Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 24151

 1                           Thursday, 15 September 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.19 p.m.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Good afternoon,

 6     everyone in and around the courtroom.

 7             This is case IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and

 8     Stojan Zupljanin.

 9             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

10             Good afternoon to everyone.  May we have the appearances, please.

11             MS. KORNER:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Joanna Korner and

12     Crispian Smith for the Prosecution.

13             MR. ZECEVIC:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Slobodan Zecevic,

14     Slobodan Cvijetic, and Ms. Deirdre Montgomery appearing for

15     Stanisic Defence this afternoon.  Thank you.

16             MR. KRGOVIC:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Dragan Krgovic and

17     Miroslav Cuskic, appearing for Zupljanin Defence.

18             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.

19             Yes, Ms. Korner.

20             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, quickly, because I'm tight for time.

21             Your Honours will recall a somewhat heated, maybe acrimonious,

22     argument about the admission of a document yesterday, which is on our

23     list as number five, and had been given the -- what was the old

24     65 ter number of 1976.  Owing to the eagle eye of Mr. Hannis, I have to

25     say, we discovered that the document is, in fact, admitted.  It is a

Page 24152

 1     different version of it.  Therefore, it has different ERN numbers, and it

 2     does not contain the letter that was attached to the document from

 3     General Kukanjac.  It is, in fact, admitted as P1295.16, as part of a

 4     65 ter [sic] package for ST-183.

 5             Now, Your Honours, there is -- as I say, there's that difference

 6     because the original exhibit doesn't contain the letter, and this one

 7     does.  So what our suggestion is, is that we should replace what was the

 8     document that is admitted as P1295.16 with this one so that the full

 9     document with the letter is there.  Otherwise, we've got admitted two

10     documents -- two identical documents.

11                           [Trial Chamber confers]

12                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

13             JUDGE HALL:  Do the Defence -- does either of Defence counsel

14     have any views on this?

15             MR. ZECEVIC:  We have no objection, Your Honour.  Ms. Korner

16     explained to us the situation.

17             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.

18             So the order is as Ms. Korner has cast it, that is, the

19     substitution of the complete document for the one that's already

20     exhibited.

21             And if there are no other matters, would the usher please conduct

22     the witness back to the stand.

23                           [The witness takes the stand]

24                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

25             JUDGE HALL:  Ms. Korner, before we continue, could we have the

Page 24153

 1     65 ter number for this document, please, for the -- so the record is

 2     clear.  The new document.

 3             MS. KORNER:  Sorry, Your Honour, the one that we produced

 4     yesterday or the -- the earlier one that was already an exhibit?

 5             JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated] The new one.

 6             MS. KORNER:  The new one was given, on our list, 65 ter 1976.

 7             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.

 8             MS. KORNER:  General --

 9             JUDGE HALL:  General, good afternoon to you.  Before Ms. Korner

10     continues, I remind you of your oath.

11             Yes, Ms. Korner.

12             MS. KORNER:  Thank you.

13                           WITNESS:  VIDOSAV KOVACEVIC [Resumed]

14                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

15                           Cross-examination by Ms. Korner: [Continued]

16        Q.   General, can I just say this: I have limited time left with you

17     and I have a lot to get through, so I would be very grateful if you could

18     literally answer the question I ask without any further detail, unless

19     you feel it's absolutely necessary.

20             Now, we're looking at the events which led to the formation of

21     the VRS through the documents that were brought into existence at the

22     time.

23             MS. KORNER:  Can we now have a look, please, on the screen at a

24     document which has been given the 65 ter number -- oh, no, actually,

25     sorry, one more -- document 1D175.  Oh, which is document 7 in our list.

Page 24154

 1        Q.   Now, General, this document does not appear in your bibliography,

 2     nor was it in the list provided by the Defence, so I take it you've not

 3     seen this document before?

 4        A.   [No interpretation]

 5        Q.   I didn't get the interpretation.

 6        A.   I don't think so, Ms. Korner.

 7        Q.   Right.  It is, in fact, the order, or the conclusions, of the

 8     Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted at the meeting held

 9     on the 5th of April to mobilise certain TO units.  And do you appreciate

10     that that came after the events that we looked at yesterday through the

11     documents in Bijeljina?  And, equally, do you see that it's in accordance

12     with Article 107 of the All People's Defence, the one you discussed with

13     Mr. Cvijetic?  So the government is exercising its powers to use the TO

14     to maintain law and order; is that right?

15        A.   Ms. Korner, I'm trying to see if it is, indeed, the government of

16     the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina that's involved here.  But I'm

17     not sure about it.

18        Q.   No, it's not.  I'm sorry.  It's the -- it's the -- if I can put

19     it that way, maybe somewhat controversially, the proper government, the

20     Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as you put it in your report, the

21     rump?

22        A.   This is a document adopted by the Socialist Republic of

23     Bosnia-Herzegovina then.

24        Q.   Correct.  I believe it says so at the top.  Although it's not

25     very clear.  And it's signed by Mr. Doko.

Page 24155

 1             MS. KORNER:  If we look at the second page, please, in B/C/S.

 2     Actually, it's probably the last page.

 3        Q.   So you were still in Bosnia at the time.  Do you recall this part

 4     mobilisation under Article 107?

 5        A.   Ms. Korner, I was in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time; specifically

 6     in Bihac.  I am aware that activities such as this one took place at the

 7     time in the area.

 8        Q.   Would you accept that this was a response to what had been

 9     happening, first of all, in Bijeljina and some other places, and also in

10     Sarajevo?

11        A.   No, Ms. Korner.

12        Q.   All right.

13             MS. KORNER:  Well, then, can we move to the next document,

14     please, which is document at -- the number is 20247; 65 ter number.  It's

15     at 8A.

16        Q.   This is the duty operations team of the 2nd Military District,

17     providing a report for the General Staff.

18             Do you agree, looking at the head?

19        A.   Yes, I do.

20        Q.   And it's dated the 10th of April.

21             MS. KORNER:  Could we go, please, to the second page,

22     paragraph 3, in English -- in English, because it appears -- that

23     page ...

24        Q.   The situation in the territory.  "The situation is becoming

25     increasingly troubled and is reaching boiling point.  ... it's

Page 24156

 1     deteriorating in trouble spots, especially in Visegrad, Zvornik, Jajce

 2     and Sarajevo.

 3             "Propaganda activity and charges laid against the JNA as the main

 4     guilty party for the recent events are continuing.  Hatred of the JNA

 5     among the Muslim and Croatian population is becoming ever greater.  The

 6     president of Bosnia [sic] claims that the JNA is the only force capable

 7     of acting to save the Muslim population in the Zvornik sector but is

 8     unwilling to do so, which will only compound further the hostile stance

 9     of the Muslim population towards the JNA."

10             And that's right, isn't it, General: The JNA, again, stood by

11     while attacks were launched in Zvornik against the Muslims?

12        A.   Ms. Korner, I wasn't there at the time, but, I repeat: It wasn't

13     the JNA that arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina but only some parts of

14     units.  The army was breaking up all the way from Slovenia across Croatia

15     to Bosnia-Herzegovina.  It was in the process of breaking up.

16             Therefore, I can't really say.  But if that's what the document

17     says, I don't know what else it says.  I don't know the context of the

18     document in its entirety.  Is this merely a report of the President's

19     words, or is this something that he really means?  And by "he," I mean

20     the operative officer who signed this report.

21        Q.   Well, again, you see, you obviously didn't see this report.  Do

22     you think it might have been useful to you in arriving at your

23     conclusions and evidence if you'd seen this report?

24             And I'm going to show you one other part of it, and also we'll

25     give you a copy to read over the break, if you'd like to.

Page 24157

 1             But can we look at the other part and then I'll ask you again the

 2     question I just asked.

 3             MS. KORNER:  Could we look, please, at page 5 in English, and in

 4     B/C/S at page -- it's the third page.

 5        Q.   The previous page talked about the 17th Corps, which was the

 6     corps that we saw yesterday in Bijeljina.  And do you see the words "the

 7     situation in the corps's zone is becoming extremely troubled and is most

 8     critical in Zvornik and Visegrad zones.  Serbian paramilitary formations

 9     are holding more than 3.000 Muslim citizens in the Kula sector, Zvornik,

10     under an ultimatum"?

11             Were you aware of that at the time?

12        A.   Ms. Korner, I'm looking at this segment of the document and I

13     believe this man, this commander, whoever signed the document, would like

14     to see a position taken, would like to see a decision taken, would like

15     to see steps taken.  What I'm telling you is, at the time, the federal

16     leadership included representatives of all the republics and all the

17     nations.  They were taking certain decisions.  I know full well how this

18     worked at the time, and what was happening.  As far as I can tell, this

19     person wants a specific position.  He wants to know what he is expected

20     to do and what task or assignment he will be given.

21        Q.   I absolutely agree.  And, in fact, if we look at the last page,

22     you will see that it's signed by a Colonel Salapura.

23             MS. KORNER:  Can we go to the last page in B/C/S and English,

24     please.

25        Q.   Did you know him?

Page 24158

 1        A.   I may have met him, Ms. Korner, but I can't remember now.  The

 2     family name rings a bell.

 3        Q.   Yes.  The reason I'm showing you this document is because doesn't

 4     it show, as I have been suggesting, that the JNA, contrary to what you

 5     suggest, that it was an independent above-politics army, was, in fact, by

 6     this stage, in 1992, firmly and completely on the side of the Serbs?

 7             And by "JNA," I mean the leadership, obviously.

 8        A.   Ms. Korner, the JNA was subordinated to the political leadership,

 9     comprising six presidents of the republics and two from the autonomous

10     provinces.  They all belonged to different ethnic groups, and they were

11     obstructing the JNA in performing its tasks.

12             On a personal level, I'm happy to agree with you that the JNA

13     failed in its mission, and that's why the country that it was expected to

14     protect eventually broke apart.  Take my word for it.  I know better than

15     you how exactly the country fell apart, and I certainly know how the JNA

16     itself fell apart.

17        Q.   But, you see, it goes back also to what you said, that the JNA's

18     role was to prevent interethnic conflict.  In fact, in reality, it did no

19     such thing, did it?  Certainly not by the beginning -- not by

20     March of 1992.

21        A.   Ms. Korner, that was the information we had at the time.  Yet I'm

22     telling you, we were under siege.  Substantial forces of the JNA were

23     under siege, being blocked by the paramilitary units.  Whole barracks

24     under siege.  Flats and residential buildings where military families

25     lived were under siege.  These commanders were the people who were

Page 24159

 1     supposed to take the relevant decisions and they were under an enormous

 2     amount of pressure.  They didn't know what to do.  They were receiving

 3     threats.  If they did anything, their whole families would be wiped out.

 4             It was a very difficult situation, and it was a very difficult

 5     situation for the then-federal state to handle.  It was a

 6     no-holds-barred situation.  Any method was a legitimate one.  I didn't

 7     specifically analyse that, Ms. Korner.  I hadn't realized that it was

 8     something that was at stake in this case.  I am, needless to say,

 9     perfectly willing to take it up.  That would, however, require a team of

10     experts, including the Croat military personnel, Macedonian, Bosnian,

11     Serbian.  We should put together a tame of military experts from back

12     then to draw up a thorough analysis of what exactly happened, but we

13     might as well leave it to history and see what researchers in the future

14     have to say about all these developments and what their judgement will

15     be.

16        Q.   General, can I say, on that last point, I'm not blaming you.  I

17     appreciate that you were under-instructed and you were not allowed or

18     given access to a lot of these documents, so I'm not blaming you for

19     this.

20             I'm merely asking you whether if you had a look at this and other

21     relevant documents you might not have asserted that the JNA's role was to

22     prevent interethnic conflict.

23        A.   Ms. Korner, I wouldn't change anything.  One thing is certain,

24     the JNA failed to do its job; I agree with that.  But I'm telling you

25     about what its role was at the time, what its purpose was.  The purpose

Page 24160

 1     being to preserve the country.

 2             And, I do apologise, to stop the country from being broken up.

 3        Q.   Yes.  It was to preserve the country, as we've already looked at,

 4     from what was perceived was going to be an outside enemy.  That's right,

 5     isn't it?

 6        A.   Yes, that's right, Ms. Korner.  Primarily.  All of the doctrine

 7     envisaged that as being the primary task of the JNA.  And that is why it

 8     failed to find its feet, as it were, given what the conditions were at

 9     the time.  The army commanders were Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, depending.

10     Just to avoid going into the whole history behind this, how it all

11     started back in the 1970s.  They started grouping and regrouping the JNA

12     officers within the army.

13        Q.   Right.  I say that we can't go back to the 1970s.  And, of

14     course, your own counsel has a chance to re-examine you on this.

15             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, can I ask that this document be

16     admitted for the purposes to which I put to him, that his assertions

17     about the JNA being there to prevent interethnic conflict, and not --

18     being Serbs [indiscernible] is wrong.

19             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] With all due respect, I don't think

20     this is relevant.

21             If we look at this document, apart from Ms. Korner's speech,

22     apart from her interpretation, we find none of the assertions that are

23     supposed to back the admission of this document.

24             JUDGE HALL:  And it seems to me, Ms. Korner, that the witness has

25     accepted your underlying suggestion that the purpose of the -- the

Page 24161

 1     original purpose, let me put it that way, of the JNA had been improperly

 2     hijacked by the political directorates, plural, at the time.

