1 Thursday, 28 January 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.23 p.m.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Good afternoon to
7 everyone in and around the courtroom. This is case IT-08-91-T, the
8 Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin. Thank you.
9 JUDGE HALL
10 May I have the appearances please.
11 MS. KORNER: Appearing for the Prosecution, Joanna Korner,
12 Belinda Pidwell, and Crispian Smith on behalf of the Prosecution.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic,
14 Slobodan Cvijetic, and Eugene O'Sullivan appearing on behalf of Mico
16 MR. PANTELIC: Good afternoon, Your Honours. For Zupljanin
17 Defence, Igor Pantelic, Dragan Krgovic.
18 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, there is -- there is a preliminary
19 matter that I wish to raise, and I discuss with the Ms. Korner, she has a
20 preliminary matter. But since mine refers to yesterday's transcript, I
21 kindly ask her for permission to state my preliminary matter first, and
22 if it pleases the Court I may do so before the usher enters the witness
23 in the Court.
24 JUDGE HALL
25 two matters which the Chamber would raise. One is the long anticipated
1 ruling on adjudicated facts. This, as counsel would appreciate, is an
2 exercise which has consumed quite a bit of time out of court on behalf of
3 the Chamber and its staff, and in order to bring this to as speedy a
4 conclusion as possible, the Chamber has reluctantly decided that the
5 better course would be to set aside a week, in order to deal with this.
6 And it proposes - and this is largely a matter for the Office of the
7 Prosecution, in terms of its own witness schedule, either the week
8 beginning 8th February or the week beginning 15th of February, when it
9 would set aside that time as out of court time in order to bring -- to
10 complete its work on this matter.
11 So if counsel -- if counsel, especially the Prosecution, would
12 consider that proposal and inform us as soon as they're in a position to
13 do so.
14 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I can tell you straight away about the
15 8th of February; that's not possible. The witness who is coming is the
16 one whom special arrangements have to be made for. Of safe conduct. I
17 wasn't going to raise that. So that is not even a remote possibility.
18 Your Honours, I had thought -- I have to say, that I thought the
19 extra week in January had dealt with this. But I understand that there
20 is some suggestion that the week after Easter was going to be one that
21 was taken for consideration of outstanding motions. And although it's
22 late, we have got witnesses lined up through -- I think we sent to the
23 legal officers a list of all the witnesses we had lined up through
25 I'm not saying that the week of --
1 [Prosecution counsel confer]
2 MS. KORNER: All right. All -- I'm just being confirmed from
3 Ms. Pidwell who has been dealing with this, that all witnesses to the end
4 of February have been confirmed. Now, of course, we can unconfirm or try
5 and unconfirm some of them, not that there is such a word in the English
6 language. But it does cause, can I put it this way, some upset on behalf
7 of the witnesses when they're told they are coming in a particular week,
8 and then they are told, Forget it.
9 JUDGE HALL
10 course, one of the factors that we take into consideration is that some
11 of the witnesses who you have yet to call, what you do is dependant on
12 the Chamber's ruling on that motion.
13 MS. KORNER: Well, yes. Yes and no. It is more a question of
14 the -- what -- what the Chamber rules on adjudicated facts, in particular
15 in relation to whether they apply to Zupljanin will affect not so much
16 what we ask witnesses who are to come, but we may have to add witnesses.
17 That's the problem.
18 And I appreciate we have been asking the Chamber for some time to
19 deal with this matter. It's just that we didn't appreciate that you were
20 going to say that -- that you wanted a week.
21 As I say, it's not -- it's not without possibilities to do the
22 second week, but I'm told by Ms. Pidwell that the first week in March
23 would be preferable because we haven't actually confirmed anybody yet.
24 JUDGE HALL
25 can let us know, and we'll take a final decision on the question.
1 MS. KORNER: Yes. Well, all I can say is it's -- certainly the
2 week of the 8th of February is not an option.
3 JUDGE HALL
4 result, yes. We --
5 MS. KORNER: Yes.
6 JUDGE HALL
7 ruling on yesterday's -- sorry.
8 The second matter is the ruling on yesterday's motion by the
9 Prosecution which parties would have had sight of by an advance courtesy
10 e-mail. And the ruling is to the fact that yesterday the Prosecution
11 informed the Chamber and the parties that it intends to use 55 intercepts
12 with the Witness Zepinic, thus raising again the issue of admissibility
13 of intercepts. The intercepts are listed and an e-mail message
14 circulated late yesterday. Having considered the arguments of the
15 parties present yesterday and taking into account both the jurisprudence
16 of the Tribunal and the decision of this Chamber on the 16th of
17 December of last year, the Trial Chamber's determination is as follows.
18 The Trial Chamber bears in mind, that in order to be admissible
19 in these proceedings and as set out in paragraph 14 of the decision of
20 the 16th of December, any proposed exhibit, including an intercept, must
21 be sufficiently reliable, authentic, and relevant to the proceedings in
22 question. All those intercepts that meet all three criteria can be
24 In the direction of the 16th December, the Trial Chamber has
25 already found that intercepts are not, prima facie inadmissible on the
1 grounds of illegality, and it has always been conceded by the parties and
2 accepted by the Chamber that where a witness is able to identify his or
3 her own voice on an intercept, and absent conflicting evidence, the
4 relevant intercept may be sufficiently authenticated.
5 The Chamber is satisfied that the witness can only satisfy the
6 requirements of Rule 89, in respect of those intercepts where he was
7 either, A, a participate in the discussion; or, B, physically present
8 when the conversation took place, in which case he can only address the
9 statements made by the person in who is presence he was at that time.
10 This will require the witness to confirm in court that it is his
11 voice on the intercept or that it is a conversation at which he was
12 present. The Trial Chamber accepts that this witness may be able to
13 provide information as to the relevance and context of matters discussed
14 in other intercepts, and those may be put to the witness. However,
15 following the reasoning set out above, any such intercept will remain
16 marked for identification, unless the intercept has already been admitted
17 in these proceedings. This also follows the past practice with the
18 witness Branko Djeric. Therefore, the Trial Chamber will permit the
19 Prosecution to seek admission through the witness Zepinic of only those
20 intercepts for which he -- it is stated that he is a party to the
21 conversation or during which he was present. The Trial Chamber has
22 examined the list, and provisionally identified 15 such intercepts.
23 However, the parties are free to bring to the attention of the Chamber
24 any other intercepts that fulfil the criteria.
25 As this -- as -- this ruling flows directly from the reasoning of
1 our decision of 16th December. The Prosecution had the opportunity to
2 take this into account when estimating the time available for this
3 witness, and so there is no need to increase the time allotted for direct
4 examination beyond the four hours already indicated. The Trial Chamber
5 reiterates that the accused has the right to remain silent, but notes
6 that as stated in paragraph 19 of 16th of December decision, the Defence
7 must weigh the consequences of remaining silent and only presenting
8 alternative evidence against using the opportunity to contradict the
9 Prosecution evidence.
10 The following is the list of the intercepts identified by the
11 Trial Chamber stated by group -- group 1 number. And you may take the
12 numbers as read.
13 The following intercepts do not have a group number and are
14 identified by a CD 1, number. And you may take those as read. Thank
16 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I do have matters to raise as a result
17 of this ruling which was kindly notified to us in advance.
18 But I will allow Mr. Zecevic first to deal with his matter.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, [In English] Your
20 Honours, I will speak in English because I note I was, for the purpose of
21 hearing Your Honours' ruling in Serbian, I put the -- the headphones off,
22 and I don't believe that half of -- of very important part which you cite
23 in your decision has been translated to Serbian. I'm really sorry to
24 raise the attention to this. It is probably because of the -- the -- the
25 manner of the speech or the -- or the fastness that Your Honour has given
1 the decision. But I don't think that the -- that the interpreters were
2 able to translate this in Serbian.
3 JUDGE HALL
4 the -- that if a written decision is issued or the transcript is made
5 available immediately?
6 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, as for myself, I don't have a
7 problem. But I think maybe in due time if -- if this decision can be --
8 can be translated in B/C/S, it would be sufficient.
9 JUDGE HALL
10 MR. ZECEVIC: Yeah.
11 JUDGE HALL
12 certainly be translated.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: Translated.
14 JUDGE HALL
15 it, whatever. But I appreciate the problem.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
17 Your Honours, there is -- well, one unfortunate matter that I
18 have to raise concerning yesterday's transcript.
19 Yesterday morning when we received the list of -- of our friends
20 from the Prosecution with 391 documents which they offered -- which they
21 proposed to offer to be admitted as the footnotes to Mr. Nielsen's
22 report, Dr. Nielsen's report, I discussed before court with Mr. Thomas
23 Hannis, and I -- I informed him that I would give him our position, the
24 Defence position in the course of the day, because he -- he appreciated
25 that 391 document we have to check, whether 65 ter list or we have other
1 objections to that.
2 Now, Your Honour -- Your Honours have ruled on page 68 and 69,
3 line 1 to 8 on the admission of these documents, which -- which
4 Mr. Hannis proposed. I -- I myself completely omitted that part of the
5 transcript. It is probably due because I was getting ready for -- for
6 the submission that was coming after, and I completely omitted, and I am
7 deeply -- I deeply regret that.
8 But, Your Honour, we do have an objection to that. I know it's
9 -- it's post-festum that I'm raising this, but if you permit me to
10 explain, I believe you will understand why it is our position --
11 JUDGE HALL
12 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.
13 Your Honours, the essence of our objection refers to 24 documents
14 which are the intercepts listed in the footnotes to Nielsen report. Now,
15 if these documents are admitted, we would be, at the very same time when
16 Your Honours rule today and in light of your 16 December decision, we
17 would basically have two different standards for the similar documents.
18 It is only logical that Mr. Nielsen was neither party to one of the
19 conversation or was physically present during that conversation. And for
20 that reason, these intercepts should be treated like the -- the -- all
21 other intercepts which you took the position on, in -- in your ruling of
22 16th of December and today.
23 Therefore, there is these 24, 65 ter documents, the footnotes to
24 Mr. Nielsen's report, that we object to be its admission. Those are the
25 intercepts. I can provide the numbers, if -- if it pleases the Court, or
1 I can provide the numbers by e-mail to -- to all parties, in order to
2 save time on the -- on the transcript.
3 I am again very sorry to bring it today, but it is entirely my
4 mistake, and I'm -- and I am -- I'm regretful for that.
5 Thank you, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE HALL
7 Of course, to the extent that there is fault, and what you're
8 pointing out is the Chamber by admitting those documents acted
9 inconsistently with its own ruling of the 16th December, reiterated
10 subsequently that it is something to which the Chamber itself should have
11 been alive.
12 But let me hear what the other side has to say in response.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, actually, this is all part of and
15 parcel what I wanted to raise with Your Honours as a result of the
16 ruling. Firstly can I also point out - it may not be that the Defence
17 have looked at it - that Your Honours have also admitted intercepts as
18 part of the 92 ter package that is going along with the witness who is
19 coming. I've forgotten his number, but the one who requires safe
20 conduct. So there are, I am afraid, a number of inconsistencies in how
21 these documents have been treated.
22 But can I -- can I say why I think it -- in one sense it is
23 right. First, the intercepts which a part of the package have been
24 admitted in at least the other case in which the transcript forms part of
25 the 92 ter package, and in this particular witness's case, these
1 particular intercepts have been admitted in a number of other cases.
2 Your Honours' ruling seems to suggest - and this is what really
3 I'm seeking clarification - first, that, the next witness will have to
4 listen in front of His Honour -- in front of Your Honours to his voice
5 and tape and identify it, having already done so yesterday, as I
6 explained, with the investigator and on the schedule.
7 Now that in itself is going to take a little time.
8 Second, Your Honours --
9 JUDGE HALL
10 along that line, Ms. Korner.
11 MS. KORNER: Yes.
12 JUDGE HALL
13 MS. KORNER: Because that's what you say. You say this will
14 require the witness to confirm in court that it is his voice on the
16 JUDGE HALL
17 preparing the -- in the course of his being prepared, and the result of
18 that being summarising in the spreadsheet, he would have done so. And
19 when we deal with the intercepts item by item, he can say whether this is
20 one in which he recognises his voice or whether he was present.
21 I don't see how -- how the question of him having to listen to
22 these transcripts in court arises.
23 MS. KORNER: Well, I'm sorry, Your Honour, that's how we read
24 that. But in any event, I don't think it will be as simple as that
25 because the witness -- if we say intercept 65 ter number 1056 on the 21st
1 of April, and you listen to it, can you confirm that's your voice.
2 He didn't have transcripts. He was deliberately not given
3 transcripts, Your Honour, because we wanted him to listen to -- to the
4 voices. So it is not that he had a transcript in front of him saying
5 this is the witness and this is the person to whom he is talking.
6 But can I move on from that. I'm grateful for that, although we
7 may have to try and work out how we're going to do that without him
8 listen doing it.
9 But it seems to follow also that Your Honours are saying that
10 admissibility of the intercepts depends on somebody who is a party to the
11 conversation and/or present at the conversation, even if is he not on the
12 telephone line, attesting to this.
13 Now, Your Honour, if that's right, obviously it increases the
14 number of witnesses we have to call, who are not dead, who have to
15 testify, That's my voice on the line.
16 And the third thing is this. I'm not sure that all of
17 Your Honours may appreciate this. The identification of voices on the
18 intercepts as shown in the transcripts that Your Honour has seen was
19 actually done by people working in Sarajevo for the organisation that
20 taped these -- these conversations, who had quite often never met any of
21 these people, and those identifications were being made through listening
22 or an analysis of voice. Whereas what you have here, for example, is a
23 witness who can say, I have known certain of the participants in these
24 phone conversations and listened to them and spoken to them on the phone,
25 even though it is not recorded, on a number of occasions. So,
1 Your Honours, at the moment this is -- what is unclear is what it is we
2 have to do to get these intercepts admitted. And, for example, you use
3 the Branko Djeric example of his failure to recognise the voice, so you
4 didn't admit it.
5 This witness listened to those three, and in one of them can say,
6 I recognise the voice of Branko Djeric.
7 Now, Your Honours, are you saying that doesn't make it
8 admissible? Because if so, what does make it admissible?
