Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 24233

 1                           Friday, 16 September 2011

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.11 a.m.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning

 6     everyone in and around the courtroom.

 7             This is case IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and

 8     Stojan Zupljanin.

 9             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

10             Good morning to everyone.  May we have the appearances, please.

11             MS. KORNER:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Joanna Korner and

12     Crispian Smith for the Prosecution.

13             MR. ZECEVIC:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Slobodan Zecevic,

14     Slobodan Cvijetic, and Ms. Deirdre Montgomery appearing for Stanisic

15     Defence this morning.  Thank you.

16             MR. KRGOVIC:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Dragan Krgovic and

17     Miroslav Cuskic, appearing for Zupljanin Defence.

18             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.

19                           [Trial Chamber confers]

20             JUDGE HALL:  Before we continue, the -- picking up on where we

21     left off yesterday in terms of today's scheduling, against the goal of -

22     and let me say parenthetically that we have just confirmed this through

23     VWS with the witness - against the goal of having the witness released

24     today, we are in the process of investigating the possibility of sitting

25     beyond the time indicated yesterday afternoon, to accommodate

Page 24234

 1     Mr. Krgovic's re-examination.  And the present disposition of the witness

 2     is that it may be -- it may mean that we would take the -- a break at

 3     1.30 and resume at 2.30, but that remains to be seen.  That's still in

 4     the process of being worked out.

 5             Ms. Korner, was there something that you wished to say?

 6             MS. KORNER:  Well, Your Honours, the first on that, of course,

 7     I -- I -- I'd be very grateful if could I have an extra 15 minutes on top

 8     of the 20 minutes, given that we started late.  I do need every second to

 9     finish --

10             JUDGE HALL:  Yes.  We're not unmindful of how these

11     investigations have affected you.

12             MS. KORNER:  Thank you very much.  Your Honours, no, I just

13     wanted -- yesterday, when -- in -- effectively in response to something

14     the witness said, I, without having had an opportunity to check,

15     paraphrased what I understood he'd said about delegation of powers, and I

16     was invited to go for the -- remind the witness of the actual words he'd

17     used in the transcript, and of course because it'd arose ex improviso, I

18     didn't have it, but I checked it last night and the relevant parts are at

19     pages 23703 -- 23704, and further, in 23805, and effectively at 23704,

20     "The president was the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces," said the

21     witness, "but the president cannot exercise command over the army."

22             So what he was -- I think was being put to him and what he was

23     agreeing with, was that it was the president's powers as

24     Commander-in-Chief of the army that were delegated to or could be

25     delegated to the Chief of Staff or the head of the staff.

Page 24235

 1             And then, later, he -- he -- it was -- the question, I think this

 2     was Mr. Cvijetic, at page 23085:

 3             "The minister of the interior within the ministry may order this

 4     kind of use," that's combat activities, "but exclusively by doing so and

 5     executing an order of superior command.  He can never do it

 6     independently," it was put.

 7             And the answer was:

 8             "Yes."

 9             So effectively what's being suggested to the witness or what was

10     being suggested to the witness was that if the minister of the interior

11     wanted to order the use, it had to be on the basis of superior command,

12     which I take to be the president.

13             And that's what the witness says.  I'm not saying that's what we

14     accept, but therefore my summary of it was, I agree, inaccurate.

15             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.

16                           [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]

17                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

18             JUDGE HALL:  Yes.  So the Registry is now requested to make the

19     necessary arrangements to facilitate the extended sitting this afternoon.

20     Thank you.

21             Could we have the witness back on the stand, please.

22                           [The witness takes the stand]

23             JUDGE HALL:  General, good morning.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

25             JUDGE HALL:  And the -- I remind you, before Ms. Korner

Page 24236

 1     continues, that you're still on your oath.

 2             And the -- we have received your communications in terms of

 3     the -- how we are going to proceed for -- for the rest of the day, and we

 4     still expect that you would be released by the end of today's -- today's

 5     sitting.  Although that may -- may be a little longer than we had

 6     indicated yesterday.

 7             Thank you.

 8             Yes, Ms. Korner.

 9             MS. KORNER:  Yes.

10                           WITNESS:  VIDOSAV KOVACEVIC [Resumed]

11                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

12                           Cross-examination by Ms. Korner: [Continued]

13        Q.   General, could we have, please, another look at the document you

14     were asked a great deal about it in -- by Mr. Krgovic, I believe, and

15     also Mr. Cvijetic, and that's the 1st of July Talic order, which is, I

16     think 1D406.  Tab 44 in our binder.  It was also in the Defence binder.

17             Yes.  This is General Talic, on the 1st of July, setting out, as

18     it were, zones of responsibility to try, presumably, to make things more

19     efficient.

20             Were you aware that on the 1st of July, 1992 Operation Corridor

21     was still going on?

22        A.   Yes, Ms. Korner.  I think that Operation Corridor went on at that

23     time.

24        Q.   And if we go to the particular line that's caused so much

25     controversy, if you like, that's on page 2, I think both in English and

Page 24237

 1     B/C/S.

 2             Now, it says:

 3             "In the conduct of combat activities all police forces shall be

 4     placed under the command of the zone commander," he has divided things

 5     into zones, as we saw, in the earlier part of this order, "who shall

 6     decide how they are used."

 7             That would mean, would it not, General, that what he is talking

 8     about there is if there are police units which have been resubordinated

 9     for the purposes of combat, it is the zone commander who will decide how

10     they're to be used in that combat.

11             Would you agree with that?

12        A.   Ms. Korner, this is a very precise order, and I agree with you

13     that the corps commander specifies under which conditions in the carrying

14     out of combat activities all police forces shall be placed under the

15     command.

16        Q.   Yes.  But I think -- it's not -- one shouldn't read it as meaning

17     that every police force within every zone commander is under that

18     command, should one?  It should be read as when the police are being used

19     for the purposes of combat, in other words, resubordinated to the army,

20     it's the zone commander who has the ultimate decision as to how they are

21     used?

22        A.   Ms. Korner, you are right.

23        Q.   Yes, thank you.

24        A.   Of course, the question is which forces those are and how strong

25     they are, if that's a what you mean.  We would have to be acquainted with

Page 24238

 1     the specific situation on the ground.

 2        Q.   Quite.  And if one looks at the next page, which is the

 3     distribution list, that is all the subordinate commands to the

 4     1st Krajina -- units, sorry, and, as we can see, it doesn't include, does

 5     it, any of the CSB chiefs or anything like that, or the minister?

 6        A.   That's correct, Ms. Korner.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  So I won't ask you about that.

 8             Now could we move, please, again to the -- a document you were

 9     asked about before, which is the July 11th meeting of the MUP, and that

10     is document number P160.  And it's tab 49A.

11             And that was a document that you hadn't seen, I think, until you

12     got here, because it's not on your bibliography.

13             If we look, please, at item 13 of the conclusions of the meeting,

14     which is page 24 in English, and I think it's page - difficult to tell -

15     I think it may be about the same page in B/C/S.  Yep.  Thank you very

16     much.

17             "In order to overcome the identified problems and issues of

18     jurisdiction between the MUP and the army of the Serbian Republic, we

19     need to prepare a joint meeting an outline all the problems and agree on

20     a solution to assure [sic] more effective co-operation and co-ordinated

21     action."

22             And then they set out the particular issues that we can see.

23     Paramilitaries.  And over the next page in English, problems about

24     engagement of police in combat, co-ordinated action of the army and the

25     MUP on crime prevention, and so on and so forth.

Page 24239

 1             Would you agree, General, that that suggests that although in

 2     your mind, and possibly in the mind of army officers, it was clear who

 3     had the authority, this was not entirely clear to the police side of it?

 4        A.   Ms. Korner, it is possible that this created huge problems for

 5     the police.

 6        Q.   Yes.  Because although, as you say, the military view was that

 7     they had the right to do anything they wanted effectively, that was not a

 8     view shared by the police?

 9        A.   Well, I don't know if I put it that way, that the military could

10     do whatever they wanted.  But they had the right to take a police officer

11     who was under work obligation and transfer him to the status of military

12     conscript under the law.  And then he becomes a military person.

13        Q.   Yes.  Well, that's what you say.  And it may well be that in

14     theory you're right.  But that's actually not what happened, was it, on

15     the ground?

16        A.   That is correct, madam.  I'm -- I'm saying how it should be in

17     accordance with the rules and regulations.

18        Q.   All right.

19             MS. KORNER:  Can we then move then, please, a little further on

20     in time.  Can we come, please, on the same topic, though, as this whole

21     question of resubordination.  And could we look, please, at another law.

22        Q.   Now you said, General, in answer to a question -- this is at page

23     23693 of the transcript, and it's on the third day of your testimony.  I

24     think it was -- it was Mr. Krgovic.  He said:

25              "General," a question, "when drafting your report, did you come

Page 24240

 1     across any rules about the competencies of the command of the land army

 2     in the VRS, and I have in mind 1992?"

 3             And you said:

 4             "I didn't come across such a document."

 5             Well, I'd like you to have a look, please, at the provision,

 6     entitled:  "Provisional Service Regulations," which is document, please,

 7     20248, and it's at tab 66A.

 8             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise.  I don't know if it

 9     was correctly interpreted, but I spoke about the corps role of the land

10     army.  That is a specific document.

11             MS. KORNER:  Well, that's not --

12             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] We were quoting from a specific

13     document.  The rule of the land army of the JNA, and then I moved onto

14     the adequate rule of the VRS.

15             MS. KORNER:  Well, Your Honour, I'm sorry, that's not the way it

16     came out.  If the translation was in error, that's one thing.  But it

17     followed on from a number of pages of discussion on the schematic, the

18     supreme commander, then the documents that the General had looked at and

19     said he came across certain documents where one finds the president of

20     the republic is authorising the commander of the Main Staff, and so on

21     and so forth.  And then the question as recorded at the top of page

22     2569 -- sorry, 23693:

23             "When drafting your report, did you come across any rules about

24     the competencies of the command of the land army in the VRS?"

25             Now if Mr. Krgovic tells me that that's not what he meant to say

Page 24241

 1     or if the translation is wrong, then, of course, I accept that.

 2        Q.   So, General, you weren't meant -- by that answer, you weren't

 3     intending to say that there were no laws or regulations relating to

 4     command and control drafted in 1992?

 5        A.   Ms. Korner, it is difficult for me to remember what I said.  I

 6     think I meant that in order to explain the topic and the problem, the

 7     rules and regulations I was able to find in the Republic of Serbia were

 8     sufficient.

 9        Q.   Ah ... yes, that may be so, but -- all right.  It's not that

10     you're asserting, General, that no rules and regulations were drafted

11     during the course of 1992 that had affected command and control of the

12     VRS.

13        A.   I did not assert that, Ms. Korner.

14        Q.   All right.  Can we, in any event just have a quick look at this

15     document.  Although it was entitled provisional service regulations, it

16     said it applied from the day of their adoption --

17             MS. KORNER:  Sorry, we need to go, please -- well, first of all,

18     can we have a look at the second page in English and the second page in

19     the B/C/S, the distribution list.

20        Q.   This was being sent on, in fact, by Mr. Vukelic from the

21     1st Krajina Corps.  It's their version of it, so we can see it's sent to

22     their units.  And, again, we'll see that it's not sent to any police,

23     CSB, to the minister, or --

24             MS. KORNER:  And then if we look at the fourth page in English

25     and B/C/S.  Yep.  Sorry, no.  Fourth page -- oh, fifth page in English

Page 24242

 1     then.  Sorry.  It's the right page in B/C/S but it's the fifth page in

 2     English, please.

 3             The Presidency of the Serbian Republic adopted in a session held

 4     on the 18th of August, 1992, the provisional service regulations of the

 5     army.  And it's signed and stamped in the original by Karadzic.

 6             Can we just look, please -- can we move on, then, another one,

 7     two -- another three pages.  It's page 8 in English, and in B/C/S -- and

 8     B/C/S, it's, yes, yes, three pages as well.

 9        Q.   Headed:  "Rights and Duties of Army Members.

10             "2. Persons employed in the army are military personnel and

11     civilian employees.  Military personnel are soldiers, cadets, active-duty

12     servicemen, and reservists, while serving in the army.  And active-duty

13     services [sic] are commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers, and

14     contract soldiers.  Civilian employs are civilians performing certain

15     specialised jobs in the army."

16             There's no mention there, is there, in defining who is a member

17     of the army and police officer who are resubordinated under the powers of

18     Article 104?

19        A.   Ms. Korner, in this specific article, and I add that I would have

20     to read the entire document, but in this article you are right in saying

21     that police officers belonging to the army force are not mentioned at

22     all.

23        Q.   Well, as I say, General, you can a copy of the whole thing.  But

24     if I'm wrong, I'm sure I will be corrected by Defence counsel.

25             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, it doesn't appear this is in the law

Page 24243

 1     library unless we've missed it, but -- so it should be added, I believe,

 2     and we can probably do that by agreement, unless I hear any objections to

 3     this.

 4             MR. KRGOVIC:  [Microphone not activated]

 5             MS. KORNER:  Sorry?

 6             MR. KRGOVIC: [Microphone not activated]...  law library.

 7             MS. KORNER:  Well, not according to us it isn't.  I mean, only

 8     if -- but it may well be we've missed it somewhere because the title in

 9     English is quite often not what -- not.  Now, right, can we move, please,

10     now to have a look at a document which is P611.  And it's at tab 74.

11        Q.   Now, this is another one of the reports on the state of morale.

12     This is for August 1992.  Done by -- in fact, it comes from the General,

13     apparently.  If we go to the last page.  I think it's signed on his

14     behalf.

15             All right.  And now can we go back, please, to the body, and it's

16     paragraph 2, which is on page 3 in English, and page 4, I think, in

17     B/C/S.  Yes.

18             I merely want to ask you if you agree that this is an example of

19     co-operation:

20             "The overall political and security situation in August 1992 was

21     characterised by the following:  The activities of several paramilitary

22     governments ... armed formations, increased extremism towards Muslim and

23     Croatian population," and so on, "and a continued effort to place the

24     organs of the authorities and the MUP, Ministry of Interior, above the

25     military formations and the army" I ought to know what RiK stands for,

Page 24244

 1     but I can't remember, "system."

 2             So stopping there, for a moment, General, does that again, is

 3     that a demonstration in this report of what appears to be, from the

 4     army's point of view, a misunderstanding of who's in charge?

 5        A.   Well, Ms. Korner, it's hard for me to confirm that, because,

 6     here, I believe, the report is about problems in the field, about the

 7     conduct of some authorities and the MUP.  And that's how I read it.  And

 8     as we see, it says the attempt to place themselves above military

 9     formations and the system of command and control.

10        Q.   And it goes on to say:

11             "For these reasons the 1st Krajina Corps commander held a meeting

12     with all unit commanders and municipal presidents at which he pointed to

13     the problem of the existence of para governments and paramilitaries and

14     the need to overcome the crisis in view of the objectives of the war we

15     are waging and at --" I think that must be "at the present time."

16             Would you accept from your knowledge of the period, the documents

17     you've looked at, either for the purposes of report or elsewhere, that

18     although there were tensions between the political, the army, and the

19     police, and arguments about jurisdiction, all three shared the same goal?

20        A.   Madam Korner, it should be understood that all these elements

21     should be aimed at protecting the Serbian people, if I understand your

22     question correctly.

23             As for how they individually interpreted that goal or implemented

24     it on the ground, one can partly see from what is noted here.

25        Q.   Yep.  And you would say, I accept because you said it before,

Page 24245

 1     that the goal was the defence the Serbian people.

 2             The report goes on to talk about the tensions in Kotor Varos,

 3     Kljuc, Sanski Most, and Prijedor, because of the large number of arrested

 4     citizens for whom there is no evidence or criminal reports that they

 5     participated in armed rebellion.  And then it goes on to talk about the

 6     CSB in Prijedor.

 7             Just pausing there for a moment, General, you've not been shown

 8     any of the documents that come out from the -- from Manjaca camp, have

 9     you, by the Defence?

10        A.   I cannot recall, Madam Korner.

11        Q.   Well, can we put it this way:  They're not in your bibliography,

12     none of them have turned up in the list of documents that the Defence

13     were going to show you, even if they didn't show them all.  So if they're

14     not there, can we take it that you weren't shown them?

15        A.   That is correct, Ms. Korner.

16        Q.   Now, the last thing I want to deal with on this document is --

17     relates to something we're going to come on to in a moment.

18             Could we have a look, please, at the third paragraph, the effect

19     of military organisation and war operations, and that's two pages on, I

20     believe, in both English and B/C/S.  It should be page 7 on the top --

21     no, next page, sorry, in B/C/S then, sorry.  And it's page 6 in English.

22             And the second paragraph begins:

23             "The prevention of these occurrences," he has described what's

24     been going on, "lies in the fact that a state of war has not been

25     declared ..."

Page 24246

 1             Now, you said in your mind there was no difference between an

 2     imminent threat of war being declared and a state of war.  But it

 3     appears, and we've seen it in other documents, General, or the Court has,

 4     that certainly to the mind of General Talic it would appear there was a

 5     difference, do you agree, from this one statement?

 6        A.   Madam Korner, I think that I said that there was no difference.

 7     But as for the authority of certain commanders and structures in each of

 8     those states, it's difficult for me to give an assessment of this report

 9     of the corps commander from the position that I am in.

10        Q.   Right.  But can I put it this way:  Wasn't the difference, as far

11     as the military were concerned, that in a state of war their powers to

12     take command and control were increased, which did not happen when it was

13     simply an imminent threat of war?

