1 Monday, 2 May 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
6 everyone in and around the courtroom.
7 This is case IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and
8 Stojan Zupljanin.
9 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
10 Good morning to everyone. And welcome back for what we expect
11 will be an uninterrupted run until the summer recess.
12 May we have the appearances, please.
13 MR. HANNIS: Good morning, Your Honour. For the Office of the
14 Prosecutor, I'm Tom Hannis, with Joanna Korner, Belinda Pidwell, and
15 Crispian Smith.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic,
17 Slobodan Cvijetic, Eugene O'Sullivan, and Ms. Tatjana Savic appearing for
18 Stanisic Defence this morning.
19 MR. KRGOVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Dragan Krgovic and
20 Aleksandar Aleksic appearing for Zupljanin Defence.
21 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
22 Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, there is a matter, Your Honour, that I wish
24 to raise this morning.
25 You will -- you're probably aware I sent an e-mail yesterday
1 morning, notifying the -- our friends from the Office of the Prosecutor
2 and the Trial Chamber of the situation. As I explained everything in
3 the -- in that particular mail, I will just shortly review the contents
4 of it.
5 You will remember, Your Honours, that on two occasions in April,
6 on April 11 and April 14, I first agreed to provide the Trial Chamber and
7 the parties with all the statements made by our witnesses. At that
8 point, and on one other occasion, I informed the Trial Chamber that
9 except for the statement of Nikola Milanovic there are no other
10 statements or investigator's notes or records of interview or
11 tape-recorded interviews of our witnesses. It is with a sincere regret
12 that I must now inform you that the representations that I made in court
13 were incorrect. Namely, we have found one statement and three records of
14 the witness interview.
15 The documents have been disclosed yesterday, one -- the moment
16 when we found these -- these documents, we sent them for translations,
17 and one of the -- one of the records of interview has been translated
18 already and has been filed -- has been filed with the Office of the
19 Prosecutor and a copy to the Trial Chamber. The other three, one
20 statement and two records of the interview, are in the process of
21 translation and we are sure that it will be translated in the course of
22 this week.
23 Your Honours, I -- I trust you will understand that I accept full
24 responsibility, and, again, I offer my sincere apologies to the
25 Trial Chamber and Office of the Prosecutor. This confusion and
1 miscommunication on my part was not at all intended to mislead either the
2 Trial Chamber or the Office of the Prosecutor.
3 That is -- that is what I had to inform the Trial Chamber about.
4 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you. Mr. Zecevic.
5 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes.
6 JUDGE HARHOFF: Please forgive me for being unaware of the mail
7 that you have sent to us at this point. I hadn't seen those statements
8 or interviews so my question to you at this point is: To whom were these
9 statements given and -- or who took the interviews with those witnesses?
10 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, I -- I sent the mail yesterday morning with
11 my letter to the Office of the Prosecutor. I copied the letter to the
12 Trial Chamber, together with the -- with all the records of the
13 interviews and the statement which we found in our records.
14 The records of the interview were done by Mr. -- my co-counsel
15 Mr. Slobodan Cvijetic, and the statement was given by Mr. Drano Vlaco.
16 And the other three are Witness Orasanin, Bjelosevic, and Macar.
17 JUDGE HARHOFF: And to whom were these statements given?
18 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, those were the records of the interviews
19 conducted between the counsel for the Defence and the witnesses.
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you. I understood. Thanks.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. So the next step in this would the
23 completion of the translations.
24 MR. ZECEVIC: That is correct, Your Honours. We sent it for
25 translation and I'm pretty sure that it will be this week.
1 JUDGE HALL: Thanks. Are there any other preliminary matters?
2 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Yes, Your Honour, there's one from our side.
3 This -- I'd like to make a submission in addition to the oral
4 submissions that were made on the 13th and 14th of April; that's the
5 first and second day of the Bjelosevic testimony.
6 On the 13th, Mr. Zecevic made an oral application, and there's no
7 written submission, an oral application concerning Rule 66(B), where we
8 said that there had been a violation of Rule 66(B) in relation to
9 Bjelosevic. That was on the first day of his testimony.
10 The next day, at the beginning of the session, the 14th,
11 Ms. Korner replied orally, and at that time she acknowledged there had
12 been violations of Rule 66(B). The only point I wish to make is that we
13 did not specifically address what we considered to be the appropriate
14 remedy for that violation. And that's what I'll do right now.
15 We say that because of the non-compliance with Rule 66(B), the --
16 Mr. Stanisic did not receive the requested material prior to the
17 testimony of Bjelosevic. We say that Rule 66(B) is tied to
18 Article 21(4)(b), which is the right enshrined in the Statute to have
19 adequate time and facilities to prepare the Defence. We say that the
20 appropriate remedy would be to preclude the Prosecution from using these
21 documents during its cross-examination of Bjelosevic. We're not
22 entitled -- we were precluded from having them prior to his testimony and
23 we say that as a result of the non-compliance with 66(B), the Prosecution
24 should not be allowed to use them during their cross-examination of
1 Thank you.
2 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, Mr. Zecevic informed us in advance
3 this was going to be the application this morning.
4 Your Honours, we resist it. Your Honours may recall that
5 although we did agree that we had been specifically asked for documents
6 authored by Mr. Bjelosevic, we'd actually missed some. But as
7 Your Honours will recall, when we -- when I went through the documents on
8 the Thursday, the 14th of April, most, if not all, appeared on the
9 Defence's list of documents because they themselves had been provided
10 with the documents by Mr. Bjelosevic. So, at the moment, Your Honours,
11 we say that there's no prejudice to the Defence for this lapse, which we
12 admit, on our parts, in failing to discover the documents.
13 We also say that it is an excessive sanction that we should be
14 precluded from using any of these documents in cross-examination. But,
15 in any event, it may well be that Your Honours will find this difficult,
16 as I will, to rule upon this - not that I will be ruling, Your Honours'
17 ruling, but my only -- application we make - without being provided of a
18 list of documents that the Defence say we should not be allowed to use in
19 cross-examination. And it may be that we'll have to revisit this matter
20 perhaps before Mr. Bjelosevic returns on the 16th of May.
21 So, Your Honours, that's all that I want to say on that matter at
22 the moment.
23 Your Honours, while I'm on my feet, can I, however, mention
24 something else. I don't know whether Your Honours have seen the motion
25 that the Defence filed saying that we should be compelled to comply with
1 Rule 66(B). They filed a motion on the 28th of April which, I think, was
2 Thursday. Yes. Thursday of last week. Having earlier sent us a request
3 which they put with the motion in an annex, including our response and a
4 much, much earlier request dating back to October of 2009.
5 We responded on the same day, that is, last Thursday, the 28th,
6 saying we had made our position clear in our response but also adding in
7 our response the original reply to the first motion -- not the first
8 motion, the -- one of the first letters they filed. There has been other
9 requests made since then but that was the major one.
10 However, Your Honours, it seems to me, I'm afraid, that this is
11 one that Your Honours will have to deal with fairly quickly, because
12 effectively what we say is that this is not a proper request under 66(B);
13 this is merely an attempt to preclude the Prosecution from, as it were,
14 keeping its powder dry, if you like, until, as the Court has ordered, we
15 should reveal what documents we're going to use for cross-examination
16 after the witness has gone into the witness box. But that's all I want
17 to say about that matter.
18 But can we ask that Your Honours rule fairly quickly because
19 obviously this is going to affect upcoming witnesses quite dramatically.
20 And finally, Your Honours, again the Defence have filed an
21 application either for reconsideration or for leave to appeal
22 Your Honours's ruling in respect of Dr. Nielsen. As Your Honours know,
23 that was all filed confidentially. But I'm raising it now. It may be
24 that again that's something else that ought to be dealt with with some
25 expedition and it may affect the present witness and/or cross-examination
1 of that witness.
2 So those are the matters that we want to raise this morning.
3 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Ms. Korner. If I may return to the first
4 matter: Do I understand your position to be that you are requesting that
5 the motion made by Mr. O'Sullivan this morning be fleshed out in order
6 for you to be in a position to - I don't want to use the word
7 "intelligently," but that's the only word that comes to mind - respond to
9 MS. KORNER: Well, Your Honours, it's not -- I don't know what --
10 it's not really a motion. It's effectively -- it's adding to what was
11 said before, namely that they, the Defence, assert that Your Honours
12 should punish the Prosecution by preventing use of these documents in --
13 in cross-examination. We say at the moment we'd like a list of the
14 documents they say we are precluded from using in cross-examination.
15 That would enable us to see which of them that we know to be in the
16 Defence possession. And in all likelihood because we know that
17 Mr. Bjelosevic gave more to the Defence than has actually been put into
18 their list of documents, because that's effectively what was said. So it
19 may well be that they've got all the documents and had all the documents
20 in any event in advance. So I, -- in effect, I'm asking the Defence not
21 only to indicate which documents, and which documents they say they never
22 had, and how they are prejudiced by those documents.
23 JUDGE HALL: Yes, thank you.
24 So there are obviously a number of matters which are going to
25 engage our attention out of court in order -- especially the two matters
1 you've indicated are -- have some urgency to them. Yes, thanks.
2 So could we have the next witness escorted in, please.
3 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, Your Honour. Our next witness is
4 Professor Bajagic, our police expert.
5 MS. KORNER: While we're waiting, can I just make an inquiry
6 through Your Honours. Mr. Bjelosevic was supposed to have been handing
7 over documents to VWS. Do we have any update on whether that's happened?
8 Because, if not, it should happen fairly quickly.
9 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
10 [The witness entered court]
11 JUDGE HALL: Yes. Thank you. The Court Officer informs us that
12 those documents have not yet been returned to -- handed over to VWS, but
13 there is a process which the -- which has been --
14 MS. KORNER: [Overlapping speakers] ... [Microphone not activated]
15 JUDGE HALL: They're being handed over to the witness today.
16 There is a --
17 MS. KORNER: [Overlapping speakers] ...
18 JUDGE HALL: -- that we had refined after the last adjournment.
19 MS. KORNER: Can we expect them fairly soon once they're handed
20 over, because obviously we've got to go through them. Thank you.
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: Good morning, Mr. Bajagic. First of all, do you
22 hear me in a language that you can understand?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
24 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you for coming to the Tribunal to give your
1 You are about to give, to read, the solemn declaration by which
2 witnesses commit themselves to tell the truth. I need to point out that
3 the solemn declaration that you are about to make does expose you to the
4 penalty of perjury, should you give misleading or untruthful evidence to
5 this Tribunal.
6 Now, then, would you please be kind enough to read aloud the
7 solemn declaration.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I solemnly
9 declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
11 WITNESS: MLADEN BAJAGIC
12 [Witness answered through interpreter]
13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you, sir. You may be seated.
14 Could we begin by asking you to state your full name and your
15 date and place of birth, please.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am Mladen Bajagic. I was born on
17 the 5th of April, 1962, in Sarajevo.
18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much. And what is your ethnicity?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm a Serb.
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Your profession today?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Currently I work as professor at
22 the Academy of Criminal Science and Policing in Belgrade.
