Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 8440

 1                           Thursday, 1 April 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.10 a.m.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  This is case number

 6     IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin.

 7             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.  Good morning to

 8     everyone.

 9             May we have the appears, please.

10             MS. KORNER:  Good morning, Your Honours.  As this is April Fool's

11     Day, this is Joanna Korner and Crispian Smith for the Defence; all right,

12     the Prosecution, really.

13             MR. PANTELIC:  So you missed Ms. Pidwell, I see, in that sense,

14     because it's the 1st of April.

15             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.  For

16     Stanisic's Defence team, my name is Mr. Cvijetic, with my assistance.

17             MR. PANTELIC:  Good morning, Your Honours, for Mr. Zupljanin

18     Defence, Igor Pantelic this morning.  Maybe I have some other members of

19     my team somewhere, but they are hiding in the courtroom.

20             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.

21             While the witness is being brought in by the usher, could we

22     dispose of the matter that was left not completed yesterday.  The ruling

23     of the -- recalling the arguments that passed yesterday, Judge Harhoff

24     dissenting, the document is admitted and Ms. Korner and Mr. O'Sullivan

25     may be familiar with the concept of admitting evidence de bene esse, so

Page 8441

 1     we will mark it as an exhibit and the Registrar will give it an exhibit

 2     number.

 3             MS. KORNER:  I think that's what Your Honours said at the end of

 4     yesterday, so that's how we took it.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 1D03-2306 is Exhibit 1D248, Your Honour.

 6                           [The witness takes the stand]

 7             JUDGE HALL:  Good morning to you, sir.  I would remind you you

 8     are still under oath.

 9                           WITNESS:  SLOBODAN SKIPINA [Resumed]

10                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, thank you.

12             JUDGE HALL:  Sorry, before you continue, Mr. Cvijetic.  I am

13     looking at the transcript, and for the assistance of the stenographer,

14     perhaps I should spell what I said.

15             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, we have just given him a note with

16     that, and also with a note of my name.

17             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.  Yes, Mr. Cvijetic.

18             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

19                           Cross-examination by Mr. Cvijetic: [Continued]

20        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Skipina, good morning.

21        A.   Good morning.

22        Q.   You were witness to a long discussion about the admitting of this

23     document, Alexander the Great dealt with the Gordian Knot by cutting it

24     in half.  It seems we have done something to that effect.  In any case,

25     at some point in time you said that it would be good for you to read the

Page 8442

 1     document so that you could speak on its different parts.  For that

 2     reason, I would kindly ask the usher to give these hard copies to you.

 3     Please go to tab 25.  A number was assigned to this document which,

 4     unfortunately, I haven't been able to remember.  It is now -- yes, it

 5     seems it is now 1D248.  Could we please have it on the screen.

 6             Do you have tab 25?  It's Memic's statement.  I believe it's the

 7     last one in your batch.

 8             Mr. Skipina, I will go through this document and by that I wish

 9     to ascertain one fact.  Did the information on the arming of the Muslim

10     population and the involvement of certain members of those in charge of

11     the SDA become, at some point, of interest in your investigation and does

12     that information stem from this statement alone or did you have anymore

13     information?

14        A.   We had information, but as the service, given that it's already

15     time of war, we had difficulty obtaining information.  This was supposed

16     to have been dealt by the State Security Service of the former Republic

17     of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

18        Q.   Yesterday you said that you did have some information about the

19     participation of the secretary of the party of Mr. Cengic in good faith.

20     That was before I showed you the document, am I correct?

21        A.   Yes, according to certain pieces of information, he was the key

22     person in charge of organising units and arming them.

23        Q.   Thank you.  In the statement, in the first paragraph, Mr. Memic

24     says that, save for Mr. Cengic, there were other people well acquainted

25     with his activity, starting with Alija Izetbegovic, Omer Behmen,

Page 8443

 1     Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, and some heads of the MUP, that is particularly

 2     interested.  These people were Alija Delimustafic, Mirsad Srebrenikovic,

 3     Jusuf Pusina, Bakir Alispahic, Kemal Sabovic [phoen], and Munir Alibabic.

 4             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] I have a correction for the

 5     transcript.  Page 3, line 15, what I said seems not to be reflected in

 6     there concerning Mr. Cengic's involvement in this process of armament and

 7     the arming of Muslims.

 8        Q.   Mr. Skipina, I read out the names of the officials, irrespective

 9     of the fact whether you had information on each and every single one of

10     them, but could such a large scale process of arming people could have

11     gone unnoticed without their knowledge?

12        A.   Absolutely not.  I didn't personally interview Senahid Memic.

13     There was mention made yesterday of the possibility that I interviewed

14     him, but, as a matter of fact, it was done by the operational department

15     of the National Security Service.  As for Senahid Memic, I told him that

16     after there was a broadcast of an interview with him on Republika Srpska

17     TV, Bakir Alispahic gave me a call because he was interested in

18     Mr. Memic.  And I asked him Bakir, what did you do?  And he said, Well,

19     it's not as it seems.  You know that I hold you in high regard and I

20     would like to meet you so that I have a chance to explain.  That's what

21     Bakir Alispahic said.  However, he also said that he used Bakir's

22     Volkswagon Golf to fetch [Realtime transcript read in error "if he was"]

23     the weapons, and the number of the registration plate is included as

24     well.  It is easy to determine whether Bakir Alispahic had a vehicle

25     registered to his name which had this particular plate number.

Page 8444

 1        Q.   Very well.  Then he speaks of the channels of supply mentioning

 2     Zagreb, Sandzak, Hungary, Romania, and even Libya.  Did you have any

 3     information on the channels of supply of weapons into Bosnia and

 4     Herzegovina?

 5        A.   There was a lot of talk about that, but there was quite reliable

 6     information that weapons arrived from Croatia, via Western Herzegovina

 7     and via Mount Igman, trying to avoid Serb settlement and routes through

 8     such areas where one could have expected to encounter patrols which may

 9     pose a hindrance.  As far as I recall, although I am not reading the

10     statement now, I believe he said that he transported most of the weapons

11     via Igman and Bosanski Samac where the relatives of Alija Izetbegovic

12     were, since he hails from Bosanski Samac, and then via Domaljevac and

13     Gradacac in that order to reach Sarajevo in the end.

14             MR. O'SULLIVAN:  Excuse me, Your Honour.  The transcript, page 4,

15     line 17, in English, I heard the interpreter say that he used Bakir's

16     Volkswagon Golf to fetch the weapons.  And I believe the word "fetch"

17     should be in that sentence.