9 JUDGE HARHOFF: Ms. Korner, may I put a question to you.
10 MS. KORNER: Certainly.
11 JUDGE HARHOFF: When a party produces an intercept before the
12 Chamber and provide a transcript or -- and a declaration from the - I
13 don't know for any better word - the interceptor, that is to say, the
14 person, the agent who sat somewhere and taped the conversation. That
15 person would normally indicate that this was a conversation between Mr. A
16 and Madam B, because the interceptor, the agent sitting with his
17 listening gear, would know from which numbers the calls were made, and by
18 virtue of that identification would normally be able to say that this is
19 a conversation between Mr. A and Madam B.
20 In the Tribunal's jurisprudence, that evidence has normally been
21 sufficient to establish the identity of those who are on the line. I
22 don't see why, at all, you need Mr. Zepinic to come in, in addition now,
23 to confirm the identity of the persons who speak on these intercepts that
24 you are putting to us.
25 You -- in my view, it would be sufficient to produce the
1 statement from the interceptor, the agent, and that would do. So the
2 Chamber is at some loss in understanding just why we need Zepinic.
3 Now the additional problem with Zepinic or anyone else is that to
4 ask a third party to confirm the identity of the speakers merely by
5 listening to the intercept seems to us to be simply too -- too
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE HARHOFF: It would be too unreliable.
9 So to have Zepinic confirm that Mr. Stanisic spoke to
10 Mr. Karadzic, or whoever it might be, may be of assistance, but I
11 certainly wouldn't rely on it, even if Mr. Zepinic is supposed to be able
12 to recognise Mr. Stanisic's voice very well, because they were good
13 friends, or whatever, they spoke often to each other. It is simply not
14 sufficiently reliable, especially when you have the normal option which
15 is available to us.
16 So that's we say that if you want Zepinic to confirm the identity
17 of the speakers on these intercepts, then at least we should restrict
18 ourselves to the intercepts in which Mr. Zepinic himself was one of the
20 And if then he had -- merely an order to meet the request from
21 the Prosecution, if then also Mr. Zepinic could say that he was in the
22 room at a particular time, and this time can be confirmed, when he heard
23 Mr. A speaking to Madam B, and after the conversation, Mr. A confirmed to
24 Zepinic that it was indeed Mrs. B that he spoke to, and we can then, by
25 verification of the time, conclude that this was indeed a conversation
1 that took place between Mr. A and Madam B, then we would go along with
2 that. But that's as far as we can go.
3 MS. KORNER: Can I -- I fully appreciate that. And, Your Honour,
4 one of the matters that we have been discussing is whether we should move
5 up the witness who is going to deal with the intercepts to a much closer
6 stage to where we are now to deal with this.
7 But, Your Honour, my understanding is that there is a wholesale
8 out and out challenge, as you gathered from Mr. Zecevic and Mr. Pantelic
9 yesterday, to not only, whether these intercepts are legal or illegal,
10 whether they have been in some way doctored, but also to the voices on
11 them. There is no admission. The Defence declined to make the
13 And, therefore, it seemed to us, sensible in the light of what we
14 now know to be the Defence position, that in addition to the man who
15 dealt with the intercepting, the interceptor who will say, Either this
16 comes from this telephone number or from listening to this voice on
17 countless occasions - which is part of the evidence as Your Honour
18 Judge Harhoff knows - I can say this is X, to have some confirmation from
19 someone who can say, I recognise the voice. It is not identification.
20 It is recognition, which is different. Because I dealt with, for
21 example, Mico Stanisic over a period of three years on a daily basis.
22 And than is the reason.
23 Now if Your Honours -- if what Your Honour is saying is, We will
24 take -- we will admit the intercepts once we have heard the evidence from
25 the people in Sarajevo, then, Your Honour, I certainly won't take up --
1 waste any time. But Your Honours are faced with what you heard yesterday
2 from the Defence, and that is why I made this application.
3 I hope that is clear.
4 JUDGE HALL
5 people in Sarajevo, you're talking about the persons who -- the technical
6 persons who would have made the --
7 MS. KORNER: Yes, well, who are not, I may say, on our witness
8 list at the moment. We have simply got the man -- overall charge. But
9 they have been called in other trials. And it we're put to this
10 challenge, we can call the various technicians. But at the moment,
11 they're not on our witness list.
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
14 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]... bring something else to
15 your attention. Mr. Smith has looked up the witness from Sarajevo. He
16 was a 92 ter package, and it looks, we're just checking, that
17 Your Honours have already admitted all the intercepts. Or -- not all,
18 but we're just checking. But the ones that were on ...
19 Which makes life even more interesting.
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 THE INTERPRETER: There's a live mike on, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE HALL
23 don't consider it necessary to say anything beyond the ruling that we
24 have delivered on these matters.
25 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] The first 12 intercepts
1 on --
2 The first 12 intercepts on our list were part of the package.
3 And, at the moment, appear to be in.
4 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
5 JUDGE DELVOIE: Which witness are we talking about, Ms. Korner?
6 MS. KORNER: I think he is a protected witness, Your Honour. He
7 is a protected witness.
8 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay, then give him a pseudonym.
9 MS. KORNER: ST-108.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE HARHOFF: Ms. Korner, I think the practice is that these
12 parts of the package are not finally admitted until the witness has been
13 heard. ST-108 hasn't been heard yet, so it's not finally admitted.
14 MS. KORNER: All right. Your Honour, this may be a -- this is --
15 may be a side one, we'll have to sort that out later. I thought
16 Your Honours admitted in lock, stock, and barrel. I didn't remember
17 there being the caveat that only after he has given evidence.
18 But anyhow, Your Honours, then can I return to how I deal with
19 this. Your Honours is saying - are saying, sorry, is - are saying I can
20 go into the content of some of the intercepts about which he may be
21 expected to know something, particularly where his name is mentioned, but
22 I should not ask him to say whether having listened to these intercepts
23 he is able to identify the voice of the person he worked with for three
25 I just want to understand that. Is that right, Your Honours?
1 Because that seems to what your ruling seems to say.
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: We're speaking about several things at the same
3 time, it appears.
4 The issue of authenticity is a part of the process of admitting
5 the intercept into evidence but is only one part. There's also the issue
6 of relevance, and there's the issue of reliability.
7 Now, only for the purpose of authenticity for that purpose only,
8 I think Mr. Zecevic's testimony [sic] as to who is speaking is
9 insufficient, unless he, himself, is a part of the conversation. You may
10 put it to him for contents or for other purposes. But for the
11 authenticity, we would require more solid evidence.
12 MS. KORNER: Yes. Your Honours, that's all I'm asking. So I
13 can't say to him, Have a look at what is said to be an intercept of a
14 conversation of Mico Stanisic and Radovan Karadzic, did you recognise the
16 Yes, Mico Stanisic.
17 I now want to ask you about some of the content about which you
18 may be expected to be able to assist.
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: Ms. Korner, I think you can [Realtime transcript
20 read in error "can't"] ask him whether he recognises or not. But you
21 can't ask as a result of that --
22 MS. KORNER: The admission.
23 JUDGE DELVOIE: To admit it as --
24 MS. KORNER: That's fine. Thank you, Your Honours, yes, that's
25 the first matter.
1 The second matter is this: Your Honours say I can't have more
2 than four hours and say that we should have thought about it when we got
3 your ruling. Your Honour we give the estimate of four hours before we
4 got the ruling about the admission of intercepts. Then when we put
5 together the package of what he would -- to listen to, it was then that
6 we appreciated that there were a large number about which he could make
7 informed comment.
8 If Your Honours limit me to the four hours, then I cannot ask the
9 witness to assist us on quite a lot of these intercepts.
10 So that's -- because you say we should have known about it once
11 we got the ruling, but the estimate of four hours was given before, was
12 given in November.
13 So I'm in Your Honours hands on this, but clearly to be able to
14 deal with it, I need more than four hours.
15 JUDGE HALL
16 that four hours, we would consider your application for further time
18 MS. KORNER: Certainly.
19 MR. PANTELIC: I do apologise, Your Honour, it's page 16, line --
20 line 18 and 19. His Honour Judge Delvoie, I think he said something
21 along these lines, I think you can ask him, if I'm right. So for the
22 purposes of precision of transcript. Thank you.
23 JUDGE HALL
24 So could the usher escort the witness to the stand, please.
25 [The witness entered court]
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
2 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
3 JUDGE HALL
5 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
6 JUDGE HALL
7 solemn declaration as a witness before this Tribunal, and the -- I would
8 begin by asking you your name.
9 THE WITNESS: My name is Vito Zepinic.
10 JUDGE HALL
11 THE WITNESS: 27 of June, 1953.
12 JUDGE HALL
13 THE WITNESS: I am doctor of medicine, Ph.D. degree.
14 JUDGE HALL
15 THE WITNESS: Australian.
16 JUDGE HALL
17 THE WITNESS: Australian.
18 JUDGE HALL
19 Tribunal; is that correct?
20 THE WITNESS: Not.
21 JUDGE HALL
22 in this case, the Prosecution - would begin by asking you questions, and
23 then counsel for each of the accused would have a right to put questions
24 to you, after which the Prosecution may have further questions arising
25 out of such questions, as were put on behalf of the accused, and the
1 Chamber may, itself, have questions by way of clarification. And upon
2 the completion of that exercise, you would be released as a witness.
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 JUDGE HALL
5 WITNESS: VITOMIR ZEPINIC
6 [Witness answered through interpreter]
7 Examination by Ms. Korner:
8 Q. All right, Mr. Zepinic, the learned Judge asked you what
9 ethnicity you were, and you said Australian. Before you became an
10 Australian were you a citizen of the former Yugoslavia?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And under which ethnic grouping would you have come -- did you
14 A. I always indicated myself as a Yugoslav.
15 Q. All right. So for the purposes of any census or elections you
16 called yourself a Yugoslav.
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. I want to ask you a little bit more about your background. I
19 think that you finished medical high school and then went to the
20 University of Sarajevo; is that right?
21 A. That's correct.
22 Q. And after had you obtained your bachelor of medicine
23 qualification did you go to Belgrade University and obtain a master's
25 A. Yes, I finish the master degree in medicine in Belgrade.
1 Q. And thereafter did you complete your PhD in 1985?
2 A. Yes, I did. I'm not quite sure, 1984 or 1985, doesn't matter.
3 Q. For anyone who wants to have look at it, I think your Ph.D. is
4 filed at Belgrade University. Is that right?
5 A. Yes, that's correct.
6 Q. Did you practice in general medicine for some years in Sokolac?
7 A. Only shortly.
8 Q. And then were you employed by the corrective services in the
9 Department of Justice dealing effectively with delinquents?
10 A. It was my interest regarding further post graduate study because
11 both thesis master degree, and Ph.D. degree, I finished in field of
12 forensic psychiatry, in particularly regarding research in delinquency.
13 Q. All right. Was it during this period that you first met
14 Momcilo Mandic?
15 A. I think so. I would say that we met during his time when he was
16 a judge in court in Sarajevo. And I think that for the first time we met
17 during my -- doing a job as a court expert, a court witness about my
19 Q. All right. Now, I think it is also right that you were awarded a
20 Fulbright scholarship to study in Chicago.
21 A. Yes, I did a project regarding investigation in the field of
22 delinquency, in adolescent delinquency in Chicago, but I didn't have such
23 pleasure and opportunity to being achieved and to go there.
24 Q. To put matters fairly shortly because this is all background, I
25 think the communist party made allegations that you were supported by the
2 A. That was -- I would say common with young people who wanted to
3 further study abroad, and my interest was science. I honestly speaking
4 cannot recall on which basis communist party made such decision and on
5 which information they stated that I am connected with CIA or any other
6 organisation or association in America instead of being interested in
7 particular and specifically about my science and my professional field.
8 Q. All right. And then I think eventually to lead into your career
9 with the police, did you obtain, in 1986, employment as director of the
10 police academy in Vrace?
11 A. Yes, I was appointed as -- under Vrace police academy.
12 Q. And were you a lecturer in the Faculty of Medicine in the
13 University of Sarajevo?
14 A. Yeah, I was associate, I would say lecturer in the University of
16 Q. Now, after the elections in 1990 -- let's start before the
17 elections. Did you join any of the nationalist parties?
18 A. No. Not national, but also nor any other party, because during
19 election after crash, I would say, of communist party in early
20 January 1990s, it was established many other parties in Bosnia and other
21 states in former Yugoslavia, but I didn't join any party. Not national,
22 but no other party as well.
23 Q. All right. After the elections, were you nominated by the SDS
24 for the position of minister of the interior?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Can you tell the Court, please, how it come about that the SDS
2 nominated you for this position.
3 A. Well, I was approached, I would say, by a few of my good friends,
4 all nationalities, because during, I would say, election and during
5 promotion of national parties, it was obvious that national parties have
6 something which is not, I would say, promising as a unity of my former
7 country. And I had already, I would say, reputation as a liberalist who
8 is looking about, you know, qualities not about national -- national
9 basis, and I was approached with -- to accept some nomination, in
10 particular in interior ministry because of my previous experience because
11 of my reputation, because of my connection with many people being my
12 students in police academy, and in particular, also, because of my
13 professional research that I did in delinquency.
14 So I would say that now any national leader directly approached
15 to me asking me for appointment, it was rather, I would say, my friends
16 who asked me to accept some position.
17 Q. All right. Did you have a meeting with anybody from the SDS
18 about your accepting the nomination for this position?
19 A. Yes, I was invited to attend at a meeting -- headquarter of SDS,
20 Djuro Djakovic in Sarajevo with a friend of mine Miodrag Simovic that I
21 know him for long period of time. I met there with Dr. Karadzic. I
22 think it was Momcilo Krajisnik. I can't recall other people being
23 present. And I remember that they explained to me that, on the agreement
24 between national parties that SDS
25 role as a deputy minister.
1 I should mention here nobody, including Dr. Karadzic or
2 Momcilo Krajisnik, they didn't require any membership to the SDS, and I
3 have never been member of SDS
4 them my concept, if I'm nominated. Dr. Karadzic was a little bit, you
5 know, reluctant saying that probably my concept is not in accordance with
6 some, you know, national parties concept. Mr. Krajisnik responded in way
7 like, We expect that you a good man, that you will do your job
8 professionally, and that you are not going to move into any -- anybody's
9 favour. That was very short meeting with that.