14        A.   Madam Korner, my opinion is that, regarding the authority of the

15     commanders, there is no major difference between the immediate threat of

16     war and the state of war, but there is a difference in the procedures,

17     deadlines, and similar based on my knowledge of these regulations.

18        Q.   All right.  The final sentence of this paragraph is, I suppose we

19     should go on.  He is talking about "... bad interpersonal relations

20     under -- undermined by alcoholism, lack of principles, failure to take

21     measures to protect troop lives.  The most prominent example in the

22     negative sense is Colonel Lisica, who, despite personal courage, also

23     demonstrates personal arrogance."

24             Now can we move from that document, please, to document which is

25     P683.  It's the next tab, 74A.

Page 24247

 1             And this goes back to what we were talking about, about the use

 2     of police and leaving the police undermanned.  This is to the CSB,

 3     written on behalf of Simo Drljaca, chief of the SJB, Prijedor.

 4             On 15th of September 1992 the Prijedor SJB received a telephone

 5     call from Lieutenant-Colonel Majstorovic from the Prijedor garrison who

 6     said "a telex had arrived in the garrison from the 1st Corps signed by

 7     the commander, General Talic requesting --"

 8             Now, can we just make sure that's the word, "requesting"?

 9        A.   That is correct.

10        Q.   "... that 100 policemen from the reserve police force of Prijedor

11     SJB be put at the disposal of the Army of the Serbian republic ... by

12     1400 hours."

13              "We are unable to meet the request of the 1st Krajina Corps

14     because we do not have this number," of this policeman whom we can set

15     aside, and he explains why.

16             "Earlier this month, we took 417 policemen including seven active

17     police policemen off the roster and gave them to the Serbian army in

18     order to go to the Han Pijesak area.

19             "If we were obliged to meet the request of the 1st Krajina Corps,

20     we would be forced to give up policemen from the Prijedor reserve force."

21             So, General, doesn't it appear that despite your assertions of

22     what the law and the regulations say, it was not an order from the army,

23     it was a request, which Drljaca said he couldn't meet, and he had

24     reported it up to his chief of the CSB, Stojan Zupljanin?

25        A.   That is correct, Madam Korner.  In several places here, the word

Page 24248

 1     "request" is mentioned and not "order" or "command."

 2        Q.   And doesn't this also square with what I was putting to you

 3     yesterday that were policemen were to be used by the army it had to go up

 4     through each side's chain of command.  Here we see General Talic sending

 5     an order to the lieutenant-colonel, who, at his level, puts in the

 6     request to the SJB, and the SJB chief says, Sorry, no can do, and reports

 7     to his chain of command?

 8        A.   Madam Korner, I agree that it would have been better had the

 9     mutual communication been better and if this were to be resolved jointly.

10     But I think that we could clarify that there are situations in law when

11     the commanders can decide on their own, as I said, to transfer a

12     policeman from the work duty to the military service duty.  And perhaps

13     that clarification of mine would help to clear up any dilemmas that you

14     might have.

15        Q.   I understand that.  You're saying, your reading the rules and

16     regs as they applied in the JNA, and prior to this war, mean that's what

17     can happen.  But that is clearly, I would suggest, not what either the

18     army or the police thought, is it?  Not in 1992 in the VRS.

19             Or maybe -- I'm sorry.  It's not what the police thought, I

20     suggest, and I suggest it was unclear to the army as well.

21        A.   It's possible, Madam Korner, that people in war time did not

22     study the regulations well or were not familiar with them in the proper

23     way.  On both sides.

24        Q.   All right.

25             MS. KORNER:  Can we then look very quickly at a document I think

Page 24249

 1     you already looked at.  It's the second communication from Zupljanin

 2     about this question of the relationship between the army and the police.

 3     It is document P1094, tab 75.

 4        Q.   Now, Zupljanin in this is, the 18th of September, is making his

 5     position absolutely clear not only to the SJBs but he is copying it to

 6     the minister for information, to the command of the 1st Krajina Corps,

 7     the 2nd Krajina Corps, and to the leaders of the organisational units in

 8     the CSB.

 9             "In recent times there has been an increasing number of

10     requests ..."

11             Can I confirm with you that the word is "requests"?

12        A.   That is correct, Ms. Korner.

13        Q.   "... from lower commands of the army of the Republika Srpska on

14     the territory of Banja Luka ... for the engagement of active and reserve

15     forces of the police in army formations on lines of contact with enemy

16     forces ... requests for the departure of police ... to protect

17     corridors ..."

18             "With regard to the above, I draw the attention of the security

19     of the SJB chiefs to the following:  In accordance with the agreement of

20     the most senior representatives of the army and the Ministry of Interior,

21     the Banja Luka CSB ordered the adjustment of the reserve police force to

22     bring it down to the lowest possible ratio ..."

23             Now, is the thinking behind that that if you reduce the number of

24     reserve police, then you increase the number of men who are available to

25     serve in the army?

Page 24250

 1        A.   Ms. Korner, in every municipality or republic or region, there is

 2     an authorised organ dealing with the defence matters, and they have

 3     records of all the military conscripts.  In the event of mobilisation and

 4     the imminent threat of war, these people, based on their earlier war time

 5     assignment, would report to the place where their war time assignment was

 6     so that, here, the chiefs of the public security services and unit

 7     commanders could, depending on the situation, reduce or increase the

 8     numbers or ask that authorised organ to assign these people, pursuant to

 9     their assignment and organisation, according to establishment.

10        Q.   Yes.  I'm sorry, my question is a simple one, and I'm not quite

11     clear that you're answering it.

12             You're either a reserve police officer or you're a reserve

13     military officer, correct, after you've done your military service?

14        A.   No, it's not quite like that, Ms. Korner.

15        Q.   All right.  Thank you.  Well, maybe I better give you the -- but

16     is the idea --

17        A.   But I can explain the difference.

18        Q.   Well, all I want to know is, if -- if you agree with this, and if

19     you don't, then say so and I'll move on because it's not the point I want

20     to deal with.

21             That if you decrease the number of reserve police, you thereby

22     increase the pool of those available to serve in the military.

23        A.   I cannot answer affirmatively, Madam Korner, because, besides the

24     military duty, there is the material obligation and the obligation to

25     serve in the civilian protection, so that does not necessarily mean that

Page 24251

 1     these people would end up in the army.

 2        Q.   Well, okay.  I think we can agree on this, just to move on, that

 3     decreasing the reserve police pool enables those persons who are no

 4     longer reserve policemen to be assigned to other war time tasks?

 5        A.   That is correct, Ms. Korner.

 6        Q.   And then, at the bottom of the page in English:

 7             "At the same time, we draw to the attention of SJB chiefs the

 8     fact that members of the active and reserve police forces may be engaged

 9     in combat activities according to the principle of resubordination to a

10     superior army command only in the event that combat activities are taking

11     place on the territory covered by the designated SJBs and with the

12     approval of the chief of the SJB [sic]."

13             So do you understand that to mean, and I hope it's the same in

14     the Serbian language, it's been translated, that Zupljanin is saying here

15     that, As far as I, the chief, am concerned, you cannot, as an SJB chief,

16     allow your officers to be resubordinated unless the combat activity is

17     taking place within your territory, and I, Stojan Zupljanin, have

18     approved?

19        A.   Well, I don't know how I can comment.

20        Q.   Well --

21        A.   I rather would not comment.

22        Q.   Well, I'm sure you wouldn't, General, because it doesn't square

23     with what you have been propounding.  But this document is not just what

24     Stojan Zupljanin thought about it, and I agree only he could tell us, but

25     he meant it to be read, as he says, in the next page --

Page 24252

 1             MS. KORNER:  Can we turn over -- sorry.  Can we turn over.  Can

 2     we go to the next page in English and also in B/C/S.

 3        Q.   You may not be able to see that, what I just read to you, because

 4     it was on the next page.

 5             Do you see the part I've just read to you?  And I'm sorry,

 6     General, I didn't realise that we hadn't -- you hadn't got it.

 7             And then it says:

 8             "In order to achieve full collaboration and synchronisation of

 9     the work of the army and police of Republika Srpska, I ask corps

10     commanders to draw this to the attention of their subordinate commands,

11     through their lines, and brief them on the agreements that were

12     established at a high level."

13             It cannot be read any other way, can it, General, other than the

14     way I suggested?

15        A.   I think here Mr. Zupljanin, and it says here:

16             "I kindly ask the corps commander to draw the attention of the

17     lower-ranking commands."

18        Q.   Could you pause there for a moment.  The word "kindly" doesn't

19     appear in the English translation.  Where do you say that appears?

20             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  I ask.

21             MS. KORNER:  Thank you.

22        Q.   Yes.  I'm sorry, I interrupted you.  Carry on.

23        A.   Ms. Korner, I quote the last paragraph:

24             "In order to achieve collaboration and synchronisation of the

25     work of the army and police of Republika Srpska, I ask corps commanders

Page 24253

 1     to draw this to the attention of their subordinate commands through their

 2     lines and brief them on the agreements that were established at joint

 3     meetings at the highest level."

 4        Q.   Yes.  And you -- and from -- you deduce what from that?

 5        A.   Madam Korner, I told you how I interpret the rules and

 6     regulations.  I can see that the practice was different, and I emphasise

 7     that, in exceptional circumstances, the commanders could take people on

 8     their own from work duty and transfer them to the military duty.  And in

 9     other cases, the regulations intend for this to be done by the authorised

10     organ upon the request of the units, military units.

11        Q.   Yes.  All right.  I think you've dealt with that.

12             All right.  Can we now move, please, to another aspect of matters

13     you were asked about.  You were asked -- just get this right.  Yes.  This

14     was the -- a question of disciplinary -- who would discipline them.  And

15     you were shown the document from General Talic about deserting Prijedor

16     policemen.

17             MS. KORNER:  And can we look, please -- no, I'm sorry.  That's --

18     it is a topic I want to deal with, but it's not the one.

19             I want to look at, please, the documentation surrounding the

20     General Lisica, Colonel Lisica, as he was then, and Mr. Bjelosevic, chief

21     of the Doboj CSB correspondence.

22        Q.   Because you were only shown one letter and I would like you to

23     look at that in context.

24             MS. KORNER:  So could we have a look, please, at the document

25     which is P683 -- no, sorry.  P -- sorry, yes.  1D283 -- 263, which is at

Page 24254

 1     tab 75A.

 2        Q.   This is Bjelosevic to, in fact, Colonel Lisica, who responds to

 3     it.  2nd of October.

 4             "Due to the worsening security situation in the area of Serbian

 5     municipalities" et cetera, et cetera, "... we are forced to withdraw the

 6     police from combat operations on the front in Bosanski Brod and

 7     Gradacac..."

 8             Do you accept that he's not saying "please, may we withdraw,"

 9     he's telling Colonel Lisica that he is going to withdraw them?

10        A.   That's what it appears to be, Ms. Korner, but you cannot say

11     definitely whether he is asking him to do that or making the decision to

12     do that.  Perhaps he is just informing him of the situation.  It's

13     difficult to say what the word "forced to" means and what the

14     consequences of that would be.

15        Q.   All right.  He goes on to say:

16             "We will carry out the withdrawal of the police from these fronts

17     on the 4th of October, 1992."

18             In the last -- he then complains about uniformed -- he wants

19     closer ties with the military police.

20             "We hope you will correctly understand the reasons why we are

21     forced to withdraw the police from the battle-field.  We also expect your

22     positive reply with regards to our request to organise and achieve a

23     higher level of association..."

24             Now, let's look at the only document that you were actually

25     shown at -- and I take it you were not shown the original letter by the

Page 24255

 1     Defence because it wasn't on their list.

 2             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, I think Ms. Korner is

 3     talking about the Stanisic Defence and is talking about that document.

 4             MS. KORNER:  Yes --

 5             MR. KRGOVIC:  [Interpretation] Because there linked document.

 6     There is a request, this one, and then there is a reply by Commander

 7     Lisica to this where he does say, I do not permit that.

 8             MS. KORNER:  Do you know, I am just about to come to that, and I

 9     made it clear I was just about to come to that.  But my complaint is

10     that -- or the General has confirmed, rather by my complaint, that a

11     selected number of documents were shown, which I suggest are out of

12     context.

13        Q.   Now can we have at a look at the only document in this series

14     that you were shown by the Defence, which I was just about to, which is

15     tab 90 -- 92 of the Defence binder and is one --

16             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I think this is an inappropriate

17     comment.  Ms. Korner is leading the witness wrongly.  She said that this

18     document hadn't been shown, which is wrong.  It had been shown to him.

19             MS. KORNER:  Let's ask the General rather than having this

20     unseemly --

21        Q.   General, were you shown this document by either Mr. Krgovic or

22     Mr. Cvijetic, the one that we just looked at on the screen, which is the

23     first letter?

24        A.   Ms. Korner, I will be as fair as so far.  If it was shown to me

25     and if it can be found in my bibliography then I seen it, because I made

Page 24256

 1     an oath to speak the truth, but I don't remember every single document.

 2     If it was shown to me, I saw it.

 3        Q.   All right.  Can we go then, please, to the document that you

 4     actually looked at in court.  As I say, that is Defence document 1D264.

 5             MS. KORNER:  We've got it up.

 6        Q.   This is the reply you were shown.  Oh, no, it isn't.  We haven't

 7     got it up.  Sorry.

 8             MS. KORNER:  Can we have it up, please.  1D264.

 9        Q.   This is the reply from Colonel Slavko Lisica, saying:

10             "I've understood your --" he calls it a proposal.  "We're

11     satisfied with their work.  We're going to pull them out for a rest, and

12     the reasons you provided are valid, but you don't understand the

13     situation we are in."

14             It was actually Mr. Cvijetic who was asking you about this

15     because he went on about there was Colonel Lisica putting defence above

16     everything.

17             And then can we look at the last of -- letter in this, please,

18     at -- which is 1D265, which is at tab 75B.

19             Now, did you see this letter, Colonel -- General?  I'm so sorry.

20        A.   Well, Ms. Korner, my reply would be the same in respect of all

21     documents.  If it was shown to me, and if it's in my bibliography

22     then ...

23        Q.   No, well it's clear it's not in your bibliography and you weren't

24     shown it in the court.

25             6th of October, Mr. Bjelosevic writes back saying:

Page 24257

 1             "I received your reply of the 3rd --" and there's an order which

 2     he's talking about, the 4th, which I don't believe we have.  But anyhow.

 3              "... all the more since I believe the co-operation between TG 3

 4     and Doboj CSB has been excellent.  Did we not fulfil each and every one

 5     of your requests, put at your disposal a vehicle," and so on.

 6             Whilst I was issuing -- could you -- the English here is rather

 7     odd.  Could you just read the sentence that comes after the words "poorly

 8     equipped"?

 9        A.   Ms. Korner, I quote:

10             "While I was giving approval for the engagement of the police in

11     combat, without my consent or an order of the minister of the interior,

12     there was looting and disorder at a massive scale behind the lines, and

13     particularly, by military deserters ..."

14        Q.   Okay.  If you stop there, thank you, because that's the only part

15     I want.

16             All right.  So reading that, if we look at this, the overall

17     picture is Bjelosevic writes to Lisica saying, I'm pulling the troops

18     out.  Lisica says, No, you can't.  And Bjelosevic then writes back

19     complaining that they co-operated and that approval has been given by him

20     for the use of police in combat; is that right?

21        A.   Well, Ms. Korner, that's what one can conclude judging on this

22     correspondence.

23        Q.   Right.  And if, as is -- as General Talic complained,

24     Colonel Lisica is a very arrogant officer, then the -- I suppose can we

25     put it this way, it's a matter of common sense, isn't it, that the

Page 24258

 1     relationship between the police and the army, at the lower levels

 2     certainly, and possibly at higher levels, would -- might depend on the

 3     character of the persons involved?

 4        A.   That is possible, Ms. Korner, but I'm saying here how people

 5     should act and what is in line with the rules and regulations.

 6             I would like to reiterate that the commander has the right to

 7     take police officers who are under work obligation and change their

 8     status to become military conscripts.

 9             What you asked me yesterday - and I'm trying to help you here and

10     provide a foundation - who instigates proceedings, that depends on the

11     status of the police officer at that point in time; whether they are

12     under work obligation or military conscripts.  And I can add that this is

13     provided for by the Law on All People's Defence from 1982.  That's a

14     document which I enclosed, and in Articles 23, 24, 25, and especially 26,

15     that -- or, rather, all that regulates work obligation.  And, if you

16     wish, I can read out Article 26.

17        Q.   No.  We've got all these articles -- it talks about, I agree,

18     about work obligation.  But, all right.

19             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours I will allow myself to be sidetracked

20     down this road, but I would ask for the extra time that I -- because this

21     is the General, I think, responding to my request that he -- I identify

22     the law.  But I've got a number of other documents I want to put to him.

23                           [Trial Chamber confers]

24             MS. KORNER:  But I have only got about half -- well, I've got 35

25     minutes left.

Page 24259

 1                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 2             JUDGE HALL:  By extra time, you mean the extra 15 minutes that we

 3     lost at the beginning?

 4             MS. KORNER:  No.  If I'm going to be allowed to side --  if the

 5     General wants to make this point, which I can -- he wants me to look at

 6     Article 26.  And I don't want to stop him because it wouldn't be fair,

 7     but I don't actually particularly want to deal with this.  I have got

 8     other matters that I want to deal with.

 9             JUDGE HALL:  Well, Mr. Krgovic could pick that up in

10     re-examination.

11             MS. KORNER:  Certainly.

12             JUDGE HALL:  And we're at the time for the first break for the

13     morning.

14                           [The witness stands down]

15                           --- Recess taken at 10.25 a.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.

