The two remaining fugitives must be brought in to the Tribunal’s custody and stand trial for the crimes they are alleged to have committed.

The Tribunal is committed to doing everything within its powers to ensure that these persons face justice and do not evade the rule of law.

Ratko Mladić Charged with: • Genocide • Complicity in Genocide • Crimes against Humanity • Violations of the Laws or Customs of War

Goran Hadžić Charged with: • Crimes Against Humanity • Violations of the Laws or Customs of War

Latest poster of ICTY Accused at large

The Tribunal continues to strive to see that the most wanted fugitive, the Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Mladić is arrested and transferred to The Hague to face the catalogue of charges against him for his role in the crimes that took place during the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Tribunal is deeply concerned that Ratko Mladić has continued to evade justice despite continuous calls for his arrest since indictments were issued against him in 1995. He has been on the run for 13 years.
Ratko Mladić is charged with:

• the direct involvement in the genocide committed after the fall of Srebrenica in July 1995;
• the killing of close to 8,000 men and boys following the fall of this enclave;
• the terror inflicted upon civilians during the 1992-1995 siege of Sarajevo;
• the widespread campaign of persecutions, deportation, torture and murders during 1992 in large parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including infamous detention camps like Omarska, Keraterm, Manjača and Trnopolje in northwestern Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A political leader of the Serb entity in Croatia during the mid-nineties, he is charged with a number of crimes committed in eastern Slavonia:

• the murder and persecution of the Croat and non-Serb civilian population;
• the prolonged imprisonment of civilians in detention facilities where torture, beatings and killing was not uncommon;
• the forcible transfer of tens of thousands of non-Serbs from across the area under his control.

Who should make the arrests?

Unlike national systems, the Tribunal has no police force and no powers of arrest. It remains reliant on the cooperation of other agencies - notably national governments, and the international forces based in the region - to arrest all remaining fugitives.

Under UN Security Council resolutions and the Tribunal’s Statute, member states are obliged to cooperate unconditionally and to comply with requests for assistance and orders of the Tribunal. Over the years, the Tribunal’s President has reported States’ non-cooperation to the Security Council on several occasions, particularly with regard to Serbia’s failure to arrest and transfer accused persons.

An unforeseen success rate after early problems

First Poster of ICTY Fugitives, issued by NATO in January 1996

The issue of fugitives and how they may be apprehended and made to stand trial has been a major challenge to the organisation and to international justice as a whole. In the Tribunal’s early years the significant number of fugitives and small number of persons actually in custody threatened to stymie the courts. But, despite recurring difficulties over the years the Tribunal entered its final phase with an impressive record on securing that those persons accused stand trial and do not escape justice. By the summer of 2008 only two persons from a total of 161 persons indicted remained fugitives. It was a long and often difficult struggle but the end results have been an unforeseen success.

In its earliest years the Tribunal faced serious obstacles in securing the arrest and transfer of fugitives. States such as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the Republic of Croatia, refused to search for, detain or transfer persons indicted to stand trial in The Hague. Indeed, in many instances the authorities provided protection from arrest to fugitives and generally showed blatant contempt for the tribunal’s orders. International troops stationed in Bosnia and Herzegovina were also not willing to take action to arrest accused persons. By mid 1997 more than 50 fugitives were at large – mostly in Serbia and the Serb-dominated portion of Bosnia and Herzegovina - and as few as eight suspects actually detained in The Hague.

The situation with fugitives improved markedly following the introduction by the prosecutor in late 1996 of sealed indictments – in which, just as in national systems, the name of suspects were not publicised prior to arrest. Additionally, the preparedness from mid-1997 onwards of multi-national peacekeeping agencies such a SFOR (the Stabilization Force) in Bosnia and Herzegovina to arrest suspects greatly increased the numbers sent to stand trial in The Hague. Such arrests also prompted many fugitives to surrender voluntarily rather than face such a prospect themselves.

By around 2000 a number of factors, including changed political circumstances in Serbia and Croatia, led to better cooperation with regard to the arrest of fugitives. Many fugitives continued to reside in these states but the number was diminishing. The high-profile arrest and transfer of former Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milošević in June 2001 was a significant development, but other high-profile accused, such as the Serbian President Milan Milutinović, continued to live and work freely in Serbia.

Throughout the period 2004-2005 a blend of shifting political circumstances in the region and substantial pressure from the international community demanding full cooperation with the Tribunal (which became a crucial pre-condition for joining the European Union) led to numerous voluntary surrenders or arrests.

However, the remaining fugitives, some of whom had been hiding for more than a decade, still presented a great challenge. The ICTY Prosecutor publicly expressed her frustration at the insufficient cooperation of both domestic and international actors and called on them to take concerted action to find the indictees who remained at large.

The arrest of one of the Tribunal’s most high profile fugitives, Ante Gotovina in 2005 displayed a well coordinated effort between the Tribunal’s Prosecution and the Croatian authorities. His extensive network of support was targeted and he was traced and located in Spain. This successful operation which led to his arrest and subsequent transfer to the Tribunal jurisdiction illustrated that even a well protected, well financed and well connected fugitive is not beyond the reach of justice when there is clear political will of state authorities to cooperate fully with the Tribunal.

Similarly, the arrest of Radovan Karadžić - the war-time President of Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, alleged to be one of the architects of the bloody Bosnian conflict, was a result of a successful operation by the Serbian authorities. In relation to Karadzic’s arrest, Prosecutor Brammertz stated, “… I would like to congratulate the Serbian authorities, especially the National Security Council, Serbia’s Action Team in charge of tracking fugitives and the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor, on achieving this milestone in cooperation with the ICTY.”

Ultimately, arrests are the responsibility of state authorities and largely beyond the control of the Tribunal – The Office of the Prosecutor has a small tracking team which collects information about the fugitives’ whereabouts, but any actual searches or arrests have to be conducted by government agencies in the relevant countries. The Prosecution has repeatedly pointed to Belgrade as holding the key to the arrest of most fugitives.

Looking Ahead

In a recent speech the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon addressed the frustration facing the Tribunal and expressed solidarity stating the following; “I know that there is a sense of frustration for not being able to complete what the ICTY is mandated to because of non-cooperation, non-availability of those people indicted”. He added that, “this is a matter to be closely coordinated and consulted with the members of the Security Council”.

The Tribunal recognises that without the arrest and trial of the remaining fugitives the Tribunal’s key objective to contribute to the cementing of peace in the region of the former Yugoslavia can never be completely achieved.

It is clear these fugitives must face justice. The Tribunal is continuing to request that the Security Council send a strong message that they will not be allowed to wait out international justice. The Security Council must make clear that the trial of these fugitives does not hinge on the Tribunal’s completion strategy dates.