18             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you, Mr. O'Sullivan.

19             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   I won't dwell on this document much further, but I wanted to ask

21     you this:  When he was arrested, you also seized a number of weapons; is

22     that correct?  I believe it is also mentioned in the statement.

23        A.   As far as I recall, I think he had two side-arms of different

24     calibres, one was 6.35 and the other 7.62 millimetres; however, it was

25     also interesting for me to know that we found six or seven pieces of

Page 8445

 1     identification bearing Serbian names.  Apparently, he was to use them if

 2     he stumbled upon a Serb patrol or a patrol comprising members of Serb

 3     ethnicity in order to produce, say, a membership card to prove that he

 4     was a Serb so that he could continue on his way safely.

 5        Q.   Mr. Skipina, did you have any reason to doubt such a statement

 6     which you must have been familiar with as the person in charge of the

 7     sector?

 8        A.   There was no room for any doubt.  It seems that these policemen

 9     asked for these persons ID by sheer circumstance and came across weapons

10     which he had with him, and then he was handed over to the National

11     Security Service.  Up to that point in time we knew nothing about this

12     person.  We had zero information on him.  Once he was brought in, he told

13     us all that.  We had no other information otherwise.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Very well.  This was only a part of our thesis.  We

15     discussed --

16             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, I see Ms. Korner on

17     her feet.

18             MS. KORNER:  Just this, Your Honour, if Mr. Cvijetic is moving to

19     another topic, I understood the admission yesterday to be partly based --

20     of this document to be partly based on what the witness appeared to say

21     yesterday was -- and it was put to him at page 8428:

22             "Q.  Let me ask you, Mr. Skipina, did you use any illegal methods

23     to coarse this person and to write him the statement such as beating or

24     anything else?

25             "A.  No, it was a normal interview."

Page 8446

 1             The impression was clearly given, I think, to everybody in this

 2     court, that he was the person who was taking the statement.  It is now

 3     absolutely parent that he didn't take the statement, has no idea of the

 4     circumstances in which it was taken.

 5             So, Your Honours, I only raise this as to whether -- as a

 6     question as to whether that should make your ruling different.  I think

 7     it was made as a totally, as it turns out, erroneous basis.

 8             JUDGE HALL:  Mr. Cvijetic, could I hear you on this point that

 9     Ms. Korner just raised?

10             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] The witness tried to explain that,

11     if we could accord him an opportunity to address that, and then, perhaps,

12     I can offer my arguments.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The person in question was not

14     tortured.  I can guarantee that.  That's thing number one.  Thing number

15     two, this person would not have been included in the first wave of

16     exchanges to Sarajevo had we applied any physical force.

17             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Perhaps I can tell you now

18     something.  Yesterday I spent a long time thinking about how to have this

19     document admitted.  That's why I made this reference to the Gordian Knot

20     which may I have been inadvertently caused by me.  I will agree with

21     Ms. Korner that this document be admitted only as a document created in

22     this service headed by the witness who was familiar with the procedure of

23     taking such statements, and only on that basis.  It shouldn't go to the

24     contents of the statement, and that is why I wanted to go through the

25     statement itself in order to have the witness say what he knows, what

Page 8447

 1     direct knowledge he has of it.  Perhaps, then, I should move that the

 2     document be admitted the way Madam Korner proposed yesterday.

 3             JUDGE HALL:  Well, I would have reservations even about that

 4     because the -- what we now understand from the evidence is that the

 5     document is more remote from this witness than we all thought.  Well, let

 6     me speak for myself, than I thought yesterday, and from what Ms. Korner

 7     said was almost common understanding.  The -- in as much as the -- with

 8     the matters that she would have raised at the time of her objection

 9     yesterday and with the reservations that would have been apparent from

10     Judge Harhoff's dissent in our decision to admit the document, I am

11     wondering whether it even reaches the threshold of even being marked for

12     identification and whether we should not simply wholly recall our order

13     admitting it.

14             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, if it helps, because there has been so

15     much time spent on it, I don't, as I say, mind if it's simply admitted on

16     the basis that Mr. Cvijetic now agrees that it can be admitted, which is

17     that it is a document that emanates from this witness's service, and

18     that's the end of it.  I can see Mr. Cvijetic has problems in otherwise

19     and dealing with it, and, as I say, so much has been read out already.

20     So I am happy with that.

21             JUDGE HALL:  Well, in the interest of time, I suppose that that

22     is the obvious course.  The only comment that I would make is that it

23     serves no purpose and merely adds clutter.  But so be it, let's move on.

24             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Mr. Skipina, this is just one segment that we have dealt with in

Page 8448

 1     order to create a picture and recreate the ambience in Bosnia and

 2     Herzegovina before the war and the escalation of the conflict.  I believe

 3     that you, yourself, said that the atmosphere in Sarajevo was quite heated

 4     before you arrived there; am I right?

 5        A.   The atmosphere had been created not only in Sarajevo.  I said

 6     that it was especially bad in Sarajevo.  The mere fact that at the time

 7     Cutileiro's plan had been a topical issue, that attempts were being made

 8     by Mr. Muhamed Filipovic and Adil Zulfikarpasic, as far as I can

 9     remember, to reach a historical agreement with the Serbs in order to

10     prevent the war between the Serbs and Bosniaks, but Alija Izetbegovic

11     prevented them from doing that.  And then there was the incident which

12     resulted in the first casualties in Bosanski Brod.  Regular Croatian

13     units stormed into the village called Sijekovac, inhabited by Serbs, and

14     massacred dozens of Serb individuals.  They took a lot of them to a camp

15     in Croatia, in Slavonski Broad.  A similar massacre took place in the

16     territory of Kupres.  All that had happened before the war in Bosnia and

17     Herzegovina broke out.  The interest of Croatia, and this is my free

18     interpretation, the interest of Croatia was to see a war taking place

19     between Bosniaks and the Serbs, because they wanted to relieve the burden

20     of the theater of war in Croatia, and they wanted to prevent any Serbian

21     assistance coming from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

22             Nothing was done, there were no reactions to that.  The

23     republican leadership tacitly accepted the fact.  The international

24     community very quickly recognised an independent state of Bosnia and

25     Herzegovina, and that was a signal for everybody that the war in Bosnia

Page 8449

 1     and Herzegovina could, indeed, start.

