Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 27270

 1                           Tuesday, 29 May 2012

 2                           [Prosecution Closing Statement]

 3                           [Open session]

 4                           [The accused entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning to

 7     everyone in and around the courtroom.

 8             This is case IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and

 9     Stojan Zupljanin.

10             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

11             As would be observed, we're getting used to the new technology.

12             May we have the appearances, please.

13             MS. KORNER:  Good morning, Your Honours.  The OTP this morning,

14     Joanna Korner; starting the most important person in the case,

15     Sebastiaan van Hooydonk, the Case Manager; then Alex Demirdjian;

16     Matthew Olmsted; and I think a new face to Your Honours, but a member of

17     the team for sometime now, Rafael La Cruz; and an intern, Lucy Eastwood

18     sitting in the back.

19             MR. ZECEVIC:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Slobodan Zecevic,

20     Slobodan Cvijetic, Eugene O'Sullivan, Ms. Tatjana Savic and

21     Andreja Zecevic, appearing for Stanisic Defence this morning.  Thank you.

22             MR. KRGOVIC:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Dragan Krgovic,

23     Aleksandar Aleksic, Michelle Butler, Miroslav Cuskic, David Martini,

24     Milena Dzudovic, and Ms. Joyce Boekestijn, appearing for Zupljanin

25     Defence team today.

Page 27271

 1             JUDGE HALL:  Thank you.

 2             So, of course, according to the Scheduling Order, we're here

 3     today to begin the closing submissions, and we would invite the OTP to

 4     begin.

 5             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, before I do that, I sent an e-mail

 6     yesterday to the Senior Legal Officer that -- I gather he's not here, but

 7     copied to other legal officers in respect of the question of matters of

 8     law contained within the Defence final briefs with which we took issue

 9     and whether it would be possible to deal with those matters because

10     they're not really the purpose of a final address in writing.

11             Were Your Honours given notification of this application?

12             Your Honour, Mr. Zecevic objects - and I assuming the objection

13     is also maintained on behalf of the Zupljanin team - effectively on the

14     basis that once the final [microphone not activated] ... it has gone off,

15     has it?  Oh, yes, I'm told the new microphones are actually less

16     sensitive than the old ones.

17             So, Your Honours, our application this morning is simply this.

18     There are not many but there are some matters of law which we say the

19     Defence have made an error about, and we would simply ask that we can

20     deal with that in writing, and no doubt if Your Honours agree to that

21     OLAD would clearly fund a response from the Defence.

22             JUDGE HALL:  I'm not sure -- I hear what you have said about the

23     funding issue, but do I understand correctly, and perhaps Mr. Zecevic

24     could confirm this, that the objection is only based on the funding issue

25     and not on any issue of procedural principle?  Because the -- as far as

Page 27272

 1     the -- the initial view of the Trial Chamber is that this is a matter

 2     that is -- can be disposed of in terms of the ordinary principles of how

 3     these -- how -- how closings are conducted without venturing into this

 4     matter of funding which ordinarily isn't the concern of the

 5     Trial Chamber.

 6             MR. ZECEVIC:  Your Honour, thank you.

 7             My -- my objection has nothing to do with the funding.  Perhaps

 8     that's a misunderstanding by Ms. Korner.  My objection was -- was the

 9     following:  We believed that the Trial Chamber has given ample time for

10     the parties to address all the matters in fact and in law during the

11     closing arguments, and we believe we should do that in the oral

12     arguments.

13             Furthermore, I added that once the closing is done, the Defence

14     team, according to the OLAD policy, does not exist anymore.  Therefore,

15     it would be a certain problem for us to -- to -- to deal with the -- with

16     the -- with the written -- written submissions after the closing

17     [microphone not activated] ... of the case.

18             Of course, I assume that this problem can be overcome, but then

19     it will require additional -- additional time for us to discuss that with

20     OLAD and how to do it.  And, by the way, a member of Defence teams have

21     been put on notice that after the 1st of June, that they will be no

22     longer needed and people have made some -- some plans to come home -- go

23     home and so on and so forth.

24             But we are in the hands of Your Honours.  I mean, it's -- it's

25     not the problem that we cannot overcome.  We just believe that it

Page 27273

 1     would -- it -- we have enough time, both parties to address these issues

 2     during the oral arguments.

 3             Thank you very much.

 4             JUDGE HALL:  Mr. Krgovic, you adopt what Mr. Zecevic has said.

 5             MR. KRGOVIC:  Yes, Your Honour.  It was joint submission by both

 6     Defence teams.

 7             JUDGE HALL:  Ms. Korner, could I hear you further on the

 8     procedural aspect.  Put aside the funding business.

 9             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, there is -- there are a number of

10     possibilities in respect of final briefs, and one of those possibilities

11     is that there's a response to the final briefs, a written response.

12             Your Honours decided not to -- to afford us the opportunity,

13     which we accept.  There are, as Your Honours will hear, we say, many

14     defects in what's asserted in some of the final briefs, but it's the --

15     the only matter that I'm concerned about is the fact of the law.

16             This is the final oral address.  There's an opportunity for both

17     sides to deal with the factual matters that they wish Your Honours to

18     take away with them and also the -- any chance the public gets to hear

19     them.  It doesn't seem to us that it's helped by an aery discussion of

20     whether or not [microphone not activated] ... the laws that been probably

21     formulated on certain aspects.

22             I don't think the new and replacement microphones are very

23     effective.

24             So that's the situation, Your Honours.

25             JUDGE HALL:  Well, we have heard the parties, and we would give

Page 27274

 1     this consideration and return with a ruling, probably oral, in the course

 2     of today or certainly by tomorrow, first thing tomorrow.

 3             Thank you.

 4             Yes, Ms. Korner, are you ready to begin?

 5             MS. KORNER:  Thank you, Your Honours.  Yes, it is on.

 6             Your Honours, can we start by saying that, as I more or less just

 7     said, that the purpose of our closing address today is to highlight some

 8     of the matters that we have dealt with at far greater length in the final

 9     [microphone not activated] ... trial brief and obviously to deal with

10     some of the matters that have been raised by both accused in their final

11     trial briefs.

12             Can I explain that as has happened through the trial, there will

13     be a division of labour for the purposes of this oral address.  Once I

14     have dealt with some preliminary matters, Mr. Demirdjian will deal with

15     the municipalities that Your Honours have heard about in this case.  I

16     will then deal with some of the background and the question of

17     resubordination.  From there, we move to the liability of

18     Stojan Zupljanin.  We are, as it were, building this address in the same

19     way that we built the final trial brief.

20             Mr. Hannis, who is not here at the moment but will be appearing

21     later, will deal with communications, which obviously an important aspect

22     highlighted by both Defence in their briefs, the liability of

23     Mico Stanisic.  And Mr. Olmsted will then deal, as he has dealt through

24     most of the trial, with the failure to investigate and to prosecute,

25     which we say applies to both these accused.

Page 27275

 1             And, finally, Your Honours, to round off, as it were, all the

 2     themes together in one short topic, the -- we will deal with the killings

 3     that took place at Koricanske Stijene.

 4             Your Honours, can I just say a few general words about the

 5     Defence final briefs.  In our submission to Your Honours, they invite

 6     very careful reading.  There are, we would suggest, a number of lacunae

 7     in these briefs.  For example, propositions with made without any

 8     citation.  There are assertions of fact about which Your Honours have

 9     heard no evidence at all.  And, Your Honours, can I take one very simple

10     and straightforward and immediate example of that.  It may not be the

11     most important, but it's, we say, unfortunately symptomatic.

12             Your Honours, in the Zupljanin final brief, at paragraph 1, so

13     the very first paragraph.  It may not be vital but it's important.  It is

14     asserted that Stojan Zupljanin was born on the 22nd of September, 1951,

15     as an only child to a poor, rural family.  Well, Your Honours, we checked

16     very carefully and we find no evidence at all that he was an only child

17     to a poor, rural family.  As I say, it begins, Your Honour, as it carries

18     on.

19             Your Honour, in paragraph 201, where the brief is dealing with

20     the special police, which I will obviously be returning when I come to

21     deal with Mr. Zupljanin's authority over them, it states:

22             "While they suggested contacting Zupljanin," this is to do with

23     complaints about the behaviour, to address these problems, this was

24     simply because he was known as the head of the CSB, and "he was the most

25     convenient point of contact in the area and the undefined nature of the

Page 27276

 1     unit also made it difficult for the Kotor Varos Crisis Staff to know whom

 2     to address their complaints."

 3             Well, Your Honours, there's not one iota of evidence to that

 4     effect.

 5             And, Your Honour, finally, if one looks at the Stanisic final

 6     brief, at paragraph 53, Your Honours, this goes to the no cites and

 7     assertion of facts we say not in evidence:

 8             "Some 2.000 MUP employs were dismissed to recruit and employ

 9     Muslim policemen on the pretext that it was necessary to achieve ethnic

10     balance between the service."

11             There is absolutely no cite for that proposition.  The next part

12     for which there is a cite is to Mr. Andan, and that doesn't in any way

13     deal with that assertion there at the beginning of paragraph 53.

14             Your Honours, further, we say that there are really misleading

15     assertions, regrettably, in the brief.

16             Your Honours, sticking with the Stanisic brief for the moment,

17     paragraph 99, Your Honour, this comes under the section which is headed

18     the previous page:  No plan to split the MUP.  And they say at the end of

19     the paragraph, having -- the document that they're dealing with is, in

20     fact, 1D116.  And it says:

21             "The document highlights the major problem created by the SDA

22     leadership by pushing the MUP into a conflict with the JNA.  This was

23     done, in part, by the take-over of military records for the creating of

24     an armed force to confront the army."

25             Your Honours, I'm going to ask that we put up 1D116, please.  Or

Page 27277

 1     part of it.  This was a public announcement.

 2             If Your Honours look, this was the -- the BiH MUP making a public

 3     announcement about the statement made by Dr. Karadzic.  And at the end,

 4     they list their complaints, we see -- it's the penultimate paragraph with

 5     a dash:

 6             "- creating an anti-army atmosphere, which is apparent in the MUP

 7     written order to engage the police in preventing the JNA ... from taking

 8     over military records... "

 9             So what was happening there was they were preventing the JNA, not

10     taking over the military reports [microphone not activated] ... so,

11     Your Honours, the reason we're giving a few examples at this stage is

12     simply so that when reading these briefs, Your Honours do check the

13     various cites.

14             Can I take one example of this from the Zupljanin final brief;

15     paragraph 235.

16             This, Your Honour, is a part of the -- I can only call it a

17     diatribe, I'll come back to that, that -- that the Zupljanin final brief

18     engages in against Mr. Brown, the military expert.  And they say there

19     that:

20             "Prosecution expert, Brown, was forced to concede that an order

21     issued by General Talic provided that police in exceptional circumstances

22     may be used in a variety of different ways to support the army and that

23     importantly they may be used for combat activities without forming MUP

24     organs or obtaining their approval."

25             And the cite there is for Mr. Brown's evidence.

Page 27278

 1             And pursuant to Talic's order discretion to resubordinate police

 2     in such circumstances was vested in the army.  Such exceptional

 3     circumstances, i.e., war, were in fact the norm through the indictment

 4     period.

 5             Now, the suggestion that is made is that what is what Mr. Brown

 6     said.  In fact, that was not what Mr. Brown said.  Mr. Brown gave an

 7     example of exceptional circumstances.  I just -- for a moment -- the

 8     passage.  Sorry about that.  Which is not cited.  It's -- it begins at

 9     the bottom of T18916.  And he said about the exceptional circumstances:

10             "I would read this as bearing in mind the context of the time and

11     this comes in the middle of the corridor operation but this is relating

12     to the front line.  I have maybe mentioned this in direct.  Front line

13     combat tasks, for example, that were occurring in the corps in that time

14     in the corridor," and that in exceptional circumstances, presumably he

15     means here, if there is a weakness in the front line or there is a

16     counter-attack by the enemy formation that "in exceptional circumstances,

17     police can be used but there are limitations and that they are to hold

18     and strengthen the front prior to the arrival of military units."

19             So in essence, it is to plug a front line if there's a problem.

20     And he goes on to say at page 18949:

21             "So I read this document in the context of what was happening in

22     the corridor."

23             He did not say that exceptional circumstances were war.  And, of

24     course, the Defence use that to show that war means that all stages, the

25     army could resubordinate the police.  And, Your Honour, I will, as I say,

Page 27279

 1     come back to that.

 2             Your Honours, there are sentences taken out of context.

 3     Judge Harhoff was quoted with approval at paragraph 420.  May wish to

 4     read what he said before and after the page that is quoted.

 5             And, finally, Your Honours, what we would call false syllogisms.

 6     Your Honours, it is particularly noted in paragraph 282 of the Zupljanin

 7     brief.  And I'm sure Your Honours are aware of what a syllogism is.  I'm

 8     having difficulty in saying it myself.

 9             Your Honours, at paragraph 282, and we're still dealing with

10     resubordination, the Defence assert that -- this is following on from the

11     Law on Internal Affairs, the Geneva Conventions, that:

12             "Any involvement by civilian police in arresting, detaining,

13     interrogating suspects during an armed conflict occurred outside the

14     legal parameters of normal police duties.  These are military tasks.  It

15     follows that the only situation in which the police could be ordered to

16     engage in such tasks would be if they were resubordinated to the army."

17             Once this happened, military rules and laws applied to the

18     individual police officers involved.

19             In other words, and what we say is the false syllogism is, the

20     police are not allowed to guard prisoners by law, the military are, ergo,

21     if the police were guarding therefore they must be resubordinated.  And

22     there's -- I'm sure Your Honours can see there's a definite missing link

23     there because the obvious answer is, well, by law they may not have been

24     allowed to do it.  This doesn't mean they didn't.  It does not

25     automatically follow that they were resubordinated.

Page 27280

 1             Your Honours, two other matters before I invite Mr. Demirdjian to

 2     tell Your Honours about what we say about municipalities.

 3             The Defence, not surprisingly, rely very heavily on the witnesses

 4     who were former senior members of the MUP and who came to testify

 5     largely for the Prosecution.  As we said in our final brief, it's for

 6     Your Honours, of course, to assess the weight and the truthfulness of

 7     that evidence.  But, of course, most of them, if not all, had been

 8     interviewed by the Office of the Prosecutor as suspects.  Many of them

 9     were clearly a party to what we say was the joint criminal enterprise,

10     and all of them had their own interests to serve.  And it's for

11     Your Honours to assess, as we say, how much weight you give their

12     evidence.

13             The second matter is this:  In one sense, the Defence have had

14     the advantage of being able to blame dead men; in particular, Mr. Drljaca

15     and Todorovic, and the advantage that in the dock, in the -- with both

16     these accused has been nobody who represented either the military or the

17     political side.

18             And the third thing, Your Honours, is this:  In the Defence

19     pre-trial briefs, both the original and the supplementary ones which were

20     ordered, there is not a hint, Your Honour, of one of the major Defences

21     that has been run in this case.  The fact that both accused who are going

22     to be saying as a major plank of their case that neither of them had

23     authority over the members of the RS MUP who committed crimes as anything

24     between 80 and 100 per cent, and I'll come to those calculations later,

25     were resubordinated at the time of the crimes being committed, whether

Page 27281

 1     they were in take-overs or guarding camps.  The nearest that one comes in

 2     any of the pre-trial briefs was paragraph 17 of the Zupljanin final --

 3     pre-trial brief where he stated that the role of the police was minor in

 4     comparison with the role of the army and that his -- Zupljanin's de jure

 5     position did not correspond with his de facto power.

 6             And Your Honours are entitled to ask why such a major plank of

 7     the Defence was never mentioned in either pre-trial brief.

 8             Your Honours, finally, can I turn to the municipalities.

 9             Your Honours, we are going to address in the beginning the events

10     there for the following reasons:

11             The crimes for which the accused, we say, are criminally liable

12     happened there; the evidence shows a pattern which leads to the

13     irresistible inference that these crimes happened by design, or these

14     events happened by design, not chance, but they are both widespread and

15     systematic.

16             And because the only mention of the victims, really, in this case

17     has come through the Defence attempts to challenge the evidence that

18     named victims either died as a result of the crimes, or challenging their

19     civilian status by saying, by seeking to say, that at some time or other

20     those victims had been members of the opposing forces.  And Your Honours

21     know, we say without any proper justification for so saying.

22             The victims for these crimes were the reason for the

23     establishment of this Court.  As one sees on the poster coming into the

24     lobby of this building, "Bringing war criminals to justice and justice to

25     victims."

Page 27282

 1             The nature of trials of high-level accused means that unlike the

 2     earlier trials at this court, their voices, the voices of the victims,

 3     have not been heard.  And the most that, really, Your Honours heard from

 4     victims of these crimes was from those who came to deal with disputed or

 5     disallowed adjudicated facts, and regrettably because of the time

 6     limitations and those limitations, in fact, were quite often not able to

 7     explain to the Court, when they tried to, about what personally happened

 8     to them.