23 JUDGE DELVOIE: And what was your occupation in 1992?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In 1992, since I was born in
25 Sarajevo, from the beginning of the war I was member of the
1 National Security Service in the Republika Srpska.
2 JUDGE DELVOIE: Is this your first testimony before this Tribunal
3 or have you given testimony before another Tribunal in your country about
4 the -- the events in 1992?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is my second appearance before
6 this Tribunal. I testified in the Popovic et al. case as an expert
7 witness. That was some two, two and a half years ago. Outside this
8 Tribunal, I never testified about anything that happened during the war
9 in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you. So then I only have to remind you of
11 the proceedings before this Tribunal since you know about them. You have
12 been called as a expert witness by the Defence of Mr. Stanisic.
13 Mr. Zecevic who is sitting on your left, sitting on your left-hand side,
14 and he has asked for 15 hours to do his examination-in-chief. After
15 that, Mr. Krgovic, the Defence of Mr. Zupljanin, sitting on your left as
16 well, will cross-examine you for --
17 How many time, Mr. Krgovic?
18 MR. KRGOVIC: Your Honour, our estimate is two hours.
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: For two hours, more or less. And after that
20 there is the cross-examination of the Office of the Prosecutor, sitting
21 on your right-hand side, and they ask for 15 hours as well.
22 After that, and in the mean time, Judges can -- no, after the
23 cross-examination we give the floor back to Mr. Zecevic for final
24 questions eventually, and after that, and in between, the Judges can ask
25 questions as well.
1 As a practical matter, for recordings, et cetera, we sit in
2 sessions of 90 minutes with each time 20 minutes' break, and morning
3 sessions end at a quater to 2.00.
4 That's all for the moment. So I'll give the floor to --
5 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour.
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: Just one more thing --
7 MR. HANNIS: If I may, when we filed our notice concerning this
8 witness testifying as an expert, we indicated that we had certain
9 objections as to his expertise in the scope of his testimony.
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: That's what I'm coming to.
11 MR. HANNIS: Okay.
12 JUDGE DELVOIE: Now a Ruling on that matter: The Trial Chamber
13 finds that Mladen Bajagic is properly characterised as an expert within
14 the meaning of Rule 94 bis and the jurisprudence of the Tribunal. The
15 Tribunal, however, takes note of the Prosecution's 94 bis B notice filed
16 on the 19th of April, 2011, whereby the Prosecution submitted that it
17 does not accept Mladen Bajagic's expertise report. In accordance with
18 the practice in -- in the instant case, the Trial Chamber will make a
19 decision on the admission into evidence of Mladen Bajagic report at the
20 end of this testimony.
21 Mr. Zecevic.
22 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
23 Examination by Mr. Zecevic:
24 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Bajagic.
25 Can you hear me? I said good morning.
1 A. Good morning. Yes, I hear you well.
2 Q. Mr. Bajagic, you stated some basic information when you were
3 asked by the Trial Chamber. I would now like to ask you to give some
4 more detailed information about your training and the scholarly work you
5 are engaged in currently.
6 A. As I said, I was born in Sarajevo on the 5th of April, 1962. In
7 Sarajevo, I graduated from primary and secondary school, "Gymnasija," and
8 the Faculty of Political Science from which I graduated in 1988.
9 After that, I did some work in journalism and I worked also on
10 the socio-political communities that were then in existence in the old
11 political system in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but not fully professionally.
12 And as for my scholarly career: From 1996 to 2000, I followed a
13 master's course at the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade. And
14 later on I got my Ph.D. from the same faculty in Belgrade, in
15 international relations, and thereby I'm now entitled to the title of
17 From the beginning of my academic career, I have worked at the
18 police academy and the post-secondary school of the interior in Belgrade.
19 As a result of the process of integration, the Academy of
20 Criminal Science and Policing was founded, and I work there at the
22 Q. Excuse me, I apologise. I think that it isn't clearly recorded
23 what you are talking about.
24 Could you please repeat which two institutions you worked for
25 that were later merged. Please explain slowly.
1 A. The first institution where I worked as an assistant professor
2 was the Police Academy of Belgrade. At the post-secondary school of the
3 interior, I also worked as lecturer, senior lecturer, and professor.
4 These two institutions were integrated a few years ago in -- as part of
5 the Bologna Process and were merged into the Academy of Criminal Science
6 and Policing. I worked there -- I worked there as a lecturer, and
7 currently I'm a extraordinary professor, teaching several courses.
8 Q. Excuse me, please, I see that Mr. Hannis wants to say something.
9 MR. HANNIS: I just wanted to bring to Mr. Zecevic's attention
10 the transcript at line -- at page 12, line 3. I think it's an error, and
11 he may want to correct that.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Mr. Hannis.
13 Q. [Interpretation] Sir, where did you get your Ph.D., from which
14 faculty or institution, and when exactly was that?
15 A. I got my Ph.D. at the Faculty of Political Science, the
16 International Relations Department, and I specialised in security
17 sciences in 2006.
18 Q. Could you now please explain --
19 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Could you now please
20 continue to explain which courses you teach now.
21 A. The institutions that I mentioned, two of them, and the political
22 police academy, are organisations where I covered many areas and taught a
23 number of courses. What I'm covering currently are the following areas.
24 They are -- or, rather, at the basic level academic studies, fourth year,
25 I teach two courses: The first one is the methodology of intelligence
1 work; and the other, international security.
2 At the master's studies level, within the same institution, I
3 teach terrorism and political violence. And finally, at the academic
4 specialist studies level, I teach three courses: These three are
5 intelligence and counter-intelligence aspects of terrorism and
6 anti-terrorism; the second is comparative models of the protection of
7 persons and property; and finally, the third, security systems.
8 Before these courses, within the first two institutions I
9 mentioned, I taught the following courses: basics of security; the system
10 of state or national security. And that is what's important for the
11 institutions where I worked permanently and where I still work. As is
12 the custom in the academic community, I have repeatedly held lectures as
13 a guest professor and an engaged professor, based on a work contract, and
14 in that capacity I have also taught at other institutions of higher
16 One of the most important courses I have taught there is security
17 management and another being security systems.
18 I think that would be it, in a nutshell.
19 Q. Thank you, Mr. Bajagic. Could you briefly mention whether you
20 have written any monographies or other works and which ones are the most
21 significant you have written?
22 A. As for my career so far, my career as a professor, that is, I
23 have published two textbooks and five monographs and between 90 and
24 100 papers, both home and abroad. These papers were published in
25 scholarly journals or in different publications that were the result of
1 different international conferences. Perhaps I could single out a few of
2 these books.
3 As for textbooks, I published two of them: One is entitled, "The
4 Fundamentals of Security" and "The Methodology of Intelligence."
5 As for monographs, I have published the following: "The Role of
6 the Intelligence Community in the Foreign Policy of the United States of
7 America." I think that the date was 2004, but it doesn't really matter,
8 the date, I mean. Then, "The Security of the World from a Secret to a
9 Public Nature." So that is the second title. And the last one is:
10 "Espionage in the 21st Century: Contemporary Intelligence and Security
11 Systems." That is what I can say as far as textbooks and monographs are
13 As for individual papers, there were a great deal of them. If I
14 really need to focus on that, I would have to give it an extra thought.
15 Q. No, it's not necessary. Thank you. This will do.
16 Mr. Bajagic, tell me, did you attend any special courses and, if
17 so, which courses were they and who organised them?
18 A. Already in the year 2000 and afterwards, the institutions where I
19 worked developed a truly fruitful cooperation with many international
20 institutions, especially the OSCE. The OSCE organised the most important
21 courses that I attended, along with other colleagues, lecturers from
22 institutions of higher learning. I attended a three-month course that
23 was entitled "Training the Trainers," and it had to do with police work.
24 And then there was yet another course that took place in
25 Basdorf in Germany, and that was a sequel to that first course. And as a
1 result of that, we received certificates, certifying that we could train
2 trainers; namely, that we were thereby specialised to train those who
3 trained police forces. Of course, there were also courses organised by
4 the International Red Cross, but I have singled out the most important
5 courses I attended.
6 Q. You mentioned the Red Cross. Did you attend any course related
7 to international humanitarian law?
8 A. I do apologise for not having stated that specifically. It was
9 precisely that course that was organised by the International Red Cross
10 in Belgrade.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 A. You're welcome.
13 Q. Mr. Bajagic, you do have your report there, don't you, the report
14 that you have prepared for this case?
15 A. Yes, I have it. It's here.
16 Q. Tell me, Mr. Bajagic, this report that is in front of you, that
17 is entitled, "The Ministry of the Interior of Republika Srpska,
18 Beginnings, Purview, Jurisdiction, Organisation, and Control, 1990 to
19 1993," who prepared this report? Who's the author of this report?
20 A. Of course, I am the author of this report.
21 Q. Tell me, Mr. Bajagic, did you prepare this report all by yourself
22 in its entirety?
23 A. Yes, yes. I authored the entire report.
24 Q. Mr. Bajagic, who assigned this task to you? Who gave you the
25 topic for this report?
1 A. As for this task -- or, rather, the first tentative topic for
2 this report was given to me by the Defence team of Mr. Stanisic, That is
3 to say, yourself and your colleagues.
4 Q. Tell me, sir, in addition to the request and the topic itself
5 that was provided to you by the Defence, what else did you receive from
6 the Defence of Mr. Stanisic? What other documents?
7 A. The Defence team provided me with the general topic that I was
8 supposed to investigate. And I can say that the title, as you see it
9 here, is a result of my research. Of course, first there is a working
10 title, but it was finally formulated this way towards the very end.
11 As for my topic of research, I received relevant documents on the
12 basis of which I was to write this report. I understand this as raw
13 material for my research work, and that is what I received from the
15 Q. Sir, the report has 494 or 495 footnotes that pertain to the
16 documents that were used when compiling this piece of research. Who
17 selected these documents?
18 A. As I've already said, I received from the Defence team a certain
19 number of documents. And then as I prepared and planned this research
20 project, I categorised the documents. However, in addition to the
21 documents provided to me by the Defence, as I dealt with particular
22 topics that are important for certain parts of this paper, I also made an
23 effort to find certain documents that helped me in writing this report,
24 this expert report, in the best possible way. So, of course, there are
25 many studies and monographs that I referred to and that are listed in the
1 footnotes, many more than provided to me by the Defence originally.
2 Q. Who selected the documents that would be used for your expert
4 A. I received a group of documents, but then I selected the
5 documents for the report myself. For me, this expert report is just like
6 a research project, as far as I'm concerned. So it requires a clear,
7 methodological procedure --
8 Q. I apologise for interrupting, but before we get to methodology
9 and procedures, let us dwell on this particular question now.
10 Mr. Bajagic, did you receive from the Defence the expert report
11 of Professor Nielsen who was a Prosecution expert in this case?
12 A. Yes, I did. As I've already pointed out, I was an expert in this
13 Court before, in a different case, so I already had occasion to read
14 Mr. Nielsen's report, but, yes, I did have it.
15 Q. Mr. Bajagic, were you here for a while when Professor Nielsen
16 testified as a Prosecution expert?
