Page 20006

 1                           Monday, 2 May 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning to

 6     everyone in and around the courtroom.

 7             This is case IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and

 8     Stojan Zupljanin.

 9             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

10             Good morning to everyone.  And welcome back for what we expect

11     will be an uninterrupted run until the summer recess.

12             May we have the appearances, please.

13             MR. HANNIS:  Good morning, Your Honour.  For the Office of the

14     Prosecutor, I'm Tom Hannis, with Joanna Korner, Belinda Pidwell, and

15     Crispian Smith.

16             MR. ZECEVIC:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Slobodan Zecevic,

17     Slobodan Cvijetic, Eugene O'Sullivan, and Ms. Tatjana Savic appearing for

18     Stanisic Defence this morning.

19             MR. KRGOVIC:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Dragan Krgovic and

20     Aleksandar Aleksic appearing for Zupljanin Defence.

21             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.

22             Yes, Mr. Zecevic.

23             MR. ZECEVIC:  Well, there is a matter, Your Honour, that I wish

24     to raise this morning.

25             You will -- you're probably aware I sent an e-mail yesterday

Page 20007

 1     morning, notifying the -- our friends from the Office of the Prosecutor

 2     and the Trial Chamber of the situation.  As I explained everything in

 3     the -- in that particular mail, I will just shortly review the contents

 4     of it.

 5             You will remember, Your Honours, that on two occasions in April,

 6     on April 11 and April 14, I first agreed to provide the Trial Chamber and

 7     the parties with all the statements made by our witnesses.  At that

 8     point, and on one other occasion, I informed the Trial Chamber that

 9     except for the statement of Nikola Milanovic there are no other

10     statements or investigator's notes or records of interview or

11     tape-recorded interviews of our witnesses.  It is with a sincere regret

12     that I must now inform you that the representations that I made in court

13     were incorrect.  Namely, we have found one statement and three records of

14     the witness interview.

15             The documents have been disclosed yesterday, one -- the moment

16     when we found these -- these documents, we sent them for translations,

17     and one of the -- one of the records of interview has been translated

18     already and has been filed -- has been filed with the Office of the

19     Prosecutor and a copy to the Trial Chamber.  The other three, one

20     statement and two records of the interview, are in the process of

21     translation and we are sure that it will be translated in the course of

22     this week.

23             Your Honours, I -- I trust you will understand that I accept full

24     responsibility, and, again, I offer my sincere apologies to the

25     Trial Chamber and Office of the Prosecutor.  This confusion and

Page 20008

 1     miscommunication on my part was not at all intended to mislead either the

 2     Trial Chamber or the Office of the Prosecutor.

 3             That is -- that is what I had to inform the Trial Chamber about.

 4             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Thank you.  Mr. Zecevic.

 5             MR. ZECEVIC:  Yes.

 6             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Please forgive me for being unaware of the mail

 7     that you have sent to us at this point.  I hadn't seen those statements

 8     or interviews so my question to you at this point is:  To whom were these

 9     statements given and -- or who took the interviews with those witnesses?

10             MR. ZECEVIC:  Well, I -- I sent the mail yesterday morning with

11     my letter to the Office of the Prosecutor.  I copied the letter to the

12     Trial Chamber, together with the -- with all the records of the

13     interviews and the statement which we found in our records.

14             The records of the interview were done by Mr. -- my co-counsel

15     Mr. Slobodan Cvijetic, and the statement was given by Mr. Drano Vlaco.

16     And the other three are Witness Orasanin, Bjelosevic, and Macar.

17             JUDGE HARHOFF:  And to whom were these statements given?

18             MR. ZECEVIC:  Well, those were the records of the interviews

19     conducted between the counsel for the Defence and the witnesses.

20             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Thank you.  I understood.  Thanks.

21             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

22             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.  So the next step in this would the

23     completion of the translations.

24             MR. ZECEVIC:  That is correct, Your Honours.  We sent it for

25     translation and I'm pretty sure that it will be this week.

Page 20009

 1             JUDGE HALL:  Thanks.  Are there any other preliminary matters?

 2             MR. O'SULLIVAN:  Yes, Your Honour, there's one from our side.

 3             This -- I'd like to make a submission in addition to the oral

 4     submissions that were made on the 13th and 14th of April; that's the

 5     first and second day of the Bjelosevic testimony.

 6             On the 13th, Mr. Zecevic made an oral application, and there's no

 7     written submission, an oral application concerning Rule 66(B), where we

 8     said that there had been a violation of Rule 66(B) in relation to

 9     Bjelosevic.  That was on the first day of his testimony.

10             The next day, at the beginning of the session, the 14th,

11     Ms. Korner replied orally, and at that time she acknowledged there had

12     been violations of Rule 66(B).  The only point I wish to make is that we

13     did not specifically address what we considered to be the appropriate

14     remedy for that violation.  And that's what I'll do right now.

15             We say that because of the non-compliance with Rule 66(B), the --

16     Mr. Stanisic did not receive the requested material prior to the

17     testimony of Bjelosevic.  We say that Rule 66(B) is tied to

18     Article 21(4)(b), which is the right enshrined in the Statute to have

19     adequate time and facilities to prepare the Defence.  We say that the

20     appropriate remedy would be to preclude the Prosecution from using these

21     documents during its cross-examination of Bjelosevic.  We're not

22     entitled -- we were precluded from having them prior to his testimony and

23     we say that as a result of the non-compliance with 66(B), the Prosecution

24     should not be allowed to use them during their cross-examination of

25     Bjelosevic.

Page 20010

 1             Thank you.

 2             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, Mr. Zecevic informed us in advance

 3     this was going to be the application this morning.

 4             Your Honours, we resist it.  Your Honours may recall that

 5     although we did agree that we had been specifically asked for documents

 6     authored by Mr. Bjelosevic, we'd actually missed some.  But as

 7     Your Honours will recall, when we -- when I went through the documents on

 8     the Thursday, the 14th of April, most, if not all, appeared on the

 9     Defence's list of documents because they themselves had been provided

10     with the documents by Mr. Bjelosevic.  So, at the moment, Your Honours,

11     we say that there's no prejudice to the Defence for this lapse, which we

12     admit, on our parts, in failing to discover the documents.

13             We also say that it is an excessive sanction that we should be

14     precluded from using any of these documents in cross-examination.  But,

15     in any event, it may well be that Your Honours will find this difficult,

16     as I will, to rule upon this - not that I will be ruling, Your Honours'

17     ruling, but my only -- application we make - without being provided of a

18     list of documents that the Defence say we should not be allowed to use in

19     cross-examination.  And it may be that we'll have to revisit this matter

20     perhaps before Mr. Bjelosevic returns on the 16th of May.

21             So, Your Honours, that's all that I want to say on that matter at

22     the moment.

23             Your Honours, while I'm on my feet, can I, however, mention

24     something else.  I don't know whether Your Honours have seen the motion

25     that the Defence filed saying that we should be compelled to comply with

Page 20011

 1     Rule 66(B).  They filed a motion on the 28th of April which, I think, was

 2     Thursday.  Yes.  Thursday of last week.  Having earlier sent us a request

 3     which they put with the motion in an annex, including our response and a

 4     much, much earlier request dating back to October of 2009.

 5             We responded on the same day, that is, last Thursday, the 28th,

 6     saying we had made our position clear in our response but also adding in

 7     our response the original reply to the first motion -- not the first

 8     motion, the -- one of the first letters they filed.  There has been other

 9     requests made since then but that was the major one.

10             However, Your Honours, it seems to me, I'm afraid, that this is

11     one that Your Honours will have to deal with fairly quickly, because

12     effectively what we say is that this is not a proper request under 66(B);

13     this is merely an attempt to preclude the Prosecution from, as it were,

14     keeping its powder dry, if you like, until, as the Court has ordered, we

15     should reveal what documents we're going to use for cross-examination

16     after the witness has gone into the witness box.  But that's all I want

17     to say about that matter.

18             But can we ask that Your Honours rule fairly quickly because

19     obviously this is going to affect upcoming witnesses quite dramatically.

20             And finally, Your Honours, again the Defence have filed an

21     application either for reconsideration or for leave to appeal

22     Your Honours's ruling in respect of Dr. Nielsen.  As Your Honours know,

23     that was all filed confidentially.  But I'm raising it now.  It may be

24     that again that's something else that ought to be dealt with with some

25     expedition and it may affect the present witness and/or cross-examination

Page 20012

 1     of that witness.

 2             So those are the matters that we want to raise this morning.

 3             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you, Ms. Korner.  If I may return to the first

 4     matter:  Do I understand your position to be that you are requesting that

 5     the motion made by Mr. O'Sullivan this morning be fleshed out in order

 6     for you to be in a position to - I don't want to use the word

 7     "intelligently," but that's the only word that comes to mind - respond to

 8     it?

 9             MS. KORNER:  Well, Your Honours, it's not -- I don't know what --

10     it's not really a motion.  It's effectively -- it's adding to what was

11     said before, namely that they, the Defence, assert that Your Honours

12     should punish the Prosecution by preventing use of these documents in --

13     in cross-examination.  We say at the moment we'd like a list of the

14     documents they say we are precluded from using in cross-examination.

15     That would enable us to see which of them that we know to be in the

16     Defence possession.  And in all likelihood because we know that

17     Mr. Bjelosevic gave more to the Defence than has actually been put into

18     their list of documents, because that's effectively what was said.  So it

19     may well be that they've got all the documents and had all the documents

20     in any event in advance.  So I, -- in effect, I'm asking the Defence not

21     only to indicate which documents, and which documents they say they never

22     had, and how they are prejudiced by those documents.

23             JUDGE HALL:  Yes, thank you.

24             So there are obviously a number of matters which are going to

25     engage our attention out of court in order -- especially the two matters

Page 20013

 1     you've indicated are -- have some urgency to them.  Yes, thanks.

 2             So could we have the next witness escorted in, please.

 3             MR. ZECEVIC:  Yes, Your Honour.  Our next witness is

 4     Professor Bajagic, our police expert.

 5             MS. KORNER:  While we're waiting, can I just make an inquiry

 6     through Your Honours.  Mr. Bjelosevic was supposed to have been handing

 7     over documents to VWS.  Do we have any update on whether that's happened?

 8     Because, if not, it should happen fairly quickly.

 9                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

10                           [The witness entered court]

11             JUDGE HALL:  Yes.  Thank you.  The Court Officer informs us that

12     those documents have not yet been returned to -- handed over to VWS, but

13     there is a process which the -- which has been --

14             MS. KORNER: [Overlapping speakers] ... [Microphone not activated]

15             JUDGE HALL:  They're being handed over to the witness today.

16     There is a --

17             MS. KORNER: [Overlapping speakers] ...

18             JUDGE HALL: -- that we had refined after the last adjournment.

19             MS. KORNER:  Can we expect them fairly soon once they're handed

20     over, because obviously we've got to go through them.  Thank you.

21             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Good morning, Mr. Bajagic.  First of all, do you

22     hear me in a language that you can understand?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

24             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you for coming to the Tribunal to give your

25     testimony.

Page 20014

 1             You are about to give, to read, the solemn declaration by which

 2     witnesses commit themselves to tell the truth.  I need to point out that

 3     the solemn declaration that you are about to make does expose you to the

 4     penalty of perjury, should you give misleading or untruthful evidence to

 5     this Tribunal.

 6             Now, then, would you please be kind enough to read aloud the

 7     solemn declaration.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  I solemnly

 9     declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

10     truth.

11                           WITNESS:  MLADEN BAJAGIC

12                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

13             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you, sir.  You may be seated.

14             Could we begin by asking you to state your full name and your

15     date and place of birth, please.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am Mladen Bajagic.  I was born on

17     the 5th of April, 1962, in Sarajevo.