 9             And so we start, we hope, properly by reminding the Court of the

10     municipalities.

11             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Good morning, Your Honours.

12             As announced by Ms. Korner, I will be dealing with the pattern of

13     the evidence that emerged out of the municipalities in this case.

14             Before I deal with the specifics, it is useful to remind

15     ourselves of some of the context in which the pattern developed.

16             Now, Your Honours, as Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its

17     independence and with the likelihood of international recognition, the

18     Bosnian Serb leadership opposed an independent Bosnia and decided to

19     create a separate Serb state on large parts of Bosnia's territory.

20             To achieve this, the Serb leadership created a parallel

21     government and forcibly removed hundreds of thousands of Muslims and

22     Croats in what turned out to be a well-developed deliberate plan.

23             The crimes that came about as a result of this plan follow a

24     clear pattern showing that the crimes charged in the indictment were not

25     committed in isolation but, rather, were guided by a common theme.

Page 27283

 1             Looking at the pattern inevitably means looking at the evidence

 2     of victims who came to The Hague to recount what must have been the worst

 3     experiences of their lives.  We will look at what they said in court and

 4     what contemporaneous documents tell us about the emergence of this

 5     pattern.

 6             The first aspect I would like to deal with is the arming of Serbs

 7     prior to the beginning of the conflict.

 8             Your Honours, there is no dispute that Muslims and Croats sought

 9     the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that Bosnian Serbs opposed it.

10     However, the accused have alleged in their Defence that all sides were

11     arming themselves as ethnic groups became suspicious of one another.

12     They have also alleged that the Bosnian Serb leadership's actions were

13     merely reactive or defensive.  They claim they did not share the intent

14     of forcibly removing Muslims and Croats and that what occurred in 1992

15     was a by-product of the conflict.

16             As Your Honours will have seen from our final brief, the evidence

17     tells a different story.  The Prosecution does not claim that Muslims and

18     Croats were not arming themselves.  However, it is submitted that the

19     Bosnian Serbs prepared themselves, not to the defend against Muslim or

20     Croat physical aggression, but rather to implement their objectives by

21     forced after the loss of their political battle in blocking the

22     recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign state.

23             Several speeches made during Serb Assembly sessions prior to the

24     conflict make it clear that the Bosnian Serb leadership had in mind to

25     concur by force large portions of Bosnia's territory.  Momcilo Krajisnik

Page 27284

 1     said very clearly during the 8th session when he stated the following:

 2             "Gentlemen, we want to remain in a single state together with

 3     Serbia, Montenegro, the Independent Autonomous Region of Krajina, now the

 4     Krajina state, and the rest.  We just need to agree on the method to

 5     achieve this.  If we don't want this to be by certain methods, let us put

 6     a stop to it.  You know what our profession has always been - to wage

 7     war."

 8             It is against this background that the Bosnian Serb armed

 9     themselves.  During the pre-conflict period, the Bosnia Serb leadership

10     requested the assistance of the JNA.  Indeed, during the session of the

11     December 11th, 1991, Krajisnik highlighted the necessity to address a

12     demand to the JNA stressing its obligation to protect the territories,

13     and I quote, "We have proclaimed an integral part of the federal state."

14             By this time, Your Honour, the republics were virtually left

15     without any weapons as military weapons and equipment from the TO

16     warehouses had already been removed by the JNA by the end of 1990.

17             What followed was a systematic distribution of weapons throughout

18     Bosnia and Herzegovina by the JNA.  Weapons were distributed to local SDS

19     committees in Bosnian Serb claimed territories.  This was a well

20     orchestrated operation and involved the use of trucks and helicopters.

21             For example, in Prijedor, many members of the 5th Kozarac Brigade

22     returned from the Croatia battle-front and kept their weapons at home.

23     Shipments of weapons were delivered by trucks and helicopters during

24     spring of 1992 and the Serb villages of Balte, Petrov Gaj, and

25     Cirkin Polje.

Page 27285

 1             The Serb staff members of the SJB used the premises of the social

 2     centre in Cirkin Polje to store weapons.  In his end-of-year report,

 3     Simo Drljaca reported that:

 4             "The focus of the work was on the covert organisation and

 5     formation of shadow police stations and the arming and equipping of the

 6     personnel.  In this manner, 13 police stations were established with a

 7     total of about 1500.  Weapons, ammunition and other materiel were

 8     acquired from various sources - the army was the primary source - and

 9     secretly, mostly at night, collected, transported, stored, and

10     distributed to personnel for home keeping and use."

11             This is in Exhibit P689.

12             In Doboj, JNA barracks were located at the outskirts of town with

13     a military presence of the 6th Motorised Brigade manned by about a

14     thousand soldiers by the beginning of conflict and several other units

15     including a JNA artillery unit.

16             Starting in October 1991, five or six volunteer detachments had

17     been created by the JNA each being manned 3- to 400 persons.  They

18     received their weapons from the JNA, and Your Honours have seen the

19     receipts for such distribution at Exhibit P2446.

20             Finally, in Zvornik, the SJB reported in its end-of-year report

21     that:

22             "Working on various check-points during the months of January and

23     February, police personnel of Serb nationality enabled the transport of

24     weapons, ammunition and other materiel and technical equipment necessary

25     for the arming of the Serb people in the territory of this municipality."

Page 27286

 1             These are but a few examples, Your Honours, of how the

 2     Bosnian Serb leadership systematically organised the arming of the Serbs

 3     in towns and villages and municipalities claimed to be an integral part

 4     of Serb territory.

 5             I will now move on to the take-overs.

 6             By the end of 1991, Your Honour, the Serb leadership had already

 7     created an assembly.  They had indicated which municipalities fell under

 8     the territory they claim to be Serb.  If you will remember after the

 9     plebescite, they issued a decision confirming the territory of each SAO.

10     They proclaim on the 9th of the January, 1992, the republic of the

11     Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  In the following weeks they

12     adopted a constitute and the laws necessary to govern the republic.

13             All they needed was a green light to assume power over the

14     claimed territories.

15             That green light came on the 24th of March, the same day that

16     Mr. Stanisic was appointed minister of the interior.  During the

17     12th Assembly, Radovan Karadzic convinced the Assembly that they did not

18     need a national guard like the one that was created in Croatia.  Indeed,

19     Karadzic was happy with having the JNA on his side, and he added that a

20     national guard was not necessary as "numbers in the police are quite

21     sufficient."  He followed by uttering these prophetic words.  First he

22     said:

23             "We have a legal basis in the Law on Internal Affairs.

24             "We also have the insignia.

25             "At a desired moment, and this will be very soon, we can form

Page 27287

 1     whatever we want.

 2             "This could happen in two of three days."

 3             And:

 4             "At that moment, all the Serbian municipalities, both the old

 5     ones and the newly established ones, would literally assume control on

 6     the entire territory of the municipality concerned."

 7             Karadzic continues by stating that in Zvornik control would be

 8     assumed over everything that constitutes the Serbian municipality of

 9     Zvornik.

10             He continued by saying this:

11             "Then, at a given moment, in the next three or four days, there

12     will be a single method used and you will be able to apply it in the

13     municipalities you represent, including both things that must be done as

14     well as how to do them.  How to separate the police ... take the

15     resources that belong to the Serbian people, and take command."

16             Your Honours, it is no coincidence that Zvornik was forcibly

17     taken over within weeks of this speech and it was one of the first

18     municipalities to be taken over.

19             Now take-overs seem to have followed a similar pattern depending

20     on the level of control exerted by the Bosnian Serbs in each

21     municipality.  For example, in Pale and Bileca which were Serb majority

22     municipalities, Bosnian Serbs assumed power over municipal organs such as

23     the police, the Assembly and their institutions several weeks before

24     attacks took place on surrounding villages; whereas in other

25     municipalities, such as Sanski Most, Doboj or Bosanski Samac the

Page 27288

 1     take-over was marked by an attack, an armed attack, against vital

 2     institutions.

 3             The take-overs were conducted simultaneously over the course of

 4     three months.

 5             Now, this animated slide will show you how these municipalities

 6     were taken over.  The municipalities in the indictment on this map will

 7     be coloured in red in a moment.  Those that are not in the indictment

 8     will be coloured in grey.  The municipalities that are not in the

 9     indictment for which we do have a take-over date will also be part of the

10     chronology, whereas the rest will be highlighted at the end.

11             Now, in the first animation you can see that by the end of the

12     March, Pale, Ilijas and Bijeljina had already been taken over.

13             By the end of the first week of April, you could see that

14     Banja Luka and Teslic have been taken over.

15             By the end of the second week in April, Zvornik and Visegrad were

16     taken over.

17             By the end the third week of April, Donji Vakuf, Bosanski Samac,

18     and Vlasenica were also taken over.

19             By the end of the fourth week in April, Prijedor and Sanski Most

20     fell as well.

21             Hence by the end of April 1992, 12 of the 19 charged

22     municipalities were under Serb control.

23             Now, by the end the first week of May, Brcko, Doboj, Skender

24     Vakuf and Kljuc were taken over.

25             Following this, by the end of May, pretty much every municipality

Page 27289

 1     in the ARK had been taken over, except for Kotor Varos.

 2             In the first week of June, Gacko was taken over.

 3             And this was followed by Bileca and Kotor Varos which were both

 4     taken over by the middle of June.

 5             By the end of June, Modrica was taken over and this marked the

 6     opening of the Posavina corridor.

 7             During the first week of July, Derventa is taken over, enlarging

 8     the corridor.

 9             And we will see that in October, Bosanski Brod was also taken

10     over.

11             By the end the year, all of the municipalities highlighted on

12     this map were effectively under Serb control.

13             Your Honours, may have already found that the take-overs have not

14     been mentioned once in the Stanisic Defence final brief, while Zupljanin

15     claims in his brief that the take-overs were conducted by the army and

16     that the involvement of the police, if any, was in a resubordinated

17     capacity.  The evidence shows, Your Honours that in some cases, yes, the

18     army did -- took part and led forcible take-overs, whereas in other cases

19     the army played no role whatsoever and is seen later taking part in joint

20     attacks.

21             We will start with Bijeljina which was, as you have seen already,

22     taken over on the 31st of March, and was the result of a combined attack

23     involving the Serb TO, Mauzer's national guard, Arkan's volunteer guard

24     with the support of the JNA.  That day, the police had the role of

25     protect the vital facilities in town.

Page 27290

 1             Following the take-over the SJB chief reported the following:

 2             "I have managed to procure some of the equipment, berets and

 3     badges with the tricolour from the Serbian MUP and our police officers

 4     have worn them since the [sic] first day when they went out on the

 5     streets on the 4th of April, 1992."

 6             Stories of civilians being arrested and mistreated in Bijeljina

 7     quickly circulated at the time and spread throughout the country.  In the

 8     first days of the attack, 48 bodies had been picked up prior to

 9     Biljana Plavsic's visit on the 4th of April.

10             In Zvornik, Your Honours, the take-over took place on the

11     8th of April, and by this time the police had already split and the Serb

12     police force had established its headquarters in the Alhos factory where

13     the Crisis Staff and Arkan's Men were also stationed.  Following an

14     ultimatum issued by the Serb forces, the police, the TO, the JNA, and

15     Arkan's men launched their attack on Zvornik town.  The attack on Zvornik

16     was of great violence as is best summarised by the UN envoy in the

17     following clip.

18                           [Video-clip played]

19             "That day an UN official was driving from Serbia to Bosnia.  He

20     was stopped just outside Zvornik.

21             "[No interpretation] Everybody is crazy."

22             "A paramilitary commander proud of his work let in a news crew.

23     Here, the regime of terror is being established as military police try to

24     identify the Muslims."

25             "[No interpretation]"

Page 27291

 1             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Your Honour, about a week after Zvornik,

 2     Bosanski Samac fell.  The town was taken over with the careful planning

 3     both by the police, the JNA and the TO.  All Serb police officers

 4     deserted the police station and left one Bosnian Croat policeman on duty,

 5     Luka Gregurevic.  On the night of the 16th of April, Samac was a deserted

 6     town.  The restaurants were empty and one could feel that something was

 7     about to happen.

 8             On 17th April around 2.00 in the morning gun-shots a loud

 9     explosion were heard in town.  Bosanski Samac was taken over by the Serb

10     police and the Serb TO by securing government institutions, as this was

11     reported in a report of the 17th Corps headquarters as you can see on the

12     screen at this moment.  The police station was attacked and taken over

13     and the new chief, Stevan Todorovic, assumed his position that day.

14             Three weeks later, Luka Gregurevic, who was on duty, would be

15     executed in Crkvine.  On the same day, the 17th of April, the police

16     station in Sanski Most was split among ethnic lines, and the police

17     chief, Dragan Majkic, distributed the new RS berets and had his staff

18     sign the loyalty oath.

19             Two days later, the SDS president, Nedeljko Rasula, issued an

20     ultimatum to the SDA to vacate the municipal building otherwise the

21     building would come under attack.  The building was indeed vacated

22     however a few non-Serb policemen remained inside.

23             At 10.00 in the morning, on the 19th of April, the Serb Defence

24     forces, the SOS attacked the municipal building and took it over.  The

25     next day, CSB Banja Luka and the Serbian news agency --

Page 27292

 1             JUDGE HALL:  Sorry, Mr. Demirdjian, I don't know if you have see

 2     the court reporter's note.

 3             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Yes, I will slow down, Your Honours.  Thank

 4     you.

 5             The next day on the 20th of April, CSB Banja Luka and the Serbian

 6     news agency in Sarajevo were informed of this take-over by letter.

 7             On 19th of April, Vlasenica's Serb Crisis Staff issued an

 8     unambiguous order entitled:  "Decision to take power."  On that day, all

 9     non-Serb policemen were disarmed.

10             And the next day on the 20th of April, units of the JNA's

11     Novi Sad corps and the Serbian Guard unit from Sekovici took control of

12     all municipal institutions in Vlasenica.

13             In Prijedor, the accused Zupljanin claims that the army and the

14     Crisis Staff led the take-over.  In fact, take-over was organised by the

15     Serb police and the military.

16             Once again, the SJB chief was very candid in his end-of-year

17     report.  Looking back of the achievements of his station in 1992, he

18     wrote the following:

19             "As a result in the night between 29 and 30 April ... following

20     very detailed preparations and pursuant to the relevant decisions of the

21     executive committee of the Serbian municipality of Prijedor, an organised

22     take-over of power was embarked upon.  About 400 policemen assembled in

23     the social centre at Cirkin Polje, and at 4.00 in the morning they took

24     control of all important sites in town, which immediately made possible

25     the take-over of all leading functions in the municipality, the municipal

Page 27293

 1     organs and the important companies."

 2             During the month of May, Brcko was the first municipality to be

 3     taken over, on the 1st to be exact.  It was followed by Doboj which was

 4     taken over during the night of the 2nd to the 3rd of May.  The attack on

 5     Doboj was orchestrated by the JNA and involved volunteer detachments led

 6     by Major Stankovic, units of the 6th Motorised Brigade, Red Berets from

 7     Serbia led by Radojica Bozovic, and the civilian police.  CSB Doboj

 8     officials had been meeting with Serb army officials for weeks prior to

 9     the take-over.  The CSB chief himself was on Mount Ozren the night of the

10     take-over at the moment when the take-over operation began.  Your Honours

11     have heard allegations that the take-over was ordered by

12     Mr. Cazim Hadzic, the 6th Motorised Brigade's commander.  However, you

13     have heard evidence that he was arrested the night of the take-over and

14     was in fact sidelined for months prior to the take-over.  This allegation

15     is not credible.

16             In relation to the CSB building, Your Honour, the scenario was

17     similar to the one in Bosanski Samac.  Virtually all Serb police officers

18     had deserted the police building and a non-Serb policeman was left in

19     charge of the duty service.  A little after midnight, armed men entered

20     this police building and arrested non-Serb employees and beat them up.

21     The police entered the station the next morning and the Serb forces

22     helped taking over a number of other buildings in town.

23             As of that day, Your Honours, all non-Serb police officers were

24     dismissed and at least one Muslim inspector was directly informed of his

25     dismissal by the CSB chief, Bjelosevic.

Page 27294

 1             The last take-over which is charged in the indictment was in

 2     Kotor Varos, Zupljanin's birth place, and it was raided by the special

 3     police detachment on the 11th of June, 1992, at dawn.

 4             This Trial Chamber has had the rare opportunity to view a video

 5     of this take-over and we will now look at some excerpts.

 6             Now the first excerpt we will see in the morning hours of the

 7     11th of June - and we can play it now - is a special unit entering the

 8     SJB building.

 9                           [Video-clip played]

10             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  You can see the entrance of the police station

11     right there.

12             And you will see in a moment a number of members of the special

13     police detachment.

14                           [Video-clip played]

15             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Now in the second excerpt, we see the special

16     police leaving the SJB building and you will notice here Ljuban Bajic

17     [sic] wearing a red beret.  He is one of the leaders of the special unit.