17 A. Yes, I was here and I followed his testimony for a few days. I
18 think it was in December 2009.
19 Q. Thank you. Mr. Bajagic -- or, rather, just a moment, please.
20 Could you please open your report, look at the second page,
21 that's where we see the contents. Just a moment, please, I'll give
22 you -- or, rather, I'll provide a reference for e-court.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] 1D06-2404, page 2.
24 Q. Mr. Bajagic, could you please explain to us what it is that we
25 see before us now. And could you explain the document that we see on the
2 A. These are the detailed contents of this expert report.
3 As you can see, there are a few broad subjects. And finally,
4 there are 12 attachments, annexes. I don't know whether I should explain
5 each and every general subject involved.
6 Q. Yes, if you can explain what they pertain to.
7 A. The first general subject within this expert report is entitled,
8 "Constituting of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
9 Establishment of Organs of State Authority." Then there are a few
10 subheadings such as, "General Characteristics of the Political and
11 State Crisis in BH --"
12 Q. Just a question, please.
13 A. Please go ahead.
14 Q. Can you explain to us why you included this particular item in
15 your expert report.
16 A. Doing research into the establishment or the determination of the
17 remit, organisation, and control of such a complex system as the Ministry
18 of the Interior in the executive branch of government of any country is
19 impossible unless you outline the realistic context, which I did. The
20 Ministry of the Interior is part of the state authorities in the
21 executive branch of government, and with regard to the specific
22 circumstances in which this Ministry of the Interior developed, the one
23 about which I wrote this expert report, namely, the Serbian Republic of
24 BH and its Ministry of the Interior, and also with regard to the
25 political crisis that prevailed then, it was impossible to do research
1 about its organisation, mission, and so on, unless you position it in the
2 broader context, the way I did. That's simply part of my methodology.
3 Q. Thank you. Could you please explain chapter 2.
4 A. You mean the chapter Roman II?
5 Q. Yes.
6 A. It's entitled, "The MUP of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and
7 Herzegovina between 1990 and April 1992."
8 The Ministry of the Interior of the Serb Republic of
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina grew out of the system of this MUP of the
10 Socialist Republic of BH, and the period stated here, from 1990 till
11 1992, has more clearly defined my efforts to describe the way of
12 functioning of the authorities of the Socialist Republic of BH until the
13 well-known events in April 1992. I also went into the reasons for the
14 gradual decentralisation and the coming into being of the Ministry of the
15 Interior of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
16 This is my explanation of the second chapter.
17 Q. Thank you, sir. Please explain the following chapter.
18 A. The following chapter is entitled, "The Functioning of the
19 Ministry of the Interior of the Serb Republic of BH in the Period from
20 April to December 1992." Clearly, this is the basic chapter, the most
21 important one, that comprises broad issues such as the legal framework
22 and the functioning of the Ministry of the Interior in the system of the
23 executive branch of government; namely, the de jure aspect.
24 Of course, we also had to deal with the -- the surreal situation
25 and the organisation of the ministry in 1992. Some issues were more
1 pronounced with regard to the tasks of the ministry, and that's why I
2 tried to describe these issues in a systematic manner.
3 Q. Please explain the following chapter as stated in the contents,
4 and please explain why it is a separate chapter.
5 A. The internal organisation of any ministry of interior, including
6 this one, is the basis upon which it acts within the legal framework that
7 defines its scope.
8 In the legal system in the former SFRY and the countries that
9 emerged subsequently, these matters were always dealt with through the
10 rule-book on the internal organisation of the Ministry of the Interior.
11 This is a separate chapter here because in the relevant period, namely in
12 the first year of its existence as the Ministry of the Interior of the
13 Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, its basic structure was defined by
14 rule-books that were created earlier, that is, in the Socialist Republic
15 of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
16 But then there was an initiative to draft a new rule-book for the
17 Ministry of the Interior of the Serb Republic of BH. That is very
18 important because that rule-book lays down in detail the organisation and
19 the territorial structure of the entire Ministry of the Interior. And
20 the remit of the individual organisational units are defined. There are
21 many significant matters that are dealt with there, and that's why this
22 is a separate chapter.
23 Q. Mr. Bajagic, in your opinion, is it possible to write such a
24 report about the Ministry of the Interior -- or, rather, which rules and
25 regulations are the most important ones for the understanding and clear
1 classification, if I may say, in your opinion?
2 A. When I was explaining the chapter about the internal organisation
3 of the MUP, especially the legal framework, I omitted to say, but I can
4 say it now, that an objective and systematic manner of dealing with
5 matters pertaining to the work of the Ministry of the Interior, it is
6 necessary, always considering the Constitution as the highest legal
7 document of a country, also presenting a number of other pieces of
8 legislation [as interpreted]. And that has been done in this expert
9 report. I'm specifically referring to the Law on the Government, then
10 the Law on Public Administration, the Law on Ministries, and the Law on
11 the Interior. That is the legal framework that was adopted in
12 early 1992, in the Serb Republic of BH.
13 Clearly it is outright impossible to analyse all the provisions
14 of these laws unless we also consider the legislation of the former SFRY,
15 including the Socialist Republic of BH. These are the same laws and
16 regulations that I mentioned when I spoke about the Serb Republic of BH.
17 But because of the specific political and general situation in
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time, it was necessary to go into some
19 provisions of the Law on Defence, the Law on the Armed Forces and, of
20 course, something that constitutes the historic background, the Law on
21 All People's Defence and the Strategy of All People's Defence that were
22 in force for -- in all of the former SFRY.
23 These are the central pieces of legislation that I also consulted
24 because I deem it necessary.
25 Q. Please explain the correlation of -- or, rather, between what you
1 call the Law on the Interior and the rule-book on the internal
2 organisation of the MUP? What is the correlation between these two
3 pieces of legislation?
4 A. The Law on the Interior clearly defines the mission and the
5 vision of the MUP and its scope of work. Naturally, it defines the remit
6 of the ministry, but the law only deals with the organisation of the MUP
7 at a general level. And it's the rule-book, a piece of subordinate
8 legislation, that goes into the details of the structures of the ministry
9 and the remit of the individual organisational units, as well as the
10 rights and duties of these units in accordance with the law.
11 Q. Thank you. Could you please comment on chapter IV of your
13 A. This chapter is entitled, "Disciplinary and Criminal
14 Responsibility of RS MUP Staff in 1992."
15 It was part of my assignment. All rules and regulations and
16 subordinate legislation also deal with these matters that are very
17 important for the functioning of the ministry. This disciplinary and
18 criminal responsibility was here analysed by consulting the Law on the
19 Interior of the Serb Republic, as compared to the rules and regulations
20 that were in force in the socialist republic, and this is the way how I
21 tried to give a brief overview of how members of the ministry could be
22 held -- could be held responsible for their acts or omissions.
23 Q. Thank you. And please give us a short explanation of the
24 annexes. What are they about?
25 A. Working on the individual chapters and the expert report as a
1 whole, I came across some documents I considered extremely important for
2 the understanding of both the Ministry of the Interior and the general
3 context in which it came into being. So as not to overburden the report
4 with footnotes, I considered it much more effective to enclose some
5 documents in the report itself, and I only refer to them in the
6 footnotes. I believe that this -- it is much easier to understand why
7 these documents were enclosed. There's a total of 12 annexes.
8 Q. Please explain to us Annex 12. What does it refer to and why did
9 you include it?
10 A. Annex 12 was created as a result of the Defence's wish from
11 the -- from earlier this year about the task of the -- tasks of the army
12 and the police during the state of the imminent threat of war. And I
13 invested a significant effort to explain some topics that deal with
14 subordination. And then I also had to go into the issues of coordination
15 and acting in coordination, from the point of view of national security,
16 and this is the last annex which I included upon the request of the
17 Defence. All the others I included of my own accord.
18 Q. Very well. Tell us, sir, can you explain which methodology you
19 used in drafting this report? Please explain very briefly. And if you
20 use any technical terms, do explain what they mean.
21 A. Yes, certainly.
22 The methodology of researching social matters or the research
23 methodology in the humanities is unique in the entire world. There's a
24 single methodology.
25 Since the Ministry of the Interior, by definition, is one of the
1 protagonists of national security, with regard to what I said about
2 original documents, the -- setting up such a complex system of public
3 administration required a multi-disciplinary approach. If you do
4 research into such an institution or such a process, political -- which
5 is a political, legal -- and legal phenomenon, and because of that I had
6 to adhere to very strict methodological rules from the very beginning.
7 The first task was the classification of sources, the sources that I had
8 before me. By their subject matter, their nature, their contents, and it
9 was necessary to devise a codex of classification into various sets.
10 As for the methods themselves, you can tell at first sight that
11 this is about a qualitative and quantitative analysis of contents; then
12 analysis and synthesis; induction and deduction; the comparative method,
13 and, of course, this includes the sociological and legal method; and many
14 other techniques that are required to deal with a document
16 In principle, this expert report is the result of -- is -- of a
17 scholarly process, which it, indeed, was. I defined hypotheses; I
18 defined indicators as material indicators of what could be found in the
19 de facto and de jure sets of the individual problems dealt with; and, of
20 course, the well-known logical processes such as proving, disproving,
21 et cetera. Since this is a multi-disciplinary problem, a very wide range
22 of general, basic methods and other methodological techniques were
23 applied in the process of drafting this work.
24 Q. When you say "multi-disciplinary problem," can you briefly
25 explain what you mean?
1 A. Of course. A multi-disciplinary approach to studying the work of
2 the ministry was indispensable because the ministry is part of the
3 executive government, and we are dealing with the legal framework, so
4 that we would see what the de jure situation was. The
5 Ministry of the Interior, as an institution or as a problem that we are
6 studying, has all the characterises of a political, legal, sociological,
7 and any other phenomenon because it is quite simply impossible to view it
8 from a single angle only. It is indispensable to carry out a political
9 analysis as well because you cannot look at it separately. You have to
10 look at it within a political and security-related context within which
11 it developed. That is why I said that this did, indeed, require a
12 multi-disciplinary approach.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: I see the time, and I think it's a proper time that
14 we take the adjournment now. Thank you.
15 JUDGE HALL: Yes. So we take the break and resume in 20 minutes.
16 MS. KORNER: Would Your Honours forgive me if I leave court now.
17 Thank you.
18 [The witness stands down]
19 --- Recess taken at 10.25 a.m.
20 --- On resuming at 10.53 a.m.
21 [The witness takes the stand]
22 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
24 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Bajagic, one more question relating to the
1 Can you explain to us the mechanism on the basis of which
2 scientific conclusions are drawn, and which particular mechanism did you
3 apply in your work?
4 A. Scientific conclusions, or one's views, are created generally on
5 the basis of the problem that you face and the subject that you research.
6 In this particular instance, this was the Ministry of the Interior.
7 In view of the available sources, you do that, and you also use
8 them as indicators, and you apply them to the entire hypothetical
9 framework, from the general to the specific theses, and also the very
10 terms of reference creates also a basis for certain conclusions.