10 Q. Now, had you met either Dr. Karadzic or Mr. Krajisnik before this
12 A. No.
13 Q. So, on that basis, did you accept the nomination for deputy
14 minister of the interior?
15 A. It wasn't meeting to accept a role. It was meeting to explain
16 that I'm ready to, you know, to take that position. In particular, that
17 national parties, SDS
18 which nationality should take control over interior ministry, probably
19 reasonable considering that it was only, I would say, armed force in our
21 In -- I remember that Muhammed Cengic was very keen to take role
22 as interior ministry. SDS
23 find somebody who is in between.
24 Q. Right. Can I just ask what you -- you said a moment ago, that
25 the -- there were long discussions about who could control the interior
1 ministry. Because it was, you would say, the only armed force in your
3 Why do you say that, given that there was the JNA as well at the
5 A. JNA was under command of federal institution, not on the state
6 constitution. And also we have Territorial Defence which was also on the
7 command of JNA, so practically speaking, state has interior ministry, the
8 police, and reserve police that state can use in case of some, you know,
9 necessary issues.
10 Q. All right. Thank you. In any event, did you obtain, were you
11 appointed to the position of deputy minister of the interior at the
12 assembly held in February 1991?
13 A. Beg your pardon, can you repeat your question and translation.
14 Because it is distracting, your question and translation, if you don't
15 mind, I will listen. If necessary I will ask Your Honour to translate
16 something if I don't understand.
17 Q. And you're happier to speak in English, and if you don't
18 understand something then you will use the interpreter.
19 A. Because it is quite distracting listening, you know, question,
20 and listening to translation at the same time.
21 Q. The question I asked was this: Were you in fact appointed to the
22 position of the deputy minister of the interior by the assembly held in
23 February of 1991?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And at the same time was Alija [overlapping speakers].
1 A. [Overlapping speakers]... appointed as a minister, yes.
2 Q. Was appointed the minister of the interior.
3 THE INTERPRETER: Would the speakers kindly not overlap for the
4 sake of interpretation.
5 MS. KORNER: Now I'm doing what normally is the problem here,
6 that two people speaking English go at speed.
7 Q. I'd like you to have a look, please, at a diagram which was
8 attached to our pre-trial brief and is -- it's exhibit -- ir 65 ter
10 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Ms. Korner, the previous question of
11 yours and the comment by the witness didn't enter -- wasn't entered into
12 the transcript.
13 MS. KORNER: Okay. Yes.
14 Q. And you said, yes.
15 At the same time, was the question, that Alija Delimustafic was
16 appointed minister, and you said yes.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. I --
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 MS. KORNER: The diagram, Your Honours, is page 4 in the bundle
21 that Your Honours all have.
22 Q. Now, I think, Mr. Zepinic, you had a chance to look at this
24 A. Yes, I did.
25 Q. Any comments you want to make about the -- the format of this?
1 A. I would make two comments here. I don't think that we have
2 assistant secretary for - I can't read - public security that
3 Jusuf Pusina was appointed on that position. I think he was director of
4 police academy. And Mr. Stanisic was appointed as an advisor to cabinet
5 of ministry, minister and with other two advisors as well.
6 So, you know, putting his position right now here, it seems that
7 he had higher position than under-secretary of security service, or
8 higher position than any assistant, in particular department. I don't
9 think that we should put on him such position that he didn't help.
10 Q. So you would say the position of advisor to the secretary which
11 Mr. Stanisic became in 1992, is one that is what, on a level with an
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Right. And you think that Mr. Pusina was the director of the
16 A. Yeah.
17 Q. Otherwise, does this diagram accurately represent the people who
18 were in these positions during this period?
19 A. I think so. Except on the -- our documents that chief of
20 security in Sarajevo was a member of our cabinet. And Mr. Stanisic was
21 previously appointed as a chief of CSB Sarajevo.
22 Q. Now you have -- thank you very much. You've talked about our
23 cabinet. Can you tell us what you mean by that?
24 A. I mean cabinet of ministry. Minister that includes our
25 assistants in different areas, like, crime, information, finances and
1 police. Uniformed police. And also secret service with under-secretary
2 as a member of our cabinet. And he has also two his assistants regarding
3 his role.
4 And, again, in case that we needed something regarding in general
5 the state in our cabinet meetings, we invited chiefs of regional security
6 police services, CSB
7 other -- or centre. We had on that time, if I remember well, ten centres
8 in the state.
9 Q. Yes, I think you will find that it was nine which are shown here.
10 A. Bihac, Banja Luka, Livno, Doboj, Tuzla, Zenica, Sarajevo,
11 Gorazde, Mostar.
12 Q. Now I can move straight away, because you have mentioned both of
13 them, to your knowledge of, first of all, Mico Stanisic. When did you
14 first meet him?
15 A. Honestly speaking, I cannot recall for the first time. I really
16 can't recall.
17 Q. Okay. If we could place it -- had you met him before the 1990
19 A. I would say yes considering that he was a member of judo club and
20 I was president of karate club. It's two sports we never, you know,
21 liked each other. It's a clash all the time. So apparently I saw him
22 before and met him before, but not establishing any particular
24 Q. After your appointment as deputy minister, how often would you
25 see or have dealings with Mico Stanisic?
1 A. I didn't have a meeting with Mico Stanisic until his appointment
2 as chief of Sarajevo CSB
3 Q. All right. And once he had been appointed, how often would you
4 have meetings with him or see him after that?
5 A. Well, depends of problems that we discussed regarding Sarajevo
6 region. Again, he was on few occasions invited in our cabinet meeting
7 regarding that. Depends, I can't say we -- we met once a week or twice
8 per day, or we had, you know, conversation on daily basis. Depends which
9 problem arise in Sarajevo that I can -- or needed to contact him and
10 resolve the problem.
11 Q. Now, what about Stojan Zupljanin?
12 A. Stojan Zupljanin was previously appointed as a chief of centre in
13 Banja Luka. He was a well-experienced policeman. If I remember well, he
14 finished law in Sarajevo and then being appointed as a crime inspector in
16 being appointed as a chief of CSB
17 So we accepted his position. We didn't replace him after we --
18 being appointed. And it was his duty as a chief of CSB Banja Luka to
19 send us any information regarding security out of that particular region.
20 Again, if something that would be discussed on the state level,
21 he would be invited to attend to our cabinet meeting, together with his
22 usually under-secretary of security service.
23 Q. And roughly how often do you think you would see him or speak to
25 A. Well, I can't say exactly. If I can say, maybe -- if I remember
1 well, we had meetings, maybe four, five times in the cabinet meeting,
2 inviting him as a chief of CSB
3 Q. And did you ever go to Banja Luka --
4 A. Yes I had on many occasions some problems that I needed to be
5 there. And my first visit in Banja Luka region was a couple of days
6 after being appointed because of problem in Bosanski Dubica between
7 Croatia and citizens, I would say, who lived in Bosnia and citizens who
8 lived in -- in Croatia. It was very close between Kutina, if my memory
9 is still very well. It is kids who attended primary school attended in
10 the [indiscernible] Sava river because it was closer than going to
11 Dubica. And at the same time, the high school kids from Croatia visited
12 and attended at Bosanska Dubica. It was quite common in Bosnia, like
13 Bosanski, Slovanski Brod, Bosanski -- anyway -- so but unfortunately --
14 Q. Can I -- I'm sorry to interrupt.
15 A. That's fine, no problem.
16 Q. It is simply that we have limited amount of time. I was just
17 trying to get at how often you had, you know, been to Banja Luka, so you
18 had met with Zupljanin, that's all.
19 A. I can't exactly number. But any time when I needed something or
20 -- or if situation required from me to be there, considering my position,
21 it was quite normal to invite and have a meeting with chief of, you know,
23 We had a, I would say, common -- and as war erupted in Croatia, I
24 would say that we had more frequent meetings in the end of 1991 than in
25 the beginning of 1991, because, simply of security reasons.
1 Q. I'm sorry to have to go back for a moment, but I think because we
2 have been slightly talking over each other, that the shorthand writer, it
3 doesn't appear what you said about Stanisic. That's at page 26, line 6.
4 You said the chief of security in Sarajevo was a member of our cabinet
5 and Mr. Stanisic was previously appointed as chief of ...
6 A. Sarajevo centre.
7 Q. [Overlapping speakers]... SUP.
8 A. Yes, before being appointed as an advisor to ministry.
9 Q. Doing it again.
10 Right. Thank you very much.
11 Now, could we move, please, to the reporting procedures and what
12 information was given to you as deputy minister and to the minister
14 We see you had -- there were a number of assistant secretaries.
15 Would they deliver reports to you or to the minister? And, if so, how
17 A. From whom?
18 Q. From the various assistant secretaries for the prevention and
19 detection of crime which was Momcilo Mandic.
20 A. Oh yes, it was their duty as our assistants to provide us
21 necessary information regarding, I would say, general issues. But
22 assistants had also responsibility for own department, to act and take
23 action in accordance with our internal documents.
24 In particular, we discuss about report provided to us, what is
25 related with state not the particular, I would say region, or particular
2 discuss such issue on the cabinet meeting as well.
3 Q. Okay. Can we deal with looking at it -- can we look at it from
4 the hierarchy point of view.
5 Would the SJBs have to deliver reports to the CSBs within their
6 area of responsibility?
7 A. Can you say again, please, your question, sorry.
8 Q. Yes. What I'm calling the SJBs --
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. -- would they have to give regular reports or reports to the
12 A. I'm sorry, I think that you are confusing me talking about the
13 same body.
14 Q. Okay. Can we have up the -- the chart again please.
15 A. Yes. CSB
16 Q. We see the CSBs there?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And underneath them are shown, for example, if we take --
19 A. SJB.
20 Q. Yeah.
21 A. That's police station.
22 THE INTERPRETER: The speakers are kindly asked not to overlap.
23 THE WITNESS: [Previous translation continues] ... every police
24 station should be informed chief of CSB. So CSB as a chief from the
25 region should inform us what is going on -- on particular area.
1 So as you see, for example, in Banja Luka, see here, we have
2 Banja Luka CSB
3 they had a commander who is responsible and to inform CSB if necessary if
4 something urgent, a copy of or any information should be sent to us
5 directly in the ministry.
6 Q. All right. What -- what would you call something urgent that
7 required immediate reporting to the ministry?
8 A. In wasting time, for example, if something occurred, like,
9 catastrophe or terrorist attack or they captured somebody dealing with
10 drugs or money smuggling or whatever, if necessary, if CSB was unable to
11 take control or deal with a current problem, SJB can request directly
12 from ministry to support in taking action.
13 Q. We have seen from other evidence that there was -- there --
14 subsequent to the period, however, when the Republika Srpska, the Serbian
15 Republic was established, that SJBs were sending or were told to send
16 weekly reports to the CSBs.
17 Would those reports sent to the CSBs be also copied and sent up
18 to the ministry?
19 A. Yes. The station, police station in particular region sent -- it
20 was normal, I would say, daily reporting what is going on in the field,
21 and CSB
22 information to send to ministry directly.
23 Q. Yes. Thank you.
24 Now, what sort of reporting went on between the minister of the
25 interior and the Presidency, for example?
1 A. By the law we had obligation to inform, I would say, governments,
2 parliaments and Presidency about situation on daily basis, providing
3 bulletins, gazettes, or other paper. And it was common that we not only
4 sending written information, attending meetings, informing Presidency or
5 parliament - and government was, you know, part of our regular meetings -
6 or being invited by a member of Presidency or president of Presidency to
7 give some brief regarding situation on the field.
8 Q. All right. I want to move, please, to a different topic.
9 JUDGE HALL
11 MS. KORNER: I have just been handed a note.
12 JUDGE HALL
13 for the adjournment.
14 So we rise for 20 minutes.
15 [The witness stands down]
16 --- Recess taken at 3.39 p.m.
17 --- On resuming at 4.03 p.m.
18 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, while the witness is coming back into
19 court, it just occurred to us a number of witnesses had talked in
20 relation to these charts we produced for the pre-trial brief. I wonder
21 if i could just have the book, as it were, exhibited now so that we have
22 an exhibit number for it. It's 65 ter 10138. And then we can have point
23 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. I don't know why it thought it was already in.
24 MS. KORNER: So did I, until it was suddenly pointed out that it
25 was not.
1 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honors, we do have some objections in that
2 respect because we don't think that that's completely accurate. But we
3 can deal with that through cross-examination.
4 But what I was -- what I had in -- in mind also was that maybe we
5 divide because each and every page is a different chart. So maybe it can
6 be -- let's say, 100.1, 2, 3, 4, and so and so on.
7 MS. KORNER: I agree.
8 MR. ZECEVIC: In order that will give us a much better view of
9 the exhibit. Thank you.
10 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, we certainly agree to that. We think
11 that's sensible. And as I say, and obviously witnesses are making slight
12 corrections. Can I put it this way, it is admitted as an exhibit, errors
13 and omissions to be rectified.
14 JUDGE HALL
15 errors and omissions excepted.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P873, Your Honours.
17 [The witness takes the stand]
18 MS. KORNER: Maybe not what Your Honours said, but it may be the
20 JUDGE HALL
21 omissions accepted.
22 MS. KORNER: A, double C, and not e-x-c-e-p-t.
23 Q. I'm so sorry, Mr. Zepinic, that was a slight digression.
24 I said I was going to move to a different topic, and I would like
25 to ask you please about the principle.
1 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm so sorry. Due to this the number wasn't
2 entered. The P number.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, just for the sake of transcript,
4 the number is P873.
5 JUDGE HALL
6 different pages and the different charts in the book.
7 The Registry will indicate the particular numbers.
8 MS. KORNER: Moving now to a slightly different more general
9 topic, if we may.
10 I want to ask you please to tell the Court about your
11 understanding of the principle of resubordination of the police to the
12 army, appreciating that you are talking about the period when you were
13 Assistant Minister.
14 JUDGE HALL
15 shouldn't have inserted that English expression excepted. It now reads
16 accepted. The word should have been excepted. E-x-c-e-p-t-e-d. Not
17 accepted, excepted. We all understand what it means, that subject to the
18 errors and --
19 MS. KORNER: Yes.
20 Q. Mr. Zepinic, resubordination, please, if you could tell the Court
21 your understanding of this principle.