18     Bajic.  Ljuban Ecim, my apologies.

19             We now see one of the blue tanks used by the CSB Banja Luka.

20     Similar tanks were seen on the 12th of May parade.  And in a moment we

21     will also see the first non-Serbs arrested that morning.  Here a member

22     of the special unit orders a man to stand against the wall and show a

23     three-finger sign.

24             The third excerpt we will see is a special police forcing a

25     civilian to open the trunk of his car with some brutality.

Page 27295

 1                           [Video-clip played]

 2             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  In the fourth excerpt, we see the special police

 3     asking a civilian peacefully walking in the street to lay down, and he

 4     kicks him.

 5                           [Video-clip played]

 6             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  In the fifth excerpt we now see the special

 7     police surrounding a house.  As Your Honours will see in a moment, the

 8     special police were allegedly searching for dangerous Muslim and Croat

 9     extremists.  Those are extremists that the Bosnian Serb leadership was

10     concerned about.  In bright daylight, under no attacks, the special

11     police easily arrested Muslim and Croat civilians.

12                           [Video-clip played]

13             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  These are the dangerous extremists,

14     Your Honours.

15             And the last excerpt we will see, on that day, the Serb flag was

16     hoisted on the municipal police station, the SJB.

17                           [Video-clip played]

18             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Now, Your Honours, some municipalities were

19     taken over by relatively non-violent means, as the Serb civilian and

20     military leadership were already in a position to control the

21     municipality.  We can see the next map, Your Honours will remember

22     hearing evidence that in municipalities of Kljuc, Pale, Bileca and

23     Teslic, non-Serb policemen were convened to meetings by their respective

24     SJB leaders and were simply told they could no longer work in the police.

25     Attacks on Muslim and Croats villages followed many weeks later at a time

Page 27296

 1     where Serb control had already been imposed on the municipality.

 2             This pattern equally applied to municipalities not charged in the

 3     indictment.  For example, you have heard evidence that in Bratunac, all

 4     Muslims were fired from their work in mid-April 1992 and all the key

 5     positions and the local government were taken over by the Serb

 6     authorities.

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Please slow down, thank you.

 8             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  What emerges from the evidence, Your Honours, is

 9     a pattern of forcible take-overs throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina with a

10     varying degree of violence depending on level of control exerted by Serb

11     authorities prior to the take-over.

12             I will now move on to the issue of persecutory measures imposed

13     following the take-over.

14             The take-over of municipalities marked, Your Honours, the

15     beginning of a period of excessive measures applied against Muslims and

16     Croats, including large-scale arrested, unlawful detention, torture and

17     cruel treatment during periods of detention, killings, and other

18     persecutory acts such as limitation of movement and the forcible transfer

19     and deportation of civilians.

20             Your Honour, may remember the evidence of Sulejman Tihic,

21     president of the SDA in Bosanski Samac.  A lawyer by profession, like

22     most of us in this room, he had his law office in Bosanski Samac.

23     However, a few days after the take-over he was arrested and suffered some

24     of the most depraved forms of mistreatment.  To add to the injury he was

25     publicly humiliated by being forced to sweep the streets outside the

Page 27297

 1     police station of the municipal building while being watched by all

 2     passers-by.

 3             In most municipalities, Your Honours, prominent Muslims and

 4     Croats were dismissed from their managerial positions and this includes

 5     judges, police station commanders, company managers, et cetera.  Setting

 6     aside managers, even employees were told they could not come to work.  In

 7     Banja Luka, already in late 1991, non-Serb directors and managers as well

 8     as factory employers were dismissed.  And in schools teaches were already

 9     forced to use the Cyrillic script.  Much later on the 18th of June, 1992,

10     all non-Serb employees from the hospital were dismissed.

11             We can move to the next slide.  You have heard similar dismissals

12     in Sanski Most where Judge Adil Draganovic refused to sign a loyalty oath

13     to the new authorities, and he was fired from his position as a judge.

14     He also lost all his property and his house which were torched while he

15     was in detention.

16             In Doboj, you heard Edin Hadzovic who told you that he worked for

17     the association of physical education organisations.  He was a cashier.

18     Hadzovic was told by Jovo Popovic, a manager of this enterprise, that he

19     and other non-Serb employees had to leave as Popovic was told to dismiss

20     all non-Serbs.  This was shortly prior to the take-over.

21             In the next slides, you will see Sulejman Crncalo.  You have

22     heard his evidence.  You've -- he's told you how he was dismissed.  On

23     the 15th of May he arrived at work at the Famos factory where he had

24     worked since 1978 and where he held the position of chief of the

25     development department.  That day, he was told by the guard at the gate

Page 27298

 1     that he could not enter.  Some employees were allowed in but no Muslims

 2     were allowed.

 3             Now Your Honours have already heard examples of curfews in

 4     various municipalities.  I will simply mention that in the municipalities

 5     of Kljuc, in Doboj, in Teslic, in Gacko, in Kotor Varos, and even in

 6     Zvornik you have evidence of this curfew being announced and imposed

 7     unequally and solely against non-Serbs.

 8             I'll now move on to the large-scale arrests that occurred

 9     following the take-overs.  Your Honours, from one municipality to the

10     other, Muslims and Croats were arrested and taken to local police

11     stations where they were detained for varying periods of time.  Usually

12     arrests started in town and focussed on prominent Muslims and Croats.

13     The aim was clear:  By neutralising the leadership of the non-Serb

14     communities, the non-Serb population was paralysed and posed no threat to

15     Serb ambitions.

16             In Pale, again you heard from Mr. Crncalo that a number of

17     Muslims were arrested randomly in the streets by the civilian police and

18     were taken to the SJB building and were held there.

19             In Banja Luka, you have heard of policemen in blue camouflage

20     uniform driving around in a red van, which was also called the "red

21     kombi," arresting non-Serbs in the streets and beating them in the van.

22     The doors were always left open to this van so other residents could hear

23     the beatings and the screams.  This method was used to intimidate other

24     Muslims and Croats in the neighbourhood.  These were members of public

25     and state security in Banja Luka considered to be heros by

Page 27299

 1     Stojan Zupljanin.

 2             In Zvornik, you heard how on the 1st of June, hundreds of Muslim

 3     civilians from the villages of Setici and Klisa were chased out of their

 4     village by the army who had surrounded it with tanks.  The villagers were

 5     forced to walk to the village of Djulici where 750 men were separated

 6     from the convoy by police officers and were taken to a Karakaj technical

 7     school.

 8             In Brcko, non-Serbs were arrested throughout town and taken to

 9     various camps.  For example, on the 4th of May, Jasmin Fazlovic, who

10     worked in the fire station, was arrested with four other non-Serbs by

11     Captain Dragan and Mirko Blagojevic.  They were taken to the SJB.  There,

12     they were received by the SJB chief, Dragan Veselic, who accused them of

13     being Green Berets and sent them to the Luka camp where he said, You will

14     be killed.

15             You also heard from Isak Gasi, a former athlete who was quite

16     well-known in Yugoslavia.  He was arrested by two preliminary,

17     Dragan Pantelic and Stevo Knezevic who took him without being told the

18     reasons for his arrest and were -- and he was taken to the SJB building.

19     After being detained there for an hour, he was taken to the Luka camp

20     which was situated 3- to 400 metres away from the police station.

21             It is worth noting that the Stanisic Defence brief claims that

22     the Luka camp was near Brcko.  However, the evidence is clear, that the

23     camp was in Brcko.  When Gasi arrived there, about 200 non-Serbs were

24     held there.

25             You also heard evidence of a similar pattern in Vogosca where

Page 27300

 1     about 470 men, women and children were arrested following the take-over

 2     of the villages of Svrake and Semizovac in early 1992.

 3             If we can look at the next slide, in Bosanski Samac, mass

 4     arrested started immediately with the take-over and were carried out

 5     throughout spring and summer of 1992.  On the 15th of May, the Serb

 6     municipality issued the following unequivocal decision:

 7             "All people of Croatian nationality on the territory of the

 8     Serbian municipality of Bosanski Samac shall be isolated and deployed to

 9     vital facilities in the town and in villages."

10             The SJB chief, Todorovic, gave evidence that Croats were actually

11     detained in such vital facilities as they knew that these were likely to

12     be targeted by the Croatian army.

13             Your Honour, one of the pervasive aspects of the pattern that we

14     observed in this case was the establishment of detention facilities where

15     civilians were held in inhumane conditions and where brutality varied

16     only in degree.  The existence of such facility in every municipality

17     charged in the indictment is sufficient by itself to demonstrate a

18     pattern too uniform to be ad hoc; instead, one that must be a product of

19     a guiding hand above the municipality level.

20             That inescapable conclusion is only bolstered by fact that camps

21     were set up and run by the army, the police, the Crisis Staffs, all with

22     their chain of command up to the Presidency, the government, and, more

23     particularly to Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin.  The detention of

24     civilians was systemic.  Officials at all levels knew about the camps and

25     the republican exchange commission was established from the earlier stage

Page 27301

 1     to monitor and control the possible release of civilians.

 2             Now, as described at paragraph 650 and 651 in our final brief,

 3     non-Serbs were detained in makeshift detention facilities from the

 4     outbreak of the conflict, and both Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin

 5     were aware of the existence of such facilities.

 6             In Pale where Stanisic had his headquarters at the beginning of

 7     the conflict, Muslims and Croats were detained in an old culture centre

 8     next to the police station.  Other detention centres included the movie

 9     theatre and military barracks in Hrenovica.

10             Kemal Hujdur described how, following the attack on Hrenovica in

11     mid-May, around 25 Muslims were taken to the SJB and were beaten in front

12     of the station.  The detainees were then brought to the old cultural

13     centre where about 20 non-Serbs were already imprisoned.  Beating

14     continues there.

15             Looking at this next map, Your Honours, you will find the 52

16     detention centres charged in the indictment.  Of course, more camps

17     existed in other municipalities not charged in the indictment, such as in

18     Rogatica, Ilidza, Sokolac and Ugljevik.  They will not appear on this

19     [indiscernible].

20             Your Honours can see that detention centres were established in

21     every one of the five regions within the RS.  Of the 52, there are 48

22     which were established by the RS MUP.  Only two were under the

23     jurisdiction of the minister -- Ministry of Justice; that is, the Doboj

24     Central Prison and Planjo's house which is an annex to the Kula prison.

25     Two other detention camps were established by the army; namely, Manjaca

Page 27302

 1     and Batkovic.  All other camps charged in the indictment were operated

 2     and manned by members of the civilian police under Mico Stanisic and

 3     Stojan Zupljanin.

 4             Before I get to the conditions in these camps, is this an

 5     appropriate time to take a break?

 6             JUDGE HALL:  Yes.  It appears so, Mr. Demirdjian.

 7             So we would return in 20 minutes.

 8                           --- Recess taken at 10.20 a.m.

 9                           --- On resuming at 10.43 a.m.

10             JUDGE HALL:  Mr. Demirdjian, before you continue, I would remind

11     you to pace yourself so that -- because it is a natural tendency that we

12     all have to speed up particularly when we deal with written --

13             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  I have been reminded by the interpreters as

14     well.  Thank you, Your Honours.

15             Before the break, Your Honours, we were reaching the stage where

16     we were discussing the conditions in the detention camps.

17             Now we have heard repeatedly from victims detained in these

18     facilities that the conditions were simply appalling.  Conditions for

19     proper hygiene did not exist.  You heard from ST-08 from Teslic who was

20     held in the SJB cells.  He recognised several prominent members of the

21     Muslim community in Teslic, and there were up to 50 Muslims and Croats

22     held in the cells at one point, clearly inadequate for the number of

23     detainees held there.

24             What he said was this:

25             "At some point we couldn't sit.  We had to stand up.  People used

Page 27303

 1     to stand up even in the toilet.  You could smell the ammonia from the

 2     urine, so it was quite unbearable.  The tears used to come out of our

 3     eyes because of the smell of the ammonia.  We used to shout, Give us some

 4     air or kill us, because we needed some air."

 5             Beatings were commonplace at the SJB building in -- several times

 6     non-Serbs would be beaten at the entrance of the SJB and detainees in the

 7     cells could hear and watch the beating.

 8             At least on one occasion the police chief, Dusan Kuzmanovic, and

 9     the police commander, Predrag Markocevic, watched the beatings from the

10     entrance of the station, standing there laughing.  Such beatings in the

11     SJB building and later at the TO warehouse would lead to the death of

12     several non-Serb civilians.

13             In Donji Vakuf, the police was involved with the army in

14     attacking villages inhabited by Muslims.  Following such attacks, the

15     police reported that there was a need to establish an collection centre

16     for Croatians and Muslim men.  And the SJB dealt with everything and the

17     police were in charge of providing security.  This was reported by the

18     SJB chief himself.  The SJB reported that during the month of June it was

19     holding 123 Muslims and Croats and that it had transferred 28 detainees

20     to Manjaca camp.

21             But it is in Prijedor, it is the camps in Prijedor, which became

22     the epitome of dreadful conditions in detention facilities.  The camps of

23     Keraterm, Omarska, and Trnopolje captured the attention of the

24     international media in July of 1992 and clearly sent a signal to the Serb

25     authorities that what was happening in these places were clearly

Page 27304

 1     unacceptable.  Lack of access to proper hygiene, lack of food, and daily

 2     beatings were part of the diet imposed on the prisoners held in Prijedor

 3     camps.

 4             The authorities in Prijedor did not label Omarska or Trnopolje as

 5     camps, as you will see in the following video.  During the visit of the

 6     international media, the prisoners were too scared to describe the

 7     conditions at these camps.  The video begins at the Omarska camp.

 8                           [Video-clip played]

 9             "Here, we were shown only several hundred of the two and a half

10     thousand prisoners or Muslim men at Omarska we were told to be

11     interrogated.  Those fund guilty of fighting Serbs were then sent to

12     prisoner of war camps, the innocents to refugee camps

13             "This is all we saw of the prisoners and of Omarska itself.

14             "They never spoke.

15             "The only voice those of the guards ordering them to eat faster

16     and leave.

17             "How are you treated?  What are the conditions, I asked.

18             "I don't want to tell lies.  I can't speak the truth.  Thank you

19     for coming.

20             "We were told that the army does not control Omarska.  These

21     prisoners are the responsibility of the civil authorities and local

22     malitia.  We sought an explanation from the camp commandant."

23             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  We can pause here.  You can see here at the left

24     the SJB chief, Simo Drljaca, and to the right Nada Balaban, the

25     administrator of the Omarska camp.

Page 27305

 1             Can you continue.

 2                           [Video-clip played]

 3             "[Indiscernible] This is a prison camp, a transit camp or a

 4     refugee camp.

 5             "No, this is not the camp, this is the centre, the transit

 6     centre.  Omarska and Trnopolje, both the centres, not camps.

 7             "And then the men left, back to wherever they'd come from, away

 8     from our cameras and questions, hidden from United Nations and the Red

 9     Cross who have been denied access to Omarska, hidden until now from the

10     world.  We were not allowed to follow them to the living accommodation

11     what appeared to be the larger of the two buildings, to see the other

12     2.000 detainees and how they lived.

13             "What's your reason?

14             "[Indiscernible] to do my best here.

15             "Show us where they live

16             "Why are you not fulfilling Dr. Karadzic's promise to us?

17             "He promised us something else and said you can do this and this

18     and that and not that.

19             "We see nothing.  We see one dining hall and 80 persons.

20             "So we left.  Our host fulfilling their promise to show us the

21     second camp, Trnopolje, where 2.000 refugees are living.  We were not

22     prepared for what we saw and heard there."

23             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  The visit of the international media left the

24     world with an unforgettable image of a terrified doctor, Idriz Merdzanic,

25     as he is being asked by the journalist about the conditions in Trnopolje

Page 27306

 1     camp.

 2                           [Video-clip played]

 3             "We, ourselves, saw no evidence of beatings on any refugee here

 4     and we only heard the allegations, allegations even the camp doctor

 5     seemed unable to substantiate in front of our Serb hosts.

 6             "[Indiscernible] cases here of people who have been beaten from

 7     the other camps?

 8             "[No interpretation] yes.

 9             "Many?

10             "[No interpretation]

11             "Would you be happy speaking in another language?

12             "Yes.

13             "I was able, however, to smuggle out a role of film and the man

14     who took these pictures and gave it to me said he would be called if

15     caught.  He begged me to check that in three days he was still alive."

16             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  This is the detention facility which was

17     labelled as a transit centre, Your Honours.

18             With the limited time we have, it would be impossible to expose

19     the details of every single detention facility, suffice it to say that in

20     most of these facilities one can observe striking similarities:

21             In all cases, detainees are Muslim or Croat civilians.

22             Detainees are never informed of the reasons behind their arrest.

23             The detainees are underfed and lose a considerable amount of

24     weight.