17             MR. ZECEVIC:  Your Honours --

18             JUDGE HALL:  Mr. Zecevic.

19             MR. ZECEVIC:  -- I notified the Registrar and the Court Officer

20     before the beginning of today that there is a matter I would like to

21     raise concerning the translations.  And I -- and together with

22     Ms. Korner, we tried to resolve that situation over the break, but it --

23     we didn't -- we didn't resolve it.

24             And in the meantime there was another issue of the -- of the --

25     of the interpretation which I think was not correct in the transcript.

Page 24260

 1     So I would need to raise this before the witness leaves, and I don't know

 2     whether Your Honours would permit me to do so right now, or would you

 3     like me to do that a bit later?

 4             JUDGE HALL:  The -- perhaps when Ms. Korner has finished her

 5     cross-examination may be a convenient point before Mr. Krgovic begins his

 6     re-examination, since it involves the witness who is presently on the

 7     stand.

 8             MR. ZECEVIC:  I understand.  Thank you.

 9             MS. KORNER:  Your Honour, the difficulty is the General has now

10     raised this question of what's in the Law on National Defence, which, I

11     think, was a response to something I put to him yesterday and invited him

12     to look for it.  But I do have to deal with it.  I cannot let it be dealt

13     with for re-examination because it's quite an important issue.  And so

14     I -- I would ask, I'm afraid -- I appreciate that the General has been

15     here for a long time, but these really are major issues, and I would,

16     therefore, ask that I be given added time to deal, I hope fairly shortly,

17     with this thing he has just raised, and then to complete my

18     cross-examination with -- I have another dozen or so documents I want to

19     look at very quickly with him, but that would certainly take the whole of

20     the 35 minutes or so that I have left.

21                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

22                           [Trial Chamber confers]

23             MS. KORNER:  So, Your Honours, can I, in effect, I'd like another

24     45 to 50 minutes, please.

25             JUDGE HALL:  You mean in total?

Page 24261

 1             MS. KORNER:  Yes.

 2                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 3                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

 4             JUDGE HALL:  Ms. Korner, the guillotine will descend 40 minutes

 5     after the witness resumes the stand.

 6             And while the witness is being escorted back to the stand, on

 7     behalf of the chamber, we express our gratitude to CLSS for being able to

 8     accommodate at very short notice the extended sitting which we have had

 9     to arrange for today.

10             MS. KORNER:  While we're waiting for the General to come in,

11     could we have document 1 -- L1 up on the screen, please.

12                           [The witness takes the stand]

13             MS. KORNER:

14        Q.   General, I want to deal extremely quickly, please, so please keep

15     your answers short, to what you've just raised with me.

16             You directed our attention to the parts of the Law on National

17     Defence which relate to work obligation.

18             Could we have up Article 23, please, at speed.

19             That sets out work obligation, and it talks about the time of war

20     and immediate threat of war, all citizens able to work, blah, blah, blah.

21             Next please could we have Article 24.  It's on the screen there.

22     We need to go to the next page in English.

23              "Members of the police and other authorised official persons

24     employed with the internal affairs organs shall carry out their work

25     obligation within the internal affairs organ [sic]."

Page 24262

 1             Correct?

 2        A.   Correct, Ms. Korner.

 3        Q.   And Article 26, please, which is the next -- 26, yes, thank you.

 4             "The performance" -- ah sorry, yes, Article 26:

 5             "Performance of tasks and duties required by the armed forces and

 6     the occasional performance of work significant for the defence of the

 7     country shall be ordered by the competent municipal organ.

 8             "In time of war if the need for immediate combat action of the

 9     armed forces so required and the competent organ is unable to issue

10     tasks [sic]," blah blah.

11             You're reading that article, aren't you that the brigade

12     commander can then take over police?

13             MR. ZECEVIC:  Battalion commander.

14             MS. KORNER:  I'm sorry.  Battalion commander.

15        Q.   Yes?

16        A.   That's correct, Ms. Korner.

17        Q.   Whether that's right or wrong doesn't really matter for these

18     purposes because there was no state of war at this period in 1992, was

19     there?  And there's a clear distinction drawn between immediate threat of

20     war and state of war in the original article.

21        A.   Ms. Korner, I said that, in my opinion, there are no great

22     differences when it comes to the jurisdiction of the commander in a state

23     of imminent threat of war, on the one hand, and in a state of war on the

24     other.

25             MR. KRGOVIC:  Maybe I'm wrong, but maybe it's translation issue.

Page 24263

 1     It was -- says in this article:  "In the war."

 2             [Interpretation] The imminent threat of war is not mentioned

 3     here.  The state of war isn't mentioned, either.

 4             MS. KORNER:  I fully appreciate it is talking about in time of

 5     war, not an imminent threat of war.

 6        Q.   And it may be, may it not, General, one of the reasons why

 7     General Talic was complaining that a state of war had not been declared

 8     and, indeed, as we saw or as we know in 1994, maybe to get round the

 9     problems, a state of war was declared?

10             So it does have an illegal effect, doesn't it General?  Or if

11     you'd -- I mean, you told us you're not a lawyer, so if you don't know,

12     say so.

13        A.   The previous article should also be read.  That I believe it also

14     mentions the imminent threat of war.  And to my mind, the law should be

15     interpreted as a whole.  That is why I relied on this law.

16        Q.   All right.  Well, General, I suggest to you that contrary to what

17     you are asserting these provisions had no effect on the actual --

18     certainly on the actual reality and indeed as you yourself said, let me

19     just find it, page ...

20             When I was asking you about a document from Mr. Bjelosevic, when

21     you quoted -- no, sorry.  Zupljanin document in September.  And you said:

22             "Ms. Korner I told you" --

23             This is it page 20, line 12:

24             "I told you how I interpret the rules and

25     regular legislations [sic].  I can see the practice was different, and I

Page 24264

 1     emphasise that in exceptional circumstances the commanders could take

 2     people on their own from work duty and transfer them to military duty and

 3     in other cases the regulations intend for this to be done by the

 4     authorised organ upon the request of the units, military units."

 5             And you were referring there, were you not, the authorised organ,

 6     to the MUP?

 7        A.   No, Ms. Korner.  The competent municipal organ.  I said it was an

 8     organ from the defence system, and it has a very wide authority.

 9        Q.   But do you agree that it's clear from the --

10             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm -- I'm really sorry.  I know Ms. Korner you're

11     pressed, but the witness was starting to -- the -- give the answer, and

12     the part of his answer was not recorded.  And I think it's important.  He

13     mentioned the minister of defence.

14             MS. KORNER:  Do you know, I'm not at all clear under right

15     Mr. Zecevic keeps standing up.  This is not his witness.  This is

16     Mr. Krgovic's witness.

17        Q.   However, General, repeat, please, your answer.

18        A.   Ms. Korner, it is very difficult for me to do that because I,

19     too, am trying to be helpful.  Here it says that this is in the remit of

20     the municipal defence organ which is under the Ministry of Defence.

21             I wanted to add that, during a war, conscription has priority

22     over any other duties, and that is clearly stated in various laws.

23        Q.   Yes.  But clearly the article we looked at earlier, Article 24,

24     intends that the police shall be, if you like, exempt from this

25     all-encompassing conscription of those under work obligation.  Because it

Page 24265

 1     says they will do it in the ministry of internal affairs unless, and I

 2     suggest that it's quite clear from Article 26, it's talking about if

 3     there's an actual time or state of war.

 4             And you say you don't agree with that.  So that's all I want to

 5     deal with you on this.

 6             MS. KORNER:  Can we move, please, back to what I'm trying to do

 7     at considerable speed this morning, and that is look at the documents,

 8     please.

 9        Q.   You were shown during the course of your examination-in-chief, or

10     cross-examination, so-called, by Mr. Cvijetic, a document in which

11     General Talic sent to the CSB and the 343rd Brigade, a complaint about

12     deserting soldiers, saying that criminal charges had to be brought.  And

13     he was quoting what the Main Staff had apparently told him.

14             And you say that's a clear example that the military dealt well

15     discipline.  Do you remember saying that?

16        A.   I cannot remember what I said, but I can comment --

17        Q.   No, I don't want your comment.

18        A.   -- the document with you, Ms. Korner.

19        Q.   No, you've already commented.  I want to show you another

20     document, please.

21             Do you agree that desertion is a military offence?

22        A.   That's correct, Ms. Korner.

23        Q.   Do you also agree that failing to obey an order is a military

24     offence?

25        A.   Likewise, Ms. Korner.

Page 24266

 1        Q.   All right.  Could you have a look now, please, at document --

 2     Exhibit 1888, I think.  Tab 75C.

 3        A.   Ms. Korner, if you allow, while we're waiting --

 4        Q.   No, the document's here.

 5             This is a document, the 18th of October, which is being sent to

 6     the SJB by Stojan Zupljanin to the chief.  Looks like it's Gradiska, I

 7     think.

 8             It starts:

 9             "At the request of the 1st Krajina Corps on 12th of October, 107

10     members of the police," in fact, it's a number of them, "36 from

11     Banja Luka, 35 from Prijedor, 35 from Gradiska, and a senior worker from

12     Banja Luka CSB were resubordinated to the Republika Srpska to carry out

13     specific tasks.  On the 17th of October 1992 all 35 workers of Gradiska

14     refused to take any further orders from the officers and voluntarily

15     returned to Gradiska.  The chief the CSB ordered on the 17 October that

16     on the morning of the 18th a new police platoon at Gradiska was to be

17     sent to continue the tasks, that all workers who refused to obey orders

18     were suspended, and criminal measures filed against them."

19             Do you accept that it is clear from this, that for this breach of

20     military discipline, it is the police who are taking the disciplinary

21     measures?  Or, indeed, criminal measures, in fact.

22        A.   Ms. Korner, in this case, these persons were military conscripts,

23     and according to what I say in my report, proceedings should have been

24     instigated by the military commanders to whose contingent these persons

25     belonged --

Page 24267

 1        Q.   Yes.

 2        A.   -- if this is your question.

 3        Q.   Yes, but that is not what's happening, is it, from this document?

 4     It's not the military.  It's the police who are bringing these charges.

 5             Do you agree with that, before I put my next question to you?

 6        A.   Ms. Korner, I'm trying to see where it states that the police

 7     initiated things.  But in any case it's better for someone to start

 8     things off rather than no one doing it, from the aspect of establishing

 9     law and order and determining responsibility.

10        Q.   I quite agree.  But the point that I'm trying to make to you is

11     that your assertion, which is that only the military could take

12     proceedings because these were military conscripts, is misconceived.  And

13     that's because you haven't looked at all the documents.

14        A.   No, Ms. Korner.

15        Q.   Right.  And I suggest to you that when you say they become

16     military conscripts, they remain, I suggest, policemen who have been

17     resubordinated for the purposes of unity or singleness of command but

18     that if disciplinary proceedings are to be taken, it will be done within

19     their own chain of command.

20             Do you accept that?

21        A.   No, Ms. Korner.

22        Q.   All right.  Because, logically, I suggest to you, it would be

23     inconceivable that the military would take these measures, first, because

24     I don't imagine they had any desire to, because it was a lot of

25     administrative work.  But, second, because they had no power to remove

Page 24268

 1     these people as police officers, did they?  Which is the ultimate

 2     disciplinary sanction.

 3        A.   Ms. Korner, when a person is being transferred from work duty to

 4     military duty, their status changes.  They receive a different

 5     assignment.  They received a different coloured paper.  And all of that

 6     is in force for as long as they are a military person.  They are assigned

 7     different powers and are responsible along the military line.  This is

 8     what the military rules and regulations state.  And in war time, you

 9     cannot interpret it other than like that, because those issues are

10     exclusively under the jurisdiction of military commanders when they are

11     dealing with military personnel.

12        Q.   I know.  That is the Defence case and that the case you are

13     putting forward.

14             But my suggestion to you is, logically, how could the military

15     in -- take disciplinary proceedings which meant the removal of a police

16     officer as an authorised official?  He couldn't, could he?  Only the

17     minister could do that?

18        A.   Ms. Korner, that person is not a policeman at that point.  They

19     are a military conscript.  So the question whether they would return to

20     their previous post is something that, again, has to follow procedure,

21     through the authorised organ so that his status could be changed again.

22     And, on the -- in the Law on Military Duty, for which you say has not

23     been seen here but which I did provide, and in Article

24     111 [as interpreted] it says precisely when somebody starts their

25     military duty and when they end it.

Page 24269

 1             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm sorry, I believe the witness said Article 11,

 2     and it's recorded 111.

 3             MS. KORNER:

 4        Q.   All right, General.  I don't want to get too bogged down in this.

 5             Do you have any explanation then why, on the face of this

 6     document, Zupljanin is saying that the chief of the Banja Luka CSB

 7     ordered, firstly, a new police platoon; and, secondly, criminal measures

 8     to be filed against them?

 9        A.   Ms. Korner, I don't want to comment this particular case.  I'm

10     talking about the rules and regulations and what they state and how it

11     should have been done.  I personally agree that this is something that

12     should have been sanctioned and that it's better that someone did it,

13     rather than no one.

14        Q.   Yes.  You're talking about your interpretation of rules and

15     regulations of which you have no idea of their application to the VRS or

16     the MUP during 1992.  That's correct, isn't it?  You simply don't know

17     what happened in practice.

18        A.   No, Ms. Korner.

19        Q.   Okay.  Can we look now, please, quickly at document number 76,

20     please.

21        A.   I apologise, Ms. Korner, but I'm confused.  I think you put two

22     questions to me just previously.  Perhaps one should have had the answer

23     yes and the other one no, if I have a right to that.

24        Q.   Yes.

25        A.   I cannot think so quickly.

Page 24270

 1        Q.   Yes.  I see that, yes.  You're going to say, yes, it's your

 2     interpretation; and, no, you don't know about -- and you agree that you

 3     don't know what happened in practice.  I accept that.

 4             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Well, now, perhaps Ms. Korner needs

 5     to put the questions again, because now this is not clear.

 6             MS. KORNER:  No.  You can re-examine.

 7             Yes.  All right.  Directive 4, very quickly, please.  That's not

 8     Directive 4.  P1780.

 9        Q.   And this deals with the -- the police brigade that you were again

10     only shown one document about.

11             Have you seen -- no, I don't think you've seen this before.

12             This is the directive that was issued by the Main Staff in

13     respect of further operations.  And, in fact, I don't think we need to

14     look at it because, I beg your pardon, what comes out of it is what is

15     important.

16             MS. KORNER:  Can we have a look, please, at the next document.

17     The date of Directive 4 was the 19th of November.

18             So could we have a look now, please, at document P1668,

19     Your Honours, which is under seal - it's tab 77 - and therefore shouldn't

20     go out on the screen.

21        Q.   It's dated 21st of November, two days later.  It's from Talic to

22     Zupljanin.  It's headed: Engaging the Unit in Combat Activities."

23             And then:

24             "In accordance with expressed needs our detailed assessment, the

25     requirement to remain [sic] the existing corridor ..." et cetera.

Page 24271

 1             "It's our opinion that the engagement of strong forces from your

 2     units would be necessary and unavoidable."

 3             And then in the third paragraph:

 4             "We therefore ask you to immediately begin preparing, organising,

 5     and establishing police units ..."

 6             Do you go the word is "ask"?  It's not "order," it's "ask"?

 7        A.   Ms. Korner, it says both.  First, it says we ask --

 8        Q.   Okay.  Can you read out the --

 9        A.   -- and then --

10        Q.   Read out -- read out the whole paragraph, please.

11        A.   "We ask you to immediately begin preparing, organising, and

12     establishing police units with a strength of at least two battalions, and

13     more, if possible."

14        Q.   Yes.  And you say it says both.  Where is the word "order"?

15        A.   After the word "molimo vas," we ask you to immediately begin.

16     Then this would be the tone of an order that relates to preparing,

17     organising, and establishing, and it determines precisely the strength.

18     It's possible that it's something that's being asked -- that is being

19     asked regarding the strength and the preparations themselves.  It's

20     difficult for me to interpret this document of the commander of the 1st

21     Krajina Corps.

22        Q.   All right.

23        A.   I think.

24        Q.   Well, I agree that it's not fair to ask you that.

25             Can we look, please, at the next document then in this whole

Page 24272

 1     series which led up to the January document that you were shown by the

 2     Defence.

 3             Could we look, please, at 2D119, also under seal, so not on the

 4     screen.  Not on the public screen.

 5             22nd of November, so the following day, Zupljanin -- yep.

 6     Zupljanin issues the order because it's gone from the minister, he says:

 7             "In accordance with the order of the Ministry of Interior of

 8     Republika Srpska ... on the basis of a dispatch from the commander of the

 9     1st Krajina Corps ..."

10             And that's the one that we've just looked at because it's got

11     that number, 730192.  So clearly Talic has sent this to minister, copied

12     it Zupljanin, and the minister has now given him the order.  Would you

13     agree with that?

14             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm sorry.  I'm sorry, this is unfair because if

15     Ms. Korner is showing the document of Talic referring to the document,

16     she must refer to the order of the minister as well.  That is the

17     document from 15th of May.

18             MS. KORNER:  Yes.  I agree.

19             MR. ZECEVIC:  Yes, but the --

20             MS. KORNER:  Why do I have to show it to him again?

21             MR. ZECEVIC:  But that that document precedes.

22             MS. KORNER:  I accept that entirely.

23             Yes, I see -- okay.  I see the point Mr. Zecevic is making.  I

24     said that the order has gone from Talic to the minister.

25        Q.   It is based on the minister's order of the 15th of May and the

Page 24273

 1     document has gone from Talic to Zupljanin who then makes this order.  I

 2     accept that.