18             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you very much.  And what is your ethnicity?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm a Serb.

20             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Your profession today?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Currently I work as professor at

22     the Academy of Criminal Science and Policing in Belgrade.

23             JUDGE DELVOIE:  And what was your occupation in 1992?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In 1992, since I was born in

25     Sarajevo, from the beginning of the war I was member of the

Page 20015

 1     National Security Service in the Republika Srpska.

 2             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Is this your first testimony before this Tribunal

 3     or have you given testimony before another Tribunal in your country about

 4     the -- the events in 1992?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is my second appearance before

 6     this Tribunal.  I testified in the Popovic et al. case as an expert

 7     witness.  That was some two, two and a half years ago.  Outside this

 8     Tribunal, I never testified about anything that happened during the war

 9     in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

10             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.  So then I only have to remind you of

11     the proceedings before this Tribunal since you know about them.  You have

12     been called as a expert witness by the Defence of Mr. Stanisic.

13     Mr. Zecevic who is sitting on your left, sitting on your left-hand side,

14     and he has asked for 15 hours to do his examination-in-chief.  After

15     that, Mr. Krgovic, the Defence of Mr. Zupljanin, sitting on your left as

16     well, will cross-examine you for --

17             How many time, Mr. Krgovic?

18             MR. KRGOVIC:  Your Honour, our estimate is two hours.

19             JUDGE DELVOIE:  For two hours, more or less.  And after that

20     there is the cross-examination of the Office of the Prosecutor, sitting

21     on your right-hand side, and they ask for 15 hours as well.

22             After that, and in the mean time, Judges can -- no, after the

23     cross-examination we give the floor back to Mr. Zecevic for final

24     questions eventually, and after that, and in between, the Judges can ask

25     questions as well.

Page 20016

 1             As a practical matter, for recordings, et cetera, we sit in

 2     sessions of 90 minutes with each time 20 minutes' break, and morning

 3     sessions end at a quater to 2.00.

 4             That's all for the moment.  So I'll give the floor to --

 5             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honour.

 6             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Just one more thing --

 7             MR. HANNIS:  If I may, when we filed our notice concerning this

 8     witness testifying as an expert, we indicated that we had certain

 9     objections as to his expertise in the scope of his testimony.

10             JUDGE DELVOIE:  That's what I'm coming to.

11             MR. HANNIS:  Okay.

12             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Now a Ruling on that matter:  The Trial Chamber

13     finds that Mladen Bajagic is properly characterised as an expert within

14     the meaning of Rule 94 bis and the jurisprudence of the Tribunal.  The

15     Tribunal, however, takes note of the Prosecution's 94 bis B notice filed

16     on the 19th of April, 2011, whereby the Prosecution submitted that it

17     does not accept Mladen Bajagic's expertise report.  In accordance with

18     the practice in -- in the instant case, the Trial Chamber will make a

19     decision on the admission into evidence of Mladen Bajagic report at the

20     end of this testimony.

21             Mr. Zecevic.

22             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

23                           Examination by Mr. Zecevic:

24        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Bajagic.

25             Can you hear me?  I said good morning.

Page 20017

 1        A.   Good morning.  Yes, I hear you well.

 2        Q.   Mr. Bajagic, you stated some basic information when you were

 3     asked by the Trial Chamber.  I would now like to ask you to give some

 4     more detailed information about your training and the scholarly work you

 5     are engaged in currently.

 6        A.   As I said, I was born in Sarajevo on the 5th of April, 1962.  In

 7     Sarajevo, I graduated from primary and secondary school, "Gymnasija," and

 8     the Faculty of Political Science from which I graduated in 1988.

 9             After that, I did some work in journalism and I worked also on

10     the socio-political communities that were then in existence in the old

11     political system in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but not fully professionally.

12             And as for my scholarly career:  From 1996 to 2000, I followed a

13     master's course at the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade.  And

14     later on I got my Ph.D. from the same faculty in Belgrade, in

15     international relations, and thereby I'm now entitled to the title of

16     Ph.D.

17             From the beginning of my academic career, I have worked at the

18     police academy and the post-secondary school of the interior in Belgrade.

19     As a result of the process of integration, the Academy of

20     Criminal Science and Policing was founded, and I work there at the

21     moment.

22        Q.   Excuse me, I apologise.  I think that it isn't clearly recorded

23     what you are talking about.

24             Could you please repeat which two institutions you worked for

25     that were later merged.  Please explain slowly.

Page 20018

 1        A.   The first institution where I worked as an assistant professor

 2     was the Police Academy of Belgrade.  At the post-secondary school of the

 3     interior, I also worked as lecturer, senior lecturer, and professor.

 4     These two institutions were integrated a few years ago in -- as part of

 5     the Bologna Process and were merged into the Academy of Criminal Science

 6     and Policing.  I worked there -- I worked there as a lecturer, and

 7     currently I'm a extraordinary professor, teaching several courses.

 8        Q.   Excuse me, please, I see that Mr. Hannis wants to say something.

 9             MR. HANNIS:  I just wanted to bring to Mr. Zecevic's attention

10     the transcript at line -- at page 12, line 3.  I think it's an error, and

11     he may want to correct that.

12             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you, Mr. Hannis.

13        Q.   [Interpretation] Sir, where did you get your Ph.D., from which

14     faculty or institution, and when exactly was that?

15        A.   I got my Ph.D. at the Faculty of Political Science, the

16     International Relations Department, and I specialised in security

17     sciences in 2006.

18        Q.   Could you now please explain --

19             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  Could you now please

20     continue to explain which courses you teach now.

21        A.   The institutions that I mentioned, two of them, and the political

22     police academy, are organisations where I covered many areas and taught a

23     number of courses.  What I'm covering currently are the following areas.

24     They are -- or, rather, at the basic level academic studies, fourth year,

25     I teach two courses:  The first one is the methodology of intelligence

Page 20019

 1     work; and the other, international security.

 2             At the master's studies level, within the same institution, I

 3     teach terrorism and political violence.  And finally, at the academic

 4     specialist studies level, I teach three courses:  These three are

 5     intelligence and counter-intelligence aspects of terrorism and

 6     anti-terrorism; the second is comparative models of the protection of

 7     persons and property; and finally, the third, security systems.

 8             Before these courses, within the first two institutions I

 9     mentioned, I taught the following courses: basics of security; the system

10     of state or national security.  And that is what's important for the

11     institutions where I worked permanently and where I still work.  As is

12     the custom in the academic community, I have repeatedly held lectures as

13     a guest professor and an engaged professor, based on a work contract, and

14     in that capacity I have also taught at other institutions of higher

15     education.

16             One of the most important courses I have taught there is security

17     management and another being security systems.

18             I think that would be it, in a nutshell.

19        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Bajagic.  Could you briefly mention whether you

20     have written any monographies or other works and which ones are the most

21     significant you have written?

22        A.   As for my career so far, my career as a professor, that is, I

23     have published two textbooks and five monographs and between 90 and

24     100 papers, both home and abroad.  These papers were published in

25     scholarly journals or in different publications that were the result of

Page 20020

 1     different international conferences.  Perhaps I could single out a few of

 2     these books.

 3             As for textbooks, I published two of them:  One is entitled, "The

 4     Fundamentals of Security" and "The Methodology of Intelligence."

 5             As for monographs, I have published the following:  "The Role of

 6     the Intelligence Community in the Foreign Policy of the United States of

 7     America."  I think that the date was 2004, but it doesn't really matter,

 8     the date, I mean.  Then, "The Security of the World from a Secret to a

 9     Public Nature."  So that is the second title.  And the last one is:

10     "Espionage in the 21st Century: Contemporary Intelligence and Security

11     Systems."  That is what I can say as far as textbooks and monographs are

12     concerned.

13           As for individual papers, there were a great deal of them.  If I

14     really need to focus on that, I would have to give it an extra thought.

15        Q.   No, it's not necessary.  Thank you.  This will do.

16             Mr. Bajagic, tell me, did you attend any special courses and, if

17     so, which courses were they and who organised them?

18        A.   Already in the year 2000 and afterwards, the institutions where I

19     worked developed a truly fruitful cooperation with many international

20     institutions, especially the OSCE.  The OSCE organised the most important

21     courses that I attended, along with other colleagues, lecturers from

22     institutions of higher learning.  I attended a three-month course that

23     was entitled "Training the Trainers," and it had to do with police work.

24             And then there was yet another course that took place in

25     Basdorf in Germany, and that was a sequel to that first course.  And as a

Page 20021

 1     result of that, we received certificates, certifying that we could train

 2     trainers; namely, that we were thereby specialised to train those who

 3     trained police forces.  Of course, there were also courses organised by

 4     the International Red Cross, but I have singled out the most important

 5     courses I attended.

 6        Q.   You mentioned the Red Cross.  Did you attend any course related

 7     to international humanitarian law?

 8        A.   I do apologise for not having stated that specifically.  It was

 9     precisely that course that was organised by the International Red Cross

10     in Belgrade.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12        A.   You're welcome.

13        Q.   Mr. Bajagic, you do have your report there, don't you, the report

14     that you have prepared for this case?

15        A.   Yes, I have it.  It's here.

16        Q.   Tell me, Mr. Bajagic, this report that is in front of you, that

17     is entitled, "The Ministry of the Interior of Republika Srpska,

18     Beginnings, Purview, Jurisdiction, Organisation, and Control, 1990 to

19     1993," who prepared this report?  Who's the author of this report?

20        A.   Of course, I am the author of this report.

21        Q.   Tell me, Mr. Bajagic, did you prepare this report all by yourself

22     in its entirety?

23        A.   Yes, yes.  I authored the entire report.

24        Q.   Mr. Bajagic, who assigned this task to you?  Who gave you the

25     topic for this report?

Page 20022

 1        A.   As for this task -- or, rather, the first tentative topic for

 2     this report was given to me by the Defence team of Mr. Stanisic, That is

 3     to say, yourself and your colleagues.

 4        Q.   Tell me, sir, in addition to the request and the topic itself

 5     that was provided to you by the Defence, what else did you receive from

 6     the Defence of Mr. Stanisic?  What other documents?

 7        A.   The Defence team provided me with the general topic that I was

 8     supposed to investigate.  And I can say that the title, as you see it

 9     here, is a result of my research.  Of course, first there is a working

10     title, but it was finally formulated this way towards the very end.

11             As for my topic of research, I received relevant documents on the

12     basis of which I was to write this report.  I understand this as raw

13     material for my research work, and that is what I received from the

14     Defence.

15        Q.   Sir, the report has 494 or 495 footnotes that pertain to the

16     documents that were used when compiling this piece of research.  Who

17     selected these documents?

18        A.   As I've already said, I received from the Defence team a certain

19     number of documents.  And then as I prepared and planned this research

20     project, I categorised the documents.  However, in addition to the

21     documents provided to me by the Defence, as I dealt with particular

22     topics that are important for certain parts of this paper, I also made an

23     effort to find certain documents that helped me in writing this report,

24     this expert report, in the best possible way.  So, of course, there are

25     many studies and monographs that I referred to and that are listed in the

Page 20023

 1     footnotes, many more than provided to me by the Defence originally.

 2        Q.   Who selected the documents that would be used for your expert

 3     report?

 4        A.   I received a group of documents, but then I selected the

 5     documents for the report myself.  For me, this expert report is just like

 6     a research project, as far as I'm concerned.  So it requires a clear,

 7     methodological procedure --

 8        Q.   I apologise for interrupting, but before we get to methodology

 9     and procedures, let us dwell on this particular question now.

10             Mr. Bajagic, did you receive from the Defence the expert report

11     of Professor Nielsen who was a Prosecution expert in this case?