25             The detainees are repeatedly beaten and mistreated by guards,

Page 27307

 1     soldiers, policemen, and members of paramilitary units.  Several

 2     detainees die of their injuries.

 3             In some facilities, such as the sawmill in Kotor Varos, detained

 4     women are raped repeatedly by guards and soldiers or policemen who

 5     entered the facility.  Some women became pregnant as a result.  In some

 6     cases, detainees are executed in large numbers while being detained.

 7     The following incidents spring to mind:

 8             Massacre of about 180 Muslim and Croat civilians in room 3 at

 9     Keraterm camp.

10             The murder of 80 Muslim and Croat men in the Crkvina warehouse in

11     Bosanski Samac.

12             The murder of dozens of non-Serbs held at Luka camp, Brcko.

13             Murder of about 175 men at Gero's slaughter-house and the killing

14     of about 20 non-Serbs at the Celopek Dom Kultur at Zvornik, as well as

15     the killing non-Serb civilians held at the Susica camp in Vlasenica in

16     the summer of 1992.

17             Your Honours, another mean to -- another means to ensure the

18     spread of terror with the aim of forcing the non-Serb population to leave

19     Serb-held territory came through the acts of murder whereby dozens of

20     Muslims and Croat civilians were coldly executed.  You have heard

21     evidence of killings at Velagici in the municipality of Kljuc where 77

22     Muslim men were killed after being detained shortly in the school.  They

23     were collected from surrounding villages from their homes.

24             In Brcko, town of Brcko, became a large killing site during 1992.

25     Non-Serbs who were detained in the camp in the SJB in the Partizan hall,

Page 27308

 1     the Laser bus company were routinely subjected to tortures and killings.

 2             You heard from Isak Gasi that he witnessed the killing of

 3     civilians in one of the streets leading to the market place on the 6th or

 4     the 7th of May.  Mr. Gasi was in a building in the old part of town when

 5     he saw at a distance of about 30 to 40 metres a policeman dressed in a

 6     typical civilian police uniform.  The policeman shot and killed three

 7     civilians right there in the street.

 8             About 50 metres away he saw men in camouflage uniforms killing

 9     about 12 more civilians.

10             In a now famous series of photographs captured in Brcko at the

11     time, Gasi was able to identify the same street where these killings

12     occurred.  You will see on the first slide a policeman, on the second

13     slide a policeman aiming at a civilian, and the third picture a civilian

14     lying down.

15             Bodies were picked up by a refrigerator truck which was

16     frequently seen coming and going in the streets of Brcko.  This picture

17     shows how these bodies were discarded in a mass grave in Brcko.

18             In Visegrad on the 14th of June a group of non-Serb civilians

19     from the village of Koritnik, mainly women, children, and the elderly

20     were forced to flee their village.  Arriving in Visegrad on foot, the

21     group was placed in houses on Pionirska Street in the Muslim

22     neighbourhood of Mahala which is located 400 metres away from the police

23     station.

24             Soon thereafter, Milan and Sredoje Lukic, along with other armed

25     Serbs arrived at the house.  They first robbed the villagers of their

Page 27309

 1     valuables, before leaving, taking one woman with them whom they would

 2     later rape.

 3             Later that night the Lukic brothers [sic] and other armed Serbs

 4     moved this group to a house next door.  They locked them up in a single

 5     room.  The house was set on fire.  Those detained who tried to escape

 6     through the windows were shot.  Approximately 60 people were burned alive

 7     in this house fire.

 8             This next map, Your Honours, will illustrate the killings charged

 9     in the indictment.  And I will summarise.  For the month of May in the

10     first wave - we'll go to the first animation - we can see killings in

11     various locations, such as the prison in Vlasenica; the killing of

12     22 non-Serbs at Nova Kasaba taken from the Vlasenica prison; the Drinjaca

13     school in Zvornik; the killing of over 800 non-Serb civilians during the

14     attack and shelling of the village of Kozarac, in Prijedor; and many

15     more.

16             Moving onto the month of June.  Many killings included the

17     notorious events such as the aforementioned killing of 77 Muslim men in

18     Velagici; the killing of over 20 non-Serbs in front of the medical centre

19     in Kotor Varos on the 25th of May; the killing of over 170 men at Gero's

20     slaughtered house; the killing of about 20 men by members of the

21     Yellow Wasps in the Celopek Dom Kultur; and many more.

22             In July, you have heard evidence of the killing of 144 men in the

23     Biljani school in Kljuc on the 10th of July; the killing of 180 non-Serbs

24     in room 3 at Keraterm; and the killings of about 24 to 25 non-Serb men

25     during transfer from Sanski Most to the Manjaca camp on 7th of July.

Page 27310

 1             I apologise.  The hospital centre in Kotor Varos was in the month

 2     of June.

 3             In August, we have heard about the killing of about 200 non-Serbs

 4     transported from Trnopolje camp on the Vlasic mountain cliffs, also known

 5     as Koricanske Stijene as Koricanske Stijene; and we've heard of killings

 6     of Muslims and Croats at the Manjaca camp; and we have already heard of

 7     killings of non-Serbs on the Kotlina bridge in Gacko.

 8             In October, we have one last killing, this time at the building

 9     behind the SJB in Bileca.

10             Your Honour, the fact speak volume about the determination of the

11     Bosnian Serb leadership to remove Muslim and Croat civilians from

12     Serb-held territories.  Killings such as those we just glanced over serve

13     two purposes:  Physically destroying parts of the population which was

14     intended to be removed and create an atmosphere of terror which would

15     prompt the rest of the population to leave the area.

16             Your Honours have already heard various accounts of attacks,

17     armed attacks on non-Serbs -- non-Serb parts of town and villages.  A

18     cursory review of the evidence allows one to observe yet another pattern

19     which would force Muslims and Croats to leave their homes.

20             For example, on the 27th of May, the village of Pudin Han in

21     Kljuc was heavily shelled killing a number of inhabitants as a

22     consequence.

23             Following the take-over the Doboj, the Muslim neighbourhood of

24     Carsija was shelled on the 3rd of May damaging the main mosque.

25             In Zvornik, you heard in the earlier video how the UN envoy

Page 27311

 1     reported the anti-aircraft cannons shelling from the Serbian side of the

 2     river into Muslim villages in Zvornik.

 3             In Visegrad, you heard how journalist Ian Traynor qualified the

 4     attack on the 13th of April in one of his articles.  Referring to the arm

 5     he stated:

 6             "There is little doubt that they and the Serbian irregulars are

 7     moving in for the kill."

 8             He added in Court, still referring to the army and Serb

 9     paramilitary troops:

10             "As we moved towards Visegrad, they were together.  I was

11     standing beside them as they were firing rockets into Visegrad both from

12     artillery pieces."

13             In Kotor Varos, we have had the chance to view a video showing

14     the attack on Muslim parts of town by aeroplane showing the superiority

15     of the equipment from the Serb forces.

16             If we could see this video, please.

17                           [Video-clip played]

18             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  Yes, for the record this is Exhibit P2014.

19             Your Honours, as a result of persecutory measures, large numbers

20     of Muslims and Croats left the Serb controlled area, and when they didn't

21     leave on their own, the Serb leadership made sure to facilitate their

22     departure by organising convoys of buses thereby expelling thousands of

23     non-Serb civilians.

24             In Sanski Most, between 3500 and 5.000 non-Serbs left as a result

25     of the take-over in April 1992.  In Kotor Varos out of 10.640 Croats,

Page 27312

 1     only a thousand remained following the take-over.  And from 11.000

 2     Muslims, only 4500 remained.

 3             Against Sulejman Crncalo explained to Your Honour that people

 4     were rounded up by the RS MUP to be placed on buses that left Pale in

 5     convoys.  RS MUP policemen escorted the convoys.  In late June, the

 6     number of Muslims from Pale were also transferred by buses.

 7             In Zvornik, quotes are attributed to a Serbian mayor,

 8     Brano Grujic, which provided chilling insight into the changing nature of

 9     that municipality from 1992.  In 1993, he stated that:

10             "The demographics are now different.  Zvornik once had a

11     population of almost 70.000 with more than 60 per cent being Muslims.

12     Today, the mosque has been blown up and the city is more than 90 per cent

13     Serb, maybe even 99 per cent."

14             The next video will illustrate what forcible transfer and

15     deportation means.

16                           [Video-clip played]

17             "Some 2.000 people were unaccounted for.  Nobody knows how many

18     of them were executed on the spot or how many were sent to concentration

19     camps where the murder continued.  The rest were expelled.  Forty-nine

20     thousand Muslims lived in Zvornik.  None remain.  Five centuries of

21     Islamic life and culture there were erased.  This is ethnic cleansing.

22     It became routine as the Serbs took control of three-quarters of Bosnia's

23     territory.  In time, they learned to keep the cameras out but ethnic

24     cleansing continued."

25             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  This was Exhibit P908, Your Honours.

Page 27313

 1             In Bijeljina, you have heard evidence from Milorad Davidovic that

 2     one of the architects of this expulsion was the CSB chief,

 3     Predrag Jesuric, another one -- another one of these architects was

 4     Vojkan Jerkovic.

 5             Can play the next video-clip, please.

 6                           [Video-clip played]

 7              "My guide was Vojkan Jerkovic, who was of Bijeljina's most

 8     prominent citizens.  He was one of the 60 fighters who seized the town of

 9     the Serbs at the beginning of the war.  Vojkan was especially proud of

10     his expensive Italian sunglasses.  Men like him are doing very well these

11     days in the Bosnian Serb republic.  At his office Vojkan had assembled

12     some of the last Muslims left in Bijeljina.  He said they're his friends.

13     Vojkan is president of the regional commission for the free movement of

14     the civilian population.  That means is he in charge of ethnic cleansing.

15     A report prepared for the UN said he has led groups of armed men had been

16     terrorising the Muslim community.  Vojkan cheerfully denies it all.

17             "[No interpretation]

18             "He has turned ethnic cleansing into an official procedure and

19     turned Bijeljina into such an ethnically Serb town that these Muslims are

20     desperate to get out.

21             "[No interpretation]"

22             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  This is Exhibit P140, Your Honours.  And another

23     excerpt of this video Djurkovic claims that he should be receiving the

24     Noble peace prize because he estimated that he had saved thousands of

25     lives.  Speaking of the Muslims he had just thrown out, he would go on to

Page 27314

 1     add these words:

 2             "They were tourists.  We took a stroll from Bijeljina to Tuzla or

 3     to Berlin or somewhere else.  Let them come back."

 4             Djurkovic was seen at Luka camp as was told to you by Isak Gasi.

 5             Banja Luka, Your Honours, resettlement agencies were also

 6     settled.  And you have heard from Witness S225 [sic] the following:

 7             "Unfortunately those are the most tragic moments in the lives of

 8     us.  Your friends, brothers, fathers, neighbours are leaving.  Maybe the

 9     most difficult the citizens of Banja Luka went through during that

10     period.  And it went on and on, convoy after convoy, bus after bus.  Very

11     difficult good-byes from the assembly points where the citizens of

12     Banja Luka went to get on the busses, and for those who stayed behind

13     there was uncertainty, huge uncertainty as to what would become of them.

14     If were to single out some moments from the overall tragedy in the area

15     then I would choose this.  These are very earth-shattering experiences."

16             As adequately reported in a 1 KK report on the 1st of June, 1992,

17     a portion of the Muslim and Croat population is moving out.  Those

18     departing will not be allowed to return.  It's Exhibit P411.29.

19             Your Honours have already heard throughout the trial that the

20     homes and property of non-Serbs were systematically torched and

21     destroyed.  The limited time we have, Your Honours, here is a video of

22     the result of attacks on the villages of Kozarac -- on the village of

23     Kozarac.

24                           [Video-clip played]

25             "We visited the ethnically cleansed Kozarac in northern Bosnia

Page 27315

 1     last week.  We were closely supervised by the local Serb militia

 2     restricted to just a few blocks of the town, once home to about 15.000

 3     Muslim men, women, and children.  Today there are no Muslims there; none.

 4     And none of their X-marked homes is in intact.  Other homes in Kozarac

 5     have been marked to survive.  This one with the colours of the Serbian

 6     flag.  This one says, This is Serbia.  They stand undamaged like the

 7     remaining Serb residents of Kozarac surrounded in silence, deadly

 8     silence."

 9             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  This is Exhibit P1718.  It was filmed in October

10     1992.

11             It was highlighted by one witness, Your Honours, not a single

12     Serb house had been attacked in Kozarac.

13             Your Honours let's me conclude with these words.  The

14     Trial Chamber has received a great deal of evidence:  Killings of Muslims

15     and Croat civilians and inflexion of bodily harm in 1992 on a massive

16     scale, and also received considerable evidence on atrocious conditions in

17     detention facilities.  We asked the Trial Chamber to keep in mind the

18     considerable evidence about the forcible displacement and systematic

19     transfer of the territory claimed by the Serbs.  The Trial Chamber must

20     assess the evidence in conjunction with the statements of the

21     Bosnian Serb leadership anticipating the take-over of large parts of

22     Bosnia and Herzegovina and the creation of ethnically pure areas.  The

23     intent of the Bosnian Serb leadership can be inferred from several

24     aspects of the evidence, including the scale and the pattern of the

25     attacks, their intensity, the substantial number of Muslims killed, the

Page 27316

 1     detention of Muslims and Croats, their brutal treatment in those

 2     detention facilities, destruction of their property.

 3             These are all factors that must be considered by the

 4     Trial Chamber.

 5             This concludes our presentation on the evidence of pattern.  I

 6     will now leave the floor to Ms. Korner who will deal with the background

 7     of the creation of the RS MUP.

 8             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Before you do so, Mr. Demirdjian, could you just

 9     clarify one thing.

10             The video you showed with the aircrafts bombing some targets on

11     land, when was that taken?

12             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  July 1992.

13             JUDGE HARHOFF:  And you referred to Exhibit P2014.

14             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  2014, that is correct.

15             JUDGE HARHOFF:  But that appears to be an interview with

16     Stojan Zupljanin, Brdjanin and Momir Talic.

17             MR. DEMIRDJIAN:  It's a -- it's a video.  It's a compellation of

18     a video showing interviews.  And interspersed in those videos, there are

19     clippings that show the attacks.  There are various attacks in that

20     video.  You also see soldiers carrying shells that are being fired

21     towards mosques and inhabited areas.

22             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Thank you.

23             MS. KORNER:  Your Honour, may I, as I explained earlier this

24     morning, say a little bit about the background to the creation of the MUP

25     because the Stanisic final brief devotes a number of pages to the

Page 27317

 1     testimony of the Serb members of the RS MUP and who had been formerly

 2     members of the BiH MUP and who gave their reasons to Your Honours for

 3     what could be said to be their disenchantment with the state of the BiH

 4     MUP between the beginning of 1991 and April of 1992.

 5             We would submit that obviously it's a one-sided view.  For

 6     obvious reasons, Your Honours didn't hear from, really, any of the Muslim

 7     members of the BiH MUP except very briefly those who were victims.  It is

 8     said in paragraph 44 of the brief that the recitation of the background

 9     of the events provides the context and reasons for the split in the MUP

10     which took place at the beginning of April 1992.

11             Well, Your Honours, can we make one thing absolutely clear.

12     There is no dispute in this case that after the 1990 elections the HDZ,

13     the SDA, and the SDS entered into an agreement on the divisions of posts

14     that was to take place amongst their separate nominees, governmental

15     posts and MUP posts.  In the MUP, the minister, of course, was

16     Delimustafic, who was SDA or Muslim; the deputy minister, Mr. Zepinic;

17     and the under-secretary for the SDB was a Croat named Kvesic.  And it is

18     equal not disputed at all that this so-called agreement led to, in fact,

19     a number of disagreements and much arguing about personnel and positions

20     and who had what.

21             The complaints which were rehearsed, as a result of questions

22     from the Defence by nearly all the witnesses which are repeated in the

23     final trial brief, was that the Serb police were being marginalised, that

24     this was the fault of the SDA, that unqualified Muslims from Sandzak were

25     being recruited, the inequities of persons such as Mr. Hebib and

Page 27318

 1     Mr. Alibabic, all of those complaints, in fact, were being made in

 2     June 1991 by a Serb ex-employee of the MUP named Goran Zecevic.  It's

 3     P517.

 4             And Your Honours can see some excerpts from that document.  It's

 5     addressed to the council of the SDS, and talks about -- what aggrieves my

 6     colleagues is that the SDS lost the secretariat of the interior positions

 7     that should have been following to them.  Key positions in the MUP have

 8     been occupied by the SDA and the HDZ and the leading figure in the MUP is

 9     the minister.  And it goes on, and I don't think I need bother to go

10     through the other parts of the documents, though we have it up to, as I

11     say, rehearse the complaints which were then rehearsed by all of these

12     witnesses.