 3             MS. KORNER:  My suggestion is by its own leadership as well,

 4     Your Honour, not just the political.

 5                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 6             JUDGE HALL:  The document is admitted and marked.  The -- I

 7     wouldn't say that Judge Hall enters a dissent.  I have reservations.  But

 8     by a majority, certainly, the document is admitted and marked.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2390, Your Honours.

10             MS. KORNER:  Thank you.  And, very quickly, can we look at one

11     more document on this particular theme.  It's 8-- sorry.  8C.  20245.

12     And it's 8C in our list.

13        Q.   This is the 17th Corps again on the 11th of April.  Its a daily

14     report to the 2nd Military District.  And if we just look, please, at the

15     end of paragraph 2:

16             [As read] "Spreading of war in the territory which brings anxiety

17     among the active servicemen and citizens and pervasive fear for their

18     families.  Some senior officers from the 92nd Motor Brigade," I believe

19     that is, "openly accused the JNA for not intervening in Bijeljina and

20     Zvornik, not to mention the ban imposed to the same unit to intervene in

21     Bosanski Brod."

22             And that it makes clear, does it not, beyond a paradventure,

23     General, that although many officers or some senior officers certainly

24     were against it, the JNA were told not to intervene?

25             MR. ZECEVIC:  Perhaps there is a -- there is a wrong translation.

Page 24162

 1     The part where it says "not to mention the ban imposed ..."

 2             MS. KORNER:  All right.  Can we -- can we -- could the General

 3     read out --

 4             MR. ZECEVIC:  Yes.

 5             MS. KORNER:  -- the Serbian and then we'll get the translation.

 6        Q.   Could you read out, please, General, from the screen the part

 7     that begins:  "Some senior officers ..."

 8             And could you read that slowly, please.

 9        A.   I'm reading, Ms. Korner:

10             "A number of officers from the 92nd Motorised Brigade are openly

11     condemning the JNA for not having intervened in Bijeljina and Zvornik,

12     but they do not mention a ban on the intervention of the same sort in

13     Bosanski Brod."

14        Q.   Right.  So if I understand that correctly, the writer of this

15     report is saying that these officers have not mentioned the ban on an

16     intervention taking place in Bosanski Brod.

17             I hope I've understood that correctly.

18        A.   Well, Ms. Korner, it is very difficult for me to comment what the

19     author wanted to say.  He's not specifying which officers he had in mind,

20     what their ethnicity was, what they were condemning or banning.  Those

21     were probably daily comments that were made in a barracks or at a

22     position; therefore, it is very difficult to say something definitely.

23             However, what I can say, and what I know from experience, we were

24     all waiting for some sort of decision or assignment from the top

25     leadership that would allow us to intervene or do anything at all.  More

Page 24163

 1     often than not, those decisions were just advance, stop, advance, stop.

 2     Which was devastating for the army and which was conducive to its

 3     breakup, which was precipitated, in my view, deliberately and by design.

 4        Q.   Can we look at two other parts of this document, please.  At the

 5     bottom of the page in English, the paragraph that begins:

 6             [As read] "Corps commander visited the area of Zvornik after

 7     which the corps command issued an announcement or an appeal to all the

 8     citizens to return from the places which they had moved out because the

 9     army guarantees them security.  The announcement was broadcast by

10     Tuzla radio.  At the same time, another announcements" --

11             MS. KORNER:  And can we go to the second page in English.  I

12     believe it's still the same page in B/C/S.

13        Q.   "... by religious officials to the population of Zvornik and the

14     surrounding villages about endangered conditions therein appeals for help

15     against the genocide."

16             And so on.  And that's been broadcast as well.

17             MS. KORNER:  And can we, then, please, to the next page -- oh,

18     sorry, in B/C/S.  Same page in English.

19        Q.   Item number 7:

20             "The security situation is without particular problems.  A truck

21     of weaponry was handed over to the SDS party Crisis Staff in the villages

22     of Kozluk and Gornji Sepak.  No killings and shootings reported.  SDS is

23     keeping the villages under blockade until they surrender the rest of the

24     weaponry."

25             And then there are rumours.  So do you understand that,

Page 24164

 1     General - and I take it, of course, you haven't seen this before - to

 2     mean that the JNA, Major-General Savo Jankovic, who signed this report,

 3     has handed over weaponry to the SDS Crisis Staff in these villages?

 4        A.   That's what it says.  However, I don't know why they were given

 5     this, whether they were threatened or something else was at stake, but

 6     this is what the document says.

 7        Q.   Again, I'm sorry to keep harping on this, General.  But isn't it

 8     absolutely clear beyond a paradventure that the SDS -- sorry, the JNA was

 9     taking sides even in the absence of any clear direction from either the

10     political leadership or its own leadership?

11        A.   Ms. Korner, it is impossible to make such an assertion on the

12     basis of these two or three documents alone.  The weapons were

13     distributed and seized, and these are the facts.

14             I have to mention an example when the commander of the

15     Varazdin Corps surrendered in Croatia and left behind hundreds of

16     state-of-the-art M84 tanks in order to save his men.  That was the

17     ultimatum that he succumbed to.  So there was total chaos that was

18     happening at the time.  I do know that the JNA was not only on the side

19     of the Serbian people.  They saved thousands and hundreds of thousands

20     members of other ethnic groups by receiving them in the barracks,

21     providing them food, and protecting them from various paramilitaries.  It

22     is not my intention to defend the JNA here.  This is not my role here.

23        Q.   Finally, let's, just briefly, the conclusion of this document,

24     where they say that:

25             [As read] "Tensions in the interethnic relations ... in the

Page 24165

 1     corps' area of responsibility could result in open conflict.  The most

 2     difficult situation is in the area of Zvornik because there are a large

 3     number of refugees coming to Tuzla and surrounding municipalities."

 4             And then this:  "Corps units have been engaged in preventing the

 5     interethnic conflicts."

 6             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, again, very quickly, can I ask that

 7     this be made an exhibit.

 8             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, once again, I object,

 9     because what Ms. Korner is trying to prove by this document is not

10     contained in the document.  That's the essence of my objection.  Why?

11     Look at paragraph 7, for example.  Ms. Korner is interpreting this

12     paragraph.  This is not about the surrender of -- or, rather, the handing

13     over of weapons to the SDS but rather it's about disarming other citizens

14     by the SDS.

15             And the gist of my objection is that this is not being

16     demonstrated, what Ms. Korner is claiming, by this document.

17             JUDGE HALL:  Well, we have your objection on the record,

18     Mr. Krgovic.  But for the reasons that -- underlying the admission of the

19     previous document, this is admitted and marked.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P2391, Your Honours.

21             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm sorry, the -- I think the -- the problem is,

22     again, the translation.  Because the English translation says a truck of

23     weaponry was handed over to the SDS.

24             MS. KORNER:  All right.

25             MR. ZECEVIC:  Where I --

Page 24166

 1             MS. KORNER:  I'll let him read the sentence, if you like.

 2             MR. ZECEVIC:  Well, it's okay, because the same word stands in

 3     Serbian both for "handed over" and to "surrender."  And that is why I

 4     think it should be -- it should be given to the CLSS --

 5             MS. KORNER:  All right.

 6             MR. ZECEVIC:  -- perhaps for the retranslation.  For --

 7             MS. KORNER:  All right.  I don't mind.  We'll get that checked,

 8     Your Honours, and see.

 9             Right.  Can we look now, please, at document P541, tab 8D.

10                           [Trial Chamber confers]

11             JUDGE HALL:  Yes, Ms. Korner, please continue.

12             MS. KORNER:  Thank you.

13        Q.   Now this I don't imagine you've seen before either.  It's a

14     record of the Serbian minister of the interior, the Expert Board, held on

15     the 14th of April.

16             MS. KORNER:  Can we go, please, to page 2 in English, and I think

17     the same page in B/C/S.

18        Q.   "A meeting should be held --" do you see, under the -- under

19     "Mr. Karisik," the -- became, you may or may not be aware, the leader of

20     the special police.  "A meeting should be held with the minister of the

21     interior, the minister of defence, and General Kukanjac, about what has

22     been done on the secret mobilization."

23             Were you aware that even before an order was issued there was a

24     mobilization going on of the Serbs?

25        A.   I'm sorry, Ms. Korner, but I can't see this particular

Page 24167

 1     paragraph in front of me.

 2        Q.   Do you see:  "Milenko Karisik" on that page?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   [Previous translation continued] ... and do you see it begins by

 5     saying "Mr. Karisik said ..."

 6        A.   My apologies.

 7        Q.   Did you -- all right.  Did you know anything about this secret

 8     mobilization?

 9        A.   No, Ms. Korner.

10        Q.   Now, could you look, please, moving on in time, to - all this

11     happening in April - the next day in April, which is document, please,

12     1D531 at tab 9.

13             Here we see -- oh.

14             MS. KORNER:  1D -- thank you.  531.

15        Q.   15th of April, the Serbian Republic declares a state of imminent

16     threat of war and the formal mobilization of the TO in the whole

17     territory of the Serbian Republic.  "All conscripts are obliged to put

18     themselves at the disposal of the municipal TO staffs in the Serbian

19     Republic."

20             And it's signed by Mr. Krajisnik.

21             If we put this into context, on the 8th -- sorry.  On the

22     5th of April, the Government of the Socialist Republic of

23     Bosnia and Herzegovina orders a partial mobilization of the TO.  On the

24     14th of April, the MUP is discussing the secret mobilization.  And, on

25     the 15th of April, there is the declaration of the imminent state of war

Page 24168

 1     and the order for mobilization.

 2             So do you agree that at that stage it would appear that roughly

 3     within days of each other both sides have decided there's clearly going

 4     to be a conflict, that is to say, the Muslims, and, I suppose, to a

 5     certain extent, the Croats, and the Serbs?

 6        A.   Ms. Korner, if we look at these dates, if I remember correctly,

 7     on the 15th of April the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was already

 8     established.

 9        Q.   [Previous translation continued] ... no, it was -- you're

10     absolutely right; it was -- there was an order - I'm sorry, we actually

11     should have produced it - there was an order dated the very self-same

12     day.  So the Army of ABiH is formally then established.  But, at the same

13     time, the Serbs are also issuing it.  And who came first may be a matter

14     of discussion or argument.  But the fact that it's both at the same time,

15     isn't it?

16        A.   It is a fact that, at the time, the Serbian people decided to

17     remain within the federal republic.  The then-TO, which was in the

18     territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, started to disintegrate along ethnic

19     lines, and I suppose that this decision was taken in order to have the

20     remains of the TO properly organised and placed under the leadership of

21     the Serbs, the then-Serbian leadership.  As far as I know, nevertheless,

22     the Serbian leadership continued to recognise the JNA and the TO as the

23     only regular armed forces.

24        Q.   Yes.  In fact, what happened was that in the territories where

25     the Serbs were in a majority, such as Celinac, or Banja Luka, I can't

Page 24169

 1     think of anywhere else at the moment, the TO was Serb.  In other places,

 2     where there was less of an overall majority, the TO was divided, wasn't

 3     it, between the various ethnicities?

 4        A.   That's correct, Ms. Korner.

 5        Q.   So the remains of the TO, as you call it, is not quite right, is

 6     it?  It's simply that part of the TO was Serbian responded to the Serbian

 7     call for mobilization, and that part of the Muslim, where it was able to,

 8     responded to the president -- the Socialist Republic's call?

 9        A.   That's correct, Ms. Korner.

10        Q.   But it's right, isn't it, that the majority of the weaponry that

11     had been held by the TOs had been, in fact, back in 1991, collected, as a

12     result of an order, by the JNA?

13        A.   I am aware of that order, Ms. Korner.  By doing so, the JNA tried

14     to leave as little weaponry among the people as possible.  However, I

15     think that somebody should make a thorough analysis and to find out where

16     all these weapons actually ended up.  How many depots were captured, how

17     many pieces of weapons were seized from these depots or from the JNA

18     barracks that were under attack at the time.

19        Q.   Now, if we look briefly, please, at the next document, because we

20     see that decision by the Serbian Republic Assembly being put into effect,

21     can you have a look, please, at document 1647.  Tab 10, sorry.

22                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

23             MS. KORNER:  Oh, sorry, it's 1D170.  Your Honours, I'm sorry.  We

24     discovered later it had been exhibited by the Defence.  1D170.

25        Q.   The following day, Mr. Subotic --

Page 24170

 1             MS. KORNER:  If you -- if we go to the second page in B/C/S and

 2     also in English.

 3        Q.   And he is putting into effect, by sending to the governments of

 4     the autonomous regions of the Serbian republic, and also to all Serbian

 5     municipality, order about an imminent state of war and to mobilise.

 6             Had you seen that before?

 7        A.   Possibly.  I'm not sure.

 8        Q.   Well, wouldn't you have received it yourself?  Or not you

 9     personally, but at your command in Bihac.  Or had you already moved by

10     then?

11        A.   No, Ms. Korner.  I was still in Bihac at the time, but I do not

12     recall this document.

13        Q.   All right.  Then, moving swiftly, I hope.  Sift through this.

14     Heading towards the end of April, and it was becoming clear, wasn't it,

15     Colonel [sic], that the JNA was probably going to be pulled out?

16        A.   If I remember correctly, there was enormous pressure, because I

17     think that on the 6th of April Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognised by some

18     members of the international community as an independent state.

19        Q.   You're absolutely right.  All I'm asking, and I suppose one

20     should say, was it clear to you as a serving officer in the JNA towards

21     the end of April that it was likely that the JNA, as an army, would be

22     pulled out of Bosnia?