12        A.   Yes, I did.  As I've already pointed out, I was an expert in this

13     Court before, in a different case, so I already had occasion to read

14     Mr. Nielsen's report, but, yes, I did have it.

15        Q.   Mr. Bajagic, were you here for a while when Professor Nielsen

16     testified as a Prosecution expert?

17        A.   Yes, I was here and I followed his testimony for a few days.  I

18     think it was in December 2009.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Bajagic -- or, rather, just a moment, please.

20             Could you please open your report, look at the second page,

21     that's where we see the contents.  Just a moment, please, I'll give

22     you -- or, rather, I'll provide a reference for e-court.

23             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] 1D06-2404, page 2.

24        Q.   Mr. Bajagic, could you please explain to us what it is that we

25     see before us now.  And could you explain the document that we see on the

Page 20024

 1     monitor.

 2        A.   These are the detailed contents of this expert report.

 3             As you can see, there are a few broad subjects.  And finally,

 4     there are 12 attachments, annexes.  I don't know whether I should explain

 5     each and every general subject involved.

 6        Q.   Yes, if you can explain what they pertain to.

 7        A.   The first general subject within this expert report is entitled,

 8     "Constituting of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and

 9     Establishment of Organs of State Authority."  Then there are a few

10     subheadings such as, "General Characteristics of the Political and

11     State Crisis in BH --"

12        Q.   Just a question, please.

13        A.   Please go ahead.

14        Q.   Can you explain to us why you included this particular item in

15     your expert report.

16        A.   Doing research into the establishment or the determination of the

17     remit, organisation, and control of such a complex system as the Ministry

18     of the Interior in the executive branch of government of any country is

19     impossible unless you outline the realistic context, which I did.  The

20     Ministry of the Interior is part of the state authorities in the

21     executive branch of government, and with regard to the specific

22     circumstances in which this Ministry of the Interior developed, the one

23     about which I wrote this expert report, namely, the Serbian Republic of

24     BH and its Ministry of the Interior, and also with regard to the

25     political crisis that prevailed then, it was impossible to do research

Page 20025

 1     about its organisation, mission, and so on, unless you position it in the

 2     broader context, the way I did.  That's simply part of my methodology.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please explain chapter 2.

 4        A.   You mean the chapter Roman II?

 5        Q.   Yes.

 6        A.   It's entitled, "The MUP of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and

 7     Herzegovina between 1990 and April 1992."

 8             The Ministry of the Interior of the Serb Republic of

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina grew out of the system of this MUP of the

10     Socialist Republic of BH, and the period stated here, from 1990 till

11     1992, has more clearly defined my efforts to describe the way of

12     functioning of the authorities of the Socialist Republic of BH until the

13     well-known events in April 1992.  I also went into the reasons for the

14     gradual decentralisation and the coming into being of the Ministry of the

15     Interior of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

16             This is my explanation of the second chapter.

17        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Please explain the following chapter.

18        A.   The following chapter is entitled, "The Functioning of the

19     Ministry of the Interior of the Serb Republic of BH in the Period from

20     April to December 1992."  Clearly, this is the basic chapter, the most

21     important one, that comprises broad issues such as the legal framework

22     and the functioning of the Ministry of the Interior in the system of the

23     executive branch of government; namely, the de jure aspect.

24             Of course, we also had to deal with the -- the surreal situation

25     and the organisation of the ministry in 1992.  Some issues were more

Page 20026

 1     pronounced with regard to the tasks of the ministry, and that's why I

 2     tried to describe these issues in a systematic manner.

 3        Q.   Please explain the following chapter as stated in the contents,

 4     and please explain why it is a separate chapter.

 5        A.   The internal organisation of any ministry of interior, including

 6     this one, is the basis upon which it acts within the legal framework that

 7     defines its scope.

 8             In the legal system in the former SFRY and the countries that

 9     emerged subsequently, these matters were always dealt with through the

10     rule-book on the internal organisation of the Ministry of the Interior.

11     This is a separate chapter here because in the relevant period, namely in

12     the first year of its existence as the Ministry of the Interior of the

13     Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, its basic structure was defined by

14     rule-books that were created earlier, that is, in the Socialist Republic

15     of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

16             But then there was an initiative to draft a new rule-book for the

17     Ministry of the Interior of the Serb Republic of BH.  That is very

18     important because that rule-book lays down in detail the organisation and

19     the territorial structure of the entire Ministry of the Interior.  And

20     the remit of the individual organisational units are defined.  There are

21     many significant matters that are dealt with there, and that's why this

22     is a separate chapter.

23        Q.   Mr. Bajagic, in your opinion, is it possible to write such a

24     report about the Ministry of the Interior -- or, rather, which rules and

25     regulations are the most important ones for the understanding and clear

Page 20027

 1     classification, if I may say, in your opinion?

 2        A.   When I was explaining the chapter about the internal organisation

 3     of the MUP, especially the legal framework, I omitted to say, but I can

 4     say it now, that an objective and systematic manner of dealing with

 5     matters pertaining to the work of the Ministry of the Interior, it is

 6     necessary, always considering the Constitution as the highest legal

 7     document of a country, also presenting a number of other pieces of

 8     legislation [as interpreted].  And that has been done in this expert

 9     report.  I'm specifically referring to the Law on the Government, then

10     the Law on Public Administration, the Law on Ministries, and the Law on

11     the Interior.  That is the legal framework that was adopted in

12     early 1992, in the Serb Republic of BH.

13             Clearly it is outright impossible to analyse all the provisions

14     of these laws unless we also consider the legislation of the former SFRY,

15     including the Socialist Republic of BH.  These are the same laws and

16     regulations that I mentioned when I spoke about the Serb Republic of BH.

17     But because of the specific political and general situation in

18     Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time, it was necessary to go into some

19     provisions of the Law on Defence, the Law on the Armed Forces and, of

20     course, something that constitutes the historic background, the Law on

21     All People's Defence and the Strategy of All People's Defence that were

22     in force for -- in all of the former SFRY.

23             These are the central pieces of legislation that I also consulted

24     because I deem it necessary.

25        Q.   Please explain the correlation of -- or, rather, between what you

Page 20028

 1     call the Law on the Interior and the rule-book on the internal

 2     organisation of the MUP?  What is the correlation between these two

 3     pieces of legislation?

 4        A.   The Law on the Interior clearly defines the mission and the

 5     vision of the MUP and its scope of work.  Naturally, it defines the remit

 6     of the ministry, but the law only deals with the organisation of the MUP

 7     at a general level.  And it's the rule-book, a piece of subordinate

 8     legislation, that goes into the details of the structures of the ministry

 9     and the remit of the individual organisational units, as well as the

10     rights and duties of these units in accordance with the law.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please comment on chapter IV of your

12     report.

13        A.   This chapter is entitled, "Disciplinary and Criminal

14     Responsibility of RS MUP Staff in 1992."

15             It was part of my assignment.  All rules and regulations and

16     subordinate legislation also deal with these matters that are very

17     important for the functioning of the ministry.  This disciplinary and

18     criminal responsibility was here analysed by consulting the Law on the

19     Interior of the Serb Republic, as compared to the rules and regulations

20     that were in force in the socialist republic, and this is the way how I

21     tried to give a brief overview of how members of the ministry could be

22     held -- could be held responsible for their acts or omissions.

23        Q.   Thank you.  And please give us a short explanation of the

24     annexes.  What are they about?

25        A.   Working on the individual chapters and the expert report as a

Page 20029

 1     whole, I came across some documents I considered extremely important for

 2     the understanding of both the Ministry of the Interior and the general

 3     context in which it came into being.  So as not to overburden the report

 4     with footnotes, I considered it much more effective to enclose some

 5     documents in the report itself, and I only refer to them in the

 6     footnotes.  I believe that this -- it is much easier to understand why

 7     these documents were enclosed.  There's a total of 12 annexes.

 8        Q.   Please explain to us Annex 12.  What does it refer to and why did

 9     you include it?

10        A.   Annex 12 was created as a result of the Defence's wish from

11     the -- from earlier this year about the task of the -- tasks of the army

12     and the police during the state of the imminent threat of war.  And I

13     invested a significant effort to explain some topics that deal with

14     subordination.  And then I also had to go into the issues of coordination

15     and acting in coordination, from the point of view of national security,

16     and this is the last annex which I included upon the request of the

17     Defence.  All the others I included of my own accord.

18        Q.   Very well.  Tell us, sir, can you explain which methodology you

19     used in drafting this report?  Please explain very briefly.  And if you

20     use any technical terms, do explain what they mean.

21        A.   Yes, certainly.

22             The methodology of researching social matters or the research

23     methodology in the humanities is unique in the entire world.  There's a

24     single methodology.

25             Since the Ministry of the Interior, by definition, is one of the

Page 20030

 1     protagonists of national security, with regard to what I said about

 2     original documents, the -- setting up such a complex system of public

 3     administration required a multi-disciplinary approach.  If you do

 4     research into such an institution or such a process, political -- which

 5     is a political, legal -- and legal phenomenon, and because of that I had

 6     to adhere to very strict methodological rules from the very beginning.

 7     The first task was the classification of sources, the sources that I had

 8     before me.  By their subject matter, their nature, their contents, and it

 9     was necessary to devise a codex of classification into various sets.

10             As for the methods themselves, you can tell at first sight that

11     this is about a qualitative and quantitative analysis of contents; then

12     analysis and synthesis; induction and deduction; the comparative method,

13     and, of course, this includes the sociological and legal method; and many

14     other techniques that are required to deal with a document

15     systematically.

16             In principle, this expert report is the result of -- is -- of a

17     scholarly process, which it, indeed, was.  I defined hypotheses; I

18     defined indicators as material indicators of what could be found in the

19     de facto and de jure sets of the individual problems dealt with; and, of

20     course, the well-known logical processes such as proving, disproving,

21     et cetera.  Since this is a multi-disciplinary problem, a very wide range

22     of general, basic methods and other methodological techniques were

23     applied in the process of drafting this work.

24        Q.   When you say "multi-disciplinary problem," can you briefly

25     explain what you mean?

Page 20031

 1        A.   Of course.  A multi-disciplinary approach to studying the work of

 2     the ministry was indispensable because the ministry is part of the

 3     executive government, and we are dealing with the legal framework, so

 4     that we would see what the de jure situation was.  The

 5     Ministry of the Interior, as an institution or as a problem that we are

 6     studying, has all the characterises of a political, legal, sociological,

 7     and any other phenomenon because it is quite simply impossible to view it

 8     from a single angle only.  It is indispensable to carry out a political

 9     analysis as well because you cannot look at it separately.  You have to

10     look at it within a political and security-related context within which

11     it developed.  That is why I said that this did, indeed, require a

12     multi-disciplinary approach.

13             MR. ZECEVIC:  I see the time, and I think it's a proper time that

14     we take the adjournment now.  Thank you.

15             JUDGE HALL:  Yes.  So we take the break and resume in 20 minutes.

16             MS. KORNER:  Would Your Honours forgive me if I leave court now.

17     Thank you.

18                           [The witness stands down]

19                           --- Recess taken at 10.25 a.m.

20                           --- On resuming at 10.53 a.m.

21                           [The witness takes the stand]

22             JUDGE HALL:  Yes, Mr. Zecevic.

23             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

24        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Bajagic, one more question relating to the

25     methodology.

Page 20032

 1             Can you explain to us the mechanism on the basis of which

 2     scientific conclusions are drawn, and which particular mechanism did you

 3     apply in your work?

 4        A.   Scientific conclusions, or one's views, are created generally on

 5     the basis of the problem that you face and the subject that you research.

 6     In this particular instance, this was the Ministry of the Interior.

 7             In view of the available sources, you do that, and you also use

 8     them as indicators, and you apply them to the entire hypothetical

 9     framework, from the general to the specific theses, and also the very

10     terms of reference creates also a basis for certain conclusions.