13             What is not referred to at all in the final trial brief is the

14     report on the ethnic structure of the ministry which was prepared, and

15     Your Honours we haven't put that up, but it's P829.  And testimony that

16     was actually given by Mr. Mandic in the Krajisnik case, and Your Honours

17     can I just remind you of this.  It was, although Mr. Mandic resiled from

18     some of his testimony, either voluntarily before he testified but after

19     he had seen the Defence or later, as a result from questions of the

20     Defence, he did not resile from this, and this is page 8650 of his

21     previous testimony which is P1318.2.

22             And he was asked:

23             "Mr. Mandic, did some of the steps towards the preparation for

24     separation of the joint MUP or unified MUP include arming of Serbian

25     police stations or police officials and at least the beginnings of the

Page 27319

 1     terminations of non-Serbs from police forces?

 2             Mandic relied this:

 3             "Well, I think it was the other way round then.  Up until the

 4     beginning of the war, in the police of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were

 5     about 11.000 members of the MUP.  From among them, there were 75 per cent

 6     Serbs.  In Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was mainly Serbs who were in the army

 7     and police which did not correspond to the ethnic pattern of

 8     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  So conclusions were reached by the senior staff of

 9     the MUP to dismiss Serb personnel who were trained and educated to work

10     on this kind of job and that Bosniaks and Croats should be recruited from

11     elsewhere, including the reserve force, and the Territorial Defence, so

12     that the pattern would correspond with the ethnic pattern in

13     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  That means, at that time, there were more Serbs on

14     the force than there were in Bosnia-Herzegovina itself and that is one of

15     the problems that was faced by the joint MUP."

16             That evidence does not get a mention in the final trial brief.

17             Your Honours, equally, if we look, please, at P905, this was a

18     letter that was sent protesting about Mr. Mandic and his work to all and

19     sundry -- when I say "all and sundry," I mean Mr. Izetbegovic,

20     Mr. Delimustafic, Mr. Zepinic, Mr. Hebib.  And if we look, please, at the

21     next part of the slide, we are writing this letter in respect of the work

22     and behaviour of the assistant minister, Mr. Mandic, who has put him in

23     charge of personnel policy an oddly enough his speciality is being the

24     selection and bringing on board of Muslim employees without anybody's --

25     concerned.  So the complaints that are made by the Serb that you heard

Page 27320

 1     from about Muslims being brought on were apparently also being brought on

 2     by Mr. Mandic.  And it goes on to say:

 3             "On the other hand, when it comes to the Serbian personnel the

 4     wishes and orders of the SDS and Mr. Karadzic are fully respected with no

 5     questions asked."

 6             And finally this kind of work is explained by Mr. Mandic's good

 7     relationship with the minister of the interior, Mr. Delimustafic, which

 8     originates from their joint business ventures:

 9              "We demand that Mr. Mandic be urgently prevented in his actions

10     and intentions and that all remaining vacancies in the BH MUP that belong

11     to the SDA cadre as per the inter-party agreement be filled but without

12     Mr. Mandic's interference."

13             So, Your Honours, the -- these complaints about who was doing

14     what, who was interfering with what, were common to all parties and all

15     sides, and it was not the one-sided issue, if one likes to put it that

16     way, that the many of the witnesses and, indeed, the brief would have you

17     believe.

18             Additionally, not mentioned, is the October 1991 paper, the

19     possibilities of organising a Serbian MUP Ministry for Internal Affairs,

20     again, not going to trouble to put it up, but, Your Honours, it's P521.

21             Moreover, it's the reaction by Karadzic, the leader of the SDS,

22     to these arguments over personnel in 1991 was unequivocal.  We just look

23     for a moment at part of an intercept which is P897, a conversation in

24     July of 1991, all arising out of arguments over who had what ministry.

25     Karadzic, in terms, saying to Zepinic:

Page 27321

 1             "Let the collegium meet every morning.  I was with Izetbegovic

 2     last night and Zulfikarpasic and I told him right into his face, We'll

 3     establish a parallel government, parallel police, we'll withdraw our

 4     people and they'll have to be paid by the government.  We withdraw all

 5     our people under arms.  We'll establish an entire parallel state if you

 6     keep on screwing us."  Et cetera.

 7             And again, at P903, another intercept.  Karadzic and Simovic in

 8     September:

 9              "Tell Zepinic that as of tomorrow we are withdrawing all our

10     ministers and all our officials in the MUP.  We are discontinuing the

11     complete partnership and going in opposition.  Vlaski," whom Your Honours

12     heard from, "was removed from his office and it's over.  Tonight at 8.00

13     I'm going to break up with Izetbegovic.  I'm withdrawing everything.

14     Serbian Democratic Party into opposition.  We're going to break apart and

15     then we are going to establish our own SUP separately, and with other men

16     and we'll make the government separately.  We'll make everything

17     separately."

18             Your Honours, it may well be that nobody took Karadzic's threats

19     that seriously in that part of 1991.  In fact, it was their mistake, we

20     submit, and they should have taken those threats seriously.

21             Your Honours, moreover, we do not quite follow, if that's the

22     right word, the Defence's train of thought on this.  Because the Defence

23     case is that there simply never was any plan to split the BiH MUP.  The

24     only time that it became under -- that it came under active consideration

25     was at the result of the Cutileiro agreement that Your Honours have heard

Page 27322

 1     so much about.  In the Stanisic final brief, between paragraphs 98 and

 2     119, that is the position that they adopt, in which case it is not easy

 3     to see why this background has any relevance to the split which took

 4     place, except as, we say, for what was being said by Karadzic at a very

 5     early stage.

 6             In fact, with respect to the Cutileiro Plan, Your Honours, the

 7     evidence shows that even before the declaration of the Serbian state in

 8     BiH in January of 1992 and long before the Cutileiro talks got started in

 9     February, the split in the MUP was being planned and planned secretly.

10             On the 19th of December, one has what's been called the Variant A

11     and B instructions.  And, Your Honours, those were referred to by

12     Karadzic in his speech at the 50th Assembly meeting in 1995.  And

13     Your Honours will see an extract from that speech on the screen where,

14     "And we really start.  We mobilise then, we did not have a war."  Ten

15     lines down:

16             "At the moment the war began, in the municipalities where we were

17     in the majority, we had municipal power, held it firmly, controlled

18     everything.  In the municipalities where we were in the minority, we set

19     up secret government, municipal boards, municipal assemblies, presidents.

20     You will remember, the A and B variants.  In the B variant where we were

21     in the minority, we had set up a government and a brigade," and so on and

22     so forth.

23             And then he deals with the involvement of the JNA.  The war began

24     and the JNA helped as much as it could here and there.  It had helped

25     before.  He adds he hopes he isn't going out on television this.

Page 27323

 1     General Subotic helped just before the war began by sending the tanks,

 2     took the risk, signed for them to go to servicing while, in fact, he sent

 3     them to Banja.  Banja, yeah.  And then it was -- he talks about the fall

 4     of one of the other municipalities done with the help of Subotic who was

 5     a colonel here.  Distribution of weapons was carried out, thanks to the

 6     JNA, and so on and so forth.

 7             And then, at the bottom:

 8             "It was the SDS which organised the people and created the army.

 9     It was an army.  Together with the police, those were the armed forces of

10     the Serbian Republic and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  They created the space,

11     they [sic] liberated and created the space."

12             And, Your Honours, of course, that is the Prosecution case in a

13     nutshell, that the police were the armed force, and together, once the

14     VRS was created, did just that:  Liberated, if that's the word, the

15     territories.

16             Your Honours going back to why we say the split in the MUP was

17     already being planned well before the Cutileiro talks.  On the

18     21st of December, 1991, the council of ministers, as part of this

19     parallel shadow government, was created.  And at that state Zepinic was

20     named as minister of the interior.  And that's P180.

21             Then we come to the 11th of February meeting in Banja Luka.  Can

22     we just have that up for a moment.  Now, Your Honours, it is asserted by

23     all the witnesses who Your Honours heard from who attended the meeting,

24     including Mr. Mandic, in particular, that there's no way this was a

25     secret meeting.  Mr. Mandic asserted that he even spoke to

Page 27324

 1     Mr. Delimustafic about it.  History in the form of Mr. Mandic, does not

 2     relate what Mr. Delimustafic's response to this invitation was.  We

 3     suggest that in that respect, Mr. Mandic was not telling the truth at

 4     all.

 5             None of the other witnesses appear to be able to explain how they

 6     had ever got an invitation to this meeting in the first place, or nobody

 7     could remember, and if this was an open meeting, open to anyone, there

 8     wasn't a single non-Serb person there.  The meeting was not held in the

 9     CSB Banja Luka despite the fact that Your Honours saw the CSB Banja Luka

10     had ample rooms to hold the meeting.  Your Honours saw the photographs

11     through one of the witnesses.

12             Having said that, Your Honour, it's a matter for Your Honours to

13     decide whether this was, firstly, a meeting that was being kept quiet;

14     and, secondly, whether it was a pivotal meeting in the split of the MUP.

15             But, clearly, Stanisic's speech said, Work has to be done by the

16     organisation of the Serbian MUP, starting from the municipal and regional

17     levels, up to the Serbian ministry.  The Serbian personnel in the MUP

18     must provide the means to strengthen and supply the Serbian MUP, ensuring

19     that resources will be distributed equally.

20             And if one looks very briefly at what each of the -- some of the

21     participants say in turn:

22             "Bjelosevic:  I support the decision to establish the Serbian

23     MUP.

24             "Zugic:  The Serbian MUP has to start work as soon as possible.

25             "Jesuric:  I only trust my own people and weapons that I have

Page 27325

 1     acquired and hidden, the Serbian MUP should be established as soon as

 2     possible."

 3             Two further quotes:

 4             "Mr. Vlaski:  The only -- who also denied that this was a meeting

 5     concerned with splitting the MUP.  The only way would be to organise the

 6     Serbian MUP and implement all decisions without question.

 7             "Mr. Draskovic:  This is the first time that we are telling each

 8     other the truth without the people who have been holding us back."

 9             And finally, Your Honours, in the conclusions suggested that

10     Mr. Delimustafic was going to be sent, the conclusions of the meeting,

11     that's not in fact what happened because if you look at the conclusions:

12             "The Serbian collegium of the MUP is hereby instructed to carry

13     out all preparations necessary for the functioning of the Serbian MUP,

14     after the promulgation of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia constitution."

15             And no mention in any of the conclusions of sending

16     Mr. Delimustafic -- the conclusions.

17             Your Honour, the next important meeting that took place was that

18     of the SDS in Holiday Inn on the 14th of February, and there Karadzic

19     explained not only that whilst the Serbs and the Croats wanted the

20     cantons, he was discussing the talks that had gone on, and the Muslims

21     want a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also that under no circumstances

22     were any Serbs to participate in any referendum.  The second level of the

23     Variant A and B instructions were to be implemented, and he added:

24             "As for the army and the defence of the Serbian Krajina, we will

25     anticipate everything:  The police we will make a plan of defence and

Page 27326

 1     security operations."

 2             An and that's P1841.

 3             Your Honours, we say that from the moment the SDS had made its

 4     decision that there was to be a separate Serbian state in

 5     Bosnia-Herzegovina, the formation of its own security forces, both army

 6     and police, was a foregone conclusion.  And it was one, we say, that was

 7     evident to all of the senior MUP officials who attended the

 8     February meeting in Banja Luka.

 9             Your Honours, can I move, then, very shortly to mention one other

10     aspect of -- of the -- which has come out through the Defence

11     cross-examination.  Your Honours, throughout the trial, the Defence have

12     attempted and sometimes succeeded in introducing evidence of events which

13     are outside the scope of the indictment, outside the period, in the

14     interests of what they've called context.  So that, for example,

15     Your Honours have heard about the alleged secret training in Croatia of

16     Muslim and Croat police officers.  Your Honours that's covered in the

17     Stanisic final brief between paragraph 62 and 69.  Can I just sort of,

18     out of interest, put -- ask for one document to be put up from this

19     series that related to the training.  That's 1D787.

20             Now, Your Honours, this was put -- oh, it's gone.  For some

21     reason, it's gone blank on my screen.  Anyhow.  Yes, thank you.

22             Your Honours, this -- this is a document that was put in by the

23     Defence as part of this series of documents showing training going on in

24     Croatia.  This is June of 1991.  But Your Honours it does show and indeed

25     Mr. Nilsson dealt with this to a certain extent in his report that these

Page 27327

 1     were rumours that's -- that was supposed to be secret training - but in

 2     actual fact was ordinary training conducted, and don't forget at this

 3     stage Yugoslavia as such still existed - containing a number of different

 4     ethnic groups.  And if one looks at the list of people here and the

 5     commanders it would appear that they were indeed mixed, Your Honours,

 6     between certainly, apparently, Serbs and, in this particular instant,

 7     Croats.  So we suggest that the so-called secret training should again be

 8     looked at with a degree of skepticism.

 9             Your Honours also heard about events in Bosanski Brod, in

10     Derventa, about Muslim attempts to procure arms, about Crisis Staffs

11     being formed by the SDA and the HDZ, and about crimes being committed by

12     Muslims or Croats against Serbs.  Many of the insider witnesses, the Serb

13     witnesses, were very insistent in having their say about what they said

14     were the crimes committed against the Serbs.  Your Honours, the -- as --

15     some of which was adduced by Defence counsel.  Witnesses ST-19 was asked

16     the following series of questions by Mr. Pantelic.  It's at page -- it's

17     T593:

18              "Q.  Witness, which forces killed hundreds upon hundreds of

19     Serbs in Kotor Varos municipality?  Do you know?

20             "A.  No, I don't know.

21             "Q.  Who roasted living Serbs in Kotor Varos municipality?  Do

22     you know that?

23             "A.  No.

24             "Q.  Who burned and levelled the Serb villages in the territory

25     of Kotor Varos municipality.  Do you know?

Page 27328

 1             "A.  I don't.

 2             "Q.  No further questions for this witness."

 3             Your Honour, that's an extreme example, but, nonetheless, it is

 4     something that was adduced through the Defence.

 5             Your Honours, because of -- this trial involves these two accused

 6     and because the evidence that has been led is that which relates to their

 7     involvement, Your Honours have no real opportunity to examine the type of

 8     evidence that was adduced in its proper context.  And the Defence that at

 9     one stage it seemed was being mounted, namely that all the actions taken

10     by the Serbs were nothing more than self-defence is not, in fact, sought

11     to be advanced, nor, on the evidence could it have been in the context of

12     the events of 1992.  And it may not need saying, but out of an abundance

13     of caution we say it:  It is not a Defence to say that the other side

14     committed crimes and so we were justified in committing the crimes that

15     we did.  Revenge attacks, which is something that's being mentioned

16     often, are still crimes.

17             Your Honours, finally before I turn to the question of

18     resubordination, can I just talk very briefly about joint criminal

19     enterprise, Mr. Pantelic's favour topic.  Neither accused, in fact, seek

20     to argue in their final trial briefs that the crimes alleged did not take

21     place.  In fact, in paragraph 219 of the Zupljanin brief, it's said in

22     terms, nor, with a few exceptions, namely, the special police actions in

23     Kotor Varos, do they seek to argue that the police did not take part in

24     crimes.  The evidence is overwhelming on that matter.

25             Neither accused further seeks to argue in their final brief that

Page 27329

 1     a joint criminal enterprise did not exist.  We say that is because the

 2     evidence of such an enterprise is overwhelming, not only from what was

 3     said at the time and subsequently by members of the Serb political,

 4     military, and police leadership, but also by the pattern so clearly

 5     demonstrated in the address given to you by Mr. Demirdjian of the events

 6     in the indictment.

 7             Your Honours, that the enterprise had, as its object, the

 8     forcible removal of the non-Serbs from the territory of the Serbian

 9     state, we say, is absolutely clear.  And if there were no other evidence

10     but that of the six strategic goals, that would set it out.  And,

11     Your Honours, can we look at the version not that given on the 12th of

12     May by Karadzic in the Assembly but by the note made by General Mladic on

13     the 7th of May, so five days before the Assembly, of his discussions with

14     Krajisnik, where the strategic goals are set out.  And goal number 1 is:

15     To separate from the Croats and Muslims forever.

16             And then the further goals of the corridor from the Krajina; the

17     Drina, Neretva -- I'll redo that one.  Neretva with -- Nere -- anyways, I

18     give that one up.  Even after all this time.  A natural border with the

19     Croats.  And then a part of Sarajevo is to be ours.  The Muslims can have

20     their part of the city and a link with their territory.  Then the passage

21     to the sea.  And links with the Republika of Serb Krajina.

22             Your Honour, the issue in this case is really were the two

23     accused members of the JCE.  Both of them deny it.  They deny any

24     knowledge of the crimes committed.  They say, as a result of the lack of

25     communication from their subordinates and/or the faulty communications

Page 27330

 1     equipment, and Mr. Hannis will deal with that as a separate topic a

 2     little later, and, to a certain extent they blame interference from

 3     municipal authorities, in particular the Crisis Staffs.