 3             Do you see there that in fact at this stage of the game the

 4     person who is appointed to command this police brigade, which I fully

 5     accept, General, was resubordinated properly to the 1st Krajina Corps.

 6             Do you see that the commander was a gentleman named Brane

 7     Pecanac?

 8        A.   That's correct, Ms. Korner.

 9        Q.   Who was in fact -- who was in fact, and the Court knows this, was

10     a member of the MUP.

11             Right.  And then what then happens, we can see, is -- well, what

12     we know is that Lieutenant-Colonel Peulic gets -- replaces Mr. Pecanac,

13     and then he is replaced in the one document that the Defence showed you

14     in January, by this other military officer.

15             Now, can we look next, please, at 1D172.

16             I can't remember whether you were shown this document or not,

17     General.  Have you seen this document before?  This is the establishment

18     of the Supreme Command.

19        A.   Ms. Korner, I think that the document is there, in the

20     description of my work.  I'm not sure, but I would have to check.

21        Q.   Don't worry.  I'm not -- [indiscernible]

22        A.   Because earlier I --

23        Q.   Yes.  Anyhow, all I want to ask you about is this.  Article 2

24     says who the Supreme Command is:  The president, the supreme commander of

25     the Presidency, national assembly, prime minister, national defence, and

Page 24274

 1     the minister of the interior.

 2             Would you agree that this is an attempt to try and, as it were,

 3     pull together what was effectively the reality of the situation, that the

 4     minister of the interior, during the course of 1992, had the power to

 5     refuse to give his men to the army and, therefore, it was decided to pass

 6     this law?

 7             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm sorry, which law are we talking about?

 8             MS. KORNER:  Decision, sorry.  I beg your pardon, decision.

 9        Q.   Make this decision.

10        A.   Ms. Korner, this is a decision on the forming of the Supreme

11     Command, and I don't understand why we're talking about the powers of the

12     minister of the interior.  I cannot just put that in the context that

13     you --

14        Q.   All right.

15        A.   -- would wish for --

16        Q.   Are you able to think of a reason why, when, according to you,

17     the minister of the interior should -- had no power to -- to make any

18     orders in respect of the army, he should now suddenly become part of the

19     Supreme Command?

20        A.   Ms. Korner, I think that the Supreme Commander commands the army

21     on behalf of the Supreme Command, not the Supreme Command.

22        Q.   All right.  I think I made my point.

23             Moving on, speedily, please.  Can we look now, please, at the MUP

24     report for the year 1992, P625.

25             Can we look, please, at - one, two, three -- fourth page in

Page 24275

 1     English.  And fifth page, I think, yes.  Thank you.

 2             MS. KORNER:  Do we see -- actually, you need to go to the next

 3     page in B/C/S, please.

 4        Q.   The activities of police employees from the beginning of the

 5     armed conflict varied from one station to another.  For example:

 6             "Employees in police stations in Bihac," et cetera, et cetera,

 7     "joined in the combat activities from the outset whilst other

 8     municipalities where there was less fighting, or it began later, the

 9     police at first began to carry out their regular tasks and duties which

10     included disarming groups --" and I'm sorry.  Doesn't say "which

11     included," I'm suggesting that's what it says.  "Disarming groups,

12     finding and seizing weapons, and when the need arose they joined the Army

13     of the Republika Srpska.

14             Do you see that?

15        A.   I can see that, yes.

16        Q.   It makes a distinction, does it not, with their regular duties

17     which included disarming groups, unspecified, and then when the need

18     arose, joining the RS, I suggest -- the VRS, as resubordinated police

19     officers?

20        A.   That is correct, Ms. Korner.

21        Q.   Yes, I don't think I need more about this.  Now, I want to look,

22     please, finally at the 1994 law that you were shown by Mr. Cvijetic.  And

23     this is Defence tab 16, L317.  I say "finally."  I do have three more

24     documents on other aspects I want to put to you, but this is the last one

25     on the topic of resubordination.

Page 24276

 1             This is Decree on the Promulgation of the Law on the

 2     Implementation of the Law on Ministries During an Imminent Threat of War

 3     or a State of War, and I think agreed with Mr. Cvijetic, this was to

 4     regularise, wasn't it, and incorporate into a law the various earlier

 5     laws and practice of what had happened.  Would you agree with that?  I

 6     think you did agree with that with Mr. Cvijetic?

 7        A.   I do agree, if that is I what I said about that.

 8        Q.   Now, I want to look at, please, with you, the law of -- first one

 9     what you looked at, the Law on Implementation of the Defence, Article 2,

10     the armed forces include the units of the Ministry of Interior.

11             And then can we look, please, at the -- the implementation on the

12     Law of Affairs [sic], please, which is page 9 of the English.

13             Is that what's showing?

14             MS. KORNER:  Could somebody please indicate to me where it is in

15     B/C/S?

16             MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Page 4; and in the English, it's

17     page 9, Article 4.

18             MS. KORNER:  [Microphone not activated] Not interested in Article

19     4.

20             "Procedures to be adopted by the ministry.  The ministry may take

21     the following measures."

22        Q.   So it's setting out the procedures that the ministry of internal

23     affairs will take in those circumstances; is that right?

24        A.   Right.

25        Q.   Move on, please, to the next part, 3:  "Responsibility of

Page 24277

 1     ministry personnel."

 2             Disciplinary measures -- Article 9, sorry.

 3             "Disciplinary measures shall be imposed by the Ministry of

 4     Interior [sic] or a person authorised by him."

 5             It then sets out what the punishments shall be, that -- what the

 6     sanctions will be, and says in Article 11:

 7             "Disciplinary proceedings issued before this law entered into

 8     force shall be completed according to the provisions of this law."

 9             Then the next part is the use of police in combat operations.

10     Article 12 through to 17.  Which is really, to a large extent,

11     reincorporating Article 104 and adding to that article about what happens

12     to the police.

13             But nowhere does it say that the minister's right to conduct

14     disciplinary proceedings does not apply when members of the MUP are

15     resubordinated, does it, General?

16        A.   Yes.  But, Ms. Korner, I don't have the whole law in front of me.

17     But I still maintain that in situations when police units are

18     subordinated to a military commander and become military conscripts, then

19     that would be under the jurisdiction of the military commander.

20        Q.   I know you keep asserting it, and I know that's what the Defence

21     case is.  But, surely, General, even you will admit that in a law that

22     was passed to make it abundantly clear what the relationship between the

23     MUP and the army was, they would have said, Disciplinary proceedings will

24     be conducted by the minister unless resubordination has taken place, in

25     which case, it is the army?

Page 24278

 1        A.   That's right, Ms. Korner.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             JUDGE HALL:  Ms. Korner, you were allowed an extra five minutes

 4     to accommodate the loading of documents and the other interruptions, but

 5     your time is now expired.

 6             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, with the greatest respect, I really

 7     would ask that I be allowed -- because there have been a number of

 8     assertions which I have not covered -- I have at least -- I would ask at

 9     least that I can put two more documents because we've not covered at all

10     the -- the -- the Crisis Staffs.

11             Your Honours, I haven't reached the 20 hours I asked for.  I knew

12     this would be a lengthy cross-examination.  I did not realise, of course,

13     that I would have to spend so much time on his report and the sources.

14     But, Your Honour, that is important.  Whatever the Defence may complain

15     about, because of the submissions I shall be making at the end, which I

16     tried to make in the middle.

17             Your Honours, I would ask that I be allowed to put these

18     documents.

19                           [Trial Chamber confers]

20             JUDGE HALL:  Ten minutes, Ms. Korner.

21             MS. KORNER:  Thank you.

22        Q.   General, you told Mr. Cvijetic that during the course of your

23     examination of documents you had looked at documents relating to Crisis

24     Staffs.  They do not appear in your bibliography, they did not appear in

25     any of the lists of the Defence -- well, I'm sorry, your bibliography for

Page 24279

 1     the report.  So can we take it that you did not look at any documents

 2     when preparing your report that were issued but the Crisis Staffs?

 3        A.   I do not remember, Ms. Korner.

 4        Q.   All right.  I want to show you, however, because in relation to

 5     town commands, you've made various assertions that they are set up by a

 6     military officer, and it's entirely him who sets them up.

 7             I want you to look, please, at a document, P448, which is at

 8     tab 55.

 9             MS. KORNER:  In English, could we look, please, at the third

10     page; and in B/C/S, it is page ... the third page, I think.  No,

11     bottom -- yes, that page.  Bottom.

12        Q.   These are the books of minutes that were kept by the Kljuc Crisis

13     Staff and there they set out -- it's on 27th of May, the relationship

14     between the military and civilian authorities shall be as follows.  The

15     military authorities will follow the orders of the civilian authorities.

16     The civilian authorities will not interfere with the way they are

17     followed.

18             Although it's -- it's rather pre-emptory put, that, in fact, is

19     right, isn't it?  Because it was the political element that set the goals

20     and it was for the military to carry out those goals.  Would you agree

21     with that?

22        A.   That is correct, Ms. Korner, if you're referring to that period.

23        Q.   Right.

24             MS. KORNER:  And then, can we look next, please, at document --

25     sorry, page 3 of this document in English -- oh, sorry, two pages on in

Page 24280

 1     English.  And it's -- the trouble is this was labelled very badly,

 2     Your Honours, in the original.

 3             In the B/C/S, it's -- it says, 38 -- it's got no page number so I

 4     can't tell.  It says 3003 or 500573884 -- 883, sorry.  Yes.

 5        Q.   This is meeting of the 29th of May.  And it says, under the

 6     session the following was concluding [sic] that a defence command should

 7     be set up and that Major Bosko Lukic should be appointed a commander.

 8     Its commander.

 9             Do you accept that from this document the Crisis Staff is making

10     the decision that a town command should be set up?  A defence command

11     it's called, I'm sorry.

12        A.   Ms. Korner, as far as I remember, I said that, according to the

13     laws and regulations, defence commands shall be set up.  That is mostly

14     done in a situation when the authorities in the area concerned are not

15     functional, or when the situation demands that all forces be integrated

16     and put under the command of the defence commander.  And I cannot see

17     from this who it is that's supposed to do that, to set it up.

18             The commander of the defence command is directly appointed by the

19     superior officer.

20        Q.   Well, I know that's what you say.  And can I say I accept

21     entirely town commands came into existence when the civilian authorities

22     were unable to function.

23             However, here, it would appear, that the defence -- the municipal

24     Crisis Staff of which, I don't know whether you know that, the SJB chief,

25     the military -- the local military chief, were all members.  Did you know

Page 24281

 1     that?

 2        A.   The command of the town command includes all the organs in the

 3     area.  I'm talking about what the theory says and how it should be.  I

 4     don't know how it really was in this particular case.

 5        Q.   All right.  Well, here, the Kljuc Crisis Staff is saying the

 6     defence command should look [sic] up, and can we look, please, finally,

 7     and that is the last document I want you to look at, is at document

 8     P1783, at tab 29.

 9             The meeting of the Kljuc Crisis Staff that we looked at was the

10     29th of May.  On the 31st of May, we have Colonel Galic putting into

11     effect the order or the request of the -- the Kljuc Crisis Staff and

12     setting up the --

13             MR. KRGOVIC:  Where is in this document?  Where is mentioned in

14     this document?  Or is this suggestion by Ms. Korner, because it is not

15     what is in this document.

16             MS. KORNER:  I'm sorry, I don't understand Mr. Krgovic's

17     objection.

18             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Where does the document say that

19     the commander is implementing the decision of the Crisis Staff?

20             MS. KORNER:  It's my suggestion.  On the 31st -- 29th of May, and

21     I -- on the 29th of May, the Kljuc orders -- municipal Crisis Staff

22     orders that a defence command be set up.

23             On the 31st of May, Colonel Galic sets up a defence command.

24        Q.   With the assistance of Mr. Krgovic, are you going to say,

25     General, that these two events are not connected?

Page 24282

 1        A.   Ms. Korner, these two events are -- probably are connected, but

 2     it's the division commander here who decides about setting up a defence

 3     command of the town.  He is the superior commander of the brigade

 4     commander.  It is not logical for the president of the municipal assembly

 5     who was in power should take a decision to renounce power and transfer

 6     himself to another organ where a military officer would be his commander.

 7        Q.   No.  The situation is this, isn't it:  That where there was a

 8     complete breakdown of civilian authority for as short a period as

 9     possible - and I haven't got time to show other documents, but that's

10     evident - what's called a town or defence command was set up.  That's

11     right, isn't it?

12        A.   That's right Ms. Korner.

13        Q.   And as soon as it was possible for the normal civilian, that is

14     to say, municipal presidents, police and the like, to function, the town

15     command was abolished?

16        A.   That's right, Ms. Korner.

17        Q.   Yes.  General, thank you very much.

18             JUDGE HALL:  Mr. Krgovic, before you begin, you would recall that

19     Mr. Zecevic, there is a matter that he raised with which he wanted to

20     deal.

21             General, we're near time for the break, but there is an short

22     procedural matter with which we have to deal so I would ask the usher to

23     escort you out a little ahead of us.  And we would resume in 25 minutes.

24                           [The witness stands down]

25             JUDGE HALL:  Yes, Mr. Zecevic.

Page 24283

 1             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you very much, Your Honours.

 2             Your Honours, yesterday, during the cross-examination of this

 3     witness, on pages 63, line 1, to 68, line 1, Ms. Korner was suggesting to

 4     the witness when reading from the document, which is 1D46 -- if we can

 5     have that document up, please.  Ms. Korner suggested to the witness that

 6     the -- that the wording of the document says that means -- that the word

 7     "may" means that it is not given that police forces will be used.  "It is

 8     within the authority of the minister or the chiefs of the CSB."

 9             Your Honours, the problem is that this is wholly erroneous

10     interpretation and misleading to the witness.  We didn't want to raise

11     it, because, at the time when it was -- when the question was asked,

12     because it would be -- it might be perceived as we are trying to coach

13     the witness.  But this is an important thing, Your Honours, and it's very

14     illustrative of the -- of the problems that -- that might develop further

15     on where Your Honours are going to determine the issues in this case, and

16     the understanding of our friends from the Office of the Prosecutor;

17     namely, linguistic interpretation of the meaning of the word is done from

18     the translation, as opposed that it's done from the original.  From the

19     original, Your Honours, it is very clear, it's at paragraph 7 that I'm

20     talking about.  Paragraph 7, first page.

21             It is -- it is very clear from the Serbian language that the word

22     "may" is used to -- to state the authority of the persons who are

23     entitled to take that decision.  It has nothing to do with their

24     understanding, as Ms. Korner is putting, whether -- whether it's given

25     that the police will be used or -- or that they have any -- any -- any

Page 24284

 1     doubts about that.

 2             It is just that the -- that the word "moze," m-o-z-e, in Serbian

 3     language, is used as "can," as "may."  There is no distinction.  So the

 4     question that is answered in this paragraph 7 is:  Who can order the use

 5     of the police forces in combat?  And it says:

 6             "The use of the police in combat can be ordered, or may be

 7     ordered by ..."

 8             Therefore, it strictly, from the -- from -- from the Serbian

 9     language, it's strictly, and there is no doubt about it whatsoever, that

10     this refers to the persons, the three persons, the minister, the

11     commander of a special brigade in the case of the CSB Sarajevo, and the

12     other CSB officers.

13             Therefore, I -- I -- I'm just raising this because this is a --

14     this is a problem which we will be facing when -- when -- when we are --

15     when we are coming down to the actual presentation of -- of our final

16     submissions.  And this is, in my opinion, a relatively big problem, and

17     I'm not sure what is the -- what is the -- the best way how to -- to deal

18     with this.

19             JUDGE HALL:  If I may inject a measure of confusion, Mr. Zecevic.

20     I refrained yesterday, when Ms. Korner was pursuing this, from making the

21     observation that, apart from the inherent difficulty of dealing with the

22     interpretation from one language to another, even among English speakers

23     in the construction of statues, the word "may" is confusing because

24     whereas ordinarily it is permissive, there are occasions in which "may"

25     is mandatory.

Page 24285

 1             So it struck me at the time, and from what you have said today I

 2     am reinforced in that view, that this is a matter ripe for argumentation,

 3     and no doubt at the appropriate time the Chamber is going to have the

 4     benefit - and I use that term advisedly - of submissions from both sides

 5     to the extent that anything turns on this.

 6             MR. ZECEVIC:  Thank you very much, Your Honours.  I understand.

 7             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, can I say, we did try to reach

 8     agreement, but there's, I'm afraid, for Your Honours -- the reasons that

 9     Your Honour has already articulated, those that I consulted who -- who

10     are native speakers of the language, didn't wholly agree with

11     Mr. Krgovic's interpretation of it.  And as I said, of course, it is

12     Stanisic's right not to give evidence, but in the end, the only person

13     who can explain what he meant by that order is the minister himself.

14             And as Your Honour has said, the rest is for argument and what

15     follows and that will be the difference between the two of us.

16             Now, the second -- I believe Mr. Zecevic has another matter that

17     he wanted to raise on interpretation.

18             JUDGE HALL:  Yes, Mr. Zecevic.

19             MR. ZECEVIC:  Your Honours, today, at page -- I'm sorry.  Page

20     19, line 23.  The witness was shown the document - just bear with me

21     Your Honour, one second - it's document P1094.  And then a part of it was

22     read to the -- to the witness.  And -- or it was -- Ms. Korner was asking

23     the witness to read the part of the -- of that document.  And the witness

24     says, 19, 23:

25             "I think here Mr. Zupljanin, and it says:

Page 24286

 1             'I kindly ask the corps commander to draw the attention of the

 2     lower-ranking commands.'"