11 Therefore, you have to make cross-reference between various sources about
12 one specific problem that can then lead you to reaching a specific
13 conclusion. And at that you try to reach as high a degree of reliability
14 as possible. And you sometimes have some impressions about the problem,
15 because it is not always possible to arrive at definitive conclusions.
16 Q. Is the drawing of conclusions dependant on, let's say, the volume
17 or the quantity of positive indicators that you receive with respect to a
18 specific problem? Let me be a little bit clearer: Do you arrive at
19 conclusions by taking a whole set of documents relating to a specific
20 topic you determine a certain common denominator, which serves as a basis
21 for your conclusion, or did you apply some different method?
22 A. That is precisely so. Through these process of thinking,
23 proving, and disproving, you eventually arrive at a set of documents that
24 create a common denominator that indicate a specific conclusion. It is
25 impossible to arrive at opinions and views based on a sole decision. Any
1 kind of research in this area you need to have a number of documents in
2 order to arrive at a relevant conclusion.
3 Q. Mr. Bajagic, what is the situation if you have a number of
4 documents confirming one common denominator and then have you another set
5 of documents that disprove it? How do you act in that particular
6 situation with respect to drawing your conclusions?
7 JUDGE HARHOFF: Excuse me for interrupting.
8 Mr. Bajagic, before you go on to answer Mr. Zecevic's question, I
9 think it would be helpful if you could clarify, then, what was, in your
10 view, the common denominator that you found in the studies that you made.
11 You made reference to the possibility of identifying one common
12 denominator in the material that you have analysed. Then Mr. Zecevic
13 then puts it to you the approach that you would take in case you would
14 then find other information that would contradict this common
16 So my question you to, before you go on to answering
17 Mr. Zecevic's question: What was, then, the common denominator that you
18 would base your conclusions on?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I arrived at this common
20 denominator, or a general conclusion, at the very end of my research
21 work. It was impossible for me to determine it at the beginning. I
22 could only work with a general hypothesis and that is that the Ministry
23 of the Interior of the Serbian Republic of BH truly operated in a very
24 difficult period and which constitutes a time-frame and a framework of
25 this expert report. It is simply impossible to give you a common
1 denominator in one sentence only. That is probably a global conclusion
2 that anyone can arrive at, anyone who reads this report.
3 Speaking about two sides, I said that there was a higher or a
4 lesser degree of probability that can help us to make decisions, but if
5 we strike a balance and if you create something through the codex, it is
6 not up to me to give the ultimate judgement. But each individual problem
7 in my expert report cannot be extracted and viewed out of context.
8 There are some indirect facts and indirect problems that are
9 relating to this report, dealt elsewhere, can also guide us towards
10 certain conclusions. Of course, at any rate, if those confirming a
11 hypothesis overweigh the other argument, and, of course, in other cases
12 we can leave some space for people reading the report to reach at an
13 overall conclusion after reading the report.
14 In that sense, I tried to answer the question to you,
15 Your Honours, and to Mr. Zecevic. I hope I was clear enough. If not, I
16 will try to do it better.
17 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you. We do have your report, and we have
18 read it. I was just trying to give you an opportunity to clarify the
19 conclusions that you have made, which are subject to interpretation. But
20 let's see about that.
21 Let's proceed. Back to you, Mr. Zecevic.
22 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
23 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Bajagic, when I asked you about common
24 denominators, I was referring to specific issues that were dealt with.
25 Can you answer this question: Does every specific issue that you
1 addressed in your expert report and on which you provided conclusions was
2 the subject of each process that you just described in each individual
4 A. Yes. I applied the same methodology in every segment of my
5 report, in each chapter, and it -- in the final part of my report. I
6 always took into account all the facts available in the material that I
7 used when drafting this report.
8 Q. Thank you. Let us now turn to the content of your report itself.
9 In chapter I, entitled, "Constituting of the Serbian Republic of
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Establishment of Organs of State Authority," was
11 divided by you into four subsections. Can you summarise what were, in
12 your view, the most important characteristics of the political and state
13 crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina that impacted or that had effect on the
14 subject of your research, i.e., the Ministry of the Serbian Republic of
16 A. If we take a look at the title of chapter I and the four
17 subsections contained therein, one can immediately see that my intention
18 was that I wanted to speak in great detail about the Serbian Ministry of
19 the Interior of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that for that purpose I had to put
20 it into a realistic, social context that prevailed in Bosnia-Herzegovina
21 at the time. As we all know, the general crisis that reigned in the area
22 of the former SFRY was particularly severe in the area of
24 Multi-party elections that were held in Bosnia-Herzegovina had
25 established all three branches of authority in a way which, at least
1 initially, seemed to provide for a possibility to overcome the problems
2 that were faced in other republics. In view of the fact that there were
3 three political parties taking part in the elections and were victorious,
4 and I'm talking about Party of Democratic Action, the
5 Serbian Democratic Party, and the Croatian Democratic Union, and as a
6 result the authority was established in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it
7 impacted the overall situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including all the
8 state organs and their functioning in B and H. Naturally, the
9 then-Ministry of the Interior of the Socialist Republic of
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina found itself in the same context, and we started with
11 problems that were mapped out in this chapter as minor ones, and
12 eventually we reached the main topic, which was the
13 Ministry of the Interior of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
14 Q. When you say that there are problems listed in this chapter, can
15 you tell us briefly, and maybe you can point us to relevant paragraphs in
16 your work, can you tell us which particular problems you had in mind and
17 why do you think that these specific problems were important?
18 A. Bearing in mind the basic characteristics of the political crisis
19 in BH, which is from paragraph 1 through paragraph 14, I believed that
20 the best way would be to analyse the activities of these main political
21 entities in that period and their activities, taking into account all the
22 information that I had in front of me but also by resorting to a broader
23 set of material. The intention was particularly to identify the factors
24 that greatly affected the operation of the Ministry of the Interior of
25 the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time. Through the
1 analysis and research of these problems, many other issues were raised,
2 and it would not have been possible without this first chapter.
3 In spite of the fact that these three parties reached a sort of
4 coalition and inter-party agreement, the available sources indicate,
5 obviously, that on many vital issues the relationships between these
6 entities were at a low level of any sincere cooperation that one might
7 have expected, in view of the coalition that they formed, and that,
8 instead, each one of them made their own moves and their own actions in
9 the context.
10 Now, without going into specifics, I dedicated a number of
11 paragraphs to each of three sides, and I highlighted some of the facts
12 that were of importance in comprehending the operation of the Ministry of
13 the Interior.
14 Q. I have to ask you just to try and speak more slowly for the
15 benefit of our interpreters. Thank you.
16 Now, can you just clarify one sentence that you uttered. You
17 said, on page 31, line 5 and 6, that their cooperation was at a much
18 lower level than one would have expected, in view of their coalition
19 agreement, and that, even contrary to that, each of them made certain
20 moves or embarked on certain actions. And as it is translated here, it
21 says "in the context," but I think you said something different;
22 therefore, my question is: Why were these actions or these moves made by
23 each of these three parties and what was the area that it affected the
24 most? Was it the functioning of the state or something else?
25 A. These moves had serious reflections upon the functioning of the
1 state authorities, the government organs.
2 Q. When you say "reflections," are you using that term in a positive
3 or negative sense? What is the connotation? I mean, if this is
4 reflected on the functioning of the state organs, is it reflected in
5 terms of these government organs functioning well or not?
6 A. This had an adverse affect on the functioning of the state
7 organs, thereby the Ministry of the Interior of the Socialist Republic of
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina in that period of time as well.
9 Q. In your view, these coalition parties, did every one of them
10 actually want to be the leading party or not?
11 A. We have a fact here that -- namely, that all three parties won a
12 certain percentage of the vote, and that is how government was
13 established. However, on the basis of certain documents that I analysed,
14 I got the impression that the Party for Democratic Action, in particular,
15 made an effort to exercise dominant influence, especially in those
16 ministries that are called the Ministries of Force in the jargon, the
17 Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice, and so on, especially
18 the Ministry of Interior.
19 I dealt with that in several paragraphs in particular, and I
20 tried to support it with truly relevant documents as sources that give
21 rise to such statements.
22 Q. Very well. Following the methodology of your work, we come to
23 the activities of one of these protagonists, if I can put it that way,
24 one of the political parties that you spoke about, that is, the SDA, the
25 Party of Democratic Action. And that is from paragraph 14 to 52, if I'm
1 not mistaken.
2 Can you tell us specifically which actions were taken by that
3 protagonist, resulting, in your view, in a certain significance for the
4 relevance of your own research?
5 A. Among others, I observed a few key phenomena as I analysed the
6 activities of the SDA in relation to the functioning of the
7 Ministry of the Interior. Firstly, when analysing certain sources, I
8 came to the conclusion that the Party of Democratic Action showed
9 specific tendencies and took specific action to exercise dominant
10 influence over personnel matters in the Ministry of the Interior in that
11 period, even by violating the intra-party agreement on the distribution
12 of positions within the ministry, starting with the minister and going
13 down to the heads of department.
14 The second conclusion was that they completely neglected the fact
15 that the Ministry of the Interior of the Socialist Republic of
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina had a system of schooling and training in place for
17 decades within its own system. And that, as they interfered in personnel
18 policies directly, they sent many of their party activists to basic
19 training courses in the Republic of Croatia throughout 1991. Later on,
20 they would show up as active members of the MUP and reservists within the
21 MUP already towards the end of 1991.
22 Another problem was the fact that the Party of Democratic Action,
23 although there were already organs established in the field of security
24 in every aspect, already in 1991 they worked on secretly arming a large
25 number of their activists and supporters. That became evident later.
1 This is tellingly demonstrated by the facts that I refer to in my expert
2 report related to the secret establishment of the Patriotic League and
3 other paramilitary formations.
4 And the finale was in the first months of 1992, when the
5 Patriotic League was proclaimed as such, as were other institutions,
6 though, of a military and political narrate, like the military wing of
7 the SDA, the Council for Defence, and so on.
8 Those are some of the basic indicators on the basis of which I
9 drew conclusions that the SDA made efforts even outside the institutions
10 of the system that existed at the time to do something that would
11 significantly assist their political interests.
12 Q. Thank you. Tell me, under item 3, you looked at the activity of
13 the other protagonist, if I can put it that way. That is to say, the
14 Croatian party, the HDZ. That is between paragraphs 52 and 80 of your
16 If you can summarise this for us very briefly, your conclusion on
17 the action taken by this other coalition partner, the HDZ.
18 A. The HDZ also demonstrated certain aspirations. From the point of
19 view of their own interests, they tried to protect the interests of the
20 Croatian community within Herceg-Bosna -- Bosnia-Herzegovina, rather.
21 However, the HDZ, as one of the victorious parties, not only in 1991 but
22 also in 1990, there are some sources that indicate this, it is already
23 then that they started establishing a particular form of organisation
24 that was then called the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. And that is
25 this problem of this third entity, as it were.