 4             Not surprisingly, Zupljanin is running an alternative Defence and

 5     sets it out as an alternative in a number of different place, that if he

 6     did know of the crimes, they fell outwith his responsibility as, at the

 7     time, the perpetrators, if they were members of the MUP, were all

 8     resubordinated to the VRS.

 9             Of course, Your Honours, the essence of the joint criminal

10     enterprise is that all involved had a role to play and notwithstanding

11     that the course of the relationships between the political, the army and

12     the police did not always run smoothly, in the end, as a number of

13     witnesses said, they did share the same goal.  The MUP at all times was

14     and had to be an integral component of any plant to take over and retain

15     territory.  In every municipality that Your Honours saw this morning, one

16     of the first actions was the take-over of the SJB.  Before the creation

17     of the VRS on the 12th of May, the only armed force on which the

18     Bosnian Serbs could positively rely was the MUP because at that stage

19     they did not know even if the JNA was secretly arming, secretly prepared

20     to help, they could not know whether or not the JNA would come down on

21     their side in any conflict, would, as they did, provide manpower and

22     materiel to carry on the -- the plan.  And so the only armed force at the

23     beginning, until May, and Your Honours saw how many of the take-overs

24     happened before May, was the MUP.

25             We say it is inconceivable that the head of the MUP, who, in this

Page 27331

 1     case, was, we say, was a member of the SDS, although it is denied, had

 2     been a part of the shadow government from no later than December 1991,

 3     together with the head of the police in the largest targeted area for the

 4     Serbian state should have been no more than the innocent tools, which is

 5     what it comes down to, of a Machiavellian Bosnian Serb political

 6     leadership.  The removal of Zepinic, who was, after all, chosen to be the

 7     first minister of the interior in the shadow government, shows the

 8     importance, we submit, that was attached to having a head of the MUP who

 9     was prepared to carry out the enterprise.

10             And, Your Honours, as we have shown, we submit, through the

11     evidence, as set out in our final trial brief, both of the accused,

12     Stanisic and Zupljanin, played their parts in the implementation of the

13     criminal enterprise.

14             Your Honours, can I now, very briefly, before I move to

15     Zupljanin, turn to the vexed question of resubordination.

16             The accused - and in particular Zupljanin because he was closer

17     to the perpetrators of the crime in his position as chief of CSB - rely

18     on what is described by them as the principle of resubordination.

19     Namely, that of all relevant times when crimes were committed by members

20     of the MUP as we have shown they were, they were under the command and

21     control of the army, the VRS.  And they say that in order to assert that

22     this deprived them of effective control of their subordinates.

23             Your Honours, the focus at this stage is not going to be on the

24     power to prevent or punish being removed from the accused - Mr. Olmsted

25     will deal with that tomorrow - but on the evidence as to whether or not

Page 27332

 1     this resubordination actually took place.  Your Honours, for one last

 2     time, or maybe more, if the Defence are going to let us have a look,

 3     please, at Article 10 far -- 104 of the Law of All People's Defence,

 4     which is in L1.

 5             Your Honours, the word "resubordination" does not appear in the

 6     Article.  It says:

 7             "In war, in times of an immediate threat of war and ... other

 8     emergencies, the police may," emphasising the word "may," "... be used

 9     for carrying out combat activities for the armed forces in accordance

10     with the law."

11             We submit the word "may" makes it clear that this is intended to

12     be the exception and not the rule.

13             And then:

14             "During its engagement for combat activities in the armed forces

15     the police shall be under the command of the authorised officer in charge

16     of combat activity."

17             I'm not sure -- we put it onto the slide, but, Your Honour, it

18     goes on to say:

19             "The reserve forces of the police shall be reinforced by military

20     conscripts."

21             Now, Your Honours, we submit that because, as Your Honours know,

22     that the great theory of Defence expert Kovacevic is that -- that -- that

23     everybody is a military conscript in a time of immediate threat of war.

24     Your Honours, it's clear here that there is a distinction made between a

25     military conscript and the police.

Page 27333

 1             Now, it is the evidence from one of the military witnesses who

 2     had actual experience of the conflict during 1992 was that to use the

 3     police for combat operations which, according to one witness, meant being

 4     on the front line, and we suggest that is the obvious common sense

 5     meaning of combat in the context of Article 104.  A formal process had to

 6     be gone through which involved seeking approval from a senior officer who

 7     in turn would have to request the use of MUP units from the appropriate

 8     MUP level.

 9             And by Stanisic's order of the 14th of May, that would be the CSB

10     chief.

11             Moreover, it was a procedure of limited duration, geography, and

12     purpose.

13             Now, there is no doubt the evidence shows there were police units

14     who were actually resubordinated.  The police brigade which was set up by

15     Zupljanin in 1992, November of 1992, was clearly a police units that had

16     been resubordinated to the military for the purposes of action.

17             But, as expressed in at least one report, such resubordination

18     was, as it's put, occasional.  This is P163, the meeting of the Trebinje

19     working group in August, where the chief of the Doboj CSB mentioned the

20     possibility of a conflict between the army and the MUP, regarding, in the

21     view of the army members, the privileged war-time position of MUP

22     employees in relation to them.  And, Your Honours, that one has a classic

23     example of the relationship not always running smoothly.

24             He therefore suggested that the reserve police force and the

25     soldiers on the front line alternate tours of duties or that the reserve

Page 27334

 1     police force is occasionally subordinated to the army.

 2             Now, Your Honours, there were obviously instances where strict

 3     procedures weren't followed and this particularly, we would suggest

 4     depended on the relationship between the local police, MUP commander, and

 5     the VRS officer.  If it was a good relationship, or the VRS officer had a

 6     particularly overbearing nature, then, it was clear that the proper

 7     procedures were sometimes by-passed and it's worth -- again, I hope one

 8     last time, looking at the Lisica/Bjelosevic correspondence.  Can we have

 9     a look at 1D263, please, or part thereof.

10             This was Mr. Bjelosevic writing to, as he then was,

11     Colonel Lisica, and saying that -- he is complaining.  It's not on the

12     screen but he is complaining about the robberies, and so on and so forth,

13     and he says:

14             "In order to prevent these occurrences, we are forced to withdraw

15     the police from combat operations on the fronts in Bosanski Brod and

16     Gradacac.  We will carry out the withdrawal of the police from these

17     fronts ..."

18             Now, Your Honours, the plain meaning of this is:  This is what

19     I'm going to do.  This is not a request.  This is what I'm going to do.

20     And then we hope that you will understand the reasons why we are forced

21     to withdraw the police from the battle-field.  Expect your positive

22     reply.  So we get the next -- letter back the following -- that's the 2nd

23     of October, the 3rd of October, from Colonel Lisica who, as Your Honours,

24     know takes the view that in time of war, whether declared or undeclared,

25     he's the boss.  And whether or not the regulations agree -- that.  I do

Page 27335

 1     not authorise the withdraw of the police forces, because if I do so, the

 2     front will soon reach Doboj and you will not have any territory under

 3     your control.  If you'll correctly understand the reasons why the police

 4     forces cannot be withdrawn.  We welcome all forms of co-operation and

 5     assistance between the military police and the police force.

 6             In fact, he's probably making -- Your Honours, making a fairly

 7     sensible point, that if there is fighting going on there the police are

 8     better off staying with him.

 9             And then on the 6th of October, Bjelosevic replies and says:

10             "I was rather surprised by the content of the order, all the more

11     since I believe that co-operation between the TG 3 and the Doboj CSB has

12     been excellent."

13             And, Your Honours, we say that is the operative word,

14     "co-operation."  And then if we go further on, we skipped about official

15     vehicles being put in his disposal:

16             "While I was issuing approval for the engagement of the police in

17     combat ... outside my authorisation and the order of the minister of the

18     interior, there was looting and disorder on a massive scale."

19             Your Honours, we suggest that, again, we have the CSB chief

20     giving approval and he, himself, says because of his relationship with

21     presumably Colonel Lisica, he had by-passed the chain of command which

22     ought to have taken place.  And, as we say, we accept the evidence is

23     plain that sometimes the proper procedures were not gone through but all

24     were aware of those procedures and resubordination was not, as

25     Zupljanin Defence [indiscernible] would have you believe an automatic

Page 27336

 1     thing as they say.  The army was there, then the police were

 2     resubordinated.  It was a highly technical matter.

 3             Your Honours, in order to overcome the plain fact that not one of

 4     the crimes charged in which members of the MUP were involved, is there

 5     any evidence at all to suggest that the police who were involved were

 6     part of a resubordinated unit.  The Defence are, in fact, forced to try

 7     and extend what we say was a formal short-lived action to encompass all

 8     police action taken in an area which contained a military unit under the

 9     principle that you have heard over and over again of singleness or unity

10     of command, which is a military term, and certainly applies if there are

11     resubordinated units properly resubordinated.  But it does not, we

12     suggest, on the evidence, encompass every single action in which the

13     police or the military co-ordinated or co-operated.

14             Your Honours, all of the undisputed actions by the police, the

15     crimes that were committed, the looting, the destruction, the killings

16     that took place after events such as the shelling of Kozarac, or Mahala,

17     the suffocation of the prisoners on the truck who had been brought by the

18     police to Manjaca as is evidenced in the report from one of the persons

19     at Manjaca, the guarding of prisoners in camps which have no military

20     presence whatsoever, as demonstrated to you by Mr. Demirdjian, all of

21     that, it is asserted, took place whilst the police officers involved were

22     resubordinated.  And it's asserted that the words "co-operation" and

23     "co-ordination" all imply that a relationship of resubordination existed.

24             Well, Your Honours, if we look for a moment at P60.3, this was

25     the order given to -- I believe it's Lieutenant-Colonel Peulic, that he

Page 27337

 1     was to move his troops and, as it is put:

 2             "Establish full co-operation with the organs of the government in

 3     Sanski Most municipality and collaboration with the To and police units."

 4             Now this was shown to the Defence expert who said that means --

 5     although it's difficult because I don't know the background, but in my

 6     view that means resubordination.

 7             Your Honours can I just go to private session for one moment.

 8             JUDGE HALL:  Yes.

 9                           [Private session]

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18                           [Open session]

19             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

20             JUDGE HALL:  And we now take the break and resume in 20 minutes.

21                           --- Recess taken at 12.04 p.m.

22                           --- On resuming at 12.29 p.m.

23             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, can I finish fairly swiftly, I keep

24     saying because of the time constraints, the question of resubordination.

25             Your Honour, no doubt, many of the insider witnesses from the MUP

Page 27338

 1     supported the population that resubordination virtually occurred anywhere

 2     where there is army and police.  They, of course, would say so, as we

 3     submit, out of self-interest.  It deflects any attention from their

 4     activities at the time and, of course, the Defence expert, Kovacevic,

 5     about whom Your Honours know we have already made lengthy submissions.

 6             In fact, the OTP rely on the documents that came into existence

 7     at the time and on the evidence of what happened.  Mr. Brown, as I've

 8     already mentioned, receives a barrage of criticism, much of it being

 9     through selective misquoting, particularly in the Zupljanin final brief,

10     and we say that paragraph 250 requires careful reading, but the OTP do

11     not rely heavily on him for this aspect of the case; because, as he

12     pointed out, it was not the focus of his report and the research which he

13     carried out which was on the activities of the VRS in the Krajina area

14     during 1992 and not the nature of the relationship between the police and

15     the military.

16             He was, of course, asked about it because by the stage at which

17     he testified, the issue had become clear, which, as we say, was

18     definitely not made clear before the start of this trial.

19             Your Honour, we say those documents show and we have set them out

20     far fuller in our final brief.  First, that the VRS accepted that there

21     needed to be a request before they could have the police resubordinated.

22     We rely on, for example, document 1D641.  Then if Your Honours also look

23     at P1789 and footnote 3076.  The RS MUP themselves refused or restricted

24     requests; for example, P376.  The VRS themselves distinguished between

25     co-ordinated action and resubordination.  It's set out -- the documents

Page 27339

 1     are set out in the footnote to our brief 3066.  And the RS MUP in its

 2     annual report referred specifically to combat activities at the front

 3     line.  If Your Honours note, is P625 at page 8, also 1D406.  And we

 4     invite Your Honours to look at paragraph 237 of the Zupljanin final

 5     brief.

 6             Your Honour, in no document produced at the time is there any

 7     suggestion that in every activity connected with the take-overs or their

 8     aftermath in which the members of the RS MUP were engaged that at all

 9     times and in all places they were not under the authority of their

10     superiors in the MUP, but, rather, resubordinated units who were under

11     the authority of the army.  That suggestion is not made.  And, in fact,

12     it couldn't have been, because, as Your Honours have heard this morning,

13     at the time of take-overs, for example, in Bijeljina and in Zvornik,

14     there was no VRS.  There was no Serb army.  There was only the JNA,

15     which, of course, did engage in those take-overs.

16             Your Honour, some time is spent in both briefs on the question of

17     town commands.  Your Honours will also have seen our submission on that.

18     We say they have almost no bearing at all on the events in this

19     indictment.  Indeed, in Kotor Varos, where apparently some kind of a town

20     command was supposed to be established, and was established, the

21     Crisis Staff was operating throughout the period until November 1992 when

22     the last stronghold of Muslim resistance, Vecici, fell to the Serbs.

23             Your Honour, the last topic on that that I want to deal with

24     are -- is this percentages which the Defence have raised.

25             Your Honours, the accused at various times, have suggested that

Page 27340

 1     80 per cent of the RS MUP was resubordinated at any one time and at one

 2     stage, Mr. Stanisic was suggesting to the government that there was

 3     100 per cent of the MUP engaged in Herzegovina which is the Trebinje CSB

 4     and in Doboj.  Your Honours, we don't have figures from Doboj but we have

 5     figures from the other reports.  And, Your Honours, we've put them up on

 6     the screen, we hope, in an attempt to assist.

 7             Your Honours, the MUP -- sorry.  The Banja Luka year-end report,

 8     P624, and this is the document on which the percentages is put by

 9     Mr. Krgovic, I believe, to Mr. Macar were taken from.  And there they say

10     it should be mentioned that 5034 employees were engaged in combat

11     operations for 114.529 days, and that's the basis of the 80 per cent

12     calculation.  This works out to an average of 23 days of combat per

13     police employee for that nine-month period.  It doesn't indicate -- it

14     just says engaged in combat and it doesn't indicate whether the police

15     were resubordinated during these operations.  We say it's made clear in

16     other documents that resubordination and police involvement in combat are

17     not synonymous.

18             In addition to participating independently in combat operations -

19     and there you have it, Your Honours - the police also made 1.593 reserve

20     on a 39 activity duty police employees available to the Army of Republika

21     Srpska, and we say there's a clear distinction being made there, being

22     made available, being resubordination independently not being

23     resubordination.

24             Your Honour, what we say is that it shows that only 1.632 police

25     officers, both active and reserve, from the CSB Banja Luka area of

Page 27341

 1     responsibility were resubordinated during the -- to the VRS during combat

 2     operations between April and December and the rest them were

 3     participating, whatever that may be, independently but certainly not

 4     resubordinated.

 5             Mr. Krgovic used the CSB's December figures for active and

 6     reserve police within the CSB Banja Luka and we say that those figures

 7     are set out there, 1203 active and 5065 reserve; 31.5 per cent of the

 8     reserve police force and 3.2 of the activity police force during this

 9     period were resubordinated.

10             And if we go to the next slide which deals with Trebinje, which

11     is where Stanisic was apparently saying there were 100 resubordinated,

12     that document which is P169, shows that the participation of active and

13     reserve police within the CSB Trebinje in combat operations varied from

14     month to month.  That's on page 2.  482 officers participated in May.

15     Between 176 and 181 participated in July and August.

16             So based on the October figures for the reserve, which are shown

17     as 530, and active, 192, within CSB Trebinje, that shows 67 per cent in

18     May, 25 in July, and 46 per cent in October.  The report doesn't indicate

19     how they were participating, whether as resubordinated or independently.

20             Your Honours, that's all that we wish to say about

21     resubordination at this stage.

22             Mr. Olmsted is going to say a little about it when he addresses

23     you on the failures tomorrow.

24             Your Honours, may I turn now to the role of Zupljanin.

25             Again, because of the time constraints we are not going to go

Page 27342

 1     through everything that we have said in the brief about him, nor would it

 2     be of assistance, we feel, to Your Honour, who can, as I've always been

 3     told, read documents the way that I can.  We say that the evidence that

 4     Zupljanin knowingly and with intent played a key role in the

 5     implementation of the joint criminal enterprise is overwhelming.  He and

 6     the other CSB chiefs were the intermediate level of authority between the

 7     SJB chiefs and their police who were the actual perpetrators of the

 8     crimes and the RS MUP top echelon.

 9             Now, on his behalf, Your Honours, and this is what we're going to

10     concentrate on, really three aspects of Zupljanin, that is raised by him

11     in the final brief.  It is contended, first, he was never a member of the

12     SDS.  He never attended any of their meetings.  He did not conform to the

13     party line and at one stage was apparently threatened.  Those submissions

14     appear in paragraphs 50, 55, and 104.