22 A. My understanding, first of all, you should understand that JNA of
23 Yugoslav People's Army was under control of federal Presidency.
24 Previously chief commander was president of Yugoslavia. And after Tito
25 died, it was Federal Presidency as a chief of army.
1 It was prime minister cabinet, having member of Ministry of
2 Defence. At the same time, it was chief in general, General Kadijevic on
3 time when we are talking about 1990 and 1991. By federal -- I'm not
4 lawyer by my occupation, and I apologise many lawyers in this room,
5 better will, I will say, explain regarding legal issues.
6 But army was under control of the federal institution, JNA. We
7 had in any state, in every state, territorial army as a part of army
8 force that should be, if necessary, under command of JNA. By law on that
9 time constitution, state and federal, we have three levels of
10 implementation or subordination between army, JNA, and police force in
11 any state. In case of crisis in some state, police is responsible
12 directly to state Presidency, and state Presidency should make decision
13 about involvement, and if necessary, on ministry request, approval to
14 engage reservists in state to look after something what is necessary for
15 security reasons.
16 In case of imminent war threat, police, in any state, with
17 decision made by federal Presidency can be under command of JNA, in some
18 particular region to resolving problem like, you know, terrorists being
19 in particular or anything else that has happened. And in case of war
20 situation, army practically is taking control over all forces in any --
21 any state. I'm talking about what's happened in former Yugoslavia before
22 disintegration practically of former Yugoslavia and before the federal
23 Yugoslavia, republic of Yugoslavia, was disintegrated into independent
24 countries starting from Slovenia, Croatia and later on.
25 Q. Right.
1 A. So that was subordination between army and police.
2 In case that, again, the necessary, federal Presidency could make
3 decision to engage, for example, Special Police force unit from my state
4 Bosnia and Herzegovina to be involved or any police -- policeman to be
5 involved in some crisis region in former Yugoslavia to support peace and
6 establishing, you know, law and order. What's happened, for example, in
7 1981 [sic], in Kosovo crisis when first erupted. On that time federal
8 Presidency established, I would say, a federal committee for Kosovo
9 involving all policemen form state republics under federal control and
10 federal order that was under federal ministry command.
11 Q. You said a moment ago that in the case of a war situation, the
12 army practically took control over all forces. When you talk about a war
13 situation, could that be one that just came about, or did there have to
14 be a declaration of war made?
15 A. Yes, of course. Federal Presidency, as a chief of army, and, you
16 know, highest ranking, I would say, body in our former country should
17 announce war situation and give instructions to all states and all
18 subjects being involved in dealing with war situation.
19 Q. If there was an imminent threat of war, you say, again, would
20 that require there to be some kind of a declaration?
21 A. Yes. In case of imminent threat of war, federal Presidency can
22 make some declaration regarding involvement of police units under army
23 [realtime transcript read in error "aerial"] control, but not necessarily
24 all of them should be. In case, for example, that some crisis erupted,
25 for example, in some region in former Yugoslavia, like the
1 [indiscernible] Bosnia, whatever, federal Presidency will announce, you
2 know, crisis situation, and that practically some part or all police --
3 policemen should be under army control and command.
4 Q. Again, you said that the federal Presidency could make a
5 declaration regarding the involvement of police units under army - as
6 opposed to aerial command - but would the president -- the federal
7 Presidency have to declare that an imminent state of war or threat of war
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. All right. If there was simply the declaration that an imminent
11 threat of war existed, who would be responsible for the disciplining of
13 A. Who is commanding them. If they implemented in armies action
14 they had responsibility practically on the army role because no one
15 policeman can be employed as a policeman before serving compulsory
16 military service in former Yugoslavia.
17 Q. So if they were ordered to serve in a -- in -- under the army, it
18 was the army who was responsible for disciplining them?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. If no such order existed, but the police, for example, were sent
21 to assist the army in guarding prisoners, who be would be, in your
22 understanding, responsible for disciplining --
23 A. The ministry, our ministry.
24 Q. When you say your ministry, the Ministry of Interior?
25 A. Ministry of Interior, yes. Sorry.
1 Q. All right. That's all I want to ask you about that topic.
2 You mentioned the Special Police. Can I ask you, please, about
3 the Special Police.
4 At the time when you were minister -- sorry, deputy minister.
5 A. Thank you for promotion.
6 Q. Who was in charge of the Special Police?
7 A. Commander at that time was Dragan Vikic.
8 Q. And to whom did Mr. Vikic report?
9 A. Well, when he came under power, we changed previous rule, and did
10 agreement between me and Alija Delimustafic that Special Police force
11 cannot be used in any circumstances without both of us signing, agreeing,
12 including commander of Special Police force. So nobody practically in my
13 state, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, had rights legally to use or ask Special
14 Police force to do something without our signature and our agreement.
15 It was deliberately, to be honest, change rules, because we tried
16 to prevent the eventuality of misusing Special Police which had, at that
17 time, between 3 and 400 specially trained young people, fully equipped in
18 case of something necessary to intervene. They had special
19 accommodation, they lived there all the time, in Krtelji Sarajevo, and
20 all the practically, in case that they don't do other duties, like
21 guarding Presidency, parliament, or government. They had regular
22 training every day regarding ability, incapability to take role, if
24 Sorry for interrupting, I'm sorry. I deeply apologise to you.
25 At the same time we had some, I would say, also young people that being
1 as a Special Police force in regional CSBs. But on that -- on our time,
2 chief of CSB
3 stations, police stations, without our agreement.
4 Q. That was actually the next thing I was going ask you.
5 So there were in fact Special Police within the CSBs. Is that
6 what you're saying?
7 A. Yeah, that's correct.
8 Q. But in order for them to be used -- your permission -- sorry, I
9 your, the ministry's permission had to be obtained?
10 A. Yes, our order practically would be order to use Special Police
11 unit in some CSBs.
12 Q. All right.
13 JUDGE HARHOFF: Ms. Korner, can I just ask the witness if Special
14 Police force units existed even on the SJB level, on the lowest, the
15 police station level?
16 THE WITNESS: It was a Special Police unit in every CSB in
17 regional areas. And they responsible practically to chief of CSB, but
18 cannot be used or moved to do any activities without order from ministry
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: I understand. But my question was, just to be
21 sure, if underneath the CSB
22 have a small Special Police unit? Or did the Special Police unit only
23 exist at the CSB
24 THE WITNESS: No, Your Honour. I should explain something more
1 In any CSB
2 didn't have police unit but had some individuals as a part of
3 Special Police unit that is part of CSB
4 JUDGE HARHOFF: So what you are saying is that the members of the
5 Special Police unit which resorted under the CSB, those individual
6 members would be scattered around in the police forces of the SJBs.
7 THE WITNESS: That's correct.
8 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you very much.
9 THE WITNESS: Pleasure.
10 MS. KORNER:
11 Q. Now, you were appointed in February 1991, and Mr. Delimustafic
12 was appointed the minister. Were you given any sort of name by the
13 press? Names, I should say.
14 A. Yeah, look, I would say that we had very good relationship
15 regarding dealing with our ministry, trying to oppose division of our
16 ministry, trying to oppose any implementation on national basis or, you
17 know, and somehow, somewhere, I don't -- I can't -- I cannot recall
18 exactly time, press called us Boro and Ramiz. Who is Boro who is Ramiz,
19 I don't know really, to be honest. It was symbolic from Second World
20 War, two young fellows in south of Serbia gave, you know, everything
21 possible to protect, you know, people around from fascists. So, yeah,
22 they called us Ramiz and Boro, and I can't tell you who was who, Boro and
24 Q. What was -- what were they trying to suggest by that?
25 A. Trying to suggest practically that we, being -- I wouldn't say it
1 is very hard or maybe too optimistic saying that we being as a symbol of
2 unity, in dealing in quite difficult time, resisting any -- anything what
3 can disturb our policy, in keeping peace and unity of our minister as
4 much as we could. That's probably -- was, I would say, motive for news
5 reporter reporting something like that.
6 Q. I want to move on, then, to how things developed through 1991.
7 But you told us that you first met Karadzic at this meeting
8 before you were nominated. After your appointment, how often would you
9 meet with -- or see Karadzic?
10 A. I would say I -- I met with Dr. Karadzic less frequently than
11 with other political leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina, simply because he
12 wasn't member of any governing body. He was only party leader.
13 So it was probably less frequent that I had meeting
14 Alija Izetbegovic or Kljuic or Biljana Plavsic or Mr. Krajisnik or
15 Jure Pelivan. In case of something is necessary regarding SDS from
16 security point of view, I would be invited to attend on the assembly
17 affairs of theirs in case something is related concerning SDS as a party
18 of coalition, we had a meeting or, you know, phone calls, you know. But,
19 again, I would say he -- I had less frequently meeting with him than
20 other political leader.
21 He never attended our cabinet meeting. He never visited our
22 building at all. Why, I don't know.
23 Apart from other political leaders, you know, being quite present
24 and coming to see us.
25 Q. In any of the meetings you had with him, did he express any views
1 about the unity between Muslims and Serbs and Croats, as you have
2 expressed you and Mr. Delimustafic were seen as a symbol of that unit.
3 What was Dr. Karadzic's attitude to this?
4 A. I would regress a little bit, you know, back. I think that our
5 national leaders, political leaders, Mr. Kljuic, Izetbegovic, and
6 Karadzic, it was, I would say, message to people in Bosnia that they
7 united on national basis to deal with situation in Bosnia, forming
8 coalition. They told us with coalition, we can do, live, and act
9 together. So what's ever happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they did
10 together. They had a power. Apart from discussions of, you know,
11 assemblies of national parties, attending of some assemblies, I never
12 heard any political leader from national party saying, Yes, we can live
13 together. But in case that they needed to keep a power as a coalition,
14 they always being together. Yeah.
15 Q. Well, I'm dealing specifically with Mr. Karadzic and any
16 conversation --
17 A. I had many conversation with Dr. Karadzic regarding his view
18 that, you know, that life together between three nationalities in -- in
19 former Yugoslavia -- or Bosnia, pardon me, is impossible. It -- it was
20 always saying what's happened in the past, you know. And I remember once
21 we had a dinner at his flat, I would say, and he told me that, you know,
22 what's happened during Second War, and something like that, and that it
23 was civil war, and something like that, that it was wrong by Tito and
24 communist party to establish former Yugoslavia, in particular in Bosnia
25 three nationalities living together, considering, you know, civil
1 conflict during Second World War.
2 However, I mentioned to him that probably bloodiest civil war we
3 had in USA by President Lincoln establishing own country without any
4 problem and they living together, we know what is -- what has happened.
5 So that was my -- my concept, actually, that people can live
6 together if they have desire to live together with tolerance and with
7 understanding, and respect to each other.
8 Q. Did you ever mention to him your own family in connection with --
9 your family circumstances in connection with living --
10 A. Oh, yes, I think that Dr. Karadzic also had in his extended
11 family some other nationalities, not only Serbs but also Montenegrins.
12 And I had also -- like everyone in -- in particularly in Bosnia, if we
13 are saying that, if I remember well, around 60 per cent of families in
14 former Bosnia being mixed.
15 Q. Yes. And in your family, was this also true?
16 A. Yes, my sister is married with a Muslim, and I ask him, Look, if
17 Serbs and Muslims cannot live together, can you tell me on which way I
18 will say to my sister that her husband is not good guy? So that's...
19 Q. You mentioned also Biljana Plavsic. How often did you have
20 dealings with her?
21 A. As a -- as my role, I -- I attended on many occasions Presidency
22 meetings, and she was also chairman of security committee of Presidency.
23 That is -- my role was also to attend. So any Security Council meeting,
24 I have to be present there, or anything on a Presidency, considering
25 security issues, and safety issues, I was invited to be there.
1 Q. And from your dealings with her, what was her attitude towards,
2 if you like, a multi-ethnic Bosnia?
3 A. It -- it was nearly, I would say, similar, what Dr. Karadzic
4 explained it. Division on national basis is imminent and that apparently
5 three nationalities cannot live in unity. That was my also, I would say,
6 opposition saying, If we cannot live together, how you can govern this
7 state together?
8 Q. Mico Stanisic, who you told us your dealings with him, was he a
9 member of any political party, to your knowledge?
10 A. I have no recollection that he was particular member of party. I
11 met with him a few times on the SDS
12 you know, topic that my ministry should answer or, you know, deal with.
13 And I ask him, Why you are here? Considering that his role wasn't to
14 represent ministry. And he told me, I am member of party. But I cannot
15 give you clear evidence that he was a member of SDS.
16 Q. In any of your dealings with him, did he express any views to you
17 about the Serbs and Croats and Muslims being able to live together?
18 A. I -- I can't remember. I don't -- I can't recall that he is
19 particular saying that Muslims and Serbs and other nationalities, Croats,
20 cannot live together. Mico usual would approach, like, that Serbs, under
21 some, I would say, sideline about situation in -- in ministry or any
22 other institution in -- in the state, in Bosnia, including some
23 departments, including, you know, people being appointed or something
24 like that. But I cannot say that he was hard-lined member of SDS saying,
25 We cannot live with Muslims or Croats together.
1 Q. Yes, sorry, can I just go back over your answer because it has
2 come out slightly oddly in the transcript.
3 You said his -- his approach was something about the Serbs being
4 sidelined in the ministry or ...
5 A. Not only in -- in our ministry but in -- in other institutions as
6 well. That was his -- his view.
7 Q. His view was that Serbs were being sidelined?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. All right. Then I want to move, please, to some of the documents
10 that reflect on the events of 1991.
11 MS. KORNER: Could we start, please, by having a look at a
12 document, which is 65 ter number 23.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honours, if I may ask Ms. Korner.
14 Mr. Cvijetic just informed me that again a part of -- of the
15 exchanges between the witness and -- and Ms. Korner has not been
16 translated in Serbian, so ...
17 If I may ask Ms. Korner just -- and the witness just to pause
18 between the -- the answer and the question -- the question and the
19 answer, so as to give the opportunity to the interpreters to interpret
20 that in -- in Serbian.
21 Thank you very much.
22 MS. KORNER:
23 Q. Now this is a document which is headed, in English:
24 Possibilities to decentralise internal affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
25 You looked at this document, I think, this morning. Had you seen
1 it before?