 2        Q.   Very well.  Mr. Skipina, I have a request.  Let's limit ourself

 3     to very short answers to my question.  Besides the threats that you said

 4     you had received from Mr. Hilmo Selimovic, you also received some

 5     unanimous telephone calls, people called you Chetniks, they wanted to see

 6     you packing; is that correct?

 7        A.   Yes, correct.  On two occasions, I received telephone calls

 8     towards the end of 1991.

 9        Q.   Just briefly please answer.

10        A.   And somebody told me, Chetnik, your turn will come soon, Chetnik,

11     you're going to be killed.  And the third message that I heard was, or,

12     that I found in my letter box, it was a letter written in red ballpoint

13     pen, and it stated, Skipina, you're going to be executed.  In addition to

14     that, my son was beaten in the middle of the street without any fault of

15     his own.  He was my younger son who was under escort.  He came under

16     attack and owing to some people, he was saved and spared any

17     consequences.

18        Q.   After the Sarajevo barricades, the atmosphere aggravated, did it

19     not?

20             JUDGE HALL:  I was just reminding counsel and the witness to

21     allow a gap between question and answer for the interpreters, and

22     Mr. Skipina, perhaps you should slow down a little for the sake of the

23     interpreters.  Thank you.

24             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] I will repeat.

25        Q.   After the Sarajevo barricades, the atmosphere became even more

Page 8450

 1     unbearable.  I believe that there was a killing of a member of the

 2     wedding [as interpreted] party in Sarajevo.  Do you know that Muslim

 3     paramilitary formations started taking hold of certain police stations?

 4        A.   Yes, the situation was really heated, if I may put it that way,

 5     and as far as the taking of the police station goes, when I was in

 6     Kalovita -- hails in Pale, Minister Stanisic, Momcilo Mandic, and

 7     Dragan Kijac, continued to negotiate with the Bosniak side which means

 8     that they had gone to the federal MUP to pursue the negotiations.  And

 9     during the negotiations during one night, Novo Sarajevo police station

10     came under attack.  According to some plans, that station should have

11     been given to the Serbian MUP because of the predominant Serb population.

12     On that occasion, the Patriotic League or the green berets took all of

13     the weapons from the police station and killed a Serbian police officer

14     Petovic [phoen] who, in factual terms, became the first casualty of war

15     in Sarajevo.

16        Q.   Very well.  You mention Mr. Stanisic's offer to help him to set

17     up the National Security Service, and you link that up with Cutileiro's

18     plan.  At that moment, did you have information that although the Serbian

19     MUP was going to be established, some joint services would still remain

20     functioning in Sarajevo?

21        A.   During one point of our conversation, Mr. Stanisic mentioned that

22     there would be a co-ordinating body for the co-ordination of the MUP

23     activities.  He did not elaborate on that.  He didn't say anything about

24     the structure of that body.  He only said that there would be some body

25     that would coordinate the work.

Page 8451

 1        Q.   It seems to me that you said that between the 1st and the 6th of

 2     April Mr. Stanisic went to implement that part of the agreement and to

 3     agree on the division of property, the division of offices; however, the

 4     events that ensued interrupted any such attempts and this type of

 5     activity?

 6        A.   Yes, during that period, Minister Stanisic, Mandic, and Kijac,

 7     did go to continue negotiations.  I am not aware of the contents of the

 8     negotiations.  You should ask the three of them because I am sure that

 9     they know.  But I do know that they went.  I did not receive any feedback

10     from them.

11        Q.   At one point in time you dealt with the problem of Serbian

12     nationalism, and you said that when you had received the offer from

13     Mr. Stanisic, you told them that he might have problems with engaging you

14     because you had been involved in the issues of Serb nationalism.  Did I

15     manage to interpret your position well?  Was that what you thought at the

16     time?

17        A.   Yes, that's how I felt at the time, but what was the background?

18     Just like I was in charge of the Izetbegovic case, I also worked on the

19     Seselj case.  And that case was well documented.  We filed a criminal

20     report against him.  And he was eventually sentenced to a prison

21     sentence.  In addition to that, in 1980, I conducted an interview with

22     Professor Nikola Koljevic because there were indicia that he was involved

23     in contacts with some persons who may have been charged with Serb

24     nationalism in Belgrade.  And, as a service, we had available to us a

25     measure of warning.  That's what we called it.  If people were not too

Page 8452

 1     involved in nationalism, we could warn them to stop whatever they were

 2     doing, and that's how I conducted an interview with Professor Koljevic.

 3     And I warned them.  That was in 1980.  And, indeed, after that, he kept a

 4     very low profile, at least as far as my service was concerned.

 5        Q.   You said that Mr. Stanisic did not pay much attention to those

 6     criticisms.  He kept you as his associate for a while.  But let me

 7     present one more thesis regarding the membership in the

 8     Serbian Democratic Party.  Mr. Stanisic claims that one of the objections

 9     put to him was why some members of his collegium, or, why not all the

10     members of his collegium are members of the SDS, and that he conveyed

11     that message to you, although he did not pay much attention to that and

12     he just ignored it.  And that was the context within which he speaks

13     about that story about the membership in the SDS.  Could that be a

14     correct interpretation of what actually was at stake?

15        A.   Let's understand one thing.

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please come closer to the

17     microphone.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Minister Stanisic didn't say that

19     on that occasion.  He only said that -- I apologise.  He said only that

20     the leaders should be members of the party, and I was the first one to

21     react, and, as I've already told you, there were two or three -- maximum

22     three of us.  And, as far I know, none of the members of collegium were

23     party members, and after that the minister never insisted on our party

24     membership.  He never even mentioned that.  He never said that we should

25     all be party members.  So I really don't know whether there were any

Page 8453

 1     complaints at his address.  I wouldn't know that.  So I would hedge my

 2     response.

 3             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Since you knew him even before 1994, did you ever see him?  Did

 5     you ever notice that he was involved in a partisan activity, yes or no?

 6        A.   No, never.  No, none of the collegium members, none of us had

 7     anything to do with the party, really.