 3             Then Ms. Korner:

 4             "Could you pause there for a moment.  The word 'kindly' doesn't

 5     appear in the English translation.  Where does that appear?"

 6             "Interpreter's correction:  I ask."

 7             Ms. Korner:  "Thank you."

 8             Your Honours, the word is "molim."  The word is "molim."  It is:

 9     "I kindly ask."

10             Now, Ms. Korner is using -- Ms. Korner is using this document to

11     show the relationship between Mr. Zupljanin and the corps commander.  The

12     nature of the relationship --

13             MS. KORNER:  [Microphone not activated]

14             MR. ZECEVIC:  Please, Ms. Korner.

15             Trying to show the -- the relationship between the two persons.

16     And in my opinion, this might create a different understanding than it is

17     in the document itself.  It's, again, Your Honours, with all due respect,

18     the same problem as I -- as I -- as I stated before.

19             JUDGE HALL:  So unless I'm missing something, is this -- does

20     this have to be referred back for translation?  Or, again, is this a

21     matter which will be left to argument.

22             MR. ZECEVIC:  Yes, yes, but all means, it needs to be re-sent

23     back to CLSS to retranslate.

24             Thank you.

25             JUDGE HALL:  You don't resist that, Ms. Korner?

Page 24287

 1             MS. KORNER:  [Microphone not activated] Your Honours, in fact,

 2     funnily enough, my understanding of the word "molim," which I have heard

 3     on a number of occasions, is it means "please."

 4             But I think if there is a dispute, and it's a Defence document,

 5     it needs to go back for translation.

 6             JUDGE HALL:  Yes.  So ordered.

 7             So we return in 20 minutes.

 8                           --- Recess taken at 12.08 p.m.

 9                           --- On resuming at 12.33 p.m.

10                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

11             JUDGE HALL:  Mr. Krgovic, I would remind you that we would be

12     adjourning at 1.30, with a view to reconvening at 2.30.

13             MR. KRGOVIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

14                           [The witness takes the stand]

15                           Re-examination by Mr. Krgovic:

16        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon.

17        A.   Good afternoon.

18        Q.   Let us return to the last topic you discussed with Ms. Korner,

19     and that was the town command, or defence command of Kljuc.

20             You then said who was authorised to take that decision, and in

21     connection with that, let us take a look at a document.

22             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it's -- please bear

23     with me.  65 ter 2025.

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Could all unnecessary microphones be switched

25     off.  Thank you.

Page 24288

 1             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] It's 20225.  That's tab 12 in the

 2     Prosecution binder.

 3        Q.   General, this, according to the Prosecution, is from the

 4     1st Krajina Corps.  It says:  "Duty team."

 5             Please look at page 78 in the Serbian.

 6             And it's on pages 59 and 60 in English.

 7             There's an entry here, paragraph 2:

 8             "The commander decided to set up a special command for the

 9     defence of Kljuc and the entire municipality, which is to comprise," and

10     he is now listing the units and the control of the area.

11             And it goes on to say that another battalion is to be set up from

12     the Kljuc area to be deployed in the area of Krasulje, Ramici, Kamicak

13     and some independent companies and police are included there.

14             General, this is a document from the corps command.  Can you

15     please comment on these authorities, or authorisations, as -- about which

16     you spoke to Ms. Korner.  And what is the relationship between this

17     battalion and the part where the police is mentioned?

18        A.   Mr. Krgovic, this document confirms what I said to Ms. Korner,

19     that the military commander decides about setting up town commands.  He

20     determines the structures and forces, all of which in conditions when the

21     authorities are not functional.  All forces are then under the command of

22     the town command commander, and they're all subordinated to him.

23        Q.   It goes on to say that another battalion is to be set up from the

24     area of Kljuc and there are some independent companies and police.

25             What about these independent companies and police with regard to

Page 24289

 1     paragraph 26 of the Law on All People's Defence?  Could you please

 2     comment on this paragraph, bearing that in mind.

 3        A.   Mr. Krgovic, the police mentioned here is subordinated to the

 4     commander of the town defence command.  This is a direct resubordination

 5     of all forces, not only the police, in that area.  This police here, if

 6     that's what you mean, has the status of subordinated unit with regard to

 7     the commander of the town defence command.

 8        Q.   I'll show you another paragraph from this document.

 9             MS. KORNER:  I'm sorry, before we leave this document, could we

10     be shown on the screen the date of this entry?  Which is on the previous

11     page in English.

12             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] The date is 30 May.  I apologise, I

13     wanted to show the first page, but I don't know the page reference for

14     the English version.

15        Q.   Please look at page -- yes, here you see it, it's 30 May.

16             And now let's see page 13 in the Serbian and 11 in the English.

17             General, Ms. Korner showed you this document in the context of

18     information and the functioning of communications, as well as the good

19     functioning of the corps, or corps.  And I'll read out this paragraph and

20     these are supposed to be the words of Major Kojic.

21             It says:

22             "A generally disorganised situation.

23             "Every TO staff runs a separate operation.

24             "Second Lieutenant Dabic and the lieutenant from the special

25     purpose unit working according to a plan of their own.

Page 24290

 1             "I cannot go on like this, I am asking for someone to come here

 2     and co-ordinate all this because I feel like leaving.

 3             "There is no communication with anyone.

 4             "A single command should be established and all actions

 5     co-ordinated, otherwise, this will all come to nothing."

 6             General, this document of the 1st Krajina Corps, what does it say

 7     about the general situation in Republika Srpska, to your mind?

 8        A.   Mr. Krgovic, when I was writing my report and making my

 9     assertions, I don't want to quote wrongly now, but the foundation for my

10     assertions is, first and foremost, the analysis of combat readiness of

11     the VRS, where at several places there is talk about the problems with

12     the functioning.  There was a section about morale, as far as I remember,

13     another section about communications, the poor training level of the

14     force, the failure of officers from Serbia to arrive, and the like.

15        Q.   General, when Ms. Korner asked you about some of the things you

16     said in the introductory part, you referred several times to analysis of

17     combat readiness.  General, are you able to tell us so that we would all

18     know, what is an analysis of combat readiness?  What does this document

19     represent?

20        A.   Mr. Krgovic, an analysis of combat readiness is one of the

21     compulsory activities of the units and commands at all levels.  It is

22     carried out at the end of the calendar year, and it's a summary by

23     specifically determined questions, as well as an analysis before that of

24     the overall situation in the army, pursuant to pre-set elements of combat

25     readiness.  And this is something that is used to this day in all the

Page 24291

 1     armies, and the top state leadership is informed about its conclusions,

 2     if we're talking about the top level, where an analysis of the entire

 3     army is carried out.

 4             So it's a statement of the status, the problems, the way to

 5     resolve the problems, relationships, organisational issues, and numerous

 6     other issues.  It deals with -- it usually ends with conclusions,

 7     assignments to subordinated units, as well as a proposal for measures

 8     relating to the superior command.  And, in this instance, this refers to

 9     the state leadership.

10        Q.   General, if we wanted to see what the situation was in a specific

11     army, in a specific time-period, what the problems were, what the

12     situation was, which document would be the best used for such a purpose?

13        A.   Mr. Krgovic, it would be this precise document.  And that's why

14     it's always given the highest confidentiality classification.

15        Q.   You mean the analysis of combat readiness?

16        A.   That is correct, Mr. Krgovic.  I was thinking of the analysis of

17     the combat readiness of a command, a unit, and its importance grows with

18     the levels of command that it covers.  The higher the level, the greater

19     the importance.

20        Q.   General, now I'm going to show you 01071, tab --

21             JUDGE HALL:  If I may, Mr. Krgovic.

22             General, the -- one -- one of your answers to Mr. Krgovic -- "as

23     well as a proposal for measures related to superior command.  And in this

24     instance this refers to state leadership."  Is this -- when you say

25     "state leadership," do I understand you to mean political leadership, as

Page 24292

 1     contrasted with the highest military leadership?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, since we're talking

 3     about an analysis of combat readiness of the highest military level, I

 4     meant that the proposed measures would be submitted to the top.  In this

 5     specific case, to the president of the republic as the Supreme Commander.

 6     And that is something that is the -- the commander's duty and the

 7     Main Staff to submit this to the supreme commander, i.e., the president,

 8     once a year.

 9             JUDGE HALL:  And do I correctly infer when, in one of your

10     earlier answers, you talked about the -- I think you used the word

11     "elements" against which the performance is measured, this is also set by

12     the leadership at that level.

13             Am I correct in that conclusion?

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the elements of

15     combat readiness that are being analysed and used to develop the rules

16     are set by the rules and regulations.  For example, number one would be

17     the control -- command and control; number two would be level of

18     training; number three would be morale; four would be personnel policies;

19     five would be logistics and so on and so forth.

20             There's no need for me to mention all the details.

21             These are pre-set elements, set by the rules and regulations.

22             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you, General.

23             Yes, Mr. Krgovic.

24        Q.   [Interpretation] General, you mentioned earlier that there are

25     analyses of combat readiness at different levels.  In this analysis of

Page 24293

 1     combat readiness of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, which

 2     information from subordinated units is this report supposed to contain?

 3     Are these their analyses, are there separate reports, or is it something

 4     completely different?

 5        A.   Mr. Krgovic, before the analysis, analyses are carried out by the

 6     commands in the units for lower-ranking units.  Before this analysis, the

 7     command of the corps analyses are completed.  And in this analysis would

 8     include all the results and the situation represented in the analyses of

 9     lower-ranking commands.  So this is how it proceeds, all the way up to

10     the battalion command.  Analyses have to be conducted in their own

11     commands and units before they go up to the next level.

12        Q.   General, Ms. Korner put a lot of questions to you from your

13     introduction, and she showed you a series of documents about the

14     functioning of the former JNA and the relationship of the JNA during a

15     certain time-period and its combat readiness.

16             So I would like to ask you:  In the analysis on page 9 in the

17     Serbian and 8 in the English, if we can just comment on one particular

18     passage.

19             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Second paragraph from the top,

20     please.  Command and control sector.

21        Q.   It states:

22             "Intelligence and reconnaissance activities were organised in

23     keeping with our capacities, although we had very limited resources after

24     the collapse of the control and command system of the 2nd Military

25     District of the former JNA."

Page 24294

 1             General, are you able to tell us what this 2nd Military District

 2     was?  What did it cover.

 3        A.   The 2nd Military District, as far as I can remember, was

 4     headquartered in Sarajevo, and it covered a significant area of Bosnia

 5     and Herzegovina.  If I remember correctly.

 6        Q.   In respect of your assertions in your previous testimony, when

 7     the JNA, as it was withdrawing from Croatia and Slovenia, at the same

 8     time was falling apart, and in light of that information, are you able to

 9     comment on this paragraph?

10             MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] Sorry, could I have an

11     exact reference to that answer?  Page number.

12             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours I'm able to do that at

13     the break.  Yesterday the witness was answering these questions, so I was

14     just speaking generally.  He talked about the withdrawal and the falling

15     apart of the JNA.  I will find the references.  He did mention that

16     several times.

17        Q.   But I think he is able to comment on this paragraph.

18        A.   Mr. Krgovic, as far as I can remember, and I know, that I said

19     that the Yugoslav People's Army from Slovenia to Bosnia and Herzegovina

20     was gradually falling apart, that people stayed in their republics, that

21     numerous materiel and equipment also remained in these republics, and I

22     think that this fits in with this assessment here from the combat

23     readiness analysis.

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

25             MR. KRGOVIC:

Page 24295

 1        Q.   [Interpretation] And the last paragraph where it says:

 2             "Order and discipline are not at the required level, although we

 3     did introduce temporary regulations --"

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We need the reference.

 5             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we look at the next page in the

 6     Serbian and the next -- page 9 in the English, please.

 7        Q.   "There are adequate laws on defence and the army, but this was

 8     not implemented in some units.  The combat [as interpreted] of soldiers

 9     in some units is not always pursuant to the regulations in effect,

10     although there are major differences from unit to unit."

11             And then it goes on.

12             MS. KORNER:  I'm sorry, what's come out on the screen -- sorry,

13     and the translation, it was quite difficult to hear, but it says "the

14     combat of soldiers in some units."  I think what should be there is

15     "conduct."

16             MR. KRGOVIC:  I agree.

17             [Interpretation] Yes, it says here the conduct of soldiers.  You

18     are correct.

19        Q.   And then you have the fourth paragraph from the top, where

20     certain failings are pointed out.  And it says:

21             "Individual --"

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreters need a reference in the English

23     text.

24             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Mr. Krgovic, could you give the interpreters a

25     reference to the English text because they don't have it.

Page 24296

 1             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] This is page 10; I apologise.

 2        Q.   General, it says:

 3             "Command and control was particularly influenced by the lack of

 4     adequate senior cadre at the level of companies and battalions.

 5     Considerable reserves, according to some officers of active officers, and

 6     the links of units to their home territory, desertion, and incomplete

 7     execution of the mobilisation ..."

 8             General, let's now look at your introduction.  This is page 3 in

 9     the Serbian version, paragraph 2.  And you comment there, you were

10     answering questions about this by Ms. Korner, when you wrote this

11     introduction.  Can you please tell me what the purpose of the

12     introduction was.  Was it your intention to deal with these matters in

13     detail, the beginning of the war, the introduction ...

14             MS. KORNER:  [Microphone not activated] Sorry, I [Overlapping

15     speakers] ...

16             MR. KRGOVIC: [Overlapping speakers] ... [In English] I rephrase.

17        Q.   [Interpretation] General, I apologise.  What was your intention

18     in writing this introduction?

19        A.   Mr. Krgovic, when I wrote this introduction, all I wanted, and as

20     I did state in the introduction, was to place my work in the context of

21     the conditions prevailing at the time or in the context of the situation

22     at the time in the Army of Republika Srpska on the basis of their

23     conclusions and to point out to the difficulties and problems that

24     existed in that initial period of the war.

25             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

Page 24297

 1             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we go back to this document,

 2     P1781.  Can we now have page 27, please, in the Serbian version, and

 3     page 30 in the English.

 4        Q.   You answered a lot of questions by Ms. Korner about the

 5     information that I read to you earlier on.  On page 23994 of the

 6     transcript, you said that, lines 11, you said that this was a basis for

 7     your analysis of combat readiness, and in several places, page 24012, you

 8     also refer to that source of information, and several times, these things

 9     that I found quickly.  So I want to draw your attention to this part

10     about the communications system in the Army of Republika Srpska.  I'm

11     going to show you this paragraph.  It's the second paragraph from the

12     top.  It states:

13             "From the very beginning of the war, and with its further

14     escalation, the stationary part of the system of communications of the

15     former JNA was disrupted, as well as the communications of other

16     operators."

17             And then in parentheses they are mentioned.  It's the post

18     office, the MUP, television, radio, power generation and distribution,

19     enterprises, and railways, as well as the power generation and

20     transmission systems suffered major damage, and part of the war weaponry

21     and equipment of the communications corps left in the territory of the

22     opponent.

23             And then it goes on to say:

24             "The mobile section of the communication system was also

25     considerably disrupted by the move of parts of and some entire signals

Page 24298

 1     units of the former JNA into the Army of Yugoslavia."

 2             And then it goes on to say:

 3             "The greatest problem faced by the signals body of the Main Staff

 4     of the Army of Republika Srpska in planning and organising communications

 5     was the breakdown of the stationary segment of the communications system,

 6     especially of some vital facilities Bjelasnica, Zlovrh and Vlasic."

 7             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] And now I would like to move to the

 8     next page; page 28.  And this would be page 31 in the English.  Page 28

 9     in the Serbian; 31 in the English.

10             I'm sorry, there is some sort of discrepancy between the English

11     and the Serbian versions.

12             Could you please scroll up this first page, where it says:

13             "From the previous diagram you can see ..."

14             Actually, I think it's one page back in the English; I apologise.

15             You can see that from a total of 16 communications nodes, five of

16     them -- yes.  That is the one, the paragraph-but-last in the English

17     version.

18              "16" -- "the above diagram shows that of a total of 16

19     stationary communications hubs, five of them ... were abandoned and left

20     in enemy territory, while one stationary communications hub ... was

21     seized by the enemy ..."

22             Can you scroll down, please, so I can see the end of the

23     paragraph.

24             "No less of a problem for" --

25             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreters need a reference.

Page 24299

 1             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Mr. Krgovic, once again, the interpreters ask for

 2     a reference.

 3             MR. KRGOVIC:  Yes, I apologise.

 4             [Interpretation] It goes on to say, and the page of the English

 5     translation is -- lower down.  Could we scroll down in English.

 6        Q.   "In planning and establishing a new organisation of

 7     communications, the considerably disrupted system of stationary

 8     communications centres and auxiliary communication centres of the former

 9     JNA, posed no less a problem.  Of a total of 32 facilities, 11 were

10     abandoned or captured and three were damaged ..."

11             And there's another page, General, that deals with

12     communications, and given this combat readiness analysis, please explain

13     to us your introductory section where you speak about poor

14     communications.

15        A.   Mr. Krgovic, that is exactly what I had in mind when I stated my

16     assessments.  Even more so, since it's well known that the communications

17     system is the most important foundation, or one of the most important

18     elements, for good command and control of units and formations for

19     successful transmission of orders, as well as successful reporting,

20     bottom-up reporting.

21             If this system is disrupted, as we can see in this analysis, then

22     the conditions for all activities between the commands and units are much

23     more difficult.

24        Q.   General, you spoke extensively about the setting up of the VRS.

25             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Let's go to page 13 in both

Page 24300

 1     linguistic versions.

