decide.

21             MR. PANTELIC:

22        Q.   Mr. Nielsen, in preparing your report, you were actually working

23     on the basis to support Prosecution case; am I correct?

24        A.   As I stated at the outset of my testimony --

25        Q.   No, no, just give me yes or no answer, please.

Page 5571

 1        A.   Well, in that case, no, you are incorrect.

 2        Q.   Mr. Nielsen, can we agree upon the fact that MUP being a part of

 3     government, now we are speaking about Republika Srpska, actually is

 4     organised in accordance and it's functioning is in accordance with the

 5     law on state administration?  Am I correct or not?

 6        A.   Yes, and I responded to that previously.

 7        Q.   And would you agree with me if I will put to you that the notion

 8     of functioning of MUP is actually closer to the verb to direct and not to

 9     command like in army structure?  In fact, Mr. Nielsen, this is the

10     approach which was taken by many of Trial Chambers within this Tribunal.

11     Would you agree with me or not?

12        A.   I'm not sure that I understand your question, quite frankly.

13        Q.   I will try to be more precise.  We have two meanings of

14     functioning.  We have verb "to direct," and we have verb "to command."

15     It's understandable for you?

16        A.   Mm-hmm.

17        Q.   Verb "to command" is more related to the army than to police; am

18     I correct?

19        A.   In normal peacetime circumstances, that would be the case, yes.

20        Q.   So in police work, we could say that the function of the police

21     is related to the notion of direction rather than commanding; yes?

22        A.   Yes, although I don't think that a police officer who disobeys

23     the commands or instructions of his superior officer will last very long

24     in professional service.

25        Q.   We shall come to that.  At this point it is quite enough.

Page 5572

 1             During your testimony in examination-in-chief, this is transcript

 2     page 4749 until page -51, in your answers on Honourable Judge Harhoff

 3     questions regarding the role of the police during military operations,

 4     you were explaining that actually, I'm quoting, you said beaurocratically

 5     speaking, during some combat activities police being subordinated to

 6     respective military commander is the fact, but on the other hand this

 7     member of police is also in kind of command relation with the MUP.  Do

 8     you remember that issue that was mentioned?

 9        A.   Yes, I recall that discussion.

10        Q.   Well, I put to you, Dr. Nielsen, that during military operations

11     only military commander in its zone of responsibility of his unit is

12     responsible for command and not police officers or employees of Ministry

13     of Internal Affairs.  Do you agree with me or not?  Just yes or no

14     question.

15        A.   No, and neither does the defence expert.

16        Q.   Okay.  Give me the answer on the following situation:  If during

17     military operation a member of police unit commit a crime, who is in

18     charge to initiate proceedings against him?

19        A.   My understanding is that responsibility rests with the military

20     authorities for that case that you explained.

21        Q.   And another issue that I would like to discuss with you is, would

22     you agree with me that the work of CSB Banja Luka with regard to the

23     communication and sending dispatches and daily reports and weekly reports

24     so that CSB Banja Luka was more active than the other regions primarily

25     due to the problems that the other regions have with the communications;

Page 5573

 1     am I correct or not?

 2        A.   It is difficult to actually answer that question for the reason

 3     that I note in my report that we in this institution, the ICTY, have a

 4     surplus of information, documentation from CSB Banja Luka, whereas we

 5     have comparatively little from other CSBs.  So it's difficult to make

 6     that finding.

 7        Q.   In any case, CSB Banja Luka, I would say, in quite good order

 8     informed and received -- informed MUP and received direction from MUP; am

 9     I correct?

10        A.   That is correct.  That is what I stated earlier today.

11        Q.   And you stated in paragraph 236 of your report that -- actually

12     you are describing the way how this reporting process is going, and then

13     you mentioned in paragraph 237 that Mr. Zupljanin actually in order to

14     comply with this practice, in fact, Mr. Zupljanin reprimanded chiefs of

15     SJB for submitting poor daily reports, that was the fact actually from

16     the documents that you were reviewing.  Am I correct?

17        A.   Yes, there is an issue between quantity and quality here.

18        Q.   Okay.  It is not for us to discuss that matter.  Now, in the

19     paragraph 186 of your report, you are speaking about the CSB structure,

20     but I'm taking -- I stand corrected, of course, that you -- in this

21     particular paragraph you would use rule book of -- 1992 rule book of MUP;

22     am I correct?

23        A.   That is correct.

24        Q.   And this rule book was a draft made, I think, in, let's say --

25     where it was made this rule book?

Page 5574

 1        A.   As we discussed yesterday, the draft, I believe, was finalised in

 2     September 1992, and it was adopted, I think, in November.

 3        Q.   And this particular rule book was related to the state of

 4     imminent threat of war and war, state of war; yes?

 5        A.   That was my understanding, that it was drafted to conform with

 6     the operation of MUP in those conditions.

 7        Q.   Okay.  And would you agree with me that in other, I would say,

 8     circumstances actually MUP was information so they used former rule

 9     books, I believe, from Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP; am I

10     correct?

11        A.   I agreed, and I answered that question earlier, that's correct.

12        Q.   Yes.  And actually in accordance with this previous regulation,

13     the structure of CSB was in general terms the following:  On the top was

14     the chief of CSB; am I correct?

15        A.   That is correct.

16        Q.   And then he got actually a certain department and a certain

17     services, two were most important under him was a chief of sector of

18     national security or state security; am I correct?

19        A.   That is correct.

20        Q.   And on the other hand, his, I would say, assistant or colleague

21     was chief of sector of public security; am I correct?

22        A.   That is also correct.

23        Q.   And also chief of CSB was in charge for the various departments,

24     I'm speaking about the CSB Banja Luka, department for finance; am I

25     correct?

Page 5575

 1        A.   Yes, there were several departments.

 2        Q.   And then other was department for legal affairs; am I correct?

 3        A.   You are again correct.

 4        Q.   And the other one was department for analytical affairs; am I

 5     correct?

 6        A.   That is also correct.

 7        Q.   And finally, it was the department for connection, transmission,

 8     and communications in general; yes?  Am I correct?

 9        A.   Yes, that is correct.

10             JUDGE HALL:  Mr. Pantelic, we've reached the point where we must

11     rise for the day.

12             MR. PANTELIC:  Yes, Your Honour, thank you, and tomorrow I have

13     additional time to finish with Mr. Nielsen, I believe.  Because in the

14     meantime, I was speaking with my learned friend, Mr. Hannis, in and

15     general, he was keen to allocate certain couple of minutes, if necessary

16     for me, or maybe I'm wrong.  You never know with the Prosecution.

17                           [Trial Chamber confers]

18             JUDGE HALL:  Mr. Hannis.

19             MR. HANNIS:  "Keen" might be too strong a word for it, but I'm

20     not objecting to him having some additional time because we spent that

21     half-hour at the beginning, I re-opened to do some additional redirect,

22     so I think it's fair to subtract some time from me tomorrow, but I don't

23     know how much time he is asking for, an hour, 45 minutes, or something in

24     that neighbourhood.

25             MS. PIDWELL:  I would be comfortable maximum, I do my best, but

Page 5576

 1     maximum it will be around 45 minutes, something like that.  So I will be

 2     along these lines, yes.

 3             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Pantelic, if we extract from that 45 minutes,

 4     the 10 minutes that you spent on irrelevant questions like you did in the

 5     beginning of this, then it will work.

 6             MR. PANTELIC:  I will do my best, Your Honour, to do my job.

 7             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Okay.  Thanks.

 8                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.

 9                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 27th day of

10                           January, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.