23             If you can't remember, or it wasn't, then say so now.

24        A.   Ms. Korner, I remember clearly that period of insanity.  We

25     received an order towards the end of April to go to Sarajevo instead of

Page 24171

 1     Belgrade, and we just couldn't believe our eyes.  Because we knew, or we

 2     supposed, and it turns out that we were right, that the war was going to

 3     take a totally different direction.

 4        Q.   All right.  Actually, all I really wanted to know was whether it

 5     was clear to you that it was likely that the JNA would be pulled out of

 6     Bosnia at this period, end of April.

 7        A.   Ms. Korner, there were hints of that being about to happen.

 8        Q.   Now can you have a look, please, at a document which is P550.

 9     Tab 12A.

10             This is actually a report which I don't imagine you've looked at

11     or -- or seen before.  It came from a SNB agent in the CSB Banja Luka.

12     It's dated the 27th of April.  It starts by telling the reader that the

13     Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Krajina has decided to form the TO.

14     And there is a document to that effect, but we don't bother with it.

15             And then it goes on to say this:

16             "The Assembly took the view that the JNA must be prevented at any

17     cost from withdrawing the equipment and ordnance from the area of the

18     Autonomous Region of Krajina."

19             And that was right, wasn't it, General, that there was allegedly

20     an order, although it was denied, from the socialist Bosnian -- socialist

21     government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, saying that the JNA should be

22     stopped and that was because they didn't want the JNA to take

23     without it -- to leave with all the weapons.  But, at the same time, the

24     Serbs didn't want the JNA to leave either, did they?  Because they wanted

25     the weaponry and the people to stay in Bosnia.

Page 24172

 1        A.   I remember those developments, Ms. Korner.  Although, I can't see

 2     here specifically whose doing the reporting or who put together the

 3     report itself.  Nevertheless, I'm telling you that it was a minor chaos

 4     in terms of the war.

 5        Q.   Well, there is, in fact, a report in a newspaper about that

 6     session, but I won't trouble you with it.

 7             Right.  So that's -- so we've reached the end of April, and

 8     that's the situation.

 9             Now, have you ever had an opportunity of looking through the

10     Mladic notebooks?  Were you offered that opportunity by either of the

11     Defence?

12        A.   I don't think so, Ms. Korner.

13        Q.   All right.  We'll I'm going to ask you to have a look, please, at

14     just a couple of entries for what was actually happening at the top level

15     around this period.

16             MS. KORNER:  Could we have up, please, document P1753, which is

17     at tab 4.  And it's at page 210, both, I think, in English and B/C/S.  If

18     that's ...

19                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

20             MS. KORNER:  It's 211 in English, please; and 214 in B/C/S, I'm

21     told.

22             Yes, that's it.

23        Q.   Now, this is General Mladic reporting -- sorry, recording, not

24     reporting, apparently a meeting with General Adzic on the

25     30th of April of 1992, and he starts off by saying that:

Page 24173

 1             "The contents should not be made public and the contents of the

 2     talks should be disclosed to trustworthy brigade commanders."

 3             MS. KORNER:  Can we go, please, to the next page in B/C/S and

 4     English.  Should be 211.

 5             It appears that Colonel Subotic, the minister of defence of the

 6     RS, was there.  And he says:

 7             "This meeting has been organised because of BH.  Nothing is

 8     organised there.  I don't understand why the leadership of the RS didn't

 9     do anything except on the -- rely on the JNA staying in

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  We've proclaimed a TO of the Serbian Republic, and

11     the army must remain in the territory ..."

12             Now, I don't know, General, you may not be able to comment on

13     this:  Were you aware that the government at that stage, when it declared

14     the TO, was relying on the JNA staying?

15             If you're not able to comment, then say so.

16        A.   Ms. Korner, I looked briefly at the previous document.  I believe

17     the last paragraph talks about the newly established TO continuing to be

18     subordinated to the JNA as it existed at the time.

19             As for the rest, I would refuse to comment.  I agree with you on

20     that.

21        Q.   All right.  Well, can I take you to another part which you may be

22     able to assist.

23             MS. KORNER:  Could we go, please, to page 220 in both B/C/S and

24     English.  This is all part and parcel, it would appear, of the same

25     meeting.  On the 30th of April.

Page 24174

 1             Is that showing the right part?  I don't think it is.  It should

 2     be 220 in B/C/S.  Yep.  Thank you.

 3        Q.   "What next?"

 4             And then I suppose we should check who the speaker was there.

 5     Back some pages.  Oh, this is General Adzic who speaks at length, it

 6     looks like.  I'm sorry, and I'll give the reference if anybody wants to

 7     check it.  That's what it appears.  It starts page 213.

 8              "What next?"  And he talks about the Presidency of the FRY.  "If

 9     such a decision is taken, the government should invite all officers to

10     defend their people.  In order for this not to be chaotic, you will have

11     to do the following ..."

12             MS. KORNER:  And I think we need to go to the next page in B/C/S,

13     please.

14        Q.   "Inform the commanders of brigades, regiments, and battalions to

15     be on stand-by.  At the given moment, they are to line up their forces

16     and to do this.  This is to be followed by a statement of the corps

17     commander that the units are staying put."

18             "2 JNA units are to pull out to areas inhabited by Serbs and

19     replenish themselves 100 percent with Serbian soldiers and that the

20     soldiers and officers will not abandon their people.

21             "... mobilise to the maximum the Serbian TO forces and organise

22     them in a military fashion --"

23             MS. KORNER:  And the next page, please.  Oh, no, it's at the

24     bottom -- well, next page in English, please, but the same page in B/C/S

25     at the bottom, I think.

Page 24175

 1        Q.   "... set the borders of the Serbian area in the territory of BH

 2     and fortify them."

 3             Now, do you agree, it's clear there that what General Adzic was

 4     saying is that the JNA, this All People's Army, would pull out into

 5     Serbian areas and replenish themselves with Serbian soldiers.

 6             That's obvious, actually.

 7             But what I want to know is -- don't answer that, General, because

 8     it's obvious.  I'm just reading it.

 9             Did you receive an order --

10        A.   Yes, yes, Ms. Korner.  I've been trying to say this all along.

11     Let's try and be specific.  These are serious things we're talking about.

12     We don't have the JNA there.  We have remnants of the JNA.  The Slovene

13     officers have already gone back to Slovenia.  The Croats back to Croatia.

14     The Muslims crossed over.  Nevertheless, as I said at the outset, a small

15     number of officers of other ethnicities still remained in the JNA.  One

16     didn't know where to go, where to take their families, where to put

17     themselves up, where to find accommodation.  There were all these

18     logistical problems.  It wasn't just about the JNA.  It was very much

19     about the JNA breaking at the seams literally, along ethnic lines.

20        Q.   I'm sorry, but this is an order.  Did you, as a Serb officer,

21     receive an order to pull your units out, the JNA units, to Serb areas?

22     You, the air force officer at that stage.

23        A.   Ms. Korner, I, or, rather, my commander at the time, my commander

24     received an order for us to move from Bihac to the Belgrade garrison.

25        Q.   All right.  I suppose that would be called a Serb area.  But a

Page 24176

 1     Serb area in Bosnia.  No?

 2        A.   I understand your question all right, but I thought you were

 3     asking me about my individual case and that of my commander.

 4        Q.   [Previous translation continued] ... all right.  Well, no.  I

 5     know what -- we're going to come on to your individual case in a moment.

 6             But was your air force unit pulled out to Belgrade or was it sent

 7     somewhere to a Serb inhabited area in Bosnia?

 8        A.   Ms. Korner, as far as I know, as far as I remember, I was with

 9     the radar control units, where the radars were stationed at the time.

10     You can't have a group of radar somewhere in a city or a town.  At the

11     time, we already had radars in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as far as I

12     remember, at Kozara and on Mount Pljesevica.  All of our equipment, taken

13     over from the other units that were previously in Slovenia, was pulled

14     out and taken to Serbia.  That is, all of it that had not been looted and

15     seized.

16        Q.   Let's move to the 5th of May, which is when the so-called order

17     came from the federal republic to pull the JNA back to Serbia.

18             MS. KORNER:  Can we have a look, please, at page 247, just for

19     the date.

20             This is just to establish the date.  It's not clear what

21     General Mladic is -- either it's questions to somebody or it's questions

22     to him; I'm not sure which.

23             But can we look, please, at page 248.

24             Again, this is talks with General Adzic.  And he's saying that

25     the status of the army has failed -- the attempt to negotiate the status

Page 24177

 1     of the army with Mr. Izetbegovic has failed.

 2             And then, please, at 249.  The next page, in B/C/S only.

 3        Q.   "The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is leaving its army in the

 4     territory of BH to BH and it's calling on all three nations to reach

 5     agreement."

 6             What do you understand by that, General?

 7        A.   Ms. Korner, it's difficult for me to interpret this.  Firstly,

 8     because I don't see the part that you referred to.  Based on the

 9     interpretation I receive, I am afraid it's not quite the same as stated

10     in the document.

11        Q.   As far as I can tell, it should be the top of -- no, it's the --

12     yes, it's the top of the page that can you read.  Can you read that out,

13     please.  The top of the page that you see there.

14        A.   "It has reached a level and that's as far as it got.  Now we have

15     no choice.  The SRJ army --" now there's something that I can't figure

16     out "... leaves B and H" - doesn't make sense - "and calls on all the

17     three ethnicities to reach agreement."

18        Q.   All right.

19        A.   There is one word here that I'm not quite able to make out.

20        Q.   Well, does it, could it say -- well, sorry, that's just argument.

21     We'll move on.

22             Because if you go on down the page we see what General Adzic is

23     saying:  "We must not allow ourselves to fall apart in

24     Bosnia-Herzegovina."

25             "Us" being the Serbs, we -- we take it.

Page 24178

 1             "Take over the" --

 2             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm sorry.  Your Honours, I -- I really have to

 3     make one principal objection to this.

 4             I don't see how this, all of this, comes out of the -- the direct

 5     examination of this expert witness or from his particular expert report.

 6     I understand Ms. Korner is entitled to test his credibility, but, with

 7     all due respect, the -- the testing of the credibility cannot be done by

 8     reading the diary of the third person about the talks which he had with

 9     the fourth person and asking this witness to comment on that.

10             And I sincerely believe there's absolutely no relevance in all of

11     this, because all of his answers can -- can -- have the -- have the basis

12     only on what he reads at the moment.

13             Thank you very much.

14             MS. KORNER:  Your Honour, at this stage, the General was present

15     in Bosnia, operating as a member of the JNA.  This is the

16     30th of April through to 5th of May.

17             This part of -- this whole section of my cross-examination, and

18     although I have no necessity to say why I'm doing it or to go beyond what

19     is in his report, is actually based, both on his report and his evidence.

20             In paragraph 50, he said, and maintains that is correct when I

21     asked him about it, that the Serbian army was only formed as a result of

22     the Muslim and Croatian armies being formed.

23             And what I'm attempting, however incompetently, to show is that,

24     in fact, the planning for the formation of the VRS, using the rump, or

25     the JNA, had gone on for a great deal longer and was running at roughly

Page 24179

 1     the same time as the formation of the ABiH.

 2             Additionally, the General asserted that the VRS was made up only

 3     of the TO units.  And I'll find the reference.  This was in his evidence

 4     at page 23671.

 5             "General," he was asked at page -- at line 13, "please explain

 6     briefly of which units the army of the RS consisted and what is the

 7     essence of the VRS."

 8             And he said:

 9             "I already said, and I can repeat now, that on the 4th of May the

10     federal leadership, and I mean that of Yugoslavia, adopted the decision

11     on the withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's Army from BiH.  After that,

12     only TO units remained functional."

13             And further on, Your Honours, we talked about the decisions.

14             "The situation was the same in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and

15     Herzegovina ... that is, the army of the Serbian republic was made up

16     exclusively of units and staffs of the Territorial Defence."

17             And, Your Honours, what I'm showing, and I'm going to be showing

18     further documents about that, is that is simply not the case.  And, as I

19     say, it is not meant as a criticism of the General.  If the General had

20     been shown the documents, he probably wouldn't have made a statement like

21     that.  But because he has, because he hasn't been shown the documents

22     before, I've got to deal with it.

23             JUDGE HALL:  I follow you, Ms. Korner.

24             We're coming up on a break.  But before we rise, coming back to

25     this document that was admitted to replace 10296, the question,

Page 24180

 1     Ms. Korner, is whether 2389, which was assigned yesterday, whether that

 2     number needs to be vacated.

 3             MS. KORNER:  Yes, I think it does.  Otherwise, we really do get

 4     confused.

 5             JUDGE HALL:  So ordered.  Yesterday's number of 2389 is vacated.

 6             So we would return in 20 minutes.

 7                           [The witness stands down]

 8                           --- Recess taken at 3.38 p.m.

 9                           --- On resuming at 4.08 p.m.

10                           [Trial Chamber confers]

11                           [The witness takes the stand]

12             MS. KORNER:

13        Q.   General, I'm going to leave that entry because I'm told that

14     there may be some mistranslations somewhere so I'm not going to waste any

15     more time on that.

16             MS. KORNER:  Can we have a look at one last entry from the diary,

17     and that's, please, first of all, at page 264 in English and B/C/S, I

18     hope.  It's page 260 in the full-typed version.  Yep.  264.  One page

19     back.  Thank you.  Thank you.

20        Q.   Just -- we see at the end this is still General Adzic going on,

21     and it's not what I want to ask you about.  But he's saying that -- or

22     Mladic has recorded: "Invite for talks Colonel Milovanovic."

23             That's the same Milovanovic, is it, who you quoted in your

24     report, part of his testimony?