 2             [No interpretation]

 3             "The infantry units which through self-organisation grew on a

 4     massive scale out of the Territorial Defence and other units, were used

 5     only at the beginning of the war according to the decisions of the Crisis

 6     Staffs and similar authoritative bodies.  Among the infantry units there

 7     were also units which represented various political structures, which

 8     were sometimes in opposition to the overall objectives of our war."

 9             General, it says:

10             "... sometimes in opposition to the overall objectives of our

11     war."

12             In your report you also touched upon these topics and you

13     mentioned improvisation, if I remember correctly.  Can you comment on

14     this section?

15        A.   Mr. Krgovic, these are only some of the significant problems

16     pointed out in this analysis, and I took them into consideration when I

17     wrote about the organisation of the VRS, its level of training, and its

18     overall functioning, especially during the initial period of the war.

19        Q.   On page 24012 of the transcript, line 6 through 11, Ms. Korner

20     asked you to give an example of a private commanding a unit, and you said

21     that it could be found in the analysis of combat readiness.

22             Please take a look at page 71 in the Serbian.

23             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] It's paragraph 4.3, 79.

24        Q.   The second paragraph says:

25             "A large number of the officer establishment posts have been

Page 24301

 1     filled with soldiers who, by their courage, resolution [as interpreted]

 2     and professionalism have won for themselves positions of leadership and

 3     even command."

 4             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] And let's go to the following page,

 5     which is 72 in the Serbian version.  It's the third paragraph here, which

 6     discusses a similar topic.

 7        Q.    "So far this problem has been addressed by assigning

 8     non-commissioned officers and brave and able soldiers, mostly from blue

 9     collar occupations, to the mentioned establishment posts.  Although they

10     are discharging their duties successfully and capably, they cannot be

11     promoted to the rank of officer."

12             And when you were answering Ms. Korner's question about these

13     instances, what did you have in mind when you had to give a specific

14     example?

15        A.   Well, Mr. Krgovic, I meant the allegations in this analysis.  It

16     is well-known that there must be four years' education to be appointed to

17     an officer's position, but these were conditions of war.  The situation

18     was the way it was, and this is how it was assessed in their analysis.

19        Q.   General, speaking about these things, on page 23984, lines 9

20     through 19, you said about a footnote that there was a mistake in your

21     reference.  I wanted to correct that, but Ms. Korner didn't allow me.

22             Please take a look at your report now.  Paragraph 93.

23             You were -- provide a citation at footnote 43.  And I will now

24     show you footnote 44, which is 57D2; that's the 65 ter number.

25             MS. KORNER:  I'm sorry, I'm sorry to interrupt.  I'm now

Page 24302

 1     confused.  My understanding was the only footnote that the General said

 2     was a mistake he corrected was in relation to the -- the number of the

 3     Law on All People's Defence.  I know you got up at this stage and said

 4     there was a --

 5             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Sorry, Ms. Korner.  While you were

 6     examining, the witness said on page 9 that the footnote was -- had a

 7     wrong number.  I offered to give the correct number of the footnote, but

 8     I couldn't, so I have to do it with the witness now.

 9             57D2; that's a 65 ter number.

10             The following page, please.

11        Q.   General, you are dealing with a command here, and you say that

12     it's a continuous process which --

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Could we have the reference, please, when

14     counsel is reading.

15             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] That's in paragraph 93 of your

16     work.

17             MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]

18             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Paragraph 93 of the report.

19        Q.   And you say that this is footnote 43.  Actually, it is footnote

20     44.  Did you mean that when you said you had made a mistake on

21     page 23984?

22        A.   That's correct, Mr. Krgovic.

23        Q.   General, you were asked a number of questions in the previous

24     session about when a person becomes a military conscript, and you

25     provided an interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Law on All

Page 24303

 1     People's Defence.

 2             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please show 1D264 to the

 3     witness.  I think that the Defence -- or the tab in the Defence binder is

 4     117.

 5             Let us enlarge, please.  92; I apologise.

 6        Q.   It says here:

 7             "I have understood your proposal regarding the withdrawal of

 8     police forces from combat operations.  We are satisfied with the work of

 9     the police ... thus far, and we have decided to pull them out for a short

10     while for rest so that we may engage them in upcoming operations.  The

11     reasons you provided are valid, but it seems to us that you do not

12     comprehend the situation we are in.  I do not authorise the withdrawal of

13     the police ..."

14             General, bearing in mind the authority, or the powers, he has

15     under Article 26 of the Law on All People's Defence -- or I go about it

16     another way.

17             Could you please comment on Colonel Lisica's document in relation

18     to Articles 24 through 26 of the law that you commented on for

19     Ms. Korner?

20        A.   Mr. Krgovic, I can tell from the content of this document that

21     the police units are subordinated to this commander and that he is

22     deciding about their use.  That is why he explicitly does not authorise

23     their return.  Such -- and similar examples I tried to interpret in

24     relation to the aforementioned articles of the Law on All People's

25     Defence, which articles deal with the execution of work obligation,

Page 24304

 1     material obligation, the obligation to serve in civilian protection, and

 2     military conscription.  Under these provisions, the commanders were able

 3     to take such decisions, depending on the situation, but I also said that

 4     this should not be the usual practice, but, rather, an exception.

 5     However, they did have the right to act that way.  They had the power to

 6     do so.

 7        Q.   Now, we heard what you said.  Did Mr. Bjelosevic have the right

 8     to withdraw his units?  Did he have the power to do so?

 9        A.   Mr. Krgovic, it is my opinion, and I claim that Mr. Bjelosevic

10     did not have that right.

11             MR. KRGOVIC:  I think it's convenient time for the break, it's

12     1.30.

13             JUDGE HALL:  Yes.  So we take a break now.

14             And we resume at 2.30, we'll sit until 4.00.  And then from 4.30

15     to 6.00, if necessary.

16                           [The witness stands down]

17                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.30 p.m.

18                           --- On resuming at 2.34 p.m.

19                           [Trial Chamber confers]

20                           [The witness takes the stand]

21             MR. KRGOVIC:

22        Q.   [Interpretation] During the last part of the cross-examination,

23     the Prosecutor showed you a document.

24             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown

25     Exhibit P01094, tab 75.

Page 24305

 1        Q.   You were shown the first portion of the document and you

 2     commented on it with me.

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could Mr. Krgovic please

 4     be asked to speak up.  Thank you.

 5             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Mr. Krgovic.

 6             MR. KRGOVIC:  Yes.

 7             JUDGE HARHOFF:  The interpreters are concerned that they can't

 8     hear you, so if you could please speak up a bit.  Thanks.

 9             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have page 2 of this

10     document.

11        Q.   General, you discussed this document with Ms. Korner.  This last

12     sentence which reads:

13             "I would kindly ask the corps commander [as interpreted] to draw

14     the attention of their subordinate commands through their own lines."

15             When answering a question by Ms. Korner you said this was a plea

16     by Mr. Zupljanin addressed to the corps commander.

17             Can you please explain the difference in our language between a

18     plea and a request.

19        A.   Mr. Krgovic, when you make a plea, when you say, Could you

20     please, or May I please ask you, it's something that people with good

21     manners often do.  That is often the case.  Nevertheless, this is a war

22     situation.  A difference between a plea and a request also tells us about

23     the relationship between the two people.  If you make a plea to someone,

24     you say, May I please ask you, it is also possibly indicative of your

25     inferior position.  If you make a request, that is something to do if you

Page 24306

 1     are in a superior position.  For example, in terms of rank.

 2             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Mr. Krgovic, in light of what the witness has

 3     just explained to us, and, notably, with regard to the comments made by

 4     the Presiding Judge before the lunch break, I don't think that we need to

 5     go any further into this issue about whether it means one or the other

 6     thing.  I think it's clear to us what's going on here.

 7             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] [No interpretation]

 8        Q.   Sir, at page 23757 and onwards, I showed you this document and I

 9     asked you to comment in the light of practice.  There was the protest by

10     Mr. Zupljanin about the way the police were used.

11             A question for you, sir:  We know what the powers were, as you

12     defined them, and we know the Law on Defence.  In keeping with those,

13     what if a commander of a certain unit, battalion level or higher up, as

14     you suggested, were to change the status of the members of a certain

15     unit, based on the practical needs, in keeping with the provisions of

16     this article.  What about a public security station chief or an official

17     like that?  Would they be in a position to refuse this?  What would be

18     the status of that particular act produced by the battalion or brigade

19     commander?  What his relationship be vis-a-vis these persons?

20        A.   Mr. Krgovic, if the law endows a military commander with the

21     possibility or, indeed, the right to change the status of a person who is

22     under a work obligation, and changes that status into the status of a

23     military conscript, in that situation, a police chief would be in no

24     position to oppose.  The police chief may be unhappy about it, and might

25     even be right to be unhappy about something like that because if you

Page 24307

 1     change someone's status like that and you turn a police officer with a

 2     work assignment, a work obligation into a military conscript, what that

 3     means is that the military conscript might as well remain there for the

 4     remaining duration of the war, which means that person is no longer in a

 5     position or, indeed, able to perform his tasks.

 6             That is how I, for my part, interpret the discontent,

 7     dissatisfaction, or, as you say, the protest lodged by the chief of the

 8     public security station.

 9             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] May the witness please be shown

10     exhibit 65 ter 479D1.  It's a Stanisic Defence document.  Tab 120.  It's

11     a Zupljanin Defence document.  My apologies.  It's from the Stanisic

12     list, but it's at tab 120 of the Zupljanin Defence.

13        Q.   Sir, you see the document.  It's a corps command document signed

14     by the chief, Mr. Talic.  It reads:

15             "Engagement and co-ordination TO units.  Warning."

16             There is a translation mistake there.  It reads:  "Co-ordination"

17     and it should be "co-ordinated action," because the original reads

18     "sadejstvo."  That is what we decided, term "co-ordinated action," with

19     TO units.

20             As you said, General, there were some problems regarding this.

21     The document begins like this.  It's the -- it's a document by the corps

22     command and delivered to the 5th Brigade, the command of the 5th Brigade.

23             Could you please have a read, sir.  The introduction reads:

24             "In combat operations so far and in the resubordination and

25     co-ordination between JNA and TO forces in the zone of responsibility of

Page 24308

 1     the 5th Corps, there have been different interpretations ..."

 2             And could you please read Article 1.

 3        A.   Mr. Krgovic, I quote:

 4             "All TO units and staffs in the zone of responsibility of JNA

 5     brigades shall be resubordinated to these commands."

 6        Q.   Paragraph 3, please.  Rather, paragraph 2; my apologies.

 7        A.   Mr. Krgovic, I quote:

 8             "A decision on the engagement and use of TO units shall be taken

 9     by the commander of the unit to which the TO unit has been attached,

10     after consultation and agreement with the appropriate officer of the TO

11     unit in question."

12        Q.   Paragraph 3, please.

13        A.   Mr. Krgovic, paragraph 3 reads:

14             "JNA brigade commanders shall consider any attached TO units and

15     any other reinforcing units as elements of their own combat deployment

16     and shall take care of these units by providing food and making sure to

17     make proper use of them."

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Can Mr. Krgovic please be

19     asked to speak up.  We cannot hear him.  Thank you.

20             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] It is quite obvious that I can't

21     pull the mic up which means that I will have to bend a little.

22        Q.   Can you please comment on this document in the light of your

23     discussion today and on the previous days with Ms. Korner.

24        A.   Mr. Krgovic, I realise that this document was only sent to a

25     single unit, the 5th Infantry Brigade.  I suppose that, in the sector of

Page 24309

 1     its zone of responsibility, there were some irregularities, such as

 2     occurrences of dual command.  For this reason, I assume the commander

 3     issued a warning, emphasizing, in clear and precise terms, who would be

 4     resubordinated to whom, who would be responsible to whom, all of which is

 5     in keeping with the principles of singleness of command and unity of

 6     command, as well as the principle of subordination, which is a principle

 7     that is preponderant and valid in any army.

 8        Q.   Paragraph 3, the brigade commander here says that the attached

 9     units shall henceforth be considered and other reinforcing units.

10             What about these reinforcing units?  What could that be?  Could

11     that be the TO, could that be some other units?

12        A.   These reinforcing units could also be tactical groups, or even

13     police units being resubordinated to the brigade commander.

14        Q.   And what about this sentence, what does it mean:

15             "... shall consider as elements of their own combat

16     deployment..." such and such units.

17             What does that mean?

18        A.   Mr. Krgovic, this means that you can move them around within your

19     own unit.  They are now elements of your own combat deployment.  You are

20     free to use them as you see fit and as you decide for missions that these

21     elements of the combat deployment would normally be considered suitably

22     trained for.

23        Q.   General, in the case at hand, we have members of some

24     subordinated units, units of the TO, or what are called reinforcing units

25     who, for example, commit a crime or a disciplinary infraction.  Who would

Page 24310

 1     be in charge of initiating proceedings against these persons?

 2        A.   Mr. Krgovic, this would be the sole responsibility of the brigade

 3     in question or the -- of the commander of the brigade in question or the

 4     commander of whatever unit we're talking about because all of the

 5     individual members are subordinated to the commander of that unit.

 6        Q.   Would it be possible for someone else other than the commander to

 7     initiate proceedings against these persons?  I mean someone who is not

 8     part of the chain of command, strictly speaking.

 9        A.   Mr. Krgovic, as for what we see here in this document, and as for

10     what the rules say, this is solely the responsibility of that unit's

11     commander, and no one else.  I can't say definitely.  I think there are

12     probably some situations where that too might be possible.  But if this

13     official is physically there, if he is present in the unit or in the

14     reinforcing unit, it would be the sole responsibility of that unit's

15     commander.  He would be in charge of initiating any proceedings and

16     punishing any disciplinary infractions.

17        Q.   My question was about the precise point in time at which they

18     were resubordinated.

19        A.   Yes, Mr. Krgovic, I did understand your question, and that is why

20     I corrected myself by saying at the time.  During their resubordination

21     to the commander of that unit.

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

23             MR. KRGOVIC:

24        Q.   [Interpretation] Ms. Korner showed you the document, and she

25     pointed out she believed your interpretation to not be correct.  Do you

Page 24311

 1     stand by your position?

 2             MS. KORNER:  I'm sorry, Your Honour, I don't follow that.  Which

 3     document?  I didn't show him this document.  I've never seen it before in

 4     my life.

 5             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] The previous document.  That's what

 6     I mean.  I meant the CSB document concerning disciplinary infractions and

 7     punishment.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Krgovic, I stand by my position

 9     as uttered some minutes ago.  I believe I also phrased it the same way in

10     my report.

11             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, may this document

12     please be admitted into evidence.  Thank you.

13             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Mr. Krgovic, you asked the witness to read out

14     the document, which he did.  And I thought that you asked him to do so

15     because you wanted to have the contents of that order on the record in

16     order not to submit it for -- into evidence.  And now you're asking for

17     the admission -- could I suggest, in light of the enormous time pressure

18     that we're under this afternoon, that you do either one or the other but

19     not both, please.

20             MS. KORNER:  And Your Honours, also, I'm sorry, I don't see how

21     this document is relevant.  Mr. Krgovic is trying to suggest -- and the

22     General said it may be the police, but there is not one iota of evidence

23     to suggest that this is anything other than a document dealing with

24     resubordination of TO units to the 1st Krajina Corps, and it is pure

25     speculation and guess-work that other reinforcing units, as, indeed, the

Page 24312

 1     General said, is police.  Nor does it assist, on the face of it, with who

 2     is responsible for disciplinary proceedings where the resubordinated

 3     brigade of the police are concerned.

 4             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this document is

 5     relevant, especially in the light of yesterday's cross-examination by the

 6     OTP.  They were talking about attaching units and resubordinating units.

 7     And it is not subordination that is implied, that was her position

 8     yesterday and this document shows otherwise.  My next question to this

 9     witness will, of course, be whether this document is in relation to these

10     principles of resubordination and attachment, whether that is in relation

11     to the police as well.  That's my next question.

12             MS. KORNER:  Your Honour, the disciplinary aspect is concerned

13     with whether when police are resubordinated to a military, the

14     disciplinary infractions are carried out by the police chain of command

15     or the military.  It is not intended to suggest that military units

16     resubordinated Anto units which were in fact like infantry units at that

17     stage of the war in October, would not have had military disciplinary

18     procedures carried out.  Because obviously the TO was

19     part of [indiscernible] -- was part of the military and it would be the

20     military's job.

21             Our argument is, as I've expressed very clearly, I believe, to

22     the General, which he doesn't accept, is that police, when

23     resubordinated, if at that stage they commit disciplinary offences, we

24     say based on the evidence it is the police chain of command, and we

25     therefore say this document does not assist one way or another.

Page 24313

 1             [Microphone not activated] No, Mr. Zecevic does not have a right

 2     in this ...

 3                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 4             JUDGE HALL:  Yes, Mr. Zecevic.

 5             MR. ZECEVIC:  I'm sorry, Your Honours.  I didn't want to get up,

 6     but I just needed to.  I must have -- must -- must stand up.

 7             Ms. Korner just said:

 8             "... we say based on the evidence it is the police chain of

 9     command, and we therefore say this document does not assist one way or

10     the other."

11             Clearly Ms. Korner is testifying now.  She is making submissions.

12     I -- I -- I go along with Mr. Krgovic, and I think that the document is

13     relevant we do not object that it be admitted.

14             Thank you.

15             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, I take objection to this.  It is not

16     for Mr. Krgovic [sic] to stand up and -- this is not his witness.  I

17     should not have to deal with two different counsel, if not three.  This

18     is Mr. Krgovic's submission.  We object, and I'm not giving evidence.

19     There is no mention whatsoever, as the General has said, of the police in

20     this document.