 8        Q.   Yesterday, you were shown a document which was the minutes of the

 9     collegium's meeting held on the 11th of July, 1992, in Belgrade, which

10     you attended yourself.  At that collegium meeting, for the first time you

11     and the minister learned of some things that had not reached Pale before

12     that, certain conclusions were reached after that, certain tasks were

13     distributed for the upcoming period.  In your binder, under 5, and

14     further on, I -- from 5 through 11, I have included several orders issued

15     by Mr. Stanisic which followed that meeting.

16             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Just for the Court's reference,

17     1D49 is the first in the series, but all of my questions, the group of my

18     questions that follows, is in respect of all of those orders.

19        Q.   The first order was issued by Mr. Stanisic in October.  1D49 is

20     the number.  And by that order, Mr. Anicic put a ban on the engagement of

21     the active police formations in armed conflicts, and he said that should

22     the need arise, the reserve strength should be placed at the disposal of

23     the military.

24             You know that the problem of police engagement in the armed

25     formations was broached at that meeting; do you remember that?

Page 8454

 1        A.   Yes, correct.  All chiefs of the centres highlighted that

 2     problem.

 3        Q.   You will also agree with me that in keeping with the problem,

 4     Mr. Stanisic reacted adequately and issued an adequate order; isn't that

 5     correct?

 6        A.   Yes, it's logical.

 7        Q.   The following document could be 1D58, and in your binder it's

 8     under tab 6.  And here Mr. Stanisic issues an order to remove from the

 9     police ranks all those who had been involved in crimes before joining the

10     police, or during their service in the police, and be placed at the

11     disposal of the military.  And within that context, I am asking you this:

12     In order for Mr. Stanisic to create a professional MUP, and I believe

13     that that's the term that you, yourself, used yesterday, and for that MUP

14     to be capable of functioning and implementing all of the conclusions, the

15     basic requirement was to clean it from those who did not deserve to be

16     its members and who should not have been its members in the first place;

17     correct?

18        A.   Yes, not only the MUP but all other state institutions.  The same

19     would apply to all of them.

20        Q.   Very well.  Since we are talking about this document, I can't not

21     ask you something that you, yourself, raised as an issue.  You spoke

22     about a very strong local influence and inherited problems the moment

23     when the MUP was being established.  The Crisis Staffs, the Serbian

24     autonomous provinces, a multiparty system existed before the MUP of

25     Republika Srpska was established and, to large extent, influenced the

Page 8455

 1     establishment of certain public security stations.  And you, yourself,

 2     said that their leaderships did not see themselves as MUP members;

 3     correct?

 4        A.   Yes, correct.

 5        Q.   You also agree with me that the struggle with those local

 6     influences could not have been overnight.  I must have lasted for some

 7     time?

 8        A.   It didn't finish before 1994.  That's for sure, and that's while

 9     I was in service.

10        Q.   Thank you very much.  And now you have a series of Mr. Stanisic's

11     orders.

12             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] The next one is 1D176.

13        Q.   In your binder it's under tab 7.  This is a very complex order in

14     which Mr. Stanisic referred to his previous orders.  Under 4, he orders

15     for the disbanding of special units that had been established by local

16     power wielders, wouldn't that be right?  And then under item 7, as it

17     were, he orders the elimination of paramilitary formations.  You will

18     agree with me, won't you, that all those were problems that had been

19     discussed at that particular collegium meeting, right?

20        A.   Right.  The minister's reaction was such that he kept reminding

21     everyone of their obligations in the respective CSBs and public security

22     stations.

23             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] 1D55, which will be the last

24     document on the issue of orders.

25        Q.   It is your tab 8.  In item 1, Mr. Stanisic specifies the

Page 8456

 1     standards for detention rooms, and in item 2, he makes a distinction

 2     between that and collection centres which do not fall under the remit of

 3     the Ministry of the Interior.  I believe your position on this is clear

 4     as well.  The minister of the interior was not competent in the matter of

 5     any collection centres; is that correct?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   Mr. Skipina, I made use of these few orders by Mr. Stanisic.  You

 8     had an opportunity to attend a number of meetings which he attended.  Did

 9     Mr. Stanisic display sufficient professionalism in the way he issued

10     orders and insisted [Realtime transcript read in error "assisted"] on

11     their implementation?

12        A.   I must say I didn't attend many collegium meetings.  The minister

13     held such meetings at Vrace with the public security sector much more

14     frequently.  I wasn't invited to such collegium meetings because I was at

15     Pale.  However, as for those meetings which I did attend, one of the

16     topics was always the elimination of negative patterns and conduct within

17     the MUP in order to a bide by the existing laws and regulations.  He kept

18     reminding us all the time that we were to act professionally in the

19     exercise of our duties.

20             MR. O'SULLIVAN:  My apologies again, Your Honour.  Page 16, line

21     21, I heard the interpreter say "insisted on implementation" not

22     "assisted."

23             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. O'Sullivan.

24        Q.   Mr. Skipina, I will go back to the part of your statement or,

25     rather, to your testimony in examination-in-chief.  You conducted

Page 8457

 1     interviews with the people who were in the Vrace school after the

 2     operation there, perhaps not you but your service?

 3        A.   Yes, my service.  Not me personally.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  You will agree with me, probably, that the school had

 5     at least 500 people involved in its work, not only students but the

 6     teaching staff as well.  Did you know that they were taken away aboard

 7     bussing the same day, and that interviews were conducted with only those

 8     for whom there were reason to believe that they had fired upon the

 9     special police units.  Do you agree with me, are you familiar with these

10     details?

11        A.   The teachers and some of the students attending the basic police

12     course were interviewed because these specific people were found to have

13     carried weapons at the moment of their arrest.  All the rest were

14     released the same day from Vrace.  So the interviews were conducted only

15     with the teaching staff and some students of the basic police course who

16     had long-barrelled weapons on them.  After those interviews, they were

17     exchanged in an exchange process involving the Bosnian side.

18        Q.   That's what I wanted clarified.  Did you know that in the course

19     of the attack, no teachers or students or anyone else who was there was

20     injured or hurt in any way?  I understand that Mr. Karadzic [as

21     interpreted] ordered that fire should not be returned because the

22     students were young people?

23        A.   I have no knowledge that any students or teaching staff were

24     injured during the operation in Vrace.  I do know, however, that two

25     members of the special police of Republika Srpska were killed and that

Page 8458

 1     six or seven were wounded.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  In my previous question, instead of Mr. Karadzic it

 3     should be Mr. Karisik.