25        A.   I think it's the same person, Ms. Korner.

Page 24181

 1        Q.   Okay.  Then we move to the 7th of May.

 2             MS. KORNER:  And I want to look at the next page, 265, please, in

 3     both -- it's the next page in both English and B/C/S.

 4        Q.   And this is talks which are being held between Mladic and other

 5     generals, because General Krstic, we saw, is there.  And this is the

 6     vice-president of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

 7     Mr. Kostic, who says:

 8             "The decision to withdraw the citizens of the FRY, the Serbian

 9     people have not been abandoned to fend on its own.

10             "For Serbs it's extremely important for the Federal Republic of

11     Yugoslavia to be preserved.

12             "Keep the materiel and technical equipment in the area.  This is

13     not a matter of us turning our backs on the Serbs in BH.  We do not want

14     to weaken the military population -- potential of the Serbian people."

15             Would the vice-president of the SFRY be in a position to

16     influence what the army did, as regards leaving materiel and equipment in

17     Bosnia?

18        A.   Ms. Korner, it's difficult for me to answer that question.  As

19     far as I can tell by looking at this, these are certain political

20     decisions that I was not entirely familiar with at the time.

21             Nevertheless, I could give you a hand.  I'm gradually beginning

22     to understand what the problem appears to be.

23             Your Honours, when I say "the problem," I mean the following:

24     Thanks to Ms. Korner, who has provided me with Mr. Brown's report, if I

25     remember correctly, there was a sentence there in that report that I

Page 24182

 1     noticed.  The Army of the Republika Srpska was established based on the

 2     JNA.

 3             Reading Mr. Butler's report, I observed the following piece of

 4     phrasing: The VRS was established based on components of the JNA.

 5             And the third definition, Your Honours, you will find in my

 6     reports.  I assert in my report that the VRS was established, based on

 7     the units and staffs of the TO.

 8             You have three expert witnesses with different assertions.

 9     Nonetheless, I base my own assertion on an official document, and, I

10     repeat, a decision taken at the time by the then-assembly, and the

11     decision reflects exactly what I say in my report.

12             I also address the breakup of the JNA and the progress of this

13     process.  This is an exceptionally serious issue and requires a

14     discussion that is structured in a totally different way.  That would be

15     the only way for us to arrive at a conclusion of what the JNA's role was

16     at the time and what its tasks were.  The only thing that we do know for

17     sure is how it has gone down in history.

18        Q.   General, thank you for that, and I'm glad that you found

19     Mr. Brown's report illuminating.

20             The point is this, that Mr. Brown and Mr. Butler, before they

21     produced their reports, and particularly Mr. Brown, made a thorough study

22     of all the documents that were available to them, and you didn't.  And,

23     as I said, I'm not blaming you for that.  You didn't have access to them,

24     and you weren't given them.  But if you had seen all these documents, and

25     there are more to come, wouldn't you be put in a position where you'd be

Page 24183

 1     prepared to agree that, in fact, the VRS was made up of large components

 2     of the JNA, assisted by the mobilization of the TO forces in Serbian

 3     territory?

 4        A.   Ms. Korner, I extremely respect Mr. Brown, but it's not up to me

 5     to assess Mr. Brown's and Mr. Butler's work.  I stand by my statement.  I

 6     come from this country, from the aforementioned Yugoslav People's Army.

 7     Both the country and the Yugoslav People's Army were in the process of

 8     disintegration.  And you will have to admit that I'm pretty familiar with

 9     how the events took place.

10        Q.   Well, General, I regret to inform you - and after that we'll move

11     back to the documents - that, I'm afraid, my suggestion is that, through

12     no fault of your own, you do not have the knowledge that it was available

13     certainly to Mr. Brown, because did you not study in depth, because you

14     couldn't, the background documents and, in particular, those that relate

15     to the 1st Krajina Corps.

16             And that's my suggestion, so that it's clear, but I think you

17     understand it.

18             Now can we go back, please, to some of the other documents

19     relating to this transformation.

20             MS. KORNER:  Please, could we look now at document -- sorry ...

21     yes, 20 -- actually, I'm sorry.  I am ... I'm going skip that one.

22             You are familiar, are you, with the 12th of May Assembly, Mr. --

23     oh, sorry, now I've missed -- sorry -- with the 12th of May Assembly

24     minutes?  Actually, I'm sorry, I have missed one out.

25             Well, firstly, can you answer that question?

Page 24184

 1        A.   It is possible that I have seen it.  I have noticed that this

 2     assembly session was mentioned in the analysis of combat readiness.

 3        Q.   Yes.  Well, that's the session that formally created -- or the

 4     decision that formally created the VRS.

 5             Are you saying you've not read the full minutes, including

 6     General Mladic's speech?

 7        A.   I don't recall, Ms. Korner.

 8        Q.   All right.  But I'd like you to look - and I'm sorry, that's the

 9     document I did miss by mistake - at document 13A, which is 20244, which

10     is 7th of May.

11             This is the 5th Corps, 5th Krajina Corps, sending to its units

12     the telegram from the Federal Secretariat, which we can see relates to

13     the 5th of May decision on the transformation of the JNA.

14             "It has been ensured that members of the JNA who remain in the

15     Republic of Bosnia ... or those being sent there will have the same

16     rights as other members of the JNA.  Accordingly, in order to ensure

17     planned and organised implementation of this decision, all members of the

18     JNA who have BH citizenship should be kept in their present posts in

19     units and institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina."

20             So the order was that those of the JNA who were citizens of BiH

21     should stay in their units in BiH; is that right?  It's an actual order.

22        A.   Ms. Korner, as far as I can see, this is not an order.  This is

23     just an option that is given to people to state their own opinion and

24     position about this fact, and it is granted here that their entitlements

25     and other rights will be regulated.

Page 24185

 1        Q.   Well, so, you say the words "all members of the JNA who have BH

 2     citizenship should be kept in their present posts" offers you an option?

 3     Offers -- sorry, those with BH citizenship an option?

 4        A.   As far as I remember, Ms. Korner, I remember from some specific

 5     examples that this was done according to the principle of voluntary

 6     decisions.

 7        Q.   You were a JNA officer with Bosnian citizenship, weren't you?

 8        A.   That's right, Ms. Korner.

 9        Q.   Why didn't you stay in Bosnia instead of going to Belgrade?

10        A.   Ms. Korner, I received an order upon which all officers had to

11     act.  It stipulated in great detail where I'm going to be transferred

12     within the move to pull out the Yugoslav People's Army out.  This order

13     contained my establishment post and the garrison to which I am to be

14     transferred.  As a soldier, I obeyed this order.

15        Q.   But, I'm sorry, General, but what you actually told the Court on

16     the first day when Mr. Krgovic was asking you questions, at page 23635,

17     was that you had gone -- this -- you even said it was in January that you

18     wanted to sign up as an officer, that you wanted to present yourself to

19     tell them what your credentials were.

20             "They were supposed to send a request to my then-command within

21     the JNA, where I served.

22             "They didn't do that."  Because: "The then-Serb leadership

23     didn't ... have much confidence, didn't really trust me as an officer of

24     the JNA."

25             So apparently in January you tried.  Did you make another attempt

Page 24186

 1     when this directive came out?  Putting it at its lowest, I suppose.

 2        A.   You're right, Ms. Korner.  But I was referring to the municipal

 3     leadership, not the leadership in general.  Since they failed to invite

 4     me and, as a soldier, I received this order in the meantime, which was

 5     very precise, I had to abide by it.  And I did.

 6        Q.   All right.

 7             MS. KORNER:  Can we look, please, next at document, P1786.  At

 8     tab 17, sorry.

 9        Q.   This is a regular combat report.  And in paragraph 3 it talks

10     about the deadline for the taking away of weapons which has expired and:

11             "... the Banja Luka Ministry of Interior organs are making

12     appropriate preparations to take away the weapons, people fear possible

13     interethnic conflicts."

14             Now, were you aware, and this is after you left, I agree, of the

15     disarmament orders that were issued by the various municipal organs and

16     regional organs?

17        A.   Ms. Korner, I don't remember having seen this particular order,

18     or, rather, this combat report.

19        Q.   Well, you had a rather interesting discussion with Mr. Cvijetic

20     over disarmament with heavy -- people who had heavy weapons would be

21     disarmed by the army, and people who had hunting rifles would be disarmed

22     by the police.

23             Can we take it on your side that, as you didn't really know from

24     experience about disarmament, you were just agreeing with Mr. Cvijetic?

25        A.   Ms. Korner, I've been sitting here for ten days now, and I don't

Page 24187

 1     have the transcript available to me on a daily basis so that I can check

 2     what was it that I talked on day 1 or day 2.  Therefore, it is very

 3     difficult for me to answer your question.

 4        Q.   All right.  And I accept that entirely, General.  You don't have

 5     the advantage that we have.

 6             In summary form, and I'll turn up the page of the transcript if

 7     necessary, Mr. Cvijetic put to you that where there was disarmament going

 8     on and the persons to be disarmed had big weaponry, such as mortars and

 9     the like, it would be the army who did it; whereas, if they had hunting

10     rifles, it would be the police that did it.

11             Are you able to say one way or another, except from, I suppose,

12     common sense points of view, and depending on the armament, what actually

13     happened?

14        A.   Ms. Korner, I don't know who did what in any specific case.  One

15     should have to look at a specific order which probably gives instructions

16     as to who is supposed to do what.

17        Q.   Yes, all right.  Thank you, sir.  And that's, rather, what I

18     thought.

19             I just wanted to look at paragraph 6, though, which is more on

20     the topic that we've dealing with at the moment.

21             "Soldiers from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are arriving at

22     the corps unit [sic] according to plan."

23             So would you accept that it's clear that people with Bosnian --

24     who were Bosnian Serbs were coming from the FRY to re-enforce the corps,

25     the 1st Krajina Corps, as it then was?

Page 24188

 1        A.   Ms. Korner, at the time, surely there were elements of JNA units

 2     that remained in Serbia, that there were people who were born or had the

 3     citizenship of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I think that this refers to these

 4     people when you cited this order and what was offered to them, but, as I

 5     said, I don't remember that being an order.

 6        Q.   All right.  Well, in fact, you may well believe it's not an order

 7     in the same way because it says, it continues:  "Officers are still

 8     dissatisfied over having to declare whether they wish to be in" -

 9     effectively - "Serbia or the Serbian Republic of BH ..."

10             So I accept you may well be right that it wasn't an order in the

11     way that I suggested.

12             MS. KORNER:  Sorry, next can we look, please, at document

13     number 19, which is tab 19, 20220.

14        Q.   This is the first -- or it's still calling itself the 5th Corps

15     then.  Probably still was, as we'll see.  18th of May.  Dealing with

16     conscripts.  "All military conscripts who've been called up shall be

17     admitted into all the units of the 5th Corps.  Special attention shall be

18     devoted to the admission of other nationalities (Muslims, Croats, and

19     others)."

20             And then the distribution list of this order.

21             MS. KORNER:  Can we go, please, to the second page in B/C/S and

22     second page in English.

23        Q.   This is the distribution -- the order, I think, is actually

24     signed by General Talic, I believe.  And then it's to all units, is that

25     right, or to the units that were subordinated?

Page 24189

 1        A.   I agree, Ms. Korner.

 2        Q.   Right.  And I think we dealt with this yesterday, but just to

 3     reinforce.  An order such as this, which has an effect on units which are

 4     subordinated, should be sent to all those units.  A list of those units

 5     should occur.  Is that right?

 6        A.   I agree, Ms. Korner.  Provided the contents of the order pertains

 7     to all the units.  It sometimes happened that some contents, some orders,

 8     could be sent only to specific units; whereas, the others are supposed to

 9     be sent to all units.

10        Q.   Thank you.  All right.  Then we're nearly at the end of this

11     section.

12             MS. KORNER:  So can we move, please, to document -- yes.  23 --

13     sorry.  22 ... actually ... yes.  23, which is 20231.

14        Q.   Now, the reason I'm going to deal with this next series of

15     documents, General, is at one stage when you were shown the order --

16     sorry, the decision which constituted the VRS, you said there was a long

17     gap between the 12th of May and I believe it was the 18th of --

18     26th of June -- 18th of June, when the formal order -- the formal VRS

19     order came out.  And I want to show you perhaps why it took a little bit

20     of time.

21             26th of May, this is a document that has been written by, as he

22     has then become, Major-General Milovanovic.

23             MS. KORNER:  Can we go to the next page both in English and

24     B/C/S, please.

25             So that's now Major-General Milovanovic.

Page 24190

 1             And if we go back to the first page --

 2        Q.   It's headed "Army of the Main Staff of the Serbian Republic

 3     Bosnia and Herzegovina," 26th of May, to the commander, (Chief of Staff).

 4              "At the meeting on the 26th of May, 1992, the commanders and the

 5     Chief of Staff of the army of the Serbian Republic of BH and the top

 6     political leadership ... discussed possible options for the Serbian

 7     Republic Army of organisational and establishment structure.  It was

 8     concluded, amongst [sic] other things, that it should be an army

 9     consisting of quick, mobile, and efficient units based on current

10     establishment formations, existing combat hardware, weapons, and other

11     military equipment.  Light infantry brigades are to be the preferred

12     option, while infantry brigades should be formed ..."

13             Going over the -- leaving aside various discussions there, going

14     over the page again, at the top:

15             "It was also agreed that our army should be equipped for an

16     offensive defence and for guarding the Serbian territories in BH, not to

17     conquer territory belonging to the others."