1 Although the official date of the establishment of the
2 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna is the 18th of November, 1991, all of
3 1991 and half of 1990 shows that the top people of Herceg-Bosna were
4 corresponding and indicated that it already existed. So this -- this was
5 also compounded by the establishment of the Croatian Defence Council in
6 the areas where they were predominant. And, of course, the HDZ was
7 closely linked to the HDZ of the Republic of Croatia. They had close
8 cooperation with them with regard to all matters.
9 Q. Could you just clarify one particular thing. The Croatian
10 Defence Council, could you explain what this is all about? What is the
11 Croatian Defence Council?
12 A. The Croatian Defence Council is a military organisation, right,
13 of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna which operated as a separate
14 armed force.
15 Q. Thank you. Could you now please explain item 4 to us, the
16 activities of the third coalition partner, the SDS. And can you explain,
17 as you did in the previous two cases, what the most important
18 characteristics involved were that affected your research?
19 A. Like the other two sides, the SDS, as the political
20 representative of the Serb community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, took certain
21 steps in terms of the political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the
22 time. Some of the basic characteristics were as follows: The
23 establishment of the autonomous Krajinas and the autonomous regions,
24 already in 1991, in the Autumn of 1991, as far as I can remember. Of
25 course, already in the beginning of 1992, the Assembly of the Serb People
1 in Bosnia-Herzegovina adopted a declaration, passed the constitution of
2 the Serbia Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, an entire set of laws that
3 will be very important in assessing further developments.
4 While analysing all of these three essential political entities,
5 we can say that all of the parties involved made certain moves on the
6 basis of their own interests. And this situation significantly affected
7 the work of the state organs of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and,
8 ultimately, all the problems that cropped up later.
9 All of this was done more or less in an environment in which,
10 officially, all three political parties were participating in a long-term
11 process of resolving the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina under international
12 auspices. Towards the end of the winter and the beginning of the spring
13 of 1992, this resulted in the adoption of certain documents during the
14 process of the Lisbon Agreement. It was the Cutileiro Agreement, as it
15 has been referred to.
16 Q. All right.
17 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zecevic, are you done with this item on
18 the three -- the activities of the three protagonists, as you call it?
19 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, I was -- I was going further on this, but,
20 please, Your Honours, by all means, pose a question.
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: Professor Bajagic, in this part of your work, the
22 three -- the description of the activities of the three protagonists, as
23 Mr. Zecevic calls it, what strikes me, without even looking to the
24 contents of it, is that for the SDS [sic] your analysis takes 38 pages;
25 for the HDZ, it takes 28 pages; and for the SDS, it takes three pages.
1 Which seems to be rather unbalanced. Is there a logical explanation for
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yes, in the transcript, the SDS is mentioned
5 twice. The first time it's mentioned, it should be "SDA" and not "SDS."
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, of course, the report shows
7 that the activities of the political leaders of the SDA has particularly
8 been focussed on, and then the HDZ, and then the SDS. I was guided by a
9 particular methodology, namely, that the latter part of my report would
10 be dedicated to the activities of the Serbian ministry and thereby the
11 Serb side, so de facto and de jure that would have been the case.
12 Perhaps I did not want to burden my report with well-known facts that had
13 already been dealt with in the expert report of Mr. Nielsen. And I did
14 not want to literally copy certain thing.
15 Despite this lack of balance, if we're speaking of the actual
16 number of pages involved, it is important, at least in my view, that I
17 pointed out that all three parties acted on their own, and that is a
18 position that is one that I'm voicing by way of criticism in my report.
19 And this is in line with what Professor Nielsen said. So it's not that
20 something different would happen in the report; it is only due to these
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
24 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Bajagic, you mentioned -- while you were
25 speaking about the contribution to the creation of the crisis by one of
1 the protagonists, the SDS, you mentioned the establishment of these
2 autonomous regions, and before that, you mentioned the Croatian Community
3 of Herceg-Bosna. So tell us, please, to what extent that type of
4 regional structure affected the functioning of the state and the state
5 organs in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the period from
6 1990 till 1992?
7 A. The very fact that these activities are under way until 1992
8 certainly significantly affect the functioning of the state organs.
9 Probably all state organs functioned difficultly. For an administrative
10 body such as the Ministry of the Interior, this is a special difficulty
11 because that ministry has a specific organisation and hierarchy. And
12 that applies to any country. It's an institution which has a specific
13 remit and area of work.
14 Under such conditions, it is really difficult, when there are
15 inter-party conflicts and a significant inference of politics in their
16 work, to really implement the law and other regulations.
17 Q. Thank you. Let us please take a look at a document. You have
18 these two binders in front of you, and we're interested in the document
19 under tab 27. That's your footnote 71.1. And the document is 1D141.
20 This is a document that is three pages long. Since your footnote
21 is 71.1, please give us a brief explanation what kind of document this
22 is, what it's about, and why you thought it was important to cite it in a
23 footnote in your work.
24 A. You stated rightly that this is a document that's three pages
1 On page 1, there's a letter with a few sentences sent by
2 Mr. Mate Boban, the president of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna,
3 which he sent to the then president of the Republic of Croatia, and
4 that's Dr. Franjo Tudjman. His name isn't mentioned, but we know who the
5 president was at the time.
6 On the second page --
7 Q. Could we please see the second page in e-court.
8 A. This is an official decision published in the Official Gazette of
9 the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna which shows that we're talking
10 about a state-like entity, given the fact it has its Official Gazette.
11 So it's a decision on the establishment of the Croatian Community of
12 Herceg-Bosna. It has nine articles. It says that the community is
13 established as a political, cultural, economic, and territorial whole.
14 Then what it's composed of, where the seat is, and it allows for the
15 possibility of accession by other municipalities. And I needn't mention
16 all articles.
17 And the third page --
18 Q. Let's see the third page in e-court, please.
19 A. There is a list on which we see the signatures of the
20 representatives of individual towns or municipalities that joined the
21 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. These are probably the signatures of
22 these representatives.
23 And the significance of this document is also stated in the
24 footnote, to back up my position that the Croatian Democratic Union, the
25 HDZ party, as early as 1991, formally established the Croatian Community
1 of Herceg-Bosna as a rather broad, regional type of organisation in
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina which covers an extensive territory, which we see
3 from the list of the municipalities that joined it. In this chapter,
4 there are more such documents that speak about the foundation and
5 functioning of Herceg-Bosna in that time-period.
6 Q. Let us go back to page 2, and I would like to hear a comment.
7 I'm especially interested in a comment about Article 5 and the
8 reference to the independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina with regard to
10 A. Well, it says here that the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna
11 will respect the democratically elected authorities of the Republic of
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina for as long as Bosnia and Herzegovina exists as an
13 independent state with regard to the former or any future Yugoslavia.
14 It is said, in other words, that they will respect the existing
15 political and legal structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina as long as it's -- as
16 it's part or linked with Yugoslavia. This -- the question what will
17 happen if Bosnia and Herzegovina completely separates itself from
18 Yugoslavia is left open.
19 Q. Mr. Bajagic, when was Bosnia-Herzegovina recognised as an
20 independent state?
21 A. In early 1992.
22 Q. Thank you. Please make a short comment about Article 7 of this
23 document, which says how the supreme body of the community is composed.
24 A. It says:
25 "The supreme body of the community shall be the Presidency which
1 shall comprise representatives of the Croatian people in the municipality
2 authorities ..."
3 We see that only "the Croatian people" is mentioned.
4 I believe that the second sentence of this Article is not so
5 important, but it says:
6 "Or the presidents of the municipal boards of the HDZ ..."
7 So this is a fully -- this relies fully on the will of the
8 Croatian Democratic Union, which was one of the victorious parties in the
9 1990 election.
10 Q. Thank you. Let's look at tab 28. Your footnote is 93, and the
11 document is 1D2.
12 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, before we move on, may I inquire if
13 Mr. Zecevic is going to offer this document? Or is he planning to try
14 and offer all of them at the end of the report?
15 MR. ZECEVIC: It's already an exhibit.
16 MR. HANNIS: Okay.
17 MR. ZECEVIC: It's 1D141.
18 MR. HANNIS: Okay. Thank you.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: The previous document.
20 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: This one is 1D2.
22 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Since this document is also part of your report as a footnote,
25 please make a short comment and explain why you considered this
1 document -- you considered it important to mention it in your footnote.
2 A. The previous document was dated 18 November as the official date
3 of the establishment of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. This
4 document shows, and I explained that in paragraph 70 of my expert report,
5 that there already were some forms of regional organisation that were
6 supported by the HDZ. We see from this document that there were at least
7 the Herzegovina regional community and the Travnik regional community,
8 which means that this form of regional organisation was typical for the
9 HDZ throughout 1991.
10 This doesn't state when they were created, but their meeting took
11 place on 12 November, six days before the official establishment of
12 Herceg-Bosna, shows that during 1991 there already was some form of
13 regional organisation, some sort of regions.
14 It even says here, this is ultimately 1991, that these regional
15 communities came into being at that time or earlier. That's one thing,
16 one reason why I used this document. And the other is that document
17 states what the final goal of the Croatian people should be.
18 Q. That's on page 2, isn't it?
19 A. It's paragraph 70, or, yeah, well, in this document it's on
20 page 2; right.
21 And for them, that's the independent Republic of Croatia or the
22 aspiration of the HDZ to establish the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna
23 through the establishment of these regional communities in order to
24 eventually become the Republic of Croatia, territorially speaking.
25 Q. Thank you. The following document is tab 34. Your footnote is
1 149, item 4.
2 MR. HANNIS: I'm sorry, Mr. Zecevic.
3 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry.
4 MR. HANNIS: Before we move on, Your Honours, I note in my
5 English translation of paragraph 70 of the report which makes reference
6 to footnote 93, which was the one we're just talking about, it says:
7 "Illegible text M. Bajagic's remark." I wonder if Mr. Zecevic can help
8 us out with what's in the original. Because it appears it hasn't been
9 translated, at least in my English translation.
10 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, let me -- let me see if I can -- this
11 is -- that should be page 1, I think.
12 MR. HANNIS: I'm looking at paragraph 93. It's paragraph 34 of
13 the English translation. The very last remark under paragraph 70. I'm
14 sorry, it's paragraph 70 on page 34 where there's a reference to footnote
16 MR. ZECEVIC:
17 Q. [Interpretation] Could you please explain the following. At the
18 end of paragraph 70 of your report, we see "Illegible text M. Bajagic's
19 remarks" in brackets. Can you please explain what this refers to, which
20 part of the document itself?
21 A. It refers to the very last lines on page 1 of the document.
22 That's why I made this remark, because I didn't want to speculate. When
23 something is illegible, then you should state so.
24 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see the first page.
25 [In English] Mr. Hannis, I must give credit to the CLSS. They
1 have obviously been able to decipher this, but and I also have the
2 problem as Mr. Bajagic has, reading what is written in the last -- last
3 sentence on this page.
4 Q. [Interpretation] The following document is tab 34. The document
5 is P1880. Your footnote 149.4.
6 As we see in your footnote, this document, too, is about one of
7 the regional communities that were created in the territory. And please
8 explain why you considered this document important and why you cite it in
9 a footnote in your report.