11     Therefore, you have to make cross-reference between various sources about

12     one specific problem that can then lead you to reaching a specific

13     conclusion.  And at that you try to reach as high a degree of reliability

14     as possible.  And you sometimes have some impressions about the problem,

15     because it is not always possible to arrive at definitive conclusions.

16        Q.   Is the drawing of conclusions dependant on, let's say, the volume

17     or the quantity of positive indicators that you receive with respect to a

18     specific problem?  Let me be a little bit clearer:  Do you arrive at

19     conclusions by taking a whole set of documents relating to a specific

20     topic you determine a certain common denominator, which serves as a basis

21     for your conclusion, or did you apply some different method?

22        A.   That is precisely so.  Through these process of thinking,

23     proving, and disproving, you eventually arrive at a set of documents that

24     create a common denominator that indicate a specific conclusion.  It is

25     impossible to arrive at opinions and views based on a sole decision.  Any

Page 20033

 1     kind of research in this area you need to have a number of documents in

 2     order to arrive at a relevant conclusion.

 3        Q.   Mr. Bajagic, what is the situation if you have a number of

 4     documents confirming one common denominator and then have you another set

 5     of documents that disprove it?  How do you act in that particular

 6     situation with respect to drawing your conclusions?

 7             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Excuse me for interrupting.

 8             Mr. Bajagic, before you go on to answer Mr. Zecevic's question, I

 9     think it would be helpful if you could clarify, then, what was, in your

10     view, the common denominator that you found in the studies that you made.

11             You made reference to the possibility of identifying one common

12     denominator in the material that you have analysed.  Then Mr. Zecevic

13     then puts it to you the approach that you would take in case you would

14     then find other information that would contradict this common

15     denominator.

16             So my question you to, before you go on to answering

17     Mr. Zecevic's question:  What was, then, the common denominator that you

18     would base your conclusions on?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I arrived at this common

20     denominator, or a general conclusion, at the very end of my research

21     work.  It was impossible for me to determine it at the beginning.  I

22     could only work with a general hypothesis and that is that the Ministry

23     of the Interior of the Serbian Republic of BH truly operated in a very

24     difficult period and which constitutes a time-frame and a framework of

25     this expert report.  It is simply impossible to give you a common

Page 20034

 1     denominator in one sentence only.  That is probably a global conclusion

 2     that anyone can arrive at, anyone who reads this report.

 3             Speaking about two sides, I said that there was a higher or a

 4     lesser degree of probability that can help us to make decisions, but if

 5     we strike a balance and if you create something through the codex, it is

 6     not up to me to give the ultimate judgement.  But each individual problem

 7     in my expert report cannot be extracted and viewed out of context.

 8             There are some indirect facts and indirect problems that are

 9     relating to this report, dealt elsewhere, can also guide us towards

10     certain conclusions.  Of course, at any rate, if those confirming a

11     hypothesis overweigh the other argument, and, of course, in other cases

12     we can leave some space for people reading the report to reach at an

13     overall conclusion after reading the report.

14             In that sense, I tried to answer the question to you,

15     Your Honours, and to Mr. Zecevic.  I hope I was clear enough.  If not, I

16     will try to do it better.

17             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Thank you.  We do have your report, and we have

18     read it.  I was just trying to give you an opportunity to clarify the

19     conclusions that you have made, which are subject to interpretation.  But

20     let's see about that.

21             Let's proceed.  Back to you, Mr. Zecevic.

22             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

23        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Bajagic, when I asked you about common

24     denominators, I was referring to specific issues that were dealt with.

25     Can you answer this question:  Does every specific issue that you

Page 20035

 1     addressed in your expert report and on which you provided conclusions was

 2     the subject of each process that you just described in each individual

 3     case?

 4        A.   Yes.  I applied the same methodology in every segment of my

 5     report, in each chapter, and it -- in the final part of my report.  I

 6     always took into account all the facts available in the material that I

 7     used when drafting this report.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Let us now turn to the content of your report itself.

 9             In chapter I, entitled, "Constituting of the Serbian Republic of

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina and Establishment of Organs of State Authority," was

11     divided by you into four subsections.  Can you summarise what were, in

12     your view, the most important characteristics of the political and state

13     crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina that impacted or that had effect on the

14     subject of your research, i.e., the Ministry of the Serbian Republic of

15     Bosnia-Herzegovina?

16        A.   If we take a look at the title of chapter I and the four

17     subsections contained therein, one can immediately see that my intention

18     was that I wanted to speak in great detail about the Serbian Ministry of

19     the Interior of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that for that purpose I had to put

20     it into a realistic, social context that prevailed in Bosnia-Herzegovina

21     at the time.  As we all know, the general crisis that reigned in the area

22     of the former SFRY was particularly severe in the area of

23     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

24             Multi-party elections that were held in Bosnia-Herzegovina had

25     established all three branches of authority in a way which, at least

Page 20036

 1     initially, seemed to provide for a possibility to overcome the problems

 2     that were faced in other republics.  In view of the fact that there were

 3     three political parties taking part in the elections and were victorious,

 4     and I'm talking about Party of Democratic Action, the

 5     Serbian Democratic Party, and the Croatian Democratic Union, and as a

 6     result the authority was established in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it

 7     impacted the overall situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including all the

 8     state organs and their functioning in B and H.  Naturally, the

 9     then-Ministry of the Interior of the Socialist Republic of

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina found itself in the same context, and we started with

11     problems that were mapped out in this chapter as minor ones, and

12     eventually we reached the main topic, which was the

13     Ministry of the Interior of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

14        Q.   When you say that there are problems listed in this chapter, can

15     you tell us briefly, and maybe you can point us to relevant paragraphs in

16     your work, can you tell us which particular problems you had in mind and

17     why do you think that these specific problems were important?

18        A.   Bearing in mind the basic characteristics of the political crisis

19     in BH, which is from paragraph 1 through paragraph 14, I believed that

20     the best way would be to analyse the activities of these main political

21     entities in that period and their activities, taking into account all the

22     information that I had in front of me but also by resorting to a broader

23     set of material.  The intention was particularly to identify the factors

24     that greatly affected the operation of the Ministry of the Interior of

25     the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time.  Through the

Page 20037

 1     analysis and research of these problems, many other issues were raised,

 2     and it would not have been possible without this first chapter.

 3             In spite of the fact that these three parties reached a sort of

 4     coalition and inter-party agreement, the available sources indicate,

 5     obviously, that on many vital issues the relationships between these

 6     entities were at a low level of any sincere cooperation that one might

 7     have expected, in view of the coalition that they formed, and that,

 8     instead, each one of them made their own moves and their own actions in

 9     the context.

10             Now, without going into specifics, I dedicated a number of

11     paragraphs to each of three sides, and I highlighted some of the facts

12     that were of importance in comprehending the operation of the Ministry of

13     the Interior.

14        Q.   I have to ask you just to try and speak more slowly for the

15     benefit of our interpreters.  Thank you.

16             Now, can you just clarify one sentence that you uttered.  You

17     said, on page 31, line 5 and 6, that their cooperation was at a much

18     lower level than one would have expected, in view of their coalition

19     agreement, and that, even contrary to that, each of them made certain

20     moves or embarked on certain actions.  And as it is translated here, it

21     says "in the context," but I think you said something different;

22     therefore, my question is:  Why were these actions or these moves made by

23     each of these three parties and what was the area that it affected the

24     most?  Was it the functioning of the state or something else?

25        A.   These moves had serious reflections upon the functioning of the

Page 20038

 1     state authorities, the government organs.

 2        Q.   When you say "reflections," are you using that term in a positive

 3     or negative sense?  What is the connotation?  I mean, if this is

 4     reflected on the functioning of the state organs, is it reflected in

 5     terms of these government organs functioning well or not?

 6        A.   This had an adverse affect on the functioning of the state

 7     organs, thereby the Ministry of the Interior of the Socialist Republic of

 8     Bosnia-Herzegovina in that period of time as well.

 9        Q.   In your view, these coalition parties, did every one of them

10     actually want to be the leading party or not?

11        A.   We have a fact here that -- namely, that all three parties won a

12     certain percentage of the vote, and that is how government was

13     established.  However, on the basis of certain documents that I analysed,

14     I got the impression that the Party for Democratic Action, in particular,

15     made an effort to exercise dominant influence, especially in those

16     ministries that are called the Ministries of Force in the jargon, the

17     Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice, and so on, especially

18     the Ministry of Interior.

19             I dealt with that in several paragraphs in particular, and I

20     tried to support it with truly relevant documents as sources that give

21     rise to such statements.

22        Q.   Very well.  Following the methodology of your work, we come to

23     the activities of one of these protagonists, if I can put it that way,

24     one of the political parties that you spoke about, that is, the SDA, the

25     Party of Democratic Action.  And that is from paragraph 14 to 52, if I'm

Page 20039

 1     not mistaken.

 2             Can you tell us specifically which actions were taken by that

 3     protagonist, resulting, in your view, in a certain significance for the

 4     relevance of your own research?

 5        A.   Among others, I observed a few key phenomena as I analysed the

 6     activities of the SDA in relation to the functioning of the

 7     Ministry of the Interior.  Firstly, when analysing certain sources, I

 8     came to the conclusion that the Party of Democratic Action showed

 9     specific tendencies and took specific action to exercise dominant

10     influence over personnel matters in the Ministry of the Interior in that

11     period, even by violating the intra-party agreement on the distribution

12     of positions within the ministry, starting with the minister and going

13     down to the heads of department.

14             The second conclusion was that they completely neglected the fact

15     that the Ministry of the Interior of the Socialist Republic of

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina had a system of schooling and training in place for

17     decades within its own system.  And that, as they interfered in personnel

18     policies directly, they sent many of their party activists to basic

19     training courses in the Republic of Croatia throughout 1991.  Later on,

20     they would show up as active members of the MUP and reservists within the

21     MUP already towards the end of 1991.

22             Another problem was the fact that the Party of Democratic Action,

23     although there were already organs established in the field of security

24     in every aspect, already in 1991 they worked on secretly arming a large

25     number of their activists and supporters.  That became evident later.

Page 20040

 1     This is tellingly demonstrated by the facts that I refer to in my expert

 2     report related to the secret establishment of the Patriotic League and

 3     other paramilitary formations.

 4             And the finale was in the first months of 1992, when the

 5     Patriotic League was proclaimed as such, as were other institutions,

 6     though, of a military and political narrate, like the military wing of

 7     the SDA, the Council for Defence, and so on.

 8             Those are some of the basic indicators on the basis of which I

 9     drew conclusions that the SDA made efforts even outside the institutions

10     of the system that existed at the time to do something that would

11     significantly assist their political interests.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Tell me, under item 3, you looked at the activity of

13     the other protagonist, if I can put it that way.  That is to say, the

14     Croatian party, the HDZ.  That is between paragraphs 52 and 80 of your

15     report.

16             If you can summarise this for us very briefly, your conclusion on

17     the action taken by this other coalition partner, the HDZ.

18        A.   The HDZ also demonstrated certain aspirations.  From the point of

19     view of their own interests, they tried to protect the interests of the

20     Croatian community within Herceg-Bosna -- Bosnia-Herzegovina, rather.

21     However, the HDZ, as one of the victorious parties, not only in 1991 but

22     also in 1990, there are some sources that indicate this, it is already

23     then that they started establishing a particular form of organisation

24     that was then called the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna.  And that is

25     this problem of this third entity, as it were.

Page 20041

 1             Although the official date of the establishment of the

 2     Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna is the 18th of November, 1991, all of

 3     1991 and half of 1990 shows that the top people of Herceg-Bosna were

 4     corresponding and indicated that it already existed.  So this -- this was

 5     also compounded by the establishment of the Croatian Defence Council in

 6     the areas where they were predominant.  And, of course, the HDZ was

 7     closely linked to the HDZ of the Republic of Croatia.  They had close

 8     cooperation with them with regard to all matters.