2 A. Not by my recollection.
3 [Prosecution counsel confer]
4 MS. KORNER: Sorry, Your Honours, I should explain we discovered
5 this morning when we were going through the documents that we have two
6 English translations, and it's been pointed out to me that I appear to be
7 working off a slightly different one.
8 Q. Sorry, Mr. Zepinic. So you had not seen this before?
9 A. Yeah.
10 Q. It's an undated document. And when you -- are you able to assist
11 at all with looking -- when you look at the contents, as to -- if you can
12 give us a sort of rough date when it might have been drafted.
13 A. No problem at all. I can assist you in making comments what is
14 inside regarding contents of this document. But if I can make my comment
16 Q. Of course.
17 A. First of all, I don't know who made this document. It could be
18 somebody's, you know, assumption. I don't think this is legal documents
19 that came from my ministry, otherwise I would be well informed about it.
20 Secondly, I don't know the dates of these documents, so if you are asking
21 me to assist regarding contents about documents, I will assist you. But
22 definitely I cannot accept this document as a valid document made from my
23 ministry, or sent to my ministry by anyone, considering again that I
24 don't know who is author of this document.
25 Q. Right. I'm not suggesting it was an official document from your
1 ministry. But from having read it, are you able to assist --
2 A. Yeah, yeah.
3 Q. -- as to whether or not whoever wrote it, had knowledge of the --
4 how the police worked. Is that something that can you assist us on?
5 A. Yeah, can I assist you in that.
6 Q. Right. That was a question. Didn't sound like one; it was a
8 Would the person who wrote this have to have had knowledge of the
10 MS. KORNER: Perhaps we can go to the second page of this in
11 English and B/C/S.
12 Q. Okay. It says:
13 "Organisation and manner of conducting internal affairs in
14 circumstances when social relations in the Republic are being
15 decentralised has a great significance and role ..."
16 And then if we go to the third paragraph:
17 "In the assessment and evaluation of the necessity to
18 decentralise relations in the Republic as an appropriate response to the
19 disintegration processes in Yugoslavia."
20 Does that help in -- in dating when this document was written,
21 because, later on, we can see:
22 "Decentralisation in internal affairs right now would play into
23 the hands of the Croatian successionists."
24 So does that help you?
25 A. Some nationalists in former Yugoslavia had, you know, Serbian or
1 Croatian expanse units or nationalists for nearly five decades. So I,
2 honestly speaking, don't see any value of this document, and this is
3 somebody's, I would say, thinking or -- and I simply cannot accept this
4 document absolutely as a valid. If you're asking me about disintegration
5 of former Yugoslavia, disintegration started when? That's real question.
6 Secondly, if we are talking about disintegration, we still have,
7 you know, federal bodies dealing with even complex, quite complex
8 situation in former Yugoslavia, and dealing practically not in 1990s when
9 political situation was, I would say, political [indiscernible], but
10 rather would say dealing with complexity in former Yugoslavia since 1981
11 when first crisis started from Kosovo. And later on, and later on. So
12 that is my response.
13 Q. All right. I just want to ask you about one other thing in
14 relation to this document.
15 Please, can we look at the third page in English. And I think in
16 B/C/S, it's also -- yes, third page as well.
17 We see in -- in the middle of the first paragraph, and I think
18 this should give us the date even more, a large number of JNA units
19 relocated from Slovenia and Croatia?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Presenting a strong factor of stability.
22 Now when did the JNA pull out of Slovenia and Croatia?
23 A. I think it started when Slovenian government announced
25 Q. Can you give us a date.
1 A. I can't remember.
2 Q. All right.
3 A. Just a moment.
4 Q. No, don't worry, I don't want to waste time.
5 A. I can give you some my writing about -- from my book to tell you.
6 But I don't remember exactly the date.
7 Q. Don't worry about that. But anyhow, what I want to ask you about
8 is this:
9 "With regard to that, the present state of security of the
10 Serbian people in BH shall, to a large extent, continue to depend on a
11 successful collaboration between the MUP and the JNA, particularly in
12 those municipalities where the Serbian people are a minority. Presently
13 the security and protection of the Serbian people can be enhanced and
14 improved through certain organisational changes within the MUP without
15 fully decentralising it."
16 Now, first of all, had you heard opinions like this being
18 A. Not in particular from anybody. And I, again, telling you I
19 don't know whose opinion was implemented in this paper. If you're asking
20 me personally, I would say that relocation of JNA from Slovenia and
21 Croatia wasn't factor of stability for Bosnia. Rather, would say it was
22 factor of instability in Bosnia. I'm saying this -- when you see, you
23 know, JNA coming from Croatia and Slovenia, you have atmosphere between
24 people of insecurity, of something forthcoming that nobody wanted to see.
25 Q. Yeah. So, I mean, had you heard anybody express the view within
1 your ministry?
2 A. Not at all. And in particular, look, saying here, The Serbian
3 people are a minority.
4 Q. No, it's saying -- sorry, sir. It's saying that the current
5 safety of the Serbian people in municipalities where they are minority -
6 not over all, but in municipalities - depends on cooperation between the
7 MUP and the JNA.
8 Is that something you had heard expressed by --
9 A. No.
10 Q. -- any of your colleagues?
11 A. No. Not by my knowledge.
12 Q. And then the next paragraph, which starts: "In conditions of
13 latent danger ..."
14 Yes. We see the fifth sentence down:
15 "The MUP must rely on the JNA and work in concert with it.
16 Decentralisation of internal affairs is not in the interest of safety of
17 the Serbian people, because this decentralisation implies forming
18 internal affairs organs only in municipalities with a Serbian majority."
19 Now, had -- did you, during the period of 1991, hear any
20 discussion of the idea of decentralising the MUP?
21 A. Not really. And I can accept that decentralisation of
22 [indiscernible] is not only in the interests of safety of entire Bosnia
23 and Herzegovina people, not only Serbian people. That is my -- my
25 Secondly, our ministry had very, very close, I would say,
1 relationship with JNA in case regarding equipment, in case of forming
2 mutual check-points in former Bosnia, to prevent and to do everything
3 possible practically to prevent eventually conflict in Bosnia.
4 Q. So do I take that all the ideas expressed in this paper,
5 including the conclusions, the proposals that there should be -- if we go
6 to the -- I suppose we better have a look at it. It's page 5 in English,
7 I think, and page -- sorry, it's page -- page 4 in English, probably the
8 fifth page then.
9 And in the B/C/S, it's page 5. Oh, no, yes, I'm sorry, I want to
10 go on a bit further. Sorry, it's my fault. It's this bit. No, no.
11 [Prosecution counsel confer]
12 MS. KORNER: Can we please go to the bottom of that page in
13 English. Yeah.
14 Q. Okay, This is the conclusions there -- and I don't know whether
15 you have got it up in the B/C/S language, I don't think you have. But is
16 effectively that there should be - well, we can see - a separate Serbian
18 Did you ever hear that being discussed?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Right. From about when?
21 A. Well, in early January, in 1991, if I remember well, it was
22 meeting in Lisbon, on the governing Mr. Cutileiro --
23 Q. No, that's not my --
24 A. And I heard from my resources that Alija Izetbegovic and
25 Dr. Karadzic proposed to Mr. Cutileiro to divide interior ministry on
1 national basis forming committee of nine members who will deal with
2 separate interior ministries in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
3 As I received, you know, information from my sources, I ask, on
4 the following day, on the prime minister cabinet, because two members of
5 the prime minister cabinet being present there, Branko Djeric, who came
6 later, first, president of Republika Srpska prime minister, and
7 Rusmir Mahmutcehajic. And I ask our prime minister before dealing with
8 other issues on the meeting, to explain on which authority they being
9 present there and, you know, not acting regarding interior ministry as
10 members of prime minister cabinet.
11 I was heavily, I would say, criticised by prime minister, saying
12 that I'm trying to -- I would say, intercept or follow or [indiscernible]
13 or whatever, about his cabinet members. And we didn't have a meeting,
14 cabinet meeting. He called President Izetbegovic, and we had a meeting
15 with Presidency. And I asked also -- Dr. Karadzic wasn't present on that
16 meeting, and I asked Mr. Izetbegovic as president of Presidency of
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina to explain to -- and publicly announced on TV or on
18 General Assembly initiative for two political leaders in front of
19 international negotiation for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina proposal to
20 divide interior ministry on national basis. Again, of course, being
21 strongly criticised at the time, you know, tried to control political
22 leaders and members of Presidency, wasn't my intention, was my role.
23 So if you are asking me about initiative, it was proposed early
24 January in 1991 during meeting with Mr. Cutileiro in Lisbon.
25 Q. So I don't think there is any dispute that you're a year out. It
1 was 1992. So --
2 A. 1992, sorry, you're right, sorry, I apologise. Yes, early in
3 January 1992, sorry, you're right.
4 Q. Before I ask you some further questions --
5 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I obviously can't get the document
6 exhibited, admitted as exhibit, but I would ask it be marked for
8 JUDGE HALL
9 MS. KORNER: Thank you.
10 THE REGISTRAR: I apologise. Your Honours, to correct the
11 transcript, the documents, the charts admitted previously, would be
12 Exhibits P873 through Exhibit P881, and 65 ter number 23 will become
13 Exhibit P882, marked for identification.
14 [Prosecution counsel confer]
15 MS. KORNER: I'm sorry, yes.
16 Q. Before January 1992 had you heard about proposals to create a
17 separate -- a separate Serbian MUP?
18 A. No.
19 Q. That was the first you heard of it?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Can I ask you, please, and in connection with something that you
22 said earlier, to have a look at document 2702.
23 MS. KORNER: Sorry, did somebody catch that? Oh, right. We seem
24 to be stuck.
25 [Prosecution counsel confer]
1 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] I don't think I want to
2 waste time on this. I mean, if we can't get it up, we can't get it up.
3 We'll come back to it.
4 Is it just that document or all documents?
5 [Prosecution counsel confer]
6 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I understand the system has crashed.
7 And as I'm now going to be going through documents with the witness, I
8 think we may have to take an early adjournment. He can't get this
9 document off and anything else up.
10 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
11 MS. KORNER: The document I asked to have put up was 2702.
12 JUDGE HARHOFF: Madam Korner, is it a very large document?
13 MS. KORNER: No, two pages.
14 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
15 JUDGE HALL
16 that we take an adjournment to have this matter looked at.
17 I suppose the Registry will notify us when we can resume.
18 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
19 JUDGE HALL
20 resume in 20 minutes, and then sit to the ordinary time that we rise for
21 the day.
22 [The witness stands down]
23 --- Recess taken at 4.59 p.m.
24 --- On resuming at 5.27 p.m.
25 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I gather -- sorry. Can I just mention
1 one thing. I know you've got -- there's a matter you want to deal with.
2 The technical problems have been resolved. But, Your Honour, I
3 understand that effectively there may be a problem with the fact that
4 Mr. Zepinic is choosing to go speak English. Whilst his English is, of
5 course, very fluent, occasionally he is quite difficult to understand by
6 the interpreters, and there has been problems with Mr. Cvijetic actually
7 getting a proper translation, not to mention the problem that I'm doing
8 what everyone else normally does, which is starting my question too soon.
9 And we wondered whether Your Honours would care to ask him if he
10 would kind enough to speak in the Serbian language. I think that may
11 help everybody.
12 JUDGE HARHOFF: We actually considered it, but thought that since
13 he chose himself to speak English, we would just let him continue.
14 MS. KORNER: Yes, But I think it is causing problems with the
15 transcript and the interpreters. And Mr. Cvijetic is going to
16 cross-examine, so it is obviously important that he hears everything that
17 is said, or gets translated.
18 MR. ZECEVIC: May I add it is important for the clients for our
19 -- for the accused also to hear the testimony in the language that they
21 Your Honours, there is just one matter I need to raise.
22 On page 47, line 21 to 24 of today's transcript, the witness I
23 understood as saying that he needed to check his book in order to provide
24 a date for a certain answer that Ms. Korner was asking him. Now, we
25 checked with our friends from the Prosecutor's side, and they are not
1 aware of existence of any book written by this witness, and therefore
2 this book was not disclosed as they were not aware of it.
3 So I don't know what is -- what is the proper way -- I was -- I
4 was kind of hoping to ask the Trial Chamber to clarify the situation. We
5 don't know whether the witness actually wrote the book or he is -- he is
6 talking about his notes, maybe.
7 JUDGE HARHOFF: [Microphone not activated]
8 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, he said book. The transcript said b-o-o-n-g.
9 But he meant book, I think.
10 JUDGE HARHOFF: Perhaps Ms. Korner can ask him to clarify it.
11 But I would have thought his notebook, but we'll see.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry. It was just my understanding that he
13 referred to his book, and he wanted to take it out of his attache case,
14 so we would just need the clarification. And if is a book, it should be
15 disclosed to us, obviously.
16 Thank you very much.
17 MS. KORNER: Your Honours will appreciate we have had limited
18 contact with him. And I don't think it occurred to anybody ask him
19 whether he had actually written a book about these events, so that's why
20 this has happened. But I'm certainly prepared to ask him about the book.
21 JUDGE HALL
22 [The witness takes the stand]
23 JUDGE HALL
24 have expressed a preference to testify in English. However, there are
25 certain difficulties not unsurmountable which this -- this raises for
1 both sides, and we are wondering whether it is a decision that you would
2 care to reconsider.
3 It seems to counsel on both sides and to the Chamber that it may
4 be simpler if you were to speak in what was originally your native
5 language. We appreciate your facility --
6 THE WITNESS: No problem at all, absolutely. Why didn't say it
7 before. That's fine. Your Honour, that's fine.
8 JUDGE HALL
9 MS. KORNER:
10 Q. Okay. Mr. Zepinic, can I, just before we look at this document
11 which we tried to get up last time, ask you -- you mentioned a book that
12 you had written earlier. Is that right?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And you've got it with you, have you?
15 A. I'm not quite sure, to be honest. Yes. Yes.
16 Q. Okay. The request has been, I am afraid, that nobody seems to
17 have appreciated that you had written a book, whether you would have any
18 objection -- is it in English or in -- in Serbian language?
19 A. [Interpretation] This is my book that I published a long time
20 ago, in 1985, entitled: "Do you smoke?"
21 But, at the moment I am working on a book, actually my biography
22 and the events that took place at the time. This particular book was
23 written a long, long time ago. I have been fighting smoking for a long
24 time, and, for that reason, I wrote the book.