10 A. Well, as I pointed out, all the parties, all the key political
11 subjects, made certain moves, and this is the proof that the Serbian side
12 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in certain areas, during the year 1991, also,
13 similarly or in the same manner, began to organise itself at the regional
14 level. And this is the decision to promulgate the Autonomous Region of
15 Krajina as a part of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and
16 the federative unit of Bosnia-Herzegovina as its integral part. And I
17 just think that this document shows fully, which is necessary, that the
18 moves of all sides in the political life at the time have to be taken
19 into account. And here we are discussing the Serbian side. I do not see
20 much difference at first between the Croatian Community in -- of
21 Herceg-Bosna and the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina, and we can see
22 that the tendency existed on all sides.
23 If you would like me to focus on any specific article --
24 Q. Well, the document speaks for itself. Thank you.
25 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I see the time. I
1 would now move to a different subject, so perhaps we might take the break
3 JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated]
4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
5 JUDGE HALL: Sorry. The -- you couldn't make effective use of --
6 MR. ZECEVIC: No, no, of course I can. I wasn't aware it was ten
8 JUDGE HALL: It's 11.57, and we break at 12.05 usually.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes. I'm sorry, Your Honours.
10 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Bajagic, we could see from the examples
11 which you mentioned about this formation of regional communities you told
12 us that it had a certain impact on the work of the organs of the state in
13 the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. How did this regionalisation in
14 the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina impact on the abilities and
15 possibilities of central government in Sarajevo to operate? Could you
16 comment on that, please.
17 A. The central authorities in Sarajevo, judging by the division of
18 influence which was a result of the municipality party elections, was
19 made up of all the three sides. But each of the three sides had its own
20 projection of the manner in which it should act in such a context. For
21 these two sides we have shown through documents that they carried out
22 certain activities in order to establish specific regions.
23 I also need to emphasise that this form of organisation had been
24 envisaged in a different legal framework at the time of the former SFRY.
25 And I have to emphasise that Bosnia-Herzegovina, throughout 1991, up
1 until the spring of 1992, was one of the constituent members of the
2 Federation. The Federation was still functional in 1991, and we should
3 bear this in mind.
4 As for the central authorities in Sarajevo, or, rather, the third
5 side in the latent conflicts that were going on at the time, they were
6 not making the moves of this kind; but by trying to become predominant in
7 all the central authorities and institutions, they were trying to achieve
8 their own goals. And through the development of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a
9 civil republic, they were trying to achieve dominance over the other two
10 sides. And this is something is that is present primarily in the first
11 part of the report.
12 Q. You say the third side. Who do you have in mind?
13 A. I have in mind the Party of Democratic Action and the political
14 establishment which represented the Muslim people in the central organs
15 of power.
16 Q. As for the regional communities, did they also establish their
17 own organs?
18 A. Yes. The regionals community, and I mean the Croatian Community
19 of Herceg-Bosna and the Autonomous Region of Krajina, already envisaged
20 the establishment of these organs in their founding documents. And they
21 did establish these organs, the organs which were practically the
22 authorities, and some institutions which looked like state institutions.
23 I think that in certain paragraphs of my expert report, where I
24 discuss the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, I mentioned a number of
25 documents in footnotes which talk about appointing certain leaders to
1 specific departments, Department of Justice, Department of the Interior,
2 and Department of Economy, and so on and so forth. The situation was the
3 same on the other side.
4 Q. Let us just be completely clear. We have shown the two examples
5 here, the Herceg-Bosna and the Autonomous Region of Krajina. Were there
6 any other autonomous regions or regional communities in Bosnia and
7 Herzegovina at the time?
8 A. Yes, certainly, there were. In the report there were no examples
9 of the Herzegovina community or the Travnik regional community or some
10 other Serbian autonomous regions, but there were others, evidently. So
11 this was not just, generally speaking, the Herceg-Bosna and the
12 Autonomous Region of Krajina; there were a number of these.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 MR. ZECEVIC: I see the time now, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE HALL: Yes. So we take the break and resume in 20 minutes.
16 [The witness stands down]
17 --- Recess taken at 12.05 p.m.
18 --- On resuming at 12.28 p.m.
19 [The witness takes the stand]
20 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
21 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Bajagic, let us move on to the second part
22 of your report, the MUP of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
23 in 1992. That is on page 34.
24 Can you briefly summarise for us what were the characteristics of
25 this period, let me put it that way, this period in the work of the MUP
1 of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina? So after the ethnic
2 parties won the election and the coalition had been formed.
3 A. On the basis of the facts already presented concerning the social
4 atmosphere in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the wake of multi-party elections,
5 the Ministry of the Interior of the Socialist Republic of
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina found itself in a really complex situation; complex in
7 every sense. We know that, on the basis of the coalition agreement
8 between the three victorious parties, the division of personnel was the
9 same in all state institutions, that is to say that the ethnic-based
10 parties agreed that positions in state organs, including the MUP, should
11 be equally distributed on the basis of the party agreement.
12 Q. Perhaps it will be easier, in order to illustrate what we are
13 discussing, if we can have a look at P875. I haven't announced it, but I
14 hope that it will not be a problem. It is a chart provided by the
15 Prosecution which reflects and illustrates the structure of the
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP.
17 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Hannis.
18 [In English] [Microphone not activated] perhaps -- perhaps usher
19 can give this to witness.
20 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Bajagic, please have a look. This is a
21 chart prepared by the Prosecution, and it is supposed to reflect, more or
22 less, the situation between January 1991 and March 1992, as the title
23 says. "The Situation in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the
24 Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina."
25 So I would ask you to have a look at it and to confirm whether
1 this is your opinion as well.
2 A. Yes, I can see in this chart that the minister of the interior is
3 Mr. Alija Delimustafic, his deputy is Mr. Vitomir Zepinic, and that one
4 of the advisors is Mr. Mico Stanisic.
5 Below that, I see that we have various lines of work, and I can
6 see the names of the officials who were discharging the duties as leaders
7 of these organisational units in the seat of the ministry. And still
8 below that, where we can see the blue signs resembling houses, we can see
9 the organisational structure of the Security Services Centres which
10 existed at the time.
11 Q. Thank you. Please -- I apologise for this digression. I wanted
12 us to present this. And, now, please, if you can continue with your
14 A. As we can see on this chart, and as I mentioned in my expert
15 report, on the basis of the party agreement, the positions within the
16 Ministry of the Interior of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and
17 Herzegovina were divided according to the percentage of the influence
18 that the parties had in power. Probably, though I did not deal with that
19 in detail, this was reflected in the territorial principle of
20 organisation from the top down, depending on the areas where a specific
21 party won most votes in the elections in certain areas; there they would
22 get most seats in the organs of power.
23 What is always a problem for any Ministry of the Interior is that
24 it should operate on the principles of political neutrality and
25 professionalism; whereas, the political parties were trying to exert some
1 sort of influence on the personnel policy within the ministry. This is
2 one of my main observations; that in certain situations it is surprising
3 that the parties made such efforts to try and have a dominate influence
4 on the personnel policy within the MUP and it had to be achieved in spite
5 of the grudges of other sides and putting aside the duties which had to
6 be discharged and which are defined by the Law on the Ministry of the
7 Interior. This is one of my observations from this chapter.
8 MR. ZECEVIC: If -- Mr. Usher, can you please give me back the
9 chart, because it is probably difficult for the expert to deal with all
10 these papers in front of him. Thank you very much.
11 Q. [Interpretation] Please go on, Mr. Bajagic. Sorry.
12 A. The other observation in connection with this is that the
13 Ministry of the Interior of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
14 had to take into account what was happening at the international level
15 and relating to the future destiny of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its state
16 and territorial organisation. I mean the negotiation process which was
17 ongoing under the auspices of the international community. And this was
18 one of the elements that determined the future operation, functioning,
19 and decentralisation of the Minister of the Internal Affairs of the
20 Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is specified in the
21 contents and also in the opinion I provided in certain paragraphs of my
23 Q. Please tell me, can you clarify for us the notion of what
24 tripartite means, what it means in general, and whether it was applied to
25 the Ministry of the Interior of the Socialist Republic of
2 A. Well, tripartite should, in this case, mean that the party
3 agreement is to be strictly observed and that all three political forces
4 should have equal influence on the operation of the Ministry of the
5 Interior. That means everyone is equal. And on the basis of the method
6 of work which was established by consensus, it implies the awareness of
7 all three sides of the main directions of activities of the other two
8 sides. So it means transparency in terms of the influence anyone would
9 have on the work of the ministry.
10 Q. On the basis of your research, did -- this tripartite principle
11 in the Ministry of the Interior of the Socialist Republic of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, was it observed and honoured?
13 A. As I pointed out in a number of paragraphs and supported it by
14 sources which are provided in the footnotes, it is clear that the Party
15 of Democratic Action violated the party agreement, not only in terms of
16 appointing personnel or observing the agreement on appointments of high
17 officials at the ministry seat, but they were also carrying out other
18 activities which suggest unlawful meddling with the personnel policy of
19 the Ministry of the Interior of the then Socialist Republic of
21 Q. Paragraph 106 on page 39 of your expert report, could you please
22 comment on paragraph 106 and the one following it. That's 107.
23 A. In paragraph 106, in order to explain what I stated previously, I
24 talk about instructions on mobilising the police reserve force which was
25 issued on the 26th of September, 1991. The instruction was signed by the
1 then deputy minister of the interior, Mr. Vitomir Zepinic. The
2 instruction was a result of an order of the Presidency. It was a result
3 of the order issued by the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
4 Further on in this paragraph, I discuss the dissatisfaction of
5 the Serbian personnel in the MUP concerning the situation, but I have to
6 refer to paragraph 107 where I specify that one of the officials of the
7 MUP in his dispatch said that the mobilisation of the reserve forces of
8 the police was unconstitutional because this order or instruction could
9 only have been issued on the level of the then SFRY, as
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina was still a federal unit of the SFRY at the time. In
11 the dispatch, Mr. Mandic referred to the decision of the Government of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1988 pertaining to this issue. Therefore, the
13 instruction on the mobilisation of the police reserve forces which was
14 issued on 26th of September, 1991, considering the fact that
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina was at the time still a federal unit of the SFRY, was
16 unconstitutional and unlawful.
17 Q. Just for the sake of reference, the document that the expert is
18 talking about is Exhibit 1D130 in this case.
19 Mr. Bajagic, this mobilisation of the police reserve forces, as
20 we can see here one of the members of the collegium addressed all the
21 relevant state organs while protesting about this. As you said, this was
22 unconstitutional and unlawful.
23 When you say that it was contrary to the constitution and
24 unlawful, what do you have in mind? Do you have in mind the number or
25 the decision itself or both?