 4             Mr. Skipina, yesterday you discussed the several exchanges in

 5     which you participated.  I am interested in one particular exchange which

 6     failed and what you know about it.  I think it was in front of the police

 7     hall.  There seems to have been some information that about a dozen of

 8     members of the former JNA were killed who were in Sarajevo.  Were any

 9     attempts made or requests put to you to have them exchanged?

10        A.   Well, the exchange did not fall through.  It was merely

11     postponed.  I insisted with Grubisic, Sime Grubisic, that he send the

12     bodies of eight members of the TO who had been executed by a firing

13     squad, in the part between the police hall and the presidency of the

14     Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Well, I asked of Sime Grubisic to

15     have their bodies returned.  We had that information because we had

16     interviewed members of the Serb community who were in Sarajevo at that

17     time and subsequently fled.  They conveyed that information to us,

18     stating that those people were killed in the park between the police hall

19     and the building of the presidency.

20        Q.   Did you have any information on who executed those men?

21        A.   We had no positive information of who executed them.

22             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have 1D03-2290 put

23     on the screen.

24        Q.   I apologise, witness.  It is your tab 3.

25             Mr. Skipina, this is a report on information and activities of

Page 8459

 1     the Seve group.  Do you know anything about that group, have you heard of

 2     its existence?

 3        A.   I have heard of their existence.  They were headed by

 4     Nedzad Ugljen, former inspector.  Well, not former, at that time he was

 5     an inspector of the State Security Service in Sarajevo.  He originates

 6     from Mostar.  They seem to have been a unit tasked with special tasks,

 7     such as liquidations and similar actions.  There seems to have been

 8     problems among their ranks and they began killing each other.

 9     Apparently, some of them leaked information to the public of who they had

10     liquidated.  Nedzad Ugljen, himself, the person in charge of the unit,

11     was subsequently killed.

12        Q.   It is stated in here that those the most responsible --

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction.

14             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   That this unit was responsibility for certain murders by the use

16     of snipers in Sarajevo?

17        A.   We had information to that effect.  It indicated that actually it

18     was this unit that liquidated the eight TO members, although I cannot say

19     that with absolute certainty.  They were accommodated in the police hall

20     and there was indicia that they executed the men, although I cannot be

21     fully positive of that.

22        Q.   I am not asking you to confirm anything with absolute certainly.

23     I did, though, come across a document and information to that effect in a

24     book published by a member of the State Security Service in Bosnia.  It

25     seems that you are not familiar with this document, although you do have

Page 8460

 1     some knowledge about the group?

 2        A.   That is correct.  I am not familiar with this document.

 3        Q.   Nevertheless, I simply used this to introduce the topic, and my

 4     information indicates that they may have been responsible for those

 5     executions.  I simply wanted to know what you knew about it?

 6             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Mr. Cvijetic, who prepared this report?

 7             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it was among the

 8     other material disclosed.  The current presidency of Bosnia and

 9     Herzegovina established a commission tasked with investigating the crimes

10     in Sarajevo which resulted in sniper killings.  This commission is

11     referred to at the end of the document, and it is they who compiled this

12     document.  This is relatively new.

13             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Do we have an approximate date of the report?

14             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I should go back to

15     the material disclosed to us and try to locate it there.  I am afraid I

16     cannot tell you right away.  I see that the -- well, I seem to have

17     reference here to a period after 2000.  So it's after 2000, that's

18     certain.  It's the last page where I find that the report on the

19     activities of this group had been forwarded to The Hague Prosecution and

20     that they do have evidence on the activities of that group.  However, I

21     undertake to have that information verified concerning the date.  I will

22     not move to have it admitted.  I merely wanted to set a background to the

23     execution.

24             MS. KORNER:  I will see if we can get some information.

25             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation]

Page 8461

 1        Q.   Mr. Skipina, we will go back to the issue of passing information

 2     in the bulletins.  Mr. Krgovic asked you something about the linguistics

 3     and the style used.  I wanted to ask you something else.  The information

 4     from the duty officer was eventually passed on by fax or phone.  Would

 5     you agree with me that the person drafting such pieces of information

 6     could be intercepted and that it is for that reason they formulated it

 7     the way they did?  It seems that these are no standard reports on the

 8     work of the MUP, the issues and security-related information which may be

 9     of interest for the other side, but, rather, these were the reports as

10     you described yesterday?

11             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] It seems I am speaking too fast

12     again.

13        Q.   Would you agree with me that the vocabulary used could have been

14     a consequence of the author's awareness.  That this information should go

15     through the postal service in Sarajevo and as such could have been

16     intercepted?

17        A.   I believe that one needs to bear in mind that this was in the

18     early stages of establishment of the MUP of the RS, so at the very outset

19     in the -- for someone to train duty officers in the course of the first

20     few days and weeks, to share with them the importance formulating their

21     reports in a certain way, was particularly difficult because they had

22     more serious issues to deal with.  On the other hand, out of the pool of

23     junior employees, no one dared to correct or meddle with the information

24     in the time of war, and they simply conveyed such information the way

25     they had received it.

Page 8462

 1        Q.   Can we say, then, that such reports could have been intercepted

 2     the way I described?

 3        A.   Well, everything and anything could have been intercepted and it

 4     was, as a matter of fact.

 5        Q.   I will go back to one part of your statement where you referred

 6     to Mr. Stanisic's departure for Banja Luka.  What was the security day

 7     observed in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and how

 8     was it celebrated?  Were there any rallies, sport activities organised,

 9     manifestations?  And I have in mind the security organs.

10        A.   I can't remember when things were marked as of recently, but that

11     one I will never remember [as interpreted].

12        Q.   Go on, tell us.

13        A.   It was the 13th of May.

14        Q.   Do you, perhaps, believe that he, Mr. Stanisic, was on his way to

15     join the festivities on that day, just yes or no?  Do you allow for that

16     possibility?

17        A.   I heard from the duty operations officer that the minister had

18     gone to Banja Luka to attend the police promotion.  That's what he told

19     and me and that's what I recorded in my report.

20        Q.   But you didn't answer the question.  Do you allow for the

21     possibility that it was the 13th of May, there were celebrations in

22     Banja Luka, the security day was marked?

23        A.   Yes, because there was no other date when to mark that.

24        Q.   So you allow for that possibility?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 8463

 1        Q.   You also told us that Mr. Stanisic forbade employees and other

 2     responsible people to provide information to any other bodies unbeknownst

 3     to him.  My question is this:  If you were in his position, would you do

 4     the same?