 9        Q.   Could you just clarify one particular thing.  The Croatian

10     Defence Council, could you explain what this is all about?  What is the

11     Croatian Defence Council?

12        A.   The Croatian Defence Council is a military organisation, right,

13     of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna which operated as a separate

14     armed force.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Could you now please explain item 4 to us, the

16     activities of the third coalition partner, the SDS.  And can you explain,

17     as you did in the previous two cases, what the most important

18     characteristics involved were that affected your research?

19        A.   Like the other two sides, the SDS, as the political

20     representative of the Serb community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, took certain

21     steps in terms of the political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the

22     time.  Some of the basic characteristics were as follows:  The

23     establishment of the autonomous Krajinas and the autonomous regions,

24     already in 1991, in the Autumn of 1991, as far as I can remember.  Of

25     course, already in the beginning of 1992, the Assembly of the Serb People

Page 20042

 1     in Bosnia-Herzegovina adopted a declaration, passed the constitution of

 2     the Serbia Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, an entire set of laws that

 3     will be very important in assessing further developments.

 4             While analysing all of these three essential political entities,

 5     we can say that all of the parties involved made certain moves on the

 6     basis of their own interests.  And this situation significantly affected

 7     the work of the state organs of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and,

 8     ultimately, all the problems that cropped up later.

 9             All of this was done more or less in an environment in which,

10     officially, all three political parties were participating in a long-term

11     process of resolving the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina under international

12     auspices.  Towards the end of the winter and the beginning of the spring

13     of 1992, this resulted in the adoption of certain documents during the

14     process of the Lisbon Agreement.  It was the Cutileiro Agreement, as it

15     has been referred to.

16        Q.   All right.

17             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Zecevic, are you done with this item on

18     the three -- the activities of the three protagonists, as you call it?

19             MR. ZECEVIC:  Well, I was -- I was going further on this, but,

20     please, Your Honours, by all means, pose a question.

21             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Professor Bajagic, in this part of your work, the

22     three -- the description of the activities of the three protagonists, as

23     Mr. Zecevic calls it, what strikes me, without even looking to the

24     contents of it, is that for the SDS [sic] your analysis takes 38 pages;

25     for the HDZ, it takes 28 pages; and for the SDS, it takes three pages.

Page 20043

 1     Which seems to be rather unbalanced.  Is there a logical explanation for

 2     that?

 3                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 4             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Yes, in the transcript, the SDS is mentioned

 5     twice.  The first time it's mentioned, it should be "SDA" and not "SDS."

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, of course, the report shows

 7     that the activities of the political leaders of the SDA has particularly

 8     been focussed on, and then the HDZ, and then the SDS.  I was guided by a

 9     particular methodology, namely, that the latter part of my report would

10     be dedicated to the activities of the Serbian ministry and thereby the

11     Serb side, so de facto and de jure that would have been the case.

12     Perhaps I did not want to burden my report with well-known facts that had

13     already been dealt with in the expert report of Mr. Nielsen.  And I did

14     not want to literally copy certain thing.

15             Despite this lack of balance, if we're speaking of the actual

16     number of pages involved, it is important, at least in my view, that I

17     pointed out that all three parties acted on their own, and that is a

18     position that is one that I'm voicing by way of criticism in my report.

19     And this is in line with what Professor Nielsen said.  So it's not that

20     something different would happen in the report; it is only due to these

21     facts.

22             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Thank you.

23             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

24        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Bajagic, you mentioned -- while you were

25     speaking about the contribution to the creation of the crisis by one of

Page 20044

 1     the protagonists, the SDS, you mentioned the establishment of these

 2     autonomous regions, and before that, you mentioned the Croatian Community

 3     of Herceg-Bosna.  So tell us, please, to what extent that type of

 4     regional structure affected the functioning of the state and the state

 5     organs in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the period from

 6     1990 till 1992?

 7        A.   The very fact that these activities are under way until 1992

 8     certainly significantly affect the functioning of the state organs.

 9     Probably all state organs functioned difficultly.  For an administrative

10     body such as the Ministry of the Interior, this is a special difficulty

11     because that ministry has a specific organisation and hierarchy.  And

12     that applies to any country.  It's an institution which has a specific

13     remit and area of work.

14             Under such conditions, it is really difficult, when there are

15     inter-party conflicts and a significant inference of politics in their

16     work, to really implement the law and other regulations.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Let us please take a look at a document.  You have

18     these two binders in front of you, and we're interested in the document

19     under tab 27.  That's your footnote 71.1.  And the document is 1D141.

20             This is a document that is three pages long.  Since your footnote

21     is 71.1, please give us a brief explanation what kind of document this

22     is, what it's about, and why you thought it was important to cite it in a

23     footnote in your work.

24        A.   You stated rightly that this is a document that's three pages

25     long.

Page 20045

 1             On page 1, there's a letter with a few sentences sent by

 2     Mr. Mate Boban, the president of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna,

 3     which he sent to the then president of the Republic of Croatia, and

 4     that's Dr. Franjo Tudjman.  His name isn't mentioned, but we know who the

 5     president was at the time.

 6             On the second page --

 7        Q.   Could we please see the second page in e-court.

 8        A.   This is an official decision published in the Official Gazette of

 9     the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna which shows that we're talking

10     about a state-like entity, given the fact it has its Official Gazette.

11     So it's a decision on the establishment of the Croatian Community of

12     Herceg-Bosna.  It has nine articles.  It says that the community is

13     established as a political, cultural, economic, and territorial whole.

14     Then what it's composed of, where the seat is, and it allows for the

15     possibility of accession by other municipalities.  And I needn't mention

16     all articles.

17             And the third page --

18        Q.   Let's see the third page in e-court, please.

19        A.   There is a list on which we see the signatures of the

20     representatives of individual towns or municipalities that joined the

21     Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna.  These are probably the signatures of

22     these representatives.

23             And the significance of this document is also stated in the

24     footnote, to back up my position that the Croatian Democratic Union, the

25     HDZ party, as early as 1991, formally established the Croatian Community

Page 20046

 1     of Herceg-Bosna as a rather broad, regional type of organisation in

 2     Bosnia and Herzegovina which covers an extensive territory, which we see

 3     from the list of the municipalities that joined it.  In this chapter,

 4     there are more such documents that speak about the foundation and

 5     functioning of Herceg-Bosna in that time-period.

 6        Q.   Let us go back to page 2, and I would like to hear a comment.

 7             I'm especially interested in a comment about Article 5 and the

 8     reference to the independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina with regard to

 9     Yugoslavia.

10        A.   Well, it says here that the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna

11     will respect the democratically elected authorities of the Republic of

12     Bosnia and Herzegovina for as long as Bosnia and Herzegovina exists as an

13     independent state with regard to the former or any future Yugoslavia.

14             It is said, in other words, that they will respect the existing

15     political and legal structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina as long as it's -- as

16     it's part or linked with Yugoslavia.  This -- the question what will

17     happen if Bosnia and Herzegovina completely separates itself from

18     Yugoslavia is left open.

19        Q.   Mr. Bajagic, when was Bosnia-Herzegovina recognised as an

20     independent state?

21        A.   In early 1992.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Please make a short comment about Article 7 of this

23     document, which says how the supreme body of the community is composed.

24        A.   It says:

25             "The supreme body of the community shall be the Presidency which

Page 20047

 1     shall comprise representatives of the Croatian people in the municipality

 2     authorities ..."

 3             We see that only "the Croatian people" is mentioned.

 4             I believe that the second sentence of this Article is not so

 5     important, but it says:

 6             "Or the presidents of the municipal boards of the HDZ ..."

 7             So this is a fully -- this relies fully on the will of the

 8     Croatian Democratic Union, which was one of the victorious parties in the

 9     1990 election.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Let's look at tab 28.  Your footnote is 93, and the

11     document is 1D2.

12             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honours, before we move on, may I inquire if

13     Mr. Zecevic is going to offer this document?  Or is he planning to try

14     and offer all of them at the end of the report?

15             MR. ZECEVIC:  It's already an exhibit.

16             MR. HANNIS:  Okay.

17             MR. ZECEVIC:  It's 1D141.

18             MR. HANNIS:  Okay.  Thank you.

19             MR. ZECEVIC:  The previous document.

20             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you.

21             MR. ZECEVIC:  This one is 1D2.

22             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you.

23             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Since this document is also part of your report as a footnote,

25     please make a short comment and explain why you considered this

Page 20048

 1     document -- you considered it important to mention it in your footnote.

 2        A.   The previous document was dated 18 November as the official date

 3     of the establishment of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna.  This

 4     document shows, and I explained that in paragraph 70 of my expert report,

 5     that there already were some forms of regional organisation that were

 6     supported by the HDZ.  We see from this document that there were at least

 7     the Herzegovina regional community and the Travnik regional community,

 8     which means that this form of regional organisation was typical for the

 9     HDZ throughout 1991.

10             This doesn't state when they were created, but their meeting took

11     place on 12 November, six days before the official establishment of

12     Herceg-Bosna, shows that during 1991 there already was some form of

13     regional organisation, some sort of regions.

14             It even says here, this is ultimately 1991, that these regional

15     communities came into being at that time or earlier.  That's one thing,

16     one reason why I used this document.  And the other is that document

17     states what the final goal of the Croatian people should be.

18        Q.   That's on page 2, isn't it?

19        A.   It's paragraph 70, or, yeah, well, in this document it's on

20     page 2; right.

21             And for them, that's the independent Republic of Croatia or the

22     aspiration of the HDZ to establish the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna

23     through the establishment of these regional communities in order to

24     eventually become the Republic of Croatia, territorially speaking.

25        Q.   Thank you.  The following document is tab 34.  Your footnote is

Page 20049

 1     149, item 4.

 2             MR. HANNIS:  I'm sorry, Mr. Zecevic.

 3             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm sorry.

 4             MR. HANNIS:  Before we move on, Your Honours, I note in my

 5     English translation of paragraph 70 of the report which makes reference

 6     to footnote 93, which was the one we're just talking about, it says:

 7     "Illegible text M. Bajagic's remark."  I wonder if Mr. Zecevic can help

 8     us out with what's in the original.  Because it appears it hasn't been

 9     translated, at least in my English translation.

10             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm sorry, let me -- let me see if I can -- this

11     is -- that should be page 1, I think.

12             MR. HANNIS:  I'm looking at paragraph 93.  It's paragraph 34 of

13     the English translation.  The very last remark under paragraph 70.  I'm

14     sorry, it's paragraph 70 on page 34 where there's a reference to footnote

15     93.

16             MR. ZECEVIC:

17        Q.   [Interpretation] Could you please explain the following.  At the

18     end of paragraph 70 of your report, we see "Illegible text M. Bajagic's

19     remarks" in brackets.  Can you please explain what this refers to, which

20     part of the document itself?

21        A.   It refers to the very last lines on page 1 of the document.

22     That's why I made this remark, because I didn't want to speculate.  When

23     something is illegible, then you should state so.

24             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see the first page.

25             [In English] Mr. Hannis, I must give credit to the CLSS.  They

Page 20050

 1     have obviously been able to decipher this, but and I also have the

 2     problem as Mr. Bajagic has, reading what is written in the last -- last

 3     sentence on this page.

 4        Q.   [Interpretation] The following document is tab 34.  The document

 5     is P1880.  Your footnote 149.4.

 6             As we see in your footnote, this document, too, is about one of

 7     the regional communities that were created in the territory.  And please

 8     explain why you considered this document important and why you cite it in

 9     a footnote in your report.