15             Second, he was only a member of the ARK Crisis Staff (ex

16     officio) - and I'll come back to that in a minute - for a matter of weeks

17     during May.  And that's paragraph 53.  He never discriminated against

18     non-Serbs; paragraph 15.

19             He had nothing to do with the formation of the special police

20     from the CSB Banja Luka or the absorption into the special police of

21     members of the SOS.

22             He had no authority or control over the actions of the special

23     police.  That's in paragraphs 15 and 171 to 216 inclusive.  He did not

24     order forces to participate in joint operations with the VRS.  All police

25     taking part in joint operations were subordinated.

Page 27343

 1             He knew nothing about the existence of any camps, particularly

 2     those in Prijedor until he was informed by Radulovic a short time before

 3     he attended the 11th of July meeting.

 4             And, finally, if he found out about crimes, he took prompt

 5     action, if he was able to, but, for the most part, he was unaware of

 6     those crimes.

 7             In other words, Your Honours, if one were to accept that

 8     throughout this whole period when Zupljanin was sitting in the CSB

 9     Banja Luka or out and about, as we know that he was, visiting the various

10     areas within his area of responsibility, he was effectively cocooned in a

11     ivory tower because that is what Defence submissions amount to.

12             Can I just then please concentrate on three aspects of what they

13     say.  The first is his relationship with the SDS.  There is no direct

14     evidence, unlike, as we say, in respect of Stanisic, that he was ever a

15     member of the SDS.  But we say it is clear that he shared their ideals

16     and in the multi-party jostling for positions in 1991 he was supported by

17     local SDS leaders; for example, Brdjanin, in his capacity as president of

18     the Celinac SDS.  And that's P1098.12.

19             Witness ST-174 believed that he was a member of the SDS.  At

20     paragraph 58 of the Zupljanin final brief, quotes what he says at

21     transcript page 8135, but entirely omits the previous lines of his

22     testimony and indeed, the statement he made in which he asserted that it

23     was his belief if not his knowledge that Zupljanin was a member of the

24     SDS, and his statement is Exhibit P1098.6.

25             He was undoubtedly in contact with both Karadzic and Plavsic in

Page 27344

 1     1991.  He is described as "our man," and that's in P1178.  And contrary

 2     to what is suggested, Your Honours, that he never attended any meetings

 3     of the SDS, there is strong circumstantial evidence to suggest that he

 4     both attended the Bosnian Serb Assembly on the 26th of January with the

 5     declaration of their state, and the Holiday Inn meeting on the

 6     14th of February.  He definitely attended the Bosnian Serb Assembly in

 7     October of 1992 in Prijedor because he is on video there and that will be

 8     shown to Your Honours later when Mr. Hannis addresses you about Stanisic.

 9             But can I just deal with his attendance at the Bosnian Serb

10     Assemblies.

11             Can we look first, please, at part of P1190.  This is an

12     intercept of a conversation -- in fact, I think it is wrongly titled.

13     Zupljanin doesn't, himself, appear on the conversation.  It's between

14     Cizmovic, described as an unknown male, and Karadzic.  It's on the

15     25th of January and there you will see that Cizmovic and Karadzic the day

16     before the Bosnian-Serb Assembly.

17             "Karadzic:  Will we see each other at the theatre?

18             "Cizmovic:  We will but Stojan is asking if he should say.

19             "Karadzic:  Pardon?

20             "Cizmovic:  Stojan Zupljanin is asking if he should stay.  Should

21     he stay on a for tomorrow?"

22             And Karadzic says:

23             "That would be good."

24             And that would seem to suggest, as we say, that he was there for

25     the 26th of January meeting.

Page 27345

 1             We turn next to the 14th of February.  We say there is no doubt

 2     he was there.

 3             On the 13th of February, Cizmovic again -- can I just remind

 4     Your Honours, Cizmovic was the so-called co-ordinator of the -- if the

 5     regions appointed back in December of 1991 and was actually a Banja Luka

 6     lawyer.  Is, actually, a Banja Luka lawyer.  Cizmovic saying to Karadzic

 7     on the 13th of February:

 8             "Can we meet earlier tomorrow, and Stojan would like to come with

 9     me?

10             "Karadzic:  I hope so.

11             "Cizmovic:  Where should we look for you?  At the headquarters

12     or --

13             "Karadzic:  We'll be there.  We'll have breaks so we'll have an

14     opportunity to get together."

15             This is the meeting which I reminded Your Honours of earlier this

16     morning where Karadzic is describing the negotiations to assemble members

17     of the SDS and the implementation of level two of the Variant A and B

18     instructions.

19             Can we look now, please, at P1353.17.  Those who came from

20     outside the Sarajevo area apparently stayed at the Holiday Inn -- a

21     number of people.  This is one of the receipts, and we say that receipt

22     is that for Mr. Zupljanin.  So we say it is untrue to assert that he

23     never attended any of their meetings.

24             JUDGE HARHOFF:  Is there a date?

25             MS. KORNER:  Is there a?

Page 27346

 1             JUDGE HARHOFF:  A date indicated on the bill.

 2             MS. KORNER:  Yes.  Do you see to the right-hand side,

 3     Your Honour, says arrival 14.2 and departure 15.2.

 4             MR. KRGOVIC:  And we also have wrong translation as well.  It

 5     says Supljanin, not Zupljanin.

 6             MS. KORNER:  I'm sorry.

 7             MR. KRGOVIC:  We also have wrong translation.  It said he is

 8     Supljanin, not Zupljanin.

 9             MS. KORNER:  Yes, well, Your Honours, so that's the -- thank you.

10     We then come to the 2nd of March and the barricades incident in Sarajevo.

11             Could we have look, please, at P981.  This is a conversation

12     between Zupljanin and then Stanisic.  And if we go -- whose called by

13     apparently appears to be his nickname, Stole, and Zupljanin tells him:

14             "We're listens to how things are going over there.  We are

15     waiting for further instructions."

16             Stanisic says:

17             "You are in contact with this policy of yours, aren't you?

18             "All right, now be ready.

19             "For the most part everything is ready on our side.

20             "Yes.

21             Zupljanin:  We are waiting for the sign.  If a total blockade is

22     needed or the rest, it will be done.

23             "Agreed."

24             Now, Your Honours, we say this shows that even if not a formal

25     member of the SDS, he was certainly by March a party to the planning that

Page 27347

 1     was going on, and, indeed, from February at least for the meeting.

 2             Now, the -- his membership of the ARK Crisis Staff.  Now,

 3     Your Honours, even before the announcement of the ARK Crisis Staff, as

 4     Zupljanin was, in fact, attending and reporting to the ARK Assembly.  And

 5     that's P2061.  He is listed as a member of the ARK Crisis Staff on the

 6     document P556, and, indeed, in the gazette that was published of all the

 7     ARK decisions up to June.

 8             Now, the Defence position on his membership of the ARK

 9     Crisis Staff, I think the fairest way of putting this is to say it has

10     vacillated somewhat.  In the pre-trial brief, at paragraphs 18 -- I'm

11     just going to find it.

12             This is the supplementary pre-trial brief that was filed on the

13     31st of July, 2009.  And they say at paragraph 18:

14             "Mr. Zupljanin also takes issue with the allegation that he was

15     an active member of the ARK Crisis Staff and instrumental in the

16     implementation of the alleged plan.  In reality, his role was minor, and

17     he did not have any influence upon the ARK Crisis Staff which was

18     directed and controlled by Radoslav Brdjanin."

19             At paragraphs 25, it is said:

20             "The Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies, and War Presidents," I

21     think they mean war staff, "were interchangable nomenclatures for the

22     same institution."

23             Well interestingly enough, Your Honours, that is not what was

24     being put to Ms. Hanson who testified about this.  What was there being

25     put was that they were completely different institutions.  Indeed, I

Page 27348

 1     think at that stage when this was being dealt with, I actually got up and

 2     asked - it's fair to say it was Mr. Pantelic - whether the suggestion was

 3     by the Defence that there was a totally separate body called a war staff

 4     from the ARK Crisis Staff which was simply Mr. Brdjanin alone without any

 5     participation by Mr. Zupljanin.  Is that the suggestion and the answer

 6     was, Yes, that is my suggestion.

 7             And that is at T4647.

 8             The paragraph 25 of the pre-trial brief, goes on to say:

 9             "Mr. Zupljanin takes issue with the contention that the ARK

10     Crisis Staff issued decisions which were sent to municipal Crisis Staffs

11     and put into effect.  The municipal Crisis Staffs were neither charged to

12     do so nor did they do so, in fact. "

13             Well, as Your Honours will see in the brief now there is a

14     change, because it said not originally but later on the ARK Crisis Staff

15     did have power over the municipal Crisis Staff.

16             And, finally, at paragraph 33 they repeat the suggestion that

17     Mr. Zupljanin's role in that organ was negligible and his acts and

18     conduct did not have any impact on the creation of either orders and

19     discussions or the outcome alleged."

20             Well, Your Honour it is now said that in fact he was only a

21     member of the ARK Crisis Staff for the period of May.  Your Honours,

22     there is -- that's what's asserted.  There is absolutely no evidence at

23     all that that is in fact the situation.  The ARK Crisis Staff went from

24     May until the 17th of July, and there's nothing to suggest that Zupljanin

25     as various witnesses have attested did attend those meetings of the

Page 27349

 1     Crisis Staff as a member.

 2             Your Honour, the words ex officio are used in both of the

 3     accused's briefs.  My understanding or our understanding of ex officio is

 4     that by virtue of the characteristics inherent in the holding of a

 5     particular office you hold an appointment without need of specific

 6     authorisation or specific appointment.

 7             In the case of the SJB chiefs, and Zupljanin, they were on the

 8     Crisis Staffs by direction of the government.  Can we look brief, please,

 9     at P70, this is Djeric's order.  The Crisis Staff consists of members,

10     each of whom has his own responsibilities:  The president, et cetera

11     et cetera, head of the MUP.

12             It is not clear either, Your Honours may think, why -- whether it

13     was by order or ex officio, it makes the slightest difference.  These SJB

14     chiefs, these MUP chiefs were participating in the Crisis Staff for the

15     reason that the Bosnian Serb leadership saw the Crisis Staffs as the best

16     means of achieving their ends by their co-ordinating factor between the

17     military, political which had the goals, the police and the military who

18     carried them out.

19             Your Honour, the ARK Crisis Staff, as we say, operated between

20     6th of May and the 17th July.  That was the vital period for the actions

21     that took place within the Autonomous Region of Krajina.  Contrary to

22     what is asserted in paragraph 114 of the Zupljanin brief, the Assembly of

23     the autonomous region did not meet between April and July of 1992.  It

24     met on the 17th of July, when it verified most, if not all, of the ARK

25     Crisis Staff decisions, and that's P1827.

Page 27350

 1             Moreover, whether called the Crisis Staff, or the war staff or

 2     the War Presidency, the composition remained the same, and everybody

 3     called it the Crisis Staff including the people on it.  Your Honours saw

 4     briefly a part of the clip of the video P204.  Can we just look at the

 5     earlier part where we see the interviews, please, of three of the major

 6     players in the Kotor Varos action.

 7                           [Video-clip played]

 8             MS. KORNER:  Could we pause for a moment.  Sorry.

 9             Your Honours, can I just pause there to note that certainly

10     Lieutenant-Colonel Peulic, who is being interviewed there, is

11     distinguishing between the units of the MUP and the units of the army.

12             Yes.  Next clip, please.

13                           [Video-clip played]

14             MS. KORNER:  Yes.  Your Honours, there we see the three

15     components together:  The army, the political, and the police in the

16     Autonomous Region of Krajina acting together, on the ground, to take over

17     Kotor Varos and rid themselves of those who did not wish to accept Serb

18     control.

19             Your Honours, the importance of Zupljanin's presence on the ARK

20     Crisis Staff can be seen from some of the matters that were discussed in

21     the meetings.

22             Could we have up, please, P441.

23             First of all, we see the decision on the formation of the

24     Crisis Staff.  The war staff as printed -- the -- shall be and we see

25     Zupljanin.  The other members were, of course, Talic, Stevandic, and

Page 27351

 1     other persons whom Your Honours have heard about.

 2             Then can we go, please, to the next decision.  This is the --

 3     of --  we haven't got the date up, have we.  I think it's April of...

 4     just a moment.  No, it must be the beginning of May.  I'm sorry,

 5     Your Honours, we should have put the date onto this.

 6             I've got it here.  It's -- the first document was the 5th of May,

 7     and this one is -- yes, it's the 11th of May, Your Honour, I'm sorry.

 8             The deadline of the surrender of weapons who will be dealing with

 9     the -- what happens after the deadline.  The weapons will be confiscated

10     by employees of the Security Services Centre.

11             Obviously important that the chief of the

12     Security Services Centre was there to discuss with the other members of

13     the Crisis Staff whether that was possible and whether they should be

14     doing it.

15             Then, next, Your Honour, can we look at the 13th of May.  On the

16     16th of the May a delegation consisting of Kupresanin; Erceg; Brdjanin;

17     Radic; Sajic, who was the national defence secretariat; Zupljanin; and

18     others to hold talks in Knin with representatives of the RSK in

19     establishing links in information and the economy.

20             And then:

21             "The security services in Banja Luka is to fully implement the

22     decisions of the Crisis Staff on the disarming ..."

23             Can we look, please, at the next clip.  This is the 18th of May.

24     A delegation.  Again, Kupresanin, Erceg, Sajic, and Zupljanin to go to

25     Pale and hold talks on defining the territory towards Semberija.

Page 27352

 1             I think that's all that I need.  Thank you.

 2             Your Honours, Zupljanin himself was fully aware of the importance

 3     of the ARK Crisis Staff as the co-ordinating body for the establishment

 4     of the Serb state.

 5             Can we have a brief look, please, at P367.

 6             And, Your Honours, this is the meeting that took place on the 6th

 7     of May.  In fact, it wasn't -- the report or the document recording it

 8     not produced until the 20th of May.  And it contains a number of themes

 9     which we say are important when you consider Zupljanin's authority.

10             "All my orders conveyed orally, as well those I may forward by

11     dispatch, must be carried out.  They are your law."

12             And then goes on about the chain of command.

13             "In all our activities, we are obliged to observe all measures

14     and apply all procedures ordered by the Crisis Staff of the autonomous

15     region."

16             And then disarmament:  "We ... take no action until the Crisis

17     Staff makes the relevant decisions.  It is ... important that we solve

18     the problem comprehensively."

19             Your Honour, again, we see over and over again in the documents

20     produced at the time that, as far as was possible, there was to be a

21     comprehensive and collaborative solution to the problems.

22             And finally this, Your Honour, which goes onto deal with the next

23     topic that I want to cover:  "The chief of the CSB informed the members

24     of the ... council that he ..."  not the army, "he had established a

25     special counter-sabotage and counter-terrorist police unit of about

Page 27353

 1     150 ... The unit is made up of both active and reserve police and persons

 2     who fought on ... Slavonia battle-fronts.  The unit is equipped with the

 3     most up-to-date combat equipment.  Its founding will be celebrated in

 4     Banja Luka at a special ceremony marking security forces day on Tuesday,

 5     12 May."

 6             Your Honour, for some reason, this has become of some importance

 7     in respect of Mr. Stanisic because, to be fair, there's been some

 8     confusion about it, largely because of the Glas article on the parade,

 9     which was dated the 14th, seemed to refer back to the 13th.  But every

10     other document in this case, including the video of the parade, shows

11     that it took place on the 12th in the late afternoon after the Serb

12     Assembly this concluded.  Stanisic in his final brief asserts that it

13     took place on the 13th and that he drove there and back again.

14             Your Honours, however, there we have, in one short document, all

15     these themes, as it were.

16             And, Your Honours, we say, and we've set it out again in our

17     brief, that the decisions made by the ARK Crisis Staff, in particular

18     those relating to disarmament and dismissals, were forwarded by Zupljanin

19     for action to his subordinate SJBs.

20             Your Honours, may I then move to the special police and/or the

21     SOS.

22             Your Honours, the evidence of Zupljanin's participation in the

23     formation of forces used to implement the common plan, his command and

24     his control of those forces, the crimes committed by those forces, is

25     fully set out in our final brief.  We say it is the strongest possible

Page 27354

 1     evidence, and the Defence attempts to negate it through the final brief -

 2     this is the Zupljanin final brief - through selective, we say, quotation,

 3     and omission demonstrates just how powerful it is.

 4             At paragraph 172 of the Zupljanin final brief starts in its

 5     recital of facts on the special police with the ARK decision of the 27th

 6     of April.  It utterly omits Zupljanin's announcement of the formation of

 7     the special police on the 15th of April.  That was an announcement made

 8     to Glas newspaper, and it's P542.

 9             It is asserted in the brief that the SOS was brought into to the

10     special police against Zupljanin's wishes and completely as a result of

11     negotiations between the army and the SOS.