 5        A.   Absolutely, yes.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  You also spoke about Radio Sarajevo, which broadcast

 7     information about crimes happening in the territory of Republika Srpska?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Bearing in mind the propaganda war that was pursued, as it were,

10     you will agree with me that such information for your service was not

11     reliable enough, and you did not follow that information because you had

12     your own methodology of work, and you had other methods to obtain

13     accurate information; am I right?

14        A.   You're absolutely right.  You didn't have to listen to radio.  If

15     you didn't, you didn't hear anything.  It was not obligatory to listen to

16     radio programmes.

17        Q.   You will agree with me that -- it was not just your service that

18     needed safe means of communication.  All security services in the entire

19     Ministry of the Interior needed safe communications?

20        A.   Everybody who uses communications means wants them to be as

21     reliable and as safe as possible.

22        Q.   It was only after the secure communications system was

23     established could one talk about a more normal functioning of the

24     Ministry of the Interior; am I right?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 8464

 1        Q.   And now let me go back to the part of your statement in which you

 2     speak about information that you received from Goran Zugic, if I am not

 3     mistaken.  And that information was about the activities of one of the

 4     paramilitary groups in Zvornik.  I don't know how much you know about

 5     Goran Zugic.  In any case, he was a member of the security services

 6     centre in Sarajevo.  Therefore, communication with the minister could

 7     have been established and it did -- and it was established through the

 8     security services centre of Sarajevo because the realisation of such

 9     information should have been carried out by the public security service,

10     not the State Security Service; am I right?

11             MS. KORNER:  Just a moment.  Apart from the fact that there are

12     at least five separate questions in that one long question, I don't think

13     counsel should be giving evidence about Zoran Zugic.  This is the witness

14     who should give evidence about what he knows, not what counsel knows.

15             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] I will split my question, unless

16     the witness is prepared to answer.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I made an explanation.  When

18     you said "Sarajevo the security services centre," what did you mean?  I

19     am total lost.  You've lost me completely.

20             MS. KORNER:  Can we make sure that counsel does not give

21     evidence, he can make suggestions, simple one-line suggestions, one fact;

22     but he cannot give evidence.

23             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Okay.  Let's split the question.

24        Q.   Zvornik was under the authority of security services centre in

25     Sarajevo; am I right?

Page 8465

 1        A.   I am not sure.  However, as far as I know, it was under

 2     Bijeljina, was it not?  I -- it was under Bijeljina.  Whether there was a

 3     time when it was under the authority of Sarajevo, I don't know.  I am not

 4     sure.  So I can't even talk about any periods.  I don't know when the

 5     authorities were transferred between the two centres.

 6        Q.   Since you are not sure about that, let me put it to you that at

 7     that point in time it was under the security services centre in Sarajevo,

 8     but then I will withdraw one part of my question and I will ask you

 9     something else.  As such, a complex activity is prepared from the moment

10     the initial information is received to its implementation implies a

11     certain period of time for such a activity to be carried out as

12     efficiently as possible; am I right?

13        A.   In peacetime, whenever police intend to carry out an operation,

14     such an operation is planned for weeks or months, in order for that

15     operation to be carried out as efficiently and as properly as possible.

16     So the moment when you receive official information there is no way you

17     can launch an operation state away.  You have to do a lot of planning as

18     to how the operation will be done, the timing, the forces at your

19     disposal, the equipment and means that will be used, and so on and so

20     forth.  A lot of issues have to be dealt with, a lot of things prepared

21     for a comprehensive operation of that sort to be carried out.

22        Q.   Mr. Skipina, maybe we should finish before our first break.  You

23     were with Mr. Mr. Stanisic until the end of 1992; is that right?

24        A.   Yes, but not all the time.  There were on-and-off periods, there

25     were periods when I had more frequently contacts, and there were also

Page 8466

 1     periods when we didn't contact at all.

 2        Q.   Very well.  As an advisor of the Ministry of the Interior, you

 3     worked in 1994 when Mr. Stanisic was reappointed as a minister; am I

 4     right?

 5        A.   Yes, you are.

 6        Q.   When Mr. Stanisic arrived again, did he continue the previous

 7     trend that is illustrated by his orders, or did he take an even more

 8     stringent position?  Would you be able to tell us something about that?

 9        A.   Since the situation in the MUP of Republika Srpska, at least in

10     some aspects, was better.  There was more organisation, things were more

11     consolidated then at the beginning of the war.  In his second tour of

12     duty, Minister Stanisic was more offensive in his attempt to deal with

13     some of the negative things that had amassed during the previous period.

14        Q.   And did he give you some special authorities?  Did he step up

15     your authorities with that goal in mind?

16        A.   In Mr. Stanisic's second term in office, for the first time,

17     after having resigned, I got my own office as advisor.  My office was

18     close to Mr. Stanisic's office.  During a conversation with him, he told

19     me, Slobo, now we have to strike the nail on the head because there is

20     too much crime at the very top, and I remember that I told him, Minister,

21     if my support means anything, you have my full support, I assure you.

22     The minister launched his activities, Goran Macar was a staple in his

23     office.  He was the assistant minister for crime.  I don't know anything

24     about the details of their conversations, which means that I was excluded

25     from one part of the conversations, but I know that there were very

Page 8467

 1     frequent meetings with crime operatives and Mr. Stanisic.

 2        Q.   However, Mr. Stanisic resigned that same year.  Do you know why?

 3     Do you know the reason why he resigned?

 4        A.   I personally don't know because I never discussed that with him

 5     either at the time or any time later.  However, the operatives from crime

 6     prevention service did talk about that, and they said that they had

 7     launched an operation revolving around Mr. Krajisnik, his brother, and

 8     somebody from the crime, in order to prove some major crimes that they

 9     had committed.  And he tackled Mr. Krajisnik, and that's how his second

10     term of office ended.

11             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Just are a correct for the

12     transcript.  You said somebody from the government, did you not?  The

13     witness said somebody from the government, together with Mr. Krajisnik.

14        Q.   Mr. Skipina, in October you resigned as well.  You left your

15     office when Mr. Stanisic was replaced by a new minister.  Why?  What were

16     your reasons, just briefly, really briefly?