1 A. I have both in mind. Simply, the organs of the SFRY and the
2 Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina were the organs who could have made such
3 a decision. It had to be taken at the level of the federal state rather
4 than individually by a constituent unit. The fact that really should be
5 taken into account when we analyse any of the processes that took place
6 in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991 was that it was still formerly at the time
7 a constituent unit of SFRY. Therefore in this territory the laws of SFRY
8 were supposed to be observed in this territory. They were still in force
10 Q. I will show you a document and ask you for your comment. It's
11 connected with this. It's tab 18, 65 ter 720D1. It's a Defence
12 document. And I need page 18 in the Serbian text. The page number from
13 the book is 157. The next page, please. I apologise.
14 Mr. Bajagic, I will read this to you. I'm just interested in
15 your -- in your comment.
16 MR. HANNIS: Can I confirm we're on the correct page in English?
17 MR. ZECEVIC: I don't think so.
18 MR. HANNIS: Could we have that up, please.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, please.
20 [Interpretation] It seems that this has not been translated. I
21 apologise. We'll return to it later. It seems not to have been
22 translated, and if that is so, then this would make no sense.
23 Q. Mr. Bajagic, tell me, calling up the reserve police in
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina, did that cause certain reactions? If so, what were
25 these reactions; and, if you know, why?
1 A. On the basis of the documents that were accessible to me when
2 working on this expert report and on the basis of this very document that
3 you withdrew just now, the conclusion may be that, in a certain way,
4 calling up the reserve police, the "milicija," in September 1991 in
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina, in this way, as it had been done, led to protests
6 from the other sides, especially the Serb personnel in the Ministry of
7 the Interior at the time, because everything pointed to a similar process
8 that had taken place in the Republic of Croatia.
9 The reserve police force was supposed to be the nucleus of some
10 new armed forces, and this is something that stems from various
11 documents. And that is supposed to be the nucleus of the SDA and the
12 future authorities in Sarajevo. And that is why we see these documents
13 of those protests with regard to this fact; namely, calling up the
14 reserve force, and, further on, the mobilisation of the reserve forces,
15 and further activities once the mobilisation had been carried out.
16 Q. Thank you. Let us move to paragraph 3 on page 44, the
17 functioning of the Ministry of Interior in the Serb Republic
18 in 1992, April.
19 Mr. Bajagic, in your paper, in paragraph 127, you listed certain
20 documents. I would like to ask you for your comments in respect of
21 paragraph 127 from your expert report.
22 A. In order to speak about the legal framework in terms of the
23 development and functioning of the Ministry of the Interior of the
24 Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, later Republika Srpska, in the
25 period from April until December 1992, it was important, and that is what
1 I did when writing up this expert report, to carry out a detailed
2 analysis of an entire set of laws that are, at the same time, primary
3 sources when categorising all of the material that this research is based
5 I've already mentioned that this is the Constitution, the Law on
6 the Government, the Law on State Administration, the Law on the Interior,
7 the Law on Defence, the Law on the Army. So these are laws that were
8 published in 1992. And, of course, some other laws are mentioned here as
9 well, that follow the development of the ministry on the basis which we
10 can follow the development of this legal framework of the ministry all
11 the way throughout the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But it is certain
12 that these four laws - government, state administration, ministries, and
13 especially the Ministry of the Interior - that is what is the most
15 In my very own modest view, without analysing these laws, it
16 would be impossible to speak about the genesis, organisation, purview,
17 competencies, powers, and all other matters relevant to the functioning
18 of the Ministry of the Interior.
19 Q. By way of a brief illustration, tab 35, your footnote 152. That
20 is P181. It is the Constitution of the Serb Republic of
22 The reason why you included the Constitution as the very first
23 document is self-evident, I believe, but could you please explain,
24 nevertheless, why it ranks first on your list of documents.
25 A. Of course. When discussing such an important organ of the
1 executive as the ministry is and discussing important system-based laws,
2 we have to look at the top-most legal document, that is, the
3 Constitution, that refers to the rights and responsibilities of the
4 executive, as well as all other branches of government. That is why the
5 Constitution is referred to in my paragraph 131.
6 I directly speak about -- Article 90 of the Constitution, that
7 refers to the rights and responsibilities of the government and makes it
8 in charge of constituting the Ministry of the Interior.
9 Q. Thank you. I would now like to look at a few decisions and to
10 ask you for your comment. Tab number 9. That is 65 ter 468D1. It has
11 to do with paragraphs 91 and 93 of your report.
12 Can you give us your comment with regard to this document that we
13 see in front of us?
14 A. As we can see from the document itself, this is a decision on the
15 establishment of the Council for National Security by the Assembly of the
16 Serb People in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the date is the
17 27th of March, 1992.
18 Q. Signed by?
19 A. The president of the Assembly of the Serb People,
20 Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik, who has a master's degree as well.
21 May I proceed? I see that you --
22 Q. Please go ahead. We are going to -- just take it easy, will you?
23 Let us not overlap.
24 A. This has to do with the establishment of the Council for
25 National Security as an advisory organ of the Assembly that has a purview
1 of its own.
2 The Council is responsible to the Assembly, and there's a
3 reference to the membership of the Council.
4 Q. Tell me --
5 A. Sorry, let me just finish my sentence.
6 So this is the Council for National Security as an advisory body
7 of the Assembly, and the Assembly is a legislative organ, not an
8 executive organ, although, if we take into account world trends, national
9 security councils are usually established by the executive, and they have
10 a purview that is much wider than the one referred to here. It is only
11 the advisory function that is referred to here; whereas, national
12 security councils in the world have other roles, like directing, guiding,
13 and advising in the field of national security. Whereas, here there is
14 only a reference to ... it is the head of the executive that heads the
15 national security councils that exist worldwide today, but here the
16 National Security Council only has an advisory function, and that would
17 be my comment.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] If there are no objections, I would
20 like to tender this document.
21 MR. HANNIS: No objection.
22 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 1D531, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE HARHOFF: Should this be in the law library?
25 MR. ZECEVIC: No, I don't think so, Your Honours. This is the
1 decision by which the Council for National Security has been established.
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.
3 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. As for the next document that I would like to ask you to comment
5 upon, Mr. Bajagic, we're looking at tab 10. 469D1 is the 65 ter number.
6 Can you give us your brief comment on this document that consists
7 of two parts.
8 A. This is a decision on declaring a state of imminent threat of war
9 and also this is an order to mobilise the TO in the whole territory of
10 the SBH [as interpreted]. This decision was taken by the Presidency of
11 the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And the Assembly of the
12 Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina confirmed this decision on the
13 15th of April, 1992, and it is signed by president of the Assembly of the
14 Serbian People of BH, Momcilo Krajisnik, MA. So the Presidency signed
15 the decision on declaring a state of imminent threat of war and the
16 assembly confirmed this decision.
17 Q. Let us be perfectly clear: The date of the decision of the
18 assembly is ... could you please tell us?
19 A. It says here, 03-11/92, the 15th of April, 1992. And the session
20 of the Assembly of the Serb People was held on the 12th of May, 1992, and
21 that is when they confirmed this decision.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] If there are no objections, I would
24 like to tender this document.
25 MR. HANNIS: No objection. But before we give that a number,
1 Your Honour, going back to the last exhibit, in the light of the question
2 that Judge Harhoff asked, I checked, and it appears that the document we
3 just gave the number Exhibit 1D531 is already in the law library as
5 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much, Mr. Hannis. Let me check
6 this. Just a second.
7 The only way would be if it was published in the Official
8 Gazette. That might be the case. Just bear with me, Your Honours.
9 [Defence counsel confer]
10 MR. ZECEVIC: Okay, I'm sorry. You were right, Mr. Hannis. We
11 checked. It's a part of the law library. Therefore, we should --
12 JUDGE HALL: -- vacate the number that we just assigned?
13 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honours, yes, we should vacate the
14 number 1D531, yes.
15 JUDGE HALL: So ordered.
16 MR. HANNIS: And I have no objection to the current proposed
17 exhibit getting that number now.
18 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much. So I'm moving that that
19 document, 469D1, be admitted as 1D531.
20 JUDGE HALL: So that would be assigned that number.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you.
22 Q. [Interpretation] Could we please have a look at document tab 46.
23 That is your footnote 326, paragraph 2. And the document is 1D170.
24 Since this document is part of your report, sir, could you please
25 give us your comment. Let us see who signed it. That is on page 2. And
1 let us see the date. And could you please give us your brief comment.
2 A. This is a document, or, rather, decision on establishing the
3 Territorial Defence of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an
4 armed force. And there is also the accompanying decision on declaring a
5 state of imminent threat of war. It was taken by Minister Bogdan Subotic
6 on the 16th of April, 1992. It was sent to the autonomous region and the
7 Serb autonomous districts or regions in the territory of the
8 Serb Republic of BH.
9 I used the document in paragraph 284, as you can see, right, from
10 the footnote.
11 Q. Thank you. I would now like to focus on sub-item 2, the
12 decentralisation of the MUP, on page 40 of your report. Paragraphs 109
13 through 124.
14 The document is under paragraph 24 [as interpreted] and your
15 footnote is number 13. The document itself is 1D78. Could you please
17 A. This is an instruction which is the result of the collegium of
18 the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina held on the 1st of April, 1992. At that
19 collegium meeting, as we can see from the text, the decentralisation of
20 the MUP was discussed in accordance with the last round of talks in the
21 framework of the Cutileiro Plan. I must also mention the
22 Sarajevo Agreement, which was reached a few days earlier. The overall
23 context was the plan of the structuring of the state of BH, and three
24 constituent units were to be created and with their respective public
25 administration bodies, including the -- a MUP.
1 So this is a -- this is an instruction from the joint collegium
2 of the MUP.
3 Q. Since you dealt with this, tell me if that plan, known as the
4 Cutileiro Plan, actually, the plan of the EU, and including the
5 Sarajevo Agreement, did it include the establishment of ministries of the
6 interior in their respective entities and a joint MUP or was there a
7 different approach?
8 A. One of the articles of the Sarajevo Agreement envisaged that each
9 constituent unit was entitled to set up its own Ministry of the Interior.
10 And probably at the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina, some line ministries
11 were joint, among them the Ministry of the Interior. So there was one
12 ministry at the top, and below it, the units had their respective
14 Q. Sir, in the second paragraph of this document on the screen, some
15 names are listed, namely, those present at this MUP collegium, the
16 collegium of the MUP of the Socialist Republic of BH held on the
17 1st of April, 1992.
18 I can see that Minister Alija Delimustafic is not listed here.
19 Could you comment on that.
20 A. Well, I can't comment, but I see that the deputy minister was
21 present and all highest-ranking officials who are the proper members of
22 the collegium of the MUP, which means those that were appointed by the
23 three parties. There's the under-secretary for the SDB, the
24 assistant minister for the police, and other officials. So a possible
25 comment of mine would be that, having a collegium session even without
1 the presence of the minister himself, who probably had some other urgent
2 commitments elsewhere, does not diminish the significance of this
3 document because of all -- because all other officials were present,
4 representatives of all three parties that made up the highest ranking --
5 or the highest echelon of officials in the ministry.
6 Q. Tell me, Mr. Bajagic, this document envisaged the composition and
7 remit of the expert collegium of the MUP, doesn't it?