12             Could we have up for a moment, please, P552.

13             This, again, is an article of an interview -- an article in Glas

14     containing an interview with Zupljanin, and he states:

15             "As to ... SOS, which were placed upped the jurisdiction of the

16     Security Services Centre by the ... Assembly decision, Zupljanin said ...

17     a large number of these units' members, being reliable and experienced

18     fighters, would be tested for engagement in the special detachment, while

19     others would be assigned to the reserve police and the Krajina TO.  The

20     SOS would thus virtually cease to exist."

21             And P560, please.

22             This is Glas interviewing Zupljanin on the 12th of May and

23     actually asking him a question about the special detachment.  And what he

24     has said -- sorry.  What he says is this, that:  This will be an elite

25     unit," middle of the -- "... equipped with combat vehicles, helicopters

Page 27355

 1     and other contemporary equipment and weaponry."

 2             And so on and so forth.

 3             "If it is necessary for the detachment to fight together with the

 4     army, it will be made available."

 5             Now, it virtually beggars belief how it can be asserted in the

 6     light of all the evidence that this was an army unit that had no

 7     connection with or was under the control of Zupljanin and, indeed, that

 8     was resubordinated.  Then he talks again about the parade on Tuesday.

 9     Or --and then he said:  "This is the first time that Security --"

10             Can we have the -- I think it's the -- that's it.  Oh, well.

11     Your Honours can see the whole article, in any event; P560.

12             Now, Your Honours, the crimes -- actually, just a couple of the

13     intercepts.  Yes, sorry.

14             I'm skipping something.  Sorry.

15             Your Honours, the identification, the IDs of the special police,

16     were signed by Zupljanin.  That's in 2D72 at page 9.  Your Honours, at

17     paragraph 174 of the final brief for the -- for Zupljanin, it is said

18     that -- and for most of what is said, they rely on the evidence of

19     Witness SZ-02.  I can't remember whether he was in closed session or not

20     so I'll just stick to it.  That although they may have formally appeared

21     to be police officers because they were issued IDs by CSB Banja Luka, in

22     essence, they were a military unit.

23             Again, Your Honour, at the time, Your Honours may have thought,

24     the -- the -- the logic behind this is not apparent, why the IDs should

25     have been signed for by Zupljanin for a unit that had nothing whatsoever

Page 27356

 1     to do with him.

 2             In paragraph 79, when dealing with why Zupljanin made the request

 3     for the military to provide the arms that he talks about and the

 4     equipment, it is said this was merely for logical -- sorry.

 5     "... logistical expedience as the structures were in place at the CSB as

 6     a regional centre to facilitate the delivery of such equipment."

 7             Now, leaving aside that there is not one iota of evidence that

 8     was why the request was made, how was it logistically more expedient for

 9     the army to take its equipment from its own headquarters in Banja Luka

10     and transport them over to the CSB for a unit that was going to be a

11     military unit?  As I say, it defeats all logical thought.

12             Your Honours, the 12th of May parade.  Your Honours, we say, it's

13     absolutely clear from the evidence you've already seen that it took place

14     on the 12th of May.  And, Your Honours, there's one other piece of

15     evidence which deals with that which we'd like Your Honours to this time

16     listen to.  It's an intercept.  It's P1124.  And it is dealt with in the

17     brief for Zupljanin as follows.  We say this intercept again goes to a

18     number of different themes.

19             The -- paragraph 61 says:  "The Prosecution's probable reliance

20     on Zupljanin's intercepted conversation with Cedo Kljajic on the 7th of

21     May to try and depict Zupljanin's character as anti-Muslim is far from

22     the mark."

23             This is when they're asserting that some of his best friends were

24     non-Serbs.

25             "It is clear from the conversation that they ..." that is,

Page 27357

 1     Kljajic and Zupljanin "... enjoyed a personal friendship, and this is

 2     reflected in the jovial and sarcastic comments recorded.  The jokes in

 3     that conversation were, no doubt, in poor taste, but they were made in

 4     jest and were undoubtedly a response to the unique strains both

 5     individuals were labouring under at the time."

 6             Leaving aside there's no evidence of what strain, if any, either

 7     of these two men were labouring under, we think that Your Honours might

 8     like to hear some of the conversation as they spoke it.

 9             It's fair to say the microphone was obviously in Kljajic's office

10     and Zupljanin is fainter.

11             And that, may I say, Your Honours, on -- what you see on the

12     screen is a still from the parade which we'll look at it.  Zupljanin in

13     front; Kljuc behind.

14                           [Intercept played]

15             MS. KORNER:  Next.

16                           [Intercept played]

17             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, looking at the conversation, you may

18     think that the humour of what they were discussing is not apparent.

19             Would Your Honours forgive me just one moment.

20                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

21             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, we invite Your Honours to read through

22     the whole transcript because there we see, we've only -- because it takes

23     a little longer to play it, there is conversation about what should be

24     done in Sarajevo, with Zupljanin indicating what he thinks ought to be

25     done, and that's at pages 4 and 5 of the intercept.  And, at the end,

Page 27358

 1     there's a conversation about the Banja Luka parade.  This is the 7th of

 2     May.  Cedo Kljajic is invited by Zupljanin and the minister, and the

 3     question is whether the minister can fly, and there's a discussion about

 4     helicopters.

 5             And there's also a long discussion with Serbian members of the

 6     MUP, of the new MUP, who are not doing what they ought to be doing.

 7             Can we now look, please, at the -- some of the video from the

 8     parade, which is P1393.

 9             Your Honours will see on the screen it's clearly the 12th of May,

10     and the part of the speeches that were made.

11                           [Video-clip played]

12             MS. KORNER:  You may have missed that.  There's the date that

13     comes up on the screen.

14                           [Video-clip played]

15             MS. KORNER:  Pause.  We will see identification later.  We

16     haven't -- we have identified some of the other participants, but that is

17     behind Zupljanin, Cedo Kljajic appearing and disappearing, with the

18     moustache.

19                           [Video-clip played]

20             MS. KORNER:  We do see the 12th there.

21                           [Video-clip played]

22             MS. KORNER:  This is the end of the Bosnian Serb Assembly.  We

23     see Zupljanin saying this speech.  While we're waiting for that.

24                           [Video-clip played]

25             MS. KORNER:  Your Honours, there is going to be identification of

Page 27359

 1     the various people in a minute.

 2                           [Video-clip played]

 3             MS. KORNER:  Your Honour, well, I say that.  The version I saw

 4     stopped the film at various points, and you saw the various participants

 5     identified.  Maybe it's this part.

 6                           [Video-clip played]

 7             MS. KORNER:  All right.  I think -- can we just ... we'll have to

 8     re-play this clip.

 9                           [Video-clip played]

10             MS. KORNER:  Can we go back to -- I'm sorry I'm taking the time,

11     but I think we need to do this.

12                           [Video-clip played]

13             MS. KORNER:  Well, there had to be one moment when techniques

14     went wrong.

15             Your Honours, can I -- we'll come back to that once

16     Mr. van Hooydonk has found the right bit.

17             Your Honours, as far as the special police are concerned, we say

18     that the crimes committed by the special police were well documented,

19     particularly in Kotor Varos.

20             Your Honours, in paragraphs 193 to 5, the Defence - the Zupljanin

21     final brief - as I say, heavily criticise Mr. Brown for what Your Honours

22     may recall was a misunderstanding between a document that was issued by

23     the 1st Krajina Corps at the beginning of July, which Mr. Brown,

24     admittedly helped along unfortunately by me, assumed related back to the

25     killings outside the health centre in June.  And he is heavily

Page 27360

 1     criticised.  It's described somewhat slangily in paragraph 193 as

 2     scuppered by the -- by the Prosecution expert Brown.  And, Your Honours,

 3     it is suggested that Brown agreed that there had not been a killing

 4     outside the health centre.  That -- if Your Honours read the relevant

 5     evidence of Mr. Brown, you will see that is -- couldn't be further from

 6     the case.  He accepted that he had misread the 1st Krajina Corps

 7     document, which related, apparently, as it says, to the killings of some

 8     special police, which took place later, quite clearly.  But the killings

 9     outside the health centre, contrary to the Defence assertion - I'm not

10     altogether clear whether they actually mean it - did take place and,

11     indeed, the witness who survived the killings, who saw them, was never

12     cross-examined on the basis that those killings did not take place.

13             Your Honours, as far as the remainder of the evidence is

14     concerned which shows Zupljanin's control over the special police, he

15     ordered their release from custody.  All that's said in the pre-trial

16     brief is he didn't order that they weren't to be prosecuted.  Well,

17     Your Honours can deal with that one, I'm sure.  He did all that he could

18     in August to prevent them being disbanded.  And, Your Honours, finally,

19     we say, the Defence undermines its whole argument on this whole matter,

20     because in paragraphs 200 and 201, they say this.  And this is the first

21     sentence:

22             "The Defence maintains that when Zupljanin was made aware of

23     accusations against the special police he (notwithstanding his lack of

24     authority over the unit) refused to allow such allegations to go

25     unaddressed."

Page 27361

 1             In other words, he went -- says the Defence, this wasn't a unit

 2     over which he had any control.  It was a military unit, but given,

 3     however arduous his task, were controlling those who were under his

 4     commend, he went out of his way to try and address their crimes.  And we

 5     say that, in itself, undermines everything.

 6             Now I don't know if we are in a position to play -- yes,

 7     Your Honours, we are.  If we could just look ...

 8                           [Video-clip played]

 9             MS. KORNER:  Yes, Your Honours, I think -- although there was

10     more, I think that will suffice.

11             Your Honours, we say there was the classic bringing together

12     again of all the components to the joint criminal enterprise.

13             Your Honour, the reality, we say, is this.  One uses the modern

14     word, "a reality check."  Zupljanin, the evidence shows, conformed and

15     controlled the special police, the CSB Banja Luka special police.  It was

16     his own personal contribution, additional to the RS MUP members he

17     already controlled through his position to the forces which implemented

18     the take-overs.  Your Honours, that the police took part in the

19     take-overs, as you've heard, is clear, from the witness testimony and

20     from the reports prepared by the MUP themselves.

21             Your Honour, finally, can I deal with the question of detention

22     facilities and Zupljanin, because we cover this aspect very fully in the

23     final brief.  But the assertions are made in the Zupljanin final brief

24     that all detention facilities were the responsibility of the army as the

25     MUP was not allowed to guard them.  I've already dealt with the missing

Page 27362

 1     logical progression in that.

 2             That Zupljanin was unaware of their existence until shortly

 3     before July the 11th meeting.  That's paragraph 299.  And that he took an

 4     initiative to form a commission and accordingly was instrumental in the

 5     closure of Omarska and Keraterm.  That is paragraphs 286 and 312.

 6             Your Honours, in the light of that, it's necessary, very shortly,

 7     to rehearse some of the evidence.  We say that that evidence shows that

 8     the incarceration of the non-Serbs in these camps and the subsequent

 9     removal from the area was a primary method of achieving the objective of

10     the Bosnian Serb plan.  Of the 22 detention facilities, as Mr. Demirdjian

11     has already shown you, that were listed -- are listed in the indictment,

12     only one of them was under the jurisdiction of the VRS, but it was the

13     police, as Your Honours know, who brought the majority of the prisoners

14     to Manjaca, Kljuc, and Sanski Most in particular.  They took part in the

15     interrogations and the classifications in Manjaca.  So they or -- and

16     guarded some of the facilities.  So although it was a military camp run

17     by Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic, the police, too, had an input into that.

18             Your Honour, when Omarska was established in May, Drljaca sent a

19     copy of his order about Omarska to the CSB in Banja Luka.  That is P1560.

20     So it is really not possible for Zupljanin to say that he was unaware of

21     the establishment of these camps.  On 13th of June, Drljaca wrote to

22     Zupljanin complaining about the treatment being meted out by the special

23     police.  Your Honours, that's P659.

24             Your Honour, it is very interesting that Drljaca, who is supposed

25     to be this rogue, this person over Zupljanin, had no control, virtually

Page 27363

 1     is one of the more assiduous reporters of matters to Zupljanin of any of

 2     the SJB chiefs.

 3             By June, Radulovic was warning his superiors in the SNB that the

 4     International Committee of the Red Cross was really exhibiting increasing

 5     interest in visiting the collection centres.  That's P1391.  So, again,

 6     that's before he actually spoke to Zupljanin about it.

 7             And in June, the same month, Muslim representatives held a

 8     meeting with General Talic about what was going on in Banja Luka.  The

 9     persecutions and the delegation facilities.  That's P459.19.  And there

10     they complain to General Talic.  And General Talic, at the end of that

11     meeting, if we can perhaps go to the next slide -- no, sorry.  I thought

12     it was on there.  But, in fact, he tells them he will write to Zupljanin

13     about the other collection centres over which the army has no control.

14             Your Honours, at the July 11 meeting, it is said in the -- in

15     the -- in the brief, that, "as a result of his submissions at that

16     meeting, conditions improved and Prijedor was eventually closed down."

17             If one looks, please, very briefly at page 7 his actual intent is

18     that the army and Crisis Staffs or War Presidencies are requesting that

19     as many Muslims as possible are gathered, and they are leaving these

20     undefined camps up to the internal affairs organs.

21             And he goes on to say -- at no stage does he say, This is all the

22     army, and we should insist that these camps are closed down.

23             Your Honour, from the moment, in fact, that the camps became

24     known to the international community, the MUP tried to shift

25     responsibility to the army, and you will see that in P1818.

Page 27364

 1             Now, Your Honours, not once in the final brief is there any

 2     mention that, in fact, as everybody knows, the reason that these camps

 3     were closed down was the visit by international reporters, and to assert,

 4     as Zupljanin asserts, that it was his action at the 11th of July which

 5     was responsible and, indeed, his subsequent commission, Your Honours, is,

 6     again, we say, without any foundation at all.  Indeed, by the time the

 7     internationals got there on the 6th of August, Keraterm had already been

 8     closed, and most of the Omarska prisoners, as we saw in that clip, had

 9     been moved to Trnopolje.  Before that happened, Zupljanin had visited

10     Omarska had no less than two occasions.

11             And, Your Honour, the report, the commission report which covers

12     only three out of the municipalities [sic] under his control, which, on

13     his order, had to be completed in three days, Your Honours may think was

14     nothing more than a whitewash.  That report being P602.

15             Your Honours, obviously, we've had to allocate the time, and I've

16     reached the end of what we say about Zupljanin.

17             The Defence rely -- when I say what we say about Zupljanin,

18     obviously we have had a great deal more to say in what we wrote.

19             The Defence rely very heavily on the document that he sent on the

20     30th of July where he was apparently saying that the police should not be

21     taking orders from Crisis Staffs and the like.  Your Honours will look at

22     the document.  It's 2D25.  And you may think that if the reason for

23     sending it is possibly quite clear, that there were a lot of complaints

24     coming about -- from the Serbs themselves about the behaviour of the

25     police, and it was a document, we suggest when you read the whole thing,

Page 27365

 1     is no more than, as it were, shifting responsibility.  There's no clear

 2     instruction given.  There's no resume of what it is in -- in detail that

 3     they are complaining about.

 4             And the one document perhaps that we should look at is one that

 5     he sent on the 20th of July to the MUP headquarters, which, needless to

 6     say, I don't think I have made a note of.  But, Your Honours, it's -- no,

 7     I haven't -- I'll have to come back to that and I'll mention that

 8     tomorrow.

 9             Your Honours, finally on the question of intent, the Defence say

10     that Zupljanin was never heard to say anything discriminatory against

11     non-Serbs.  In fact, the theme that comes out very strongly from a number

12     of witnesses who spoke to Zupljanin and complained to him about what was

13     happening was effectively there was nothing he could do.  Well,

14     Your Honours, he wasn't a Brdjanin, he wasn't a Vukic, he wasn't a

15     Kalinic.  He didn't use words in the way that they did to drive out those

16     who were terrified.  But we say if you look at his actions, they have no

17     other explanation but of his whole-hearted endorsement of, and mixing

18     with, involvement in, the Bosnian Serb plan.

19             Your Honours, we've got five minutes, but whether it is worth

20     Mr. Hannis starting, I don't know.

21             JUDGE HALL:  [Microphone not activated] ...

22             Before we take the adjournment for the day, with regard to the

23     Prosecution's request seeking leave to file a written motion to address

24     what it argues are errors of law in the Defence trial briefs, the Trial

25     Chamber notes that the Prosecution has had an opportunity to make its

Page 27366

 1     submissions on the law in its final trial brief.  Moreover, the Chamber

 2     has granted the parties an additional hour for their closing arguments,

 3     in order to give the parties more time to attend to what was raised in

 4     the final trial briefs.

 5             For these reasons, the Chamber denies the Prosecution's request.

 6             So we take the adjournment until 9.00 tomorrow morning.

 7                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.44 p.m.,

 8                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 30th day of May,

 9                           2012, at 9.00 a.m.