10        A.   Well, as I pointed out, all the parties, all the key political

11     subjects, made certain moves, and this is the proof that the Serbian side

12     in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in certain areas, during the year 1991, also,

13     similarly or in the same manner, began to organise itself at the regional

14     level.  And this is the decision to promulgate the Autonomous Region of

15     Krajina as a part of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and

16     the federative unit of Bosnia-Herzegovina as its integral part.  And I

17     just think that this document shows fully, which is necessary, that the

18     moves of all sides in the political life at the time have to be taken

19     into account.  And here we are discussing the Serbian side.  I do not see

20     much difference at first between the Croatian Community in -- of

21     Herceg-Bosna and the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina, and we can see

22     that the tendency existed on all sides.

23             If you would like me to focus on any specific article --

24        Q.   Well, the document speaks for itself.  Thank you.

25             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I see the time.  I

Page 20051

 1     would now move to a different subject, so perhaps we might take the break

 2     now.

 3             JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated]

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 5             JUDGE HALL:  Sorry.  The -- you couldn't make effective use of --

 6             MR. ZECEVIC:  No, no, of course I can.  I wasn't aware it was ten

 7     minutes.

 8             JUDGE HALL:  It's 11.57, and we break at 12.05 usually.

 9             MR. ZECEVIC:  Yes.  I'm sorry, Your Honours.

10        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Bajagic, we could see from the examples

11     which you mentioned about this formation of regional communities you told

12     us that it had a certain impact on the work of the organs of the state in

13     the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  How did this regionalisation in

14     the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina impact on the abilities and

15     possibilities of central government in Sarajevo to operate?  Could you

16     comment on that, please.

17        A.   The central authorities in Sarajevo, judging by the division of

18     influence which was a result of the municipality party elections, was

19     made up of all the three sides.  But each of the three sides had its own

20     projection of the manner in which it should act in such a context.  For

21     these two sides we have shown through documents that they carried out

22     certain activities in order to establish specific regions.

23             I also need to emphasise that this form of organisation had been

24     envisaged in a different legal framework at the time of the former SFRY.

25     And I have to emphasise that Bosnia-Herzegovina, throughout 1991, up

Page 20052

 1     until the spring of 1992, was one of the constituent members of the

 2     Federation.  The Federation was still functional in 1991, and we should

 3     bear this in mind.

 4             As for the central authorities in Sarajevo, or, rather, the third

 5     side in the latent conflicts that were going on at the time, they were

 6     not making the moves of this kind; but by trying to become predominant in

 7     all the central authorities and institutions, they were trying to achieve

 8     their own goals.  And through the development of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a

 9     civil republic, they were trying to achieve dominance over the other two

10     sides.  And this is something is that is present primarily in the first

11     part of the report.

12        Q.   You say the third side.  Who do you have in mind?

13        A.   I have in mind the Party of Democratic Action and the political

14     establishment which represented the Muslim people in the central organs

15     of power.

16        Q.   As for the regional communities, did they also establish their

17     own organs?

18        A.   Yes.  The regionals community, and I mean the Croatian Community

19     of Herceg-Bosna and the Autonomous Region of Krajina, already envisaged

20     the establishment of these organs in their founding documents.  And they

21     did establish these organs, the organs which were practically the

22     authorities, and some institutions which looked like state institutions.

23             I think that in certain paragraphs of my expert report, where I

24     discuss the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, I mentioned a number of

25     documents in footnotes which talk about appointing certain leaders to

Page 20053

 1     specific departments, Department of Justice, Department of the Interior,

 2     and Department of Economy, and so on and so forth.  The situation was the

 3     same on the other side.

 4        Q.   Let us just be completely clear.  We have shown the two examples

 5     here, the Herceg-Bosna and the Autonomous Region of Krajina.  Were there

 6     any other autonomous regions or regional communities in Bosnia and

 7     Herzegovina at the time?

 8        A.   Yes, certainly, there were.  In the report there were no examples

 9     of the Herzegovina community or the Travnik regional community or some

10     other Serbian autonomous regions, but there were others, evidently.  So

11     this was not just, generally speaking, the Herceg-Bosna and the

12     Autonomous Region of Krajina; there were a number of these.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             MR. ZECEVIC:  I see the time now, Your Honours.

15             JUDGE HALL:  Yes.  So we take the break and resume in 20 minutes.

16                           [The witness stands down]

17                           --- Recess taken at 12.05 p.m.

18                           --- On resuming at 12.28 p.m.

19                           [The witness takes the stand]

20             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

21        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Bajagic, let us move on to the second part

22     of your report, the MUP of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina

23     in 1992.  That is on page 34.

24             Can you briefly summarise for us what were the characteristics of

25     this period, let me put it that way, this period in the work of the MUP

Page 20054

 1     of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?  So after the ethnic

 2     parties won the election and the coalition had been formed.

 3        A.   On the basis of the facts already presented concerning the social

 4     atmosphere in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the wake of multi-party elections,

 5     the Ministry of the Interior of the Socialist Republic of

 6     Bosnia-Herzegovina found itself in a really complex situation; complex in

 7     every sense.  We know that, on the basis of the coalition agreement

 8     between the three victorious parties, the division of personnel was the

 9     same in all state institutions, that is to say that the ethnic-based

10     parties agreed that positions in state organs, including the MUP, should

11     be equally distributed on the basis of the party agreement.

12        Q.   Perhaps it will be easier, in order to illustrate what we are

13     discussing, if we can have a look at P875.  I haven't announced it, but I

14     hope that it will not be a problem.  It is a chart provided by the

15     Prosecution which reflects and illustrates the structure of the

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP.

17             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Hannis.

18             [In English] [Microphone not activated] perhaps -- perhaps usher

19     can give this to witness.

20        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Bajagic, please have a look.  This is a

21     chart prepared by the Prosecution, and it is supposed to reflect, more or

22     less, the situation between January 1991 and March 1992, as the title

23     says.  "The Situation in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the

24     Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

25             So I would ask you to have a look at it and to confirm whether

Page 20055

 1     this is your opinion as well.

 2        A.   Yes, I can see in this chart that the minister of the interior is

 3     Mr. Alija Delimustafic, his deputy is Mr. Vitomir Zepinic, and that one

 4     of the advisors is Mr. Mico Stanisic.

 5             Below that, I see that we have various lines of work, and I can

 6     see the names of the officials who were discharging the duties as leaders

 7     of these organisational units in the seat of the ministry.  And still

 8     below that, where we can see the blue signs resembling houses, we can see

 9     the organisational structure of the Security Services Centres which

10     existed at the time.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Please -- I apologise for this digression.  I wanted

12     us to present this.  And, now, please, if you can continue with your

13     answer.

14        A.   As we can see on this chart, and as I mentioned in my expert

15     report, on the basis of the party agreement, the positions within the

16     Ministry of the Interior of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and

17     Herzegovina were divided according to the percentage of the influence

18     that the parties had in power.  Probably, though I did not deal with that

19     in detail, this was reflected in the territorial principle of

20     organisation from the top down, depending on the areas where a specific

21     party won most votes in the elections in certain areas; there they would

22     get most seats in the organs of power.

23             What is always a problem for any Ministry of the Interior is that

24     it should operate on the principles of political neutrality and

25     professionalism; whereas, the political parties were trying to exert some

Page 20056

 1     sort of influence on the personnel policy within the ministry.  This is

 2     one of my main observations; that in certain situations it is surprising

 3     that the parties made such efforts to try and have a dominate influence

 4     on the personnel policy within the MUP and it had to be achieved in spite

 5     of the grudges of other sides and putting aside the duties which had to

 6     be discharged and which are defined by the Law on the Ministry of the

 7     Interior.  This is one of my observations from this chapter.

 8             MR. ZECEVIC:  If -- Mr. Usher, can you please give me back the

 9     chart, because it is probably difficult for the expert to deal with all

10     these papers in front of him.  Thank you very much.

11        Q.   [Interpretation] Please go on, Mr. Bajagic.  Sorry.

12        A.   The other observation in connection with this is that the

13     Ministry of the Interior of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina

14     had to take into account what was happening at the international level

15     and relating to the future destiny of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its state

16     and territorial organisation.  I mean the negotiation process which was

17     ongoing under the auspices of the international community.  And this was

18     one of the elements that determined the future operation, functioning,

19     and decentralisation of the Minister of the Internal Affairs of the

20     Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  This is specified in the

21     contents and also in the opinion I provided in certain paragraphs of my

22     report.

23        Q.   Please tell me, can you clarify for us the notion of what

24     tripartite means, what it means in general, and whether it was applied to

25     the Ministry of the Interior of the Socialist Republic of

Page 20057

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 2        A.   Well, tripartite should, in this case, mean that the party

 3     agreement is to be strictly observed and that all three political forces

 4     should have equal influence on the operation of the Ministry of the

 5     Interior.  That means everyone is equal.  And on the basis of the method

 6     of work which was established by consensus, it implies the awareness of

 7     all three sides of the main directions of activities of the other two

 8     sides.  So it means transparency in terms of the influence anyone would

 9     have on the work of the ministry.

10        Q.   On the basis of your research, did -- this tripartite principle

11     in the Ministry of the Interior of the Socialist Republic of

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina, was it observed and honoured?

13        A.   As I pointed out in a number of paragraphs and supported it by

14     sources which are provided in the footnotes, it is clear that the Party

15     of Democratic Action violated the party agreement, not only in terms of

16     appointing personnel or observing the agreement on appointments of high

17     officials at the ministry seat, but they were also carrying out other

18     activities which suggest unlawful meddling with the personnel policy of

19     the Ministry of the Interior of the then Socialist Republic of

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

21        Q.   Paragraph 106 on page 39 of your expert report, could you please

22     comment on paragraph 106 and the one following it.  That's 107.

23        A.   In paragraph 106, in order to explain what I stated previously, I

24     talk about instructions on mobilising the police reserve force which was

25     issued on the 26th of September, 1991.  The instruction was signed by the

Page 20058

 1     then deputy minister of the interior, Mr. Vitomir Zepinic.  The

 2     instruction was a result of an order of the Presidency.  It was a result

 3     of the order issued by the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 4             Further on in this paragraph, I discuss the dissatisfaction of

 5     the Serbian personnel in the MUP concerning the situation, but I have to

 6     refer to paragraph 107 where I specify that one of the officials of the

 7     MUP in his dispatch said that the mobilisation of the reserve forces of

 8     the police was unconstitutional because this order or instruction could

 9     only have been issued on the level of the then SFRY, as

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina was still a federal unit of the SFRY at the time.  In

11     the dispatch, Mr. Mandic referred to the decision of the Government of

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1988 pertaining to this issue.  Therefore, the

13     instruction on the mobilisation of the police reserve forces which was

14     issued on 26th of September, 1991, considering the fact that

15     Bosnia-Herzegovina was at the time still a federal unit of the SFRY, was

16     unconstitutional and unlawful.

17        Q.   Just for the sake of reference, the document that the expert is

18     talking about is Exhibit 1D130 in this case.

19             Mr. Bajagic, this mobilisation of the police reserve forces, as

20     we can see here one of the members of the collegium addressed all the

21     relevant state organs while protesting about this.  As you said, this was

22     unconstitutional and unlawful.

23             When you say that it was contrary to the constitution and

24     unlawful, what do you have in mind?  Do you have in mind the number or

25     the decision itself or both?

Page 20059

 1        A.   I have both in mind.  Simply, the organs of the SFRY and the

 2     Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina were the organs who could have made such

 3     a decision.  It had to be taken at the level of the federal state rather

 4     than individually by a constituent unit.  The fact that really should be

 5     taken into account when we analyse any of the processes that took place

 6     in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991 was that it was still formerly at the time

 7     a constituent unit of SFRY.  Therefore in this territory the laws of SFRY

 8     were supposed to be observed in this territory.  They were still in force

 9     there.