18             And then it's signed by him.  And the distribution is to the

19     1st and 2nd Krajina Corps, the Sarajevo-Romanija, Eastern Bosnia, and

20     Herzegovina Corps.

21             You relied for part of your report on something that

22     General Milovanovic had testified about in the Perisic [sic] case.  Were

23     you also aware that he had testified about how he came to be in the VRS?

24     Were you shown that part?  Did you read the whole transcript?

25        A.   I don't remember, Ms. Korner.

Page 24191

 1        Q.   Well, you put in as part of the Defence documents was that part

 2     of the transcript that you relied on.

 3             MS. KORNER:  Can we have up, please, document, which has been

 4     given the 65 ter 20233.

 5             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm sorry, I was just -- luckily for us,

 6     Ms. Deirdre Montgomery was in Perisic case.  Milovanovic never testified

 7     in Perisic case.  Just for the record.

 8             MS. KORNER:  Oh, did I say Perisic?  Sorry.  Popovic.  Sorry,

 9     Your Honours, that was a ... it was Popovic.

10             And it's footnoted in the General's report, part of the

11     transcript.  But I'd like to look at another part.

12        Q.   And I'd like you to look at another part, please.

13             MS. KORNER:  Could we look, please, at page 12151.  Page 21 in

14     e-court.

15             He was asked by Mr. McCloskey how his position evolved during

16     those events.  And he said, and I'm going to summarize, that General --

17        A.   Ms. Korner, I don't have the document in front of me.  My

18     apologies.

19        Q.   You do.  But you can't -- well, you may be able to read some of

20     it in English, but I'm afraid there's no -- as far as I'm aware, there's

21     no B/C/S transcript of this.  Unless the Defence have got a copy.  How

22     did you -- well, never mind.

23             Let me summarize what is said here, and let me ask you if you

24     know this.  That on the 11th of May, General Kukanjac was removed from

25     the position of the commander of the 2nd Army to be replaced by

Page 24192

 1     General Mladic.

 2             First, did you know that?

 3        A.   I am aware of that event, Ms. Korner.

 4        Q.   All right.  And General Milovanovic said he was appointed as

 5     chief of the 2nd Army.  And he wanted to know why he was being sent to

 6     Bosnia, knowing that the JNA was in the process of withdrawal and it was

 7     disappearing from Bosnia and Herzegovina.  And he was told to go to

 8     Han Pijesak, to report to General Mladic, who was supposed to brief him.

 9             MS. KORNER:  And could we go to the next page, please.

10        Q.   And he said he got there on the 11th of May, waiting for Mladic,

11     and he found 12 people, Mladic, Gvero, including four generals.  Then

12     General Mladic briefed us and he told us that the 2nd army was being

13     transformed, that the following day the Assembly of the Serbian Republic

14     of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Banja Luka would make a decision on the

15     establishment of the Army of the Republika Srpska and that we had been

16     appointed as members of the Main Staff.  Mladic would be its commander, I

17     would be its chief, General Gvero would be assistant commander for moral

18     guidance.  Djukic, assistant commander.  And so on and so forth.

19             Now, what General Milovanovic was saying there, and I don't know

20     whether you can confirm it or not, was that the whole of the --

21     effectively, the 2nd Military District was being transformed into the

22     VRS.

23             Now, were you aware of that?

24        A.   Ms. Korner, I'm not sure that it can be interpreted in this way.

25     Although, I find it very difficult without closely studying the

Page 24193

 1     transcript in its entirety.

 2        Q.   Well, you were -- either you were -- how did you get the

 3     transcript that you relied on?  Was that something given to you by the

 4     Defence, or did you have the transcript?  Because you only had -- you

 5     only referred to a few pages of that testimony.

 6        A.   Yes, Ms. Korner.  As far as I remember, I only referred to the

 7     portion in relation to General Milovanovic saying that the armies being

 8     created were applying the rules and regulations of the former JNA.

 9     Again, if I remember correctly.

10             I do believe that I got the document from Mr. Krgovic.

11        Q.   All right.  Well, if Mr. Krgovic has the full transcript, which

12     he may have because he was in the case, you can have a look at it if you

13     require to.

14             MS. KORNER:  Right.  Can we look then, please - and, as I say,

15     this is near the end of what I want to do on this topic - at a document

16     number 01651.  At tab 25.

17        Q.   The following day, in response to General Milovanovic's request,

18     the 1st Krajina Corps replies, giving its proposal for the organisation

19     of the 1st Krajina Corps.

20             Have you -- no, I don't imagine you've seen this document before

21     either.

22        A.   If it's not on my list --

23        Q.   [Previous translation continued] ...

24        A.   -- then I haven't, Ms. Korner.

25        Q.   In which case, I don't think I can ask you anything about it.

Page 24194

 1             MS. KORNER:  But can we then move, please, to the 1st of June.

 2     And it's document number L51.  Oh, and it's at tab 30.  Four days later.

 3        Q.   The Law on the Army is published, 1st of June.  And under

 4     Article -- as you say, the Army of the Serbian Republic, I think you

 5     dealt with that, so you looked at a different document, is the armed

 6     force of the Serbian Republic of Herzegovina.

 7             [As read] "Article 3, the persons serving in the army are

 8     soldiers and employees of the army.  Pursuant to the present law, the

 9     following shall be members of the army, soldiers, cadets of

10     Military Academies (herein after cadets), active members of the military

11     reserve personnel whilst on military duty in the army.  Active member of

12     the military shall include officers, non-commissioned officers, and

13     soldiers under contract."

14             And I take it that you are familiar with that, because you looked

15     at it with Mr. Krgovic, I believe.

16             Is that right, General?  I'm sorry, I need an answer.  You're

17     familiar with the law?

18        A.   Ms. Korner, I believe that document is actually on my list.

19        Q.   All right.  Well, exactly.  So the answer is yes.  All right.

20             Can we just look at Article 9 for a moment, which is the next

21     page, I think.

22             MS. KORNER:  It's the same page in B/C/S, but the next page in

23     B/C/S.

24        Q.   Replenishment -- it's headed "Replenishment of the Army."

25     Article 8:

Page 24195

 1             "Citizens ... shall join the army pursuant to regulations issued

 2     by competent bodies ... based on conscription or the regulation on the

 3     admission to activity military service, i.e., to cadet school."

 4             Article 9:

 5             [As read] "Military units and institutions shall be replenished

 6     with troops from the active forces, reserves, materiel, et cetera.  In a

 7     state of war, imminent threat of war, or in a state of emergency, the

 8     army may be replenished with volunteers.  Pursuant to provisions of

 9     paragraph 2 herein, volunteers are persons joining the army at their own

10     request, without a war time assignment, and the persons described in

11     paragraph 2 herein shall have equal rights and duties to members of the

12     military, i.e., conscripts."

13             Now, do you agree - and you are familiar with this whole law -

14     that nowhere is there a mention of resubordinated police being members of

15     the army, either as conscripts or anywhere else?

16        A.   Ms. Korner, in my opinion, one should establish a link between

17     this law, the Law on Military Duty of the former state, and the Law on

18     All People's Defence, which we discussed and which envisages the

19     involvement of military police in combat operations.  Only then could we

20     properly discuss the subject.

21        Q.   [Previous translation continued] ... no, I appreciate what you're

22     trying to say and what you've been trying to say throughout your evidence

23     on this issue, but at the moment it really is a simple question:

24             Is there any mention in the Law on the Military, passed on

25     1st of June, 1992, of resubordinated police, under Article 104 of the

Page 24196

 1     All People's Defence?

 2        A.   Ms. Korner, we would need to go through every single article of

 3     this law.  It is possible that it is not mentioned in this law.  I do,

 4     however, assert that there are provisions in other laws saying that from

 5     battalion commander level up, in a situation of war or imminent threat of

 6     war, may resubordinate someone from the police.  The law entitles that

 7     commander to do that.

 8        Q.   Yes.  Well, two things:  You have overnight to consider it.  I

 9     would be grateful if you would point me to any law or regulation that

10     says in times of imminent threat of war a commander may -- a brigade

11     commander, or officers to the level of a brigade commander, may

12     resubordinate police, other than Article 104 of the All People's Defence.

13     I'll give you overnight.

14             But, anyhow, that's the only question I want to ask you about

15     that.

16             MS. KORNER:  Can we look now, please, at document 1D534, MFI,

17     apparently.  Not sure why.  Just a second.  Ah, yes, well, in fact, this

18     was a document - [indiscernible] - that Mr. Zecevic attempted to put in

19     and Mr. Hannis -- I'm not sure ... and Mr. Hannis pointed out that there

20     was a military expert to whom it could be put, but nobody seems to have

21     bothered to put it to him.  So I'm quite happy to deal with it.

22        Q.   This is the decision of the 15th of June, 1992, on the forming,

23     organisation, establishment, command, and control of the Army of the

24     Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

25             Now, have you seen that document before?  I don't think that's on

Page 24197

 1     your list at all.  In fact, I know it isn't.

 2             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, I'm told it was Mr. Bajagic, that this

 3     was the attempt to put it through.

 4        Q.   Are you familiar with that document at all?

 5        A.   Ms. Korner, this document is on my list.

 6        Q.   I beg your pardon, General.  I may have missed it.  Can you tell

 7     us where you footnoted it?  In any event, so you are familiar with it.

 8     Let's not waste time.  I accept it entirely.

 9             MS. KORNER:  In which case, Your Honours, Mr. Hannis objected to

10     it going in through Mr. Bajagic.  But Mr. Zecevic certainly wants it in.

11     We're happy to have it in as well.

12                           [Trial Chamber confers]

13             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm grateful to Ms. Korner.  I don't have any

14     objection.  Document should be de-MFI'd, actually, yes.

15             JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated] Yes.  So ordered.

16             MS. KORNER:  Thank you.  In which case it must be in the Defence

17     documents as well.

18        Q.   And, finally, then, on this -- as I say, the document that you

19     were shown by the Defence for the 18th of June, which is tab 11 in their

20     bundle, is -- it's got the 65 ter number 39D2.

21             And there's the decision that you were shown by Mr. Krgovic.

22             Now, General, the reason that I've been taking you through,

23     somewhat torturously and at length, all these documents, apart from

24     whether or not the TO formed the bulk of the VRS, is because you told

25     Mr. Krgovic that you couldn't understand why there was this gap between

Page 24198

 1     the 12th of May -- I better find the exact reference.

 2             Yes, it's 23676, second day of your testimony:

 3             "General," it was asked of you, "can you tell us what

 4     implication ... this order has [sic] in the process of ... forming of an

 5     army?"

 6             And you said:

 7             "It is slightly unusual that nearly a month elapsed after the

 8     decision that we mentioned a minute ago to establish an army.  And then

 9     one month later, an order is issued to form unit commands of the ...

10     Serbian Republic ..."

11             In fact, as we can see, there was pretty much continuous

12     activity, wasn't there, between the 12th of May and the 18th of June when

13     this all -- 15th of June, when this order came out.  Do you accept that?

14        A.   Ms. Korner, I accept that certain consultations were underway.

15     We see the Main Staff sending suggestions to the corps and the corps

16     sending their own suggestions back.  All I did was voice my opinion, as

17     it is.  In a war situation, the process should have been a lot speedier.

18        Q.   Well, the thing was you voiced your opinion on -- without the

19     knowledge, didn't you?  You hadn't seen the documents that I've just

20     shown you.  With the exception of the Law on the Army.

21        A.   Ms. Korner, if you look at my list, item 28 specifically, it

22     reads:  "Decision of the Presidency of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and

23     Herzegovina on establishing, forming, organising and commanding the VRS."

24        Q.   Yes.  I'm sorry.  You misunderstand.  What you hadn't seen was

25     the Milovanovic order asking for suggestions; the 1 KK reply, and

Page 24199

 1     presumably all the other corps replied as well; the earlier discussions,

 2     about which we can see in the Mladic diary; and -- and the like.  You

 3     hadn't looked at any of that, had you?  And that's why you said, Well,

 4     it's rather odd that it should take nearly a month.

 5        A.   No, Ms. Korner.  I was wondering as an officer, as a soldier,

 6     given the conditions of war and the 12th of May Assembly decision about

 7     all this thing about the army being set up, my personal opinion is this

 8     should have been a lot speedier.

 9        Q.   All right.  Now, I regret to say, I think for the rest of this

10     afternoon, I want to return to the controversial issue of

11     resubordination.

12             Now, General, it really comes down to -- to three or four things,

13     doesn't it?

14             First, how does resubordination come about?  In other words, is

15     it automatic whenever there's a joint action - and "joint," using in a

16     non-military sense, just togetherness - between the MUP and the VRS?

17     That's the first thing, isn't it?  You're saying it's effectively

18     automatic because of, as you put it, the principle of singleness of

19     command.

20        A.   Yes, that's right, Ms. Korner.

21        Q.   All right.  The next issue on that is how the MUP comes to be in

22     a resubordinated position.  In other words, does it come about without a

23     request; or does there have to be a request?

24             Would you agree with that?

25        A.   Ms. Korner, we discussed both cases.  The case in which a

Page 24200

 1     commander decides on his own, based on assessment of the situation, to

 2     resubordinate all of the forces, including the civilian authorities, to

 3     his command.

 4             We've also discussed cases in which a commander talks to the

 5     Ministry of the Interior, the public security station, seeking to have

 6     certain forces allocated to him for a particular mission.

 7        Q.   Yes.  Well, as I say, that's one of the other issues.

 8             The third is, what is the status of police officers who are in a

 9     resubordinated position in the military?  In other words, are they

10     military conscripts, as you suggest, and therefore lose all their rights

11     and entitlements as policemen; or do they remain policemen who are merely

12     acting under the orders of the army?