21             JUDGE HALL:  Ms. Korner, this is not the first time that you

22     have -- that -- an intervention about Mr. Zecevic's involvement in this,

23     and the -- the -- we have not responded up to this point for the obvious

24     reason that, although, strictly speaking, this is Mr. Krgovic's witness,

25     this is an general understanding that -- that he is a common witness to

Page 24314

 1     the Defence.  That aside, in this instance, we are satisfied on the basis

 2     of your objection that this document does not assist and ought not to be

 3     admitted.

 4             MR. KRGOVIC:

 5        Q.   [Interpretation] General, now that we're dealing with

 6     disciplinary responsibility, is it possible in the military in a unit

 7     which is under the command of a military officer to have two different

 8     organs, to have two different systems be in charge of disciplinary

 9     proceedings and initiating them?

10        A.   No, Mr. Krgovic.

11        Q.   In case there is a violation of military discipline, a case of --

12     of military duty while the combat is on, is it possible for somebody else

13     outside of the military chain of command to investigate such cases and

14     take steps in -- in connection with them?

15        A.   No, Mr. Krgovic.

16        Q.   General, during cross-examination, a number of questions were put

17     to you with respect to co-ordinated action, and you explained that in

18     your report.  You explain how you viewed the co-ordinated action.

19             And I will now show you a document.

20             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Please show the witness P00680,

21     tab 122.

22        Q.   It was suggested to you that co-ordinated action between the MUP

23     units and the army units did not automatically amount to resubordination.

24             So would you please look at page 3 of this document.

25     Paragraph 3.5 which is page 5 in the Serbian version.

Page 24315

 1             It says here:

 2             "When carrying out combat operations, the CSB and SJB units shall

 3     be under the direct command of the unit officers," and you explain that,

 4     "in keeping with the combat rules of the armed forces of Republika

 5     Srpska.  In the event of co-ordinated action with the Army of Republika

 6     Srpska, the units shall be resubordinated to the command of the armed

 7     forces in charge of combat operations."

 8             General, the last page of this document is signed by chief of the

 9     centre, Stojan Zupljanin.

10             Can you tell us, General, or, rather, can you give us your

11     comments concerning this paragraph about the co-ordinated action between

12     the police forces and the army.

13        A.   Mr. Krgovic, in my report, and also in my replies, I clearly and

14     in detail explained that the notion of co-ordinated action not only in

15     the former JNA and in the Army of Republika Srpska but in all armies is a

16     strictly military notion which includes military forces, armed forces.

17     Co-ordinated action cannot be carried out with somebody who has merely a

18     work obligation.  This is why the commander is first needed to give an

19     appropriate status to a policeman who has a work obligation.  He needed

20     to be transferred into military obligation, and only then was it possible

21     to have a co-ordinated action with this person who, thus, becomes a

22     conscript.

23             In accordance with the rules of international laws of war, one

24     may kill members of armed forces.  By giving the status of that person

25     and making that person a military conscript, you automatically provide

Page 24316

 1     that person all the protection under the law and all the protection

 2     against any adverse consequences.  This is why I emphasise that the

 3     term -- the notion of "co-ordinated action" is a strictly military term,

 4     unlike co-operation, which is a somewhat different notion.

 5             As for co-ordinated action, it always pre-supposes

 6     resubordination.  It pre-supposes singleness of command and

 7     subordination.

 8             Yesterday, I did not have time to fully conclude this topic.

 9     Co-ordinated action could be of an internal nature, within that unit, and

10     of an external nature.  It can be between that unit and some other

11     forces.  However, in that case, the relations, the place, and the role of

12     each individual is strictly defined, and one is always subordinated to

13     one's commander.

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please, for Mr. Krgovic.

15             JUDGE DELVOIE:  [Previous translation continued]... microphone.

16             MR. KRGOVIC:

17        Q.   [Interpretation] When Mr. Zupljanin, in this document, says:

18             "In case of co-ordinated action with the units of Army of

19     Republika Srpska, units shall be resubordinated to the command of armed

20     forces in charge of combat operations."

21             Is this a correct attitude, a correct view?

22        A.   The only possible one.  This is the only way in which one can

23     protect the people involved in this, by defining it in this way.

24     Otherwise, they would not be considered members of armed forces and they

25     would not be permitted to take part in combat operations.

Page 24317

 1        Q.   General, further on, it was suggested to you that resubordination

 2     of the police to the army in such large-scale operations, such as

 3     Operation Corridor, and that there were no such cases in practice.  And I

 4     will show you some exhibits demonstrating this, P1298 or, rather, 1928.

 5     I apologise.

 6             MS. KORNER:  To be accurate, I didn't put that there were no such

 7     cases in practice.

 8             MR. KRGOVIC:

 9        Q.   [Interpretation] General, this is a report on the work of the

10     public security station in Donji Vakuf between the 1st of April, 1992 and

11     25th of December, 1992.

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  25th of December,

13     1992.

14             MR. KRGOVIC:

15        Q.   [Interpretation] So would you please look at the next page of

16     this document.

17             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] The penultimate paragraph.  The

18     next page in English.

19        Q.   And it begins with the following words:

20             "In the middle of May, both active and reserve police forces

21     actively joined the army in combat operations and in crushing the

22     resistance in villages inhabited by Muslims."

23             And then this paragraph goes on to describe these activities, and

24     what I'm interested in is the last paragraph:

25             "During participation in combat operations, the workers of the

Page 24318

 1     public security station were resubordinated to the command of the RS Army

 2     (the 19th Krajina Brigade)."

 3             Then they go on to give a number of 11 combat operations

 4     involving the police.

 5             General, would you please give a brief comment of this.  Of the

 6     paragraph and of the report.

 7        A.   Mr. Krgovic, this is yet another example which shows that it was

 8     only possible to use the police in combat operations via this mechanism

 9     by resubordination.  By doing that, the status of policemen was changed,

10     from one status to a different status.

11             It is well known that it is only based on that status that, after

12     the war, people can get various benefits, entitlements, compensation in

13     case of injury, death, and similar consequences that can ensue in war

14     time.

15        Q.   General, during your testimony here, did either side show you a

16     single document that would point to something completely opposite from

17     what you described to us here, concerning the resubordination of police

18     forces to the military in combat operations.

19             MS. KORNER:  Well, Your Honours, the --

20             MR. KRGOVIC:  Sorry, I'll rephrase because I'm not quite precise.

21             MS. KORNER:  Okay.

22             MR. KRGOVIC:

23        Q.   [Interpretation] Were you a shown a single document that would

24     make you change your conclusion about the principle of resubordination,

25     as described in your report, and as explained here before the Trial

Page 24319

 1     Chamber during your testimony.

 2        A.   No, Mr. Krgovic.  Not as far as I can recall.

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 4             MR. KRGOVIC:  [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   General, would you please look at paragraph 133 of your report.

 6             Here, you deal with the issue of responsibility for the acts of

 7     the subordinates.  It goes on to say:

 8             "A military officer is personally responsible for violations of

 9     the laws of war if he knew or could have known that a person subordinated

10     to him or other units or individuals were preparing such violations."

11             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, I don't believe I asked a single

12     question about that paragraph or on that issue at all in

13     cross-examination.

14             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I'll deal well that, Ms. Korner.

15             MS. KORNER:  Well, no, I'm sorry.  Before you can re-examine it

16     has to arise from cross-examination.

17             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Be patient, Miss.  Wait up, please.

18        Q.   You quote footnote 60, the control and command, manual for

19     military academies.  The application of international law of war and the

20     armed forces of the SFRY.  That's in the footnote.

21             General, what about a brigade commander who would have heard

22     about this during his training, would that commander not have to be

23     familiar with these regulations?

24             MS. KORNER:  One, that's leading, and it's still not a matter

25     that's come out of cross-examination.

Page 24320

 1             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] You mentioned the person of the

 2     brigade commander and his responsibility for subordination.  I'm not

 3     mentioning the name for obvious reasons.  You even quote something he

 4     wrote about his own responsibility for punishing subordinates.  That

 5     stems directly from your cross-examination.  You even specified a brigade

 6     commander.

 7             MS. KORNER:  No, I'm sorry, Your Honours, I don't follow this at

 8     all, I'm afraid.  What I quoted to the General and he declined to accept,

 9     as Mr. Krgovic rightly points out, and for the sake -- safety's sake, we

10     better go into private session.

11             JUDGE HALL:  We go into private session.

12                           [Private session]

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 24321

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10                           [Open session]

11             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

12             JUDGE HALL:  Mr. Krgovic, you appreciate the distinction?

13     Ms. Korner's last comment.

14             MR. KRGOVIC:  Yes.

15        Q.   [Interpretation] General, yesterday Ms. Korner showed you this

16     paragraph about a specific situation.  Or, rather, stated her position

17     regarding this specific situation.

18             My question:  We have a resubordinated police officer, in a

19     specific case, and a brigade commander, who was in charge of initiating

20     disciplinary proceedings and who is authorised to take measures?

21        A.   Mr. Krgovic, as I've pointed out on more than one occasion, if a

22     police officer is subordinated to a military unit commander, he is

23     effectively a military conscript and has that status.

24             In that case, it is the commander of the military unit that is

25     responsible for initiating any proceedings or, indeed, pressing charges

Page 24322

 1     against this subordinated individual.

 2             JUDGE HARHOFF:  And, General, do we take it to mean that this

 3     also includes disciplinary proceedings?  In contrasts of criminal

 4     proceedings arising out of a -- a major offence.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, that's right.

 6             Any kind of responsibility, moral responsibility, material

 7     responsibility, disciplinary responsibility, criminal responsibility.

 8             Your Honour, the status of that person in that case is the same

 9     of that of any other member of the unit for the duration of the

10     resubordination.

11             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Mr. Krgovic, it strikes me as if we have come as

12     far as we can possibly get with this witness in relation to the issue of

13     proceedings -- okay.  So I suggest that, again, in light of the time

14     pressure that we are under this afternoon, that you move onto something

15     else.

16             Very well.  Please proceed.

17             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I am done with this.  This was my

18     last question on the subject.

19        Q.   General, sir, two days ago, you spoke about the concept of

20     combat.

21             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] May the witness please be shown

22     65 ter 20259; tab 110, OTP.

23             Could we please zoom in on the portion where it talks about

24     combat.  This is midway down the middle paragraph, or column.

25        Q.   General, you quoted the military lexicon, describing combat as

Page 24323

 1     the basic and most widespread form of combat activity.

 2             General, what would be the broader concept here?  Combat activity

 3     or combat?

 4        A.   Mr. Krgovic, combat activities are the broader concept of the

 5     two.  As is obvious, combat is one and perhaps the simplest form of

 6     combat activities.  There are higher forms and more complex forms of

 7     combat activity, such as battle and operation, as the most evolved, most

 8     complex form that a combat activity may take.

 9        Q.   What about the conduct of an operation?  Would that comprise a

10     single action or several actions?  And can you please explain.

11        A.   Mr. Krgovic, as I've said before, operation is the most complex

12     form of combat activity.  This means that it comprises a number of

13     battles or situations of combat, the objective being to inflict as many

14     losses on the enemy as possible throughout a war.  In terms of character,

15     in terms of substance, in terms of the number of men involved, it

16     represents the most complex, the most evolved form of combat activity.

17        Q.   Yesterday you were asked a question about this.  During the

18     conduct of combat operations, while cleaning up, or mopping up, which

19     category would that particular action belong to?

20        A.   Well, now you're making me think back -- you make me remember all

21     these details.  In addition to combat and battle, as you suggest

22     yourself, there are many other combat actions that are performed, as well

23     as tactical actions or procedures.  All of that might entail what you

24     suggest; mopping up as a tactical action.

25        Q.   Is that part of combat activities?

Page 24324

 1        A.   Yes, indeed.  That's right, Mr. Krgovic.

 2        Q.   What about combat task, a combat assignment?

 3        A.   Mr. Krgovic, a combat task is clearly and precisely defined in

 4     relation to each unit, depending on its level, depending on the

 5     situation.  One must define what that unit is expected to do

 6     specifically, within the framework of an operation, in a combat situation

 7     or in a battle.  What it is expected to do in order to achieve the

 8     objective of a certain operation or the objective of certain combat

 9     activities.

10             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreters didn't hear the question.  The

11     microphone was off.

12             MR. KRGOVIC:

13        Q.   [Interpretation] Performing a combat task, tactical operations,

14     if I may put it that way -- or, rather, when we have a resubordinated

15     unit, during these activities, were these resubordinated units under the

16     command of the commander performing these activities?

17        A.   That's right, Mr. Krgovic.

18        Q.   I'll move onto a different subject now.

19             General, during the resubordination process - and now the unit is

20     subordinated to the military commander - so during the process itself, is

21     the unit bound to carry out each and any of his orders during this

22     situation, while all of this applies?

23        A.   Yes, indeed, that's right, Mr. Krgovic.

24        Q.   Ms. Korner asked you about POWs yesterday.  What in case POWs are

25     being transported, taken somewhere?  What about securing the place where

Page 24325

 1     these POWs are assembled, put together?  What about securing their

 2     transport to a camp?

 3        A.   Mr. Krgovic, the same thing applies.  POW transport can be

 4     secured in a variety of ways.  All of this is regulated by the military

 5     commander in charge, and he was put in charge by his superior commander.

 6     He must carry out this task.  The commander in charge of transporting

 7     POWs is allowed to use certain units, certain equipment to make sure that

 8     the transport of POWs from point A to point B is safe.

 9        Q.   General, you were asked yesterday whether you came across an

10     order or a directive by the VRS invoking Article 104 of the Law on All

11     People's Defence.

12             General, what is the established practice in the army?  When an

13     order is issued, or when instructions are issued, does one usually invoke

14     a particular article of the law, a particular rule, a particular

15     provision?

16        A.   No, Mr. Krgovic.  What applies in our case is do first and

17     complain later.  You receive an order, the preamble normally invokes in

18     no uncertain terms another order by a superior officer, or one invokes a

19     particular situation.  It is based on that that you put together your own

20     order.

21        Q.   General, you were shown a document yesterday.  It's P2390.

22             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] May the witness please be shown

23     that document.

24             The last paragraph, please.

25        Q.   It reads:

Page 24326

 1             "Situation in the zone of responsibility of the 2nd Military

 2     District.

 3              "Propaganda activity and charges laid against the JNA as the

 4     main ... party ... responsibile for the recent events are continuing."

 5             General, you addressed this before this Honourable Tribunal.  You

 6     talked about the effects of propaganda.  Ms. Korner showed you this

 7     document during her cross-examination.  Can you please tell us how this

 8     propaganda, if I may call it that, and documents such as these affected

 9     the way some components of the JNA treated those doing the actual

10     propaganda?

11        A.   Mr. Krgovic, I'm afraid I did not completely understand your

12     question.  My concentration may be wearing off.

13             MR. KRGOVIC:  I tried to --

14        Q.   [Interpretation] I'm trying not to put leading questions.

15             In your report, you discuss this very issue of the attitude the

16     JNA had vis-a-vis -- let me help you.  When addressing propaganda aimed

17     against the JNA.

18             In this report, we see some propaganda activities aimed at the

19     JNA.  How did such activities impact the attitude of the JNA officers.

20        A.   Mr. Krgovic, a similar method or scenario was used, starting from

21     Slovenia, down to Bosnia, with the aim of breaking up the JNA.  It was

22     best achieved by people leaving its ranks.  As I have said before, it

23     started in Slovenia.  Unusual situations began to take place, but one

24     needs to expect that in a war.  For example, in my own unit, there was an

25     assistant commander of the battalion who abandoned his position, his

Page 24327

 1     position being a senior one, in order to join the Slovenian TO.

 2        Q.   General, you seem to have gone off on a tangent.  I'd like us to

 3     focus on the first part of your answer.

 4             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we look at P2391 for that

 5     purpose.

 6        Q.   Before that, let me ask you this:  As the JNA was withdrawing,

 7     did its ethnic composition change, and, in what way, especially once you

 8     arrived Bosnia?  What was the ethnic composition of the remaining part of

 9     the JNA?

10        A.   Mr. Krgovic, I can only cite examples from my own unit, although

11     I'm aware of similar situations elsewhere.  I can say that most

12     Slovenians and Croatians, including officers, as well as soldiers,

13     remained behind.  Many Muslims did stay with the JNA, as far as Bosnia,

14     when they began leaving us.  Macedonians and Montenegrins remained, as

15     well as Albanian, Hungarians, and other ethnicities which were then

16     represented in the JNA.

17        Q.   We have this report before us shown to you yesterday by

18     Ms. Korner.

19             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please zoom in.  Item 2.

20     The penultimate paragraph.

21        Q.   It reads:

22             "Part of the officers in the 92nd Motorised Brigade openly -- is

23     openly against the JNA for not taking a different approach in Bijeljina

24     and Zvornik, whereas, they do not apply the same standard when they refer

25     to Bosanski Brod."

Page 24328

 1             Do you know which event they have in mind when they mention this

 2     ban on intervention?

 3        A.   Mr. Krgovic, given the fact that this was in April, it could be

 4     the issue of the Posavina, although I'm not certain.  It concerned an

 5     attack of the Croatian armed forces against the Serbs, or on the Serbs

 6     who lived there, although I'm not certain.

 7        Q.   Does Sijekovac ring a bell?

 8        A.   It is difficult for me to recall it, Mr. Krgovic.

 9             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please show another

10     document to the witness then, which is -- please bear with me.  I seem to

11     have written down an incorrect number.

12             P20246.  65 ter 20246.  Apologies.  Tab 6A of the Prosecutor.

13        Q.   General, it was suggested to you yesterday in relation to this

14     document that the JNA did nothing.  Please read carefully paragraph 4.