25 Q. It is clearly one I ought to read then.
1 However, thank you very much.
2 A. [In English] I give you as a present. It is no problem at all.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 We'll leave that, and the Defence can ask you anything else they
5 want to ask but that.
6 Can we now look at the document, please.
7 This document, as we can see is the SDS inviting following
8 members of the SDS
9 number 10 your name appears, and indeed on the original, there seems to
10 be some ticks, but --
11 A. [No interpretation]
12 Q. Firstly did you ever receive an invitation to attend sessions of
13 the SDS
14 A. As I said, I attended meetings of the Deputies Club, not only of
15 the SDS
16 issues were on the agenda, the security issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
17 that is.
18 The policy was that parties may invite certain members that would
19 appear on behalf of the party and have undertaken certain obligations in
20 different ministries and other republican organs. This is probably a
21 list of the Serbian Democratic Party. I don't know the date, but by
22 looking at it, it contains all of us that were in one way or another
23 involved or appointed to various ministries and other institutions that
24 were at the level of the government, the parliament, or the Presidency.
25 Q. It says that the following, including you, although in the
1 English version your name has been misspelt, members of the SDS. I think
2 you told us earlier you weren't a member of the SDS.
3 MR. ZECEVIC: I believe there is a mistake in translation.
4 MS. KORNER: Oh, really?
5 MR. ZECEVIC: Yeah.
6 MS. KORNER: Thank you.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: The Serbian version does not say ...
8 MS. KORNER: Thank you very much.
9 A. I agree with you.
10 In the English version, it says that the following members of the
11 Serbian Democratic Party shall be invited. But in the original it says,
12 cadres that work in the ministries and other republic organisations.
13 Q. Right. Thank you very much.
14 MS. KORNER: And I am grateful Mr. Zecevic for your intervention.
15 Your Honours, could that be admitted and marked, please.
16 JUDGE HALL
17 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P883, Your Honours.
18 MS. KORNER: Thank you.
19 Q. I want to move to looking at some of the events in 1991 through
20 some of the intercepts which you have had a chance to listen to.
21 MS. KORNER: Could we have up on the screen, please -- sorry.
22 It's one of the ones Your Honours referred to. It's 10249.
23 Your Honours, may I ask at this stage, because this shows that
24 Mr. Zepinic was a party to this call, whether Your Honours want it played
25 or whether I can simply lead him on the basis that he has identified the
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE HALL
4 MS. KORNER: Thank you very much, Your Honour.
5 Q. This is one of the ones you listened to. And the other person on
6 the phone is Rajko Dukic. Djukic or Dukic?
7 A. Dukic.
8 Q. Dukic. Can you tell us who he was, at this stage?
9 A. Rajko Dukic was in charge in the Serbian Democratic Party,
10 actually he was the chairman of the executive committee, and he was in
11 charge for personnel affairs within the party.
12 Q. Now, this phone call is you to him, and you're complaining about
13 Biljana Plavsic who was going to come over to the Ministry of Interior.
14 First of all, this is March 1991. Can you remember - very briefly - what
15 this was about. If you can't, say so straight away.
16 A. I remember very well what happened here. I had been informed
17 that barricades had been erected in Sarajevo. This information came from
18 Mr. Dukic at around 7.00 p.m. on the 1st of March, 1992. I immediately
19 went to the ministry, my ministry. There were problems given that the
20 barricades had already been set up in the city. I went to the office. I
21 tried to get in touch with members of the Presidency in the hope that
22 this issue can be resolved.
23 Of all members of the Presidency, Biljana Plavsic was the only
24 one who responded to my call that I made after I visited certain points
25 and barricades in Sarajevo and that was sometime after midnight, I would
1 say, between 1.00 and 2.00 in the morning.
2 Mr. Izetbegovic didn't show any interest at all for me to meet
3 him either in the Presidency or in the MUP building in order to solve
4 this problem because he thought that was exclusively the matter for the
5 security organs. I didn't manage to locate other members of the
6 Presidency, because, Krajisnik, Koljevic, and Karadzic were not in
7 Sarajevo but were in Belgrade attending a meeting. Mr. Plavsic responded
8 and said that she would come to the ministry building, in order to try to
9 solve this in a peaceful way. However, later, in a conversation with
10 Dukic, I learned that she insisted that General Kukanjac be involved in
11 that as well, who was the commander of the 5th Army in
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I believe that any involvement of the army in
13 resolving the problem of barricades in Sarajevo would be totally
14 counter-productive, that that would cause an even grater chaos and
15 probably direct armed conflicts at the barricades that had been erected
16 by the Muslim forces. And that probably that would cause escalation of
17 conflicts not only in Sarajevo, but probably in other towns in
19 My opinion was that the barricades have to be resolved through
20 political agreements between the nationalist party, primarily I referred
21 to the SDA and the SDS
22 didn't have a single barricade set up by their members.
23 As I said, the barricades were erected on behalf of the political
24 parties and on nationalist basis; therefore, I thought that relevant
25 political figures should be involved in solving this situation. I was
1 extremely, so to say, disappointed by the fact that members of the
2 Presidency didn't think that it was necessary for them to get involved.
3 And I said with the exception of Mrs. Plavsic. Only in the morning at
4 around 7.00, we finally had a meeting in the Presidency which was
5 attended by Mr. Izetbegovic, Ganic, and other members of the Presidency,
6 except Professor Koljevic who was absent.
7 At this meeting, I took the opportunity to tell them that this
8 kind of irresponsible conduct in such a situation, which unfortunately
9 still remained unsolved because the barricades remained in place for a
10 long time, particularly the conduct of Mr. Ganic who on behalf of the
11 Presidency was appointed as a person in charge of resolving possible
12 crises in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I thought that this extremely critical and
13 chaotic situation necessitated an involvement of all political factors in
14 order to find a political solution. And that this, in any way, should be
15 resolved by -- shouldn't be resolved by involving the army or any other
16 armed force, which later proved to be the case.
17 So Dukic as the only one in the SDS party who was present there
18 was the one who I asked to call and to invite Mrs. Plavsic. I expected
19 her to come together with Mr. Izetbegovic so that we could solve this
20 problems without involving the army and General Kukanjac.
21 Q. All right. It looks like -- thank you very much for that
22 explanation. Sorry, I was going to chronologically. But from what you
23 say, the date, 1991, is an error, and it should read 1992. Is that
25 A. Yes, 1992.
1 Q. I'm sorry about that because --
2 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, having said that, may it be admitted
3 and marked, please. It's on the list of the ones that you admitted.
4 JUDGE HALL
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P884, Your Honours.
6 MS. KORNER: I'm so sorry. In that case, I need to take you --
7 I'm sorry, I need to ask you about an earlier intercept in 1991.
8 Could we have up on the screen, please, 1027. 1024, I beg your
9 pardon. 1024.
10 Q. Again, this is an intercept you listened to. Is that right,
11 Dr. Zepinic? And you were able to identify your voice and of that
12 Radovan Karadzic. Is that correct?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. I want to ask you about some of the content.
15 Karadzic was asking you on the first page about you being with
16 Rajko. Do you know who he was referring to there?
17 A. I believe that he was referring to Rajko Dukic.
18 Q. And there's a conversation -- there's a question from Karadzic.
19 Has he been stopped, Tomo? And you ask which?
20 MS. KORNER: If we go to the next page in English, sorry.
21 Q. And the response is: Kovac.
22 Can you remember now what the problem was -- [Overlapping
24 A. This was probably Tomo Kovac who was the commander of the public
25 security station at Ilidza.
1 Q. And do you know what the problem was that required him to be
3 A. [In English] I can't remember -- sorry.
4 [Interpretation] I cannot remember because I have seen a lot of
5 material to that effect. But if you show me how this conversation went
6 on, maybe I can tell you what we talked about and why Tomo Kovac was the
7 subject of this conversation between Mr. Karadzic and myself.
8 Q. It may be the next part. Because Karadzic goes on say there are
9 terrible complaints about him. And then changes the subject, Please tell
10 me, what happened with the Special Police unit. The command has changed
11 there, hasn't it?
12 In about May of 1991 was there a -- a change notice command of
13 the Special Police unit?
14 A. No. Throughout the whole period, when I assumed my position, the
15 commander of the special unit was Dragan Vikic. There were pressures
16 from all three nationalist parties for Dragan Vikic to be replaced and
17 dismissed. There was also pressure relating to who should be given this
18 position on the level of nationality, when it came to who should command
19 the special unit. However, we did not replace Dragan Vikic. We even
20 reinforced by well-trained personnel who were able to lead the unit. So
21 apart from these personnel changes, basically, the commander remained in
22 place, and that was the commander who discharged his duties even before
23 we assumed our position. Then Karadzic insisted that we try to find a
24 way for it to be given to a Serb. On the other hand, Izetbegovic
25 insisted on this position to be given to a Muslim. But since the two of
1 them couldn't reach agreement who should be the commander, the best
2 possible solution was to retain the professional who had been at the head
3 of this unit for years without any problems. We tried the best we could
4 for members of this unit to be corresponding to the national composition
5 of the Republic.
6 Q. All right. I'm sorry, the wrong page is up on the screen in
8 MS. KORNER: Can we have the second page. Not the third, which
9 is up at the moment. Yeah. Yes.
10 Q. Because later down that --
11 MS. KORNER: Further on, I don't know, in B/C/S, you need the --
12 the second page. Yeah.
13 Q. You go on to say that, We will try to have it connected with the
14 minister exclusively. And Karadzic queries that. And you say: The
15 minister or his deputy. And then Karadzic says: All right, but it still
16 has to have a commander.
17 So was there a discussion at that stage going on about the whole
18 set-up of the special unit with Karadzic?
19 A. There was no discussion about how it was composed. Dr. Karadzic
20 wanted, if possible, the commander to be a Serb. As I already explained,
21 we changed the document on the basis of which the special unit can be
22 engaged in an action, and that this could not, under any circumstances,
23 be done without co-signature of two of us and our consent.
24 So, in that sense, the commander of this unit couldn't be in a
25 situation and wouldn't dare activate or use the unit or part of the unit
1 without the signatures and the consent of the two of us.
2 It would have been totally irrelevant whether the commander of
3 the Special Police unit was Chinese or an Indian or whatever.
4 Q. All right.
5 A. If he was a professional and if he did his job well, and if he
6 obeyed orders signed by the two of us, then it was totally irrelevant
7 what his descent was. For that reason, I didn't accept Dr. Karadzic's
8 suggestion for the commander to be replaced.
9 Q. Right. I want to ask you -- because there is a lot of discussion
10 about various personnel, but I want it ask you about one other thing in
11 this intercept.
12 MS. KORNER: Could we go in the English to the fifth page. And
13 in the B/C/S, to the fourth. And we need to scroll up, please, in the
14 English. Thank you.
15 Q. There's a discussion about what ethnicity or nationality people
16 belong to. And then Karadzic says -- there's going to be a meeting. And
17 there's -- something about a group that is against Mico, and you say: Yes
18 And I told them not to give us any crap; we know exactly what we
19 are doing. Besides, Mico can't, and this should be your argument as
20 well. Mico can't do it because we would lose a Member of Parliament. If
21 he were in the Council of Citizens, he would not -- he would be able to,
22 because he would leave the ... position, be next off the list, et cetera,
23 et cetera.
24 Do you know who is he referring to there?
25 A. I suppose that he is talking about Mr. Stanisic here. There was
1 a -- an initiative for Mr. Stanisic to be appointed chief of the CSB
2 Sarajevo. There was equally other initiatives coming from some members
3 of the SDS
4 Whether he was a member of the deputies club of the Serbian Democratic
5 Party, I don't know, and I have no documents relating to that. But
6 according to our rule books, members of the MUP were allowed to be
7 members of political parties, but there had to leave aside their
8 political affiliations and give precedence to their professional duties.
9 Q. All right. Thank you very much. That that's all I asked. May
10 that be admitted and marked.
11 JUDGE HALL
12 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P885, Your Honours.
13 MS. KORNER: Can we look very quickly please at 3028.
14 Q. This is the same day as the previous conversation. Again, with
15 you and Dr. Karadzic. And all I want to ask you about is this. Karadzic
16 there is saying to you, and if we look at the bottom of the page in
17 English -- yes. Can you please keep Kovac in Ilidza.
18 Does that ring any bells as to what the problem was with Kovac?
19 A. The problem with Kovac was that he was the commander of the
20 police station at Ilidza even before we assumed our positions. In the
21 personnel division of jobs between the political parties, this particular
22 job was allocated to the Serb, but there was some objections and
23 Mr. Stanisic would remember that in conversation between him and
24 Mr. Tinta [phoen], it was threatened that 10.000 demonstrators would
25 appear in Vogosca if Kovac remained commander of the police station at
1 Ilidza. Kovac fulfilled all the legal regulations according to our rules
2 to carry out this duty, and he was fully qualified for that. Political
3 arguments that he was unsuitable because of his political affiliation was
4 something that I couldn't accept as a criterion for appointments to any
5 position whatsoever for a very simple reason, that, by -- that I thought
6 one should insist that everyone should carry out their job
8 In many conversations with our political leaders, I expressed my
9 readiness to have in my ministry 11.000 members of the MUP of one single
10 ethnicity, provided that they carry out their duties in a professional
11 manner. And, on that basis, I could guarantee them that jobs would be
12 done professionally.
13 So these division along ethnic lines within the ministry was an
14 insane idea from whoever it came from. And I was very much opposed to
15 it, especially when it came to executive positions, who primarily had the
16 duty of performing their job in a professional way and to serve as a role
17 model and convey this professionalism to their subordinates. If any of
18 the executives in the Ministry of the Interior showed his exclusive party
19 affiliation, I thought that those who were under him were justified in
20 questioning his professionalism and professionalism of all other
21 executive officers.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, can that be admitted and marked,
25 JUDGE HALL
1 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P886, Your Honours.
2 MS. KORNER:
3 Q. Can you look, please, now at -- again, it is a conversation the
4 same day, 3360, but not between you and Mr. Karadzic, so -- I just want
5 to ask you about the content.
6 Right. You listened to this one. Were you able to identify,
7 even though you weren't present at this, the voices on the tape? Leaving
8 aside, Mrs. Karadzic, the former Mrs. Karadzic.