13             Do you agree with that?

14        A.   Ms. Korner, I said there needs to be a document that deals with

15     this.  A resubordination document or a document on a unit being

16     dispatched somewhere.  For example, a police unit is sent off to become a

17     part of a military unit.  Its members temporarily lose their status as

18     the officials that they are.  For the duration of that particular

19     mission, they become military personnel.

20        Q.   Yes, I understand that's what you're saying, and I'm going to ask

21     you on what possible basis you make that assertion when we get to it.

22             Fourth issue, really, is:  Who was responsible for carrying out

23     or taking disciplinary proceedings and/or criminal proceedings during a

24     period when a police officer, or police officers, were subordinated,

25     resubordinated to a military command?

Page 24201

 1             And as I understand your assertion, it is that the military would

 2     be responsible for the taking of disciplinary action and criminal

 3     proceedings.

 4             Am I correct in understanding that's what you say?

 5        A.   Ms. Korner, that would be the authority of that unit's commander.

 6     All members of that unit are subject to rules and regulations, or,

 7     rather, the unit commander must initiate proceedings against individuals

 8     found to have committed some disciplinary infraction or, indeed, criminal

 9     offence.

10        Q.   Yes.  So that all depends on whether you are correct in your

11     assertion that police officers resubordinated effectively are members of

12     the military.  They are conscripts.  Because if they're not, then - would

13     you agree? - disciplinary and/or criminal, depending on the nature of the

14     offence, whether it's a military offence or a civilian-type offence,

15     would be the responsibility of the police officer's chain of command.

16             That's right, isn't it?

17        A.   That's right, Ms. Korner.

18        Q.   All right.  You insist that for resubordination, for the police

19     to become members of a military unit or command, there has to be a

20     document.  I mean, that's a precursor, is it, to any proper

21     resubordination?

22        A.   Ms. Korner, that's what the theory says.  It is in that document

23     that many individual things, rights and commitments, depend, anything at

24     all that stems from that document which also regulates all of that when

25     the resubordination commences, as well as when it ends.

Page 24202

 1             Other things mentioned are also the different costs, travel

 2     costs, various types of expenditure.  So in one word, yes.  There needs

 3     be to a document.

 4        Q.   And if there isn't a document, if no one has produced a document

 5     saying, The Banja Luka - no, let's take a small one - the Prnjavor, your

 6     brother's station, SJB is hereby ordered to supply 20 men for the

 7     purposes of combat - because it has to be combat, doesn't it? - to the

 8     army, and no document is produced to that effect, a military commander

 9     rings up -- rings up - gets in touch with the SJB chief, says, I need 20

10     men, send them over right away.  And the SJB chief does that.  And nobody

11     ever produces a document about that.  It's all unofficial.  Well, then,

12     that is an illegal action by both the SJB chief and the army officer.  Is

13     that right?

14        A.   Ms. Korner, when I spoke about document, it's is quite possible

15     that orders are verbally transmitted, as you showed us yesterday.  And a

16     verbally transmitted order is then recorded in a log-book.  Reference is

17     included in the duty officer's reports.  If this unit is off on a combat

18     mission, in my opinion there needs to be an underlying document.  It is a

19     serious activity.  Sending men to battle is a serious activity.

20        Q.   Yes, quite.  But it's not just battle you're talking about,

21     apparently.  And you've said -- I'm sorry, you've said over and over

22     again, There has to be a document, because all sorts of things are

23     regulated by that document, not just the length of the service, but the

24     payment and all the rest of it.

25             So let's go back to what I was saying.  If no such document is

Page 24203

 1     brought into existence whatsoever, is that not, in your book, an illegal

 2     action?  It's contrary to the regulations and the law.

 3        A.   Ms. Korner, it is not illegal.  According to the rules and

 4     regulations, a superior officer may issue a verbal order by which he

 5     commands and conveys orders.

 6        Q.   But supposing - and just looking at it this way - the -- the

 7     SJ -- the commander who's got in touch with the SJB Prnjavor doesn't want

 8     police officers to fight, to engage in combat, as defined.  He simply

 9     wants the police to, if you like, stick up a roadblock to make sure that

10     people fleeing from the village don't get away.

11             Are you saying then that the police unit that does that is

12     resubordinated to the military?

13        A.   Ms. Korner, we need to analyse this on a case-by-case basis, in

14     view of the mission and the contents and the purpose of sending a unit.

15     If this police force and this barricade, roadblock, is within the zone of

16     responsibility of a certain commander, then these elements of the police

17     force are resubordinated and placed under the command of this particular

18     commander.

19        Q.   Well, if you take that to its logical conclusion, General, then,

20     if police officers acting in the zone of responsibility of a brigade

21     commander commit a serious crime, such as the killing of over 100 people,

22     it is the brigade commander who is responsible for the criminal

23     investigation of those police officers and the disciplining or otherwise,

24     isn't it?

25        A.   That's right, Ms. Korner.  If, at that time, they were

Page 24204

 1     subordinated to him and took part in a joint operation.

 2        Q.   Well, I'm sorry, that's not what you said before.

 3             What you said a minute ago was:

 4             "If the [sic] police force and this [sic] barricade ... is within

 5     the zone of responsibility of a certain commander, then ... elements of

 6     the police force are resubordinated and placed under the command of this

 7     particular commander."

 8             So, therefore, if what is happening is that police officers, for

 9     example, are transferring prisoners and commit offences, it's not the

10     responsibility of the police to investigate.  It's the responsibility of

11     the army.

12             Is that what you're saying?

13             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think that this is

14     either mistranslation or -- I don't want to confuse the witness.  But I

15     would like to hear from the witness.  Since he understands a little

16     English, I don't want to suggest any -- anything to him.

17             MS. KORNER: [Previous translation continued] ...

18             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] What Ms. Korner is saying, that the

19     witness didn't say, is not something that is -- that derives from the

20     transcript.

21             MS. KORNER:  All right.  Can I start this and then I think it's

22     time -- probably time for the break.  But can I just put this.

23        Q.   If, in this example, the commander, the brigade commander, says

24     to the SJB, "I want you to lend me -- or your part in this is to set up a

25     roadblock and prevent people from fleeing from the village which I'm

Page 24205

 1     about to shell with my troops," and during the course of that activity,

 2     when the roadblock is set up, the police who are manning it kill the

 3     fleeing civilians or catch them and beat them, it is your contention, is

 4     it, that it is the military who are responsible for investigating the

 5     crime?

 6        A.   Yes, Ms. Korner.  Provided these men were subordinated to this

 7     commander within the task performed.

 8        Q.   [Previous translation continued] ... but, you see, we keep going

 9     round in endless, ever-decreasing circles.  And the reality is, isn't it,

10     that resubordination was done, as it's properly understood, was done on

11     rare occasions for effectively large-scale military operations, such as

12     Operation Corridor?

13        A.   Ms. Korner, in my report I stated and asserted that when the

14     police was used for combat, there always has to be resubordination.  And

15     you can only have one commander.

16             You are giving me various examples, and I don't know what is the

17     particular status of this unit in the events that you are describing.

18     But I know that the commander of the brigade, of the corps -- or the

19     corps must know what is going on, on the ground.

20        Q.   And all of this, as you say, this resubordination, depends on

21     there being a document to that effect, doesn't it?

22        A.   Either a document or a decision of the commander in charge, which

23     confirms that he has engaged a number of men and subordinated them to

24     himself.

25             MS. KORNER: [Previous translation continued] ... I thought that

Page 24206

 1     was -- I'm being told it is time for the break.

 2             JUDGE HARHOFF:  It is actually.  We're past the time.

 3             But there was a question put to you, General, by Ms. Korner,

 4     regarding the authority to investigate and possibly either prosecute or

 5     initiate disciplinary proceedings against anyone who, while being

 6     resubordinated from the police to the army, commits a crime.  And I don't

 7     think you answered that part of her question.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I said, and I stand by

 9     it, that for as long as police officers are subordinated to a military

10     commander it is up to the military commander to undertake all possible

11     measures, including disciplinary and criminal actions, against

12     individuals who are committing infringement of discipline or violate the

13     rules of international laws of war.

14             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Thank you.

15             JUDGE HALL:  Yes, so we'll take a break and return in 20 minutes.

16                           [The witness stands down]

17                           --- Recess taken at 5.26 p.m.

18                           --- On resuming at 5.51 p.m.

19                           [The witness takes the stand]

20             MS. KORNER:

21        Q.   General, as we already established, you had no personal

22     experience of the combat or, indeed, the events in Bosnia after

23     May of 1992.  That's correct, isn't it?  No personal experience.

24        A.   Well, that's what you are claiming, Ms. Korner.  I did not take

25     part in any combat activities after May 1992.

Page 24207

 1        Q.   I'm not claiming anything, General.  I thought you -- that's what

 2     you told us.  In Bosnia, in 1992, you took no part in the military

 3     activities, nor, at that stage, were you a member of the VRS.

 4        A.   Ms. Korner, the term "military activities" is a rather broad

 5     notion, but I do accept what you say.

 6        Q.   All right.  Nor, in fact, have you ever personally had

 7     resubordinated to you, or asked for the resubordination in the course of

 8     your military duties, of police?

 9        A.   No, Ms. Korner.

10        Q.   I want to ask if you'll agree with these statements.

11             If a brigade commander wanted to request resubordination, as a

12     commander, he had to do it through regular or interim combat reports to

13     his superior commander.

14        A.   Ms. Korner, a commander, in compliance with the prevailing

15     situation on the ground, may take such a decision, either independently,

16     or independently but he is obliged to inform, about this decision, his

17     superior officer.

18        Q.   Yes.  So you wouldn't agree that before he could ask for the

19     police to resubordinate men he had to get the permission of his

20     commander?

21        A.   I said in keeping with the current situation.  And tomorrow, I'm

22     going to show you the article of the law which says that a battalion

23     commander can independently decide to employ certain forces and include

24     them in his unit that, for example, have to perform some work obligation

25     or other type of obligation that stems from mobilization that was

Page 24208

 1     declared in a country or in a certain region.

 2        Q.   All right.  Would you accept this:  That the request made by the

 3     brigade commander had to include a statement of reasons, whether -- that

 4     a -- for example, that a situation had occurred that demanded such

 5     resubordination; and it would be the superior who would decide whether

 6     the request was granted within the superior's own framework of

 7     competencies?

 8        A.   Not in every single case, Ms. Korner.

 9        Q.   Well, as a general rule, then, would you agree that that

10     statement is correct?

11        A.   I told you that a battalion commander may request the draft

12     office that keeps the records of all conscripts, to have even the chief

13     of the public security station be sent to him.  And then, subsequently,

14     he is duty-bound to inform the superior who is at the next level above

15     him.

16        Q.   No, I'm sorry.  That -- just answer, please, the question I ask.

17     I really do have limited time.

18             As a general rule, would you agree that the statement that a

19     situation that -- the brigade commander had to include a statement of

20     reasons to his superior, and it was his superior who would decide whether

21     the request was granted.

22             As a general rule, would you agree with that or not?

23        A.   I agree with you, Ms. Korner, that that is how it was supposed to

24     be.  But I would like to underline that according to the law it is

25     possible for a commander to act independently.

Page 24209

 1        Q.   Yes.  Well, you're going to tell me what law that is tomorrow, so

 2     let's just carry on with this.

 3             Would you also agree with this statement:  If, during a period of

 4     resubordination, a civilian police officer commits a disciplinary

 5     offence, the chain of command who would deal with it would be that of the

 6     civilian police?

 7        A.   No, Ms. Korner.  I keep saying that if a person is subordinated

 8     to a military commander, then it is the military commander who undertakes

 9     certain measures.

10        Q.   So if any brigade commander thought that was the position, he was

11     totally and utterly wrong; is that right?  Is that what you're saying?

12        A.   You mean in general, Ms. Korner?

13        Q.   No.  I mean specifically.  If a brigade commander was under the

14     impression -- not the impression - was sure that if the disciplinary

15     offence were to be committed by a resubordinated police officer it would

16     be the police officer's own chain of command that would deal with it.

17     That's wrong, according to you?

18        A.   According to the rules in force, I think that he would be wrong.

19        Q.   Well, you don't think.  You've been asserting throughout this

20     that he is wrong.

21        A.   That's right, Ms. Korner.

22        Q.   Would you agree that, even when resubordinated, the police

23     officers were under the command of a police -- the ordinary police

24     officers were under the command of a superior police officer who, in

25     turn, would be under the command of a military officer?

Page 24210

 1        A.   That's right, Ms. Korner.

 2        Q.   Would you agree that, even where there was resubordination, the

 3     police commander would be reporting on the events, and the like, to his

 4     immediate superior in the police?

 5        A.   Ms. Korner, this police commander is subordinated to a military

 6     commander, and it is to him that he is reporting about all the activities

 7     and all the details pertaining to his unit.

 8        Q.   So, as far as you're concerned there would be no circumstances in

 9     which a police officer in charge of a resubordinated unit would be

10     sending reports back, about what was happening, to his superior officer

11     in the police?

12        A.   Ms. Korner, I already said that if he is subordinated to a

13     commander of a military unit, the chain of reporting is identical to the

14     chain of command for the duration of this situation and until such time

15     as this policeman is returned to his police station.

16        Q.   All right.  Just before we look at the documents:  On what law do

17     you base your assertion that when a police officer is resubordinated

18     under the terms of Article 104 he loses all rights and responsibilities

19     as a police officer and, ergo, does not report to his superior officer?