15             The second sentence from the top:

16             "However, in the morning hours, the activities became of higher

17     intensity."

18             "Party leaders do not control the situation and are not capable

19     of stopping the activity.  For this reason, they are unable to enforce

20     the curfew between 8.00 p.m. and 6.00 a.m., and MUP, at present, refuses

21     to participate in mixed patrols with the JNA."

22             General, can you offer comments regarding this last sentence?

23     What is the commander in question trying to say?

24        A.   As far as I remember that period, there were political

25     negotiations round the clock, as well as different attempts to put a stop

Page 24329

 1     to these interethnic clashes.  One such measure that was agreed upon was

 2     to conduct joint patrols, comprising members of the MUP and JNA.  It

 3     seems that the arrangement, however, was not honoured and that it is that

 4     that is discussed in this part of the report.

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 6             JUDGE DELVOIE:  Microphone.

 7             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Apologies.

 8        Q.   Let me go back to your report.

 9             In footnote number 10, you mention a date.  And you refer to a

10     book:  "Cessation Orchestrated by the Great Powers."

11             General, did you use any part of this book or any of the

12     positions put forth by its author in your report?

13        A.   I did not, Mr. Krgovic.

14        Q.   Let us study the footnote for a moment.  It is 35D2; 65 ter.

15     Tab 10.

16             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] It seems I don't have the page I

17     wanted to show, Your Honours.  Perhaps we could take an earlier break by

18     some five minutes so that I can come up with the appropriate page.  And

19     once we are back, I'll wrap up in 30 minutes.

20             JUDGE HALL:  Very well.

21                           [The witness stands down]

22                           --- Recess taken at 3.55 p.m.

23                           --- On resuming at 4.34 p.m.

24                           [Trial Chamber confers]

25                           [The witness takes the stand]

Page 24330

 1             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours --

 2        Q.   General.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, Your Honours, I

 4     would like to ask your leave to more specifically define the position

 5     that I presented a while ago when I spoke about the status of members of

 6     the armed forces in relation to the provisions of the international law

 7     of war.  I believe I was slightly imprecise when I said that a while ago.

 8     I have thought about it, and I think I'm getting a little tired, so that

 9     was probably the reason.

10             JUDGE HALL:  Yes, please proceed, General.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

12             When I talked about resubordination as an act and the fact that

13     they thereby become members of the armed forces, and under the rules of

14     international law, it was allowed to kill them; and they thereby became

15     legitimate targets.  That is what I tried to say, and now I'm trying to

16     be more precise about it and specifically define it.  It is allowed to

17     kill them.

18             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.

19             Yes, Mr. Krgovic.

20             MR. KRGOVIC:

21        Q.   [Interpretation] General, you've answered my question, but I'll

22     move onto something else now.

23             I showed you this book, Cessation Orchestrated by the Great

24     Powers.

25             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have OTP

Page 24331

 1     Exhibit 2235; tab 97.  2235.  20235.  That's a 65 ter number.  Page 3,

 2     please.

 3        Q.   General, you see the editors of this book and the reviewers.

 4     Professor Miodrag Starcevic is one of the names there.  In answer to one

 5     of the questions by Ms. Korner, 23907, page 23907, specifically, you

 6     said -- 23965, you said that this was a book published by an institute

 7     with a good reputation and very good references.

 8             Do you know this gentleman, Miodrag Starcevic?

 9        A.   Mr. Krgovic, yes, I do know Professor Miodrag Starcevic.  He is a

10     well-known and well-regarded expert for international law of war.

11        Q.   Could you please look at a document for me, just to make sure we

12     mean the same person, we have the same person in mind.

13             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Just a minute, please.  2D101233.

14     The last page of the document, please.  This is tab 118; Defence tab 118.

15        Q.   Here, have a look.  Miodrag Starcevic.  His CV.  A member of the

16     international humanitarian fact-finding commission.

17        A.   Mr. Krgovic, I think I only met this gentleman once, so -- and

18     even that was a long time ago.  I was still working as head of the morale

19     administration and as assistant chief of the General Staff.  So this may

20     be the same person I met back then.

21             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

22             MR. KRGOVIC:

23        Q.   [Interpretation] General, can we please go back to the Law on All

24     People's Defence.  Paragraphs 24 through to 26 are the ones we will be

25     discussing.

Page 24332

 1             In the meantime, we have received a document from the OTP and

 2     I'll ask you to comment.  It's in relation to that law.

 3             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] 65 ter 20264.  OTP document 20264.

 4     Page 2, please.  Article 1.

 5        Q.   It reads:

 6             "Work obligation units shall be organised for the needs of the

 7     armed forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ... in war

 8     and in the case of an imminent threat of war.  Work obligation units

 9     shall be organised by assigning them to -- by assigning to them citizens

10     subject to work obligation and not assigned to the armed forces or

11     subject to work obligation in bodies of the Interior Ministry."

12             General, to go back to your interpretation of this article,

13     number 4, 25, 26, what about the provisions of this decree?  Have a close

14     look, please.  Are they any different from the letter of the law; and are

15     the two interpretations different?

16             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, also, I think the General ought to be

17     asked if he has ever seen it before in fairness to him, or if this is the

18     first time he's seen this.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Ms. Korner, I've come across this

20     document already.  I never had a chance to use it in my work though.

21             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Can you please answer the question, General.

23        A.   Mr. Krgovic, I'm looking at Article 1.  I'm looking for a

24     discrepancy.  Then there is something there that confuses me.

25        Q.   But my question was:  Are there any discrepancies.  If you don't

Page 24333

 1     see any, please state so.

 2        A.   I see this:  "For the needs of the armed forces in war and in

 3     case of an imminent threat of war."

 4             I see that this classification was added in relation to what

 5     Article 26 says.  It only says "in war."

 6        Q.   And what about how it relates to Article 25?

 7        A.   I established a link between Article 25 and Article 26.  In my

 8     opinion, the two are related.  It reads:

 9             "Among other things, that those liable for work obligation must

10     remain on their jobs and assignments, the ones they are performing,

11     unless they are called to serve in the armed forces or assigned to other

12     tasks and jobs."

13             Specifically in relation to practical matters, the next

14     paragraph says that such individuals may be assigned within their own

15     place of residence or outside their place of residence.  They must act in

16     compliance with the assignment received.

17             And then Article 26.  It specifies who is responsible and who is

18     authorised to change their war assignment.

19             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, I'm really sorry.  I would invite

20     Mr. Krgovic or Your Honours to ask, and I'm sorry this arrived so late,

21     but the simple question is this:  Whether Article 1 --

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

23             MS. KORNER:  Oh, I'm sorry.  The simple question is whether

24     Article 1 of this particular regulation, if it's correct as published in

25     the gazette, means that people who are assigned to work obligation for

Page 24334

 1     the minister [sic] of interior may not be assigned to the military.

 2     That's the -- the simple question.

 3             Do you agree.

 4             MR. KRGOVIC: [Microphone not activated]

 5        Q.   General, you have heard the question.  Could you please answer

 6     it?

 7        A.   No, that is not my interpretation.  My interpretation is what the

 8     law says, the law that I used for my report, Ms. Korner.  I see it as

 9     being very specific and clear.  Workers assigned a particular work

10     obligation during a war or during an imminent threat of war may change

11     their war assignment, and, if called upon by the relevant bodies, they

12     may also perform military duties.

13        Q.   Thank you very much, General.

14             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, while Mr. Krgovic is looking for his

15     next document, can I say we're going to look for the official version and

16     then, by agreement, we'll add it to the law library.

17             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.

18             MR. KRGOVIC:  [Interpretation]

19        Q.   General, I have a series of questions for you about the

20     differences between the expert report that you produced for the Popovic

21     case and the present one.

22             You referred several times to the fact that these are two

23     different reports.  Can you please explain what that difference is

24     reflected in?  How are the two different?  What does the difference

25     comprise?

Page 24335

 1        A.   Mr. Krgovic, in the briefest possible terms, the substantial

 2     difference between the two reports is the fact that we're dealing with

 3     two different cases.  We are studying two different cases.

 4        Q.   Are we looking at the same time-period, the same time-frame?

 5     Both cases are two different ones.  If so, each -- if so, which?

 6        A.   Mr. Krgovic, the focus of my second report, the present one, is

 7     on 1992; whereas, the first report did not have a limited time-frame.  It

 8     was more about explaining the place and role of assistant commander for

 9     morale.  Firstly, in general terms; and, secondly, in a war time

10     situation.

11        Q.   General, Ms. Korner spent quite some time in her

12     cross-examination probing the introductory part of your report.  Would

13     you please open page 2 of your report and look at paragraph 2 and 3.

14             General, it says here:  "Introduction."

15             And then please look at paragraph 14 where it says:  "General

16     Framework."

17             Tell me, please, General, when you wrote this, the introduction

18     and the general framework, what was your intention?  What significance do

19     you think this part of your report holds?  Why did you use that

20     methodological approach?

21        A.   Mr. Krgovic, in order to research the topic that I did, I had to

22     place it in some general context which is described in the first part.

23     And I also had to give it some temporal context, which is discussed in

24     paragraph 14.  I had to start from somewhere.

25        Q.   Was that the main focus, the main topic of your report?

Page 24336

 1        A.   No, Mr. Krgovic.  As I have said throughout my report, when

 2     dealing with a command, organisation, rules and regulations, I attempted

 3     to deal with the very important topic that I put before myself because I

 4     considered that those cases or those phenomena of the use of police units

 5     and their resubordination to military commanders were possible or could

 6     be explained only by studying military rules and regulations because a

 7     war is waged in accordance with military rules and regulations and it is

 8     waged by soldiers, not by policemen.  This is why I analysed the

 9     organisation, command, principles, and structure in order to confirm this

10     position of mine which I considered to be the only

11     possible [as interpreted] in these cases, in order - I emphasise - to

12     classify or categorise those individuals as members of armed forces who

13     would fall under the provisions of the international laws of war.

14        Q.   General, on page 23907, it was suggested to you by the

15     Prosecutor -- or, rather, the previous page, 906 and 907, it was

16     suggested to you that your idea was to ensure that the Defence got

17     General Gvero acquitted for Srebrenica, that that was your goal when

18     writing that report.  And your reply was:  "When I said that I wanted to

19     assist the Defence, I wish to explain that my aim was to explain the

20     principles existing in the army, and to assist, first and foremost, the

21     Trial Chamber."

22             MS. KORNER:  He said -- well, I'm sorry.

23     [Microphone not activated] answer.  He said, "You're right," to my

24     question, and then added that.

25             MR. KRGOVIC:  But not when you say that only helped

Page 24337

 1     General Gvero.  "I wanted to explain this as a principle present in the

 2     army, and I wanted to assist the Trial Chamber, first and foremost ..."

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please, for Mr. Krgovic.

 4             MR. KRGOVIC:

 5        Q.   [Interpretation] General, it was suggested to you by Ms. Korner,

 6     and on page 23872, she said to you that, as a Defence expert, you wanted

 7     to help the Defence.  Could you explain to us what is your perception of

 8     the role of an expert in this case before this Court?

 9        A.   Mr. Krgovic, I understand that, as an expert before this Court, I

10     have to be objective and unbiased.  It is possible that prompted by the

11     suggestion of Ms. Korner, I uttered those words.  However, I emphasise

12     and I have said earlier that I see my role, first and foremost, as that

13     of an expert before this Trial Chamber.  I see that my role is to help

14     the Trial Chamber.  Perhaps I was led in giving that answer by the

15     position that I held for the longest time in my career.  As you could see

16     from my CV, I spent the longest part of my career in the position of an

17     assistant, assisting sometimes the commanders to take difficult

18     decisions.

19             As you could see in my CV, at the end of my career, I held the

20     position of a commander, and I had to then take difficult decisions

21     myself, and I know that it's not easy to do that.

22        Q.   General, when you drew conclusions and when you included them in

23     your report, did anyone influence you, influence your conclusions and the

24     views expressed in this report?

25        A.   No, Mr. Krgovic.

Page 24338

 1        Q.   If you were not a Defence expert but an expert of the OTP or of

 2     any other side, would the views expressed in your report be different?

 3        A.   No.  Mr. Krgovic, I claim with full responsibility that I would

 4     have provided identical answers, an identical report when it comes to

 5     this topic, resubordination to military -- of police to military

 6     commanders and military units.

 7        Q.   Thank you, sir.  I have no further questions for you.

 8                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 9             JUDGE HALL:  General, we are grateful for your willingness to

10     assist the Tribunal, for your patience over the many days that you have

11     been with us.  And your persistence, despite your own personal

12     difficulties.  You would be pleased to know that you are now released,

13     and we wish you a safe journey back to your home.

14             There are a few matters with which the Tribunal must deal before

15     it rises, so I would ask the usher to escort you from the courtroom.

16             MS. KORNER:  And before that, can I say that whatever submissions

17     I may be making about the General's evidence I too am grateful for his

18     patience over what was, obviously, a very lengthy cross-examination and

19     also his courtesy; although, I could have done without being called

20     Ms. Korner every time he answered a question.  But I am very grateful.

21             JUDGE HALL:  [Previous translation continued]...

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President --

23             JUDGE HALL:  Sorry, you wanted to say something?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I wish to thank you

25     and this Trial Chamber for the understanding you have shown and for your

Page 24339

 1     fair treatment.  Thank you.

 2             Thank you.

 3                           [The witness withdrew]

 4             JUDGE HALL:  There are brief matters that the Chamber wishes to

 5     address, but before I do that, I don't know if counsel from either side

 6     have any observations or requests before we rise for the day.

 7             MS. KORNER:  I imagine Mr. Krgovic wants to ask that Your Honours

 8     admit the report and the accompanying documents.  As I've indicated to

 9     Mr. Krgovic and to Mr. Zecevic, I will be objecting to the admission of

10     that report with some reasons for it, and I think we all feel that Monday

11     morning would be better for that.

12             JUDGE HALL:  Very well.

13             The first matter is the admission of 659D1.

14             In its decision of the 15th of September the Chamber marked for

15     identification a document with Rule 65 ter number 659D1, pending the

16     provision of a complete translation.  As one has now been provided, we

17     order that this -- the MFI qualification on this be removed and the

18     document be admitted and marked as a full exhibit.

19             And we record our appreciation for the assistance of Defence

20     counsel in noting the situation with regard to this document.

21             The second matter is the completion of the Rule 66(B) disclosure.

22     And we note that now that we have a revised batting order from the

23     Zupljanin Defence, we anticipate that the Prosecution can also confirm to

24     the Chamber that its disclosure of Rule 66(B) material to the Defence

25     pursuant to our decision of the 19th of August is now complete.

Page 24340

 1             MS. KORNER:  Is that -- are you asking me, Your Honours?

 2             JUDGE HALL:  Well, I paused.  You may wish to -- when I say

 3     "you," the OTP may wish to return to this when we reconvene on Monday.

 4             MS. KORNER:  Yes, but I do say --

 5             JUDGE HALL:  But I pause in the even that you are in a position

 6     to respond now.

 7             MS. KORNER:  I am, with the exception of one witness, who I think

 8     is still a query -- and I see Mr. Krgovic nodding, he is still a query

 9     even though he is still on the list.  We have, otherwise, completed

10     disclosure.

11             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.

12             The final matter is estimates for cross-examination, and in order

13     for forward planning and to make the most effective use of the limited

14     time available, we invite both the Prosecution and the Stanisic Defence

15     to provide the Chamber with its time estimates for cross-examination of

16     all remaining witnesses no later than Thursday, next, that's the 22nd of

17     September.  And we take the opportunity to remind the Prosecution that

18     with the exception of the three Rule 92 ter witnesses, it will be granted

19     no more than the time estimated by the Zupljanin Defence for

20     examination-in-chief.

21             We also remind all parties of the requirements of guide-lines 25

22     to 27 of the procedural guide-lines on the presentation of evidence of

23     Rule 92 ter witnesses.  Estimates of time for cross-examination of the

24     three Rule 92 ter witnesses were expected "as soon as possible" after the

25     relevant decisions were issued on the 21st of July and the 22nd of

Page 24341

 1     August.

 2             And as we rise for the weekend, the Chamber wishes to

 3     acknowledge -- it would have earlier expressed its gratitude to CLSS for

 4     agreeing to accommodate the extended sitting today, and we wish to

 5     acknowledge the co-operation of everyone else who would have had to

 6     facilitate this.  We -- especially the support staff, that is the

 7     security personnel, the court reporters, the court officers, and most of

 8     all, the accused, whose ordinary schedule would have been disrupted as a

 9     result of this extended sitting.

10             So we thankfully have completed a little earlier than we thought

11     we would have been here so --

12             You had something to add, Mr. Krgovic?

13             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honours.

14             I just wanted to notify you that we made a submission for some

15     documents to be added to our 65 ter list.  This motion will reach you

16     very soon.  It has to do -- do with documents that we wanted to add to

17     the list in relation to the next witness.  The Prosecution has already

18     been notified of this and I wanted to notify the Chamber as well, that we

19     filed that motion, but it hasn't been distributed to the parties for

20     technical reasons.  Not yet.

21             These are the documents that had been disclosed to us by the

22     Prosecution.  Some in August.  And some earlier.  All of these documents

23     come from the OTP.

24             JUDGE HALL:  So we are alerted.

25             Well, I trust that everyone has a safe weekend, and we reconvene,

Page 24342

 1     I think, Monday morning, and we're in the courtroom for the duration of

 2     this -- of the sitting of this case, during this period.

 3                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 5.12 p.m.,

 4                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 19th day of

 5                           September, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.