8 A. That -- well, that follows from the Law on the Interior of the
9 SRBH and the rule-book on the internal organisation of the ministry. I
10 believe that rule-book was adopted in 1994, that single MUP of
12 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. I'm about to show you this bylaw, the rule-book, tab 138. Your
15 footnote is 168. And the exhibit number is P850.
16 No, this isn't it. P850. 65 ter 02668. 65 ter list of the OTP.
17 Sir, is this the rule-book you spoke about?
18 A. Yes, this is it.
19 Q. Since which year was this rule-book in use; do you know?
20 A. We see that the date here is from the 29th of January, 1990.
21 Q. Was this rule-book in use in 1992?
22 A. Yes. The internal organisation of the MUP of the Serb Republic
23 of BH was made pursuant to this rule-book, until a new rule-book was
24 adopted. That is, until the adoption of the rule-book on the internal
25 organisation of the MUP of the Serb Republic of BH throughout 1992, this
1 one was in force.
2 Q. Let us sum up then. This is the rule-book on the internal
3 organisation of the Ministry of the Interior, which at the time was
4 called Republican Secretariat of the Socialist Republic of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and you say that it was in force since
6 29 January 1990?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Was this rule-book used in the MUP of the Socialist Republic of
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina between the 29th of January, 1990, and April 1992?
10 A. Yes. This was a rule-book that regulated the internal
11 organisation of the Secretariat of the Interior, which later became the
12 MUP, of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
13 Q. You told us already that this same rule-book was also in use in
14 the MUP of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina until the adoption of
15 the rule-book of the SRBH. Tell us, when was the latter, the rule-book
16 of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, adopted?
17 A. It was adopted in the first quarter of 1993. I think it was late
18 April or --
19 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction late March or early
21 A. I'm not sure. Which means that this rule-book was in force. And
22 throughout 1992, that is, during the establishment of the organisational
23 structure of the MUP of the Serb Republic of BH, was governed by its
24 provisions. The Constitution of the Serb Republic stipulates that all
25 laws and regulations that are not in direct contradiction of the
1 Constitution will remain in force, irrespective if we're -- whether we're
2 speaking about laws or bylaws or subordinate legislation.
3 Q. Please make another comment for us. Page 287, ERN 0113-7325. In
4 the header of your copy, you will find page number 284.
5 Paragraph 126, criminal logs.
6 A. Yes.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I don't know if there is a
8 translation of this OTP document. I'm not sure there is one.
9 Q. All right. Can you explain what we see in items 126, 127, 128,
10 129, and 130. They deal with various types of logs. Could you list them
11 for us and explain what kind of logs they are.
12 A. They are operative log-books of the Ministry of the Interior;
13 that is, criminal, operative, and investigative, as well as
15 Q. Slowly, please. Please list for us every log-book and tell us to
16 which line of work it is linked.
17 A. The first one is the criminal log-book. It is a log-book based
18 on the -- on the decisions of domestic and foreign courts. That is,
19 persons are entered here who are convicted by courts.
20 Q. This is a widely known as the KE log-book.
21 A. Yes. And the ministry --
22 Q. Mr. Bajagic, please make a pause between question and answer.
23 I'm trying to clarify things. In this way, we can create an even greater
24 problem in the transcript.
25 So this is -- what -- what is this called in the police jargon?
1 A. You have just said it, the KE.
2 Q. Very well. Thank you. Let's proceed.
3 A. The following log-books are operative crime investigation
4 log-books, and I don't think there's a need for me to list them all.
5 The first log-book, the criminal log-book, shows the
6 administrative function of the ministry and its wide remit.
7 The third log-book is the operative MOS evidence. Just like the
8 operative and the criminal investigation log-book, it has to do with the
9 crime investigation service of the ministry and other connected units.
10 The following log-book is the misdemeanours log-book. It's on
11 the following page. Where the Ministry of the Interior keeps this
12 log-book based on the decisions of misdemeanour courts, with the
13 perpetrators of those misdemeanours.
14 And, finally, there's the criminal register. This is a register
15 kept by the Ministry of Interior as a summary of all lines of work. That
16 is, the drafting of criminal complaints against known and unknown
17 perpetrators of crimes. And then there are various ways of keeping
18 registers, by persons, by types of criminal offences, and so on. And we
19 needn't go into that. So this is the last type of register mentioned in
20 this rule-book.
21 Q. Thank you. And what's the abbreviated name of that register in
22 the police jargon?
23 A. Well, criminal register. I don't know. I can't remember any
24 special abbreviated name.
25 Q. If I say KU register.
1 A. Yes, KU, K-U. These are the initial letters. And the one under
2 item 127 was usually called OE in police jargon.
3 Q. Let us see page 0113-7510. In the header, you can see page
4 reference 469. And it refers to the professional collegium of the
5 republican secretary.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm being informed that this can be found on the
7 243rd page of the English text. In Serbian, the page number could be
8 472. As I said, the ERN is E0113-7510. This is it. I'm told that in
9 English the page number is 243.
10 Q. Please give us a short review about this professional collegium
11 of the republican secretary. First of all, is it the same as the
12 professional collegium of the MUP? And who are the members? And which
13 matters does this body deal with?
14 A. According to these rules, and according to other rules as well,
15 the professional collegium of the republican secretary is the same as the
16 professional collegium of the minister of the interior. It's just a
17 question of changing the name of the ministry.
18 Professional collegiums are always composed of the top
19 professionals of the ministry. The minister is the word I'm going to use
20 now. So it's the minister, the assistant ministers, the heads of the key
21 departments, lines of work, heads of sectors, because at that time, as
22 well, there were two basic sectors within the ministry, one for public
23 security, and the other one for state security.
24 Sometimes these meetings can be attended by other top personnel
25 from the ministry, depending on the agenda. At any rate, this is the
1 highest professional body, and these are the top officials anyway, if we
2 look at the composition of the body.
3 If we look at the questions that they deal with, it has to do
4 with the overall policy of the Ministry of the Interior. Questions
5 related to the implementation of the basic guide-lines provided by the
6 top state authorities, questions related to the strategy and tasks from
7 the line of work of the ministry. Of course, organisational matters as
8 well. Then questions involving the active participation of the ministry
9 in providing draft laws, bills, as well as internal documents that are
10 only drafted by the ministry, and many other questions. We can see that
11 here. I don't have to go into all of it.
12 Q. Yes, the document is self-explanatory, isn't it?
13 Tell me, in your opinion, the previous document that we saw,
14 dated the 1st of April, 1992, the minutes from the collegium, in your
15 opinion does that belong to questions that are discussed by the collegium
16 of the minister of the interior on the basis of these rules?
17 A. Yes. All the items on the agenda of the collegium meeting of the
18 1st of April, 1992, are questions that the professional collegium of the
19 Ministry of the Interior should deal with.
20 Q. Thank you. I'm going to show you another document. However,
21 before that, let me ask you: In your opinion, such a record, or, rather,
22 such communication from the collegium meeting of the 1st of April which
23 was sent to all, as far as we can see, including all centres, all public
24 security stations, and the entire top personnel of both ministries, in
25 your view could this document have been sent from the Ministry of the
1 Interior without the agreement or knowledge of the top personnel of that
3 A. Well, that's impossible. It's impossible for a document of such
4 significance -- and it was a vital issue that was discussed at that
5 collegium meeting, namely, the future functioning of the entire field of
6 the interior in Bosnia-Herzegovina as such. So we're not only talking
7 about the ministry itself. That kind of document could not have left the
8 ministry headquarters without the knowledge of the top officials. The
9 fact that the deputy minister is there and all the other highest
10 officials were there, all of the people comprising this professional
11 collegium on the basis of the rules, indicates that when this document
12 was sent, it meant that the facts referred to in this document were
13 actually accepted by all persons present at that meeting. We do see that
14 the minister was not present at the meeting, but it is impossible to
15 assume that the minister did not know about the content of this meeting
16 because it was attended by his deputy and other top personnel of the
18 Q. I would like to show you tab 42, your footnote 206. This is
19 document 1D138.
20 Since you cited this document in your report - that's in
21 paragraph 169 - could you please give us a brief comment? We have four
22 minutes left today.
23 A. The document I see here is a dispatch sent from the ministry
24 headquarters, and it was sent by Alija Delimustafic, minister of the
25 interior. And in this document, everything that is contained in the
1 document of the 1st of April is categorically refuted. He is completely
2 denying the fact that this collegium was held at all and that certain
3 conclusions had been reached. And, specifically, this document says --
4 or, rather, he assesses that there was pressure and blackmail, and he is
5 also saying that there were declarations of loyalty that were made. It
6 is a denial issued nine days later by the minister of the interior, and
7 it has to do with the document that had been sent nine days before that.
8 That's my comment.
9 Q. Now we go back to the question of the methodology of conclusions.
10 We have discussed that already.
11 So, in this case, we have two documents that are opposites. On
12 the one hand, we have the record of the collegium meeting; and, on the
13 other, this document, dated the 10th of April, which de facto denies
14 everything that is stated in the previous document dated the
15 1st of April.
16 On which basis do you draw your conclusions, the ones that you
17 refer to here in paragraphs 169, 170, and - how should I put this? - what
18 is the methodology that you used for drawing these conclusions? Thank
20 A. The instruction on information - that is what the dispatch is
21 called - of the 1st of April, 1992, is the result of that collegium
22 meeting, and it is based on the Sarajevo Agreement, on a
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina consisting of three constituent units and the right of
24 these constituent units to have their own Ministries of the Interior. So
25 that document is based on the Cutileiro Plan, the Sarajevo Agreement, and
1 accepting the fact that all persons present at that collegium meeting
2 accept as a fact that this agreement had been reached in Sarajevo. That
3 is what we have on the one hand. It is my assessment that it has a
4 particular, specific weight. On the other hand, this is a dispatch of
5 the minister of the interior, so it is the minister. He knew of the fact
6 that the Sarajevo Agreement had been reached and that a collegium meeting
7 had been held, but in this dispatch he is denying certain things that had
8 started happening on the ground on the basis of the instructions provided
9 in this dispatch sent on 1st of April, 1992.
10 If we are talking about this on scales, as it were, I don't think
11 that this dispatch has the same weight that the previous document has,
12 and that is why I draw the conclusions that are referred to in the
13 relevant paragraphs.
14 Q. I see the time. Thank you.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I believe that it
16 would be convenient if we would adjourn for the day.
17 Thank you, Mr. Bajagic.
18 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Mr. Zecevic.
19 Mr. Bajagic, we are about to take the first adjournment for the
20 day in the course of your testimony, which you would have gathered, from
21 what Judge Delvoie said at the beginning, is going to go over several
22 days. You, having testified before this Tribunal previously, I'm
23 reminding you of the fact that having been sworn as a witness, you cannot
24 have any communication with counsel from either side until at the
25 conclusion of your testimony you are released by the Court. And,
1 furthermore, in such conversations that you may with other persons, you
2 cannot discuss your testimony.
3 So we rise for the day, and we will resume in this courtroom
4 tomorrow morning at 9.00.
5 [The witness stands down]
6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,
7 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 3rd day
8 of May, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.