17        A.   Well, I can't be brief, I'm afraid.

18        Q.   Well, in that case ...

19        A.   When Mr. Stanisic resigned, he was replaced by a certain man

20     called Zivko Zikarakic [phoen].  He was the owner of a production company

21     in Bosanski Brod, a character of sorts who should not have been appointed

22     to the Ministry of the Interior, let alone the minister of the interior.

23     We had information about him that he was involved in the smuggling of oil

24     in Krajina.  When he joined the minister, on the second day after his

25     arrival he met with Mr. Dragan Keca [phoen].  And on that second day, he

Page 8468

 1     told him, I don't need Mr. Skipina as an advisor.  This was conveyed to

 2     me by Dragan.  I was infuriated by that.  I stormed into the minister's

 3     office, his deputy was there, Mr. Kovac, and since I know, more or less,

 4     about the person that I was dealing with, I slammed the -- I banged my

 5     hand on the table, and I told him this:  You don't want me as an advisor

 6     and you never asked yourself whether I would accept to be advisor in the

 7     first place.  It would be my biggest mistake and the worst type of

 8     humiliation I could suffer, that at the same time there was which --

 9     against the National Security Service.  They were accusing us of being

10     Mr. Milosevic's service, and that encompassed those in the MUP who were

11     prone to follow Mr. Krajisnik's line of thoughts and, again, people were

12     being fired.  The idea was revived that everybody who was newly appointed

13     had to be good Serbs, and so on and so forth.

14             One night, five of us went to Mr. Krajisnik's office,

15     Dobro Planojevic was one of us, Dragisa Mihic, Zoran Vukadinovic,

16     possibly Goran Radovic, and possibly Kasimir Kusmo [phoen], and then he

17     told us, Please, hold on, wait, Milosevic will fall soon.  And I then I

18     told, Mr. Krajisnik, this was never Milosevic's service, and you,

19     yourself, met with Milosevic, you negotiated with him.  And now the

20     National Security Service has to be a scapegoat.

21        Q.   Tell us about your resignation?

22        A.   I had said another sentence and then I left.  I said the

23     following:  Mr. Krajisnik, I am not interested in you as Momo Krajisnik,

24     I am talking to you as the speaker of the parliament, as the president of

25     the parliament, I am telling you leave the MUP alone, let them do their

Page 8469

 1     job professionally.  Don't try to make the MUP your own backyard with

 2     your stuff in it.  I left that office, and two days later I received an

 3     invitation from Mr. Karadzic's office.  I reported to that office.  There

 4     was a secretary there.  She handed me a decision.  Mr. Karadzic was busy

 5     with somebody.  In the office she gave me a decision to read, and that

 6     decision was issued by President Karadzic appointing me as the

 7     commissioner on behalf of the president of the republic for the Doboj

 8     region with full authorities to fire mayors, chiefs of the SUP offices,

 9     police stations.

10             And when that guest that he had had in his office left his

11     office, Mr. Karadzic received me, he asked me whether I had read the

12     decision --

13             JUDGE HALL:  I appreciate that as you told Mr. Cvijetic you

14     couldn't give a brief answer, but we are at the point of the break.  So

15     could you add one sentence and bring what you were saying to an end.  And

16     then when we resume we will move on to another topic.  One sentence.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Indeed, I have just one more

18     sentence to add, and I told Mr. Karadzic, President Karadzic, that he

19     would have to appoint somebody else because I was leaving the service for

20     good.  And that's how I left.

21             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.  So we resume in 20 minutes.

22                           [The witness stands down]

23                           --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

24                           --- On resuming at 10.51 a.m.

25                           [The witness takes the stand]

Page 8470

 1             JUDGE HALL:  Yes, please proceed, Mr. Cvijetic.

 2             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I will be very brief.

 3     I would like to thank the witness for his co-operation and answers, and I

 4     wanted to tell you that this is the close of my cross-examination.

 5             JUDGE HALL:  Re-examination?

 6             MS. KORNER:  Oh, sorry.  I haven't even put my headphones in, so

 7     I didn't hear it, and, indeed, I was told that I -- [Microphone not

 8     activated].

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for counsel, please.

10             MS. KORNER:  Just a moment, if I can just gather myself.

11             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] It seems that half of the building

12     is empty, and those people left behind asked me to be done as quickly as

13     I can so they can take off for the Easter vacation, although this is not

14     necessarily the reason why I finished my cross-examination.

15             MS. KORNER:  Your Honour, yes, just -- Your Honours, just a

16     couple of short matters.

17                           Re-examination by Ms. Korner:

18        Q.   Yesterday, Mr. Skipina, you were asked about or mentioned an

19     organisation called Tajfun; do you remember that?

20        A.   Yes, I think I mentioned it.

21        Q.   Just very briefly, could you tell the Trial Chamber what Tajfun

22     was?

23        A.   I heard of Tajfun for the first time towards the end of June 1992

24     when the then Colonel Subotic, Minister of Defence, came to visit me.  He

25     asked me if I knew anything about a secret service called Tajfun from

Page 8471

 1     Banja Luka secret service, and I told him I have no idea.  He asked me if

 2     I knew if they worked for the Army of the RS or for the Army of

 3     Yugoslavia, or is it a service of yours, or whether they worked for the

 4     president of republic.  I told him that this was the first I heard of it.

 5     And I was not in contact with Mr. Kesic, so I couldn't check that.  I

 6     simply told him I didn't know what that service was or who it belonged

 7     to.

 8        Q.   Well, yes, I'm sorry, but why did you want to check that with

 9     Mr. Kesic?  What did Mr. Kesic have to do with it?

10        A.   To ask him if he had any information about the existence of such

11     a service.

12        Q.   But why Kesic?  Why Banja Luka?

13        A.   Because Mr. Subotic asked me if I was aware of Tajfun, a secret

14     service from Banja Luka.

15        Q.   Right.  But you hadn't said that -- oh, I see you had, but I

16     missed it.  I'm sorry.  I just -- didn't appear on the transcript.

17     Subsequently did you discover what Tajfun was?

18        A.   On one occasion I was with Dragan Kijac, I believe it was

19     probably in 1993.  We were on our way to Banja Luka.  He said, Let's go

20     to Tajfun, because Draga, probably in the meantime, had met the person in

21     charge of it, whose name I cannot recall.  We went to their premises.  He

22     merely wanted to see it.  Once there, I was amazed to see the equipment

23     they had.  In our official National Security Service, I had no means at

24     my disposal, and yet they had computers, communications systems, and so

25     on.  I don't know whose service it was though.  I know that later on

Page 8472

 1     there was something concerning Tomislav Kovac when he was deputy minister

 2     of the interior, and their premises were searched, some people brought

 3     in.  But to date, I don't know whose service it was and who it worked

 4     for.