9 A. Karadzic, yes, Ljilja. I recognised Ljilja's voice, too,
10 although we didn't speak much either over the phone or in person. And as
11 far as Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Zupljanin are concerned, I recognised their
12 voices for the simple reason that we had a great many conversations on
13 the phone and we also met often in person. So it was no problem for me
14 to recognise a conversation between the two of them.
15 Q. Right. At the bottom of the page in English - yeah -
16 Mr. Zupljanin is saying to Karadzic that:
17 "A dispatch had arrived from the federal SUP, and I talked with
18 the deputy Vito. He assigned me to go and pick them up at 10.00 tomorrow
19 morning and to make the exchange."
20 Is that a reference to you, or to somebody else?
21 THE INTERPRETER: Could the interpreters please have the
22 tab number.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He probably meant me because I know
24 this case.
25 It would -- asked by the federal MUP, we made an assessment,
1 because three officers of the federal MUP had been illegally detained in
2 Kninska Krajina. And these guys who were from the federal MUP had to be
3 taken over from Babic. And I asked to resolve the issue in a couple of
4 phone calls with Milan Babic. There was were some delays, I can't really
5 remember why, but I got really mad, and I said, Okay, if you don't agree,
6 then we'll send our special unit forces from Banja Luka to liberate them.
7 And I informed Mr. Zupljanin, because that was part of his remit as the
8 nearest SJB to the Kninska Krajina, and told him to go there with a group
9 of his staff and accept these three persons from Knin.
10 Q. All right. You said, first of all --
11 JUDGE HALL
12 they still need it, but before the witness had started the answer, the
13 interpreters had asked for the tab number.
14 MS. KORNER: The tab number? Oh, I see, I didn't catch that.
15 It's tab number 7.
16 Q. You said, first of all, that it was part of his remit as the
17 nearest SJB. Do you mean SJB or CSB
18 A. Excuse me. Speaking about such things, it was natural for the
20 forces that -- that were specialised on that, rather than the nearest
21 station which was Grahovo, if I remember well. But the Banja Luka centre
22 was closest, so it was only natural for them to do it, if that had
23 happened at Trogir, then the nearest CSB
24 the case of Slavonski Brod, then the CSB of Tuzla would have been
25 closest. So it all depended on where the event had happened.
1 I remember this case. I know that Zupljanin went there with a
2 group of his co-workers and that it was taken care of in a way which did
3 not cause unnecessary subsequent complications when it comes to the
4 relations between the security forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina and those
5 of Croatia.
6 Q. Right. Thank you. There are just two other matters I want to
7 ask you about in connection with in intercept.
8 MS. KORNER: If one looks at the third page in English, and it's
9 -- I seem to have failed to mark it in B/C/S. It's also the third page
10 in the B/C/S. I'm not sure.
11 Q. Stojan Zupljanin says in the middle of the English page, and I
12 hope it is in that page somewhere, but that Avdo Hebib is trying to go
13 down there with him. Karadzic asks why, or effectively. And he says, I
14 don't know what the devil's up. I told Vito as well not to send him. No
15 way, Vito, let him be captured and then exchanged for Vojkovac.
16 Again, is he talking about you there?
17 MR. ZECEVIC: In fairness to the witness I don't believe that the
18 Serbian version corresponds to the English in this case.
19 MS. KORNER: [Overlapping speakers] ...
20 MR. ZECEVIC: [Overlapping speakers] ... citing from Ms. Korner
21 is not on the -- on the monitor.
22 MS. KORNER: Sorry about this, Your Honours. I thought I had
23 marked up all the B/C/S, but obviously I failed to do it in this case.
24 Ah, it's on page -- got it. The fourth page in the Serbian
25 language. Right.
1 Q. Do you remember Zupljanin saying something to you about not
2 sending Avdo Hebib?
3 A. I don't remember that any mention was made of Avdo Hebib, who was
4 assistant for police, to act as a mediator in this liberation action with
5 Kninska Krajina or, rather, release action. So I cannot confirm that.
6 And I don't see a reason why Avdo Hebib, with regard to his position,
7 should not do the job, although he is of a different ethnicity. So if
8 his engagement had been sought for, why not?
9 Q. The next question is this, leaving aside whether you remember
10 this, was Zupljanin in the habit of, as it were, giving you orders, it
11 looks like, if that's the right way of putting it?
12 A. Zupljanin issued orders to me.
13 Q. Are you saying I told Vito as well not to send him. I don't mean
14 orders in the proper sense. Clearly the chain of command was you, and
15 then he was below. But was he somebody who would, can I put it this way
16 then, put his point of view forcefully to you?
17 A. Well, you see, regardless of my position it was always my custom
18 to consult not only the chiefs of the centres or the chiefs of the police
19 stations but maybe even with regular police officers. If that would
20 enable me to get information or find the best possible solution.
21 I repeat that I don't remember this particular incident, so I
22 cannot directly answer your question. But if, for any reason,
23 Stojan Zupljanin thought that the appearance of Avdo Hebib would have
24 been counter-productive with regard to completing the job which could
25 have been done by the CSB
1 same way as I would have accepted Zupljanin's insistence that Avdo Hebib
2 come on the occasion of the conflict at Bosanska Krupa, if I remember
4 I always made an effort to respect my co-workers. Whether they
5 respected me in turn is for them to say.
6 Q. [Microphone not activated] And the final matter on this
7 particular intercept that I want to ask you about is --
8 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for counsel.
9 MS. KORNER: Sorry.
10 Q. The final matter I want to ask you about on this intercept is on
11 the last -- sorry, the fourth page of the English. And I hope on the
12 fifth page -- maybe the fourth page of the B/C/S. Sorry. It's the --
13 it's the fourth page of the B/C/S, at the bottom, I think.
14 Zupljanin says to Dr. Karadzic:
15 "Mr. Karadzic, I felt it was necessary to inform you ..."
16 And Karadzic replies: "Oh, thank you very much. It's not easy
17 for you. Be strong."
18 First question: Were you aware that Stojan Zupljanin would be
19 effectively ringing Karadzic and going over your head?
20 A. I didn't know that he spoke with Mr. Karadzic about this case.
21 This was an activity, in my opinion, of which I wouldn't have informed
22 Karadzic or any other politician. Because it was a professional task for
23 the CSB
24 Q. Yes, thank you.
25 MS. KORNER: Well, Your Honours, in line with the ruling, may I
1 just have this marked for identification.
2 JUDGE HALL
3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P887 marked for identification,
4 Your Honours.
5 MS. KORNER:
6 Q. I'd like now to ask you to look, please, at a document around
7 this period -- if I can find my list. All right.
8 MS. KORNER: 2582, please, on the screen.
9 Q. 16th of May of 1991. It's a decision, apparently signed by
10 Mr. Delimustafic, appointing Mico Stanisic as the secretary of the
11 Sarajevo SUP
12 Were you aware of -- of this official decision?
13 A. Just a correction. The signature is mine, rather than
15 But each decision of appointment bore the name of the minister.
16 So, officially, I appointed Mico Stanisic to his position of secretary of
17 the SUP
19 If I may just add a comment with regard to this appointment.
20 Q. Certainly.
21 A. With your leave, Your Honours, before Mico Stanisic
22 Mr. Kemo Sabovic was in this position who was a professional, Mico knows
23 him. He had been a police inspector for a long time, and he was a top
24 professional. However, the SDA didn't think him suitable, and
25 Izetbegovic insisted several times that Kemo Sabovic be replaced from the
1 position of head or, rather, secretary of the SUP of Sarajevo.
2 I did not accept the reasoning given, because I considered
3 Mr. Sabovic's qualifications and experience as well as professionalism
4 merit his -- him remaining in that position. But that was probably due
5 to the rivalry of the political leaders Karadzic and Izetbegovic, and the
6 SDA would then cede to the SDS
7 I don't know which the conditions were, which conditions were
8 attached to that. And I was duty-bound to appoint a Serb to the position
9 of secretary of the SUP
10 The SDS
11 criteria, and the -- as set out in the regulations. And so he met all
12 the conditions to be appointed to this position, and I indeed appointed
13 him. This is my signature.
14 Q. Right. Thank you very much.
15 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, may that be admitted and marked,
17 JUDGE HALL
18 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P888.
19 MS. KORNER:
20 Q. Before we come to the next document, in terms of time, can we go
21 back, please, to some of the intercepts that you listened to.
22 MS. KORNER: Could we go, please, to 17th of June; in fact, the
23 same day as this. It's document number 1027, please; tab 8 for the
25 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, could we have a 65 ter number.
1 MS. KORNER: I'm sorry, I thought I said it. 1027.
2 Q. Which is you and again Mr. Karadzic -- sorry, I say it was the
3 same day, it's [indiscernible]. We're moving into June, and I think you
4 were again able to identify your voice and that of Mr. Karadzic.
5 A. Yes, I recognised both voices.
6 Q. All right. Now, here, there's -- there's a long discussion which
7 starts on that very -- we can see, which is about the minister of the
8 interior procuring anti-armour weapons. And you explain that -- it's not
9 your decision. It's -- I'm sorry. It is determined by the army. And
10 there's a long discussion about this.
11 MS. KORNER: And then could we go, please, in English to the
12 fifth page. And in the B/C/S, to the fourth page.
13 Q. In the middle of the page, Karadzic -- Dr. Karadzic is asking
14 about the staff of the MUP. And then Draskovic.
15 MS. KORNER: And then at the bottom of the page, in English,
16 please, scroll up.
17 Q. "Look please, tonight I need very clear information. I have
18 negotiations with Izetbegovic tomorrow at 9.00. At 10.00 we have the
19 assembly. There's no way that an appointment" --
20 MS. KORNER: Can we go to the next page, please, in English.
21 Q. "... or a change in personnel could happen without the approval
22 of the SDS
23 single situation concerning staff."
24 We see a number of conversations where he is effectively
25 cross-examining you about what's happening. And here he makes it
1 absolutely plain, according to him, that there can be no appointments
2 without the approval of the SDS
3 Was that a view that he expressed on more than one occasion?
4 A. If I may correct you in your introduction into this document
5 where you called him a minister. Or, rather, when you said that the
6 minister had ordered anti-armour weapons. It was actually the ministry
7 based on the assessment that we should equip ourselves as well we could
8 to keep peace and order in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, no such weapons
9 could be bought without the approval of the JNA in accordance with the
10 then law.
11 We had reason to arm ourselves well, to prevent the break-up of
13 However, the political leaders that out from our minister, and
14 then interventions ensued, to check whether that was correct or not. You
15 will have been able to tell that I evaded giving Mr. Karadzic a clear
17 About personnel, or cadres, Karadzic insisted that no -- nobody
18 could be appoint without the approval of the SDS. That was his opinion,
19 just as it was the opinion of the two other political leaders to whom --
20 or, rather, with which opinion I didn't agree. Because it was my idea
21 and wish, and it was my effort to appoint a professional to any position.
22 I didn't think it a great problem for any political party to find
23 a professional from the ranks of their own ethnicity. But I didn't need
24 a loyal party member of any ethnic party in my ministry. I needed people
25 who would go about their duties in a professional fashion for the benefit
1 of all inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2 This conversation between me and Mr. Radovan Karadzic, and you
3 will probably have recordings of my conversations with Mr. Izetbegovic in
4 which I insisted very energetically and I even invited SDA leaders to my
5 office to ask them whether it was in the interest of any ethnic party to
6 insist that loyal party members be appointed to executive positions if
7 those members had criminal files or police files. And I wanted those
8 political leaders to clearly say so at their assemblies.
9 So this was my opposition to it be to the appointment of party
10 cadres rather than to professionals to positions in the ministry.
11 Q. Yes, you say you wanted those political leaders to clearly say so
12 at their assemblies. In June of 1991 there was just the one assembly
13 wasn't there, of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
14 A. [In English] Yes, a General Assembly; I'm talking about a
15 General Assembly.
16 Q. All right.
17 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, could that admitted and marked,
19 JUDGE HALL
20 MS. KORNER: Thank you.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P889, Your Honours.
22 MS. KORNER:
23 Q. I want you to look now again at a conversation that you weren't a
24 party to but where you appear to get a mention?
25 Could we have up -- it's the same day.
1 MS. KORNER: And could we have up, please, number 2669. Oh,
2 tab 9, sorry.
3 Q. Again, it is a conversation that you listened to. Were you able
4 to identify the voices of Biljana Plavsic and Mr. Karadzic?
5 A. [Interpretation] Mr. Karadzic and Ms. Plavsic, yes.
6 Q. All right. In the middle of the first page, you say -- he --
7 Karadzic -- sorry, Biljana Plavsic is saying that Dukic was here, and
8 then Neskovic.
9 "They're all complaining bitterly that I should tell you about
10 the MUP. Rajko's not letting anyone say a thing against Zepinic, and
11 everyone else is saying that it's awful how susceptible to the influence
12 of these people."
13 This is connected with barricades that have been erected in,
14 apparently, in Sokolac.
15 Were aware of people making complaints about you, and Rajko
16 protecting you, Rajko Dukic?
17 A. I don't know if Rajko Dukic protected me. If he did, I'm
18 grateful to him. This is the first time I hear of it.
19 But this is -- this is a criticism to my opposition to the
20 efforts of the ethnic parties, but I was criticised by everybody. And I
21 didn't want to give in to this pressure, The more so since on some
22 occasions I offered my resignation to the political leaders, the
23 president of the assembly, the prime minister, the president of the
24 Presidency, if they thought that I was an opponent to the political
25 parties. The concrete mention of Mr. Neskovic is because I replaced him
1 for justified reasons, and Mr. Karadzic accepted that, because he knew my
2 reasons. And he didn't deem it necessary to discuss that at all.
3 Why Mr. Plavsic [as interpreted] had this conversation with
4 Mr. Karadzic, I don't know. It's a fact that on several occasions we had
5 some contradictory reports at the Security Council -- at Security Council
6 meetings of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and because there had been attempts to
7 politicise the MUP.
8 Q. Right --
9 A. That I was criticised from this side and the other and the third,
10 well, what can you do?
11 Q. There is one other matter here that is dealt with here by
12 Mrs. Plavsic.
13 MS. KORNER: Can we look, please, at page 3 of the English and
14 page 2 in the B/C/S.