20             Under what law?  Where does it say that?

21        A.   Ms. Korner, this is contained in all the military rules that

22     govern command relation, the principle of singleness of command and

23     subordination.  The law provides that if a police unit is resubordinated

24     to a military unit, it becomes subordinated to the commander of that

25     unit.

Page 24211

 1        Q.   I understand that.  It says "resubordinated."

 2             But where does it say - leaving aside singleness of command -

 3     where does it say a police officer resubordinated is no longer a police

 4     officer and therefore has no rights of payment, pension,

 5     responsibilities, such and such; where does it actually say that?

 6        A.   Ms. Korner, I think that this is provided by Article 11 of the

 7     Law on Mandatory Military Service.  It defines the moment when someone

 8     becomes a member of the unit, and it stipulates the status thereafter

 9     that he acquires and all the entitlements that he is granted.

10        Q.   But that has nothing to do -- that has to do, does it not -- not

11     that we've got that law, as far as I know - that has nothing do with

12     the -- the borrowing, if you like, of some police officers and

13     resubordinating for the purpose of combat?

14        A.   Ms. Korner, we mentioned the Law on All People's Defence several

15     times so far, and this is where this is very clearly stipulated and

16     provided.

17        Q.   No, it doesn't say anything of the sort, does it?  I don't want

18     to have up for the nth time Article 104.  It says "for the purposes --"

19             MS. KORNER:  Well, I suppose we better have it up.  Can we have

20     up document 104.  L1, please.

21        Q.   Actually, I don't want to go -- because I am short of time and

22     we've seen it a number of times and it's a matter of interpretation.  You

23     interpret it one way, and we suggest that, on the evidence, you're wrong.

24             So can we look, please, now, first of all, at one of the

25     documents you were shown by the Defence, which is P603, and it's document

Page 24212

 1     95 in the Defence bundle.

 2             MS. KORNER:  No, that's not the one I want to have a look at.

 3                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

 4             MS. KORNER:  Sorry, that's definitely not the one I want.  Yes.

 5     It's ...

 6                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

 7             MS. KORNER:  Oh, 60.3.  Sorry.  60.3, not 603.

 8        Q.   Now I would ask you, General, to keep your answers really, really

 9     short from now on because there are a lot of documents that I want to

10     show you.

11             This is the order to the command of the 10th Partisan Division on

12     1st of April, 1992.  As you pointed out when you were asked about it,

13     this is still the time of the JNA and you do not know the circumstances

14     of this order.

15             "Establish full co-operation," well, it's co-ordination, although

16     I think the translation still says co-operation, "...with the organs of

17     government in Sanski Most municipality and collaboration with TO --"

18     well, let's have a look at the exact words.

19             Sorry, does it say -- I'm sorry, perhaps you should read it out.

20     Read out that part, would you?  Under order: 1; the third paragraph.

21        A.   Ms. Korner, I quote: "Implement a full co-operation with the

22     authorities in Sanski Most municipality and co-ordinated action with the

23     TO and police units."

24        Q.   Right.  Now, and you say that means that the officer to whom this

25     order was given, in fact, as we know, Lieutenant-Colonel Peulic, was

Page 24213

 1     resubordinating the police and TO to his command; is that right?

 2        A.   Ms. Korner, as I've already said several times, if it's about

 3     co-ordination or co-ordinated action with TO or police units, then any of

 4     the forces being co-ordinated in the implementation of that task are

 5     subordinated to that commander.

 6             In addition to that, we don't have a co-ordination plan here.  We

 7     don't see the specific forces involved.  We don't see the specific police

 8     units involved.  Therefore, it's highly imprecise, from my perspective.

 9        Q.   Right.  And you don't know what was happening in Sanski Most at

10     the time, do you?

11        A.   No, I don't, Ms. Korner.  You keep taking me back to a specific

12     event, and what I'm talking about is the theory, the rules, and the

13     regulations.

14        Q.   I know.  But we've been through this a number of times.  The

15     theory is all very well, but the practice, you would accept, wouldn't

16     you, General, may be very different?

17        A.   Ms. Korner, I agree with you.  I have addressed the issue too.  I

18     know what war means, and it doesn't always work based on theory.

19        Q.   And the one person who could have addressed what he understood by

20     this order and what happened is the person to whom it went,

21     Lieutenant-Colonel Peulic.  Would you agree with that?

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 24214











11 Page 24214 redacted.















Page 24215

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I may just add

15     this.

16             This is a slightly different situation than we would encounter

17     with an ordinary witness.

18             The present witness is an expert who may well have been in a

19     position to obtain confidential material or even documents under seal.

20     He took up this commitment when he was scheduled to appear.  He knows and

21     has signed a document to that effect that he is under no circumstances

22     allowed to disclose any of the material used in the process of drafting

23     his report.

24             So the situation is slightly different.  The present expert --

25     the present witness, being an expert witness, is allowed to access

Page 24216

 1     certain types of confidential material and has already assumed the

 2     responsibility and undertaken the obligation of keeping this to himself

 3     and under no conditions disclosing any of it.

 4             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.  But, of course, the -- that's --

 5     that's -- what happened today is a slightly -- is a variation on that

 6     principle, so the injunction by the Court is nevertheless necessary.

 7     Thank you.

 8             MS. KORNER:  Right.

 9        Q.   Can we move on, please, General, to a document you've also been

10     asked about before, which is the 15th of May MUP order from Stanisic.

11             MS. KORNER:  It's document 1D46.  Tab 17.  Well, no it's been

12     twice actually.  Tab 16 or tab 17A.

13        Q.   This is the order from the MUP side, which, I take it, you had

14     not seen until you got here.  You didn't see it before you drafted your

15     report.

16        A.   As far as I remember, Ms. Korner, this order was discussed during

17     my examination by Mr. Cvijetic.

18        Q.   Yes.  No.  What I'm -- sorry, I think you misunderstand.  You

19     didn't see it.  It's not part of your bibliography; let's put it that

20     way.

21        A.   That's right, it isn't.

22        Q.   Right.  Now, what Mico Stanisic is doing here, you spent a long

23     time with Mr. Cvijetic over the theory that there were two police forces

24     being set up by this order.  One that was being resubordinated, and

25     another that remained as police officers.

Page 24217

 1             But in item number 3, it states:

 2             "Due to difficulties existing in communication lines with the

 3     Security Services Centre, I hereby authorise chiefs of the CSB to

 4     organise the authorised officials of the ministry in the [sic] territory

 5     ... in the war time ..."

 6             So the chief of the CSB has to get authority from his own chief;

 7     namely, the minister of the interior?  Would you agree with that?

 8        A.   Yes, Ms. Korner.

 9             MS. KORNER:  Then can we go to item 7, which is -- yes, next page

10     in both.

11        Q.   This is what I was asking you about earlier, about authority from

12     above:

13             "The use of the ministry units in co-ordinated action with the

14     armed forces ... may be ordered by the minister of the interior, the

15     commander of the police detachment of the ministry (for the Sarajevo ...)

16     and the chief of the CSB ... for the territory of the [sic]

17     jurisdiction."

18             Do you agree that the use of the word "may" means that it is not

19     a given that police forces will be used; it is within the authority of

20     the minister or the chiefs of the CSBs?

21        A.   Ms. Korner, as far as I understand, these are some preliminary

22     actions and activities being undertaken by the ministry to establish,

23     organise, and train its own units during a mobilization, if already

24     implemented.

25        Q.   I'm so sorry.  It says -- it doesn't talk about during

Page 24218

 1     mobilization at all.  It says:

 2             "The use of the ministry units in co-ordinated action with the

 3     armed forces," which is what we've been discussing.  "The commander of

 4     the police detachment and chiefs of the CSB shall inform the ministry of

 5     any use of the units," and there we have the repetition of

 6     paragraph Article 104, "whilst participating in combat operations the

 7     units of the ministry shall be subordinated to the command of the armed

 8     forces."

 9             So we're talking about, aren't we, the MUP side of these

10     co-ordinated actions, resubordinated?

11        A.   Yes, Ms. Korner.  I see that paragraph now, which confirms what

12     are you say.

13        Q.   Thank you very much.  And can we go back to my original question,

14     which is that:  What is being said there by the minister is "may."  It's

15     not a given that they will be used.  It depends on the authority of him

16     or his chiefs of the CSBs.

17        A.   Ms. Korner, it reads here that the Ministry of Interior "may"

18     order this, that the commander of the police detachment and the commander

19     of the ministry branch covering, and so on and so forth.

20        Q.   [Previous translation continued] ... yes --

21        A.   However, that doesn't imply any use being made when a unit is

22     subordinate -- resubordinated.  So this person may decide that a unit

23     will be on its way somewhere as soon as a request is received from one of

24     the relevant officers.  The minister provides instructions.

25        Q.   Yes.  General, I mean, we're making this really complicated.  All

Page 24219

 1     I'm saying is it's clear, isn't it, from this document, that what is

 2     being said is, it is up to the minister, or the chiefs of the CSB, to

 3     decide whether or not to order an attachment to the army?

 4        A.   Ms. Korner, as far as I remember, the Law on Defence states that

 5     it is the president of the republic that decides on the use of the police

 6     in war time.

 7        Q.   We've already -- but we've been through that, and you went

 8     through it with the Defence, I think.  You agree that the minister -- the

 9     president of the republic delegates certain powers to the minister of the

10     interior in the same way as he delegates them to the Chief of the

11     Main Staff?

12             I thought that's what you told us a few days ago.

13        A.   Ms. Korner, I'm afraid I have not been following closely enough.

14        Q.   All right.  You said only --

15             MS. KORNER:  I see Mr. Cvijetic on his feet, but I'm afraid I'm

16     not prepared to take any objections from Mr. Cvijetic.  It's enough that

17     we have Mr. Zecevic.

18             MR. KRGOVIC: [Microphone not activated]

19             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

20             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could Ms. Korner please quote

21     exactly what the witness said, instead of summarizing the witness's

22     answers.  Could she please provide a specific quote, transcript page and,

23     as I said, exactly what the witness said.

24             MS. KORNER:  No, I won't because I haven't got time, and I'm

25     going to be asking for further time as a result of all these footling

Page 24220

 1     objections that are going on.

 2             MR. ZECEVIC:  No, no, but, I'm sorry, but we're entitled to

 3     reference, Your Honours.  We're entitled to reference.  If Ms. Korner is

 4     putting something to the witness, then she must give us a reference to

 5     that.

 6             MS. KORNER:  Your Honour, I'm putting it as a result of his

 7     reply.  I haven't got the reference here, but I will look it up if I'm

 8     coming back to this.

 9             I would like to move on from this document.

10        Q.   Do I understand that you do not agree that this document shows

11     plainly that the minister and the chiefs of the CSB have the right to

12     refuse a request from the military?

13        A.   Ms. Korner, if you look at the command system, especially in war

14     time, each order must be carried out, unless it runs counter to the rules

15     and regulations applied.

16        Q.   Yes.  But what I'm putting to you is that the person who wants

17     the use of police as a resubordinated unit has to put or should put in a

18     request.  That's what this order from the minister means.

19             Now, do you agree with that or not?

20        A.   I agree with you that these are not military terms being used.

21     However, these are no military officers.  And that is why the term may,

22     here, be interpreted in this way.  In the military, there is no such word

23     as "may," no modality.  There are orders being given by a person to

24     another person, addressing specific tasks.

25        Q.   All right.  But you accept that clearly the minister was under

Page 24221

 1     the impression that he or his chiefs had the right to refuse, by the use

 2     of the word "may"?

 3        A.   Ms. Korner, it's what we've been talking about.  I find the

 4     definition of the following paragraph much clearer and more precise.  It

 5     talks about combat operations being carried out.  The units of the

 6     ministry are resubordinated to the command of the armed forces.

 7        Q.   Please, please just answer the question I ask.  I'm glad you find

 8     the next paragraph clearer.

 9             Does it seem that the minister thought that he had the right to

10     the -- refuse?

11        A.   Ms. Korner, I -- I can't reply in terms of deciding what the

12     minister may have meant.

13        Q.   [Previous translation continued] ... no, I agree.  Only the

14     minister could tell us what he meant.  But to anybody reading it ... all

15     right.  Let's move on.  We'll see what his subordinates thought.

16             MS. KORNER:  Can we have a look, please, at P376.  Tab 26.

17        Q.   28th of May, so some ten days or so, maybe a fortnight, after

18     Mico Stanisic's order.  Stojan Zupljanin is sending to all SJBs and the

19     corps command and the chief of the corps security, and this is the

20     Prijedor Police Station copy, it looks like.  He talks about the armed

21     conflicts, the security situation, and so on.

22             [As read] "With regard to this matter and bearing in mind that

23     further uncontrolled activity could have major undesirable consequences,

24     et cetera, all armed action and police activity is hereby forbidden

25     without a prior decision and the consent of this CSB and the relevant

Page 24222

 1     corps command of the armed forces of the Serbian republic.  Therefore,

 2     SJB chiefs and other responsible SJ [sic] officials cannot order the

 3     police to take armed action, particular to go to the areas of others SJBs

 4     to carry out certain missions, activities, without the prior consent of

 5     the CSB and the relevant corps command."

 6             Would you agree that Stojan Zupljanin is saying that my consent,

 7     as the chief, is needed before any SJB police officers can go off and

 8     carry out, -- I suppose, combat actions with the military?