 5        Q.   Well, you see, the Court has seen documents, in particular,

 6     relating to members of the Banja Luka special police who apparently went

 7     to work for Tajfun after that, were you aware of that?

 8        A.   No, I was not.  I was only introduced to the person in charge of

 9     the service.  I think his last name was Rakic or Ratic.  That's all I

10     know about the service.  I don't know who their members were.  Kijac and

11     I simply dropped by to see their premises and equipment.  They were

12     outside Banja Luka in the direction of Gradiska.

13        Q.   But it appears, even if you didn't know about it, Mr. Kijac knew

14     about, and clearly if it didn't come under the SNB, it had some kind of

15     an official statistics if he was going there; is that right?

16        A.   No, we didn't go there officially.  We went there privately to

17     see what they had.  Officially, we were with Kesic in the National

18     Security Service.  Dragan had tasks of his own, whereas I didn't.  But he

19     simply brought me along.

20        Q.   All right.  I think that's as far as we can take that.  One other

21     matter, and I just want to go back for a moment to this question of what

22     Mr. Stanisic said about leaders being members of the SDS.  If you would

23     just give me one moment while I find the part in my -- in the LiveNote

24     from today.  Right.

25             Now, yesterday -- sorry, yesterday -- two days ago when you were

Page 8473

 1     asked about this at page 8294 of the transcript which is Tuesday.  The

 2     question you were asked by me was:

 3             "Q.  Was there a discussion with Mico Stanisic when others were

 4     present about SDS membership?"

 5             And your reply was:

 6             "Yes.  Sometime in the beginning perhaps around the 15th of

 7     April, roughly, I can't remember exactly.  There were two or three of us

 8     sitting together.  I think that Kusmuk was one of them and another person

 9     whom I can't remember now, Mr. Stanisic, as we sat there informally, it

10     was not a formal meeting or anything of the sort, just three or four of

11     us meeting, and Mr. Stanisic said something like this, I think that all

12     officials in leading positions, members of the collegium need to be

13     members of the party.  I told him that I did not want to become one, nor

14     that the operations officers who were working for the SNB would, and that

15     was the only discussion that I ever had with Mr. Stanisic concerning

16     that.  He did not reply anything to what I said.  He did not insist.

17             "All I know is that none of the members of the collegium, as far

18     as I know, were members of the Serbian Democratic Party."

19             Now, today, it was put to you that Stanisic claims that one of

20     the objections put to him was why some members of his collegium or why

21     not all members of his collegium are members of the SDS, and he conveyed

22     that message to you, and that was the context in which he speaks about

23     that story about the membership in the SDS.  Could that be a correct

24     interpretation?

25             And your answer:

Page 8474

 1             "Mr. Stanisic didn't say that on that occasion.  He said that --

 2     he said only that the leaders should be members of the party, and I was

 3     the first one to react, and as I've already told you, that there were two

 4     or three -- maximum, three of us.  As far as --"

 5             I can't read the next bit:

 6             "None of the members of the collegium were party members, and

 7     after that, the minister never insisted on our party membership.  He

 8     never even mentioned that.  He never said that we should all be party

 9     members."

10             Now, in the face of it, in that one answer, you are contradicting

11     yourself and you are slightly contradicting what you said earlier.  But,

12     what's your final word on this?  On that occasion, did Mr. Stanisic say

13     that you, the members of the collegium of the MUP should be members of

14     the SDS?

15        A.   I believe your interpretation of my answer is not correct.  I

16     said that never again did Mr. Stanisic mention that we should be.  This

17     was the only instance.  In the period following that, he never again

18     mentioned that we ought to be members of the party.

19        Q.   All right.  On that occasion, that one occasion, he did say that

20     you should be members of the party?

21        A.   Yes, and I said so.

22        Q.   Yes, thank you very much, Mr. Skipina.  That's all I ask in

23     re-examination.

24             MS. KORNER:  Sorry, would Your Honours give me just one moment.

25             No, thank you very much.  That's all I ask.

Page 8475

 1             JUDGE HALL:  Mr. Skipina, we thank you for your assistance to the

 2     Tribunal.  You are now released as a witness and we wish you a safe

 3     journey back to your home.

 4             Do counsel --

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             MS. KORNER:  Your Honour, I do have a couple of matters to raise

 7     once Mr. ...

 8                           [The witness withdrew]

 9             MS. KORNER:  Your Honour, I am a bit nervous about asking for

10     clarification, but I have to on one matter relating to the intercepts

11     ruling.  Your Honours didn't specifically, in the ruling, say that the

12     actual recordings were admitted.  You referred to the transcript, but if

13     you remember, both myself and Mr. Dobbyn said that it was the recordings,

14     clearly, the transcripts are merely the written record of what's on the

15     recording but those are the important aspects, and if Your Honours could

16     perhaps just clarify that?  I am not asking for immediate clarification,

17     but we are wondering whether your ruling includes admission into evidence

18     of the actual recordings?

19                           [Trial Chamber confers]

20             JUDGE HALL:  Ms. Korner, the transcript is merely the --

21             MS. KORNER:  The written -- yes, the written --

22             JUDGE HALL:  We don't see how the one could be separated from the

23     other.

24             MS. KORNER:  That's all right.  I just needed that to be said on

25     the record.  Thank you very much.  Your Honours, for the second matter

Page 8476

 1     can we just go into private second for a moment, because I need to

 2     mention a protected witness.

 3                           [Private session]

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 8477

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3                           [Open session]

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  We are now in open session, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE HALL:  Unless the proper schedule changes, we take the

 6     adjournment -- we take the adjournment and would reconvene in this

 7     courtroom at 2.15 on the 12th of April.  I, on behalf of the

 8     Trial Chamber, wish everyone a safe and refreshing break and especially

 9     for those who are travelling, I wish you safe travels.

10             Counsel could expect, before the close of business today, the

11     Chamber's ruling on the outstanding motion on adjudicated facts.  Thank

12     you.

13                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

14                           11.12 a.m., to be reconvened on Monday, the

15                           12th day of April, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.