15 Q. Mrs. Plavsic is saying:
16 "He is one of the three MUP guys.
17 "Put pressure on him for that.
18 "They tricked him or he made a deal," and that's another matter.
19 "Yes, all right."
20 And then Radovan Karadzic is saying:
21 "Put a lot of pressure on; we mustn't let them in in any way."
22 This appears to be in connection with the council in the MUP.
23 But did Mrs. Plavsic put pressure on you to do anything?
24 A. Well, look, Mrs. Plavsic even asked the Federal Secretariat for
25 National Defence on behalf of the committee for the protection of the
1 constitutional order of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is due to criminal
2 proceedings against him which is total unlawful and illegal.
3 As for her role as member of the Presidency, there is no disputes
4 about that. This was reflected throughout the whole period that I was in
5 power. The fact that I didn't believe that the three members of the MUP
6 taken over by Mr. Zupljanin from Knin and solved this problem, somebody
7 should gain some political points for any political party. And for that
8 reason, I think that this was done at my request, or, rather, the
9 ministry's requests, sent to the Banja Luka CSB, in a professional and
10 expert manner, without giving any political credibility to any political
11 party because I thought that to be totally inappropriate, that anyone
12 should gain some political points for doing a professional job.
13 Q. All right. Thank you very much.
14 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, may that just be marked for
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What it says here, put pressure on
17 him, you know, that was their style. But what can you do?
18 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P890, marked for identification,
19 Your Honours.
20 MS. KORNER:
21 Q. And when you say that was their style, what do you mean by that?
22 A. You see, the political style of all the three political parties
23 and the three political leaders was to politicise as much as possible the
24 MUP. That is to say to exert direct pressure on executives within the
25 MUP, in order to give preference to one or the other party, particularly
1 when it came to the appointment of specific executive officers.
2 I have to tell that you we had tremendous problems not only with
3 the SDS
4 they with a nominate a candidate that didn't fulfil absolutely a single
5 requirement according to the rule on internal organisation. He lacked --
6 he or she lacked qualification, lacked any experience to make them a
7 candidate who was appropriate for the proposed job, and the worse thing
8 was that often it happened that such a candidate who was proposed on a
9 political basis and is loyal to political party had a criminal record.
10 So imagine if you appoint someone who did time for a few months for some
11 criminal offences to the position of a commander or police station.
12 I simply couldn't and wouldn't accept such policies. And I don't
13 think that anyone should accept that, if we want to have professionalism.
14 However, since this concept of mine didn't suit our political leaders was
15 not my problem. They had a problem with me. But that was the time it
17 Q. Yes, thank you very much.
18 MS. KORNER: Can we move then, please, to the next document,
19 which is tab 10 for the interpreters. And it's 3030.
20 Q. Again, this is a conversation with Radovan Karadzic, and
21 originally it was put "unidentified male." But if we looked at the last
22 page, it -- it says it was you.
23 And are you able to confirm having listened to this
24 conversation -- [Overlapping speakers] ...
25 A. Yes, that's me.
1 Q. All right.
2 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I don't -- because of the time I don't
3 want to spend any more time. Can I simply ask that it be admitted and
5 JUDGE HALL
6 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P891.
7 MS. KORNER:
8 Q. I want you to look next, please, at the report of the 24th of
9 June. And that is 65 ter 8.
10 I think this is a report that you were aware of at the time
11 headed: On activities relating to changes in senior officers at the
12 Ministry of Interior and the need to bring the ethnic structure of
13 employees more into line with the ethnic structure of the population.
14 The report is dated but not actually, I think, signed by anyone.
15 Do you know who wrote the report?
16 A. This is information that the Ministry of the Interior sent to the
17 government, to the Presidency, and the parliament at the request of the
18 Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to bringing into line the
19 national structure of the staff with the national structure of the
21 I cannot remember all the details, but this information depicts
22 the entire structure of the MUP, including the State Security Service.
23 Based on ethnicity, age, and other criteria that were asked of us to
24 provide. According to this material, if I remember correctly, a
25 significant percentage of members of the MUP, including myself, declare
1 themselves Yugoslavs, which the national leaders extremely resented,
2 because they thought that those who belonged to this particular ethnic
3 group should be appointed on the principle that the national ethnicity of
4 the ministry should reflect the national composition of Bosnia and
6 In political terms, can I accept that, but I couldn't accept any
7 discussion about what we were going to do with around 650 people, members
8 of the staff, who did not want to declare their ethnicity for any reason.
9 We also had a certain disproportion in the MUP in comparison to the
10 national composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I have to say that as
11 far as the Serbs are concerned, the percentage of the staff was higher
12 than the percentage of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But, as I said,
13 I abided by the principle to speak only about professionalism, and I
14 think this is at this Presidency meeting that I presented this
15 information, and at this meeting I said that I wouldn't mind having a
16 single ethnicity in my ministry providing they all do their job in a
17 professional way and that by that, I would guarantee them that the
18 ministry would fulfil all its obligations in a professional manner, as
19 required by the law.
20 Q. All right. Thank you very much.
21 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, may that be admitted and marked,
23 JUDGE HALL
24 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P892, Your Honours.
25 MS. KORNER: Thank you.
1 Q. Can we look, please, at a conversation with you, Mandic, and
2 Karadzic together, on 24th June; tab 13, 65 ter number 1034.
3 This is a very long conversation. It starts off with you, and
4 then Mandic -- you and Karadzic, and then Mandic and Karadzic have a
6 I just want to ask you about one matter in this. First of all, I
7 think you have identified your voice, that of Mandic and that of
8 Mr. Karadzic?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And Karadzic says at the bottom of page one in the English.
11 MS. KORNER: Please if we move to the bottom.
12 Q. "I was in Nevesinje and Visegrad," and then goes on to say,
13 "three guys were severely beaten" --
14 MS KORNER: Sorry, can we go to the next page, I think it is, in
15 each. Sorry, I said in each. It's not in English. Can we have the next
16 page in B/C/S as well.
17 Q. And you talk about a Working Group led by -- and Karadzic says:
18 "I said they should not, by any means, take anywhere down there
19 any illegal action. Let them be beaten, let them suffer, let" --
20 something or other else. I don't know what that means.
21 But do you know what that was about?
22 A. I don't know specifically which case it was. It has to do with
23 Nevesinje; that's correct.
24 This initiative and this conversation with Mr. Karadzic was
25 unacceptable, given that he wanted to score some political points, and if
1 one cannot do that, then it must be established if any offence was
2 committed on the ground that should be sanctioned under the law. So his
3 saying let them be beaten, let them suffer, was something intended to
4 score political points, in order to create chaos and to instill mistrust,
5 mistrust in the other nationality and in the other national ethnic group,
6 and it was inconsistent with the policy.
7 I cannot say specifically which case he is talking here about.
8 But, as you can see, in a certain way, Mr. Karadzic is defying the fact
9 that I appointed a Working Group that was supposed to find out the
10 reasons and the perpetrators of this incident that is being mentioned
12 Q. All right. Can we move, then --
13 MS. KORNER: Oh, sorry, Your Honour. Can I have that marked
14 admitted, please.
15 JUDGE HALL
16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P893.
17 MS. KORNER: All right. I want to move, please, now into July in
18 the last ten minutes or so of this session.
19 Q. Could you have a look, please, first of all, at the intercept,
20 which is tab 14, 1413. Right.
21 Conversation, 8th of July between you and Mr. Karadzic. Again, I
22 think you identified the voices. And obviously it has come in the -- the
23 recording started in the middle of the conversation, or after the
24 earlier -- because Karadzic is saying this:
25 "I was with Izetbegovic and Zulfikarpasic last night, and I told
1 them openly we would form a parallel government, we would form a parallel
2 police, if they exclude our people in government, and they will still
3 have to pay for them. We would exclude all our people who are armed. We
4 would form completely a parallel state if you continue to fuck us around,
5 and he only stared at me and winked because he knew we would do it."
6 Now, the first thing is, could you tell the Trial Chamber who
7 Zulfikarpasic was?
8 A. Abdil Zulfikarpasic was the founder of the SDA party. Later on,
9 he was joined by Alija Izetbegovic.
10 Due to some political reasons and Alija Izetbegovic's being a
11 hard-liner, they went their separate ways. Zulfikarpasic established a
12 Bosnia party that had one or two seats in the parliament, but they
13 remained in coalition with the SDA.
14 So this meeting, whether this meeting actually happened between
15 Karadzic, Zulfikarpasic, and Izetbegovic, and this initiative to create
16 parallel state and --
17 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat his first
18 sentence. He is speaking too fast. Thank you.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As you can see, they had only one
20 session, and they agreed on only one issue. That is; to keep the power
21 in their hands and to increase the remunerations for the deputies.
22 MS. KORNER:
23 Q. Okay. The interpreters didn't catch your first sentence about
24 the initiative -- I think the initiative to create a parallel state.
25 They have asked to say that you're talking too quickly.
1 A. I will try to slow down as best I can for the Chamber to be able
2 to hear. That way I will take up a little more time than would probably
3 be required to provide a direct answer.
4 The ethnic parties formed a coalition, and that's how power was
5 structured; the assembly, the cabinet, and the Presidency. Any ethnic
6 party -- but, by the way, having mentioned Mr. Zulfikarpasic and his
7 having -- his party having one or two sets in parliament, and
8 Mr. Filipovic was there on behalf of the Bosnian party, and with the SDS,
9 there was the SPO
10 I'm not sure, I'm sorry. And only due to -- or owing to that coalition
11 did the ethnic party manage to cross the threshold of 50 per cent and
12 establish institutions of power. But this threat -- we leave the
13 coalition. Well, why didn't they? If any of these parties had left the
14 coalition, and if there had been another -- if there had been repeated
15 elections, because that was the duty of the political parties if they
16 were unable to come to terms, and obviously they were not able to agree
17 on anything except on remaining in power and raising the remuneration of
18 the Members of the Parliament who were biding their time, wasting money
19 and time. And this threat, we will leave the institutions of power and
20 establish parallel power structures was a justified idea because it
21 actually meant that the ethnic parties had no more power, and
22 Mr. Karadzic and Izetbegovic knew that very well. And that's why they
23 never published the split of the coalition, the break-up of the
24 coalition, because the break-up of the coalition would have meant that
25 they were losing power.
1 [Previous translation continues] [In English] ... to giving me
2 opportunity to talk further or ...
3 Q. No. I mean -- sorry. It is not actually the question I want to
4 ask. I mean, I just asked you to repeat your first sentence.
5 What I want to ask you about is this. You said to us earlier on
6 this afternoon that you hadn't heard about proposed split in the MUP
7 before the Cutileiro discussions in 1992.
8 When you heard Karadzic say this to you, did you take this
10 A. [Interpretation] Oh, come on, this was a totally unserious
11 conversation, such as many other conversations in which the nationalist
12 leaders were saying, We have power, We have power, and so on. I am, of
13 course, speaking for myself now and not for the MUP.
14 And at one meeting it was put to me, at a Presidency meeting,
15 in -- with the participation of others, they were saying that we were
16 elected by the people. Is it possible that the Muslims in Foca were
17 unable to elect a better Member of Parliament than Saja [phoen], or the
18 Serbs from Ozren to elect a better -- worse Serb than Nedic? When I had
19 said that, Mr. Krajisnik kept -- shut up, and the never repeated that
20 they were elected by the people. Possibly the people elected the worse
21 deputies to do what they eventually ended up doing.
22 Q. All right. I -- sorry. The problem is, is that we do have a
23 limited time, and as I say, it was a simple question, to which the answer
24 is, no, you didn't take it seriously. Is that right?
25 A. [In English] No, no, no, not -- absolutely. No. No.
1 MS. KORNER: Well, Your Honours, in any event, may that be marked
2 and admitted. Admitted and marked.
3 JUDGE HALL
4 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit number P894, Your Honours.
5 MS. KORNER: Right. Can we move, please, to a document -- well,
6 Your Honours, perhaps I can just get the document -- just show the
7 witness. It's -- all right. Document number 12; 65 ter number 12.
8 Q. Now, this is a letter written by Mr. Zupljanin to Mrs. Plavsic.
9 Firstly, did she ever show you the letter or speak to you about
11 A. No, I only saw this letter here at the Tribunal for the first
13 Q. All right. He is complaining in this letter that, on the 22nd of
14 July, 1991, he was at a meeting at the ministry and couldn't believe his
15 eyes when he received a summary of the systemisation of posts. Not the
16 content but the appearance. Apparently it had been printed in green.
17 Now, all I want to ask you is this. Is that right: Was there a
18 change from the colour of correspondence?
19 A. Not only that it was known to me that there was a change in
20 correspondence. Or, rather, I didn't know. Because I saw this only for
21 the first time here.
22 If I may comment, it is unbecoming for a chief of the Security
23 Service to address directly the head of the State Security -- or, rather,
24 the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order --
25 Q. So --
1 A. -- for -- and if I had known about this letter, in the position
2 that I was, I would have probably launched disciplinary proceeds against
3 Mr. Zupljanin, and he would be replaced from his position, and which he
4 was at the time, when he drafted this letter.
5 Q. So Mr. Zupljanin takes the view that this was a deep-dyed plot by
6 the Muslims to change the colour to green. Was there any decision made
7 that the correspondence should be changed from blue to green?
8 A. No. Such a decision was never taken. And I am unaware that
9 there was even discussion about it.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, could I ask that that probably be
12 marked for identification. I don't think, as the witness says he hasn't
13 seen it before, but ...
14 JUDGE HALL
15 MS. KORNER: Thank you.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P894, marked for identification,
17 Your Honours.
18 JUDGE HALL
19 MS. KORNER: Yes. Your Honours, I understand that the witness
20 has made a request to know whether is he required to come back tomorrow.
21 This is through VWS.
22 JUDGE HALL
23 of -- you're still in the process of being examined by the side that
24 called you, as I explained to you at the beginning, and you are not yet
25 released as a witness. You are excused. This is the time at which the
1 Chamber normally rises, and we would resume in this courtroom -- you will
2 escorted for here for 9.00 tomorrow morning.
3 So the Chamber will indicate to you when you are finally
4 released. But, at this moment, you are required to return tomorrow.
5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.00 p.m.,
6 to be reconvened on Friday, the 29th day of
7 January, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.