10        Q.   I will show you a document and ask you for your comment.  It's

11     connected with this.  It's tab 18, 65 ter 720D1.  It's a Defence

12     document.  And I need page 18 in the Serbian text.  The page number from

13     the book is 157.  The next page, please.  I apologise.

14             Mr. Bajagic, I will read this to you.  I'm just interested in

15     your -- in your comment.

16             MR. HANNIS:  Can I confirm we're on the correct page in English?

17             MR. ZECEVIC:  I don't think so.

18             MR. HANNIS:  Could we have that up, please.

19             MR. ZECEVIC:  Yes, please.

20             [Interpretation] It seems that this has not been translated.  I

21     apologise.  We'll return to it later.  It seems not to have been

22     translated, and if that is so, then this would make no sense.

23        Q.   Mr. Bajagic, tell me, calling up the reserve police in

24     Bosnia-Herzegovina, did that cause certain reactions?  If so, what were

25     these reactions; and, if you know, why?

Page 20060

 1        A.   On the basis of the documents that were accessible to me when

 2     working on this expert report and on the basis of this very document that

 3     you withdrew just now, the conclusion may be that, in a certain way,

 4     calling up the reserve police, the "milicija," in September 1991 in

 5     Bosnia-Herzegovina, in this way, as it had been done, led to protests

 6     from the other sides, especially the Serb personnel in the Ministry of

 7     the Interior at the time, because everything pointed to a similar process

 8     that had taken place in the Republic of Croatia.

 9             The reserve police force was supposed to be the nucleus of some

10     new armed forces, and this is something that stems from various

11     documents.  And that is supposed to be the nucleus of the SDA and the

12     future authorities in Sarajevo.  And that is why we see these documents

13     of those protests with regard to this fact; namely, calling up the

14     reserve force, and, further on, the mobilisation of the reserve forces,

15     and further activities once the mobilisation had been carried out.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Let us move to paragraph 3 on page 44, the

17     functioning of the Ministry of Interior in the Serb Republic

18     in 1992, April.

19             Mr. Bajagic, in your paper, in paragraph 127, you listed certain

20     documents.  I would like to ask you for your comments in respect of

21     paragraph 127 from your expert report.

22        A.   In order to speak about the legal framework in terms of the

23     development and functioning of the Ministry of the Interior of the

24     Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, later Republika Srpska, in the

25     period from April until December 1992, it was important, and that is what

Page 20061

 1     I did when writing up this expert report, to carry out a detailed

 2     analysis of an entire set of laws that are, at the same time, primary

 3     sources when categorising all of the material that this research is based

 4     on.

 5             I've already mentioned that this is the Constitution, the Law on

 6     the Government, the Law on State Administration, the Law on the Interior,

 7     the Law on Defence, the Law on the Army.  So these are laws that were

 8     published in 1992.  And, of course, some other laws are mentioned here as

 9     well, that follow the development of the ministry on the basis which we

10     can follow the development of this legal framework of the ministry all

11     the way throughout the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  But it is certain

12     that these four laws - government, state administration, ministries, and

13     especially the Ministry of the Interior - that is what is the most

14     important.

15             In my very own modest view, without analysing these laws, it

16     would be impossible to speak about the genesis, organisation, purview,

17     competencies, powers, and all other matters relevant to the functioning

18     of the Ministry of the Interior.

19        Q.   By way of a brief illustration, tab 35, your footnote 152.  That

20     is P181.  It is the Constitution of the Serb Republic of

21     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

22             The reason why you included the Constitution as the very first

23     document is self-evident, I believe, but could you please explain,

24     nevertheless, why it ranks first on your list of documents.

25        A.   Of course.  When discussing such an important organ of the

Page 20062

 1     executive as the ministry is and discussing important system-based laws,

 2     we have to look at the top-most legal document, that is, the

 3     Constitution, that refers to the rights and responsibilities of the

 4     executive, as well as all other branches of government.  That is why the

 5     Constitution is referred to in my paragraph 131.

 6             I directly speak about -- Article 90 of the Constitution, that

 7     refers to the rights and responsibilities of the government and makes it

 8     in charge of constituting the Ministry of the Interior.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  I would now like to look at a few decisions and to

10     ask you for your comment.  Tab number 9.  That is 65 ter 468D1.  It has

11     to do with paragraphs 91 and 93 of your report.

12             Can you give us your comment with regard to this document that we

13     see in front of us?

14        A.   As we can see from the document itself, this is a decision on the

15     establishment of the Council for National Security by the Assembly of the

16     Serb People in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the date is the

17     27th of March, 1992.

18        Q.   Signed by?

19        A.   The president of the Assembly of the Serb People,

20     Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik, who has a master's degree as well.

21             May I proceed?  I see that you --

22        Q.   Please go ahead.  We are going to -- just take it easy, will you?

23     Let us not overlap.

24        A.   This has to do with the establishment of the Council for

25     National Security as an advisory organ of the Assembly that has a purview

Page 20063

 1     of its own.

 2             The Council is responsible to the Assembly, and there's a

 3     reference to the membership of the Council.

 4        Q.   Tell me --

 5        A.   Sorry, let me just finish my sentence.

 6             So this is the Council for National Security as an advisory body

 7     of the Assembly, and the Assembly is a legislative organ, not an

 8     executive organ, although, if we take into account world trends, national

 9     security councils are usually established by the executive, and they have

10     a purview that is much wider than the one referred to here.  It is only

11     the advisory function that is referred to here; whereas, national

12     security councils in the world have other roles, like directing, guiding,

13     and advising in the field of national security.  Whereas, here there is

14     only a reference to ... it is the head of the executive that heads the

15     national security councils that exist worldwide today, but here the

16     National Security Council only has an advisory function, and that would

17     be my comment.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] If there are no objections, I would

20     like to tender this document.

21             MR. HANNIS:  No objection.

22             JUDGE HALL:  Admitted and marked.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit 1D531, Your Honours.

24             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Should this be in the law library?

25             MR. ZECEVIC:  No, I don't think so, Your Honours.  This is the

Page 20064

 1     decision by which the Council for National Security has been established.

 2             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Thank you.

 3             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   As for the next document that I would like to ask you to comment

 5     upon, Mr. Bajagic, we're looking at tab 10.  469D1 is the 65 ter number.

 6             Can you give us your brief comment on this document that consists

 7     of two parts.

 8        A.   This is a decision on declaring a state of imminent threat of war

 9     and also this is an order to mobilise the TO in the whole territory of

10     the SBH [as interpreted].  This decision was taken by the Presidency of

11     the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And the Assembly of the

12     Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina confirmed this decision on the

13     15th of April, 1992, and it is signed by president of the Assembly of the

14     Serbian People of BH, Momcilo Krajisnik, MA.  So the Presidency signed

15     the decision on declaring a state of imminent threat of war and the

16     assembly confirmed this decision.

17        Q.   Let us be perfectly clear:  The date of the decision of the

18     assembly is ... could you please tell us?

19        A.   It says here, 03-11/92, the 15th of April, 1992.  And the session

20     of the Assembly of the Serb People was held on the 12th of May, 1992, and

21     that is when they confirmed this decision.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] If there are no objections, I would

24     like to tender this document.

25             MR. HANNIS:  No objection.  But before we give that a number,

Page 20065

 1     Your Honour, going back to the last exhibit, in the light of the question

 2     that Judge Harhoff asked, I checked, and it appears that the document we

 3     just gave the number Exhibit 1D531 is already in the law library as

 4     L-327.

 5             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you very much, Mr. Hannis.  Let me check

 6     this.  Just a second.

 7             The only way would be if it was published in the Official

 8     Gazette.  That might be the case.  Just bear with me, Your Honours.

 9                           [Defence counsel confer]

10             MR. ZECEVIC:  Okay, I'm sorry.  You were right, Mr. Hannis.  We

11     checked.  It's a part of the law library.  Therefore, we should --

12             JUDGE HALL: -- vacate the number that we just assigned?

13             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm sorry, Your Honours, yes, we should vacate the

14     number 1D531, yes.

15             JUDGE HALL:  So ordered.

16             MR. HANNIS:  And I have no objection to the current proposed

17     exhibit getting that number now.

18             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you very much.  So I'm moving that that

19     document, 469D1, be admitted as 1D531.

20             JUDGE HALL:  So that would be assigned that number.

21             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you.

22        Q.   [Interpretation] Could we please have a look at document tab 46.

23     That is your footnote 326, paragraph 2.  And the document is 1D170.

24             Since this document is part of your report, sir, could you please

25     give us your comment.  Let us see who signed it.  That is on page 2.  And

Page 20066

 1     let us see the date.  And could you please give us your brief comment.

 2        A.   This is a document, or, rather, decision on establishing the

 3     Territorial Defence of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an

 4     armed force.  And there is also the accompanying decision on declaring a

 5     state of imminent threat of war.  It was taken by Minister Bogdan Subotic

 6     on the 16th of April, 1992.  It was sent to the autonomous region and the

 7     Serb autonomous districts or regions in the territory of the

 8     Serb Republic of BH.

 9             I used the document in paragraph 284, as you can see, right, from

10     the footnote.

11        Q.   Thank you.  I would now like to focus on sub-item 2, the

12     decentralisation of the MUP, on page 40 of your report.  Paragraphs 109

13     through 124.

14             The document is under paragraph 24 [as interpreted] and your

15     footnote is number 13.  The document itself is 1D78.  Could you please

16     comment.

17        A.   This is an instruction which is the result of the collegium of

18     the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina held on the 1st of April, 1992.  At that

19     collegium meeting, as we can see from the text, the decentralisation of

20     the MUP was discussed in accordance with the last round of talks in the

21     framework of the Cutileiro Plan.  I must also mention the

22     Sarajevo Agreement, which was reached a few days earlier.  The overall

23     context was the plan of the structuring of the state of BH, and three

24     constituent units were to be created and with their respective public

25     administration bodies, including the -- a MUP.

Page 20067

 1             So this is a -- this is an instruction from the joint collegium

 2     of the MUP.

 3        Q.   Since you dealt with this, tell me if that plan, known as the

 4     Cutileiro Plan, actually, the plan of the EU, and including the

 5     Sarajevo Agreement, did it include the establishment of ministries of the

 6     interior in their respective entities and a joint MUP or was there a

 7     different approach?

 8        A.   One of the articles of the Sarajevo Agreement envisaged that each

 9     constituent unit was entitled to set up its own Ministry of the Interior.

10     And probably at the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina, some line ministries

11     were joint, among them the Ministry of the Interior.  So there was one

12     ministry at the top, and below it, the units had their respective

13     ministries.

14        Q.   Sir, in the second paragraph of this document on the screen, some

15     names are listed, namely, those present at this MUP collegium, the

16     collegium of the MUP of the Socialist Republic of BH held on the

17     1st of April, 1992.

18             I can see that Minister Alija Delimustafic is not listed here.

19     Could you comment on that.

20        A.   Well, I can't comment, but I see that the deputy minister was

21     present and all highest-ranking officials who are the proper members of

22     the collegium of the MUP, which means those that were appointed by the

23     three parties.  There's the under-secretary for the SDB, the

24     assistant minister for the police, and other officials.  So a possible

25     comment of mine would be that, having a collegium session even without

Page 20068

 1     the presence of the minister himself, who probably had some other urgent

 2     commitments elsewhere, does not diminish the significance of this

 3     document because of all -- because all other officials were present,

 4     representatives of all three parties that made up the highest ranking --

 5     or the highest echelon of officials in the ministry.

 6        Q.   Tell me, Mr. Bajagic, this document envisaged the composition and

 7     remit of the expert collegium of the MUP, doesn't it?