 9        A.   Yes, that's right, Ms. Korner.

10        Q.   Right.  Thank you.  Now, going back to what I was asking you

11     about originally.  What he's complaining about is SJB chiefs and other

12     SJB officials are apparently sending off the police [indiscernible] armed

13     action without the consent of the relevant corps authority or his.  In

14     those circumstances, would those actions be illegal?

15        A.   Ms. Korner, if the commanders on the ground directly took that

16     unit and resubordinated it to themselves, I assert to you that they had

17     every right to do that.  Nevertheless, the centre chief, or the commander

18     of that station, should have reported to his superior about that before

19     going out on a mission.

20        Q.   But you've -- I thought you told us that nobody below the level

21     of a brigade commander could order the police to be resubordinated.  I

22     thought you told us that at least half a dozen times.

23        A.   Ms. Korner, the battalion commander, as I specified, is the

24     lowest level.

25        Q.   All right.  But, clearly, what's going on here is something

Page 24223

 1     completely different, according to the complaint.  So let's say somebody

 2     below the level of a battalion commander is taking these SJBs off.  That

 3     would be, would that not be, on your definition, illegal, subject to

 4     disciplinary proceedings on both sides at the very least?

 5        A.   Ms. Korner, as I said, the law states that the battalion

 6     commander is the lowest level which, in extraordinary circumstances, may

 7     decide to take someone and resubordinate that someone to himself.

 8        Q.   All right.  So, in fact, it can go to any level, according to

 9     you.

10             Can we move, then, please --

11             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm -- I'm truly sorry.

12             The comment:  "So, in fact, it can go to any level, according to

13     you."  The witness, for the nth time, said the battalion commander is the

14     lowest level.

15             I'm not sure I understand the comment by Ms. Korner.

16             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, I think I'd rather carry on.  And

17     we'll forget -- can we scrub that comment?  If we were in the States,

18     we'd say "strike it."

19             Can we move, please, to the -- sorry.  Yes, to the 6th of June.

20     And that's P1794.

21             MR. ZECEVIC:  Could we have a tab number, please?

22             MS. KORNER:  32.

23        Q.   This is what's been called Directive 1.  It's a directive of the

24     Main Staff of the 6th of June.  Or, rather, the Mladic, I think.  Have

25     you ever seen that before?

Page 24224

 1             No, it's not in your bibliography.  Have you ever seen it before

 2     in any other circumstances, whether at conferences, analyses, whatever?

 3        A.   That is exactly what I'm thinking about, and thank you for your

 4     assistance.  I can't quite remember.  It's possible, though.

 5        Q.   All right.  What it deals with is the various operations, in

 6     particular, Operation Corridor.

 7             MS. KORNER:  Can we look, please, at the third page in English

 8     and the second page in B/C/S.

 9        Q.   In the second stage, says this directive, in a duration of four

10     to six days create a corridor between Semberija and Bosnian Krajina and

11     reject the enemy forces away from the communications.

12             Then 5: Tasks of the unit: The 1st Krajina Corps from OG Doboj

13     uses its main forces to defend the attained lines, and so on and so

14     forth.

15             Then: By persistent and active defence, and in concert with the

16     2nd Krajina Corps, maintain the attained front line, use appropriate

17     grouping of forces and - this is all translated as - co-action with the

18     East Bosnia Corps to break the enemy forces.

19             Now, I can't see, but is the word used in both cases

20     "sadejstvo [phoen]," or whatever it is?

21        A.   That's right, Ms. Korner.

22        Q.   So the Supreme Commander -- oh, not Supreme Commander.  I'm

23     sorry.  The Chief of the General Staff is ordering two completely

24     different corps to act together in the -- for the purposes of this

25     operation, using that word.  Would you agree with that?  Three corps, in

Page 24225

 1     fact.

 2        A.   I agree, Ms. Korner.

 3        Q.   Now, can we see how that was translated by the 1st Krajina Corps

 4     into action.

 5             MS. KORNER:  At number 33, please -- sorry.  Document 33 is P1 --

 6     yes, 1795.

 7        Q.   This is Colonel Ludvig Krajnc on behalf of the 1st Krajina Corps,

 8     who, on the 10th of June, is sending out the operation to -- sending out

 9     the order, and how its going to carry out its task, to the various units

10     involved.

11             MS. KORNER:  Can we have a look, please, at the next page in

12     B/C/S and English.

13        Q.   Distributed to, you see, we see the list of subordinated units.

14     And on the next page as well.

15             MS. KORNER:  Or is it the same?  No, I think [indiscernible].

16        Q.   Oh, this is a receipt.  So these units received it.

17             Do you agree?

18        A.   Yes, I do, Ms. Korner.

19        Q.   Do you also agree that for an operation of this size, this order

20     would have to go to all the units who were expecting to take part, all

21     subordinated units expecting to take part, in this operation?

22        A.   Ms. Korner, we haven't seen the entire document.  But as a rule,

23     the contents of a document have to be conveyed either to all units or

24     only those subordinate units that are taking part in a specific mission.

25             MS. KORNER:  Right.  Now let's look, please, at page 2 in

Page 24226

 1     English, and page -- sorry, not page 2.  It's - one, two, three, four -

 2     page 5 in English, and I believe it's the same in B/C/S.

 3        Q.   Paragraph 2: Task of the 1st Krajina Corps.

 4             Second paragraph:

 5             Task: Using persistent and active defence, and in co-ordination

 6     with the 2nd Krajina Corps, hold the current front line.  And by grouping

 7     the forces advantageously and in co-ordination with the East Bosnia Corps

 8     defeat enemy forces.

 9             And the word is the usual word.

10             Now, it's right, isn't it, that the commander of the first --

11             MR. KRGOVIC:  I do apologise, but I think this is, again, a

12     translation error, because the word, what you said, "co-ordination," it's

13     "sadejstvo."  "Co-ordination."  "Action."

14             MS. KORNER: [Overlapping speakers] ... I know.  Oh, sorry.

15     Co-ord-- yes, I'm so sorry.  Yes, I meant to say it's "sadejstvo" again,

16     in each case, "co-ordinated action."

17             Now, it's right, isn't it, that the commander of the

18     1st Krajina Corps cannot order by use of the word "co-ordinated action"

19     either the 2nd Krajina Corps or the East Bosnia Corps?

20        A.   Yes, Ms. Korner.  A corps commander only commands his units in

21     line with the task assigned, the plan, or whatever he receives from the

22     Main Staff.

23        Q.   Right.  And therefore the use of the word "co-ordinated action"

24     in this context does not mean that the 2nd Krajina Corps or the

25     East Bosnia Corps are, in fact, subordinated to the 1st Krajina Corps.

Page 24227

 1        A.   Ms. Korner, I understand why you are asking me this.  Along with

 2     this directive, as I mentioned earlier, a co-ordination plan has to be

 3     worked out, and then plan of co-ordinated actions, in which it is

 4     designated which forces from a corps will be part of the command or

 5     subordinated to the operation commander.  In this case, the commander of

 6     the Main Staff is ordering both corps to make these forces available that

 7     have been provided in the plan of co-ordinated action.  And then, again,

 8     they have to be subordinated to the operation commander who is entitled

 9     to use elements of the 1st, the 2nd, and the 3rd Krajina Corps, or any

10     other forces placed at his disposal for that matter.

11        Q.   I perfectly understand that.  What I'm trying to establish, as

12     you understand, is that the use of the word "co-ordinated action" does

13     not automatically mean that the unit or the persons that are being

14     discussed are, in fact, subordinated.  And I think you agree with that.

15        A.   Here it is said that all the three corps commanders are

16     subordinated to the commander of the Main Staff.  And they must not do

17     anything without a decision of the Main Staff commander regarding this

18     particular operation.  The commander of the Main Staff, either authorised

19     them, or gives them an order, with relation to which forces are going to

20     be involved.  It does not mean that the entire corps are going to be

21     involved in this operation.

22        Q.   No.  I -- I understand that.  I perfectly accept that.  That the

23     Main Staff is ordering these three corps, who are subordinate to them, to

24     carry out this operation.  But General Talic or his -- Colonel Kranjc

25     sending this out is not suggested by, the use of the word "co-ordinated

Page 24228

 1     action," that the other 2nd Corps are co-ordinated [sic] to him.  Is that

 2     right?  Can you just say yes or no, please, because we've got about five

 3     minutes left.

 4        A.   Well, they're not subordinated in that way.

 5        Q.   Right.  The -- the 1st Krajina Corps then goes on to list under

 6     paragraph 5 the tasks of the units which are subordinated to it.

 7             MS. KORNER:  And can we come, please, to 10, paragraph 10 of this

 8     document, which is - one, two, three, four, eight, nine - page 10, I

 9     think, yes.  Thank you.

10             Under (b), security support: Focus of security support in all

11     units and safe-guarding the commander's decisions, and so on and so

12     forth.

13             "In all units, a part of the forces are to be ready to defeat and

14     destroy infiltrated sabotage and terrorist groups and other enemy special

15     forces in co-ordinate --" I suppose it says co-ordinated action.  I can't

16     see the ... well, whatever it says.

17             "... in co-ordination with neighbouring forces and police forces

18     on the ground."

19             Now, is it your contention that when he is using that phrase, and

20     I can't find it at the moment in B/C/S, but I assume it's the usual

21     phrase of co-ordinated action, yes, I can see it is, finally, General --

22             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm sorry, if you're reading the second

23     paragraph under (b), I don't think that that shows to the -- to the

24     General on the monitor.

25             MS. KORNER:  Oh, I'm sorry.  All right.  Can we ...

Page 24229

 1        Q.   Do you see that paragraph I've just read to you?

 2        A.   Yes, I do, Ms. Korner.

 3        Q.   Is it your contention that General Talic is, here,

 4     resubordinating, by the terms of this order, the police forces for the

 5     purposes of this Operation Corridor?

 6        A.   Ms. Korner, one cannot conclude that from this portion of the

 7     order.  I'm telling you that there must be a commander of the operation

 8     and there must be forces taking part in the operation.  These forces have

 9     to be put together under a single command.  He is going to take decisions

10     himself with relation to all the forces that he received from other

11     sources, whether it's logistics or any other tasks, as part of the

12     operation.

13        Q.   Right.  Well, that's all that I'm trying to establish, that the

14     use of the word "co-ordinated action" does not automatically imply

15     resubordination.  And, indeed, we went through the distribution list, and

16     no CSB, SJB, or anybody appears on -- any MUP unit appears, does it, on

17     that distribution list?

18        A.   Ms. Korner, you put me two or three -- put two or three questions

19     to me.

20             As far as I can remember, there were no public security centres

21     who received this order.

22        Q.   Right.

23             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, then that -- that will be an

24     appropriate moment for today.

25             Your Honour, however, as I say, I have lost, over the last few

Page 24230

 1     days, a great deal of time that I've asked for through objections and

 2     arguments about the admission of documents.  Your Honours said yesterday

 3     that I had until -- only until the end of the first session tomorrow.

 4     Your Honour, I would ask for a little more time because I still have to

 5     deal with a number of other issues in this case.

 6             I don't know how long Mr. Krgovic intends to re-examine for, but

 7     it may well be that he, in fact, wouldn't finish his re-examination

 8     tomorrow in any event.  But I'm asking that I may have a little extra

 9     time.

10             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, first of all, I think

11     that this request of Ms. Korner is not justified.

12             Ms. Korner spent a lot of time of her examination dealing with

13     marginal issues.  Only one session yesterday and today dealt with some of

14     the crucial matters and the issues that are contained in the expert

15     report and his -- the appearance of the expert witness here.

16             My intention was to conclude my re-direct examination as soon as

17     possible in order to allow the witness to leave on the Friday.  I'm

18     afraid that with this request of Ms. Korner this is not going to be

19     possible.  Of course, it's not up to me to suggest to the other party how

20     they should conduct their examination, but, as I said, I think that

21     Ms. Korner dedicated at least three days only to the introductory part of

22     the report, without going into any key issues, and I think that was her

23     problem.

24                           [Trial Chamber confers]

25             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Mr. Krgovic, how long -- how long do you think

Page 24231

 1     you will have for -- need for re-direct?

 2             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think that I need

 3     two or three sessions for re-direct.

 4                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 5             JUDGE DELVOIE:  The last -- the last information you gave us was

 6     one session.

 7             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] That was two days ago.

 8             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Okay.  So -- so it increases by one session a

 9     day.  Then let's finish this as quick as possible then.

10             JUDGE HALL:  Anyway, we will make this determination tomorrow.

11             But I remind counsel that whereas we appreciate that it is up to

12     counsels how to conduct his or her case, our responsibility is in terms

13     of management of the trial.  And one of the realities that we are hard up

14     against is to avoid any witness being -- waiting here for two weeks.  We

15     must complete such witness as is called next week by the time we rise on

16     Friday.

17                           [Trial Chamber confers]

18                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

19             JUDGE HALL:  Yes.  The Chamber has determined that this witness

20     will be released tomorrow.  And to that end, the -- by the time we

21     reconvene tomorrow morning, the Court Officer would be in a position to

22     report as to whether it is possible to have an extra sitting from 2.30 to

23     3.30/4.00 tomorrow afternoon.

24             Working back from that towards the morning, we would expect

25     Ms. Korner to complete her cross -- we would require Ms. Korner to

Page 24232

 1     complete her cross-examination by the third of the second session

 2     tomorrow.  So that's an extra 20 minutes.

 3             MS. KORNER:  Thank you very much, Your Honours.

 4             JUDGE HALL:  Yes.  Thank you.

 5             So we rise.

 6                           [The witness stands down]

 7                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.04 p.m.,

 8                           to be reconvened on Friday, the 16th day of

 9                           September, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.