 8        A.   That -- well, that follows from the Law on the Interior of the

 9     SRBH and the rule-book on the internal organisation of the ministry.  I

10     believe that rule-book was adopted in 1994, that single MUP of

11     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

13             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   I'm about to show you this bylaw, the rule-book, tab 138.  Your

15     footnote is 168.  And the exhibit number is P850.

16             No, this isn't it.  P850.  65 ter 02668.  65 ter list of the OTP.

17             Sir, is this the rule-book you spoke about?

18        A.   Yes, this is it.

19        Q.   Since which year was this rule-book in use; do you know?

20        A.   We see that the date here is from the 29th of January, 1990.

21        Q.   Was this rule-book in use in 1992?

22        A.   Yes.  The internal organisation of the MUP of the Serb Republic

23     of BH was made pursuant to this rule-book, until a new rule-book was

24     adopted.  That is, until the adoption of the rule-book on the internal

25     organisation of the MUP of the Serb Republic of BH throughout 1992, this

Page 20069

 1     one was in force.

 2        Q.   Let us sum up then.  This is the rule-book on the internal

 3     organisation of the Ministry of the Interior, which at the time was

 4     called Republican Secretariat of the Socialist Republic of

 5     Bosnia-Herzegovina, and you say that it was in force since

 6     29 January 1990?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Was this rule-book used in the MUP of the Socialist Republic of

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina between the 29th of January, 1990, and April 1992?

10        A.   Yes.  This was a rule-book that regulated the internal

11     organisation of the Secretariat of the Interior, which later became the

12     MUP, of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

13        Q.   You told us already that this same rule-book was also in use in

14     the MUP of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina until the adoption of

15     the rule-book of the SRBH.  Tell us, when was the latter, the rule-book

16     of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, adopted?

17        A.   It was adopted in the first quarter of 1993.  I think it was late

18     April or --

19             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction late March or early

20     April.

21        A.   I'm not sure.  Which means that this rule-book was in force.  And

22     throughout 1992, that is, during the establishment of the organisational

23     structure of the MUP of the Serb Republic of BH, was governed by its

24     provisions.  The Constitution of the Serb Republic stipulates that all

25     laws and regulations that are not in direct contradiction of the

Page 20070

 1     Constitution will remain in force, irrespective if we're -- whether we're

 2     speaking about laws or bylaws or subordinate legislation.

 3        Q.   Please make another comment for us.  Page 287, ERN 0113-7325.  In

 4     the header of your copy, you will find page number 284.

 5             Paragraph 126, criminal logs.

 6        A.   Yes.

 7             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I don't know if there is a

 8     translation of this OTP document.  I'm not sure there is one.

 9        Q.   All right.  Can you explain what we see in items 126, 127, 128,

10     129, and 130.  They deal with various types of logs.  Could you list them

11     for us and explain what kind of logs they are.

12        A.   They are operative log-books of the Ministry of the Interior;

13     that is, criminal, operative, and investigative, as well as

14     misdemeanours.

15        Q.   Slowly, please.  Please list for us every log-book and tell us to

16     which line of work it is linked.

17        A.   The first one is the criminal log-book.  It is a log-book based

18     on the -- on the decisions of domestic and foreign courts.  That is,

19     persons are entered here who are convicted by courts.

20        Q.   This is a widely known as the KE log-book.

21        A.   Yes.  And the ministry --

22        Q.   Mr. Bajagic, please make a pause between question and answer.

23     I'm trying to clarify things.  In this way, we can create an even greater

24     problem in the transcript.

25             So this is -- what -- what is this called in the police jargon?

Page 20071

 1        A.   You have just said it, the KE.

 2        Q.   Very well.  Thank you.  Let's proceed.

 3        A.   The following log-books are operative crime investigation

 4     log-books, and I don't think there's a need for me to list them all.

 5             The first log-book, the criminal log-book, shows the

 6     administrative function of the ministry and its wide remit.

 7             The third log-book is the operative MOS evidence.  Just like the

 8     operative and the criminal investigation log-book, it has to do with the

 9     crime investigation service of the ministry and other connected units.

10             The following log-book is the misdemeanours log-book.  It's on

11     the following page.  Where the Ministry of the Interior keeps this

12     log-book based on the decisions of misdemeanour courts, with the

13     perpetrators of those misdemeanours.

14             And, finally, there's the criminal register.  This is a register

15     kept by the Ministry of Interior as a summary of all lines of work.  That

16     is, the drafting of criminal complaints against known and unknown

17     perpetrators of crimes.  And then there are various ways of keeping

18     registers, by persons, by types of criminal offences, and so on.  And we

19     needn't go into that.  So this is the last type of register mentioned in

20     this rule-book.

21        Q.   Thank you.  And what's the abbreviated name of that register in

22     the police jargon?

23        A.   Well, criminal register.  I don't know.  I can't remember any

24     special abbreviated name.

25        Q.   If I say KU register.

Page 20072

 1        A.   Yes, KU, K-U.  These are the initial letters.  And the one under

 2     item 127 was usually called OE in police jargon.

 3        Q.   Let us see page 0113-7510.  In the header, you can see page

 4     reference 469.  And it refers to the professional collegium of the

 5     republican secretary.

 6             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm being informed that this can be found on the

 7     243rd page of the English text.  In Serbian, the page number could be

 8     472.  As I said, the ERN is E0113-7510.  This is it.  I'm told that in

 9     English the page number is 243.

10        Q.   Please give us a short review about this professional collegium

11     of the republican secretary.  First of all, is it the same as the

12     professional collegium of the MUP?  And who are the members?  And which

13     matters does this body deal with?

14        A.   According to these rules, and according to other rules as well,

15     the professional collegium of the republican secretary is the same as the

16     professional collegium of the minister of the interior.  It's just a

17     question of changing the name of the ministry.

18             Professional collegiums are always composed of the top

19     professionals of the ministry.  The minister is the word I'm going to use

20     now.  So it's the minister, the assistant ministers, the heads of the key

21     departments, lines of work, heads of sectors, because at that time, as

22     well, there were two basic sectors within the ministry, one for public

23     security, and the other one for state security.

24             Sometimes these meetings can be attended by other top personnel

25     from the ministry, depending on the agenda.  At any rate, this is the

Page 20073

 1     highest professional body, and these are the top officials anyway, if we

 2     look at the composition of the body.

 3             If we look at the questions that they deal with, it has to do

 4     with the overall policy of the Ministry of the Interior.  Questions

 5     related to the implementation of the basic guide-lines provided by the

 6     top state authorities, questions related to the strategy and tasks from

 7     the line of work of the ministry.  Of course, organisational matters as

 8     well.  Then questions involving the active participation of the ministry

 9     in providing draft laws, bills, as well as internal documents that are

10     only drafted by the ministry, and many other questions.  We can see that

11     here.  I don't have to go into all of it.

12        Q.   Yes, the document is self-explanatory, isn't it?

13             Tell me, in your opinion, the previous document that we saw,

14     dated the 1st of April, 1992, the minutes from the collegium, in your

15     opinion does that belong to questions that are discussed by the collegium

16     of the minister of the interior on the basis of these rules?

17        A.   Yes.  All the items on the agenda of the collegium meeting of the

18     1st of April, 1992, are questions that the professional collegium of the

19     Ministry of the Interior should deal with.

20        Q.   Thank you.  I'm going to show you another document.  However,

21     before that, let me ask you:  In your opinion, such a record, or, rather,

22     such communication from the collegium meeting of the 1st of April which

23     was sent to all, as far as we can see, including all centres, all public

24     security stations, and the entire top personnel of both ministries, in

25     your view could this document have been sent from the Ministry of the

Page 20074

 1     Interior without the agreement or knowledge of the top personnel of that

 2     ministry?

 3        A.   Well, that's impossible.  It's impossible for a document of such

 4     significance -- and it was a vital issue that was discussed at that

 5     collegium meeting, namely, the future functioning of the entire field of

 6     the interior in Bosnia-Herzegovina as such.  So we're not only talking

 7     about the ministry itself.  That kind of document could not have left the

 8     ministry headquarters without the knowledge of the top officials.  The

 9     fact that the deputy minister is there and all the other highest

10     officials were there, all of the people comprising this professional

11     collegium on the basis of the rules, indicates that when this document

12     was sent, it meant that the facts referred to in this document were

13     actually accepted by all persons present at that meeting.  We do see that

14     the minister was not present at the meeting, but it is impossible to

15     assume that the minister did not know about the content of this meeting

16     because it was attended by his deputy and other top personnel of the

17     ministry.

18        Q.   I would like to show you tab 42, your footnote 206.  This is

19     document 1D138.

20             Since you cited this document in your report - that's in

21     paragraph 169 - could you please give us a brief comment?  We have four

22     minutes left today.

23        A.   The document I see here is a dispatch sent from the ministry

24     headquarters, and it was sent by Alija Delimustafic, minister of the

25     interior.  And in this document, everything that is contained in the

Page 20075

 1     document of the 1st of April is categorically refuted.  He is completely

 2     denying the fact that this collegium was held at all and that certain

 3     conclusions had been reached.  And, specifically, this document says --

 4     or, rather, he assesses that there was pressure and blackmail, and he is

 5     also saying that there were declarations of loyalty that were made.  It

 6     is a denial issued nine days later by the minister of the interior, and

 7     it has to do with the document that had been sent nine days before that.

 8     That's my comment.

 9        Q.   Now we go back to the question of the methodology of conclusions.

10     We have discussed that already.

11             So, in this case, we have two documents that are opposites.  On

12     the one hand, we have the record of the collegium meeting; and, on the

13     other, this document, dated the 10th of April, which de facto denies

14     everything that is stated in the previous document dated the

15     1st of April.

16             On which basis do you draw your conclusions, the ones that you

17     refer to here in paragraphs 169, 170, and - how should I put this? - what

18     is the methodology that you used for drawing these conclusions?  Thank

19     you.

20        A.   The instruction on information - that is what the dispatch is

21     called - of the 1st of April, 1992, is the result of that collegium

22     meeting, and it is based on the Sarajevo Agreement, on a

23     Bosnia-Herzegovina consisting of three constituent units and the right of

24     these constituent units to have their own Ministries of the Interior.  So

25     that document is based on the Cutileiro Plan, the Sarajevo Agreement, and

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 1     accepting the fact that all persons present at that collegium meeting

 2     accept as a fact that this agreement had been reached in Sarajevo.  That

 3     is what we have on the one hand.  It is my assessment that it has a

 4     particular, specific weight.  On the other hand, this is a dispatch of

 5     the minister of the interior, so it is the minister.  He knew of the fact

 6     that the Sarajevo Agreement had been reached and that a collegium meeting

 7     had been held, but in this dispatch he is denying certain things that had

 8     started happening on the ground on the basis of the instructions provided

 9     in this dispatch sent on 1st of April, 1992.

10             If we are talking about this on scales, as it were, I don't think

11     that this dispatch has the same weight that the previous document has,

12     and that is why I draw the conclusions that are referred to in the

13     relevant paragraphs.

14        Q.   I see the time.  Thank you.

15             MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I believe that it

16     would be convenient if we would adjourn for the day.

17             Thank you, Mr. Bajagic.

18             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you, Mr. Zecevic.

19             Mr. Bajagic, we are about to take the first adjournment for the

20     day in the course of your testimony, which you would have gathered, from

21     what Judge Delvoie said at the beginning, is going to go over several

22     days.  You, having testified before this Tribunal previously, I'm

23     reminding you of the fact that having been sworn as a witness, you cannot

24     have any communication with counsel from either side until at the

25     conclusion of your testimony you are released by the Court.  And,

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 1     furthermore, in such conversations that you may with other persons, you

 2     cannot discuss your testimony.

 3             So we rise for the day, and we will resume in this courtroom

 4     tomorrow morning at 9.00.

 5                           [The witness stands down]

 6                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,

 7                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 3rd day

 8                           of May, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.

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